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TELEVISION NEWS AS A SOURCE OF POLITICAL
INFORMATION: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF
"CBS EVENING NEWS WITH WALTER CRONKITE"
COVERING THE PERIOD OF
SEPTEMBER 1, 1970, TO OCTOBER 15, 1971

A Dissertation Presented

By

Peter Edmond Poor

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

April

1975

Political Science

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
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Dr. Glen Gordon, Chairman
Department of Political Science

April 1975

This dissertation is fondly dedicated
to my late parents. The final product
is as much an extension of them --
as it is of me.

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

I would like to thank the many people who have helped in the writing of this dissertation. Many people in the Political Science Department have been tremendously valuable because they were concerned with both me as a person and my research. They were there when I needed them and I really appreciated it.

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To the other Members of my Committee, Dr. Phillip B. Coulter and Dr. Timothy P. Meyer, who were also there when I needed them;

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and finally,

To My wife, Susan, who suffered and agonized through this as much as I did. Her support and help can never be measured, but it will always be thoroughly appreciated.

Television News As A Source of Political
Information: A Content Analysis of
"CBS Evening News With Walter Cronkite"
Covering The Period of September 1, 1970,
to October 15, 1971 (April 1975)

Peter E. Poor, B.A., Rhode Island College

M.A., University of Rhode Island,

Directed by: Dr. John H. Fenton

Television has an obvious relevance to the study of political behavior. Television has been cited as the major source of information for most Americans. It has also been cited as the most credible source. Thus, it seems quite apparent that television has some important influences and effects on political attitudes, public opinion, and political behavior. The problem is that we do not understand the political effects of television. In order to understand the political effects of television news, it is first necessary to document and understand the content of television news. An important problem here is that there have been no systematic attempts to analyze television news over an extended period.

This study, a systematic content analysis of CBS Evening News With Walter Cronkite, seeks to fill the existing void. The analysis covers the period of September, 1970, to October 15, 1971. The analysis used xeroxed copies of transcripts. The analysis involved a multi-state process. First, an index of each broadcast was constructed. Second, a frequency distribution coding form was constructed,

and each news story was coded according to the relevant variables. Third, the results of the quantitative analysis were tabulated and analyzed. Fourth, subject areas for the qualitative analysis were selected, coding rules were established, and a qualitative coding form was constructed. Fifth, the selected areas were analyzed and the results tabulated. Sixth, a reliability test was conducted.

The Findings:

The following are some of the general findings. First, CBS covered many news stories superficially rather than emphasizing depth of coverage. The average broadcast had 27.35 news stories with most of these (75.61%) being "Events" or news stories read by the commentator. Second, CBS News basically presented political news. Almost 75% of the news stories fell into this category. Third, most (71%) of CBS News involved the United States. Fourth, United States political news was dominated by coverage of the national government which constituted almost 67% of the news stories. Fifth, the Executive branch dominated coverage of the national government. Almost 63% of the news stories of the national government involved the Executive branch. Sixth, almost half (46%) of the news stories of the Executive branch involved coverage of the Bureaucracy. Seventh, the Senate dominated coverage of Congress. The Senate accounted for slightly over 67% of congressional news stories. Eighth, with United States news, the "Political" and "Social" Policy

Issues accounted for over 46% of the United States political news.

This study also involved a qualitative analysis of the following subject areas: 1) Vietnam Battle Deaths, 2) Reactions To The Conviction of Lt. Calley, 3) The Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee Hearings on Freedom of the Press, 4) The Son Tay Prison Raid, 5) Campaign 1970, and 6) Domestic Support and Opposition Towards the Vietnam War.

While each subject area was analyzed, only the general patterns of coverage will be listed. Even though they might not pertain to each subject area, they were prevalent enough to justify inclusion. The basic patterns of coverage documented were: 1) Inaccurate Reflection of Reality, 2) Unbalanced Coverage, 3) Qualitatively Unbalanced Coverage, 4) Dominance of Executive Branch, 5) Balancing of Unequals, 6) Seeking Out Opinion, 7) Creating and Determining Issues, 8) Absence of Issues in Campaign Reporting, 9) Institutional Bias, 10) Subjective Role of the Reporter, and 11) Coverage of a Nonentity.

These were all forms of "bias" found in those subjects which were qualitatively analyzed. The study concludes with a discussion of the complexity of bias as an operational concept. It is argued that instead of just one form of bias, there are many forms. Bias, therefore, is a multi-faceted concept.

This study basically documented the content and the kinds of information presented by CBS Evening News during

an extended period. It is only a beginning, however, towards the greater task--that of understanding the political effects of television news.

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C H A P T E R I

INTRODUCTION

Content of the Research

While not the main focus of contemporary political science, the field of public opinion still remains an area in need of more comprehensive analysis and understanding. This is true today considering the degree to which people talk about the polarized state of public opinion. This is also true considering the lack of understanding of the effects of television, especially television news, on public opinion and political attitudes. Today, television is cited as the major source of political information. Since people primarily get their political, or politically related, information from television, it stands to reason that television could quite possibly have a very important influence on the formation and change of public opinion and political attitudes. In fact, television might be very much related to the degree of polarity which exists today. However, it is extremely difficult to estimate the potential or real effect of television on public opinions and political attitudes. No substantial research exists that either documents the content of television news or analyzes the possible effects of television news on public opinion. Thus, it is the contention of this proposal that there is a justifiable

need to understand the effects of television news on public opinion and political attitudes. And, it is a basic contention that in order to understand the possible effects of television news on public opinion, it is necessary first to examine and analyze the nature and content of television news. Without a full understanding of the content of television news, there can be nothing but speculation as to the possible effects on public opinion and political attitudes.

In order to understand the state of research of the effects of television news on public opinion, it is best to briefly review the field of public opinion. This will help to demonstrate why there has been so little attention paid to the possible effects of television on public opinion. The study and analysis of public opinion usually consists of four perspectives. The first is basically theoretical. Here, the emphasis is usually on the role public opinion either does, or ought to, play in a democracy.¹ The second perspective concentrates on the opinion process itself, basically emphasizing factors involved in the formation of opinion. Within this perspective such factors as the family, schools, groups, opinion leaders, and the mass media are

¹See Bernard Berelson, and Morris Janowitz (Ed.) Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, 2nd Ed. (New York: Free Press, 1966), Chapters 1 and 9; Bernard C. Hennessy, Public Opinion, 2nd Edition (Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1970), Chapter 2, 8; V.O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion And American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), Chapter 21.

examined to determine their influence or effect on opinion formation.² The third perspective involves the opinion context itself. Here the emphasis is on the actual measurement, description and analysis of public opinion.³ As would be expected, this is the major emphasis and concentration of the field of public opinion. The fourth perspective involves the relationship between public opinion and public policy.⁴

While these four perspectives all help to explain public opinion, the emphasis of the field has been towards the measurement and description of opinion. Because of this, the other three perspectives have not received the same depth of analysis. This is especially true with the second perspective--which is relevant to analyzing the effects of television news. The second perspective concentrates on opinion formation--though the emphasis is primarily on initial or early

²See Berelson and Janowitz, Chapter 2; William J. Crotty (ed.), Public Opinion and Politics: A Reader (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), Chapter 1-5; Hennessy, Chapters 9-14; Key, Chapters 12-15; Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964), Chapters 3-6.

³For example see Crotty, Chapters 6-18; Edward C. Dreyer and Walter A. Rosenbaum (ed.), Political Opinion and Behavior, 2nd ed., (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1970), Chapters 1,2,4,5,6; Hennessy, Chapters 1,3-8, 15-19; Key, Chapters 2-11; Lane and Sears, Chapters 2,7,8,9; Norman R. Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy: Models of Political Linkage (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1968), Chapters 2,3,5,6.

⁴See Berelson and Janowitz, Section 3; Dreyer and Rosenbaum, Section 7; Hennessy, Part VI, chapters 20-22; Key, Part V, chapters 16-19; Luttbeg, whole book.

influences--such as the family and the school as socializing influences.⁵ The main point of this research has been well-established--that the family, school and peer groups are very important factors in attitude and opinion formation. The same point has been made concerning opinion leaders.⁶ Thus, with such agents as the family, school, opinion leaders, research and analysis has documented their influence. However, this same depth of analysis does not exist with respect to the effects on opinion formation or change that mass media might have; and this is especially true concerning television. In descriptions of the influencing factors of opinion, television, like the other forms of media; is always included, but there has been no documentation of the effects of television. It is assumed to have an influence on opinion, but this has not been documented on a comprehensive scale. This point is expressed by V.O. Key: "Given the limits of knowledge of the political role and effects of mass communications,

⁵For example see Ribhard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968); David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government", The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 361 (September 1965) pp. 40-57; Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Robert D. Hess and Judith Torrey, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967); Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (New York: The Free Press, 1959); M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "Patterns of Political Learning," Harvard Educational Review, vol. 38, 1968; Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955); James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion And Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961).

⁶Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955).

about all that can be done is to make educated guesses around the edge of the problem."⁷

This lack of analysis of the role of television news in the attitude and opinion process is difficult to justify--given that today television is the major source of information. That television is the major source of information has been documented. According to An Extended View of Public Attitudes Toward Television and Other Mass Media - 1959-1971, "the first question in every questionnaire has asked people where they get their news. Television leads today, as it has since 1963, and it has kept, if not actually increased, the sizeable lead over newspapers it attained in 1968."⁸ In addition, and extremely crucial, this study also cites television as being "The most believable news medium."⁹ Thus, in terms of media, television is both the major, and the most credible source of information. Attitudes and opinions have a cognitive component--which is based on various types of information from various sources or stimuli. In the context of media, television, therefore, would be the greatest and most credible contribution to the cognitive aspect of attitudes and opinions. The problem, of course, is to determine the amounts and forms

⁷Key, p. 345.

⁸Burns Roper, "An Extended View of Public Attitudes Toward Television and Other Mass Media 1959-1971." (New York: Television Information Office, 1971), pp. 1-2.

⁹Roper, p. 3.

of the information internalized and then to determine (in a political context) the affective and behavioral consequences of that information. To do this, it is first necessary to document and analyze the nature and forms of information presented by television.

Thus, there is a need to have an understanding of the forms of television information. This need has been stated by others. In 1969, Robert MacNeil argued that the "field is wide open for research. . . It would be helpful, for example, to know, over a period of months, what consistent bias, if any, is detected. . . . And some reliable data on what information viewers really get from the news programs would be invaluable. No one really knows."¹⁰ MacNeil, who is still involved in broadcast journalism, recently indicated that the problem still exists: "Four years ago, after a thorough study, I concluded in my book . . . that 'the real impact of the (television) medium on the American democratic process is still too sparsely documented to justify sweeping conclusions.' As far as I can determine, that is still the case."¹¹ Bernard C. Cohen has written that "there is a pressing need for good data on media coverage. Comparative data on the context of and the space and play given to, foreign policy and domestic policy,

¹⁰Robert MacNeil, The People Machine (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 54-55.

¹¹Robert MacNeil, "Electronic Schizophrenia: Does Television Alienate Voters?", Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, Summer 1972, pp. 5-10.

over a range of issues and of media, are called for in order to get extensive and reliable measures of the processing of different kinds of issues."¹² And, Dennis Thompson states that "these theorists' diagnosis of the present state of the media no doubt contain much truth, though content analysis that would adequately support it does not exist."¹³

One explanation for the nonexistence of research on television news stems in part from the focus of public opinion research. Within public opinion research the emphasis is either on opinion measurement or description, or, on an understanding of the opinion formation process. The analysis of television and its role in the formation of public opinion and political attitudes should be integrated into this latter emphasis of public opinion. However, television is only superficially integrated into the analysis of the opinion formation process.

There seems to be a specific reason for this. "Opinion formation", within political science, is basically conceived as a "past" process. Thus, analysis of the opinion formation process is primarily concerned with factors which have exerted their influences on the formation of opinion in the

¹²In James N. Rosenau (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 210.

¹³Dennis F. Thompson, The Democratic Citizen (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 116.

past--rather than the present. Because of this, the emphasis of analysis is primarily on the role of the family and the schools in the opinion formation process. While this is justified, what is needed is extensive analysis of the "on-going" or "present" influences on opinion formation. Once the individual is no longer subjected to the direct influences of the family and schools, what are the factors involved in opinion formation? While it is known that media is one of the influencing factors, little analysis has been conducted as to the precise nature of that influence. Thus, not only is it vital that the past influences on past opinion or the past influences on present opinion be understood; but, it is crucial that the present influences on "present" opinion be understood.

This is not to say that there has been no work in this area--because there has. The concept of the funnel of causality, as conceived by Campbell (et. al.) and as modified by Hennessey, and, Dreyer and Rosenbaum, offers a theoretical model and framework for analyzing both past and present influences on opinion formation.¹⁴ But, other than in voting studies, this model has rarely been used in empirical research. The

¹⁴See Angus Campbell (et. al.), The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), pp. 24-32; Bernard C. Hennessey, Public Opinion 2nd Ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 186-192; Edward C. Dreyer and Walter A. Rosenbaum (ed.), Political Opinion and Behavior, 2nd Ed. (Belmont, California, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 23-27.

concept of "opinion leaders" provides a basis for this type of research.¹⁵ However, even with concepts of opinion leaders and the "two-step flow of communication," the research is not extensive. The point is that since the emphasis of public opinion research is not oriented towards "present" influences on opinion formation--the lack of concentration on television as a "present" influence is understandable.

Disregarding the lack of research, the role of television in the "present" opinion formation process seems obvious. As noted, television has been cited as being both the major source of information and the most credible source. In addition, television may be the sole source of information concerning the political and outside world. However, speculating on the role of television on public opinion and political attitudes is one thing; documenting that role is another. To properly understand the role of television on public opinion, three steps are necessary. First, it is necessary to establish a broader conception of "opinion formation." Second, it is necessary to document the content of specific aspects of television--especially television news. Third, it is necessary to relate the content of television with an analysis of contemporary public opinions and political attitudes in order to begin to under-

¹⁵See Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955); James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961).

stand the effects of television on public opinion. This third part is the most difficult and complex as attempts to understand the effects of any mass communications must take into consideration a variety of intervening social and psychological variables.¹⁶ The research proposed in this proposal will concentrate on the first two steps, but will only, based on the analysis, speculate on the third step--that of trying to explain the effects of television on public opinion and political attitudes.

As mentioned, it seems necessary to establish a broader conception of the "opinion formation" process. Actually, this is more of a change in emphasis. "Opinion formation" is restrictive in that it has the connotation of actually forming an opinion. Within this context, "opinion formation" refers to a process where previously there was no opinion on a subject and now (at a certain point in time) there exists an opinion on the subject. However, in opinion description and measurement, the emphasis should be on more than just the "formation" of opinion since in dealing with "present" influences on "present" public opinion, the opinion has already been formed. Therefore, to understand the effects of television, it is necessary, in addition to understanding how opinion was formed on a new subject, to understand how an existing opinion is

¹⁶For the best summary of this see Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communications (New York: The Free Press, 1960).

changed, maintained, reinforced, strengthened, or weakened. The point is that television could be very influential in changing, or reinforcing or strengthening opinion relative to direction and intensity. If "opinion formation" is narrowly conceived in terms of "forming" a new opinion on a new subject, then much of the potential influence of television may be lost through a conceptual limitation. Therefore, it will be best to conceive of "opinion process" as a process which involves the addition of new information stimuli, or cognitions which function to create, form, influence, reinforce, maintain, alter, change, intensify or weaken an opinion or set of opinions. This conceptualization does have the advantage of being more precise in the attempt to understand the effects of television on public opinion and political attitudes. In many cases television news may not have "formed" many opinions, but it may have had a great effect on changing, reinforcing, or strengthening already existing opinions.

The second step in understanding the effects of television on public opinion and political attitudes entails documenting and analyzing the content of television. Relative to television news, most people have an intuitive notion of the content of television news--since they experience it quite a few times a week. However, for purposes of analysis, there exists no long term, systematic analysis of the content of television news. As will be demonstrated, most research concerning television is of a very limited and super-

ficial nature.

Existing Research. A brief survey of the literature relevant to possible effects of television on public opinion and political attitudes indicates that the field is wide open and in need of research. As mentioned, most of the relevant literature assumes that the media in general do have an influence on public opinion, but they do not document or analyze the specific nature of the influence. Also, there have been very few attempts to document and analyze the content of television. In order to explain the effects of television on public opinion and political attitudes, it is first necessary to understand what kinds of information are being presented. Very little available research has done this.

Perhaps the best book to begin with to appreciate the complexities involved in the political effect of television is Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communications.¹⁷ In reviewing and analyzing mass communications and attitude research of the 1940's and 1950's, Klapper demonstrates the complexity of the intervening social and psychological variables inherent in a communications situation. The complexity of the situation is such that Klapper notes that there is "widespread pessimism about the possibility of ever bringing about any order to the field."¹⁸ In discussing the complexity of the communications process Klapper stresses that "mass

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Klapper, p. 2.

communications ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influences."¹⁹ Thus, in dealing with television or any other media, the nature and causality of effects are difficult to extrapolate and understand. It is often tempting to assume the existence of a causal relationship in dealing with the effects of mass communications. However, because of the presence of social and psychological variables and "screens", actually verifying this relationship is extremely difficult.

For some, though, who actually use the media the communication-effects relationship may not be so hard to understand. Based on his experiences, Yippie leader Jerry Rubin has written that "Just being on TV makes it exciting. Even picket lines look exciting. TV creates myths bigger than reality. . . .the media does not report 'news,' it creates it. An event happens when it goes on TV and becomes myth. . . .The media is not 'neutral.' The presence of a camera transforms a demonstration turning us into heroes."²⁰ One, of course, can dispute the validity of Rubin's perceptions as to whether or not demonstrators are received as "heroes", but Rubin may be very representative of those who seek to use television to

¹⁹Klapner, p. 8.

²⁰Jerry Rubin, Do It! (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1970), pp. 106-107.

attain "political visibility." Political visibility, exposure and publicity are valuable commodities. This explains why there have been increases in the attempts to attain "political visibility" through the use of television. One of the main devices now employed, and now being used by nongovernmental actors as well as governmental actors, is what has been referred to as a "pseudo-event." A "pseudo-event" is an activity which is staged first and foremost to gain television coverage. The nature of the activity is secondary to the main function--securing television coverage. Generating publicity is, of course, a natural function of government. Today, however, there is keen competition to attain "political visibility." This emphasis on "pseudo-events" and attempts to achieve "political visibility", especially by people outside of government, does serve to indicate that many people do feel that they do understand the effects of television. Also, they feel that they can manipulate television to achieve their desired effects.

From the above, two different perspectives emerge. One is that, because of psychological and sociological complications, the effects of mass media or television are almost impossible to know. The other perspective assumes that the effects of television are capable of being understood. To put the general problems of the effects of television on public opinion and political attitudes into a better perspective, it is necessary to examine the relevant work done within political science.

As might be expected, within political science, there has been speculation about the potential effects of television; however, there has been a minimum of empirical research concerning these effects. Within political science and political analysis most of the speculation concerning the effects of television news involves its relationship to voting behavior. DeVries and Tarrance argue "that for several reasons, the 1970's will see more ticket-splitting, not less. People under thirty years of age are oriented to audio-visual media, principally television, because they are the first generation to grow up in the environment of this media. They view television as a more authoritative news source than print media. They learn most about politics from television."²¹ The authors contend that "ticket-splitters make up their minds mainly on the basis of the information they get from television newscasts, documentaries, and specials."²² The idea here is that television may have much more important effects in the period between elections--rather than the actual campaign period. This same idea and appreciation of the importance of television is expressed in Polls, Television And The New Politics. Mendelsohn and Crespi argue that "the real political game is being played more and more between formal campaigns rather

²¹Walter DeVries and V. Lance Tarrance, The Ticket-Splitter (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972), p. 117.

²²DeVries and Tarrance, p. 118-119.

than during them. The playing field is the television screen, and the name of the game is 'exposure.'²³ Again, the emphasis is on television news rather than on exposure during the campaign period.

Two recent books, The Hidden Crisis In American Politics and The Real Majority, also discuss the potential effects of television. In The Hidden Crisis of American Politics, Samuel Lubell discusses the importance of "political visibility."²⁴ Lubell argues that "political visibility" is a "new structure of political bargaining in that it enables individuals and groups to gain attention for their views and interest."²⁵ Lubell contends that the "net effect is likely to be a greater distrust of politics and our political leaders."²⁶ Specifically, Lubell asserts that "visibility tends to politicize what it touches. It is more likely to increase rather than reduce the public's expectations of what politics and government should do."²⁷ Scammon and Wattenberg, The Real Majority, speculate on the specific effects of television on the 1968 election.

²³Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi, Polls, Television And The New Politics (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970), p. 307.

²⁴Samuel Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), p. 65.

²⁵Lubell, p. 65.

²⁶Lubell, p. 67.

²⁷Lubell, p. 67-68.

To them, "The real action is where the real actions isn't-- where a man just home watches a two minute film clip of Hubert Humphrey being baited by student militants."²⁸ Central to their analysis of 1968 is what the authors refer to as the "Social Issue." The Social Issue is defined as "a set of public attitudes concerning the more personally frightening aspects of disruptive social change."²⁹ It should be noted that much of people's experience with the many dimensions of the Social Issue has approximated a first-hand experience because television makes it a personal experience. Television penetrates. The volatility and intensity of present forms of social change are not abstract. They are very real and television has made them very real for the nonparticipants. It is interesting to speculate on whether the Social Issue would have had the same degree of all-encompassing volatility if there had been no television during this period.

As everyone knows, the last decade has been a period of intense social conflict. Television has played an influential role in the scope and direction of the conflicts. A key to any conflict or the volatility of any conflict is visibility. Without discussing television Schattschneider discusses this:

²⁸Richard M. Scammon, and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970), p. 20.

²⁹Scammon and Wattenberg, p. 43.

"visibility is a factor in expanding the scope of conflict."³⁰ Television has provided this "visibility." A better perspective of the role of television is offered by an analogy used by Schattschneider. He argues that ". . .the distinctive quality of political conflicts is that the relations between the players and audience have not been well-defined and there is usually nothing to keep the audience from getting into the game."³¹ Extending this analogy, it seems proper to argue that television has been a major stimulus in increasing the number of players who get into the game. It has also been a major stimulus in intensifying the emotional and partisan involvement of the audience. And, if Scammon and Watenberg are correct in their assessment that the "Social Issue" was the most important issue in the 1968 Election, then television may have been the major stimulus in determining why the audience "cheered" some players and "booed" others.

Vietnam, of course, has been one such area of intense political conflict. While the role of television in relation to attitudes and opinion concerning Vietnam will be discussed in more detail, two perspectives on the possible effects of television will serve to indicate that speculation, but little empirical research, exists concerning the effects of television.

³⁰E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 16.

³¹Schattschneider, p. 18.

The authors of Vietnam and the Silent Majority discuss attitude formation and contend that the great visibility given certain issues and conflicts by the media does have important effects.³² They argue that greater visibility functions to decrease attitude ambivalence.³³ Specifically, they assert that the "debate over Southeast Asian policy has risen to so high a level of media preoccupation and political struggle that members of the general public probably feel increasingly compelled to decide which side they are on."³⁴ This may be true. A different perspective of the same phenomenon of media preoccupation with Vietnam is presented by John G. Morris.³⁵ Morris develops a theme which seems extremely important. He notes ". . .that public sympathy seems to lie on the side of Lieutenant Calley, (that this) makes one wonder if the public's daily diet of televised war coverage has increased public understanding of the Vietnam War to any noticeable degree. Perhaps we have had image fatigue?"³⁶ While there is an implicit value assumption inherent in Morris' "increased public

³²Milton J. Rosenberg, Sidney Verbit, and Phillip Converse, Vietnam And The Silent Majority (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

³³Rosenberg (et. al.), p. 89.

³⁴Rosenberg (et. al.), pp. 89-90.

³⁵John G. Morris, "This We Remember," Harpers, September 1972, pp. 72-78.

³⁶Morris, p. 77.

understanding," it is important to realize that he is discussing a potentially valid concept. Maybe the vivid coverage of the war has really done nothing but dull the senses, or make the war commonplace--rather than increase awareness. Maybe there is no incompatibility between these two perspectives. Maybe the political visibility of the Vietnam debate has served to commit people to a point of view while the actual visibility of the war has served to dull the salience and horror of the war. Thus, perhaps television coverage made the war, per se, less salient and made the debate, and the manner of the debate, more salient. The point is that we do not know. There is no empirical research to really provide a guide.

While political science has provided little empirical help in understanding either the content or the effects of television, it should be noted that journalistic studies have also not been of much help. Two specific works do deal with the content of television news. The most relevant work in this context is The News Twisters by Edith Efron.³⁷ The importance of this book will necessitate further discussion, but briefly the book is a content analysis of the three evening network news programs during the 1968 election period. Based on her analysis, Miss Efron contends that "all three networks clearly tried to defeat Mr. Nixon in his campaign

³⁷ Edith Efron, The News Twisters (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971).

for the presidency of the United States."³⁸ She documents how the three networks were "anti-war" and "pro-black militant" in their coverage during this period. While Miss Efron does document a "liberal bias" in the news, the main importance of the book is that it is the only extended, systematic analysis of television news. Eve On The World, by Walter Cronkite, discusses contemporary problems from the perspective of CBS television news coverage.³⁹ This book is not systematic and it is not meant to be. It does, however, give an insight into how CBS news perceives the world and its problems.

Other books, written from a journalistic perspective are worth mentioning--even though they will be discussed in greater detail. Harry J. Skornia, Television And The News, discusses, analyzes, and criticizes the news.⁴⁰ Skornia discusses an aspect of news which is vital to an understanding of the effects. He argues that television has redefined news: "in the newsland of television, where the showman is king, news is expected to entertain rather than primarily to inform."⁴¹ This perspective of news--as entertainment--could yield important results in trying to understand the effects of tele-

³⁸Efron, p. 50.

³⁹Walter Cronkite, Eve On The World (New York: Cowles Book Company, 1971).

⁴⁰Harry J. Skornia, Television And The News, A Critical Appraisal (Palto Alto, California: Pacific Books, Publishers, 1968).

⁴¹Skornia, p. 29.

vision. If people approach, or relate to, news as entertainment, then the effects are going to be different than if people relate to the news in terms of its information content. This concept of television as escape and pleasure is discussed in William Stephenson's The Play Theory of Mass Communication.⁴² Robert MacNeil's The People Machine also considers the nature of television news.⁴³ MacNeil, who has television news experience, criticizes television news for its emphasis on the visual and the trivial, rather than on substance.⁴⁴ But, he is also critical of news coverage of Vietnam. He contends that television deleted the most "unbearable" scenes of the war and that this helped to build up tolerance for the war. He contends that". . .by cutting out what is most unbearable, it may be that television has built up a tolerance for the frightful, a feeling that war really is bearable."⁴⁵ Politics And The Press, edited by Richard W. Lee, and President Nixon And The Press, by James Keough, both give interesting perspectives and interpretations of television journalism and some

⁴²William Stephenson, The Play Theory of Mass Communication (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

⁴³Robert MacNeil, The People Machine (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

⁴⁴MacNeil, p. 35.

⁴⁵MacNeil, p. 66.

effects.⁴⁶ The latter is especially interesting since it discusses television news from the perspective of the Nixon Administration. Finally, and worth mentioning, is an insight found in July, 1972, Harpers, "Is Kennedy The One?"⁴⁷ This article contained an Oliver Quayle poll which asked "Whom do you trust the most?" Possible responses include Nixon, Agnew, Humphrey, Kennedy, Muskie, McGovern, and Walter Cronkite. In three different polls, Walter Cronkite emerged as the "most trusted."⁴⁸ Appreciating the significance of this is perhaps the best way to really begin to understand the potential effects television news might have on public opinion, political attitudes, and political behavior. Unfortunately, there exists neither extensive systematic research documenting or analyzing the content of television news nor systematic attempts explaining the effects television might have on public opinion and political attitudes.

Research design. The need to understand the political effects of television is both obvious and justified. Justification for this type of research is related to two factors. First, as made evident by the above discussion, television,

⁴⁶Richard W. Lee (ed.), Politics And The Press (Washington: Acropolis Books, 1970) and James Keough, President Nixon and The Press (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1972).

⁴⁷"Is Kennedy The One?" Harpers, July 1972, pp. 39-40.

⁴⁸Ibid. p. 40.

since it is the "major" source of information, has to be one of the prime influences on present public opinion, political attitudes and political behavior. Second, while there has been speculation on the possible effects of television news, there has been no systematic, extended analysis of television news.

It is the contention of this proposal that in order to begin to understand the effects of television, it is first necessary to understand the content of television. An understanding and an analysis of the content of television news is the subject of this research proposal.

Specifically, the subject of this proposal is a content analysis of "CBS Evening News With Walter Cronkite." This will be an extended analysis and will cover the period of September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971. This analysis will be based on xeroxed copies of the actual transcripts of the CBS Evening News; and, this explains why this analysis involves only one network. While local television stations are important, their basic news orientation is local news. Thus, it is the three network evening news programs which present the most comprehensive summary of national and international news. Ideally, to properly analyze the effects television news might have on public opinion and political attitudes, it would be necessary to analyze the ABC, CBS, and NBC Evening News Programs. In addition to being the most comprehensive type of analysis, an analysis of this type

would be of value since the three network News Programs could be compared to each other. This comparative analysis could give a different perspective on what kinds of information are being presented on the Evening News Program.

However, for practical reasons, the analysis will only concern CBS Evening News. The only practical way to analyze the Evening News Programs is to acquire xeroxed transcripts of the actual broadcasts. Taping the broadcasts and then typing the transcripts would be too inconvenient and too expensive--considering the analysis would extend for one year. Also, two of the news programs are broadcast at the same time. Thus, transcripts were needed. In order to obtain transcripts the cooperation of the three networks was needed. While CBS and ABC did cooperate, NBC did not. This meant that the analysis would be without NBC--the second network in terms of viewing audience. At this point, other considerations became important. The first consideration was money. While CBS would permit xeroxing at their facilities (at 10¢ a page), ABC would not. Thus, the cost of xeroxing the ABC transcripts at an outside agency was estimated to be anywhere from 15¢ to 25¢ a page. This would mean, as estimated by the ABC manager of Public Relations, Don Alloway, that the cost of xeroxing the ABC transcripts would be over \$500. This, plus the cost of xeroxing the CBS transcripts would be too much to assume. The second consideration was the volume of work involved. Analyzing two news programs

simply would have been too much work--considering that the analysis was to be an extended one.

Thus, the decision was made to analyze only CBS Evening News. As it was--the cost of xeroxing the CBS transcripts was \$427.00. While double-spaced, the total number of pages involved with the CBS transcripts was over 4200! This gives an indication of how much work would be involved in analyzing two network news broadcasts. The use of CBS seems to be the best choice since CBS has the biggest audience and since Walter Cronkite is the most respected and most popular news commentator. CBS Evening News is acknowledged as being number one. Thus, the analysis involves only CBS and covers the period of September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971. There is nothing sacred about this period. Originally, the analysis was to cover the September 1, 1970, to September 1, 1971, period, but the xeroxing was not done until October 1971. By having a longer period of analysis than a year, the analysis will be able to include both the 1970 elections and the revolt at Attica.

While the nature, scope, method and objectives of the analysis will be discussed, it should be stated that the main objective of the analysis of CBS Evening News is to document and analyze the news. While the focus of this analysis is not primarily oriented towards an understanding of the effects of television news in general and CBS News specifically, it is anticipated that others, with better backgrounds in

psychology and mass communications could use the findings of this analysis in their attempts to understand the effects of television news.

Since the emphasis of the research will be on documenting and analyzing the content of CBS Evening News, it is important from the beginning, to make clear the limitations of this type of analysis. The first limitation has been mentioned. This is that the analysis includes only CBS--and not the other two networks. While CBS does have the biggest audience, it obviously does not have the total evening news audience. Thus, one has to be very careful in trying to discuss the possible effects of television news--since with this research, the only segment of the population directly involved is the CBS audience. Of interest here is whether or not the CBS's is similar to the audiences of NBC and ABC News. Also, of interest is whether or not the CBS audience is representative of the people of this country. With an audience of over 15,000,000, one would expect a certain degree of representativeness, but the fact that only one "audience" or "public" is directly involved is important. Also important, is the degree to which one can assume or generalize that the news content on CBS Evening News is similar or dissimilar with the news content of ABC or NBC. Again, this has to limit the degree of generalizing about the possible effects of television news, since the nature, emphasis and content of CBS news does differ from that of ABC or NBC. Watching two

different news programs the same night will verify this. The main point is that caution should be used in generalizing based on CBS Evening News and the audience of CBS News. However, it can be argued that news events are basically covered in similar ways by the three networks and that the CBS audience, because of its size, is similar and representative of the other evening news audiences. Also, one could adopt the Agnewian approach to television news--that they are part of the "Liberal Establishment." These two limitations should be kept in mind.

In addition to only using CBS, there are other limitations to this research which must be considered. First, the analysis only covers week nights. It was felt that Saturday and Sunday viewing habits are different from regular week nights because people are involved in more activities during the weekends. Also, the weekend format of CBS Evening News is different, the most important being that Walter Cronkite does not do the weekend broadcasts. While this is a technical limitation, the second limitation is crucial. This limitation is simply that an analysis of the transcripts of a television broadcast can in no way capture the emotion and feeling and preciseness of that broadcast. This is the same with an analysis of television news. Television is a visual medium. Television news is primarily visual. If it were not, the news would consist of a commentator merely reading the news. But, the emphasis of television news is visual description of what has happened. This emphasis on the visual is ex-

tremely critical. For many people, the mental and emotional absorbing of the pictures may be the only real internalizing they do. The pictures require less effort to absorb and they make a deeper and more lasting imprint. Also, the types of social change which have emerged during the 1960's have been very dramatically captured by the visual medium. A person reading the newspaper during this period would have a totally different perspective about what was going on than would the person who saw and "experienced" the news on television. With television, one "experiences" the news; with newspapers, one reads the news. Thus, the transcripts can indicate what is said, but they cannot document how it was said or how it was shown. For many people, the latter is most important. The transcripts will, however, catalog the nature and direction of coverage as well as document what was said by whom. A knowledge and understanding of this will be an improvement over the present level of analysis.

Other limitations on this type of research involve the audience rather than the broadcast. This concerns some of the major difficulties of mass communications research. For example, while the transcending question of this research will be "What kinds of information are being presented?", it is important to consider a second question--"What kinds of information are being received?" An analysis of television news has to consider this second question since different people "receive" information in different ways. Differences

in intelligence, interest, motivation, perception, personality, ideology and frequency of exposure all "cause" different individuals to internalize and absorb different amounts of information in different ways, shapes and forms. It is important not only to consider how much information is received, but to consider under what psychological terms the information is received. Related to this is the nature of the transcripts. The transcripts only document the audio portion of the broadcast. As mentioned, television is a visual medium, and thus, transcripts can only capture one dimension of the multi-dimensional medium. Since television is a visual medium, it is important to consider just how much of the audio portion will actually be internalized. In considering the possible effects of television news, it is important to know that perhaps most people really listen to, or pay attention to only half of the broadcast. Some people simply do not have the interest or background to be fully attentive to both the narrated news--and the visual news.

While these limitations on research based upon an analysis of transcripts of news programs are important, they are not severe enough to counter the value of such research. The point of this discussion has been to indicate that any analysis of the media should be well aware, in advance, of the potential problems and limitations. While the proposed analysis of CBS Evening News is far from comprehensive, it will be comprehensive enough to provide a good insight and understanding of the nature and content of television news. This alone

seems to be justification for the research. The basic justification, however, is simply that for most people, television is the major source of information; yet, there exists no extended, systematic analysis of television news.

As mentioned, the actual analysis is based on xeroxed transcripts of CBS Evening News. The period of analysis is September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971. The basic and primary objective of the research is to document and to analyze the content of CBS News during the period of analysis. A secondary objective will be to discuss and try to relate the findings of the analysis to some of the public opinion indices of this period. While this secondary objective will be interesting, it should be noted again that the main function of the research is to document and analyze the nature of CBS News. The secondary objective does lead in the direction of considering the effects of television on public opinion and political attitudes. However, within the scope of this research there will only be speculation and discussion, based on the findings of the analysis, of the possible effects.

This analysis will address itself to three major questions. The first concerns the frequency and nature of the news. The first question is: "What amounts and forms of information are being presented?" The main objective here is to describe, document, and analyze the frequency of occurrence of different subject areas and stories. While this will be quantitatively and qualitatively superficial, it will not be without value. It will give a superficial indication of what

has actually been presented. In addition to documenting the quantitative frequency, it will be possible to document the qualitative frequency. While it is important to know how many stories were about Vietnam, it is important to know substantially how many reports were negative towards Vietnam and how many were positive. Also, a quantitative-qualitative frequency distribution will give a good indication of how CBS sees the world. It will give a precise indication of what CBS sees as important; and, by omission, what it does not consider to be important. What CBS conceives as being important and unimportant is not a neutral decision without political consequences. That CBS has considered, and given much exposure to "protest" groups has not been a neutral act--given the one-dimensional direction of most "protest" groups. And, the amount of exposure given to them has very possibly had effects on public opinion, political attitudes, and political behavior. News broadcasting involves selectivity. Selectivity, according to David Broder, "is the essence of all contemporary journalism. . . . Now, selectivity, which is the essence of the procedure, involves criteria. Criteria mean value judgments. And value judgements are just fancy words for prejudices."⁴⁹ A frequency distribution will give an insight into the "prejudices" of CBS and will give a summary of what actually has been presented.

⁴⁹David S. Broder, "Politicians and Biased Political Information," in Richard W. Lee, ed., Politics and The Press (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1970), p. 62.

The second transcending question of the analysis is related to the value implications involved with selectivity and frequency of presentation. This second question deals directly with values. The second question is: "What are the directions of information and opinion?" As Mr. Broder asserts, the presentation of news is based upon selectivity--which itself is based on value judgments. News is not neutral since it is a reflection of some of the major political and social conflicts of the day. Since news is not neutral, it is important to measure and document the direction of the news. This involves two dimensions. One is simply the direction of the nature of the story or the report. Reports on the corruption of Thieu's regime, the Watergate episode, McGovern's problems with his campaigns are all examples of stories--which by their very nature and which without expressed opinion do have an obvious affective or pro-con direction. In the three examples, the reporting may be totally "factual" and "objective." This does not mean that there is no value content or direction to the stories for there obviously is--especially if one is, respectively, a defender of our Vietnam effort, a Republican, or a McGovern supporter. For all three, the inclusion of these stories would be dissonant creating. The second dimension of measuring direction involves opinion. Opinion manifests itself in different ways. It can be expressed by the commentator, it can be expressed by the participants of the story, or it

can be expressed by the reporter. All three are extremely crucial and have to be measured qualitatively and quantitatively. All three are vital elements of the nature of television news. According to Edith Efron, "It is the opinion element in a story that contains the evaluative element. It is the element in the story that states not just what is, but also what ought to be; that states what is good and bad about the situation being reported on; that positions pro and con. It is the most emotionally loaded of all the elements in a story."⁵⁰

The third transcending question is very much interrelated with the expression and measurement of opinion. The third question is: "What are the patterns of frequency and access of opinion or point of view?" The interest here concerns the selectivity of opinion. The concern is--which groups, people, philosophies, opinions have access. Is there an equality of access--or do some points of view and philosophies have an easier time receiving exposure while other groups and philosophies have a much more difficult time? This selectivity of direction or opinion is crucial. First, television by "selecting" what or whose opinion will be expressed helps to shape and define the debate of major issues. Second, in this age of protest, and publicity, it is vital for many opinions and philosophies to acquire "political

⁵⁰Efron, pp. 24-25.

visibility." Who acquires "political visibility" is determined by the news programs. Third, it might be the patterns of access of different philosophies and groups is related to the effects of television on public opinion and political attitude. People respond to what they have seen on television: they do not respond to what they have not seen. Therefore, their responses are, in part, a function of the selectivity decisions of television. What should be determined by the analysis is whether or not the selectivity process is an equitable and fair one. Do the "major" groups and philosophies have a relative equality of access? Or, do certain groups and philosophies have easier access? The analysis will answer this and will also determine, if there is an inequality of access, the nature and direction of that inequality.

Inherent in the above questions is the problem of bias. From the beginning, it should be strongly emphasized that documenting bias and unbalanced coverage is not the basic objective of this research. The basic objective is to document and to analyze the nature and content of the news. A mere documenting of bias would be too superficial and would not tell very much about the totality of the news. However, within the scope of this research, it is imperative to examine CBS' view of the world. The CBS view of the world is obviously important since it is the one viewers are exposed to. Thus, while documenting bias is not the main objective, it is crucial to discuss it and to examine the effects it

might have on public opinion and political behavior.

The concept of bias will be discussed in more detail in further sections. At this point, however, it is important to discuss the two forms of bias--institutional and ideological. Institutional bias is bias which emanates from limits of television. Because the evening news is less than thirty minutes, there obviously has to be a high degree of selectivity. There is neither time for all stories and reports nor time for detailed analyses or explanations. The emphasis of the evening news is on the visual--and this structures the news in certain ways. Thus, the very nature of television will impose limits on the presentation of news and will function to structure the news and news coverage. What is often exciting, dramatic, or emotional will receive precedence over the less visually exciting stories. It is quite possible that this type of institutional bias does have some important effects. It makes the news "fun." The news becomes entertainment. It is possible that the entertaining aspects of the news function to subordinate the legitimate stories both in terms of impact and importance. For example, it was extremely difficult to think seriously of the world and its problems while the evening news was totally immersed in the Howard Hughes-Clifford Irving fiasco. During this period, news was "fun" and entertaining, but it was not necessarily relevant. Also, if viewers perceive of something like the Hughes-Irving situation as news, there may be less of a tendency to consider the real stories (Vietnam) as being real.

The second form of bias, ideological, is the more common form. This involves whether or not there is a relative equality of both sides of an issue, a controversy, or an opinion. The Fairness Doctrine of the FCC states that there should be this relative balance. When there is bias, there is an inequality of coverage--which is manifested in various ways. One way concerns the selection of stories. By emphasizing certain stories (American atrocities in Vietnam) and not covering other stories (Viet Cong atrocities in Vietnam), CBS can give a certain view of the world which has definite ideological content. Another form concerns the selection of subjects within a story. A good example of this is a story CBS had concerning the student vote in the 1972 election. (The date of the story was October 23, 1972.) CBS used four universities as being indicative of college students. The four were Harvard, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Georgia, and Berkely! Obviously, these schools were not representative of U.S. colleges and would thus give "distorted" or unrealistic views of student opinion. A third form of bias is a quantitative one involving which point of view receives the greatest amount of coverage or exposure. Both the quantity and the direction of opinion in this case can be measured and documented. Related to this is a qualitative form of bias. This is when both sides of a controversy are presented, but one side has knowledgeable, credible, and well-known spokesmen whereas the opposing side is represented by

unknown and less credible spokesmen. Another form of bias is that of the reporter or the commentator. They can, and often do, include editorial comments of their own. Opinion is often part of the reporter's repertoire. While there are various forms of ideological bias, the importance of it is that it conveys certain benefits--such as exposure and qualitative and quantitative superior coverage--on certain ideological groups, issues, or opinions.

If it can be documented, and it appears that it can, an understanding of the nature and direction of the CBS view of the world is imperative to an understanding of the effect of the news on public opinion and political attitudes. Within the context of this research, it is hypothesized that there is a definite "liberal" bias, direction, or sympathy to CBS news and that this can be documented. While this will be discussed in more detail, some of the dimensions of this "liberal" direction can be mentioned. Based on (1) viewing of CBS Evening News during the period of analysis and (2) a reading and classifying of the transcripts of CBS Evening News for this period, it does seem clear that there is an obvious ideological direction to CBS News. Some of the dimensions of this are that CBS has been "Anti-Vietnam", pro-"Social Protest," pro-liberal point of view", and anti-Nixon Administration. While these are just general categories, they will attain more substance and significance as they are related to the analysis. Based on exposure to CBS Evening News, it does seem that CBS does separate the world

into "Good Guys" and "Bad Guys" and that the "Good Guys" have quantitatively and qualitatively superior coverage and exposure. Some examples of this will demonstrate the nature of CBS coverage.

As mentioned, CBS seems to be very much against the Vietnam War. One possible effect of this is that their coverage of Vietnam may convey an unrealistic picture of what is actually happening in Vietnam. For example, and this can be measured, it seems that the nightly news clips on Vietnam battle action have a tendency to emphasize and to concentrate on situations where U.S. and/or South Vietnamese troops are being ambushed, attacked, or defeated. Thus, the view is that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong are "winning." However, this view seems at variance with the weekly casualty reports (even given their inaccuracies). The weekly casualty reports show the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong as "losing." Which is real?

Another example of this involves the CBS view of youth. Samuel Lubell has asked the question: "Is what becomes visible truly representative of the whole?"⁵¹ News, by its very nature, deals with the "unrepresentative." However, this has some important consequences in relation to youth since most of the coverage of youth is presented in an ideological context. This is important because of the intense competition for "political visibility." Are the youth who receive coverage in a political context, representative of all youth? The

⁵¹Lubell, p. 66.

answer is no in two respects. First, it is usually only college students, who are a minority among youth but who are loud, vocal and organized, who receive coverage. Second, among college youth, those who receive the coverage are those of a liberal or leftist persuasion. How often does television give exposure to noncollege youth or conservative college students? If the reply is that they are not "news" because they neither demonstrate nor "protest", then this is a good example of institutional bias--where only those who are active deserve coverage. This view, however, has important consequences in that it is both misleading and unrepresentative. It is misleading in that the leftist views expressed by those who receive coverage do not coincide with those of all youth. It is unrepresentative in that those who receive coverage are not representative of all youth. Youth are not monolithic; yet, the view of youth on CBS News seems to present just one segment of youth. This can be measured.

A further example of the CBS view of the world, which most likely has had effects on public opinion and political attitudes, is the emphasis on social protest and the techniques of social protest. Regardless of the motivation, it does seem that television in general, and CBS, specifically, may have been sympathetic to the "protest movement." Protest, especially anti-war protest, involving scenes of chanting, marching, and sometimes disruption, are familiar scenes to television viewers. To some, the protesters have received a disproportionate amount of coverage. This emphasis on protest

seems to have had two different political effects--one functional and one dysfunctional, depending on one's point of view.

One effect is that television has publicized the manner and efficacy of different forms and techniques of protest. This coverage has been a learning experience for those who would later use the same techniques. Without television coverage, would the shape, form, and amount of social protest have been the same? The answer is probably no. A second possible effect involves the public's reaction to the demonstrations and social protest. Has the public's reactions been generally favorable or unfavorable? In their national 1971 public opinion study, Cantril and Roll state that "our most startling finding, however, was a new and urgent concern over national unity, political stability, and law and order."⁵² While one cannot "blame" television for this concern, is it unrealistic to speculate that the dimensions and intensity of the "concern" would have been different if television had not been so sympathetic and accessible to organized protest? What is interesting is that television still emphasizes social protest while giving no coverage to those who are "concerned" about protest and stability. Thus, television has structured the debate, but it has left out some very important players--those who do not have political visibility because their form

⁵²Albert H. Cantril, Charles W. Roll, Jr., Hopes and Fears Of The American People (New York: Universe Books, 1971), p. 24.

of expression is not amenable to television coverage. Television emphasizes dramatic and organized behavior or modes of expression. The average man is neither dramatic nor organized. Thus, he is not politically visible. He does, however, seem to be very upset about what he sees the politically visible doing on television. Isn't it quite possible that the popularity of Nixon, Agnew, and Wallace has been related to what the average man and woman have seen the politically visible doing on television? It seems that this excessive exposure has bred sympathy and identification for the various forms of social protest--but it has also bred contempt. The extensive coverage may have been dysfunctional since the extent of antagonism may have exceeded the extent of identification.

From the above, it should be obvious that while bias is not the main concern of this research, the CBS view and interpretation (whether "biased" or not) of the world is central to an understanding of "what forms of information are being presented?" Within this context, there are three important questions which can be answered by this research. Who are the politically visible? Is there a consistent political or ideological direction to those who are politically visible? Is there a sense of proportion between those who are visible and the strength of the ideology or point of view they represent? A brief examination of some of the events and units of analysis will help to relate these questions to the actual research.

The following are some of the events which occurred during the period of analysis--September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971: Vietnam, Paris Peace Talks, Vietnam Debate, My Lai Trials, 1970 Elections, Attica, political trials, SST, Pentagon Papers, wage-price freeze, and China trip announcement. In addition, there are many subject areas which will be examined. Some are: coverage of the President, Congress, congressional spokesmen, Presidential-congressional relations, Presidential-press relations, busing, social protest, civil rights, coverage of Blacks, Black spokesmen, visible groups, youth, students, middle class, Southerners, law and order syndrome, ecology, pseudo-events, Nixon Administration spokesmen and critics, themes and symbols. While some of these will pose problems, it does seem that they can be defined, identified and measured. Within these events and subject areas, the concern will be on access, opinion, and direction. Who has access? Who is the source of opinion? What is the amount and direction of coverage and opinion?

With these events and subject areas some very important questions can be asked. For example, in the Paris Peace Talks, who receives the most coverage--the U.S. or the North Vietnamese? Who speaks for Congress? What is the balance between coverage of the President and coverage of Congress? Who speaks for the Blacks? Does television actually reinforce stereotypes? In the Vietnam debate who has received the most coverage? Is there a relatively equal balance of

coverage given to conservatives and liberals? What is the view of youth, the South, the middle class? What type of coverage did the "presidential" candidates receive? An important area to examine will be the "political" and military trials. Is the coverage similar between the two types of trials? The 1970 election and interpretation are important. Was the coverage balanced? Was it important that CBS said that the main issue in 1970 was the economy--when their own poll indicated that law and order was more important? Does protest have to be organized, dramatic and visual to receive coverage? Is "nongovernmental" opinion balanced or is it primarily negative or critical? Who receives more coverage--Senators or Representatives? These are some of the questions and problems which can be examined by the research. While all are not of equal importance, the events, subject areas, and questions discussed do give an indication of the types of information and opinion presented by CBS. A knowledge and understanding of this will contribute to an understanding of the effects of television news on public opinion, political attitudes, and political behavior.

A final point concerns the method of analysis--content analysis. Content analysis is a "systematic technique for analyzing message content and message handling--it is a tool for observing and analyzing the overt communication behavior of selected communication."⁵³ The standard communication

⁵³Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp, Lewis Donohew, Content Analysis of Communications (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 2.

process consists of the Source, the Message, the Channel, and the Receiver. Content analysis focuses on the Message as its unit of analysis, but does integrate the other three elements into the analysis. For example, in this research, the Source, Walter Cronkite, is extremely important. He projects an image which is obviously related to his high credibility and which would be related to how the audience perceives some of the news. Cronkite is well-known, has celebrity status, has a kind, fatherly image, and is trusted. These commodities would contribute to how the audience does perceive the news. It is quite possible that people choose their evening news program solely on the basis of who the commentator is--rather than using the format, perspective or direction of the program as the criteria. Also crucial to this research is the Channel--television.

Television, as a Channel, is crucial because of its authority. Using circular reasoning, people seem to perceive that what is on television is true and accurate--because it is on television. Thus, what is on television becomes authoritative and credible--again because it is on television. What is seen is believed--especially by those who primarily use only television as their source of information. Because television is a visual medium, there is very little basis to question or doubt what is seen. Television is also a factor because of the way it structures the message. Again, because television is a visual medium, certain types of coverage--the visual--are emphasized. This

in turn can provoke certain types of behavior in attempts to gain "political visibility." And, television is important because of its immediacy. Television makes the audience seem as if they are there--with a minimum amount of effort or imagination.

While the Receiver is not the immediate focus of this research, his perceptions, opinions, and political behavior in the context of television are the ultimate orientation of this type of research. Important to note is that there are many types and qualities of Receivers. It is vital to stratify them in relation to who they are, how they perceived the Message, and, what they do with it. For example, CBS News will have different effects on: the Nixon Administration, other government leaders, opinion leaders, average people, students, and noncollege youth.

The actual analysis will focus on the Message of CBS News. This entails two interrelated levels of analysis--quantitative and qualitative. With both levels there will be the problem of construction of categories. This is vital. Budd (et al.) assert that "no content analysis is better than its categories, for a system of categories, is, in essence, a conceptual scheme."⁵⁴ While some of the categories have been constructed, more will be devised. Related with this is the problem of direction. Direction will be measured by such qualities as--positive-negative, pro-con, balanced-unbalanced, favorable-neutral-unfavorable. These qualities will be defined and

⁵⁴Budd, (et al.) p. 39.

explained as to what they actually signify.

While the quantitative and qualitative analyzes focus on different elements, they are interrelated. Quantitative analysis is concerned with frequency of categories or analytical units. For example, the amount of coverage given to such categories as Social Protest, Nixon Administration, and Vietnam War can be measured. This is the lowest level of documenting the kinds of information which is being presented. A more abstract level will be documented by the qualitative analysis. This will measure the qualitative nature, tone, and direction of the coverage and will give a more precise understanding of the forms of information being presented. For example, this will document the positive, neutral, and negative coverage of Nixon's Vietnam policy. In addition, the research will combine certain quantitative and qualitative elements. This would document the frequency of certain types of coverage. Thus, it would be possible to determine the frequency and percentage of "pro"- and "anti"-Vietnam coverage.

While this research may be unique, there are certain procedures which are endemic to any content analysis. Categories and qualitative measurements will have to be defined and explained. Tests of reliability and validity will have to be made. The uniqueness of this research, though, will have consequences. Use of a computer would not be of value--because of the size of the analysis and because there will be so many different units of analysis. Sampling will not be used. The focus of the research is to document the

the coverage of different units and subject areas over an extended period. It is anticipated that, by documenting the quantitative and qualitative nature of "CBS Evening News" over an extended period, a more precise understanding of the forms and directions of the information being presented can be attained. This will also give an indication of the patterns of access on network television news. From this, with further refinement, it may be possible to determine the effects of television news on public opinion, political attitudes, and political behavior. Research such as this can lead the way.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The previous chapter has indicated the need for extended, systematic analysis of television news. It is obvious that an understanding of television news content does not guarantee an understanding of the political effects of television news. It is the argument of this paper, however, that an understanding of the content of television news is requisite to an understanding of the political effects of that news. It is the purpose of this chapter to review the literature relevant to the nature, content, and effects of both television and television news. This will give an accurate indication of the nature and extent of this type of research. It should be noted that it is not the function of this chapter to examine the literature in depth. Rather, the concern is to document the literature and to give brief, superficial impressions of what others are saying about the content and effects of television. Thus, while the number of sources examined will be extensive, the analysis of each will be limited. The review will concentrate first on the content of television and television news and second, on the effects of television and television news.

Nature and Content of Television and Television News

Analytical approaches to television, in a political context, seem to consist of one of two types. They are either very general or very specific. Works dealing with the press (including television) are usually general in nature while studies of television news are very specific--usually dealing with a very short period of analysis. The more general literature will be discussed first under the categories of (1) The Press and Television, (2) Television and Politics, and (3) Television News. To understand the nature of television news, it is imperative to examine it from these perspectives.

The press and television. Some books discuss television from the perspective of journalism. While the main orientation of this type of work is journalism, these are important in that they involve aspects of broadcast journalism, or they examine elements which are common to both the paper and the electronic press. Dan Nimmo, Newsgathering In Washington, is one example.¹ Although dated, this study of newsmen's attitudes and perceptions does include more than the usual anecdotal description of newsmen. While not differentiating between paper and electronic newsmen, the main subject of the study pertains to both. James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War, analyzes the role and the behavior of the press as

¹Dan Nimmo, Newsgathering In Washington (New York: Atherton Press, 1964).

it relates to the cold war.² The period of 1945 to Vietnam is covered. Ben H. Bagdikian, The Effete Conspiracy, centers mainly on the paper press.³ Bagdikian does, though, include discussions of television as the President's medium as well as Johnson's and Nixon's press relationships. About Television, by Martin Mayer, is similar to the many general works on television in that it devotes only a small portion to television news.⁴ Mayer does provide a good description of the actual operation of CBS Evening News.

Television and politics. Much of the current writing about the press discusses the relationship between the press and various aspects of the political process. Even though many of these are general, in that they pertain to much more than television news, they are valuable since television in a political context has similar characteristics with television news.

The perspective of many books dealing with the press (and television) and politics involves the natural tension which exists between the political and journalistic worlds.

²James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970).

³Ben H. Bagdikian, The Effete Conspiracy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972).

⁴Martin Mayer, About Television (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972).

This adversary relationship is the subject of William L. Rivers, The Adversaries, Politics and the Press.⁵ Rivers discusses this adversary relationship in terms of a "delicate balance." He concludes that "the proper role of a political reporter is that of an adversary."⁶ One problem, and one discussed by Rivers, entails the nature and extent of this adversary relationship. An excellent work which also discusses this adversary relationship is George F. Will (ed.) Press, Politics, and Popular Government.⁷ Since this is based on a panel discussion, it involves diverse points of view. Robert Bartley argues that the liberal-conservative dimension is not the best way to classify journalists and reporters. Instead, a more meaningful perspective is an "idealist-practical axis."⁸ Bartley contends that

journalists tend to be representative of an idealistic elite, which presumably functions to articulate values and ideals for the larger society. Perhaps because others are rejecting the values and ideas the idealistic elite has been offering, a significant gulf has grown between it and the rest of society.⁹

The press, he continues, ought to re-examine its role. It

⁵William L. Rivers, The Adversaries, Politics and the Press (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).

⁶Rivers, p. 47

⁷George F. Will, Press, Politics and Popular Government (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972).

⁸Will, p. 11.

⁹Will, p. 14.

should concentrate on the "competing elites that are discussing policies and on the policy-makers themselves."¹⁰ In responding to Bartley, Rowland Evans contends that there always will be a credibility gap and that this gap between the "producers and the consumers of the news is healthy."¹¹

Other points of view discuss the actual content of news. Cater argues that ". . .most reporters are not much concerned with personality and conflict."¹² Kristol mentions other problems. He states that television is the "slave of the . . . camera."¹³ It is, he says, the camera which dictates what is and what is not television news. This usual criterion oversimplifies complex issues and mobilizes "the audience's emotions around a vivid, simplified, essentially melodramatic vision of a political world, in which praise and blame are the magnetic poles."¹⁴

A similar work is Richard W. Lee (ed.), Politics and the Press.¹⁵ Examined here are such subjects as: "the role of the press in presidential politics", press coverage of politics, "biased political information", selection, credibility

¹⁰Will, p. 26.

¹¹Will, p. 30.

¹²Will, p. 34.

¹³Will, p. 48.

¹⁴Will, p. 51.

¹⁵Richard W. Lee (ed), Politics and the Press (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1970).

and "television distortion in political reporting." In this, Cornwell refers to the press-politics relationship as an "antagonistic one."¹⁶ He notes the importance of "image capital" to the President. Rovese, in "Inhibitions of the Truth," examines such inhibitions as the journalists' selective processes, the notion of a journalistic elite and the adversary nature of the press-politics relationship.¹⁸ All these combine to inhibit the "truth." According to David Broder, however, there is no such thing as "truth":

"...we have to realize that there is no such thing as a totally neutral, objective portrait of the world that can emerge from contemporary journalism."¹⁹ Journalists, therefore, should be aware "of our prejudices and built-in biases."²⁰ In discussing the press-politics relationship, Broder asserts that this cannot be a "neutral" relationship.²¹ Instead, it is a "manipulative" relationship--one in which both attempt to exploit or manipulate the other.²²

Other writers in this work are concerned with problems of selection. "News," argue Lang and Lang, "becomes increas-

¹⁶ Lee, p. 18.

¹⁷ Lee, p. 19.

¹⁸ Lee, p. 38.

¹⁹ Lee, pp. 62-63.

²⁰ Lee, p. 62.

²¹ Lee, p. 63.

²² Lee, p. 156.

ingly--for millions of Americans--that which is televised.²³ That which is televised, however, can be a function of the camera, emphasis on the visual, or the behavioral effects of being televised. Television, the Langs contend, is a "medium of confrontation. People become agitated over issues with which they have little familiarity, and react to them as if they really knew."²⁴

Other important books deal with the press and politics from different perspectives. From the perspective of CBS, William J. Small has written two relevant books: To Kill a Messenger and Political Power and the Press.²⁵ Of the two, the former is the more relevant. James Keough, President Nixon and the Press, examines the press-politics relationship from the perspective of the Nixon Administration.²⁶ While one may not agree with the interpretations of the book, the book is important because it gives a different perspective of events covered by the media. Thus, it is possible to contrast the Administration's interpretation of an event with the media's (including CBS) interpretation. The major

²³Lee, p. 156.

²⁴Lee, p. 161.

²⁵William J. Small, To Kill a Messenger (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1970), and Political Power and the Press (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1972).

²⁶James Keough, President Nixon and the Press (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1972).

thesis of the book seems to be that

there was that overriding, deep concern that the Washington news corps and the staffs of the major national media were so biased that the Administration would not get a fair break through them. As the months went by, there was considerable evidence to support that point of view.²⁷

A related category of works worth examining entails those which, while not concentrating on television news, do examine television in a political context. Often, much of what they do say about television in general does incorporate important elements which do pertain to television news. Their orientation, however, is usually towards the political campaigning aspect of politics.

Two such books are: Edward W. Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics and Bernard Rubin, Political Television.²⁸

Whereas Chester presents an historical analysis of radio and television, Rubin discusses television in the context of the early 1960's. A similar, though more specific work is Robert E. Gilbert, Television and Presidential Politics.²⁹ As the title indicates, the work concerns itself with the impact of television on presidential campaigning. This does present a good review of past presidential campaigns from the perspective of television impact.

²⁷Keough, p. 60.

²⁸Edward W. Chester, Radio, Television, and American Politics (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), Bernard Rubin, Political Television (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1967).

²⁹Robert E. Gilbert, Television and Presidential Politics (No. Quincy, Mass.: Christopher Publishing House, 1972)

Lang and Lang also analyze the impact of television on events and politics in Politics and Television.³⁰ In discussing the impact of television on such events as MacArthur Day, the 1952 conventions and the 1960 presidential campaign, they argue that television "presents a refracted image of the events it reports."³¹ Of more relevance, however, is their analysis of the "television personality" and the "intimacy" of television. The "television personality" is analyzed in the context of (1) television performance, (2) political role, and (3) personal image. While their concept of "intimacy" is discussed basically in terms of political campaigning, it does have relevance to television news, since television news does convey this same sense of intimacy. For many, this sense of intimacy is their basic contact with the political world. In an extended passage worth citing, the Langs discuss the nature and importance of television's intimacy.

. . .there is widespread belief in the intimacy of television, and this, in itself, makes a difference. When the formats of political telecasts are adapted to this belief, they emphasize the personal qualities of the politician rather than his purely political qualifications, or how well equipped he is to handle a particular role. At the same time, viewers believe that they have "seen for themselves," and their visual impressions suggest to them the "real" personal qualities of the familiar face. In all of this, the contribution

³⁰Kurt Lang, Gladys Lang, Politics and Television (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968).

³¹Lang and Lang, p. 295.

of television is made through its sensory realism, through the emphasis it places on symbols directly accessible to experience. The heterogeneity of views on complex policy matters and public problems can be factored down to simple alternatives. The search for "truth" becomes a search for "trust." Principles and methods become less important than "sincerity."³²

While the Langs approach television from a scholarly perspective, an inside perspective is offered by Robert MacNeil and Sig Michelson. MacNeil was associated with NBC News while Michelson worked for CBS News. Of the two works, Robert MacNeil, The People Machine, The Influence of Television on American Politics and Sig Michelson, The Electric Mirror, Politics in an Age of Television, MacNeil is more important in the context of television news.³³ MacNeil, in referring to network news, argues that

their content demonstrates capricious selection, due not only to lazy news judgment, but to the unshakable belief that the picture must come first. When good picture and hard, important news happily coincide, the result is often powerful. When there is important hard news and no relevant picture, then television is in trouble.³⁴

In addition to the analysis of television news, MacNeil discusses such topics as consensus journalism, political advertising, campaigning, and presidential access. Michelson, however, is more oriented towards the political aspects--

³²Lang and Lang, pp. 210-211.

³³Robert MacNeil, The People Machine (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968) and Sig Michelson, The Electric Mirror (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1972).

³⁴MacNeil, p. 54.

conventions, campaigning, and advertising--of television. He devotes little attention to television news.

Still, within the context of television and politics, a related category is worth examining. This involves works concentrating on the "new politics" and modern political campaigning. While the motivation and style of political campaigning differs from television news, the fact that they both deal with, and are concerned about, the visual aspects of the medium justifies its inclusion. Especially important is that a new trend in political advertising is the attempt to create commercials which appear less "commercial" and instead appear more in the form of a news-type documentary. Also, the political effects of campaign advertising could be both related to and similar to those of television news.

Gene Wyckoff, The Image Candidates, presents various descriptions and examples of new styles in political campaigning.³⁵ Important here is the notion and process of image building. According to Wyckoff, "television apparently does more than just present political candidates. Television transfigures candidates into personal images or characterizations that can be quite unique to the medium."³⁶ And, reinforcing what the

³⁵Gene Wyckoff, The Image Candidates (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1968).

³⁶Wyckoff, p. 216.

Langs said about intimacy, Wyckoff states that

a candidate's appearance and demeanor appear to provide viewers with the most substantial clues to his character. The rational import of what the candidate says on television, as long as it is not blatantly offensive to the great central cluster of the electorate, appears to have very little influence on viewer's perception of image.³⁷

Even though television news, unlike political advertising, covers uncontrolled situations, similar results might emerge--appearance and demeanor being the most important criterion. Also, there could be a vital interrelationship between the images of political advertising--each one exerting an influence on the other. For example, the image one has of a politician derived from television news could influence one's perception of the politician in an advertising situation. And, the image one gets of a politician from advertising could influence subsequent perceptions of the politician in uncontrolled news situations. Candidates, of course, do try to control their exposure. This strategy was described in The Selling of the President, 1968, by Joe McGinnis.³⁸

Three works are representative of the literature of the "new" politics and modern campaign techniques. These are Dan Nimmo, The Political Persuaders, The Techniques of Modern Election Campaigns; Ray Hiebert (ed.) The Political Image Merchants: Strategies in the New Politics; Robert

³⁷Wyckoff, p. 217

³⁸Joe McGinnis, The Selling of the President, 1968 (New York: Pocket Books, 1970).

Agranoff (ed.) The New Style in Election Campaigns.³⁹ All three are excellent in their descriptions and analyses of contemporary campaign techniques. Much of what they say interrelates with elements of the content and effects of television news.

Nimmo, for example, describes the importance of television and television news. Television is discussed in terms of visibility, simplicity, image and substance. For a candidate, ". . . exposure on a news program legitimizes the candidate; anyone can buy commercial advertising."⁴⁰ In addition to this legitimizing function, television functions to create a sense of involvement and participation in a campaign:

The remarkable capacity of television to convey the images of conflicts, candidates, and political moods, yet allow the viewer to perceive in those images what he expects to see, to "see for himself," results in citizens who are electronic participants in political events rather than mere targets for campaign messages. But the character of television itself shapes what they expect to see.⁴¹

Jay Weitzner, in Hiebert (ed.), continues with this same theme:

that which I see and hear involves me more than that which I just see. Once I am involved, I become a

³⁹Dan Nimmo, The Political Persuaders (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Ray Hiebert (et al.), ed. The Political Image Merchants (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, Ltd., 1971); Robert Agranoff, ed., The New Style in Election Campaigns (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1972).

⁴⁰Nimmo, p. 155.

⁴¹Nimmo, p. 186.

participant and add something of myself to what I see and hear. I add my own impressions and attitudes. I have become a part of a circle of communication. I see a politician and add something of what I believe a politician should be.⁴²

This quality of television, of course, pertains to both television news and political advertising. As mentioned previously, exposure with one would "condition" the perceptions and images towards the other. This interrelationship between television news and political advertising is worth examining.

Television news. There is very little good literature which deals solely with television news. Usually, description and analysis of television news is incorporated into either works on television or works on journalism. Television news, as the unit of analysis, has received very little scholarly examination. In this section the literature of television news will be divided into (1) Interpretation and Analysis and (2) Empirical Studies.

Interpretation and analysis. Two basic sources provide a good introduction into the literature of television news. Irving E. Fang, Television News, presents a good account of the technical aspects of television news and its production.⁴³

⁴²Jay Weitzner, "Handling the Candidate on Television," in Ray Hiebert (et al.), ed., The Political Image Merchants, p. 105.

⁴³Irving E. Fang, Television News (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1968).

This is not an analysis of television news--rather it is an insight into such processes as filming, reporting, editing, and producing the news. Also, this is one of the few works which actually includes transcripts of network news programs. A basic analysis of television news is provided by Harry J. Skornia, Television and the News, A Critical Appraisal.⁴⁴ Although the book is dated in that it does not incorporate some of the more contemporary criticisms of television news, it does have utility since many of his criticisms are basic. Also important are his descriptions of the inside aspects of television news. Skornia contends that television "magnifies small, even microscopic objects until they fill the entire screen as completely as the largest objects. Television daily makes unequals equal, and equals unequal, as it pleases."⁴⁵ This is crucial considering that a vital element in today's political process is the contest for "political visibility." Most of Skornia's criticisms reflect the shortcomings of both the medium and the philosophy of news. He discusses such things as: emphasis on the abnormal and superficial, the lack of real information, the emphasis on "firstness and recency," the use of the star" system, the influence of financial considerations, and the problems of "fragmentation and discontinuity."⁴⁶ Also, although his examples are dated, Skornia .

⁴⁴Harry J. Skornia, Television and the News (Palto Alto, California: Pacific Books, Publishers, 1968).

⁴⁵Skornia, p. 22.

⁴⁶Skornia, pp. 30-45.

does give an interesting account of news blockage and suppression--a situation most would be totally unfamiliar with.

Many good analyses of television news are found in works of a slightly more general nature. William Wood, Electronic Journalism, is an example of this.⁴⁷ Television here, as in other sources, is analyzed from such perspectives as immediacy and intimacy. While television is intimate, Wood argues that "involvement does not insure that the viewer will be informed and enlightened by what he sees."⁴⁸ Wood discusses television in terms of different forms of news, gatekeeping, the role of television news, objectivity and bias. Because of the "personalness" of television, Wood contends that there is less chance of objectivity than with other media.⁴⁹ Emphasized here are such things as "a raised eyebrow, a pause, a tone of voice, a three-word aside."⁵⁰ Also vital are the emphasis of stories and the ordering and presentation of certain scenes. One way to view television news is as an "originator." By this, Wood means that "the men of television journalism have made news by getting newsmakers to say something newsworthy on the air before they say it anywhere else."⁵¹

⁴⁷William Wood, Electronic Journalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

⁴⁸Wood, p. 7.

⁴⁹Wood, p. 73.

⁵⁰Wood, p. 73.

⁵¹Wood, p. 92.

An excellent work, which deserves extended commentary is Phillip Geyelin and Douglas Cater, American Media:

Adequate or Not?⁵² Geyelin asks if the media "do as good a job as they could in presenting an accurate, balanced, comprehensive, unprejudiced picture of society--which is to say our problems and what we are doing or not doing about them?"⁵³

His own response:

The answer is no, not only because the job is probably impossible, or because there can be nothing but the most arbitrary standards for judging what an accurate picture of society might be, but because the errors and weaknesses and failures in the performance of the media are plainly there for all to see.⁵⁴

He goes on to discuss the liberal orientation of most reporters and thinks that most would agree with Howard K.

Smith's criticisms of reporters and their liberal bias. This liberal orientation, however, Geyelin argues, does not really explain the shortcomings of the news media.

As might be expected, a discussion of bias or orientation would be followed by philosophy on the notion of objectivity. Geyelin asserts that objectivity and fairness are "in the eye of the beholder."⁵⁵ What most people want, he insists, when they ask for less bias is in fact a better picture of society...a picture of society more congenial to

⁵²Phillip Geyelin, Douglas Cater, American Media: Ade-
quate or Not? (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise In-
stitute for Public Policy Research, 1970).

⁵³Geyelin, pp. 10-11.

⁵⁴Geyelin, p. 11.

⁵⁵Geyelin, p. 13.

what they think it is or wish it was."⁵⁶ Geyelin could be quite right about this, but it does not answer the problem of a liberal bias--which Geyelin admits exists. The fact that people do want a more congenial view of society does not cancel out the existence of bias,--whether it be conservative or liberal. Geyelin does argue that the press is really too diffuse to be monolithically liberal.

Cater, in his section, responds to Geyelin's comments. He argues that the news media do not take "themselves and their role seriously enough."⁵⁷ While noting that the media do play an obvious important role, Cater asks how does "one of us judge whether the images we see are an adequate picture of American society today?"⁵⁸ While Cater is critical of Agnew's "devil theory" of mass media, he does ask some questions which seem to reinforce Agnew's complaints. For example, he asks, "Does TV's coast-to-coast range give the dissenter publicity advantages which the voice of reason is unable to combat?"⁵⁹ In addition, Cater discusses other aspects of media--such as its power to both influence and ignore, its gatekeeping function, and the fact that it is attacked from all sides.

Charles Daley (ed.), in Media and the Cities, centers on the role of the news media in relation to Black and racial problems.⁶⁰ Here Bennett argues that American journalism

⁵⁶Geyelin, p. 24.

⁵⁷Geyelin, p. 35.

⁵⁸Geyelin, p. 35.

⁵⁹Geyelin, p. 45.

⁶⁰Charles Daley (ed.), The Media and the Cities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

is white, middle-class, and opposed to radical change.⁶¹ He talks of Blacks being "smothered by extremists of the middle, extremists of the status quo."⁶² Hamilton discusses the lack of media coverage of the "invisible" poor while Bagdikian argues for the inclusion of extreme views. Bagdikian contends that

Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown should not be excluded from the news solely on grounds that they disturb the peace. Ideas are not always propelled into the public consciousness by quiet voices speaking in tranquility.⁶³

Bagdikian reinforces this by stating that there were times when such people as Whitney Young, Roy Wilkins, Thurgood Marshall, and Dr. Martin Luther King were considered radicals who did not "represent the Negro community."⁶⁴

Just as the Black upheaval and racial problems of the 1960's produced, among other things, a re-examination of the role and performance of the press, Vietnam and the resulting dissention also produced a similar re-examination and re-evaluation of the news media--especially television. One such work which specifically discusses Vietnam is Michael J. Arlen, The Living Room War. The title indicates the nature

⁶¹Lerone Bennett Jr., "The White Media" in Daley, p. 8.

⁶²Bennett, p. 9, in Daley.

⁶³Ben Bagdikian, "Editorial Responsibility in Times of Urban Disorder", in Daley, p. 20.

⁶⁴Bagdikian, in Daley, pp. 20-21.

of coverage of the war--the type coverage, of course, which is familiar to most everyone. Another way to refer to Vietnam is "television's war." His basic criticism of the Vietnam coverage is that it is an "excessively simple, emotional, and military-oriented view of what is at best a mighty unsimple situation."⁶⁵

Arlen also discusses television in the context of accuracy and balance, politics, personality and pseudoevents. Similar to others, he notes that it is television which "certifies" things as being "real."⁶⁷ In discussing the importance of intimacy and personality, Arlen notes that

. . .people nowadays, for whatever reasons, seem to want so terribly to touch and be reassured by personality--not just by its presence but by its implications (the hope, for example, that one attaches in one's own feelings to a leader, and that is still so much a realer thing on any issue), and TV simply happens to affect that. . .⁶⁸

Also interesting is Arlen's contention that

What people really and mostly receive from television, it would seem is a sense of themselves--the same sort of sense, perhaps, that people once received by looking into the faces of their neighbors, when neighbors still had faces and in turn looked back.⁶⁹

⁶⁵Michael J. Arlen, Living Room War (New York: The Viking Press, 1969).

⁶⁶Arlen, pp. 7-8.

⁶⁷Arlen, p. 191.

⁶⁸Arlen, p. 138.

⁶⁹Arlen, p. 178.

One of the complaints about television news, however, seems to be that people do not really get a "sense of themselves" from it. Instead, they get a vision of America which seems to be alien to them

Dale Minor, The Information War, an interesting work similar to Arlen, reiterates a familiar theme: "people in general want the press to tell it like they think it should be."⁷⁰ Minor basically concentrates on two aspects: the antagonistic government-press relationship and the presentation of news. After criticizing both and arguing that it is easy to blame the press and to make it the scapegoat of today's problems, Minor states that to "the white racist it is the 'integrationist' or 'liberal' press. To the black militant, it is the 'white' press. To the Right, it is the 'Leftist' press; and to the Left, the 'Establishment' press. For all, however, it is the enemy's press."⁷¹ The two reactions to this, of course, are (1) that the press must be doing something right since it antagonizes everybody or (2) the press obviously must be doing something wrong since it pleases nobody. Also discussed here are such relevant things as the role and effects of television, definitions of news, government deceit and manipulation of news, pseudo-events, objectivity and balance.

⁷⁰Dale Minor, The Information War (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1970), p. xi.

⁷¹Minor, p. 93

Also relevant are Minor's criticisms of the press. He argues that

the critical factor, however, is the relative competence of the press with respect to the demands made upon it by contemporary society. The truth is that compared to the past, it may make a very good showing, but its performance has fallen seriously behind the requirements and responsibilities of the present day.⁷²

Other criticisms pertain to such things as TV's reliance on the New York Times, the emphasis on speed, and action, the lack of depth, the star system, the failure to really inform, and the entertainment orientation of television news. On Vietnam coverage Minor argues that

on television, . . . it has often seemed that Vietnam's importance as a news event is outweighed by its importance as a dramatic event. How else explain the displacement of perhaps significant news and analysis--a political story, for instance, that might presage a change in the situation--by the coverage of search and destroy operation number 3,468. . .⁷³

In addition to this, Minor also discusses the shortcomings of the press in general; shortcomings such as--having a business and conservative orientation, reflecting the views of the Establishment, and failure to provide a real understanding--which would pertain to television.

Another critical perspective of television news is provided by Joseph Keeley, The Left-Leaning Antenna - Political Bias in Television.⁷⁴ Other than reflecting conservative

⁷²Minor, p. xii.

⁷³Minor, p. 155.

⁷⁴Joseph Keeley, The Left-Leaning Antenna (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1971).

criticisms of television news, this is not really that valuable in that Keeley's analysis is not that extensive. Even the chapter on Vietnam coverage is not that substantive.

Of more relevance is the yearly editions of Marvin Barrett (ed.), Survey of Broadcast Journalism, 1968-1969, 1969-1970.⁷⁵

While it is relevant, it does have limited utility since much of it concentrates on local broadcast journalism. Written from the perspective of broadcast journalism, the Survey often quotes the top names in broadcast journalism. For example, Walter Cronkite is quoted as saying ". . . what we're defending is the people's right to know and we have to be in the front line of that battle all the time."⁷⁶

Another perspective in the literature of television news is offered by the personalities themselves. Two short magazine articles give an indication of the views of Walter Cronkite. "What Does Walter Cronkite Really Think?" is one.⁷⁷ The other is "A Conversation With Walter Cronkite."⁷⁸ Neither has much utility--other than to give a superficial description of Cronkite and some of his opinions. More important is

⁷⁵Marvin Barrett (ed.), Survey of Broadcast Journalism, 1968-1969 (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, Inc., 1969), Survey of Broadcast Journalism, 1969-1970 (New York, Grosset and Dunlap, Inc., 1970).

⁷⁶Barrett (ed.), 1969-1970, p. 38.

⁷⁷Oriana Fallaci, "What Does Walter Cronkite Really Think?", Look, November 11, 1970, pp. 57-62.

⁷⁸"A Conversation with Cronkite," TV Guide, March 4, 1972, pp. 18-20.

Cronkite's The Challenges of Change.⁷⁹ This collection of speeches and lectures is good; all but one, however, were delivered before 1970. Thus, they are not a response to some of the real contemporary journalistic problems--such as the Agnew criticisms. But the book does give Cronkite's perception as to the role of journalism:

The public fails to realize that what is at stake is not a narrow pride of product on the part of the publisher or broadcaster but the citizen's own unquestioned right to know.⁸⁰

Another interesting insight is provided by CBS' Charles Kuralt, "Reporting on the 'Little People.'"⁸¹ Kuralt's remarks, which are worth quoting, deal with the diversity of the country, a diversity and tone not evident on television news. From the perspective of "On the Road," Kuralt states that

To read the papers and listen to the news, to be a reporter working in the midst of the great movements which are sweeping the country and trying to make sense out of them, one would think that the country is in terrible trouble. You do not get that impression when you travel the back roads and the small towns. You find many strengths you weren't aware of. You find people who are courteous and neighborly and who really care about their country and wish it well, and seek for leadership to heal the wounds of the country. You do not get the feeling of a country on the brink of revolution or torn apart by hatred--the kind of impression you might get if you only read the page one stories.⁸²

⁷⁹Walter Cronkite, The Challenges of Change (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1971).

⁸⁰Cronkite, p. 97.

⁸¹Charles Kuralt, "Reporting the 'Little People'", Columbia Journalism Review (Jan.-Feb., 1972), pp. 17-22.

⁸²Kuralt, p. 20.

What Kuralt is saying also pertains to television news; and, he seems to have captured a basic dissatisfaction that most average people have toward television news.

Although there are not many scholarly analyses of television news, three, two of which are excellent, are worth examining in detail. One is Walter Goldstein, "Network Television and Political Change: Two Issues in Democratic Theory."⁸³ Arguing for a better understanding of the mass media, Goldstein is interested in two basic problems. They are (1) "the responsibility of the networks and their staffs in handling complex and controversial issues," and (2) "the inevitable manipulation or shaping of values which the networks cannot hope to evade. . ."⁸⁴ Within this context, Goldstein discusses news selection, presentation, and treatment. Goldstein asks, with concern for more diversified views,

Whose decision, it must be asked, is it that the mass viewers shall be exposed to a particular set of values? Who shall sanction the choice of deviant values that are to be made visible, and just how wide is the range of deviation that is acceptable?⁸⁵

In answering this latter question, Goldstein is critical of network news for failing "to act outside the area of perceived social consensus."⁸⁶

⁸³Walter Goldstein, "Network Television and Political Change: Two Issues in Democratic Theory", Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 20, 1967, pp. 875-887.

⁸⁴Goldstein, p. 877.

⁸⁵Goldstein, p. 881.

⁸⁶Goldstein, p. 882.

Paul Weaver, in a more contemporary article, also discusses the performance of network television news in "Is Television News Biased?"⁸⁷ The article is in part a response to Edith Efron's finding that television news is biased.

Weaver, however, asserts that

The real question is not: Are the media biased? They are, by definition and of necessity. The question is rather: How are the media biased and what is the consequent effect on our interest and values?⁸⁸

Weaver has both positive and negative things to say about Efron's The News Twisters. On a positive note, Weaver argues that "properly interpreted, this evidence reveals a great deal about how television news is biased and thus about the direction of its influence on public opinion."⁸⁹

Weaver, in addition to his extensive analysis of Efron, analyzes the nature of television news. Important is his concept of the "journalistic model or theory of politics."⁹⁰ This, he asserts, is the framework within which television news views politics. Within this model

politics is essentially a game played by individual politicians for personal advancement, gain, or power. The game is a competitive one, and the players' principal activities are those of calculating and pursuing strategies designed to defeat competitors and to achieve their goals (usually election to office).⁹¹

⁸⁷ Paul Weaver, "Is Television News Biased?", Public Interest, #26 Winter, 1972, pp. 57-74.

⁸⁸ Weaver, p. 57.

⁸⁹ Weaver, p. 60.

⁹⁰ Weaver, p. 69.

⁹¹ Weaver, p. 69.

Weaver employs this model in his analysis of television's coverage of the 1968 presidential campaign. He argues that television basically presented each candidates within the context of a particular theme, and that analysis of the candidates was based on interpretations reflecting these themes. He contends that

Humphrey, the underdog, Nixon, the front runner, and Wallace, the sower of discord and violence--these were the central themes which the networks repeated day after day as they looked beneath the surface of events to plumb what was really happening in the campaign.⁹²

What is needed, Weaver argues, is a pluralism of themes or stories; an "expansion of the journalists' vision."⁹³

Another excellent article, the best and most contemporary scholarly analysis of television news, is Gary L. Wamsley and Richard A. Pride, "Television Network News: Rethinking The Iceberg Problem."⁹⁴ After a review of the literature of mass media effects, they ask". . .can a case be made that TV news is qualitatively different in its effects from other news media?"⁹⁵ The authors think that television is different and argue that it should be analyzed within the context of these different, or unique, characteristics. Some of these characteristics are: the

⁹²Weaver, p. 72.

⁹³Weaver, p. 74.

⁹⁴Gary L. Wamsley, Richard A. Pride, "Television Network News: Re-Thinking the Iceberg Problem", Western Political Quarterly, Vol. xxv #3, September 1972, pp. 434-450.

⁹⁵Wamsley, p. 435.

audience size, the mix, the trust, the unavoidable nature of television and its video effects.

In addition to arguing that television news is qualitatively different from other forms, Wamsley and Pride also reject the conventional wisdom concerning the political effects of the news media. Whereas previously it was held that the media had reinforcing political effects, the authors assert that "television news may have profound non-reinforcing political effects."⁹⁶ This "non-reinforcing" effect of television news is discussed in such terms and concepts as "potent symbols affecting a broader audience, altered perceptions of reality and delayed attitude change, great issue awareness than previously believed."⁹⁷ On a specific note, and one of interest to the research of this paper, Wamsley and Pride conclude by saying that the "characteristics outlined in this essay may mean that TV news presents the authority figures of the American political system in more of a negative light than a positive one."⁹⁸ If this is true, it could raise some interesting questions relevant to both the content and effects of television news.

Empirical Studies. This section reviews some empirical studies of different aspects of television news. Almost all

⁹⁶Wamsley, p. 443.

⁹⁷Wamsley, p. 449.

⁹⁸Wamsley, p. 450.

of these studies involve either a short period of analysis or a small sample of a longer period of coverage. The following studies do give a good indication of the nature and extent of empirical research dealing with the content of television news.

The most comprehensive examination of the content of television news is Edith Efron's The News Twisters.⁹⁹ While her analysis covers all three networks, it is limited to the 1968 campaign period--September 16, 1968, to November 4, 1968. And it only concentrates on coverage of the three presidential candidates plus selected "issues." Still, it is the most ambitious attempt to document television news' content. While Efron has been criticized on methodological grounds, her study does give a good account of the nature of television coverage during this period.¹⁰⁰ Efron's technique was to select, in addition to the three presidential races, ten "issues" prevalent during this period. Some of these "issues" were: Vietnam policy, the Viet Cong, Black militants, conservatives, liberals, left and demonstrators. After recording and transcribing the news programs, she then identified, isolated and coded the opinion source and the nature and direction of that opinion source and the nature and direction of that opinion

⁹⁹Edith Efron, The News Twisters (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971).

¹⁰⁰For example, see Weaver.

From this, she concludes that

on the basis of these descriptive statistics, it is clear that network coverage tends to be strongly biased in favor of the Democratic-liberal-left axis of opinion, and strongly biased against the Republican-conservative-right axis of opinion.¹⁰¹

She continues:

The networks actively slanted their opinion coverage against U.S. policy on the Vietnam War. . . .The networks actively favored the Democratic candidate, Hubert Humphrey, for the Presidency, over his Republican opponent.¹⁰²

As might be expected, the Efron study has provoked various reactions. Charles Winick discusses the methodological shortcomings of the study.¹⁰³ He criticizes the study on such grounds as the lack of clearly defined categories and concepts, the absence of any form of coder reliability, and the importance of the visual effects. Even with these and other methodological criticisms, the book is important since more methodological precision would not destroy her basic findings. In addition to the analysis of television coverage, Efron does present a good discussion of the nature, type and extent of opinion and bias. And, she discusses the different techniques of opinion expression.

While the Efron study documents the "liberal" bias of

¹⁰¹Efron, p. 47.

¹⁰²Efron, p. 47.

¹⁰³Charles Winick, "Critique of the Methodology of Edith Efron's 'The News Twisters'," Congressional Record, October 26, 1971, pp. E11283-E11286.

television news, another study by Robert Cirino, Don't Blame the Media, reaches different conclusions.¹⁰⁴ Based on an analysis covering the period of July 10, 1969, to September 10, 1969, Cirino discovers a lack of objectivity and fairness and concludes that

Those who control access to mass media clearly and unmistakably select, exclude, edit, and distort interviews in such a way that Establishment viewpoints have a decided competitive advantage over those viewpoints critical of the Establishment.¹⁰⁵

Even though Cirino only devotes a portion of the book to television news, and although his analysis is not as systematic or comprehensive as Efron's study, his analysis is still valuable. While Efron obviously comes at her analysis from a conservative perspective, Cirino comes at his from a liberal perspective. Much of what he says about the techniques of bias--such as news selection, omission, emphasis on the visual and editorializing--has been cited by others, including Efron. What is different, however, are Cirino's conclusions as to the nature, direction, and causes of the bias.

Other similar, though short, empirical studies exist. The most recent study, one still in progress, is an examination of network coverage of the 1972 presidential campaign.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴Robert Cirino, Don't Blame the People (New York: Vintage Books, 1971).

¹⁰⁵Cirino, p. 152

¹⁰⁶See Edwin Diamond, "Fairness and Balance in the Evening News", Columbia Journalism Review, January-February, 1973, pp. 22-23.

This study, to be finished in April, 1973, will seek to document "some definite patterns of campaign coverage."¹⁰⁷ Dennis T. Lowry, "Agnew and the Network TV News: A Before/After Content Analysis," analyzes ninety newscasts from the three networks.¹⁰⁸ Analyzing two periods, June to August, 1969, and June to August, 1970, Lowry wanted to see if Agnew's 1969 Des Moines speech had any effect on subsequent news content. He concludes that the speech did influence network treatment of news. Specifically, he notes that there was a "9% in report sentences attributed--the category which is the 'safest' of all categories a network can use."¹⁰⁹ Another study by Lowry, "Gresham's Law and Network TV News Selection", is based on a sample of the 1970 July and August broadcasts.¹¹⁰ The purpose here was to document the extent of "Bad News" covered by the networks. Lowry concludes that "Bad News" does not drive out Other News. . . .¹¹¹ However, while "Bad News" and "Other News" received the approximate same length of coverage, it is important to note that "Bad News" in general received more visual emphasis than "Other News."¹¹²

¹⁰⁷Diamond, p. 22.

¹⁰⁸Dennis T. Lowry, "Agnew and the Network TV News: A Before/After Content Analysis", Journalism Quarterly, Summer 1971, pp. 205-210.

¹⁰⁹Lowry, p. 210.

¹¹⁰Dennis T. Lowry, "Gresham's Law and Network TV News Selection", Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. xv, #4, Fall 1971, pp. 397-408.

¹¹¹Lowry, p. 405.

¹¹²Lowry, p. 406.

Other studies document different subject areas. For example, Frank Russo examines Vietnam coverage in "A Study of Bias in TV Coverage of the Vietnam War: 1969 and 1970."¹¹³ Using a total of ninety-six broadcasts, Russo examines bias within the context of the Nixon Administration's Vietnam policy. Defining bias as "that quality of opinion or of actual or supposed fact that would influence one to support or oppose a President or his policy," Russo concludes that there was no bias.¹¹⁴ He asserts that his results "provide factual evidence that there was no bias against the Nixon Administration's policies in Vietnam in the 1969 and 1970 broadcasts of either NBC or CBS."¹¹⁵

Two studies compare American television network news with CBS during a twenty-one day period covering broadcasts in 1970-1971.¹¹⁶ They discovered differences which reflected, "the different political positions of their relative countries in the world."¹¹⁷ For example, international news on

¹¹³Frank D. Russo, "A Study of Bias in TV Coverage of the Vietnam War: 1969 and 1970", Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter 1971-1972, pp. 528-543.

¹¹⁴Russo, p. 539.

¹¹⁵Russo, p. 542.

¹¹⁶Chris J. Sheer and Sam W. Eiler, "A Comparison of Canadian and American Network Television News", Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. xvi, #2, Spring 1972, pp. 159-164.

¹¹⁷Sheer, p. 163.

NBC was related to political or domestic situations in America. Benjamin D. Singer, "Violence, Protest, and the War in Television News: The U.S. and Canada Compared," analyzes "aggressive items"--events dealing with violence, protest and the War during the period of April 20, 1970, to May 10, 1970.¹¹⁸ One of his conclusions is that the "American television news show exceeds the Canadian program in aggression items for every one of the 21 consecutive days monitored."¹¹⁹ The percentage difference was almost two-to-one. Even controlling for Vietnam coverage, which would be more salient to the United States, CBS still devoted a significantly higher proportion of time to "aggression items."

Other studies examine different elements. Adnan Almaney, "International and Foreign News on Network Television News," examines during a four-week period the priority of different types of news.¹²⁰ In terms of priority and coverage, the order of ranking was national news, international news and foreign news. Almaney states that generally "international and foreign news are reported only when they reach the 'crisis'

¹¹⁸ Benjamin D. Singer, "Violence, Protest, and the War in Television News: The U.S. and Canada Compared", Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter 1970-1971, pp. 611-616.

¹¹⁹ Singer, p. 613.

¹²⁰ Adnan Almaney, "International and Foreign Affairs on Network Television News", Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. xiv (Fall 1970), pp. 499-509.

point. Events that remain below that point are scarcely reported."¹²¹ Specific television news' coverage of the 1965 Dominican Crisis is analyzed by Harney and Stone in "Television and Newspaper Front Page Coverage of a Major News Story."¹²² The authors argue that the emphasis of the television coverage was on the dramatic and colorful--rather than on the reporting of actual news. They conclude that "on every network less than half of the Dominican film segments contributed directly to the reporting of the major events of the crisis."¹²³

There are studies worth mentioning which do not directly involve network television news, but which do relate to the concerns of this research. For example, Doris Graber, "The Press as Opinion Resource During the 1968 Presidential Campaign," examines newspaper coverage of the candidates.¹²⁴ This study provides a good framework for a similar study based on television coverage. Could it be documented that television, like the newspapers, emphasizes the candidates' personal qualities while de-emphasizing their philosophies

¹²¹Almaney, p. 509.

¹²²Russell R. Harney, Vernon A. Stone, "Television and Newspaper Front Page Coverage of a Major News Story, Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. xii #2, Spring 1969, pp. 181-188.

¹²³Harney, p. 187.

¹²⁴Doris Graber, "The Press As Opinion Resource During the 1968 Presidential Campaign", Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1971, pp. 168-182.

or abilities? Rogers and Clevenger provide a good example of the form and method of content analysis of television in "The Selling of the Pentagon: Was CBS The Fulbright Propaganda Machine?"¹²⁵ Another example of television news content analysis is James A. Anderson, "Broadcast Stations and Newspapers: The Problem of Information Control: A Content Analysis of Local News Presentations."¹²⁶

Two other works which are systematic analyses are worth mentioning, One is Walter Cronkite, Eye on the World.¹²⁷ In this, Cronkite, using pictures and excerpts from his program, discusses and describes the major contemporary issues and events. The book does give some indications of Cronkite's perspective toward these issues and events. Finally, Dan Menaker, "Art and Artifice in Network News," provides a short, light description and analysis of television news.¹²⁸ Among other things, he discusses the entertainment function of television news.

The effects of television. As might be expected, there is much speculation but little understanding of the political effects of television and television news. This section will

¹²⁵Jimmie N. Rogers, Theodore Clevenger, Jr., "The Selling of the Pentagon: Was CBS the Fulbright Propaganda Machine?", The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. LVII, #3, October 1971, pp. 266-273.

¹²⁶James A. Anderson, "Broadcast Stations and Newspapers: The Problem of Information Control: A Content Analysis of Local News Presentation." (Ohio: Ohio University Broadcast Research Center, 1971).

¹²⁷Walter Cronkite, Eye on the World (New York: Cowles Book Company, 1971).

¹²⁸Dan Menaker, "Art and Artifice in Network News", Harpers Magazine, October 1972, pp. 40-47.

briefly review some of the empirical research, speculation, and discussion concerned with television's political effects.

General works. Two works serve as the best introductions to the broad area of the effects of mass media. The first, Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communications, examines the psychological screens, variable, and effects involved in the communication process.¹²⁹ Klapper's pessimism as to the possibility of understanding the complexity of the effects has been discussed. Although written in 1960, Klapper is still cited as the most important work dealing with communication effects. The second important general source is Walter Weiss, "Effects of the Mass Media of Communication" in The Handbook of Social Psychology.¹³⁰ While Weiss does provide a good summation of the research and literature of media effects, one of the problems with his article is that it has very little utility in terms of contemporary political effects. The problem is that his analysis of the political effects of the media is conducted within the context of the voting studies of the 1940's and 1950's. Thus, he analyzes media's political effects from the perspective of The People's Choice, The Voter

¹²⁹See Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communications (New York: The Free Press, 1960).

¹³⁰Walter Weiss, "Effects of the Mass Media of Communication," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd edition. (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.), Vol. 5, 1969, pp. 77-195.

Decides, and Voting. Obviously, the political significance and impact of television has greatly changed since these studies.

A short article, which provides a good perspective for both empirical and intuitive analysis of the political effects of television is Leonard Berkowitz, "Sex and Violence: We Can't Have It Both Ways."¹³¹ The purpose of the article is to discuss the important part values play in media research. Citing both the conclusions of the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, Berkowitz demonstrates how one argued, in effect, that the media did have important effects whereas the other Commission argued that the media did not have any real effects. Thus, the Violence Commission concluded that media violence will have effects while the Pornography Commission concluded that media exposure of sex has very little overt effect. As Berkowitz says, "you can't have it both ways." He argues that values and ideology had important influence on these two contradictory conclusions.

Empirical studies. Four empirical studies indicate some of the directions of the research of the effects of television. Harvey K. Jacobson, "Mass Media Believability: A Study of Receiver Judgments" reinforces the findings of the Roper studies concerning the credibility of the news media.¹³² In this study

¹³¹ Leonard Berkowitz, "Sex and Violence: We Can't Have It Both Ways," Psychology Today, December 1971, pp. 14-23.

¹³² Harvey K. Jacobson, "Mass Media Believability: A Study of Receiver Judgments," Journalism Quarterly, Spring 1969, pp. 20-28.

television did emerge as "the most believable news source."¹³³ Lemert and Nestvold, "Television News and Status Conferred," conclude as would be expected, that exposure on network television news does confer status upon those receiving coverage.¹³⁴

Timothy P. Meyer, "News Reporter Bias: A Case Study in Selective Perception", compares the effects of an Agnew interview on the David Frost show with the effects of the New York Times' report of the program.¹³⁵ While this does not involve television news, it is relevant since it demonstrates that direct television exposure of a political actor will produce different effects than a newspaper account. While there were obvious differences, this direct coverage of the Frost show would have similarities with the direct coverage of television news. Meyer states, "In brief, students who saw the program judged Agnew in a more positive light, while students who read about the program saw Agnew in a more negative light."¹³⁶ The Frost program, of course, was not edited whereas the newspaper report could have been selective in many ways. Another study by Meyer, "Some Effects of Real Newsfilm Violence on

¹³³Jacobson, p. 26.

¹³⁴James B. Lemert, Karl J. Nestvold, "Television News and Status Conferred", Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. XV, #4, Fall, 1970, pp. 491-497.

¹³⁵Timothy P. Meyer, "New Reporter Bias: A Case Study in Selective Perception", Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. XVI #2, Spring 1972, pp. 195-203.

¹³⁶Meyer, p. 199.

the Behavior of Others", attempted to examine the "effects of television news reporters' descriptions on the viewer's perception of a news event. . .".¹³⁷ Using newsfilm of a stabbing of a North Vietnamese soldier, Meyer concludes that

the news reporters' descriptions of a "real violence" news event can substantially affect the viewer's perception of the violence in that event. . . And, the news reporter can, by himself, determine whether the violence will be perceived as justified or unjustified.¹³⁸

Most of the analysis of the effects of television, however, are not the product of laboratory experiments. This final section will examine some of the scholarly and journalistic analyses and interpretations of the political effects of the news media.

Scholarly and journalistic interpretations. One excellent source, already discussed, is Lang and Lang, Politics and Television. Since this is one of the best extended discussions of concerns relevant to this paper, their ideas will be extensively discussed and quoted.

They concur with others that the vote decision is the culmination of a process; a process in which television does pay an important role since it helps to create and shape the "political imagery" of the vote decision.¹³⁹ Specifically,

¹³⁷Timothy P. Meyer, "Some Effects of Real Newsfilm Violence on the Behavior of Viewers", Journal of Broadcasting, Vol. XV, #3, Summer 1971, pp. 275-285.

¹³⁸Meyer, p. 285.

¹³⁹Lang and Lang, p. 305.

they note that

television, like radio and print, forces attention to some issues and ignores others, helps build public images of political figures until they become familiar to all, and constantly suggests, by what is shown, the things individuals everywhere should know about, think about, have opinions about.¹⁴⁰

Another type of effects they discuss involves dimensions of trust and confidence in the government. In examining this, they argue that the distrust of government

has its roots in the complexities of political life, complexities that lie beyond the understanding of all but the most politically sophisticated. The media, we contend, can stir up in individuals defense reactions by their emphasis on crisis and conflict in lieu of clarifying normal decision-making processes. . . . Sometimes disgust may be fully justified, but often it is nothing but a defensive reaction against confusion, against reality that is overpowering, against the unfamiliar and the frightening, where "remote" events and invisible powers seem to determine the destiny of the individual who can do nothing about it.¹⁴¹

Still another interesting theme developed by the Langs is the role television plays in "personalizing" some aspects of the political process. The result of the "personalizing" process is that "trust" may become a more important requisite than "truth." The Langs contend that one of the effects of television is that

viewers focus less on what the truth is than on who can be trusted. Trusting in their own ability to know who can be trusted, they will accept policies they otherwise might oppose, so long as their advocates seem 'sincere' and 'honest.' Even the most sophisticated viewer will

¹⁴⁰Lang and Lang, p. 306.

¹⁴¹Lang and Lang, p. 307.

lean on television for this kind of information during those periods when "whom to trust" seems more important than what any man stands for.¹⁴²

A final point worth examining is the notion, discussed by the Langs, that television has the effect of being most believable since with television, people can "see for themselves."

We do not imply that viewers believe they actually see and know everything that is going on. But they do come to subscribe to the notion, constantly conveyed to them by TV commentary and the press, that they "see for themselves," that they are directly involved in history, that television takes them to the scene of the crime, that they have a clearer picture of what is going on than people right "there." . . . The gist of the evidence is that people do not actually "see for themselves," but many still believe that they do. The effect of this belief may be as important as any effect of television that can be objectively documented. A belief in television as authentic experience makes it possible for viewers to validate their prejudices while increasing their self-confidence about their political expertise. They can assure this by not perceiving what they do not want to see, or by limiting their "participation" to what they understand. Viewers often lack the background to comprehend a good many of the events that "happen before their eyes." But no matter. They can decline to follow the camera and limit the number of personalities and the breadth of action they permit to reach their threshold of attention. In this way, they can overlook much of what goes on and fit the rest into available stereotypes.¹⁴³

Others approach the problem of media effects from different perspectives. As mentioned, Vamsley and Pride note that the conventional thinking towards media effects has held that media "are more likely to reinforce than change."¹⁴⁴ They argue, however, that because of its unique nature, television

¹⁴²Lang and Lang, p. 308.

¹⁴³Lang and Lang, p. 301.

¹⁴⁴Klapper, p. 8.

"may have profound non-reinforcing effects."¹⁴⁵ Specifically, they assert that the characteristics of television "result in a sum total of effects that is denigrative of political system authority symbols rather than supportive."¹⁴⁶

On Vietnam, Russo believes that

. . .the ambivalent. . .coverage of the war by the TV media can be seen as a large factor contributing to the public's distaste for more aggressive and lengthy war activity.¹⁴⁷

However, John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, disagrees with this view. Mueller, based on an extensive analysis of poll data, argues that the television coverage of Vietnam did not "make a profound impression on public attitudes."¹⁴⁹

Another obvious area of interest involving the political effects of television concerns voting and elections. For example, Edward W. Chester contends that television "has probably led to a greater independency in voting and decline in partisan politics."¹⁵⁰ David Broder is even more emphatic about television's effect on politics: "Television has pro-

¹⁴⁵Wamsley and Pride, p. 443.

¹⁴⁶Wamsley and Pride, p. 449.

¹⁴⁷Russo, p. 543.

¹⁴⁸John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973).

¹⁴⁹Mueller, p. 167.

¹⁵⁰Chester, p. 310.

bably changed American politics more than any other single factor in the past two decades."¹⁵¹ McCombs and Shaw discuss the possibility that the media may "set the agenda for each political campaign."¹⁵² Mendelson and Crespi believe that

television has created new political experiences for the electorate which are not fully understood. Because these experiences are emotional rather than cognitive they have a powerful impact upon the election process, particularly in the selection of candidates for national office. As the voter is embroiled in the daily unfolding of the political process on the TV screen, he develops over time his own subjective, private percepts of the process and of its participants. The development of these percepts occurs quite imperceptibly and unconsciously.¹⁵³

Robert MacNeil, "Electric Schizophrenia: Does Television Alienate Voters?", states that there are four general areas in which television effects the electoral process.¹⁵⁴ These areas are (1) identifying candidates, (2) choosing issues, (3) increasing voter turnout and (4) affecting election results. MacNeil contends that television has presented a "disconnected and schizophrenic view of America" with one of the results being that it "would be very surprising if television has not contributed substantially to the disorien-

¹⁵¹David S. Broder, The Party's Over (New York: Harper & Roe, Publishers, 1971), p. 239.

¹⁵²Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda - Setting Function of Mass Media", Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1972, pp. 176-187, p. 177.

¹⁵³Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi, Polls, Television and the New Politics (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Company, 1970), p. 276.

¹⁵⁴Robert MacNeil, "Electronic Schizophrenia: Does Television Alienate Voters?", Politeia, Vol. 1, #4, Summer 1972, pp. 5-10.

tation and volatility of the 1972 election scene."¹⁵⁵

A similar argument is made by Shafer and Larson in "Did TV Create the 'Social Issue'?"¹⁵⁶ In arguing that television did, in fact, play a vital role in creating the "Social Issue", they assert that often the picture broadcast by television is perceived as being a "threat to ordinary secure living. The threat results from what the physical/electronic fact of seeing demonstrations, atrocities, and confrontations does to the viewer."¹⁵⁷ The authors mention other effects related to this. For example, television "forces" different lifestyles upon the viewers--which could increase hostility. Also, "those with deviant life styles see themselves on the evening news, but fear is not the emotion they feel. Rather they tend to vastly overestimate their own strength--which could increase feelings of hostility and insecurity."¹⁵⁸ An important political effect of television is the teaching function it serves. According to Shafer and Larson, what television teaches "is not the 'old' politics of hard work and compromise, but the 'new politics' of theatricality."¹⁵⁹

Whether or not television created the "Social Issue"

¹⁵⁵MacNeil, p. 10.

¹⁵⁶Byron Shafer, Richard Larson, "Did TV Create the 'Social Issue'?", Columbia Journalism Review, September/October 1972, pp. 10-17.

¹⁵⁷Shafer, p. 11.

¹⁵⁸Shafer, p. 13.

¹⁵⁹Shafer, p. 13.

is something we just do not know since there is not a good understanding of the political effects of television. The following two extended thoughts seem to epitomize both the complexity and lack of understanding of television's political effects. On one hand, Minor argues that

The ugly image of American corpses piled like cord wood on the backs of tanks and personnel carriers, the bloody bitterness of Hue, and the insanity of Khe Sanh--shocked Americans into a new awareness of the Vietnam War and forced them to re-examine America's participation in it. The sense of "being there" of "seeing it with your own eyes," provided by television, had a profound effect on the conscience and consciousness of Americans of many political persuasions. Some military people will argue that for this very reason television should be curtailed. 160

On the other hand, considering the following:

The public reaction to the events in Chicago seemed to prove that television's ability to sway the viewer in one direction or another is less than it has been given credit for. The emotions that were aroused were not those that might be expected from pictures of police brutality. Instead of the shame and desire for change stirred by the historic coverage of Selma and Birmingham earlier in the decade, Chicago produced mindless denial and revulsion from the victimized. Was the public finally fed up with too much violence, the real life, not the fictional, kind, so that in the interest of national sanity such material must be avoided in the future? 161

Two main conclusions emerge from this extended review. First, there exists only a limited understanding of the content of television news. Second, the existing empirical research has not produced a real understanding of the political effects of television news. Instead, analysis of television's political effects is usually based on perceptions.

¹⁶⁰Minor, p. 116.

¹⁶¹Barrett, 1968-1969, p. 24.

These perceptions, as has been shown, often produce contradictory interpretations. Therefore, the obvious need is for a real understanding of the content of television news, an understanding which can function as a foundation for attempts to understand the political effects of television news.

C H A P T E R I I I

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

The content of CBS Evening News can be analyzed two ways--quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitative analysis classifies records and measures the frequency of the relevant coding units of the communication. It attempts to identify numerical patterns and tendencies. Qualitative analysis, on the other hand, classifies, measures, and documents the direction of the communication. The essence of this research involves a qualitative comprehension of CBS Evening News. However, to accomplish this, it is helpful to have an understanding of the frequency of both the different categories of news and the different types of news stories. In addition to providing this information, the quantitative analysis will also, in providing a composite of CBS Evening News, identify certain patterns of coverage. By doing this, it is possible to have an understanding of the subject areas and types of news stories CBS Evening News chooses to emphasize. This chapter and the next will analyze CBS Evening News from a quantitative perspective. This chapter will be general in nature while the next will be more specific.

This chapter directs itself to the first major question of the research: "What amounts and forms of information are being presented?" Therefore, it is not interested in direction, favorable-unfavorable assertions, or bias in its usual sense. The concern of this chapter is the frequency of different subject areas and types of news stories. However, even the measurement of frequency is not necessarily dealing with neutral entities. Exposure on the nightly news is a valued commodity. One aspect of many of the controversies of today is the contest for "political visibility." Exposure and coverage themselves become a value--whether it is positive or negative coverage of one's position or positive or negative coverage of the opposition's position. In many cases, the more extensive the coverage, the better, even if it is negative, since it affords a greater opportunity to explain one's own side of the problem. Naturally, there are instances when political actors would just as soon reduce the scope and extent of coverage. However, while they might want a reduction of coverage, others would be hoping for an extension of the coverage. Exposure, therefore, may convey certain benefits and advantages to some while withholding similar benefits and advantages from others. A quantitative analysis may give some indication of who receives the most benefits and advantages.

Methodology

In order to most accurately measure and reflect the types and forms of information being presented, each individual news story was classified according to three basic criteria. Each news story was classified on the basis of its being (1) an Event or a Report, (2) U.S.-Domestic, and (3) Political or Non-Political. The first criterion involved the journalistic nature of the news story. The second involved the location of the news story. And, the third concerned the political or non-political nature of the news story.

One point should be made concerning the strategy used in this analysis. This research is ultimately concerned with the political effects of television news on public opinion and political behavior. Because of this, the analysis should be sensitive to the nature of the mass audience of television news. Because this research is oriented toward the effects of television news, the categories and coding schemes used should be similar in nature to those an "average" man would choose if he were doing the analysis. Thus, a conscious attempt has been made to construct categories and code the news in a manner which would be self-evident and obvious to the "average" viewer if he were familiar with the rules and coding procedures. For example, it makes no sense to define "political" in a way which would have no meaning to the "average" viewer.

The first of the three basic categories involved the journalistic nature of the unit of analysis--the news story. The reporting of the news on CBS Evening News either occurs in the CBS studio or outside of it. Those news stories which are reported from the CBS studio have been categorized as Events. Events have the characteristics of (1) being read by the commentator (usually Cronkite), (2) being brief in nature and (3) providing the basis for understanding a more elaborate report of the story which follows. The following are examples of number 1 and number 2.

CRONKITE: There was more sporadic gunfire in Amman tonight between Palestinian commandos and Jordanian troops. The outburst followed an emergency meeting of the Jordanian Cabinet to consider Iraq's threat to use its 12,000 troops stationed in Jordan to aid the guerrillas. King Hussein's government, in effect, warned Iraq to keep its nose out of Jordan's internal affairs.

In that other war, North Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris has rejected the idea of a stand-still cease-fire in Vietnam. Referring to that proposal by 14 U.S. Senators, Xuan Thuy said that there can be no cease-fire until the allies withdraw all American troops from the war.

The major fighting in Cambodia still centers around the town of Srang, 26 miles south of Phnom Penh, and for the third straight day Cambodian troops were unable to dislodge the Communists there despite air and artillery strikes.

Ever since Communist forces began fighting in Cambodia, they have had no hesitance about breaking into holy places and using them as battle stations. Well, today, the country's Buddhist, Moslem and Catholic leaders denounced the enemy troops, saying they not only have ignored the sanctity of churches and pagodas but killed or wounded scores of monks or priests. They appealed to all Cambodians to resist the Communists in any way possible.

Defense Secretary Laird has disclosed that for the third time since 1969 the Soviet Union is sending a small task force to the Caribbean. It includes two missile-firing surface ships and, for the first time, a landing ship. This raised the possibility that the Russians might take part in a mock assault on Fidel Castro's Cuban beaches.

A former mental patient from Southern Italy threw two egg-sized stones at Pope Paul today during an indoor audience at his summer home in Castelgandolfo. Though the stones whizzed by close behind him, the pope apparently was unaware they were thrown. The assailant, quickly subdued, told police he was motivated by "spirits."

While Events are brief, other news stories receive more emphasis and thus are longer, more complete and involve a correspondent. This type of news story has been labelled a Report. A Report, therefore, occurs outside of the CBS studio, involves a correspondent such as Dan Rather, Daniel Schorr or Bruce Morton, and elaborates upon the Event. Usually the Report is dependent upon or related to a previous "Event" read by Cronkite. Along with visual presentation, a Report often involves interpretive and analytical reporting—rather than just reading the "facts" of the news. There are two basic exceptions to the above rules. First, sometimes Reports do occur within the CBS studio and are handled by Cronkite. Second, because of their nature, Eric Sevareid's "commentaries" are classified as Reports.

Events and Reports, therefore, are each coded as one news story—even though a Report deals with the same subject matter as its preceding Event. Although the decision to distinguish between Events and Reports was a subjective one, it does seem justified on two counts. First, these are two

different journalistic forms and should be treated as such in order to give a more accurate reflection of CBS Evening News. Second, by doing this, it is possible to locate and document those subject areas which CBS perceives as important and thus chooses to emphasize. It has to be assumed that a Report does reflect news which CBS has considered important enough to merit elaboration or interpretation. Thus, the Report category is used to provide a more precise measurement of the forms of information which are perceived to be most important by CBS--and therefore receive more extensive emphasis.

To count every news story as just one unit equal to the others would give a distorted and inaccurate reflection of the actual content of CBS Evening News. For example, a thirty-word Event is not equal to a two-page Report and should not be counted as being equal. Thus, what others might classify as one news story or unit is classified here as two news stories or units when the news story contains an Event plus an accompanying Report--even though both deal with the same subject matter. This should be kept in mind when the total number of news stories is being analyzed since this classification scheme does produce an artificial total number of news stories. It is felt, however, that the advantages and precision attained by distinguishing between Events and Reports do outweigh the problem of an inflated total. The following are examples of Events followed by Reports:

(Event)

CRONKITE: Good evening. The American-sponsored effort to bring peace to the Middle East has reached its most critical stage yet. What Israel has been charging all along, that Egypt has used the cease-fire to build up its Suez Canal sites, is now openly confirmed by the United States. And Washington, in hopes of getting the angry Israelis back to the peace table, has taken its findings to Russia and Egypt. We have a roundup report on the situation, beginning with CBS News Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin Kalb in Washington.

(Report)

KALB: Several times in the past week, the U.S. has presented evidence of cease-fire violations to Moscow and Cairo, and appealed to both to observe the terms of the standstill along the Suez Canal. The Egyptians ignored the evidence and denied there had been violations. They accused the Israelis of trying to sabotage the peace talks. The Russians leveled the same charge against Israel and refused to discuss the substance of Washington's independent and indisputable evidence of Egyptian violations.

This curt, negative response from both Moscow and Cairo has persuaded the Administration that the Egyptians have no intention of reversing the missile buildup, and that the Russians won't help either. In the official view here, that leaves only one course of action, designed to keep the possibility of the peace talks alive. That is to take advantage of the 19 billion dollar weapons bill, passed yesterday, and step up the flow of American planes and air-to-ground missiles to Israel. The hope is that this American step-up will ease Israeli anxieties, which are recognized here as profound, and thus reduce the chances of Israel busting up the cease-fire by attacking the new Egyptian missile sites.

--Marvin Kalb, CBS NEWS, Washington.

(Event)

CRONKITE: Vice-President Agnew, in an unscheduled speech to the American Legion convention today, discussed the problem of division at home. Those who look at the faults and cry that the system has failed, Agnew said, just don't understand the system.

--Terry Drinkwater reports from Portland, Oregon.

(Report)

DRINKWATER; It was Agnew's kind of audience. Perhaps no other organization in the country likes the Vice-President as much as the Legionnaires. He didn't disappoint them either. The speech was tough, prefaced by some wry humor.

AGNEW: Thank heaven the people here aren't so sophisticated they long for an American defeat. As you know, I've just returned from an Asian tour during which I visited many countries including Vietnam and Korea. I brought back many messages from our brave troops there to some of our more dovish Senators. The soldiers asked me to deliver those messages personally because you're not supposed to send that stuff through the mails.

Actually, I'd like to remain in the West to attend the dinner that President Nixon is having in honor of the President of Mexico, but I have a previous commitment to attend a wildfowl dinner at Senator Fulbright's. I've-- I've waited a long time to see Senator Fulbright have his goose cooked.

One of the tragedies of life in America today is that when we speak of maintaining peace we do have to speak not only of peace abroad but of peace at home. We find bombs exploding not just in Vietnam but in our own cities. But true peace lies neither in the bomb nor the truncheon. It lies in a pattern of mutual respect and mutual forbearance that is the essence of a civilized society.

DRINKWATER: The applause for Agnew inside the convention hall was more than a match for the jeers from the 300 anti-Legion, anti-Agnew demonstrators outside. It was the last and rather feeble showing of the protestors who once threatened to disrupt this whole convention

--Terry Drinkwater, CBS NEWS, Portland.

The second basic criterion for classifying the news involves the location of the news story and its relevance to the United States. On the basis of location and relevance, the three classifications are: (1) U.S.-Domestic, (2) U.S.-International, and (3) International. "U.S.-Domestic" merely categorizes all news stories which physically occurred within

the United States. "U.S.-International" involves news stories which occurred outside of the United States but which personally involved Americans in some capacity. News about the Indochina War or about a Russian statement on U.S. participation in Indochina would be examples. The "International" classification refers to news stories which physically occur outside of the United States and which do not involve the United States in any direct way. A news story about the German government would be an example.

The third basic criterion for classifying the news concerns whether or not a news story is "Political" or "Non-Political". Previously, it was discussed that because this research is oriented towards the political effects of television upon its audience, the construction of categories and coding procedures should try to relate to the perceptions of the audience. Because of this, the distinction between "Political" and "Non-Political" is an elementary and traditional one. Basically, "Political" news is news which involves the government. Specifically, the Political category contains news which involves the individuals, institutions and agencies of the various governments and those individuals and groups who either seek to influence or discuss government policy. Thus, Political involves "government" and those who discuss governmental policy or try to influence the actions of government. Non-Political news stories are

those which do not directly involve the government, governmental policy, politics, or attempts to influence the government.

The Political category is constructed in such a way that it permits a two-dimensional analysis. Within the Political category, each news story is classified according to two perspectives: (1) the Political Actor or Actors who are the main subjects of the Political news and (2) the Policies, Actions, Issues or Controversies which are being discussed or acted upon by the Political Actor or Actors. Thus, each Political news story is classified on the basis of the Political Actor and the Issue or Policy area. A two-dimensional classification such as this is more accurate in that it permits analysis of political news from four perspectives: (1) the number of news stories involving specific Political Actors, (2) the number of stories involving Political Actors and Specific Policy or Issue Areas, (3) the number of stories concerned with a specific Policy or Issue Area, and (4) using a specific Policy or Issue Area as the unit of analysis--the number of stories involving the Specific Policy or Issue Area and selected Political Actors. Numbers 2 and 4 are similar but one uses the Political Actors as the unit of analysis while the other uses a specific Policy or Issue Area.

The following is a list of the Political Actors, Issue and Policy Areas, and Non-Political categories which were used:

Political Actors

U.S. - Domestic:

INSTITUTIONS

Executive

Nixon
 Agner
 Advisers/Staff
 Cabinet
 Departments
 Exec. Agencies
 Reg. Agencies

Legislative

Senate
 House

Judicial

Supreme
 Lower Courts

GROUPS: ORGANIZED

Political

Parties
 Ideological
 Vietnam
 Other

Social

Poverty/Welfare
 Environmental
 Consumer
 Other

Economic

Business
 Labor
 Other

Racial

GROUPS: UNORGANIZED

PoliticalSocialRacialEnvironmental

INDIVIDUALS

Inst. OfficialsPoliticiansOthersEric Sevareid

STATE/CITY/LOCAL

ExecutiveLegislativeJudicialGroupsIndividuals

Policy or Issue Areas

Political
 Social
 Economic

Racial
 Military
 Indochina

Ecology
 Foreign Policy
 Inter. Rel.

Political Actors

U.S. - International and International

INSTITUTIONS/GROUPS/INDIVIDUALS

United States*	Indochina*
Great Britain/Commonwealth	Other S.E. Asia
Germany/France	South Asia
Other W. Europe	Japan and Pacific Islands
Middle East	So. and Central America
Africa	Intern. Organizations
Russia	
China	

*not included in International category

Policy or Issue Areas

U.S. - International and International

Political	War	Ecology
Social	Military	Foreign Policy/Int. Relations
Economic	Indochina*	

*not included in International category

Non-Political Subject Areas

U.S. - Domestic, U.S. - International, and International

Tragic Events	NYSE*	Racial/Ethnic
Accidents	Personalit.	Military
Crime	Intertain.	Environment
Space	Sports	On The Road*
Labor	Social	Other
Business	Economic	

*only included in U.S.- Domestic category

More information concerning the meanings of these categories will be given in the discussion of the results. One point, however, should be made concerning one specific coding procedure since it does affect the results. While the normal coding procedure was to count each news story as one unit and to place it in one category, it was often necessary to divide news stories into two halves and place each half in a separate

category. The reason for this was simply that many news stories contained more than one Political Actor or involved more than one Issue-Area. Examples of this might be news involving the President and Congress, the State Department and a foreign government, or a situation such as the Calley Trial which involved both the "Military" and "Indochina" Issue Areas. The following examples illustrate how news stories would have to be divided between two Political Actors:

The United States and the Soviet Union completed the third of their SALT talks today in Helsinki, and promptly issued a joint pledge to make every effort to limit the nuclear arms race. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the progress made in this third round, and said that they looked forward to the next session, scheduled to begin in Vienna next March.

In Paris, today's Vietnam peace talks ended up in arguments over whether the United States has the right to carry out reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam. American Ambassador David Bruce said those flights were permitted under the "understanding" that led to the suspension of U.S. bombing attacks. The North Vietnamese denied that, and said they'll use all of their resources to shoot down any U.S. plane flying over their territory.

President Nixon assured industrialists today that his Administration will not beat them on the head to fight pollution. To correct what is wrong, Mr. Nixon said, we must not destroy what is right, what has provided America's wealth. The officials, members of his industrial pollution control council, had assembled to present a report which, among other things, charged that some government antipollution standards are harsh and impractical. In the council's words: "Standards have been established which are unachievable with presently available technology or are unattainable at economically tolerable costs." Often, the council added, standards have been based not on facts but on emotional appeals.

Obviously, this type of coding will affect the total results. For example, during the period of a week, there

might be four Reports involving debate between the Secretary of State and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. By dividing each Report in half and coding it appropriately, the week's total would be

		Indochina
Cabinet ($\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{2}$)	=	2
Senate ($\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{2}$)	=	2

While this procedure does give distorted totals in one sense, it does seem justified since it is the most accurate way of measuring and reflecting the content and the emphasis of CBS Evening News.

Analysis

The analysis covered the period of September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971,--exclusive of weekend broadcasts. This period contained a total of 294 broadcasts which produced a grand total of 8,042 news stories. This yielded an average of 27.35 news stories per broadcast. It should be noted that this does not mean that approximately 27.35 different subjects were presented on an average broadcast. Since this total does include both Events and Reports, it is important to remember that generally a Report involves the same subject matter as the Event which immediately preceded it. Thus, the number of Events in an average broadcast would give a better approximation of the number of different subject areas which were covered. And, since Reports are usually dependent upon Events,

it is expected that Events will outnumber Reports.

The fact that Events do outnumber Reports by a great margin is the first significant pattern which emerges from the analysis. This is understandable since television news emphasizes width rather than depth of coverage. Thus, Events outnumber Reports by a 3:1 ratio.

Table 1. Total Number of Events and Reports

	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>	<u># Per Broadcast</u>
Events	6081.	75.61	20.68
Reports	1961.	24.39	6.67
<u>Total</u>	8042.	100.	27.35

From these totals, it is evident that on an average nightly broadcast slightly over 75% of the news stories were Events. With an average of over twenty Events per broadcast, there obviously is not very much time to go into much detail in any news story. Since there were 20.68 Events per broadcast, this would mean that there were approximately twenty different subject areas covered on each broadcast. Thus, the first pattern to be documented, and one quite familiar to viewers of CBS Evening News, is that CBS Evening News emphasizes quantity and width rather than depth of coverage.

The second pattern to emerge concerns the dominance of Political news. While about 75% of the news stories were Events, about the same percentage (74%) of news stories were Political.

Table 2. Political - Non-Political Totals

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Political	5925.5	73.68
Non-Political	2116.5	26.32
<u>Total</u>	<u>8042.</u>	<u>100.</u>

As Table 3 illustrates, this general pattern holds with both Events and Reports:

Table 3. Political - Non-Political Totals for Events and Reports

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>
Political	4435.5	74.92	1490.	75.98
Non-Political	1645.5	27.06	471.	24.02
<u>Total</u>	<u>6081.</u>	<u>100.</u>	<u>1961.</u>	<u>100.</u>

Thus, on an average broadcast, CBS devoted 75% of its news stories to matters of a political nature. One important point should be noted. The actual battlefield coverage of the Indochina War was classified as being Political. Because of the heavy coverage of the war, this would tend to inflate the number of Political news stories. The inclusion of Indochina battlefield coverage as being Political is justified since the success, failure and brutality of the war could be very strong factors in terms of public opinion support or

opposition to the war. This would apply to both mass and attentive publics. Whether or not television coverage of the war increased or decreased support is immaterial at this point. The point is that coverage of the war could have had important effects on public opinion. This justifies its inclusion as Political news.

Thus, as will be seen, the U.S.-International category, which includes coverage of the Indochina War has an extremely high percentage (93.76%) of Political news stories. However, as Table 4 illustrates, the other two categories which do not include coverage of the Indochina War, both devote about 70% of their news stories to Political news.

The distortion imposed by the high percentage of Political news stories in the U.S.-International category does not affect the total average very much. Thus, the pattern of CBS' devoting 70% of its news stories to Political matter is a pattern prevalent in all of the three main categories.

A third basic pattern which is evident from the results is that slightly over 70% of the news stories falls within the U.S.-Domestic category. Therefore, about 70% of the news stories on CBS Evening News involved news which occurred within the United States.

Table 4. Political - Non-Political Totals for The Three Basic Categories

	<u>Political</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Non-Political</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
U.S. - Domestic	3974.	(69.62)	1734.5	(30.38)	5708.5	(100%)
U.S. - International	1261.5	(93.78)	84.	(6.24)	1345.5	(100%)
International	690.	(69.84%)	298.	(30.16)	988.	(100%)
Total	5925.5	(73.68%)	2116.5	(26.32%)	8042.	(100%)

Table 5. Totals for The Three Basic Categories

	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
U.S. - Domestic	5708.5	70.98
U.S. - International	1345.5	16.73
International	988.	12.29
<u>Total</u>	<u>8042.</u>	<u>100%</u>

This table graphically illustrates the dominance of U.S.-Domestic news--as the combined total of the other two categories does not even equal one-third of the total number of news stories. This emphasis on news involving the United States can be further illustrated by combining the two categories involving the United States. The combined total of the U.S.-Domestic and U.S.-International categories is 7054. news stories or 87.71% of the total number. Therefore, during this period, almost 88% of the news stories of CBS Evening News consisted of news stories occurring within the United States or news stories involving the United States in some direct capacity.

Table 6, giving a different perspective, illustrates the comparative emphasis of Events to Reports for each of the three basic categories.

Table 6. The Totals of The Three Basic Categories
Within Events and Reports

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>
U.S. - Domestic	4171.5	(68.60)	1537.	(78.38)
U.S. - International	1101.5	(18.11)	244.	(12.44)
International	808.	(13.29)	180.	(9.18)
Total	6081.	100%	1961.	100%

Here, within the Reports category, U.S.-Domestic news stories dominate to an even greater degree with over 78% of the news stories involving news within the United States. By combining the U.S.-Domestic and U.S.-International categories, it is evident that slightly over 90% consist of news stories involving the United States in some direct capacity. The similar percentage for Events is 86.71%.

Table 7 shows dominance of Events to Reports within each of the three basic categories.

This again illustrates the dominance of Events to Reports within each main category. This is especially apparent with the U.S.-International and International categories where over 80% of the news stories are Events.

Table 7. Total Number of Events and Reports for Each of The Three Basic Categories

	<u>Event</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Report</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
U.S. - Domestic	4171.5	(73.08)	1537.	(26.92)	5708.5	(100%)
U.S. - International	1101.5	(81.87)	244.	(18.13)	1345.5	(100%)
International	808.	(81.78)	180.	(18.22)	988.	(100%)
Total	6081.	(75.62)	1961.	(24.38)	8042.	(100%)

There is a fourth basic pattern which is evident from the results. This pattern is the dominance of Events which are Political in nature. Within each of the three basic categories, there are four general news types as illustrated by the matrix:

	Events	Reports
Political		
Non-Political		

In a situation of equality, each news type would, of course, equal about 25%. With CBS Evening News, however, it is significant that slightly over 55% of the total news stories were Political-Events. Of the 8042. total news stories, 4435.5 (55.15%) were Political-Events.

Table 8. Totals of the Four General Types of News Stories

	<u>Event</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Report</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Political	4435.5	(55.15)	1490.	(18.53)
Non-Political	1645.5	(20.46)	471.	(5.86)
Total	6081.		1961.	8042.

The actual matrix, therefore, looks like:

	Events	Reports
Political	55.15%	18.53%
Non-Political	20.46%	5.86%

As would be expected, the dominance of Political-Events is constant throughout the three basic categories. Specifically, within all three of the major categories, at least 50% of all the news stories within each category was a Political-Event. Tables 9-11 illustrate this.

Within the U.S.-Domestic category, two types of news stories dominate: Political and Events. Of the total 5708.5 U.S.-Domestic news stories, almost 70% (69.62%) were Political and over 73% (73.08%) were Events. The dominant single news type was the Political-Event as almost one-half (49.66) of the U.S.-Domestic news stories were Political Events. The matrix illustrates the proportions of the other news types within the U.S.-Domestic category.

	Events	Reports
Political	49.66%	19.96%
Non-Political	23.41%	6.97%

Table 9. Totals of U.S. - Domestic Category

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
U.S.-Domestic Political	2835. (67.96%)	(71.34%)	1139. (74.11%)	(28.66%)	3974. (69.62%)	(100%)
U.S.-Domestic Non-Political	1330.5 (32.04%)	(77.05%)	398. (25.89%)	(22.95%)	1734.5 (30.38%)	(100%)
Total	4171.5 (100%)	(73.08%)	1537. (100%)	(26.92%)	5708.5 (100%)	(100%)

The results from Table 9 and the matrix mean that approximately one-half of all the news stories on CBS Evening News which occurred within the United States were Political--yet only received superficial coverage since they were Events. Much of this type of news is basically an announcement or press release briefly indicating that a Political Actor or a Governmental Agency either said or did something. Or, as stated by George Reedy in The Presidency in Flux: "One of the real problems with television is that it has not worked out techniques for conveying ideas. It is not capable of carrying any more than very brief bulletins; it does not have the capacity to really probe into, behind, and under the various words that are being said."¹ This would certainly seem to apply to news stories occurring within the United States since 71.34% of the total U.S.-Domestic Political news stories are Events.

Table 10 indicates how this pattern was prevalent in the U.S.-International category--the category which included coverage of the Indochina War. Again, the dominant news types are Political and Events. Within this category, over 93% (93.76%) of the news stories are Political. This is extremely high though one obvious cause is the extensive coverage of the Indochina War--almost all of which was classified as Political. A second cause is simply that the most

¹George E. Reedy, The Presidency In Flux, New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, p. 62.

Table 10. Totals of U.S. - International Category

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
U.S.-International	1033.5 (93.83%)	(81.93%)	228. (93.44%)	(18.07%)	1261.5 (93.76%)	(100%)
U.S.-International	68. (6.17%)	(80.95%)	16. (6.56%)	(19.05%)	84. (6.24%)	(100%)
Total	1101.5 (100%)		244. (100%)		1345.5 (100%)	

important news involving the United States and other parts of the world is news of a political nature involving governments. Also evident within the U.S.-International category is the high incidence of Events (81.76%) compared to Reports (18.13%)

As would be expected, the single dominant news type in the U.S.-International category was the Political-Event. Political-Events comprised over 76% of the U.S.-International news stories. Again, much of this was due to coverage of the Indochina War. The matrix shows the percentages for the other news types within the U.S.-International category.

	Events	Reports
Political	76.81%	16.95%
Non-Political	5.05%	1.19%

Obviously, the Non-Political News is not emphasized by CBS Evening News.

As indicated by Table 11, similar patterns were found in the category which did not contain news involving the United States--the International category. Here, over 87% (87.78%) of the news stories were Events and almost 70% (69.84%) were Political. The Political-Event was the single most dominant news type as over 57% of the International news

Table 11. Totals of The International Category

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
International Political	567. (70.17%)	(82.17%)	123. (68.33%)	(17.83%)	690. (69.84%)	(100%)
International	241. (29.83%)	(80.87%)	57. (31.67%)	(19.13%)	298. (30.16%)	(100%)
Total	808. (100%)	(87.78%)	180. (100%)	(18.22%)	988. (100%)	(100%)

stories were Political-Events. The matrix illustrates the other percentages of news types:

	Events	Reports
Political	57.39%	12.45%
Non-Political	24.39%	5.77%

The pattern established in Tables 9-11 has been both constant and clear. Within each of the three basic categories, at least 69% of the news stories within that category were Political. And, within each category at least 73% of the news stories within that category were Events. As cited in Table 8, 55.15% of all news stories are Political-Events. Table 12 compares the number of Political-Events for each of the three basic categories:

Table 12. Number of Political-Events
Per Major Category

	<u>#</u>	<u>% of each category</u>
U.S.-Domestic	2835.	49.66%
U.S.-International	1033.5	76.81%
International	567.	57.39%
Total	4435.5	

Another way of emphasizing the dominance of specific types of news stories is to compare each to the total number of Events or the total number of Reports. In doing this, Table 13 again illustrates the dominance of both the U.S.-Domestic category and Political news stories within both the Events and Reports. Especially evident is the disproportionate number of Political news stories to Non-Political news stories within both the Events and Reports.

Table 13. Number and Percentage of News Types Within Events and Reports

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>
U.S.-Domestic Political	2835.	(46.62%)	1139.	(58.08%)
U.S.- Domestic Non-Political	1336.5	(21.98%)	398.	(20.29%)
U.S.-International Political	1033.5	(17.00%)	228.	(11.63%)
U.S.-International Non-Political	68.	(1.12%)	16.	(.82%)
International Political	567.	(9.32%)	123.	(6.27%)
International Non-Political	241.	(3.96%)	57.	(2.91%)
Total	6081.	(100%)	1961.	(100%)

Table 13, again demonstrates the emphasis given to U.S.-Domestic Political-Events. This one type of news story comprises almost 47% of the total Events and slightly over 58% of the total Reports.

Another way of examining these patterns is to compare each news type to the total number (8042) of news stories rather than to the number of Events or Reports as illustrated in Table 13.

Table 14. Number and % of the Whole of Each News Type

	<u>Event</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>
U.S. Domestic Political	2835.	(35.25%)	1139.	(14.16%)
U.S.-Domestic Non-Political	1336.5	(16.62%)	398.	(4.95%)
U.S.-International Political	1033.5	(12.85%)	228.	(2.83%)
U.S.-International Non-Political	68.	(.85%)	16.	(.20%)
International Political	567.	(7.05%)	123.	(1.53%)
International Non-Political	241.	(3.00%)	57.	(.71%)
			8042.	(100%)

This table gives the most accurate reflection of the content of CBS Evening News presented so far. It should be noted, however, that the numbers included here indicate only the number and proportion of news stories during this period. Table 14 says nothing about the amount or proportions of time allotted to each category or news type. Thus, according to Table 14, CBS Evening News devoted 35.25% of its total news stories to U.S.-Domestic Political Events. However,

this does not mean that CBS Evening News allocated 35% of its broadcast time to U.S.-Domestic Political Events. The reason this inference cannot be made is obvious since Events and Reports are not equal in time length.

It is possible, however, to obtain a more precise reflection of CBS Evening News than that offered by Table 14. The actual number of specific news stories on an "average" broadcast can be computed. As cited in Table 1, there were an average of 20.68 Events per broadcast and an average of 6.67 Reports per broadcast. By using the respective percentage from Table 13, it is possible to compute the actual number of news stories per broadcast. For example, from Table 13, U.S.-Domestic Political Events comprise 46.62% of the total Events. Since there were an average of 20.68 Events per broadcast, then 46.62% of 20.68 would be 9.64. Thus, there were 9.64 U.S.-Domestic Political Events in an "average" broadcast. Table 15 provides a composite of the number and type of specific news stories on an "average" broadcast of CBS Evening News during the period of analysis. This table illustrates the number and type of news stories which would appear on CBS Evening News during the period of September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971. The average number of news stories can be summarized in various ways which reflect the dominant patterns discussed in this chapter.

Table 15. Average Number of News Stories Per Broadcast

	<u>Events</u>	<u>Reports</u>
U.S.-Domestic Political	9.64	3.87
U.S.-Domestic Non-Political	4.54	1.35
U.S.-International Political	3.52	.78
U.S.-International Non-Political	.23	.06
International Political	1.93	.42
International Non-Political	.82	.19
<hr/> Total	<hr/> 20.68	<hr/> 6.67

Table 16. Average Number of News Stories per Broadcast

	<u>#</u>
U.S.-Domestic	19.40
U.S.-International	4.59
<hr/> International	<hr/> 3.36
Total	27.35

Table 17. Average Number of News Stories per Broadcast

	<u>#</u>
U.S.-Domestic Political	13.51
U.S.-Domestic Non-Political	5.89
U.S.-International Political	4.30
U.S.-International Non-Political	.29
International Political	2.35
International Non-Political	1.01
Total	27.35

Table 18. Average Number of News Stories per Broadcast

	<u>Events</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>Total</u>
U.S.-Domestic	14.18	5.22	19.40
U.S.-International	3.75	.84	4.59
International	2.75	.61	3.36
Total	20.68	6.67	27.35

Table 19. Average Number of News Stories per Broadcast

	<u>Events</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>Total</u>
Political	15.09	5.07	20.16
Non-Political	5.59	1.60	7.19
			27.35

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to examine some of the more general results of the quantitative analysis of CBS Evening News during the period of September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971. The results of this analysis have indicated some very obvious patterns.

These patterns have been quite evident in the preceding analysis and thus can be easily summarized. First, a high number (75%) of news stories were Events. Second, an almost equally high number (74%) of the news stories were Political. Third, a dominant number of news stories (70%) were U.S.-Domestic and thus involved news which occurred within the United States. Fourth, over half (55%) of the total news stories were Political-Events. Fifth, slightly over 35% of all the news stories involved Political-Events within the U.S.-Domestic category. Thus, the dominant news type were news stories which were: (1) Events, (2) Political, (3) U.S.-Domestic, (4) Political-Events and (5) U.S.-Domestic-Political Events.

The actual significance of these results in relation to the effects of television news on public opinion is difficult to determine given the generality of the results. While further discussion of this should wait until it can be put into a more complete context, a few generalizations can be made concerning the patterns outlined in this chapter.

It would appear that most Americans, through television news, learn more from their government than about it. Because of the heavy emphasis on announcement-type Events, people cannot learn much about their government or the political process. What they do learn, as transmitted by television news, is a superficial account of what the government or key Political Actors say or do. However, learning this is one thing--understanding it is another. How can the people, especially those whose main source of political information is television, "understand" the government and the political process when over 70% of the U.S.-Domestic Political news stories are Events?

Even the extent of this "learning" has to be suspect--given that there are over twenty-seven news stories in an average broadcast. Obviously, vital and salient information conveyed by television is absorbed. However, when television "passes on" information at the rate that it does rather than explain it, the visual element, because it is easier to retain than marginally important political information, may become the most important factor in the political effects of television. More information is required to have a better understanding of the forms of information presented by CBS Evening News. This chapter, though, has given a general understanding of some of the forms and types of information conveyed by CBS Evening News. Perhaps most important, it has documented and reinforced Reedy's contention that television "is not capable

of carrying any more than very brief bulletins."² However, in doing this, a point Reedy overlooks, the visual element of television may emerge as the most important and most personal link between government and the average man. The next chapter will give a more precise account of who CBS Evening News permits the average man to see.

²Reedy, p. 62.

CHAPTER IV

COVERAGE OF POLITICAL ACTORS

This chapter continues the quantitative analysis of the previous chapter. While Chapter III was general in nature and involved both Political and Non-Political news, this chapter is more limited in that it only analyzes Political news. Specifically, this chapter documents and analyzes coverage of Political Actors--within the context of (1) the three main categories and (2) the respective subcategories. Thus, this chapter is only concerned with the analysis of Political Actors. The next chapter will complete the quantitative analysis by analyzing both the Policy-Issue Areas and the Non-Political news.

U.S.-Domestic

Within the U.S.-Domestic category, the main groups of Political Actors were categorized as: (1) Institution, (2) Organized Groups, (3) Unorganized Groups, (4) Individuals, and (5) State/City/Local. All the Political Actors except for State/City/Local pertain to, and involve, the national government. The Institutions category included the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of the national government. Both Organized and Unorganized Groups are Political Actors who either discuss or try to influence

national governmental policy. The types of groups involved here are (1) Political, (2) Social, (3) Economic, and (4) Racial. Each of these is divided into more specific groups. A distinction is made between Organized Groups and Unorganized Groups. The latter refers to groups which have a temporary association rather than a permanent basis of existence. Demonstrations and protest groups would be included here. The individuals classification involves two types of people who discuss or try to influence government policy. One type is a person who is not a part of the government. The other is a governmental official, usually of the Executive branch, who is speaking for himself--rather than for his Administration or his executive agency. This way, it is possible to discriminate between Political Actors who speak for themselves. The State/City/Local category includes political news stories which involve state, city or local governments or those Political Actors discussing or trying to influence state, city or local governmental policy.

Within the U.S.-Domestic Political category, there were a total of 3974. news stories. Of these, 2835. (71.34%) were Events and 1139. (28.66%) were Reports. Table 1 presents the totals for the subcategories.

Table 1. Totals of the Five Main Subcategories

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Institutions	2637.5	(66.37%)
Organized Groups	276.5	(6.96%)
Unorganized Groups	71.	(1.79%)
Individuals	632.5	(15.91%)
State/City/Local	356.5	(8.97%)
<u>Total</u>	<u>3974.</u>	<u>(100%)</u>

From Table 1, the first main and important pattern emerges. Within the U.S.-Domestic Political category, the dominant Political Actor is The Institutions--which involves the three branches of government. Almost 67% of all Political news stories occurring within the United States were ones in which Institutions were the main Political Actors. Even more impressive is the fact that Institutions comprised almost one-third (32.80%) of the total number of news stories during the period of analysis. Thus, Political news within the United State is for the most part dominated by the Political Actors of the three branches of the national government. Table 2 examines totals of the five main subcategories in terms of Events and Reports. This again reflects the dominance of the Institutions category. The Institutions comprise over 70% (72.13%) of the U.S.-Domestic Events and over 50% (52.02%) of the Reports. Except for the

Table 2. Totals of the Five Main Categories

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Institutions	2045. (72.13%)	(77.54%)	592.5 (52.02%)	(22.46%)	2637.5 (66.37%)	(100%)
Organized Groups	203. (71.6%)	(73.42%)	73.5 (6.45%)	(26.58%)	276.5 (6.96%)	(100%)
Unorganized Groups	46.5 (1.63%)	(65.49%)	24.5 (2.15%)	(34.51%)	71. (1.79%)	(100%)
Individuals	302. (10.65%)	(47.75%)	330.5 (29.02%)	(52.25%)	632.5 (15.91%)	(100%)
State/City/Local	238.5 (8.42%)	(66.90%)	118. (10.36%)	(33.10%)	356.5 (8.97%)	(100%)
Totals	2835. (100%)	(71.34%)	1139. (100%)	(28.66%)	3974. (100%)	100%

Individuals category, the pattern of Events outnumbering Reports is constant. The deviation was caused by Eric Sevareid's "commentaries" which comprised 47.50% of the Individuals-Reports.

Institutions. With the Institutions, as with the other main sub-categories of the U.S.-Domestic category, it is possible to obtain a very accurate reflection of the degree of emphasis given to each Political Actor. This analysis will examine the relation of the three branches to each other and will then examine the relation of the Political Actors within each branch.

From Table 3 a second pattern emerges. It is evident that the dominant Political Actor of the Institutions category is the Executive branch.

Table 3. Totals of The Institutions Category

	<u>f</u>	<u>%</u>
Executive	1656.5	62.81
Legislative	628.	23.81
Judicial	353.	13.38
<u>Total</u>	<u>2637.</u>	<u>100%</u>

Obviously, the Executive branch is the center of attention as it completely dominates the other two branches. The dominance of the executive branch is illustrated by the

fact that it comprises slightly over one-fifth (20.60%) of all the news stories of CBS Evening News during this period. Thus, while theoretically the three branches of the federal government are equal, on CBS Evening News, as in reality, they are not. Access to the television screen is much easier for members of the Executive branch than for members of the Legislative or Judicial branches. The obvious question is--Can the other two branches, especially the Legislative branch which plays a more antagonistic role vis-à-vis the Executive branch, really compete with the Executive branch for "political visibility"? The answer appears to be "NO."

Table 4 presents a different perspective of the emphasis given each branch.

While these tables indicate certain patterns such as the dominance of the Executive, it is important to penetrate further and examine the patterns within each branch. Closer examination of the Executive branch, for example, illustrates that in one sense, President Nixon is not the dominating Political Actor within the Executive branch.

Table 5 illustrates the coverage given to Nixon in relation to the other Political Actors of the Executive branch of the government.

Table 4. Totals of The Institution Category

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Executive	1303.5 (63.47%)	(78.69%)	353. (59.58%)	(21.31%)	1656.5 (62.81%)	(100%)
Legislative	470.5 (23.01%)	(74.92%)	157.5 (26.58%)	(25.08%)	628. (23.81%)	(100%)
Judicial	271.	(76.77%)	82. (13.84%)	(23.23%)	353. (13.38%)	(100%)
Totals	2045.	(77.54%)	592.5	(22.46%)	2637.5	(100%)

Table 5. Totals of The Executive Branch

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Nixon	391.5	23.63%
Agnew	42.5	2.56%
Advisers/staff	217.5	13.13%
Cabinet	243.	14.67%
Departments	530.5	32.03%
Executive Agencies	127.5	7.70%
Regulatory Agencies	104.	6.28%
<u>Totals</u>	<u>1656.5</u>	<u>100%</u>

According to Table 5, it is not Nixon but the Departments who are the dominant Political Actors within the Executive branch. However, this can be explained. First, the Nixon category pertains only to President Nixon himself. Other references used by CBS Evening News which would relate to Nixon such as the "Nixon Administration" or the "White House" were classified in the Advisers/staff category. Second, while the Departments outnumbered Nixon in Events, Nixon did surpass the Departments in total number of Reports. Thus, as Table 6 illustrates, a high number (82.56%) of the news stories of the Departments were Events. By comparison, 72.54% of the news stories involving Nixon were Events.

Table 6. Totals of The Executive Branch

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Nixon	284. (21.79%)	(72.54%)	107.5 (30.45%)	(27.46%)	391.5 (23.63%)	(100%)
Agnew	28. (2.15%)	(65.88%)	14.5 (4.11%)	(34.12%)	42.5 (2.56%)	(100%)
Advisers/Staff	178. (13.65%)	(81.84%)	39.5 (11.19%)	(18.16%)	217.5 (13.13%)	(100%)
Cabinet	176. (13.50%)	(72.43%)	67. (18.98%)	(27.57%)	243. (14.67%)	(100%)
Departments	438. (33.60%)	(82.56%)	92.5 (26.20%)	(17.44%)	530.5 (32.03%)	(100%)
Executive Agencies	101.5 (7.79%)	(79.61%)	26. (7.37%)	(20.39%)	127.5 (7.79%)	(100%)
Regulatory Agencies	98. (7.52%)	(94.34%)	6. (1.70%)	(5.77%)	104. (6.28%)	(100%)
Totals	1303.5 (100%)	(78.69%)	353. (100%)	(21.31%)	1656.5 (100%)	(100%)

An interesting perspective of the Executive branch can be obtained by collapsing the three bureaucratic categories-- Departments, Executive Agencies, and Regulatory Agencies. By doing this, it is possible to document the emphasis CBS Evening News places on "announcement-type" news passed on to them by the federal bureaucracy. Within these three bureaucratic categories there are 762 news stories--or 46% of the total news stories of the Executive branch. Of these, 637.5 (83.66%) are Events while 124.5 (16.34%) are Reports. Thus, almost 84% of the news stories involving the federal bureaucracy are Events. Also, within the Executive branch, these three bureaucratic categories comprise 48.91% of the Events but only 35.27% of the Reports. Therefore, almost one-half of the Events of the Executive branch involve the Departments, Executive Agencies or Regulatory Agencies. This is a third important pattern to emerge.

A fourth pattern involves the Legislative branch. The pattern here concerns the dominance of the Senate. As Table 7 indicates, on CBS Evening News the two houses of the Legislative branch are not equal. Slightly over two-thirds (67.59%) of the news stories of the Legislative branch involved the Senate. Thus, by better than a 2:1 ratio, the Senate is emphasized over the House.

Table 7. Totals of The Legislative Branch

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Senate	424.5	67.59%
House	199.	31.69%
"Legislative Branch"	4.5	.72%
<u>Totals</u>	<u>628.</u>	<u>100%</u>

With the Reports the Senate is even more dominant since 73.01% of the Reports of the Legislative branch involve the Senate. Thus, within the Legislative branch, the "action" and glamour are in the Senate--not the House. Access to the television screen is easier for Senators than for Representatives. First, CBS Evening News emphasizes the Senate over the House by better than a 2:1 margin. Second, there are fewer Senators than Representatives which thus increases the potential for "political visibility" for each Senator.

Table 8. Totals of The Legislative Branch

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Senate	309.5 (65.78%)	(72.91%)	115. (73.01%)	(27.09%)	424.5 (67.59%)	(100%)
House	159. (33.79%)	(79.90%)	40. (25.40%)	(20.10%)	199. (31.69%)	(100%)
"Legislative Branch"	2. (.43%)	(44.44%)	2.5 (1.59%)	(55.56%)	4.5 (.72%)	(100%)
Totals	470.5 (100%)	(74.92%)	157.5 (100%)	(25.08%)	628. (100%)	(100%)

Within the Judicial branch there were two categories-- Supreme and Lower Courts. The latter refers to any federal courts other than the Supreme Court. Included here are the military courts. As evident in Table 9, the Lower Courts greatly outnumber the Supreme Court in total news stories. One reason for this is that usually only the Supreme Court decisions receive coverage. With the lower courts, however, the trial in progress is covered as well as the final decision. A second reason is that there are more Lower Courts to cover. A third reason is the My Lai trials which were extensively covered by CBS Evening News.

Table 9. Totals of the Judicial Branch

	<u>$\frac{1}{2}$</u>	<u>$\%$</u>
Supreme Court	75.5	(21.39%)
Lower Courts	277.5	(78.61%)
<u>Totals</u>	<u>353.</u>	<u>100%</u>

As evidenced from this table, relative to the Lower Courts, the Supreme Court does not receive much coverage. Also, since slightly over 85% (85.43%) of the news stories involving the Supreme Court are Events, the coverage the Court receives is very brief. Table 10 illustrates this.

Table 10. Totals of the Judicial Branch

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Supreme Court	64.5 (23.80%)	(85.43%)	11. (13.41%)	(14.97%)	75.5	(100%)
Lower Courts	206.5 (76.20%)	(74.41%)	71. (86.59%)	(25.59%)	277.5	(100%)
Totals	271. (100%)	(76.77%)	82. (100%)	(23.23%)	353. (100%)	(100%)

Groups. In addition to Institutions, the U.S.-Domestic category includes categories involving Groups, Individuals, and State/City/Local Government. Even though they share only a combined 33% of the total U.S.-Domestic Political news stories, they do deserve to be examined.

Within the Organized Groups there were four categories-- (1) Political, (2) Social, (3) Economic, and (4) Racial. The two most dominant were the Political and Social Groups which involve 80.92% of the news stories of the Organized Groups.

Table 11. Totals of Organized Groups

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Political	120.	43.40%
Social	40.5	14.65%
Economic	103.	37.52%
Racial	13.	4.70%
<u>Totals</u>	<u>276.5</u>	<u>100%</u>

As Table 12 illustrates, the Political groups, in addition to being the most numerous, also have the highest percentage (31.67%) of Reports.

Table 12. Totals of Organized Groups

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Political	82. (40.39%)	(68.33%)	38. (51.70%)	(31.67%)	120.	(100%)
Social	34. (16.75%)	(83.95%)	6.5 (8.84%)	(16.05%)	40.5	(100%)
Economic	76. (37.44%)	(73.79%)	27. (36.74%)	(26.21%)	103.	(100%)
Racial	11. (5.42%)	(84.62%)	2. (2.72%)	(15.38%)	13.	(100%)
Totals	203. (100%)	(73.42%)	73.5 (100%)	(26.58%)	276.5 (100%)	(100%)

As with the Institutions, a better understanding of the general category can be attained by examining each individual category. The Political category of Organized Groups consists of four groups: (1) Parties, (2) Ideological, (3) Vietnam, and (4) Others. The most dominant of these four groups were Vietnam groups--groups which existed either to support or oppose the war. Table 13 demonstrates the dominance of the Vietnam groups.

Table 13. Totals of Organized Political Groups

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Parties	27.5	22.92%
Ideological	10.	8.33%
Vietnam	66.	55.00%
Other	16.5	13.75%
Totals	120.	100%

In addition to being the dominant group, the Vietnam category also has a high number (34.85%) of Reports.

Table 14. Totals of Organized Political Groups

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Parties	21. (25.61%)	(76.36%)	6.5 (17.10%)	(23.64%)	27.5 (22.92%)	(100%)
Ideological	6. (7.32%)	(60.00%)	4. (10.53%)	(40.00%)	10. (8.33%)	(100%)
Vietnam	43. (52.44%)	(65.15%)	23. (60.53%)	(34.85%)	66. (55.00%)	(100%)
Other	12. (14.63%)	(72.73%)	4.5 (11.84%)	(27.27%)	16.5 (13.75%)	(100%)
Totals	82. (100%)	(68.33%)	38. (100%)	(31.67%)	120. (100%)	(100%)

Organized Social groups involved only 40.5 news stories. No one group dominated since the most numerous group, Others, would include diverse types of groups. Table 15 shows how these groups were distributed.

Table 15. Totals of Organized Social Groups

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Poverty/Welfare	3.	7.41%
Environmental	7.5	18.52%
Consumer	6.	14.81%
Other	24.	59.26%
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Totals	40.5	100%

Within this category, Events greatly outnumber Reports.

Table 16. Totals of Organized Social Groups

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Poverty/Welfare	2.5 (7.35%)	(83.33%)	.5 (7.69%)	(16.67)	3. (7.41%)	(100%)
Environmental	5.5 (16.18%)	(73.33%)	2. (30.77%)	(26.67%)	7.5 (18.52%)	(100%)
Consumer	4.5 (13.24%)	(75.00%)	1.5 (23.08%)	(25.00%)	6. (14.81%)	(100%)
Other	21.5 (63.23%)	(89.58%)	2.5 (38.46%)	(10.42%)	24. (59.26%)	(100%)
Totals	34. (100%)	(83.95%)	6.5 (100%)	(16.05%)	40.5 (100%)	(100%)

Organized Economic Groups consist of three types: Business, Labor and Other. This category does not involve strikes or disputes between business and labor unless they specifically involve the federal government in some way. Within this category, Business was the dominant Political Actor.

Table 17. Totals of Organized Economic Groups

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Business	66.5	64.56%
Labor	34.5	33.50%
Other	2.	1.94%
<u>Totals</u>	<u>103.</u>	<u>100%</u>

In comparing Events to Reports, there is no important deviation from the normal patterns.

Table 18. Totals of Organized Economic Groups

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Business	49.5 (65.13%)	(74.44%)	17. (62.96%)	(25.56%)	66.5 (64.56%)	(100%)
Labor	24.5 (32.24%)	(71.01%)	10. (37.04%)	(28.99%)	34.5 (33.50%)	(100%)
Other	2.63 (2.63%)	(100%)	--	--	2. (1.94%)	(100%)
Totals	76. (100%)	(73.79%)	27. (100%)	(26.21%)	103. (100%)	(100%)

Within the Organized Racial Groups there is only one category, Racial, which only involves a total of thirteen news stories.

Table 19. Totals of Organized Racial Groups

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Racial	11	(84.62%)	2	(15.38%)	13	(100%)

While the total number of Organized Groups is not that significant compared to the Institutions, the number of Unorganized Groups is even more insignificant. The total number of news stories dealing with Unorganized Groups is 71. Thus, the total of news stories involving Organized and Unorganized Groups is 347.5 or 8.74% of the total U.S.-Domestic Political news stories. Obviously, relative to Institutions, Groups do not have a very good access to the television screen. Table 20 shows the distribution of the four categories of Unorganized Groups:

Table 20. Totals of Unorganized Groups

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Political	16.5	23.24%
Social	45.	63.38%
Racial	2.5	3.52%
Environmental	7.0	9.86%
<u>Totals</u>	<u>71.</u>	<u>100%</u>

Among the Unorganized Groups the dominant Political Actors are the Social Groups. And, as Table 21 demonstrates, within Social Groups, 40% of the news stories are Reports.

Table 21. Totals of Unorganized Groups

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Political	12.5 (26.88%)	(75.76%)	4. (16.33%)	(24.24%)	16.5 (23.24%)	(100%)
Social	27. (58.06%)	(60.00%)	18. (73.47%)	(40.00%)	45. (63.38%)	(100%)
Racial	2.5 (5.38%)	(100%)	--	--	2.5 (3.52%)	(100%)
Environmental	4.5 (9.68%)	(64.29%)	2.5 (10.20%)	(35.71%)	7. (9.86%)	(100%)
Totals	46.5 (100%)	(65.49%)	24.5 (100%)	(34.51%)	71. (100%)	(100%)

Individuals. The Individuals category includes four elements: (1) Institutional Officials, (2) Politicians, (3) Others, and (4) Eric Sevaried. As mentioned, Institutional Officials are governmental officials who in the news story are speaking for themselves--rather than reflecting their administration, departmental, or agency position. For example, a member of the State Department who criticizes official policy would be listed here rather than under Departments since he is speaking for himself and not for the State Department. Politicians are those who are engaged in a political campaign. Others are those who were not part of the government but were discussing Political matters. As Table 22 illustrates, the Others category was the most dominant with 47.12% of the news stories of the Individual category.

Table 22. Totals of Individuals Category

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Institutional Officials	88.	13.91%
Politicians	88.5	13.99%
Others	298.	47.12%
Eric Sevaried	158.	24.98%
<u>Totals</u>	<u>632.5</u>	<u>100%</u>

The influence of Eric Sevaried is seen in Table 23. Here, because of Sevaried, Reports actually outnumber Events.

Sevareid constitutes 47.50% of the Reports. Without him, the normal pattern of Events greatly outnumbering Reports would be present.

Table 23. Totals of The Individuals Category

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Institutional Officials	62.5 (20.70%)	(71.02%)	25.5 (7.72%)	(28.98%)	88. (13.91%)	(100%)
Politicians	51. (16.83%)	(57.63%)	37.5 (11.35%)	(42.37%)	88.5 (13.99%)	(100%)
Others	187.5 (62.09%)	(62.92%)	110.5 (33.43%)	(37.08%)	298. (47.12%)	(100%)
Sevareid	1. (.33%)	(.63%)	157. (47.50%)	(99.37%)	158. (24.98%)	(100%)
Totals	302. (100%)	(47.75%)	330.5 (100%)	(52.25%)	632.5 (100%)	(100%)

State/City/Local. The State/City/Local category involves Political news stories on the State, City or Local level. Within this category, the two most dominant Political Actors are Groups and the Executive. These two account for over 70% of the news stories within this category.

Table 24. Totals of The State/City/Local Category

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Executive	108.5	30.43%
Legislative	11.5	3.23%
Judicial	41.5	11.64%
Groups	143.	40.12%
Individuals	49.	13.74%
State/City/Local	3.	.84%
<hr/> Totals	<hr/> 356.5	<hr/> 100%

Table 25 shows the proportion of Events to Reports within the State/City/Local category.

Table 25. Totals of The State/City/Local Category

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Executive	82. (34.38%)	(75.58%)	26.5 (22.46%)	(24.42%)	108.5 (30.43%)	(100%)
Legislative	9.5 (3.98%)	(82.61%)	2. (1.69%)	(17.39%)	11.5 (3.23%)	(100%)
Judicial	35. (14.68%)	(84.34%)	6.5 (5.52%)	(15.66%)	41.5 (11.64%)	(100%)
Groups	82. (34.38%)	(57.34%)	61. (51.69%)	(42.66%)	143. (40.12%)	(100%)
Individuals	29. (12.16%)	(59.18%)	20. (16.95%)	(40.82%)	49. (13.74%)	(100%)
State/City/Local	1. (.43%)	(33.33%)	2. (1.69%)	(67.66%)	3. (.84%)	(100%)
Totals	238.5 (100%)	(66.90%)	118. (100%)	(33.10%)	356.5 (100%)	(100%)

U.S. - International

The U.S.-International category includes news stories which occur outside of the United States, but which directly involve either Americans or the United States. Here, as with the International category, there are only two basic categorical distinctions--(1) Institutions and (2) Groups and Individuals. Each of these is subdivided into fourteen geographical areas or countries. Because of the distribution of the news in the U.S.-International category, the subsequent analysis will be more general than the previous one. And, in most cases, whole numbers rather than percentages will be used.

Within the U.S.-International Political Category there were a total of 1261.5 news stories. Of these, 1033.5 (81.93%) were Events and 228 (18.07%) were Reports. Obviously, this indicates a great emphasis on Events. Table 26 shows the distribution of news stories among the two Political Actors of the U.S.-International category.

Table 26. Totals of The U.S.-International Category

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Institutions	1091.5	86.52%
Groups - Individuals	170.	13.48%
<u>Totals</u>	<u>1261.</u>	<u>100%</u>

From this, the first obvious pattern is evident. Almost 87% of the Political news stories of the U.S.-International category involve Institutions. The distribution of Events and Reports within this category is illustrated in Table 27.

Table 27. Totals of The U.S.-International Category

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Institutions	909.5 (88.00%)	(83.33%)	182. (79.82%)	(16.67%)	1091.5 (86.52%)	(100%)
Groups- Individuals	124. (12.00%)	(72.94%)	46. (20.18%)	(27.06%)	170. (13.48%)	(100%)
Totals	1033.5 (100%)	(81.93%)	228. (100%)	(18.07%)	1261.5 (100%)	(100%)

This again reinforces the dominance of Institutions. In fact, Institutions constitute 81.12% of the total U.S.-International news stories.

Institutions. Within Institutions, a second pattern emerges--that of the dominance of two countries--the United States and Indochina. Together, they represent slightly over 79% (79.21%) of the total news stories of the Institutions category. The United States has 45.63% of the news stories and Indochina has 33.58%. Obviously, both of these reflect the extensive coverage of the Indochina War. Table 28 illustrates the totals and the distribution between Events and Reports for the Institutions category.

Table 28. Totals for Institutions Category

	<u>Events</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>Total</u>
United States	399.	99.	498.
Great Britain/Commonwealth	12.5	1	13.5
Germany/France	12.	2.5	14.5
Other, Western Europe	8.5	2.	10.5
Eastern Europe	8.5	0.	8.5
Middle East	49.5	8.5	58.
Africa	6.5	1.	7.5
Russia	44.5	.5	45.
China	15.	2.5	17.5*
Indochina	313.	53.5	366.5
South Asia	5.	1.	6.
Japan/Pacific Islands	3.	1.	4.
South and Central America	15.	2.5	17.5
International Organizations	17.5	7.	24.5
Totals	909.5	182.	1091.5
(* 4 of which are Natl. China)			

Groups-Individuals. Within the Groups-Individuals category, the United States and Indochina still dominate. They account for 59.41% of the category's total. As Table 29 indicates, this is constant with both Events and Reports. With the Reports the United States constitutes 51.09% of the total Reports.

Table 29. Totals of Groups-Individuals Category

	<u>Events</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>Total</u>
United States	43.	23.5	66.5
German/France	2.5	1.	3.5
Other Western Europe	4.5	1.	5.5
East Europe	2.	1.	3.
Middle East	18.5	1.5	20.
Russia	2.5	-	2.5
China	1.	-	1.
Indochina	25.5	9.	34.5
South Asia	2.	-	2.
Japan/Pacific Islands	1.	3.	4.
South and Central America	2.	-	2.
International Organizations	19.5	6.	25.5
Totals	124.	46.	170.

International

The International category includes news stories which occurred outside of the United States and did not involve Americans or the United States in any direct way. The sub-categories here are the same as the U.S.-International category--except for the absence of the United States and Indochina. Table 30 shows the general distribution of the International category.

Table 30. Totals of The International Category

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Institutions	523.5	75.87%
Groups - Individuals	166.5	24.13%
Totals	690.	100%

As would be expected, the Institutions dominate. Table 31 shows the distribution of Events to Reports.

Table 31. Totals of The International Category

	<u>Events</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Institutions	426. (75.13%)	(81.38%)	97.5 (79.27%)	(18.62%)	523.5 (75.87%)	(100%)
Groups - Individuals	141. (24.87%)	(84.68%)	25.5 (20.73%)	(15.32%)	166.5 (24.13%)	(100%)
Totals	567. (100%)	(80.87%)	123. (100%)	(19.13%)	690. (100%)	(100%)

Institutions. The most dominant "Political Actor" within International Institutions was the Middle East with 35.53% of the news stories. Second in emphasis was Great Britain/Commonwealth with 14.90% of the news stories. Table 32 shows how the other news stories were distributed.

Table 32. Totals of Institutions Category

	<u>Events</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>Total</u>
Great Britain/Commonwealth	60.5	17.5	78.
Germany/France	23.5	10.5	34.
Other Western Europe	22.5	4.5	27.
East Europe	19.	2.5	21.5
Middle East	146.	40.	186.
Africa	13.5	2.	15.5
Russia	52.	.5	52.5
China	9.	2.	11.
Other S.E. Asia	.5	-	.5
South Asia	32.	10.	42.
Japan/Pacific Islands	.5	-	.5
South and Central America	33.	7.	40.
International Organizations	12.5	1.	13.5
Institutions	1.5	-	1.5
<u>Totals</u>	<u>426.</u>	<u>97.5</u>	<u>523.5</u>

(* 2 are Natl. China)

Groups-Individuals. Within this category the two areas receiving most emphasis were the same as with the Institutions, Middle East and Great Britain/Commonwealth. These two combine for 47.59% of the total Groups-Individuals news stories. Table 33 illustrates how the others are distributed.

Table 33. Totals of Individuals-Groups Category

	<u>Events</u>	<u>Reports</u>	<u>Total</u>
Great Britain/Commonwealth	35.	3.5	38.5
Germany/France	3.5	-	3.5
Other Western Europe	11.	3.	14.
East Europe	12.	2.	14.
Middle East	27.5	13.	40.5
Russia	7.5	-	1.5
China	1.5	-	1.5
Other S.E. Asia	1.	-	1.
South Asia	4.5	1.	4.5
Japan/Pacific Islands	3.5	1.	4.5
South and Central America	13.5	-	13.5
International Organizations	20.5	2.	22.5
<u>Totals</u>	<u>141.</u>	<u>25.5</u>	<u>166.5</u>

Conclusion

Within the dimensions of this analysis some interesting and significant patterns emerged concerning the coverage of Political Actors. While it is difficult to obtain an understanding of the political effects of television based on this analysis, the analysis does give a good perspective of what CBS Evening News chooses to emphasize. By knowing what CBS emphasizes, one is in a better position to at least make generalizations about the effects of television on public opinion. These generalizations, in turn, can be the basis for a more detailed investigation of the political effects of television.

Within the most important category, the U.S.-Domestic category, four significant patterns were evident. The first involved the dominance of Institutions. The Institutions constituted almost 67% of the total U.S.-Domestic news stories. Actually, almost 33% of the total news stories during this period involved these Institutions. However, on CBS Evening News, the three branches of the Institutions are not of equal importance. Thus, the second pattern is the inequality of the three branches. By a large degree, the Executive branch dominates the other two branches. It constitutes almost 63% of the total Institutions' news stories and over 20% of the total number of news stories during this period. A third

pattern occurs within the Executive branch. Here the three bureaucratic categories (Departments, Executive Agencies, Regulatory Agencies) account for 49% of the Events of the Executive branch--but only 35% of the Reports. A fourth pattern involves the Legislative branch. Here, the Senate dominates the House by better than a 2:1 margin. Over 67% of the news stories of the Legislative branch involve the Senate. Thus, relative to the Senate, viewers do not learn much about the House of Representatives.

The two other main categories have interesting patterns, but they are not as important as those of the U.S.-Domestic category. In the International category, Institutions were emphasized. They comprised over 86% of all the U.S.-International news stories. And, obvious within Institutions was the dominance of both the United States (45.63%) and Indochina (33.58%). These two areas accounted for over 79% of all the U.S.-International Political news stories. In the International category, Institutions (75.87%) were dominant. And, two areas, Middle East and Great Britain, accounted for over 50% of the Institutions' news stories.

CHAPTER V

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLICY ISSUES

This chapter is a continuation of the quantitative analysis of the previous two chapters. While the previous two chapters concentrated on the Political Actors, this chapter will examine the frequency and the relationship between the Political Actors and the Policy Issues. And, it will also examine the frequency of the Policy Issues. In addition, it will briefly examine the nature and frequency of the Non-Political News Stories.

Before discussing each category, an overview of the totals will give an indication of some of the patterns which will emerge. Table 1 presents the total number and percentage of Policies.

The most numerous subject area would actually be coverage of all matters relating to Indochina. The general area of "Indochina" actually involves many news stories classified under different Policies, such as War or Military. The War category involved noncombat military matters. Needless to say, not all the "War" and "Military" totals pertain to Indochina. Thus, by combining the total Indochina news stories (750.) with the War (462.5) and Military (84.5) news stories specifically involving the United States or Indo-Chinese, the total news stories about the

Table 1. Policy Issues

<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR.</u>	<u>Total</u>
1341	1099.5	466.5	107.5	664.5	506.5	750.	247.5	732.5	(10.) 5925.5
% 22.63	18.56	7.87	1.81	11.21	8.55	12.66	4.18	12.36	(.17) 100%

Indochina War would be at least 1397. news stories. The most numerous analytical category was the political one. There were more news stories involving strictly political matters than any other single category. While all the stories involving these Policy-Issues are political in nature, over one-fifth of the news stories deal with strictly political activities or problems. As evident, the second most numerous single category is the social policy area.

Table 2 illustrates the frequency of Events and Reports for the total Policy-Issues. Most of the Policy-Issues were very close to the overall 3:1 ratio of Events to Reports. The two biggest exceptions were "War" with almost 85% Events and "Indochina" with over 35% Reports. This might be significant. Much of the discussion relevant to the Indochina War has been the effect of television coverage of it on United States public opinion. From a quantitative perspective, the potential impact would appear to be small, since only 15% of the "War" news stories are Reports. In total, the "War" news stories constitute 11.21% of the total 5925.5 political news stories. And, of the total number of political reports, "War" Reports constitute only 6.75%. These figures involve more than the Indochina War, although the respective figures from the U.S.-International category demonstrate that the same proportion of Events [436, (85.66%)] to Reports [73, (14.34%)] exists. While taking into account that visual reports do have obvious effects, these figures

Table 2. The Frequency of Events and Reports for the Total Policy Issues

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Events	985.	859.	352.	73.5	564.	376.5	484.	189.5	552.	4435.5
%	(73.46)	(78.13)	(75.46)	(68.37)	(84.88)	(74.33)	(64.53)	(76.57)	(75.36)	(74.85)
Reports	356.	240.5	114.5	34.	100.5	130.	266.	58.	180.5	(10)1490.
%	(26.54)	(21.87)	(24.54)	(31.63)	(15.12)	(25.67)	(35.47)	(23.43)	(24.64)	(100)25.15)
Total	1341.	1099.5	466.5	107.5	664.5	506.5	750.	247.5	732.5	(10) 5925.5
	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%) (100%)

would tend to de-emphasize the impact visual coverage of the Vietnam War might have on public opinion since the incidence of Reports to Events was so small--only 15%, and since "War" Reports only constituted 6.75% of the total Political Reports.

Table 3 gives a more complete perspective of the total Policy-Issues for the basic Political Actors. The number one Policy-Issue concern for the U.S.-Domestic category (news stories occurring within the United States) is "Social" news stories which comprised almost 25% of the total U.S.- Domestic Political news stories. This is followed by "Political" Activities (21.24%) and Indochina (15.80%). Together, these three Policy-Issues comprise almost 62% of news stories within this basic category. Within the U.S.-International category (news outside the United States which directly involves the United States), the obvious main Policy-Issue is the "War" category--the coverage of actual hostilities and combat. Over 40% of the U.S.-International news stories involved "War" coverage. As will be shown, the emphasis of the U.S.-International category involved coverage of the activities and problem of Indochina. Within the U.S.-International category, three Policy-Issue areas, "Political", "War", and "Foreign Policy/International Relations", dominate. Together, they constitute 75.54% of the Political U.S.-International news stories. Three Policy-Issues also dominate the International category, (news occurring outside of the United States, not directly involving the United States). These three, "Polit-

Table 3. Totals of The Three Categories

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR.</u>	<u>Total</u>
									(10)	
U.S.-Dom.	844. (21.24)	989. (24.89)	429. (10.80)	107.5 (2.70)	—	376.5 (9.47)	628. (15.80)	235.5 (5.93)	354.5 (8.92)	3974. (.25) (100%)
U.S.-Int.	250. (19.82)	41.5 (3.29)	28. (2.22)	—	509. (40.35)	112.5 (8.92)	122. (9.67)	4.5 (.36)	194. (15.37)	1261.5 (100%)
Intern.	247. (35.80)	69. (10.)	9.5 (1.38)	—	155.5 (22.54)	17.5 (2.54)	—	7.5 (1.08)	184. (22.66)	690. (100%)
Totals	1341. (22.63)	1099.5 (18.56)	466.5 (7.87)	107.5 (1.81)	664.5 (11.21)	506.5 (8.55)	750. (12.66)	247.5 (4.18)	732.5 (12.36)	5925.5 (.17) (100%)

ical", "War", and Foreign Policy/International Relations", account for 85% of the Political-International news stories.

Table 4 shows the number and frequency of the basic Political Actors for each of the Policy-Issues. By relating each Policy-Issue area to the totals, it is possible to see how far each Policy-Issue deviated from the average of each basic category. Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the same perspective for total Events and Reports.

Table 4. Totals for Policy-Issues

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR.</u>	<u>Total</u>
U.S.-Dom.	844. (62.94)	989. (89.95)	429. (91.96)	107.5 (100%)	—	376.5 (74.33)	628. (83.73)	235.5 (95.15)	354.5 (48.40)	3974. (70.98)
U.S.-Int.	250. (18.64)	41.5 (3.77)	28. (6.00)	—	509. (76.60)	112.5 (22.21)	122. (16.27)	4.5 (1.82)	194. (26.48)	1261.5 (16.73)
Int.	247. (18.42)	69. (6.28)	9.5 (2.04)	—	155.5 (23.40)	17.5 (3.46)	—	7.5 (3.03)	184. (25.12)	690. (12.29)
Totals	1341. (100%)	1099.5 (100%)	466.5 (100%)	107.5 (100%)	664.5 (100%)	506.5 (100%)	750. (100%)	247.5 (100%)	732.5 (100%)	5925.5 (100%)

(Note: Blank areas indicate Issue-Policy areas which were not used in specific basic categories.)

Table 5. Total Policy-Issue Events

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR.</u>	<u>Total</u>
U.S.-Dom. ²⁰	591.5 (60.05)	770.5 (89.70)	321. (91.19)	73.5 (100.)	-	273.5 (72.64)	387. (79.96)	181. (95.51)	237. (42.94)	2835. (63.92)
U.S.-Int.	200. (20.30)	31. (3.61)	22. (6.25)	-	436. (77.30)	87.5 (23.24)	97. (20.04)	3.5 (1.85)	156.5 (28.35)	1033.5 (23.30)
Int.	193.5 (19.65)	57.5 (6.69)	9. (2.56)	-	128. (22.70)	15.5 (4.12)	-	5. (2.64)	158.5 (28.71)	567. (12.78)
Totals	985. (100%)	859. (100%)	352. (100%)	73.5 (100%)	564. (100%)	376.5 (100%)	484. (100%)	189.5 (100%)	552. (100%)	4435.5 (100%)

Table 6. Total Policy-Issue Reports

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
U.S.-Dom.	252.5 (70.93)	218.5 (90.85)	108. (94.32)	34. (100%)	-	103. (79.23)	241. (90.60)	54.5 (93.97)	117.5 (65.10)	(10) 1139 (76.44)
U.S.-Int.	50. (14.04)	10.5 (4.37)	6. (5.24)	-	73. (72.64)	25. (19.23)	25. (9.40)	1. (1.72)	37.5 (20.77)	228. (15.30)
Int.	53.5 (15.03)	11.5 (4.78)	.5 (.44)	-	27.5 (27.36)	2. (1.54)	-	2.5 (4.31)	25.5 (14.13)	123. (8.26)
Totals	356. (100%)	240.5 (100%)	114.5 (100%)	34. (100%)	100.5 (100%)	130. (100%)	266. (100%)	58. (100%)	180.5 (100%)	(10) 1490. (100%)

An examination of each basic category will illustrate further patterns.

The U.S.-Domestic Category

Table 7 illustrates the distribution of the Policy-Issues for the main Political Actors within the U.S.-Domestic category. With each Political Actor either the "Political" or "Social" Policy Issue is the most numerous, and it is evident that with some Political Actors, the coverage is often monopolized by only two Policy-Issues. Policy-Issues dominate. These two Policy-Issues constitute 51.10% of the news stories of the Organized Groups, 60.56% of the news stories of Unorganized Groups, and 55.81% of the news stories of Individuals. With State/City/Local, the "Political" and "Social" Policy-Issues comprise almost 72% of the news stories.

Table 8 reveals the percentage of Political Actors for each Policy-Issue. This gives a good perspective of how the coverage of each Policy-Issue is distributed among the Political Actors. As would be expected, there is much variation. For example, 51.60% of the "Political" Policy-Issue news stories involve Institutions while 82.47% of the "Military" Policy-Issue news stories involve Institutions. Since the Institutions constitute almost 67% of the total Political news stories, it is obvious that this category

would dominate each Policy-Issue. With only two Policy-Issues, "Political" and "Racial", does the percentage of Institution news stories fall below 60% of each respective Policy-Issue.

Table 9 presents a similar perspective of the Events of the U.S.-Domestic Policy-Issue totals. Tables 9 and 10 will combine the percentages of both the Political Actors and the Policy-Issues.

Most of the patterns prevalent in Table 7 are still prevalent in the coverage of Events (news stories read at CBS studio by Cronkite). For each Policy-Issue, Institutions is the dominant Political Actor. Within Events, Institutions constitute 72.14% of the total Political Events, and with only one Policy-Issue, "Political", does the percentage of Institutions fall below 60%. A different situation, however, prevails with the Reports (news stories which are reported by a correspondent away from CBS studio). Here, the Institutions are not so dominant, as Institutions comprise 52.02% of the total U.S.-Domestic Political Reports. Within the "Political" Policy-Issue area, the dominant Political Actor (43.37%) is Individuals. One of the reasons for this is the commentaries of Eric Sevaried which comprise 20.59% of all the "Political" Policy-Issues which are Reports. Within the "Political" Policy-Issue area, Institutions is the second most frequent Political Actor at 36.43%. Also, deviating from the pattern in Table 8 is the "Racial" Policy-

Issue. Here, 60.29% of the "Racial" reports involve coverage at the level of State, City or Local. Only 23.53% of the "Racial" news stories involve the federal institutions. Thus, what little coverage there is of "Racial" matters (thirty-four Reports) is primarily coverage of State, City or Local matters.

Since the Institutions category of Political Actors is the most dominant, it is necessary to examine it in greater detail. Table 11 illustrates the distribution of Policy-Issues for the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches.

Except for some exceptions, the distribution of the Policy-Issues among the three Political-Actors is rather consistent. The coverage of the executive branch for both "Economic" and "Foreign Policy/International Relations" are two such exceptions.

Another exception is the coverage the Judiciary received with the "Military" and "Indochina" Policy-Issue areas. The reason for this was the extensive coverage of the My Lai trials. Other than these exceptions, the proportion of Policy-Issue coverage for each of the three branches is remarkably similar.

Table 7. U.S.-Domestic Policy-Issue Totals

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Inst.	435.5 (16.51)	678. (25.71)	323. (12.25)	60.5 (2.29)	310.5 (11.77)	393.5 (14.92)	166. (6.29)	270.5 (10.26)	2637.5 (100%)
Or. Groups	82.5 (29.84)	46. (16.64)	45.5 (16.46)	9. (3.25)	9. (3.25)	59. (21.34)	19. (6.87)	6.5 (2.35)	276.5 (100%)
Unorg. Groups	26.5 (37.32)	12.5 (17.61)	—	1. (1.41)	3.5 (4.93)	16.5 (23.24)	5. (7.04)	6. (8.45)	71. (100%)
Indiv.	206.5 (32.65)	89. (14.07)	51. (8.06)	8. (1.27)	42. (6.64)	146.5 (23.16)	11.5 (1.82)	68. (10.75)	632.5 (100%)
State/ Local	93. (26.09)	163.5 (45.86)	9.5 (2.66)	29. (8.13)	11.5 (3.23)	12.5 (3.51)	34. (9.54)	3.5 (.98)	356.5 (100%)
Totals	844.	989.	429.	107.5	376.5	628.	235.5	354.5	3974. (10.)
	(21.24%)	(24.89%)	(10.80%)	(2.70%)	(9.47%)	(15.80%)	(5.93%)	(8.92%)	(.25) (100%)

Table 8. U.S.-Domestic Policy-Issue Totals

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Instit.	435.5 (51.60)	678. (68.55)	323. (75.29)	60.5 (56.28)	310.5 (82.47)	393.5 (62.66)	166. (70.49)	270.5 (76.31)	2637.5 (66.37)
Org. Groups	82.5 (9.77)	46. (4.65)	45.5 (10.61)	9. (8.37)	9. (2.39)	59. (9.39)	19. (8.07)	6.5 (1.83)	276.5 (6.96)
Unorg. Groups	26.5 (3.14)	12.5 (1.26)	—	1. (.93)	3.5 (.93)	16.5 (2.63)	5. (2.12)	6. (1.69)	71. (1.79)
Indiv.	206.5 (24.47)	89. (9.00)	51. (11.89)	8. (7.44)	42. (11.16)	146.5 (23.33)	11.5 (4.88)	68. (19.18)	632.5 (15.91)
State/ Local	93. (11.02)	163.5 (16.53)	9.5 (2.21)	29. (26.98)	11.5 (3.05)	12.5 (1.99)	34. (14.44)	3.5 (.99)	356.5 (8.97)
Totals	844. (100%)	989. (100%)	429. (100%)	107.5 (100%)	376.5 (100%)	628. (100%)	235.5 (100%)	354.5 (100%)	3974. (100%)

Table 9. U.S.-Domestic Policy-Issue Totals: Events

	Pol.	Soc.	Econ.	Racial	Mil.	Indoch.	Ecol.	FP/IR	Total
Instit.	343.5 (16.80) (58.07)	565.5 (27.65) (73.40)	259.5 (12.69) (80.84)	52.5 (2.57) (71.43)	234. (11.44) (85.56)	257.5 (12.59) (66.54)	140. (6.85) (77.35)	192.5 (9.41) (81.22)	2045. (100%) (72.14)
Org. Groups	64.5 (31.77) (10.90)	37. (18.23) (4.80)	29.5 (14.53) (9.19)	7.5 (3.69) (10.21)	7. (3.45) (2.56)	38.5 (18.97) (9.95)	13.5 (6.65) (7.46)	5.5 (2.71) (2.32)	203. (100%) (7.16)
Unorg. Groups	16.5 (35.48) (2.79)	8.5 (18.28) (1.10)	—(0)	1. (2.15) (1.36)	1. (2.15) (.36)	12. (25.81) (3.10)	3.5 (7.53) (1.93)	4. (8.60) (1.69)	46.5 (100%) (1.64)
Indiv.	97. (32.12) (16.40)	43. (14.24) (5.58)	25. (8.28) (7.79)	4. (1.32) (5.44)	23.5 (7.78) (8.59)	71. (23.51) (18.39)	5. (1.66) (2.76)	33.5 (11.09) (14.14)	302. (100%) (10.65)
State/ Local	70. (29.35) (11.84)	116.5 (48.85) (15.12)	7. (2.94) (218.)	8.5 (3.56) (11.56)	8. (3.35) (1.93)	8. (3.35) (2.07)	19. (7.97) (10.50)	1.5 (.63) (.63)	238.5 (100%) (8.41)
Total	591.5 (20.86) (100%)	770.5 (27.19) (100%)	321. (11.32) (100%)	73.5 (2.59) (100%)	273.5 (9.65) (100%)	387. (13.65) (100%)	181. (6.38) (100%)	237. (8.36) (100%)	2835. (100%) (100%)

Table 10. U.S.-Domestic Policy Issue Totals: Reports

Instit.	Pol. 92.	Soc. 112.5	Econ. 63.5	Racial 8.	Mil. 76.5	Indoch. 136.	Ecol. 26.	FP/IR 78.	Total 592.5
	(15.53)	(18.99)	(10.72)	(1.35)	(12.91)	(22.95)	(4.39)	(13.16)	(100%)
	(36.43)	(51.49)	(58.80)	(23.53)	(74.27)	(56.43)	(47.71)	(66.38)	(52.02)
Org. Groups	18.	9.	16.	1.5	2.	20.5	5.5	1.	73.5
	(24.49)	(12.24)	(21.77)	(2.04)	(2.73)	(27.89)	(7.48)	(1.36)	(100%)
	(7.13)	(4.12)	(14.81)	(4.41)	(1.94)	(8.50)	(10.09)	(.86)	(6.45)
Unorg. Groups	10.	4.	—	—	2.5	4.5	1.5	2.	24.5
	(40.82)	(16.33)	(0)	(0)	(10.20)	(18.37)	(6.12)	(8.16)	(100%)
	(3.96)	(1.83)	(0)	(0)	(2.43)	(1.87)	(2.75)	(1.70)	(2.15)
Indiv.	109.5	46.	26.	4.	18.5	75.5	6.5	34.5	330.5
	(33.13)	(13.92)	(7.87)	(1.20)	(5.60)	(22.84)	(1.97)	(10.44)	(100%)
	(43.37)	(21.05)	(24.07)	(11.77)	(17.96)	(31.33)	(11.93)	(29.36)	(100)
State/ Local	23.	47.	2.5	20.5	3.5	4.5	15.	2.	118.
	(19.49)	(39.83)	(2.12)	(17.37)	(2.97)	(3.81)	(12.71)	(1.70)	(100%)
	(9.11)	(21.51)	(2.32)	(60.29)	(3.40)	(1.87)	(27.52)	(1.70)	(10.36)
Total	252.5	218.5	108.	34.	103.	241.	54.5	117.5	(10)(.88)
	(22.17)	(19.18)	(9.48)	(2.99)	(9.04)	(21.16)	4.78)	(10.32)	1139.
	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)

Table 11. Totals for Institutions Category

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Exec.	247. (14.91)	426. (25.72)	269.5 (16.27)	33. (1.99)	146. (8.81)	188. (11.35)	117.5 (7.09)	229.5 (13.86)	1656.5 (100%)
Leg.	138.5 (22.05)	168.5 (26.83)	47.5 (7.56)	13.5 (2.15)	78.5 (12.50)	103. (16.40)	40. (6.38)	38.5 (6.13)	628. (100%)
Jud.	50. (14.16)	83.5 (23.65)	6. (1.70)	14. (3.97)	86. (24.36)	102.5 (29.04)	8.5 (2.41)	2.5 (.71)	353. (100%)
Total	435.5 (16.51)	678. (25.71)	323. (12.25)	60.5 (2.29)	310.5 (11.77)	393.5 (14.92)	166. (6.29)	270.5 (10.26)	2637.5 (100%)

Table 12 illustrates how the coverage for the three branches is distributed within each Policy-Issue.

Table 12. Institutional Totals for Each Policy-Issue

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Exec.	247. (56.72)	426. (62.83)	269.5 (83.44)	33. (54.55)	146. (47.02)	188. (47.78)	117.5 (70.78)	229.5 (84.84)	1656.5 (62.81)
Leg.	138.5 (31.80)	168.5 (24.85)	47.5 (14.70)	13.5 (22.31)	78.5 (25.28)	103. (26.17)	40. (24.10)	38.5 (14.23)	628. (23.81)
Jud.	50. (11.48)	83. (12.32)	6. (1.86)	14. (23.14)	86. (27.70)	102.5 (26.05)	8.5 (5.12)	2.5 (.93)	353. (13.38)
Total	435.5 (100%)	678. (100%)	323. (100%)	60.5 (100%)	310.5 (100%)	393.5 (100%)	166. (100%)	270.5 (100%)	2637.5 (100%)

Since 62.81% of the news stories here are news stories involving the Executive, it is obvious that the Executive will dominate each Policy-Issue area. Even so, as is evident, there is variation. Almost 85% of the news stories concerned with "Foreign Policy/International Relations" involve the Executive branch whereas less than 48% of the news stories about the "Military" and "Indochina" involve the Executive. But even with "Military" or "Indochina" news stories, it is still obvious that the Executive dominates since with each of these Policy-Issue areas, the Executive outnumbers each of the other branches by an almost 2:1 ratio. Thus, at the minimum, there will be almost twice as many news stories for a Policy-Issue involving the Executive than for one which involves Congress or the Courts.

Table 13 presents the totals for Events of the Institutions category. The distribution of Events in Table 13 is extremely similar to the total figures presented in Table 11 and 12.

Table 13. Institutional Totals for Events

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Exec.	195. (14.96) (56.77)	355.5 (27.27) (62.86)	219. (16.80) (84.39)	28.5 (2.18) (54.29)	119.5 (9.17) (51.07)	123. (9.44) (47.77)	100.5 (7.71) (71.79)	162.5 (12.47) (84.42)	1303.5 (100%) (63.74)
Leg.	105. (22.32) (30.57)	133. (28.27) (23.52)	34.5 (7.33) (13.30)	11.5 (2.44) (21.90)	59. (12.54) (25.21)	69. (26.79) (26.79)	31. (6.59) (22.14)	27.5 (5.84) (14.28)	470.5 (100%) (23.01)
Jud.	43.5 (16.05) (12.66)	77. (28.41) (13.62)	6. (2.22) (2.31)	12.5 (4.61) (23.81)	55.5 (20.48) (23.72)	65.5 (24.17) (25.44)	8.5 (3.14) (6.07)	2.5 (.92) 1.30	271. (100%) (12.25)
Total	343.5 (16.80) (100%)	565.5 (27.65) (100%)	259.5 (12.69) (100%)	52.5 (2.57) (100%)	234. (11.44) (100%)	257.5 (12.59) (100%)	140. (6.85) (100%)	192.5 (9.41) (100%)	2045. (100%) (100%)

Table 14 presents the totals for Institutional Reports. Here, there is a little more variation than in Table 13. Within each Policy-Issue, the Executive branch is generally not quite as dominant as it was with the Events. Even so, in every Policy-Issue except for "Military" and "Indochina" the Executive branch is more pronounced with the Events. With the Events, the highest frequency of Executive coverage was "Foreign Policy/International Relations" with 84.42% and the lowest was "Indochina" with 47.77%--or a difference of 36.65%. With the Reports, the highest frequency of Executive coverage was again "Foreign Policy/International Relations" with 85.90% and the lowest was "Military" with 34.64%--or a difference of 51.26%. As explained earlier, the coverage of the My Lai trials accounts for the high percentage of "Military" (39.87%) and "Indochina" (27.21%) Reports which involve the Judiciary. And, within the Judiciary, the "Military" and "Indochina" combined account for 67.08% of its total. Thus, with the Judiciary, one-fourth of the Policy-Issue areas account for two-thirds of its total coverage.

With Congress, three Policy-Issue Areas, "Social" (22.54%), "Indochina" (21.59%) and "Political" (21.27%) account for 65.40% of its total coverage of Reports. Within the Executive branch, the top three Policy-Issue areas, "Social" (19.97%), "Foreign Policy/International

(18.98%), and "Indochina" (18.41%) account for 57.36% of the total. However, it should be obvious from Table 14 that with the exception of "Racial" (since it is so small) and "Military", Congress cannot compete with the Executive for political visibility. Since Reports offer more of a chance at political visibility than do Events, the results presented in Table 15 are significant in trying to understand the difficult time Congress has in trying to compete with the Executive branch--even though, of course, the Legislative branch consists of two Houses, each speaking not with one voice, but with many diverse voices.

Table 15 presents an even closer look at the distribution of Policy-Issues among the Executive branch. It presents the distribution of Policy-Issues for each Political Actor of the Executive branch. As evident in Table 15, 60.03% of the news stories about President Nixon involve either the "Political" or "Social" Policy-Issues. By contrast, over 62% of the news stories of Agnew involved "Political" Policy-Issues. The coverage of the Advisers/Staff was more oriented towards "Economic" and "Foreign Policy/International Relations" Policy-Issues since these two account for almost 50% of the coverage.

Other patterns are evident. Over 46% of the coverage of the Cabinet involves the "Social" and "Indochina" Policy-Issues. The coverage of the Departments is more evenly distributed with the Executive Agencies--56.87% of the news stories involve "Social" and "Ecology" Policy Issues.

Table 14. Institutional Totals for Reports

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Exec.	52. (14.73) (56.52)	70.5 (19.97) (62.67)	50.5 (14.31) (79.53)	4.5 (1.28) (56.25)	26.5 (7.51) (34.64)	65. (18.41) (47.79)	17. (4.82) (65.38)	67. (18.98) (85.90)	353. (100%) (59.58)
Leg.	33.5 (21.27) (36.41)	35.5 (22.54) (31.55)	13. (8.25) (20.47)	2. (1.27) (25.)	19.5 (12.38) (25.49)	34. (21.59) (25.)	9. (5.72) (34.62)	11. (6.98) (14.10)	157.5 (100%) (26.58)
Jud.	6.5 (7.93) (7.07)	6.5 (7.93) (5.78)	— (0) (0)	1.5 (1.83) (18.75)	30.5 (37.19) (39.87)	37. (45.12) (27.21)	— (0) (0)	— (0) (0)	82. (100%) (13.84)
Total	92. (15.53) (100%)	112.5 (18.99) (100%)	63.5 (10.72) (100%)	8. (1.35) (100%)	76.5 (12.91) (100%)	136. (22.95) (100%)	26. (4.39) (100%)	78. (13.19) (100%)	592.5 (100%) (100%)

Table 15. Executive Branch Totals

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Nixon	137.5 (32.12)	97.5 (24.91)	49. (12.52)	3.5 (.89)	14.5 (3.70)	33. (8.43)	15.5 (3.96)	41. (10.47)	391.5 (100%)
Agnew	26.5 (62.35)	9. (21.18)	-	-	1.5 (3.53)	1.5 (3.53)	-	4. (9.41)	42.5 (100%)
Advis/ Staff	24.5 (11.26)	39.5 (18.16)	64. (29.43)	7. (3.22)	6.5 (2.99)	19.5 (8.96)	12.5 (5.75)	44. (20.23)	217.5 (100%)
Cabinet	21.5 (8.85)	53.5 (22.02)	30.5 (12.55)	5. (2.06)	18.5 (7.61)	59. (24.28)	7. (2.88)	48. (19.75)	243. (100%)
Depts.	29. (5.47)	119. (22.43)	87. (16.40)	14. (2.64)	87. (16.40)	74. (13.95)	35.5 (6.69)	85. (16.02)	530.5 (100%)
Exec. Ag.	4. (3.14)	38.5 (30.20)	21. (16.47)	3.5 (2.74)	18. (14.12)	1. (.78)	34. (26.67)	7.5 (5.88)	127.5 (100%)
Reg. Ag.	4. (3.84)	69. (66.35)	18. (17.31)	- (0)	- (0)	- (0)	13. (12.50)	- (0)	104. (100%)
Total	247. (14.91)	426. (25.72)	269.5 (16.27)	33. (1.99)	146. (8.81)	188. (11.35)	117.5 (7.09)	229.5 (13.86)	1656.5 (100%)

With the Regulatory Agencies, 66.35% of the news stories alone involve the "Social" Policy-Issues.

Table 16 illustrates the distribution of Executive branch Political Actors for each Policy-Issue. Of interest here is the high (55.67) percentage of "Political" coverage which involved President Nixon. With each of the other Policy-Issues, the Departments account for the most coverage. With the "Military" Policy-Issue, almost 60.% of the Executive branch news stories involve the Department. With "Indochina", almost 40% of the news stories involve the Department.

Table 17 presents the distribution of Reports for the Executive branch. While the Reports are less numerous than the Events, Reports are more significant since this is where the political visibility is.

As evident in Table 17, for both Nixon and Agnew, "Political" and "Social" Policy-Issues dominate their coverage. Combined, they account for 54.42% of the news stories of Nixon and 79.30% of the news stories about Agnew. And, 70.19% of the "Political" Policy-Issue Reports dealt with President Nixon.

Other patterns are evident. For example, the "Economic" and "Foreign Policy/International Relations" Policy-Issues account for almost 65% of the Adviser/Staff coverage. With the Departments, "Indochina" and "Foreign Policy/International Relations" account for almost 53% of the news stories. President Nixon, Advisers/Staff, and Departments account for

Table 16. Executive Branch Totals

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Nixon	137.5 (55.67)	97.5 (22.89)	49. (18.18)	3.5 (10.61)	14.5 (9.93)	33. (17.55)	15.5 (13.19)	41. (17.86)	391.5 (23.63)
Agnew	26.5 (10.73)	9. (2.11)	- (0)	- (0)	1.5 (1.03)	1.5 (.80)	- (0)	4. (1.74)	42.5 (2.56)
Advis. Staff	24.5 (9.92)	39.5 (9.27)	64. (23.75)	7. (21.21)	6.5 (4.45)	19.5 (10.37)	12.5 (10.64)	44. (19.17)	217.5 (13.13)
Cabi- net	21.5 (8.70)	53.5 (12.56)	30.5 (11.32)	5. (15.15)	18.5 (12.67)	59. (31.39)	7. (5.96)	48. (20.92)	243. (14.67)
Dept.	29. (11.74)	119. (27.93)	87. (32.28)	14. (42.42)	87. (59.59)	74. (39.36)	35.5 (30.21)	85. (37.04)	530.5 (32.03)
Exec. Ag.	4. (1.62)	38.5 (9.04)	21. (7.79)	3.5 (10.61)	18. (12.23)	1. (.53)	34. (28.94)	7.5 (3.27)	127.5 (7.70)
Reg. Ag.	4. (1.62)	69. (16.20)	18. (6.68)	- (0)	- (0)	- (0)	13. (11.06)	- (0)	104. (6.28)
Total	247. (100%)	426. (100%)	269.5 (100%)	33. (100%)	146. (100%)	188. (100%)	117.5 (100%)	229.5 (100%)	1656.5 (100%)

Table 17. Executive Branch Totals: Reports

	Pol.	Soc.	Econ.	Racial	Mil.	Indoch.	Ecol.	FP/IR	Total
Nixon	36.5 (33.95) (70.19)	22. (20.47) (31.21)	12.5 (11.63) (24.75)	.5 (.47) (11.11)	3. (2.79) (11.32)	12. (11.16) (18.46)	4. (3.72) (23.53)	17. (15.81) (25.37)	107.5 (100%) (30.45)
Agnew	7.5 (51.72) (14.42)	4. (27.58) (5.67)	-	-	1. (6.90) (3.77)	1. (6.90) (1.54)	-	1. (6.90) (1.49)	14.5 (100%) (4.11)
Advis. Staff	3.5 (8.86) (6.73)	7.5 (18.99) (10.64)	12. (30.38) (23.76)	1. (2.53) (22.22)	.5 (1.26) (1.89)	-	1.5 (3.80) (8.82)	13.5 (34.18) (20.15)	39.5 (100%) (11.19)
Cab.	2. (2.99) (3.85)	14. (20.89) (19.86)	7.5 (11.19) (14.85)	1.5 (2.24) (33.33)	4. (5.97) (15.10)	26. (38.81) (40.)	-	12. (17.91) (17.91)	67. (100%) (18.98)
Dept.	2. (2.16) (3.85)	11. (11.89) (15.60)	13.5 (14.60) (26.73)	.5 (.54) (11.11)	12.5 (13.51) (47.17)	26. (28.11) (40.)	4. (4.32) (23.53)	23. (24.87) (34.33)	92.5 (100%) (26.20)
Exec. Agenc.	.5 (1.92) (.96)	7. (26.92) (9.93)	4.5 (17.31) (8.91)	1. (3.85) (22.23)	5.5 (21.15) (20.75)	-	7. (26.93) (41.18)	.5 (1.92) (.75)	26. (100%) (7.37)
Reg. Agenc.	-	5. (83.33) (7.09)	.5 (8.33) (.99)	-	-	-	.5 (8.34) (2.94)	-	6. (100%) (1.70)
Total	52. (14.73) (100%)	70.5 (19.97) (100%)	50.5 (14.31) (100%)	4.5 (1.27) (100%)	26.5 (7.51) (100%)	65. (18.41) (100%)	17. (4.82) (100%)	67. (18.98) (100%)	353. (100%)

75% of the "Economic" Policy-Issue news stories. Almost one-half (47.17%) of the "Military" news stories involve the Departments with the "Indochina" Policy-Issue; 80% of the news stories involve the Cabinet or the Departments. Slightly over 59% of the "Foreign Policy/International Relations" news stories involve President Nixon and the Departments.

Table 18 illustrates the distribution of coverage between the House and the Senate.

The difference between the coverage of the two Houses is evident. The "Political" and "Social" Policy-Issues accounted for 58.55% of the news stories of the House but only 44.29% of the Senate. With each Policy-Issue the Senate receives the most coverage. This ranges from almost 57% with "Social" to slightly over 82% with "Indochina". Thus, on Indochina, the obvious focal point of CBS' coverage is the Senate. The same applies to the "Military" and "Foreign Policy/International Relations" Policy-Issues, since the Senate accounts for over 70% of their coverage. Only in "Social" and "Economic" Policy-Issues does the House's proportion of coverage go above 40%.

Table 18. Totals of Legislative Branch

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Senate	92. (21.67) (66.43)	96. (22.62) (56.97)	28.5 (6.71) (60.)	8.5 (2.00) (62.96)	58. (13.66) (73.89)	84.5 (19.91) (82.04)	27.5 (6.48) (68.75)	29.5 (6.95) (76.62)	424.5 (100%) (67.60)
House	46. (23.12) (33.21)	70.5 (35.43) (41.84)	19. (9.55) (40.)	5 (2.51) (37.04)	20. (10.05) (25.48)	18. (9.04) (17.48)	11.5 (5.78) (28.75)	9 (4.52) (23.38)	199 (100%) (31.69)
Total	138.5 (22.05)	168.5 (26.83)	47.5 (7.56)	13.5 (2.15)	78.5 (12.50)	103. (16.40)	40. (6.38)	38.5 (6.13)	628. (100%)
	(99.64)*	(98.81)*	(100%)	(100%)	(99.37)*	(99.52)*	(97.50)*	(100%)	(99.29)*

* Some stories were classified as Legislative Branch.

Table 19 presents the totals for Organized Groups.

As would be expected, the most coverage for each Organized Group involves its respective Policy-Issue. Thus, for Political Groups, "Political" Policy-Issues receive the most coverage. However, within Political Groups, "Indochina" accounted for 42.50% of the coverage. And, over 86% of the coverage of "Indochina" as it involved Organized Groups involved "Political" Groups.

Table 20 presents the totals for Organized Groups-Reports. From this, the dominance of the "Indochina" coverage is evident. "Indochina" received more coverage (27.89%) than any other Policy-Issue. It constituted 50% of the news stories of Political groups. Almost 93% of the "Indochina" news stories involved Political groups--which would be expected.

Table 21 presents the totals for Unorganized Groups who received coverage--such as some demonstrations and protests. In all, seventy-one news stories dealt with Unorganized Groups. Of this total, forty-five (63.38%) news stories involved Social Groups. Two Policy-Issues, "Political" and "Indochina", constitute slightly over 60% of the news stories.

Table 19. Organized Groups: Totals

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Political	56. (46.69) (67.88)	3. (2.50) (6.52)	-	1.5 (1.25) (16.67)	4.5 (3.74) (50.)	51. (42.50) (86.44)	2. (1.67) (10.53)	2. (1.67) (30.77)	120. (100%) (43.40)
Social	6.5 (16.05) (7.88)	13. (32.10) (28.26)	3. (7.41) (6.59)	2.5 (6.17) (27.78)	1.5 (3.70) (16.67)	5. (12.35) (8.47)	8. (19.75) (42.10)	1. (2.47) (15.38)	40.5 (100%) (14.65)
Econ.	16.5 (16.02) (20.)	27. (26.21) (58.70)	41.5 (40.29) (91.21)	1. (.97) (11.11)	1.5 (1.46) (16.67)	3. (2.91) (5.09)	9. (8.74) (47.37)	3.5 (3.40) (53.85)	103. (100%) (37.25)
Racial	3.5 (26.92) (4.24)	3. (23.08) (6.52)	1. (7.69) (2.20)	4. (30.77) (44.44)	1.5 (11.54) (16.66)	-	-	-	13. (100%) (4.70)
Total	82.5 (29.84) (100%)	46. (16.64) (100%)	45.5 (16.46) (100%)	9. (3.25) (100%)	9. (3.25) (100%)	59. (21.34) (100%)	19. (6.5) (100%)	6.5 (2.35) (100%)	276.5 (100%) (100%)

Table 20. Organized Groups: Totals Reports

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Political	14.5 (38.16) (80.56)	1 (2.63) (11.11)	-	-	1.5 (3.95) (75.)	19. (50.) (92.68)	1. (2.63) (18.18)	1. (2.63) (100.)	38. (100%) (51.70)
Social	1.5 (23.08) (8.33)	2. (30.77) (22.22)	1. (15.38) (6.25)	-	.5 (7.69) (25.)	-	1.5 (23.08) (27.27)	-	6.5 (100%) (8.84)
Economic	2. (7.41) (11.11)	5. (1.52) (55.56)	14.5 (53.70) (90.63)	1. (3.70) (66.67)	-	1.5 (5.56) (7.32)	3. (11.11) (54.55)	-	27. (100%) (36.74)
Racial	-	1. (50.) (11.11)	5 (25.) (3.12)	5 (25.) (33.33)	-	-	-	-	2. (100%) (2.72)
Totals	18. (24.49) (100%)	9. (12.24) (100%)	16. (21.77) (100%)	1.5 (2.04) (100%)	2. (2.73) (100%)	20.5 (27.89) (100%)	5.5 (7.48) (100%)	1. (1.36) (100%)	73.5 (100%) (100%)

Table 21. Unorganized Groups: Totals

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Political	9.5 (57.58) (35.85)	1. (6.06) (8.)	-	-	2. (12.12) (57.14)	2. (12.12) (12.12)	1. (6.06) (20.)	1. (6.06) (16.67)	16.5 (100%) (23.24)
Social	13.5 (30.) (50.94)	10.5 (23.33) (84.)	-	-	1.5 (3.33) (42.86)	14.5 (32.23) (87.88)	-	5. (11.11) (83.33)	45. (100%) (63.38)
Racial	1.5 (60.) (5.66)	-	-	1. (40.) (100.)	-	-	-	-	2.5 (100%) (3.52)
Environ.	2. (28.57) (7.55)	1. (14.29) (8.00)	-	-	-	-	4. (57.14) (80.)	-	7. (100%) (9.86)
Totals	26.5 (37.32) (100%)	12.5 (17.61) (100%)	-	1. (1.41) (100%)	3.5 (4.93) (100%)	16.5 (23.24) (100%)	5. (7.04) (100%)	6. (8.45) (100%)	71. (100%) (100%)

Table 22 illustrates how the coverage was distributed among Individuals. This category consists of four types. Institutional officials are people who work for the federal government but were speaking on their own--not in the capacity of a member of a department or agency. An example might be the secretary of labor commenting on Vietnam. A politician is a Political Actor campaigning for office or dealing in nonlegislative party politics--such as the Republican National Governors' Conference. Eric Sevareid is self-explanatory. "Others" involves those not in government (George Meany) who speak for themselves and receive coverage within the context of the Policy-Issues. Actually, the "Others" category is the most dominant. "Others" account for 47.12% of the news stories within this category. Two Policy-Issues, "Political" and "Indochina" constitute 55.81% of the news stories.

Table 23 gives the totals for the Reports of the Individual category. As might be expected, Eric Sevareid has the most coverage. He accounts for 47.50% of these Reports. He spent 33.12% of his time discussing "Political" Policy-Issues. The rest of his time is pretty much balanced between the "Social", "Economic", "Indochina" and "Foreign Policy/International Relations" Policy issues. With the "Others" category, "Indochina" constitutes 41.18% of the news stories.

Table 22. Individuals: Totals

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Inst. Officials	27. (30.68) (13.08)	16. (18.18) (17.98)	3.5 (3.98) (6.86)	4.5 (5.11) (56.25)	10. (11.36) (23.81)	15. (17.05) (10.24)	2.5 (2.84) (21.74)	9.5 (10.80) (13.97)	88. (100%) (13.91)
Politicians	63.5 (71.75) (30.75)	1. (1.13) (1.12)	7.5 (8.47) (14.71)	.5 (.56) (6.25)	2. (2.26) (4.76)	8.5 (9.61) (5.80)	- (6.22) (8.09)	5.5 (100%) (13.99)	88.5 (100%) (13.99)
Others	63.5 (21.31) (30.75)	51. (17.11) (57.30)	21. (7.05) (41.18)	3. (1.01) (37.50)	27.5 (9.23) (65.48)	101. (33.89) (68.94)	8.5 (2.85) (73.91)	22.5 (7.55) (33.09)	298. (100%) (47.12)
Eric Seavareid	52.5 (33.23) (25.42)	21. (13.29) (23.60)	19. (12.03) (37.25)	- (5.95)	2.5 (1.58) (5.95)	22. (13.92) (15.02)	.5 (.32) (4.35)	30.5 (19.30) (44.85)	158. (100%) (24.98)
Total	206.5 (32.65) (100%)	89. (14.07) (100%)	51. (8.06) (100%)	8. (1.27) (100%)	42. (6.64) (100%)	146.5 (23.16) (100%)	11.5 (1.82) (100%)	68. (10.75) (100%)	632.5 (100%) (100%)

Table 23. Individual Totals: Reports

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Inst. Officials.	6. (23.53) (5.48)	4. (15.69) (8.69)	-	2. (7.84) (50.)	3. (11.77) (16.22)	6. (23.53) (7.95)	2. (7.84) (30.77)	2.5 (9.80) (7.25)	25.5 (100%) (7.72)
Pols.	31. (82.67) (28.31)	.5 (1.34) (1.09)	2. (5.33) (7.69)	.5 (1.33) (12.50)	-	2. (5.33) (2.65)	-	1.5 (4.) (4.35)	37.5 (100%) (33.43)
Others	20.5 (18.55) (18.72)	21. (19.00) (45.65)	5. (4.53) (19.23)	1.5 (1.36) (37.50)	13. (11.76) (70.27)	45.5 (41.18) (60.26)	4. (3.62) (61.54)	-	110.5 (100%) (33.43)
Eric Sevareid	52. (33.12) (47.49)	20.5 (13.06) (44.57)	19. (12.10) (73.08)	-	2.5 (1.59) (13.51)	22. (14.01) (29.14)	.5 (.32) (7.69)	30.5 (19.43) (100.)	157. (100%) (47.50)
Total	109.5 (33.13) (100%)	46. (13.92) (100%)	26. (7.87) (100%)	4. (1.20) (100%)	18.5 (5.60) (100%)	75.5 (22.84) (100%)	6.5 (1.97) (100%)	34.5 (10.44) (100%)	330.5 (100%) (100%)

Of the total U.S.-Domestic Political category, 8.97% of the news stories involved news at the state, city or local level. Table 24 presents the total distribution of Policy-Issues.

Table 24. State, City, Local: Policy-Issue Distribution

<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racl.</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indch.</u>	<u>EcoL</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Totls.</u>
93	163.5	9.5	29.	11.5	12.5	3.34	3.5	356.5
% (26.09)	(45.86)	(2.66)	(8.13)	(3.23)	(3.51)	(9.54)	(.98)	(100%)

Two Policy-Issues, "Political" and "Social" account for almost 72% of the state, city, local coverage. Table 25 demonstrates the distribution of the coverage of the Political Actors.

Table 25. State, City, Local: Political Actor Distribution

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Executive	108.5	30.43
Legislative	11.5	3.23
Judicial	41.5	11.64
Groups	143.	40.12
Individuals	49.	13.74
Totals	<u>356.5</u>	<u>100%</u>

Two Political Actors, "Executive" and "Groups" account for over 70% of the news stories at the state, city, or local level. With the Reports, as illustrated by Table 26, these two Political Actors account for an even higher percentage of the news stories.

Table 26. State, City, Local: Political Actor Distribution - Reports

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Executive	26.5	22.46
Legislative	2.	1.69
Judicial	6.5	5.52
Groups	61.	51.69
Individuals	20.	16.95
	<u>118.</u>	<u>100%</u>
Totals	118.	100%

With the Reports, the proportion of Executive news stories is reduced. However, with Groups accounting for almost 52% of the news stories, the combined-total of Executive and Groups is almost 75%. Table 27 presents the distribution of Policy-Issues for each Political Actor. Within the biggest category, "Social", 66.36% of the news stories involve the Executive and Groups.

Before discussing the U.S.-International category, it is necessary to briefly discuss the U.S.-Domestic Non-Political News. Table 28 presents the total number and distribution of U.S. Non-Political News. Four types of Non-Political News dominate these totals: Crime, New York Stock Exchange, Business, and Social. Together, four account for 54.97% of the total U.S. Non-Political news stories.

Table 27. State, City, Local: Total Distribution of Policy-Issues

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>Racial</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Exec.	26.5 (28.49)	45. (27.52)	6. (63.16)	10. (34.48)	4.5 (39.19)	1.5 (12.)	13. (38.24)	2. (57.14)	108.5 (30.43)
Leg.	3. (3.23)	5. (3.06)	.5 (5.26)	1. (3.45)	-	-	2. (5.88)	-	11.5 (3.23)
Jud.	6. (6.45)	30. (18.35)	1.5 (15.79)	2. (6.90)	1. (8.70)	1. (8.)	-	-	41.5 (11.64)
Groups	43. (46.24)	63.5 (38.84)	1. (10.53)	13. (44.83)	3. (26.09)	3. (24.)	16.5 (48.53)	-	143. (40.12)
Indiv.	14.5 (15.59)	19. (11.62)	.5 (5.26)	3. (10.34)	3. (26.08)	6. (48.)	2.5 (7.35)	.5 (14.29)	49. (13.74)
Total	93. (100%)	163.5 * (99.39%)	9.5 (100%)	29. (100%)	11.5 (100%)	12.5 * (92%)	34. (100%)	3.5 * (71.43%)	356.5 (100%)

*Note: Some news stories were classified as "State/City/Local".

Table 28. Totals for U.S.-Domestic: Nonpolitical

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Tragic Events	57.5	3.32
Accidents	73.	4.21
Crime	324.	18.68
Space	88.	5.07
Labor	80.5	4.64
Business	168.5	9.71
N.Y. Stock Exchange	288.5	16.63
Personalities	115.	6.63
Entertainment	15.	.86
Sports	77.	4.44
Social	172.5	9.95
Economic	10.	.58
Racial/Ethnic	17.5	1.01
Military	45.	2.59
Environment	69.5	4.01
"On The Road"	43.	2.48
Other	90.	5.19
Total	<u>1734.5</u>	<u>(100%)</u>

Because the nightly N.Y. Stock Exchange listing is not a Report, there is a much wider distribution of Non-political Reports. As evident in Table 29, there is a relatively equal distribution of category. The two exceptions are "Crime" and "Social" which together account for 35.56% of the Reports.

Table 29. Totals for U.S.-Domestic Nonpolitical:
Events and Reports

	<u>Events</u>		<u>Reports</u>	
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
Tragic Events	33.	2.47	24.5	6.16
Accidents	51.5	3.85	21.5	5.40
Crime	234.5	17.55	89.5	22.49
Space	64.5	4.83	23.5	5.90
Labor	61.5	4.60	19.	4.77
Business	136.5	10.21	32.	8.04
N.Y. Stock Exchange	287.5	21.51	1.	.25
Personalities	99.	7.41	16.	4.02
Entertainment	11.	.82	4.	1.01
Sports	57.	4.27	20.	5.03
Social	120.5	9.02	52.	13.07
Economic	5.	.37	5.	1.26
Racial/Ethnic	12.	.90	5.5	1.38
Military	37.	2.77	8.	2.01
Environment	45.5	3.40	24.	6.03
"On The Road"	13.	.97	30.	7.54
Other	67.5	5.05	22.5	5.65
Total	1336.5	(100%)	398.	(100%)

U.S.-International

As discussed earlier, the "U.S.-International" category refers to news which occurs outside the United States but either involves Americans or the United States directly. The coverage of the Indochina War will, of course, dominate this whole category. On the Institutions level, slightly over 50% of the news stories of the United States and 57.57% of the news stories of Indochina involve actual coverage of the war.

For both the U.S.-International and International categories there are two basic classifications--Institutions and Groups/Individuals. "Institutions" involve entities or extensions of a government, whereas Groups/Individuals do not. Thus, our military forces in Vietnam would be an "Institution". Tables 30, 31, and 32 present the totals for the Groups and Institutions.

In each table, "War" is the dominant Policy-Issue for the Institutions. For the Groups/Individuals, "Politics" is the dominant Policy-Issue.

Table 33 presents a closer examination of the two main Political Actors--The United States and Indochina.

Together, the United States and Indochina account for 81.92% of the total U.S.-International Institutions news stories. The United States alone constitutes 47.20% of this coverage. Within the United States category, the "War", "Military" and "Indochina" Policy-Issues combine

Table 30. U.S.-International Totals

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Inst. %	190.5 (17.45)	19.5 (1.79)	19.5 (1.79)	478. (43.79)	101.5 (9.30)	103. (9.44)	4.5 (.41)	175. (16.03)	1091.5 (100%)
Groups/ Ind.	59.5 (35.)	22. (12.94)	8.5 (5.)	31. (18.23)	11. (6.47)	19. (11.18)	-	19. (11.18)	170. (100%)
Totals	250. (19.82)	41.5 (3.29)	28. (2.22)	509. (40.35)	112.5 (8.92)	122. (9.67)	4.5 (.36)	194. (15.37)	1261.5 (100%)

Table 31. U.S.-International: Total Events

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Instit.	156. (17.15)	16.5 (1.81)	15.5 (1.70)	411. (45.19)	79.5 (8.74)	86. (9.46)	3.5 (.39)	141.5 (15.56)	909.5 (100%)
Groups/ Ind.	44. (35.48)	14.5 (11.70)	6.5 (5.24)	25. (20.16)	8. (6.45)	11. (8.87)	-	15. (12.10)	124. (100%)
Totals	200. 19.35)	31. (3.00)	22. (2.13)	436. (42.19)	87.5 (8.47)	97. (9.38)	3.5 (.34)	156.5 (15.14)	1033.5 (100%)

Table 32. U.S.-International: Total Reports

	Pol.	Soc.	Econ.	War	Mil.	Indoch.	Ecol.	FP/IR	Totals
Instit.	<u>34.5</u> (18.95)	<u>3.</u> (1.65)	<u>4.</u> (2.20)	<u>67.</u> (36.81)	<u>22.</u> (12.09)	<u>17.</u> (9.34)	<u>1.</u> (.55)	<u>33.5</u> (18.41)	<u>182.</u> (100%)
Groups/ Ind.	15.5 (33.70)	7.5 (16.30)	2. (4.35)	6. (13.04)	3. (6.52)	8. (17.39)	-	4. (8.70)	46. (100%)
Totals	50. (21.93)	10.5 (4.61)	6. (2.63)	73. (32.02)	25. (10.96)	25. (10.96)	1. (.44)	37.5 (16.45)	228. (100%)

Table 33. U.S. and Indochina Totals: Institutions

	<u>Fol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Totals</u>
U.S.	13. (2.61)	3. (.60)	3.5 (.70)	251.5 (50.50)	76. (15.26)	91. (18.28)	3. (.60)	57. (11.45)	498. (100%)
Indo- china	136. (37.11)	3. (.82)	3.5 (.95)	211. (57.57)	8.5 (2.32)	X	-	4.5 (1.23)	366.5 (100%)

for a total of slightly over 84%. While not all the "Military" Policy-Issue would pertain to the Indochina War, certainly most of it would. For Indochina, as a Political Actor, almost 58% of its news stories involved the hostilities of the "War". "Politics" and "War" together accounted for almost 95% of Indochina's total news stories. Table 34 gives similar totals for Reports.

The difference here is that with the United States, the "War" Policy-Issue is not so dominant as it is in Table 33. As evident from Table 34, almost all (96.26%) of the Indochina Reports involve the "Political" or "War" Policy-Issues.

Table 35 illustrates the totals for some of the major countries in the U.S.-International category. This table tends to reaffirm the dominance of the United States and Indochina.

Table 34. U.S. and Indochina Institution Totals: Reports

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Indoch.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Totals</u>
U.S.	4. (4.04)	1.5 (1.52)	1. (1.01)	37. (37.37)	19.5 (19.70)	17. (17.17)	.5 (.50)	18.5 (18.69)	99. (100%)
Indo- china	23.5 (43.92)	-	1. (1.87)	28. (52.34)	1. (1.87)	X	-	-	53.5 (100%)

Table 35. U.S.-International Totals of Major Countries

	Pol.	Soc.	Econ.	War	Mil.	Indoch.	Ecol.	FP/IR	Total
U.S.	13. (7.28)	3. (16.67)	3.5 (18.92)	251.5 (52.61)	76. (78.35)	91. (92.86)	3. (66.67)	57. (36.08)	498. (47.20)
Gt. Brit.	3. (1.68)	1.5 (8.33)	-	1. (.21)	1. (1.03)	-	1.5 (33.33)	5.5 (3.38)	13.5 (1.28)
Germ./ France	.5 (.28)	5. (27.78)	4.5 (24.32)	-	1.5 (1.55)	.5 (.51)	-	2.5 (1.54)	14.5 (1.37)
Middle East	10.5 (5.88)	1.5 (8.33)	-	12.5 (2.62)	3. (3.09)	-	-	30.5 (18.77)	58. (5.50)
Russia	5. (2.80)	2.5 (13.89)	1.5 (8.11)	-	4.5 (4.64)	5.5 (5.61)	-	26. (16.)	45. (4.27)
China	2.5 (1.40)	-	-	-	-	1. (1.02)	-	14. (8.61)	17.5 (1.66)
Indo- china	136. (76.19)	3. (16.67)	3.5 (18.92)	211. (44.14)	8.5 (8.76)	X	-	4.5 (2.77)	366.5 (34.74)
So. America	7. (3.93)	1. (5.55)	-	2. (.42)	1. (1.03)	-	-	6.5 (4.00)	17.5 (1.66)
Int. Org.	1. (.56)	5. (2.78)	5.5 (29.73)	-	1.5 (1.55)	-	-	16. (9.85)	24. (2.32)
Total	178.5 (100%)	18. (100%)	18.5 (100%)	478. (100%)	97. (100%)	98. (100%)	4.5 (100%)	162.5 (100%)	1055. (100%)

Table 36 presents the nonpolitical totals for the U.S.-International category.

Table 36. U.S.-International Nonpolitical Totals

	<u>#</u>
Tragic Event	4.
Accident	3.5
Crime	7.
Social	19.5
Economic	19.
Racial/Ethnic	.5
Military	2.5
Ecology	1.5
Space	5.5
Business	4.5
Labor	.5
Personalities	2.
Entertainment	1.
Sports	10.
Other	3.
Total	<u>84.</u>

International

The International Category involves news which does not directly involve the United States. As with the U.S.-International Category, the International Category has two subdivisions--Institutions and Groups/Individuals. Table 37 presents the totals for Institutions and Groups/Individuals.

Since Institutions account for 75.87% of the news stories, it is to be expected that for each Policy-Issue the Institutions will dominate. And for both Institutions and Groups/Individuals, "Political" is the most numerous Policy-Issue. The total Reports for these two basic Political Actors are illustrated in Table 38. The same pattern exists here as with the totals.

Table 39 illustrates the distribution of news stories among some of the more numerous Political Actors. Three Policy-Issues, "Political", "War", and "Foreign Policy/International Relations" pretty much dominate. They account for 86.18% of the news stories in Table 39. The biggest Political Actor was the Middle East which was involved in hostilities during the period of analysis.

Table 37. Institution and Group Totals

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Insts.	184. (35.15) (74.49)	44. (8.41) (63.77)	6.5 (1.24) (68.42)	119. (22.73) (76.53)	14. (2.67) (80.)	6. (1.15) (80.)	150. (28.65) (81.52)	523.5 (100%) (75.87)
Groups/ Individs.	63. (37.84) (25.51)	25. (15.01) (36.23)	3 (1.80) (31.58)	36.5 (21.92) (23.47)	3.5 (2.10) (20.)	1.5 (.91) (20.)	34. (20.42) (18.48)	166.5 (100%) (24.13)
Totals	247. (35.80) (100%)	69. (10.) (100%)	9.5 (1.38) (100%)	155.5 (22.54) (100%)	17.5 (2.54) (100%)	7.5 (1.08) (100%)	184. (26.66) (100%)	690. (100%) (100%)

Table 38. Institution and Group Totals: Reports

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Instit.	44. (45.13) (82.24)	8. (8.21) (69.57)	.5 (.51) (100.)	22. (22.56) (80.)	2. (2.05) (100.)	2. (2.05) (80.)	19. (19.49) (74.51)	97.5 (100%) (79.27)
Indiv./ Groups	9.5 (37.25) (17.76)	3.5 (13.73) (30.43)	-	5.5 (21.57) (20.)	-	.5 (1.96) (20.)	6.5 (25.49) (25.49)	25.5 (100%) (20.73)
Total	53.5 (43.49) (100%)	11.5 (9.35) (100%)	.5 (.41) (100%)	27.5 (22.36) (100%)	2. (1.63) (100%)	2.5 (2.03) (100%)	25.5 (20.73) (100%)	123. (100%) (100%)

Table 39. Major International Totals

	<u>Pol.</u>	<u>Soc.</u>	<u>Econ.</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>Mil.</u>	<u>Ecol.</u>	<u>FP/IR</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Gt. Brit.	14.5 (18.59) (9.57)	13. (16.66) (33.77)	3. (3.85) (46.15)	26. (33.33) (23.01)	4. (5.13) (32.)	3.5 (4.49) (58.33)	14. (17.95) (10.65)	78. (100%) (16.97)
Germ./ France	20.5 (60.29) (13.53)	5. (14.71) (12.99)	1. (2.94) (15.39)	-	.5 (1.47) (4.)	1. (2.94) (16.67)	6. (17.65) (4.56)	34. (100%) (7.40)
Other, W. Europe	10.5 (38.89) (6.93)	3. (11.11) (7.79)	-	2.5 (9.26) (2.21)	.5 (1.85) (4.)	.5 (8.33) (1.85)	10. (37.04) (7.61)	27. (100%) (5.88)
Middle East	43.5 (23.39) (28.72)	8. (4.30) (20.78)	-	61. (32.79) (53.98)	4.5 (2.42) (36.)	-	69. (37.10) (52.47)	186. (100%) (40.48)
Russia	16. (30.48) (10.56)	6.5 (12.38) (16.88)	2.5 (4.76) (3.46)	3. (5.71) (2.66)	2.5 (4.76) (20.)	1. (1.91) (16.67)	21. (40.) (15.97)	52.5 (100%) (11.43)
So. Asia	18.5 (44.05) (12.21)	1. (2.38) (2.60)	-	13. (30.95) (11.50)	.5 (1.19) (4.)	-	9. (21.43) (6.84)	42. (100%) (9.14)
So. America	28. (70.) (18.48)	2. (5.) (5.19)	-	7.5 (18.75) (6.64)	-	-	2.5 (6.25) (1.90)	40. (100%) (8.70)
Totals	151.5 (32.97) (100%)	38.5 (8.38) (100%)	6.5 (1.41) (100%)	113. (24.59) (100%)	12.5 (2.72) (100%)	6. (1.31) (100%)	131.5 (28.62) (100%)	459.5 (100%) (100%)

Before concluding, it is necessary to examine the International Nonpolitical News.

Table 40. International Nonpolitical Totals

	#	%
Tragic Events	34.5	11.58
Accident	29.5	9.90
Crime	38.5	12.92
Social	11.35	38.09
Economic	1.	.33
Military	2.5	.84
Ecology	6.5	2.18
Space	26.5	8.89
Business	9.	3.02
Labor	6.5	2.18
Personalities	22.	7.38
Sports	3.	1.01
Other	5.	1.68
Total	298.	(100%)

As evident from this table, "Social" news dominates, as it constitutes 38.09% of the International Nonpolitical News. And, "Social", "Crime" and "Tragic Events" account for 62.59% of the International Nonpolitical News stories.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined aspects of CBS' news coverage. Because of the scope of the information presented, there are too many obvious patterns to summarize as was done in the previous chapters.

C H A P T E R V I

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: PART 1

The preceding three chapters have been relatively general and have analyzed CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite from a quantitative perspective. The remaining chapters will analyze CBS' coverage of different subject areas from a qualitative perspective. The subject areas that will be analyzed are: 1) Vietnam Battle Deaths, 2) Reactions to the Conviction of Lt. Calley, 3) The Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee Hearings on Freedom of the Press, 5) The Son Tay Prison Raid, 6) Campaign '70, and 7) Domestic Support and Opposition Towards the Vietnam War. It should be remembered that the period of analysis of this study was September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971. Because of this length, it was felt that it would be more advantageous to do "mini" analyses involving different subject areas over short periods of time, rather than just having a few analyses covering the entire thirteen and one-half month period.

Before examining the actual studies, it is helpful to review the analytical methods employed. The qualitative analysis used in this study involved the basic steps of any content analysis: 1) selection of categories and criteria, 2) defining direction, 3) coding, and 4) measure-

ment. Within the analysis, with the exception of the Vietnam Battle Deaths, the unit of analysis was the individual word. Although word-count was extremely time consuming, this seemed to be the best method of accurately determining the nature and direction of the coverage. It might have been possible to use either number of lines or number of inches as the unit of measurement. However, this would have produced inaccuracies since the transcripts often contain dialogue or other irregularities which would not lend themselves to precise measurement.

The actual selection of subject areas was dictated by various factors. One factor, with the exception of Domestic Support and Opposition of the Vietnam War, was that coverage of the subject should have occurred over a relatively short period of time to facilitate measurement. Another factor was simply that the subject should be important. A third factor was that the subject provide ample potential for support and opposition. It should be noted that one of the basic considerations of this study is to examine the degree to which CBS "balanced" supporting and opposing opinion on different subjects. Thus, the subjects had to possess measurable degrees of both support and opposition. A fourth factor was that this analysis only involved subjects of a political nature.

While the individual subjects differed in nature, the criteria applied to each were the same. These criteria basically involved two dimensions: 1) direction and 2) rele-

vant material. Direction was expressed as 1) Support or Favorable Coverage (Positive), 2) Neutral Coverage, and 3) Opposition or Unfavorable Coverage (Negative). All relevant content was classified into one of these three categories. The definitive definitions as to what constituted Positive or Negative coverage were basically consistent throughout the entire qualitative analysis. There was some flexibility as the subjects differed in nature. Relevant material was simply coverage which by 1) statement, 2) expression, or 3) action involved support, neutral coverage, or opposition towards the specific subject being analyzed. Irrelevant material within a news story was not measured. Thus, all relevant content would be classified within the following matrix:

	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Statement			
Expression			
Action			

Both the actual determination of direction and coding were, for the most part, not that difficult. It should be noted that the qualitative analysis was not based on sampling. All the relevant content for each subject was measured and included. And, this analysis did not measure intensity of direction. It was felt that the inclusion of intensity in the analysis would involve ambiguous criteria and the costs would outweigh the benefits. It should be remembered that one of the long-range concerns of this research are the effects of television news on public opinion and political behavior. Thus, any research of this nature, in addition to meeting the criteria of scholarly research, be sensitive to how the "Average" man would receive, perceive and internalize the information being presented. It was felt that intensity of direction, as defined by the researcher, would simply be beyond the recognition of the average viewer. Therefore, it was felt that it would be better to omit intensity of direction as an analytical variable.

As mentioned, coding was relatively simple. The word was the unit of analysis, but this, of course, was interpreted within the context of the paragraph, sentence, or phrase. In order to be precise, a sentence would sometimes contain opinion of two directions. This, however, was unusual, as most sentences contained a consistent direction. If the direction of some content was ambiguous or too difficult to classify, that content was classified as

"neutral" coverage.

The third step, measuring, involved simply classifying a sentence or phrase and then counting the words within it. Next, the subtotals were transferred to a calculating sheet where the totals for each news story were computed. The totals for each news story were then entered on the master coding sheets. The totals for each master coding sheet were computed, which produced the grand totals found in the tables.

In addition, most analyses contain sections which, using material from the transcripts, function to give a more accurate perspective of the nature of the coverage. This specific type of analysis is selective and this should be kept in mind, since it examines a limited, though meaningful, portion of the coverage. Often, this type of analysis is meant to demonstrate different types of coverage or reporting techniques prevalent in CBS News.

Mention should also be made of the problems inherent in this type of research--content analysis of television news. One problem is the actual acquisition of the television transcripts. Experience has shown that this is not easy. Individual taping and transcribing can be done, but this involves additional work and may reduce accuracy. A second problem is the necessity of an index if the period of analysis is an extended one. The index, which classifies each news story on each program, is essential but in itself, involves substantial work. A third major problem involves

the actual measuring. Counting words is dull, laborious, and time consuming. The point is that these three basic problems would tend to motivate researchers away from this type of research--at a time when more not less analysis of television news is needed.

Vietnam Battle Deaths

The Vietnam War offers many opportunities to examine the "reality" of CBS' coverage. One way to examine this reality is to use battle deaths (KSA) as the unit of analysis. This is amenable for comparison because two versions of "reality" are presented and thus can be compared.

Even though CBS received most of the reports of battle deaths from the Saigon command, CBS presented these in two different forms. One form was the occasional nightly reports of battle deaths which had occurred the previous day. It should be noted that these battle death reports were not reported every night. Their reporting was at the discretion of CBS. The motivation for reporting these battle deaths on an occasional basis cannot be determined from the transcripts. A second form of "reality" was reported every Thursday night. This was the weekly report of battle deaths for the previous week. This version of "reality", as mentioned, appeared occasionally according to the selective criteria of CBS.

These two versions of "reality" can easily be compared since they both deal in basically quantitative terms.

Since these two versions are both reporting and describing the same war, it can be argued that there should be a close similarity between the two versions. However, there are some methodological problems which should be discussed.

First, there are obvious problems in using casualty figures submitted by the South Vietnamese. It seemed to be a known fact that figures submitted by the South Vietnamese were grossly distorted--both in underestimating their own casualties and overestimating the casualties of the North Vietnamese/Vietcong. But, this does not present a real methodological liability, since CBS was using South Vietnamese casualty figures for both its nightly reports and the Thursday night weekly reports. Thus, the distortion which was present was a consistent one since the two versions of "reality" were based on the same sources. A second problem involved the actual casualty figures. Not all the nightly casualty figures could be used since some, but not many, were expressed in relative terms such as "light", or "several", or were expressed as "between 100 to 150." The latter, however, by interpolation based on the total proportion of dead to wounded, could be reduced to an absolute figure. This same interpolation was employed when just the term "casualties" was used.

Even with these liabilities, battle deaths, as the unit of analysis, can be used to compare these two versions of "reality." Needless to say, battle deaths are only one criteria of the progress and success of the war. In a limited sense, though, battle death reports do give one

perspective on who is "winning" and who is "losing." And, one would argue that the two versions of "reality" would agree.

Table 1 compares the total number of "nightly" battle deaths with the total number of "weekly" battle deaths.

Table 1. Comparison of Total Number of Nightly and Weekly Battle Deaths

	<u>Nightly</u>	<u>Weekly</u>
United States	393	2,094
South Vietnam	4,112	24,081
North Vietnam/ Vietcong	<u>23,237</u>	<u>106,216</u>
	27,742	132,391

From this, it is evident that the nightly reports include only a small portion of the weekly battle deaths. The total "nightly" battle deaths account for only 20.95% of the total "weekly" battle deaths. Table 2 illustrates this proportion for each combatant.

Table 2. Percentage of Total Nightly Battle Deaths to Total Weekly Battle Deaths

United States	18.77%
South Vietnam	17.08%
North Vietnam/ Vietcong	21.88%

Each combatant has about the same percentage of battle deaths on the "nightly" reports. From this perspective, the "nightly" view of "reality" is a uniform one for each combatant. And, as Table 3 illustrates, the "nightly" perspective closely approximates the "weekly" one.

Table 3. Comparison of Total Battle Deaths
of Each Combatant

	<u>Nightly</u>	<u>Weekly</u>
United States	1.42%	1.58%
South Vietnam	14.82%	18.19%
North Vietnam/ Vietcong	83.76%	80.23%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

As can be seen, there is no great variance, for any of the combatants, between the "nightly" and "weekly" reports. Thus, from this perspective, it appears that the two forms of "reality", the "nightly" and the "weekly" reports are very similar with only minor discrepancies.

However, in analyzing this data, some oddities appeared. It seemed that a large portion of the "nightly" battle deaths might be concentrated in only a few broadcasts--especially during the Laotian Campaign of Winter 1971. It is possible that a few broadcasts during this period distorted the total number of "nightly" battle deaths for the September 1, 1970, to October 8, 1971, period of analysis--which covered over three hundred broadcasts.

Closer analysis did reveal that heavy concentrations of battle deaths in a few broadcasts did distort the results. For example, of the total 23,237 North Vietnamese/Vietcong "nightly" battle deaths, 13,600 or 58.53% were reported on one nightly broadcast (March 24, 1971) which reported on the recent losses of the Laotian campaign. Obviously, this would distort the North Vietnamese/Vietcong results in Table 2.

To determine the effect of a few "nightly" broadcasts on the total number of "nightly" battle deaths, the five most numerous "nightly" broadcasts for each combatant were totaled and eliminated. Table 4 illustrates the number and percentages of battle deaths reported on the five most numerous broadcasts.

Table 4. The Number and Percentage of Nightly Battle Deaths Reported on the Five Most Numerous Broadcasts

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total Nightly Battle Deaths</u>
United States	185	47.07%
South Vietnam	2,588	62.94%
North Vietnam/ Vietcong	18,150	78.11%

As evident in Table 4, the top five broadcasts involve substantial percentages of the total number of "nightly" battle deaths. This is especially true with the North Vietnamese/Vietcong--where five broadcasts account for almost 80% of their total "nightly" battle deaths.

Table 5 demonstrates the effect of eliminating the five most numerous nightly broadcasts on the relationships presented in Table 2.

Table 5. Percentage of Total Nightly Battle Deaths
(Minus the Top Five Broadcasts) to
Total Weekly Battle Deaths

United States	9.93%
South Vietnam	6.33%
North Vietnam/ Vietcong	4.79%

Viewed from this perspective, the results are interesting. Since this version of "reality" is at variance with the "weekly" version of "reality." As discussed, according to the "weekly" reports, the United States suffered the fewest battle deaths. Now, with the elimination of the top five "nightly" broadcasts, the United States is experiencing the highest percentage of "nightly" battle deaths while the North Vietnamese/Vietcong were experiencing the lightest percentage of "nightly" battle deaths. The percentage of "nightly" battle deaths for the United States is twice that of the North Vietnamese/Vietcong. However, according to the "weekly" battle deaths, just the opposite was true--the North Vietnamese/Vietcong suffered the heaviest number of battle deaths while the United States suffered the fewest number of battle deaths. Thus after eliminating

the top five "nightly" broadcasts for each combatant, two grossly different forms of reality were being presented. In one, the "nightly" reports, the United States was "losing" in that relative to its total "weekly" number of battle deaths it was experiencing the highest percentage of "nightly" battle deaths while the North Vietnamese/Vietcong were "winning" since they were experiencing the fewest battle deaths. In the other, the "weekly" reports, the opposite was true. Here, the United States, with the fewest battle deaths was "winning" while the North Vietnamese/Vietcong were "losing" since they had the most battle deaths. Thus, two different versions of the same war were presented.

Son Tay Prison Raid

This section will briefly analyze coverage of the unsuccessful raid on the Son Tay Prison in North Vietnam in late November, 1970. Initially, after a preliminary reading of the transcripts, it was felt that possibly the "negative" coverage might exceed "positive" coverage. Here, "positive" coverage involved opinion which supported the raid; "negative" opinion opposed it. The analysis, however, demonstrated that this was not true. Positive coverage exceeded negative coverage on both quantitative and qualitative levels. Coverage of this subject is interesting in that it distinguishes the difference between "description" which supports opinion and opinion itself. It is significant,

therefore, that 62.55% of the "positive" coverage of the raid was basically description of the actual raid.

Table 6 shows the distribution of the coverage--using number of words as the unit of analysis.

Table 6. Totals for Raid at Son Tay Prison
and Subsequent Reactions

+	=	3,829	(67.17%)
0	=	359	(6.30%)
-	=	1,512	(26.53%)
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Total	=	5,700	(100%)

Positive coverage is obviously Dominant. Table 7 shows the proportion of positive to negative coverage.

Table 7. Positive and Negative Coverage

+	=	3,829	(71.69%)
-	=	1,512	(28.31%)
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Total	=	5,341	(100%)

Thus, as evident in both tables, there was a huge imbalance of coverage in support of the raid. However, a closer analysis put this imbalance in a different perspective. It seemed that much of what was classified as positive coverage was not opinion per se, but rather actual

descriptions of the raid itself--either by reporters, President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, or by some of the actual participants. It was decided to eliminate description of the actual raid from both positive and negative coverage.

The results are interesting. Of the total positive coverage, 1,434 words or 37.45% were classified as opinion. Thus, as mentioned earlier, 62.55% of the positive coverage was not opinion--but description of the raid itself. With the negative opinion, as one might expect, a different situation existed. Here, 1,428 words, or 94.44% of the negative coverage was opinion. Thus, as Table 8 illustrates, there was a close balance of coverage of actual "opinion."

Table 8. Number and Percentage of Actual Opinion

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+	=	1,434	(50.10%)
-	=	1,428	(49.90%)
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Total	=	2,862	(100%)
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As evident, the totals were almost exact. But, there was still an important difference--and that was in the proportion of "direct" to "indirect" coverage. The advantage, here, as illustrated by Table 9 was with coverage supporting the raid.

Table 9. Number and Percentage of "Direct"
Coverage of Opinion

+	=	1,007	(70.22%)
-	=	643	(45.03%)

Thus, over 70% of the positive coverage was "Direct" while only 45% of the negative coverage was "Direct." In both cases this percentage was computed only on "opinion." With this measurement, it is evident that the "positive" coverage was superior.

And, even though for part of this analysis, the descriptions of the raid were eliminated in that they were not opinion per se, it should be noted that the descriptions of the raid were not neutral. The descriptions did help to confer legitimacy on the raid, especially when others were criticizing it or questioning its intent--such as Senator Fulbright. These descriptions by military leaders or by the participants were not neutral in another way, for they helped to "romanticize" the war. These descriptions involved traditional American values, qualities and symbols--bravery and heroism--even though the raid did not achieve its announced objective. While these descriptions of the raid probably had little effect in terms of support, it is important to note that these values and symbols had largely been missing from the war. Coverage of the war had not produced any "heroes." Thus, it is possible (though maybe

not probable) that this type of coverage could have had, for some, the effect of presenting the complex war in a very simple and traditional way--war as consisting of bravery and heroism. The presentation of a war within this context is not neutral, since bravery and heroism help to romanticize a war; and, romanticizing a war on the basis of traditional values could quite possibly help to legitimize it.

Therefore, while description was not included in part of this analysis, it is important to note that description of an event such as the Son Tay Raid could be a factor in the formation of opinion. Thus, the coverage of the Son Tay Raid contained a disproportionate amount of positive coverage--which supported the raid.

The coverage of the Son Tay Raid was interesting in other ways. The coverage, to a certain extent, shows the capacity and inclination of the media to define or frame an event or reaction in a certain way. And, this is not neutral. The capacity to frame the issue in a certain way or to help determine what the "questions" will be can affect the subsequent debate and reactions. This was exemplified by Cronkite's discussion of "the big question."

- 1) The big question, now what will North Vietnam's reaction be, will there be reprisals against the more than 500 prisoners it's believed they hold?
(11/23/70, page 4)
- 2) The big question now in Washington and Paris is what effect the raids against North Vietnam will have on the peace talks. (11/23/70, page 7)

- 3) The big unanswered question, of course, is, what went wrong in the prison camp raid; why were the prisoners gone? (11/24/70, page 6)

While these may be "valid" questions, it should be noted that these are not the only "questions" that could be raised. And, more important, they are not neutral questions; they are negative questions--meant to place the Son Tay Raid in a negative context. Questions number 1 and number 2 are not necessarily questions that supporters of the raid would ask after the raid had been conducted. Cronkite, in this instance, was not being neutral. And, by he, himself, raising the questions, he became, a participant in the debate over the justification of the raid. Thus, the capacity of the media to raise the questions is vitally significant; but also significant is the direction of the questions. In this case, the direction is quite apparent--especially number 2. It should be remembered that in the fall of 1970, the Paris Peace Talks were unproductive.

Another interesting example from the Son Tay coverage was the tendency of newsmen to preface an event with their own subjective description:

- 1) There was an unusual reception at Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina today. Those being welcomed were part of the military team that tried, without success, to rescue American prisoners of war in North Vietnam. (11/25/70, page 3)
- 2) There was a certain sense of unreality about the ceremony for those who remembered that the highly publicized mission was a failure, even though the men who tried to carry it out might be heroes. (11/25/70, page 4)

Thus, for Cronkite, the reception was "unusual", and for Pierpoint, the White House reception had a "certain sense of unreality." Obviously, these descriptions are not neutral, and they may function to place the subsequent story within a negative context. Both descriptions were at the beginning of each story. Therefore, they could affect the audience's subsequent perception of the story.

Reactions to Lt. Calley's Conviction

This section analyzes the reactions to the conviction of Lt. Calley on March 29, 1971. The reaction to Calley's conviction was immediate and was overwhelmingly in support of Calley. The size of the reaction was impressive.

CBS described the reaction in the following terms: "A nationwide protest, taking many forms. . ."(3/30/71, page 2); "The furor touched off by Calley's conviction continued unabated today." . . ."More than 16,000 telegrams addressed to the White House have poured into Washington's main telegraph office since the verdict was announced Monday. Eight to ten thousand were received today, and message tapes piled up faster than clerks could process them. The White House reported 1500 phone calls. Another 20,000 telegrams addressed to congressmen flooded the Capitol Hill office. A company spokesman called the messages 'the tip of the iceberg'." (3/31/71, page 5); "The announcements came amid a deluge of telegrams to the White House--25,000 today--called the greatest expression of public sentiment by far on any issue of the Nixon presidency. . . .Mr. Nixon did so

as White House and Western Union sources acknowledged that the telephone and telegraph flood on Calley's behalf is setting an all-time record, surpassing that set last year at the time of the offensive in Cambodia." (4/1/71, page 2).

The reaction, while short-lived, was substantial and one-sided. And, there was no significant counter-reaction in support of Calley's conviction. However, there were certain factors which mitigated against extensive coverage of the pro-Calley reaction. As a result, it can be argued that the pro-Calley sentiment did not receive much coverage relative to its size. One of the reasons for this was that the pro-Calley sentiment was not "televisable." Basically, it was neither action-oriented nor organized. The way to receive television coverage is to do something which can be televised; and better yet--be organized and do something as a group. Basically, the pro-Calley reaction met neither of these criteria since it consisted of individuals acting alone or in small groups. Thus, except for some rallies, the basic "nongroup" or dispersed nature of the reaction did not conform to the unofficial rules of television coverage. The pro-Calley reaction was not an "event." It consisted of "mini" events--which do not receive coverage. In addition to the dispersed nature of the protest, the manner of the protest dictated against coverage. Except for the rallies, there was nothing television could cover--unless it took the initiative. Telegrams in a pile do not meet television's need for action. Thus, because the Calley protest was not

organized or visual in the manner of the anti-war protests, it did not receive coverage proportionate to its size and intensity.

Another problem created by the nature of the situation was the absence of counter-reactions. Thus, if CBS were to try to achieve a relative balance of opinion, it would have to go out and overtly solicit opinion which supported the conviction. This, CBS did. It included interviews with one of the jurors, Major Harvey Brown and Telford Taylor. Both of these people supported the conviction and were critical of the pro-Calley reaction. CBS also had an interview with George Latimer, Calley's attorney. Since CBS twice overtly sought and gave extended coverage to opinion contrary to the majority opinion expressed in the protest, an interesting situation arises. Should television basically reflect the "reality" of the situation and give coverage primarily to that opinion which is being overtly expressed? Or, should television try to "balance" the opinion by seeking and presenting counter-opinion? There is no correct answer--as this, of course, involves values, but one quality that should be insisted upon would be that of consistency. Which-ever approach CBS takes should be consistently used--regardless of the controversy or issue. It might be that CBS would "balance" the opinions only when it is in philosophical disagreement with the major opinion being expressed. If one can argue that CBS does have a liberal bias, then it would support the conviction of Calley. Thus, it would seek

and give coverage of opinion which also supported Calley's conviction. To do this--it would have to go out and overtly seek this opinion. Now, the interesting question concerns whether or not CBS would overtly attempt to achieve this same type of balance in a situation where CBS' views coincided with the major opinion being expressed. For example, during the Vietnam Veterans Against The War Demonstration in Washington, a few weeks after the Calley reaction, will CBS also attempt to overtly solicit opinion contrary to that being expressed by the anti-war veterans? If CBS does not, it may say something about bias. After analyzing CBS' coverage of the Calley reaction, the veterans' march will be analyzed and compared to the Calley reaction.

The coverage of the pro-Calley reaction covered the period of March 29, 1971, to April 7, 1971--a period of eight broadcasts. (Saturday and Sunday are excluded.) During this period, the unit of analysis used was "reactions to Calley's conviction." A total of 5454 words were used within this context. Table 10 demonstrates the qualitative classification.

Table 10. Nature and Percent of Coverage of Calley's Conviction

+	=	3,199	(58.65%)
0	=	1,287	(23.60%)
-	=	968	(17.75%)
Total		= 5,454	(100%)

Here, the positive (+) category refers to opinion which supports Calley and thus opposes the verdict of guilty. Negative opinion is negative toward Calley and thus supports the conviction. By eliminating the relevant but neutral coverage, a better picture is gained of the effective ratio.

Table 11. Percentage of Positive and Negative Coverage of Reaction To Calley

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+	=	76.77%
-	=	23.23%
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Total	=	(100%)
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The coverage obviously was dominated by pro-Calley coverage. As mentioned, CBS actively solicited, by going out and interviewing two people--Major Brown, a juror, and Telford Taylor. These two interviews were substantial in that they involved 48.14% of the anti-Calley coverage. Thus, almost half of the anti-Calley opinion was solicited opinion. This small example would tend to negate the contention of television that all it does is reflect reality. Obviously, with this example CBS created a significant part of the "reality"--rather than just reflecting it. When television goes out and solicits interviews, rather than doing them at the scene of the story, then it is creating the "reality" which appears on the screen. Without the

Brown and Taylor interviews, the coverage was distributed as follows:

Table 12. Adjusted Percentage of Positive and Negative Coverage of Reaction to Calley

+	=	86.22%
-	=	13.78%
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Total	=	(100%)

The coverage of the pro-Calley opinion deserves analysis. The major source of pro-Calley opinion was George Latimer, Calley's lawyer. He, personally, accounted for 24.66% of the pro-Calley opinion. Obviously, Latimer would be a valid source of opinion, but it is interesting why CBS concentrated so much on him--especially when so much pro-Calley opinion was being expressed by those unrelated to the case. Another pro-Calley source of opinion was interesting. One story dealt with a pro-Calley record which had just been released (4/6/71, pages 18-19). This accounted for 6.90% of the pro-Calley opinion. As with Latimer, this coverage did not reflect, other than the big success the record was having, the massive sentiment that Calley had in the country. Thus, these two opinion sources accounted for almost one-third (31.56%) of

the pro-Calley opinion--yet neither articulated the public's views on the issue. This total reaches 40% (40.44%). When a third source, Retired Marine General Lewis Walt, (3/31/71, page 6) is added. In fact, even though CBS noted that "there have been demonstrations of support for Calley in many places across the land" (4/2/71, page 4), and one demonstration as being". . .especially typical of hundreds like it around the country--(like it)--this week" (4/2/71, page 4). CBS, during this whole period, only gave actual coverage to two of them. These were demonstrations in Columbus, Georgia (3/31/71, page 7) and Waterloo, Illinois, 4/2/71, page 4). This, in itself, is interesting. Together, the two demonstrations included 358 words--or just 11.19% of the total pro-Calley opinion. This is significant--given that there were so many rallies and demonstrations in Calley's support. CBS obviously de-emphasized the importance of these by not covering them. The question has to be asked--Why? Did they articulate a sentiment that CBS found itself in disagreement with? It would seem that the CBS view of "reality" was at variance with what was really happening. It seems obvious that through its coverage, CBS did not transmit or reflect the true size, activity, and intensity of the pro-Calley sentiment throughout the country. True, the coverage was "pro-Calley," but the point is that the mass public, which was expressing its

outrage at the verdict, did not receive coverage proportionate to its size or degree of activity. It will be interesting to compare its coverage with that of the Vietnam Veterans Against The War.

CHAPTER VII

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: PART 2

This section analyzes coverage of the 1970 congressional elections. This analysis covered the period of September 10, 1970, to November 2, 1970. There were basically two aspects to the coverage of these elections. The first was the extensive coverage of President Nixon and Vice President Agnew and their activities and role in the elections. The second aspect involved the coverage of the elections and selected campaigns. This analysis will demonstrate that not only was the coverage of Nixon and Agnew quite extensive but it was also extremely positive coverage. Thus, Nixon and Agnew were able to have the best of both worlds. They had extensive coverage which was not countered by much negative coverage. Part of this, of course, would be endemic to the situation--since Nixon and Agnew were not running against anybody. Thus, there was no real organized entity to "balance" them. This "pro-Nixon" coverage was "balanced" in an overall sense by CBS' coverage of the actual campaigns. CBS gave "in-depth" coverage to nine different congressional or gubernatorial races. This analysis will show that the Democrats (combined with anti-administration Republicans and Independents in two races) received more positive coverage than did the

Republicans. This was true in seven of the nine races.

For the purpose of analysis, coverage favorable to the Nixon Administration and Republicans supported by the Nixon Administration was labeled "positive." Coverage of Democrats was classified as "negative" coverage. A couple of problems were apparent, given the nature of the 1970 election. First was the Nixon-Agnew opposition to Goodell and their subsequent support of Buckley. Here, favorable coverage of Buckley was classified as positive, while favorable coverage of Goodell was classified as "negative," since it was, similar to favorable coverage of Democrats, negative from the Administration perspective. Second, the campaign of Thomas Dodd as an Independent in Connecticut presented minor problems. Since Dodd was not supported by the Nixon Administration, "pro"-Dodd coverage was classified as negative. These two races, New York and Connecticut, made interpretations of "balance" difficult, since there were three people in each race--one basically supported by the Administration and two candidates opposed by the Administration.

Table 1 presents the total distribution of coverage for the congressional and gubernatorial elections of 1970.

Table 1. Total Distribution of Coverage of "Campaign '70"

+	=	9,129	(46.56%)
0	=	3,815	(19.46%)
-	=	6,661	(33.98%)
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Total	=	19,605	(100%)

Table 2 compares the positive and negative coverage.

Table 2. Distribution of Positive and Negative Coverage of
"Campaign '70"

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+	=	9,129	(57.82%)
-	=	6,661	(42.18%)
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Total	=	15,790	(100%)
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From these two tables, it is quite obvious that the "positive" coverage dominates. "Positive" coverage includes coverage favorable to 1) the Nixon Administration in its campaign activities of this period, and 2) Republicans, and 3) other candidates supported by the Administration. As evident, almost 58% of the coverage was favorable to the above point of view--which is a distinct imbalance.

However, a more precise perspective of this can be obtained by separating the coverage of the role of the Nixon Administration from the rest of "Campaign '70" coverage. Without the coverage of the Nixon Administration (primarily Nixon, Agnew and Mrs. Nixon), the balance of coverage swings the other way, with favorable coverage of the Democrats and anti-Administration campaign coverage dominating. Table 3 presents these results.

Table 3. Totals for Coverage of "Campaign '70 Minus Coverage of Nixon Administration

	+	=	4,116	(42.19%)
	-	=	5,641	(57.81%)
Total	=		9,757	(100%)

Here, coverage favorable to Democrats or anti-Administration dominates by 57% to 42%. This imbalance is the second example of imbalance--though its direction is opposite that of the first example, as illustrated in Table 2.

A third imbalance, one of a greater magnitude, is found in the coverage of the role of Nixon, Agnew and Mrs. Nixon in Campaign '70. Of importance here is the significant degree of imbalance favorable toward Nixon, Agnew and Mrs. Nixon. Of the coverage involving just Nixon and Agnew, 81.75% was "positive." When the coverage of Mrs. Nixon is added, the total percentage of "positive" coverage was 83.09%.

Table 4 presents these totals.

Table 4. Positive and Negative Coverage of The Role of Nixon, Agnew, and Mrs. Nixon in Campaign '70

	+	%	-	%	Total	%
Nixon	= 3,493	(81.91%)	809	(18.81%)	4,302	(100%)
Agnew	= 1,050	(83.76%)	205	(16.33%)	1,255	(100%)
Mrs. Nixon	= 470	(98.74%)	6	(1.26%)	476	(100%)
Totals	5,013	(83.09%)	1,020	(16.91%)	6,033	(100%)

As is quite evident, there is a significant imbalance in favor of Nixon and Agnew--who were playing a very active role in Campaign '70. It should be noted, however, that Table 4 only includes coverage of the actual activities and rhetoric of Nixon and Agnew. This rhetoric and these activities are the unit of analysis. This is important in interpreting Table 4 since Table 4 would exclude such things as negative remarks by Lawrence O'Brien (10/22/'70, pages 4-5) since they were not delivered within the context of the Nixon/Agnew campaign activity. Because of this, there is a bias to Table 4 since, while it is important, it only presents one aspect of the total picture. Therefore, discussing the significance of Table 4, it is necessary to examine further data to get a better perspective of the meaning of Table 4.

The coverage of Campaign '70 can be divided into three parts: 1) the role of Nixon/Agnew, 2) the nine congressional and gubernatorial races, and 3) the remaining coverage. This "remaining coverage" category is of relevance here since this category would include coverage of anti-Administration remarks, such as those by O'Brien (10/22/'70, pages 5-5) which might balance the tremendously favorable imbalance given to Nixon/Agnew presented in Table 4. Table 5 presents the totals for this third category--which is the fourth example of imbalance.

Table 5. Coverage of Third Category

+	=	911	(32.49%)
-	=	1,893	(67.51%)
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Total	=	2,804	(100%)

Here, as evident, pro-Democratic and anti-Administration opinion dominate by a big percentage. The imbalance is significant, though not quite as big as the pro-Nixon/Agnew imbalance exhibited in Table 4. To give a better perspective of the extensive coverage given to Nixon/Agnew, it would be helpful to combine Tables 4 and 5. It should be obvious, however, that the results of Table 5, imbalanced as they are, cannot effectively counterbalance the favorable coverage given to Nixon and Agnew. Table 6 documents this.

Table 6. Combined Total of Tables 4 and 5

+	=	5,924	(67.04%)
-	=	2,913	(32.96%)
<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	=	8,837	(100%)

As was expected, the pro-Nixon/Agnew, Republican imbalance is only slightly diluted by the addition of the third category coverage of Table 5. Even with this addi-

tional category, the imbalance (67.04%) in favor of the Nixon/Agnew and Republican point of view is still quite significant.

Together, Nixon and Agnew accounted for 49.76% of the total "positive" (+) coverage whereas they accounted for only 15.22% of the "negative" (-) coverage. The reality of this imbalance resulted from both the tendency of CBS News to give the President excessive coverage and the fact that Nixon and Agnew were not candidates; thus, there were not any "equal" entities playing the same role who could in quantity and quality effectively counter the coverage given to Nixon and Agnew. This situation does pose problems and further documents the dominant role the president plays as a newsmaker--even in an election in which he is not a candidate.

So far, this analysis has demonstrated four examples of imbalance. The imbalance of coverage presented by Table 2 and 4 favored the Nixon/Agnew Republican point of view. The imbalance presented in Table 3 and Table 5, which is equally significant, favors the Democratic and anti-Administration point of view. This is not quite a standoff since the total coverage (Table 6) to this point favors Nixon/Agnew, Republican opinion. What remains to be examined are the nine congressional or gubernatorial races which were a part of CBS' coverage of Campaign '70. This analysis will demonstrate that there was a fifth example of

imbalance--one in favor of Democrat and anti-Administration opinion, but that the total degree of this imbalance was not very significant since the imbalance was not that great.

The following is a list of the campaigns featured on CBS News:

- 1) New York Senate: Goodell, Ottinger, Buckley
- 2) Ohio Senate: Taft, Metzenbaum
- 3) California Governor: Reagan, Unruh
- 4) Tennessee Senate: Gore, Brock
- 5) New York Governor: Rockefeller, Goldberg
- 6) California Senate: Tunney, Murphy
- 7) Florida Senate: Chiles, Cramer
- 8) Illinois Senate: Stevenson, Smith
- 9) Connecticut Senate: Weicker, Dodd, Duffey

The total distribution of coverage is presented in Table 7.

Table 7. Total Coverage of Nine Major Races

+	=	3,205	(40.87%)
0	=	889	(11.34%)
-	=	3,748	(47.79%)
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Total	=	7,842	(100%)

Table 8 shows the relationship between the "positive" and "negative" coverage.

Table 8. Positive and Negative Coverage of Nine Major Races

+	=	3,025	(46.10%)
-	=	3,748	(53.90%)
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Total	=	6,953	(100%)

The total imbalance here is really not one of significance. However, this slight imbalance in favor of the Democratic or anti-Administration point of view is a composite total. An examination of the coverage of the individual races will produce more significant examples of imbalanced coverage. This is presented in Table 9. In this table, neutral coverage is omitted for better comparison.

As evident, there are major imbalances in both directions--though most of the major imbalances are in favor of the Democratic-anti-Administration point of view. Of particular significance were the New York Senate, the New York Governor, the California Senate, and the Florida Senate Races because of the extent of the imbalance. The New York Senate race was significant since there were two anti-Administration candidates (Goodell and Ottinger); yet, the pro-Administration candidate (Buckley) received the favorable imbalance. The New York Governor and Florida Senate Races were very interesting because of the real imbalance in favor of Democratic candidates. Also, it is important to note that

Table 9. Positive and Negative Coverage of Each of the Nine Major Races

Race	+	-	Total
New York Senate	499 (58.91%)	348 (41.09%)	847 (100%)
Ohio Senate	299 (48.54%)	317 (51.46%)	616 (100%)
California Governor	327 (48.09%)	353 (51.91%)	680 (100%)
Tennessee Senate	369 (58.66%)	260 (41.34%)	629 (100%)
New York Governor	408 (40.84%)	591 (59.16%)	999 (100%)
California Senate	332 (41.29%)	472 (58.71%)	804 (100%)
Florida Senate/Gov.	256 (32.74%)	526 (67.26%)	782 (100%)
Illinois Senate	336 (49.93%)	337 (50.07%)	673 (100%)
Connecticut Senate	379 (41.06%)	544 (58.94%)	923 (100%)
Totals	3,205 (46.10%)	3,748 (53.90%)	6,953 (100%)

Note: + refers to Republican or Administration-supported candidates;
 - refers to Democratic or anti-Administration candidates.

the reporter covering the story can be a source of opinion. This will be discussed in the next section.

In order to summarize the information presented to this point, a composite chart would be helpful. Table 10 presents a brief composite of the three categories of the coverage of Campaign '70.

Table 10. Total Coverage of Three Basic Categories of Campaign '70

	+	-	Total
1) Role of Nixon & Agnew, etc.	5,013 (83.09%)	1,020 (16.91%)	6,033 (100%)
2) 9 Major Races	3,205 (46.10%)	3,748 (53.90%)	6,953 (100%)
3) "Remaining" Coverage	911 (32.49%)	1,893 (67.51%)	2,804 (100%)
Totals	9,129 (57.82%)	6,661 (42.18%)	15,790 (100%)

This table once again graphically illustrates both the quantitative and qualitative imbalance in favor of Nixon and Agnew.

Another perspective of the CBS News coverage of Campaign '70 can be obtained by examining some of the different patterns of coverage. For example, coverage of the nine major races featured by CBS tended to emphasize such things as personalities, prediction, and politics at the expense of issues. A review of the coverage of the nine campaigns will demonstrate this.

In the coverage of the New York Senate Campaign, (10/2/70, pages 12-15), there was no discussion of the issues by the CBS reporter, Morton Dean. He did ask Buckley if he agreed with Nixon on certain issues (page 14). Dan Rather, covering the Ohio Senate race (10/14/70, pages 14-16), indicated that "integrity of state Republican leaders" was the issue (page 14). However, he later stated that both Taft and Metzenbaum felt that "the economy may decide the election." (page 15) In the California race (10/19/70, pages 13-14), there was no discussion of the issues by the reporter. The coverage included Reagan's discussion of law and order (page 13) and Unruh's discussion of pollution and Reagan's association with big business. Roger Mudd's coverage of the Tennessee Senatorial race did not specifically include discussion of issues. He did indicate that Brock said that Gore was out of touch with the people of Tennessee (page 8). Brock later reiterated this charge. The coverage of the New York gubernatorial race involved no definition of the issues by the reporter Mike Wallace. The coverage did include survey results (page 10) and charges by Goldberg (page 11) concerning the economy. Bill Stout, in his coverage of the California Senate Race, reported that, "There seem to be few issues capturing the voter's imagination." (page 12) Basically, he said, it would be a "choice between men not issues." (page 12)

The coverage of the Florida Senate and Gubernatorial Races (10/27/70, pages 12-14) contained no discussion of the issues. There was, though, coverage of Cramer stressing the need for "strong law enforcement." (page 13) In the Illinois Senate Race (10/29/70, pages 6-8), there was a definition of the prime issue. Reporter Fromson reported that "like so many races across the country, the campaign here is keyed to the issue of law and order." (page 6) There was no discussion of the major issues in the Connecticut Senatorial Race. (10/30/74, pages 9-12.

Thus, the "in-depth" coverage of Senatorial and Gubernatorial Races does not really develop the issues involved in each Race. It is interesting, though, that Walter Cronkite had little trouble identifying the issues. For example: "One of the big question marks in this year's election is whether economic problems or law and order will have greater impact on blue collar workers. . ." (10/27/73, page 3) Also, "With congressional elections getting closer, and the state of the economy becoming increasingly important as an issue, the Nixon Administration was confronted with more bad economic news today." (10/28/70, page 2) Cronkite also stated that "would-be forecasters are hesitating calling many of next Tuesday's election contests because of general uncertainty over the nation's economy." (10/28/70, page 16)

Other interesting points are worth discussing. On October 29, (pages 4-5) CBS discussed the results of its own poll on aspects of Campaign '70. Specifically, the poll meant to discover if Nixon and Agnew were effective in their campaigning. One of the questions employed was: "If you knew that Mr. Nixon (or Agnew) supported a candidate for election in your state, would you be more likely or less likely to vote for that candidate?" (10/29/70, page 4)

There seems to be a problem with this question since it can be argued that very few people would answer in the affirmative--no matter who the reference is included in the question. Thus, the result of the poll was not surprising. "If you add the second and third columns ("less likely", "not affected"), you find that three-quarters of the voters say the President could not influence them in favor of his men." (10/29/70, page 4) An indication of the feeling of CBS seemed to emerge in the third question of the poll: "In a non-presidential election year, is it proper or improper for the President to personally campaign for candidates in state elections?" (10/29/70, page 4) Perhaps this question said something about how CBS felt about the campaign activities of President Nixon.

Another interesting aspect is the role the reporter plays in the reporting of a story. For example, after a report in which George Meany and Speaker McCormack criticized the economy, Daniel Schorr summarized by saying:

"What Meany and McCormack are arguing is that conditions are bad and, and that this is the gut issue for labor." (10/27/70, page 4) This last point is interesting since neither Meany nor McCormack mentioned anything about the 1970 elections. Thus, Schorr added something on his own. Sometimes reporters can be mouthpieces for one candidate. For example, Roger Mudd, in an interview with Senator Gore, said: "Well, your opponent says that you're tied too closely with Washington; that you really don't represent Tennessee." (10/20/70, page 8) Mudd did not make a similar statement against Brock.

Also, reporters have the ability to ask what can be considered unfair questions. For example, Roger Mudd asked Reubin Askew, who was running against Claude Kirk, "What do you think of Governor Kirk, Senator?" (10/27/70, page 14) Askew then indicated what he felt about his opponent. This same question was not asked of Kirk. Needless to say, this was a rather slanted question. Another tactic is the capacity of the reporter to put a candidate on the defensive on a point that may not be important. For example, Mike Wallace, in discussing Goldberg in the New York gubernatorial race, stated that "He has been called aloof. Some say he still comes over like a Supreme Court Justice." (10/21/70, page 12) Goldberg, being on the defensive, was then forced to respond to the allegation provoked by the reporter, that he was aloof. Goldberg spent the rest of the interview explaining that he was not aloof. (10/21/70, pages 12-13.

Another tactic is for a reporter to defend a candidate. For example, as cited by Murray Fromson, the main issue in the Illinois Senatorial Campaign was law and order. (10/29/70, page 6) Some of the charges made in the campaign were that Stevenson was a "radical liberal." However, Fromson told the viewers that "Stevenson is not a radic-lib." (10/29/70, page 7) He then went on to explain why Stevenson was not a "radic-lib." Needless to say, this explanation was beneficial to Stevenson. Still another tactic is reporter's giving coverage to one side but not the other. On November 2, 1970, CBS gave direct and extensive coverage to the address Muskie was going to make later that night. He had not given the speech, yet a significant videotape excerpt of his speech was broadcast. Nixon, on the night before the election, was not given the same opportunity. According to Cronkite: "President Nixon's broadcast was to have been taken from a speech in Phoenix on Saturday. Most of that has been widely reported. It is a television reporting of portions of that speech." (11/2/70, page 2) A subsequent story discussed some of the activities and strategies of President Nixon. However, this was in no way synonymous with the exposure given to the Muskie speech. On the night before the elections on CBS, there was a favorable, extensive imbalance in favor of the Democrats.

Ervin Constitutional Rights Subcommittee on
Freedom of The Press

This section analyzes CBS' coverage of Senator Ervin's Constitutional Rights Subcommittee's hearings on "Freedom of The Press". This analysis covers five different news stories which were broadcast between September 28, 1971, and October 13, 1971. It should be noted that the period of analysis for this study ended on October 15, 1971. Thus, it is possible that CBS had other coverage of The Ervin Subcommittee which would not be included in this analysis. This should be kept in mind.

CBS, obviously, has a strong interest in freedom of the press. This interest and lack of neutrality seemed to emerge in CBS' coverage of the hearing dealing with government regulation of the press. In this analysis "positive" coverage is coverage "positive" or supporting the point of view taken by the press. This point of view argues that governmental regulation of the press is a real danger. An example of this would be:

Norman Issacs, . . . , decried what he called persistent Administration pressure on the press and its effect in eroding press forthrightness. (9/28/71, page 8)

"Negative coverage would be coverage which argued that the government does not represent a real threat to freedom of the press. For example:

. . . Ronald Ziegler said that the Vice-President has every right to express himself, that the Administration is not trying to intimidate the press, and that the press is too sensitive to receiving the kind of criticism it likes to hand out. (9/28/71, page 8)

Table 11 shows the distribution of opinion for the coverage of the subcommittee hearings.

Table 11. Total Distribution of Opinion: Ervin Subcommittee Hearings

+	=	1,060	(68.65%)
0	=	148	(9.59%)
-	=	336	(24.07%)
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Total	=	1,544	(100%)

Note: + = pro-press; - = support of Administration position

On CBS, over 68% (68.65%) of the coverage of the Ervin Subcommittee Hearings contained opinion which argued that government regulation was a real threat to freedom of the press. The percentage is even higher when just the positive and negative coverage is compared.

Table 12. Distribution of Positive and Negative Coverage

+	=	1,060	(75.93%)
-	=	336	(24.07%)
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Total	=	1,544	(100%)

Thus, of the positive and negative opinion, positive (pro-press) opinion constitutes better than 75% (75.93%)

of the total. This, obviously, is not an even balance of opinion. In addition to the 3:1 ratio of opinion supporting CBS' opinion, other factors are worth examining.

All the opinion was opinion which occurred before the Ervin Subcommittee. Thus, it is possible that testimony before the Ervin Subcommittee contained a 3:1 ratio in favor of condemning government regulation and intimidation of the press. If so, then CBS did reflect the "reality" of the hearings. But, CBS made no attempt, as it did with the Calley reaction, to solicit opinion to balance its coverage. With the reaction to Calley, CBS went out and gave interviews to two people who supported the conviction of Calley.

Yet, with the Veterans' Demonstration and the Ervin Subcommittee Hearings, CBS made no such effort--and as a result, in both cases--the opinion was very much one-sided, one-sided in the direction that one might anticipate if one were to argue that CBS has a "liberal" bias. Based on these three limited examples, CBS will "Balance" opinion only when to do so would increase the opinion CBS identifies with.

And, as with the Veterans' Demonstration, opinion before the Ervin Subcommittee which warned of dangers of governmental regulation received extensive and direct coverage. Table 13 documents the percentage of Direct to Indirect Coverage for both Positive and Negative Coverage. Obviously, Direct Coverage is superior to Indirect--where the reporter quotes or summarizes what the opinion source said.

Table 13. Percentage of Direct to Indirect Coverage

	<u>Direct</u>	<u>Indirect</u>	<u>Total</u>
+	701 (66.13%)	359 (33.87%)	1,060 (100%)
-	90 (26.79%)	246 (73.21%)	336 (100%)

This further substantiates the great advantage to opinion which would support the CBS point of view. (In this case it is possible to speak of "CBS point of view", since both CBS President Frank Stanton and Walter Cronkite testified before the Ervin Subcommittee.) Almost two-thirds (66.13%) of "pro-press" opinion was Direct. Whereas only slightly above one-fourth (26.79%) of negative coverage was Direct. Direct Coverage was given to: Senator Ervin, Norman Is-sacs, Representative Odgen Reid, CBS President Frank Stanton, Walter Cronkite, NBC President Julian Goodman, and Fred Friendly. All, except Friendly, represented the "pro-press" position. Five other people who testified were given Indirect Coverage. Two of these were "pro-press" and three took the opposite point of view.

Thus, CBS gave superior quantitative and qualitative coverage to opinion it agreed with. It did not actively attempt to solicit opinion to balance the proportion of positive to negative opinion. "Pro-press" opinion got the most coverage and it got the best coverage. As mentioned,

subsequent coverage of the Ervin Subcommittee may have occurred past October 15, 1971--which was the end of the period of analysis for the whole study. But, the concept of "balance" is one which should be applied over a short period--not over a month's period. Thus, it would seem that the results presented here are valid and that they do say something about CBS' coverage of a controversy where there were two basic sides. It is interesting that CBS did not include any opinion, with the exception of Ziegler's, from the Nixon Administration. The conclusion is obvious--there was no quantitative or qualitative equality of opinion here. And, that is what bias is all about.

CHAPTER VIII

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: PART 3

This section is an analysis of CBS' coverage of domestic support and opposition toward the Vietnam War during the period of September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971. The most significant finding was that CBS gave almost exactly equal coverage to both the "pro"-war and the "anti"-war positions. A second significant finding was that the "pro"-war opinion almost totally consisted of Nixon Administration sources. The "anti"-war opinion was much more diverse. It contained both governmental and non-governmental sources.

Before discussing the results, it is important to examine the rules and criteria employed in this analysis. First, opinion, behavior, and policy statements were included. Behavior involved such things as demonstrations and Senate votes. Policy statements, such as a new peace proposal by President Nixon, were also included. While these were not exactly opinions, they were value preferences stated in the form of policy. If the analysis relied strictly on the "opinions" of the Nixon Administration, then there would not have been too much to analyze. Included in this was justification of a specific policy or decision. Second, this analysis only measured domestic opinion--opinion which occurred within the United States.

Thus, this analysis does not include coverage of 1) foreign opinion, 2) Paris Peace Talks, or 3) battle action in Indochina. It does, however, include opinion and commentary on these--if the opinion did occur within the United States. For example, the analysis would include a Defense Department comment on the success of a military operation or Secretary Rogers' speaking about the Paris Peace Talks.

Third, the analysis excluded coverage of the various trials--such as My Lai or the Berrigans' trials. It was felt that this would lead to difficult coding problems and that material presented in an indictment or trial was not synonymous with the type of opinion this analysis was attempting to measure. Fourth, coverage of the Pentagon Papers was qualified. The government's attempts to prevent the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers was excluded, since this involved Vietnam only in a secondary way. And, coverage of the content of the Pentagon Papers was not neutral. However, the Pentagon Papers did not deal with President Nixon's policy during the period of analysis. Thus, it was felt that it would be best to include it, but not to measure it by direction.

In this analysis, as with the previous, opinion was classified as "positive", "neutral", or "negative." Here, "positive" opinion was opinion which supported or coincided with the position of the Nixon Administration during this period. The "negative" classification involved opinion and behavior which opposed the war and Nixon's conduct of it.

In addition, it is important to place the analysis in the context of the period of analysis--September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971. The basic military activities during this period involved 1) Nixon's winding down of the war, 2) the Son Tay raid, and 3) the Laos invasion. Domestically, the period was one of relative calm. During this period, the campuses were quiet. The major anti-war activities included the Vietnam Veterans Against the War demonstration and the subsequent demonstrations in May, 1971, by anti-war groups. Also, this period contained attempts by Congress to limit or end the war.

The total distribution of opinion (including behavior and policy position) proved to be both significant and interesting. In its coverage of domestic opinion concerning Vietnam, CBS gave almost exactly the same proportion of coverage to "anti"-war opinion as it did to opinion which supported the war--which included the policy statements and positions of the Nixon Administration. Basically, the Nixon Administration was the major source of opinion which supported the war. Thus, it seems that for almost every Nixon Administration opinion or policy position on Vietnam, CBS would counter this--though not necessarily at the same time--with an equal amount of "anti"-war opinion. Table 1 documents this and presents the totals for the September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971, period.

Table 1. Total Distribution of Domestic Opinion on Vietnam
September 1, 1970, to October 15, 1971

+	=	31,905	(39.11%)
0	=	19,492	(23.89%)
-	=	30,184	(37.00%)
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Total	=	81,581	(100%)

Table 2 eliminates the "neutral" coverage and demonstrates how close the coverage was between "anti"- and "pro"-war opinion.

Table 2. Total Distribution of Positive and Negative Domestic
Opinion on Vietnam War

+	=	31,905	(51.39%)
-	=	30,184	(48.61%)
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Total	=	62,089	(100%)

Not only is this almost incredibly similar, given the total amount of opinion, but it illustrates an extremely high degree of coverage given to the "anti"-war position. This is especially interesting in that this was not a period of many anti-war demonstrations. As demonstrated by Table 2, the coverage of "pro"-war opinion exceeded that of "anti"-war opinion by only 2.78%.

Also, the proportion of "direct" opinion for both the opinion which supported the Nixon Administration's Vietnam policy and "anti"-war opinion was almost equal in coverage given. Table 3 presents this.

Table 3. Proportion of "Direct" Coverage for "Pro"- and "Anti"- War Opinion

		<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
+	=	10,435	(32.71%)
-	=	8,883	(29.43%)

The difference here, as with the total distribution of positive and negative opinion, is not that significant. What is significant is the almost equal coverage CBS gave to both the "pro"- and "anti"-war opinion. This equality involved both total distribution and proportion of "direct" coverage.

Although this was not precisely measured, there was one difference in the coverage of the "pro"- and "anti"-war opinion. This was, as previously mentioned, the fact that opinion in support of the Nixon Administration's handling of the War emanated almost totally within either the Nixon Administration or within the federal government. Anti-war opinion, however, was more diverse in that it involved, in significant degrees, both governmental and non-governmental opinion. This seems natural and perhaps is to be expected.

However, this raises an important question. What about non-governmental opinion which supported Nixon's handling of the War? It surely existed--but not on CBS. If CBS was overtly attempting to "balance" "pro"-war and "anti"-war opinion, it did accomplish that--as evidenced by the totals of Table 2. But, whatever its motivation, the result seemed to be that a significant aspect of society, that portion which did support Nixon's handling of the War during this period, was denied access and simply did not receive coverage.

In fact, it sometimes seemed as if CBS over-extended itself to give coverage to anti-war opinion. Because of the length of this period of analysis, it is not possible to analyze it with the same degree of depth as contained in other analyses. However, it is possible to briefly examine some of the peculiarities in CBS' coverage of domestic opinion of the Vietnam War.

One CBS tendency was to give coverage to what can be classified as a "nonentity"--someone who was not important, but, because of unusual circumstances and anti-war opinion, received coverage. One example of this was the coverage given to Debra Sweet, the girl who told President Nixon at an award ceremony that, "I find it very hard to believe in you until you get us out of Vietnam." (12/3/70, pages 10-11) The story was first told by Cronkite; then a report was given by Robert Pierpoint. The report by Pierpoint included an interview with Debra Sweet. This was a lot of coverage

given to one person. One important question concerns whether or not the routine ceremony would have received any coverage if Miss Sweet had not made her anti-war remark. Would it have received the same coverage if a recipient had made a "pro"- war comment?

Another example of the same tendency was a story and report on Lt. Louis Font. (4/12/71, page 3-4) Lt. Font had just been discharged from the Army because he became a conscientious objector. As with Debra Sweet, Font was interviewed. This situation was unusual but would have the same degree of coverage been given in a similar situation if the direction had not been anti-war? And, sometimes the unusual but equal coverage achieves the status of the usual. On Memorial Day (5/31/71), CBS had two stories of equal length about Memorial Day ceremonies. One involved the ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery. The other story, of equal length, involved an anti-war parade in Madison, Wisconsin. Thus, the one anti-war parade, probably the only one in the United States that Memorial Day, received about one-half of the total Memorial Day coverage. This raises questions about how well the news actually reflects reality.

Another interesting tendency involves the reporter's personal involvement or commentary. Often, this involves just one or two sentences at the beginning or end of a story which tend to dilute the credibility of what is being said. Some examples will illustrate this.

In a story on the Senate's rejection of the McGovern-Hatfield amendment, Marvin Kalb said:

Today's votes and proposals climax many months of anti-war activity in the U.S. Senate. The doves have gained strength steadily, but those who do not wish to challenge the President of his policy in South-east Asia still retain the conclusive power of a voting majority. (9/1/70, page 3)

Rather than presenting this in a positive sense--that the majority in the Senate did support the President, Kalb chose to present the results in a negative sense--the majority not wishing to "challenge the President or his policy. . ."

Sometimes CBS would discuss the motivation behind an event or story. For example, right before President Nixon was to make a new proposal on ending the Vietnam War, Dan Rather said:

Political observers note that the President's speech comes just three weeks before the November congressional elections. (10/6/70, page 2)

Rather then went on to tell how CBS had been told that some senators had been told by the White House that they could expect "help from the President on the Vietnam issue some time in late October." Another example involved a media event on Thanksgiving--prisoners' families eating Vietnam prison food. Jim Kilpatrick closed by saying:

The gathering was clearly organized to focus media attention on the POW cause. (11/26/70, page 9)

Both Rather's and Kilpatrick's statements quite possibly could be very valid. But, did CBS attribute the same "political" motivations to members of the anti-war movement?

Did CBS discuss coverage of anti-war demonstrations within the context that they were trying to "focus media attention" on themselves?

Sometimes the reporter's feelings just simply creep into the story--as illustrated by Dan Rather's reporting of President Nixon's welcome of the First Marine Division:

These ceremonies are designed as a symbol of America's gratitude for sacrifices by their sons whether they believe in the War or not, of the President's word that he is ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and as a symbol of Mr. Nixon's determination not to let anti-war disruptions in Washington get all of the weekend headlines. (4/30/71, page 5)

Once again Mr. Rather gave us President Nixon's motivation. In addition, Rather described the soldiers in terms of "whether they believe in the War or not." As part of his closing, Rather states:

There was a flyover and Marine Veterans marching in review. Marines wounded in Vietnam: 51,000;
Marines killed in Vietnam: 8,000. . . (4/30/71, page 5)

Obviously, Mr. Rather was trying to make a point. Sometimes a reporter will reach conclusions that are not really evident in the story. Remarks by Robert Schakne illustrate this. After reporting on a campaign to produce commercials to publicize the condition of POW's with counter-reactions by other POW families, Schakne concluded by saying:

But this strange controversy over the advertising techniques to get these men home seems to point up a growing disenchantment among more and more POW families, with the war itself, and with the political uses of the prisoner issue. (8/12/71, page 9)

The story did discuss POW families who opposed the use of commercials and opposed President Nixon's policy, but the story in no way indicated that there was a "growing disenchantment among more and more POW families, with the war itself, and with the political uses of the prisoner issue."

Sometimes reporters simply like to "tell it like it is." This involves a negative description of the statement or activity. For example, Bob Schieffer reported that:

The Pentagon has added a new touch to what has become an obvious public relations campaign aimed at counter-ing bad news from the battlefield. (3/1/71, page 8)

Marvin Kalb reported that:

The line here is that the bombing of the American Embassy is "not alarming" even though additional Marine guards will now have to be posted there. And this line gets a novel twist. (12/1/70, page 4)

Kalb then went on what he meant by the "novel twist." Sometimes it is possible to detect the reporter's sympathies by his use of labels and names. For example, in May, 1971, anti-war demonstrators in Washington tried to shut down the government by various methods. To Bruce Morton, these protestors were "the peace army."

The peace army tried to do that today, but it failed. Washington faltered, but was not shot down, perhaps because the peace army lacked the organization. . . . So the peace army changed tactics, turned guerrillas, hit and run raids. . . . (5/3/71, page 2)

And,

And while the peace army was making its plans, the other army was planning to move out. (5/4/71, page 3)

Needless to say, the reference to protestors--whose stated goal was to break the law, to physically prevent the government from operating--as "peace army" was perhaps overly sympathetic and euphemistic.

Finally, the sympathies of reporters can be determined by the questions that are asked and the respondents who are selected.

For example:

In Washington, Senator Hubert Humphrey was asked about the Indochina situation, and whether he thought the Nixon Administration is giving the public all the facts on U.S. involvement there. (2/1/71, page 5)

And, Humphrey then gave a predictable response.

These examples of CBS' reporting were specifically chosen from the more than four-hundred news stories of domestic support or opposition of the Vietnam War. It should be stressed that they were specifically chosen to illustrate a point--that CBS was very sympathetic to the philosophy, objectives and means of the anti-war movement. And, that this sympathy did filtrate into its reporting. As evidenced by the reading, coding, and analysis of the transcripts, it did seem to the author that CBS 1) often questioned the motives of the Nixon Administration, 2) went out of its way to give coverage to anti-war opinion, and 3) presented the anti-war opinion uncritically.

Of course, other considerations have to be considered. The events of the past year have certainly given a rather negative perspective of the motives and operation of the

Nixon Administration. But does this justify questioning and critically examining one side of a controversy while not doing the same for the other? And, as previously discussed, what about the lack of coverage given to those who supported the Nixon Administration's Vietnam policy? This element simply was not given coverage. This raises some interesting questions about balance--and bias. What constitutes balance? As documented by Table 2, CBS gave almost equal coverage to the "pro"- and "anti"- war positions. But does this constitute "balance" when CBS omits an important segment of public opinion and uncritically gives sympathetic and extensive coverage to the other?

One of the problems, it seems, is that while CBS was presenting "balanced" coverage in a quantitative sense, it was not presenting a balance of equals. Thus, the basic contest seemed to be: The Nixon Administration vs. other governmental opposition and anti-war sentiment in the country. "Pro"-war sentiment of a non-governmental nature, as indicated, was omitted. There were probably two reasons for this--both involving bias. One was that CBS did oppose the war and gave superior coverage to the point of view it identified with. Two, "pro"-war opinion was not organized, nor was it active or visible. But, CBS could have specifically sought out this opinion. It seemed to have no trouble finding anti-war opinion, such as an interview with Clark Clifford (7/1/71, page 5), or the aforementioned example of

Senator Humphrey (2/1/71, page 5), when it needed it.

Vietnam Veterans Against The War
Demonstration

This section analyzes the Washington demonstration by the "Vietnam Veterans Against The War" which occurred between April 19 and April 22, 1971. CBS' coverage of this demonstration raises some interesting questions--especially when compared against its coverage of the Calley reaction. First, the total number involved in the demonstration was small. According to CBS, "a thousand, maybe fifteen hundred men." (4/19/71, page 2) However, the coverage of the demonstration was relatively extensive. The amount of coverage was almost half (46.71%); yet, the reaction to Calley involved "thousands" more than the fifteen hundred Vietnam Vets. Thus, one question is--why did the fifteen hundred anti-war veterans receive so much coverage? Second, much of the coverage of the Vietnam Vets was "direct"--the Vets expressed their views directly--rather than having them communicated by a reporter. This, obviously, is the best type of coverage for a group which is expressing a point of view. A group could ask no better than to be able to express its message in its own words; a message delivered direct--unfiltered by a reporter's interpretation. A question that has to be asked is--why did the Veterans' demonstration receive so much direct coverage?

Third, as recalled in its coverage of the Calley reaction, CBS went out and solicited opinion which supported the verdict and which opposed the pro-Calley reaction. In the coverage of the Vietnam Veterans, however, CBS did not solicit any opinion which opposed the method or message of the Veterans' demonstration. This is not to say that CBS had no negative opinion in the coverage, for it did. One was a statement of Senator Scott, read by Cronkite. The other was a direct statement (not an interview) by the commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars--who questioned the publicity the anti-war Veterans were receiving. But, the point is that CBS did not seek interviews with those who opposed the Veterans--yet they did with those who opposed Calley. It can be argued that this was not done accidentally.

A comparison of the two forms of expression--the pro-Calley reaction and the Veterans' Demonstration may say (even though these are only two limited examples) something about bias. This is bias which is endemic to television itself. It involves the criteria for coverage imposed by the uniqueness of television. Thus, it seems that there is an obvious bias in favor of organization. A group which is organized is much more likely to receive direct coverage. This appears to document one of the reasons for the difference in coverage between the Calley reaction and the Veterans' Demonstration. The Calley reaction was not a product

of organization; it was not the expression of one organized group--as was the Veterans' Demonstration. A second difference between the two forms of expression, and an important one, is that the Veterans fulfilled the basic criteria of television, action, whereas the Calley reaction did not. Television is an action-oriented medium. The Veterans provided this "action"--some of which were pseudo-events--while the pro-Calley reaction did not. And, while this is not an "ideological" bias, it is not neutral since because of life styles, etc., some groups find it much easier to organize and to provide "action" than do others. It can be argued that television's emphasis on organized opinion and action discriminates against an important segment of the population--those who do not have the means, or are too busy working or raising a family to participate in "demonstration" politics.

Also involved here may be an "ideological" bias, but since the "ideological" bias and the "institutional" bias are interrelated, it is difficult to ascertain where one ends and the other begins. The ideological bias is simply a bias based on the ideology or philosophy of a reporter or a network. Thus, it may be that CBS 1) supported the conviction of Calley and thus opposed the pro-Calley reaction, and 2) opposed the Vietnam War and thus supported the manner and method of the Vietnam Veterans. If this were true, then CBS might 1) actively solicit anti-Calley opinion

(which it did) while not soliciting anti-Veterans' opinion (which it did also) and 2) present much of the Veterans' opinion directly (which it did) while presenting much of the pro-Calley reaction indirectly (which it also did). But, the situation seems more complex than this, since, if it is true that CBS is "liberally" oriented, then often that opinion which supports CBS' position is opinion which is 1) organized and 2) action-oriented. Thus, the excessive coverage, relative to its size and importance, the Veterans received may have been due to the fact that they were 1) an action-oriented group or 2) that they opposed the war. Or, the extensive coverage could be due to both of these--as they are interrelated. Thus, given the nature of "protest politics" during this period, it may be that the demands of action-oriented television made it easier for CBS to express its ideological position. It may be that one kind of bias "feeds" on the other.

As mentioned, the Veterans' Demonstration received extensive coverage. Table 4 presents the totals.

Table 4. Total Coverage of Vietnam Veterans' Demonstration

+	=	1,982	(77.79%)
0	=	83	(3.26%)
-	=	483	(18.95%)
<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	=	2,548	(100%)

Here, positive (+) coverage was coverage favorable to the Vietnam Veterans while negative (-) coverage was unfavorable to the Veterans. Table 5 shows the totals for positive and negative coverage.

Table 5. Positive and Negative Coverage of Vietnam Veterans' Demonstration

+	=	1,982	(80.41%)
-	+	483	(19.59%)
<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	=	2,465	(100%)

From both of these tables, it is obvious that, based on word count, the coverage was overwhelmingly favorable to the Vietnam Veterans. The ratio of positive to negative coverage was better than 4:1.

It should be noted that not all of the negative coverage was really negative. Actually, there were only three sources who spoke against the anti-war Veterans. These three, Senator Scott, Brig. General Daniel James, and the Commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, totaled 230 words or 47.62% of the negative coverage. The rest of the "negative" coverage consisted of such things as the government's attempts to prevent the Veterans from sleeping on the Capitol Mall and the actual arrest of the Veterans by police. Thus, over 52% of the "negative" coverage did not really "counter" the opinions expressed by the Veterans--even though it was negative.

If this 52% of "negative" coverage is eliminated, the percentage of positive coverage to negative coverage is 88.68% positive to 11.32% negative, a tremendous imbalance in favor of the Vietnam Veterans.

As mentioned, most of the positive coverage of the Veterans was "direct." The "direct" coverage consisted basically of the following:

April 19, 1971

- 1) Demonstration at Arlington National Cemetery
- 2) Direct statement by John Kerry

April 20, 1971

- 1) Demonstration at Capitol
- 2) Demonstration at Arlington National Cemetery

April 21, 1971

- 1) Demonstration at Pentagon

April 22, 1971

- 1) Direct testimony by John Kerry in front of Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- 2) Demonstration in front of Capitol; Veterans turned in the medals they had won

As evident, the Veterans were pretty much able to express themselves on television the way they wanted. They were able to obtain "political visibility" on their own terms for a period of five days. Whether or not they were "newsworthy" for these five days is immaterial, since CBS' extensive coverage of their events or pseudo-events made them "newsworthy." And, as might be expected, the Veterans

actively contributed to their own "newsworthiness" by "performing" within the action-oriented criteria of television. They also, most likely, furnished the networks with schedules of each day's events.

C H A P T E R I X

CONCLUSION

This chapter will review and discuss the findings and patterns of coverage revealed in this study. It will also discuss the nature of the concept of bias.

Quantitative Findings

- 1) CBS News covered many news stories superficially rather than emphasizing depth of coverage.

The average broadcast had 27.35 news stories. A high number of these (75.61%) were Events--bulletin or announcement-type news stories read by Cronkite. Often, they were not more than five to ten sentences long. For every one Report, which is a short-indepth analysis or description, there were three Events.

- 2) CBS News basically presented political news.

Almost 74% of the news stories on an average broadcast dealt with governmental action or other matters of a political nature. Many of these, though, were primarily bulletins or announcements, since, as discussed above, over 75% of all news stories were Events. Specifically, over half (55%) of the total news stories were Political-Events.

- 3) CBS News, as would be expected, primarily dealt with news within the United States.

Almost 71% of the total news stories fell within this category. The standard news story on CBS, therefore was an Event which dealt with governmental or political matters occurring within the United States. Over 35% of all news stories were of this type.

- 4) Political news within the United States was dominated by coverage of the three branches of the national government.

These three branches, the "Institutions" category accounted for almost 67% of the political news stories occurring within the United States. In fact, coverage of the three branches constituted almost 33% of the total news stories. Therefore, political news within the United States was primarily "national" political news.

- 5) The Executive branch dominated coverage of the national government.

On CBS News, Congress and the Courts were left far behind in the competition for "political visibility." The Executive branch accounted for almost 63% of the news stories involving the three branches of the national government. This total, in fact, constituted slightly over 20% of the total number of news stories during this period.

- 6) Coverage of the Executive branch involved much more than just coverage of President Nixon and his Administration.

The federal bureaucracy accounted for over 46% of the news stories of the Executive branch. This would include coverage of the departments and executive agencies. But, coverage of the bureaucracy consisted primarily of bulletins and announcements. Almost 84% of the news stories involving the bureaucracy were Events.

- 7) The Senate dominated coverage of Congress.

It has been documented that on CBS the three branches of government were not equal. Within Congress, on CBS, the two houses were not equal. The Senate itself accounted for slightly over 67% of the congressional news stories. On CBS coverage of Congress was primarily coverage of the Senate. The Senate and Senators were, by far, the most visible. In addition, individual Senators were much more visible since there are fewer Senators than Representatives. Thus, Senators had a much greater potential for visibility than did Representatives.

- 8) Within the "U.S.-International" category coverage of two countries, the United States and Indochina, primarily dominated.

This was to be expected, given the nature and extent of the War. The United States and Indochina personally accounted for almost 80% of the "U.S.-International" news stories.

- 9) The United States involvement in the Indochina War and the War itself constituted the biggest Policy-Issue.

This also was to be expected--given the depth of the involvement of the United States.

- 10) Within the "U.S.-Domestic" category, Political and Social Policy-Issues dominated.

These two Policy-Issues accounted for over 46% of the political news stories occurring within the United States. The "Indochina" Policy-Issue involved almost 16% of the "U.S.-Domestic" news stories. Thus, three Policy-Issues, "Political," "Social," and "Indochina," constituted almost 62% of the political news stories occurring within the United States.

- 11) Within the "U.S.-Domestic" category, the dominant "Political Actor" for each Policy-Issue was the "Institutions"--the three branches of the national government.

This was consistent with all the Policy-Issues. This ranged from a high with "Military" policy--where almost 83% of the news stories involved the three branches to a low with "Political" Policy-Issues where almost 52% of the news stories involved the three branches.

- 12) Within the three branches of the national government, the "Political" and "Social" Policy-Issues dominated.

These two Policy-Issues accounted for slightly over 42% of the news stories of the three branches.

While there were many other findings, these were the most important and most significant findings of the quantitative analysis. The results of the qualitative analysis discussed next, will present some of the various patterns of coverage which could be explicated from CBS' coverage of the subject areas analyzed. The following examples, therefore, are meant to illustrate some of the patterns and journalistic characteristics prevalent in CBS' coverage during this period. Obviously, these patterns have been selected to illustrate various points. They were not necessarily present in all the subject areas analyzed in this study. They were frequent enough, however, to be justified for inclusion in this section. And, their inclusion does not necessarily mean that they were only found in the coverage which was qualitatively analyzed.

Qualitative Findings

1) Inaccurate Reflection of Reality

The analysis of the Vietnam Battle Deaths was one illustration of this pattern. After accounting for periods of heavy concentrations of battle deaths, it was evident that the "nightly" coverage of battle deaths portrayed the United States as experiencing the highest percentage of battle deaths while on the "weekly" reports, the United States suffered the fewest battle deaths. Another example involved the Reaction to the Conviction

of Lt. Calley. This involved a huge, nation-wide mass reaction in opposition to the conviction. The masses involved in this reaction, however, received very little coverage--especially in proportion to their size. Was this minimal coverage an accurate reflection of the existing reality at that time? A similar example is provided by the coverage of Support and Opposition towards the Vietnam War. In coverage of non-governmental opinion, CBS gave exposure to primarily only one entity--the anti-war segment. Mass opinion supporting the President's policy in Vietnam was not really given exposure. In the competition for "political visibility" mass support for the President's Vietnam policy never had a chance. Where was the "pro"-war mass opinion? In neglecting this segment, was CBS reflecting reality? Another example of a specific nature involved CBS' coverage of 1971 Memorial Day activities. Fifty percent of that coverage involved an anti-war parade in Madison, Wisconsin. Did this proportion of coverage reflect the existing reality that day?

2) Quantitatively Unbalanced Coverage

There were various examples of this pattern where coverage of one side of opinion vastly outnumbered the coverage given to the other side. The coverage of the Son Tay Prison Raid contained unbalanced coverage in favor

of the Press illustrated a vast quantitative imbalance in favor of the "pro-press" position. The coverage of the reaction to the conviction of Lt. Calley and the Vietnam Veterans Against the War Demonstration both contained imbalances--in favor of the subject of the analysis.

The coverage of Campaign '70 contained many imbalances. Some of these favored the Republican point of view--especially the coverage of Nixon and Agnew. Other coverage favored the Democratic point of view. Also, coverage of individual campaigns illustrated imbalance. This was evident in the following campaigns: New York Senate, New York Governor, Tennessee Senate, California Senate, Connecticut Senate and Florida Senate/Governor. Not all of these imbalances go in the same direction. Since these imbalances involve different races, each one should be considered an example of imbalance rather than computing the total distribution of opinion and basing a judgment on that total amount.

3) Qualitatively Unbalanced Coverage

In addition to having a numerical superiority of one point of view, it was also possible to have other qualitative advantages--such as a favorable imbalance in "direct" or on-camera coverage. The "pro-press" opinion in the coverage of the Ervin subcommittee

illustrated this. Almost 67% of the "pro-press" opinion in the coverage of the Ervin subcommittee was "direct" while a little under 27% of the opposite opinion was "direct." The coverage of the Son Tay Prison Raid was similar. Here, opinion supporting the raid was slightly over 70% "direct" while opinion opposing the raid was a little over 45% "direct." In both these examples, the opinion which experienced the quantitative advantage also enjoyed an advantage in the qualitative or "direct" coverage. It was often found that opinion which did have a numerical superiority also had a qualitative advantage. The coverage of Campaign '70 presents another example. President Nixon received 1) extensive coverage in his campaigning role and 2) coverage that, because he had no "opponent", was primarily (81.91%) positive. A similar example is provided by the coverage of the Vietnam Veterans Demonstration. The anti-war Veterans received 1) excessive coverage--given their size, 2) coverage that was not "balanced" by opposite opinion and 3) coverage that was primarily "direct" which allowed the Veterans many opportunities to communicate their message to the television audience.

4) Dominance of the Executive Branch

This pattern was illustrated in three different analyses. One example was found in the coverage of support and opposition towards the Vietnam War. Here,

opinion which supported the current policy in Vietnam primarily came from the Executive branch. A second example, which has already been discussed, was the extensive coverage given to Nixon and Agnew during the 1970 campaign. The coverage of the Son Tay Prison Raid could be considered a third example since support for the raid basically came from the President and the Pentagon.

5) Balancing Unequals

It is imperative to realize that "balancing" involves much more than relatively equal amounts of words. To have a real "balance" the balance itself should involve equal entities. One example where this pattern of balancing unequals was prevalent was the coverage of Support and Opposition Towards The Vietnam War. Here, as previously discussed, the total distribution of opinion was relatively equal. However, this coverage was not "equal" since it did not really incorporate a significant body of opinion--mass opinion which supported the war.

The coverage of the reaction to the conviction of Lt. Calley was similar since CBS attempted to "balance" the mass opinion which opposed the conviction with "elite" opinion, such as Telford Taylor and Major Brown, which supported the conviction. A specific example of this pattern was provided by CBS coverage of an "environmental battle" over the aerial spraying of mirex to kill

fire ants (4/12/71, pages 12-14). The spraying was supported by the Department of Agriculture and opposed by environmentalists. But, CBS did not include the Department of Agriculture as a source of opinion. The only real source presented in support of the spraying was a farmer, M. W. Thompson, who demonstrated what the fire ants looked like. Farmer Thompson was "balanced" against 1) Lee Rogers, a conservationist with the Environmental Defense Fund and 2) Dr. F. S. Arant who had served on a National Academy of Sciences Committee--relevant to this. Obviously, the anti-spraying opinion surpassed that of Farmer Thompson in both legitimacy and stature. Equal sophisticated opinion from the Department of Agriculture would have helped, but CBS chose not to present it.

6) Seeking Out Opinion

Both the coverage of the reaction to Calley's conviction and the support and opposition towards the Vietnam War illustrated CBS' tendency to actively seek out certain types of opinion. Specific examples would be the inclusion of interviews with Major Brown and Telford Taylor (both in support of Calley's conviction) and Clark Clifford (who opposed the War). CBS, however, was not always consistent in this practice of seeking out opinion. For example, in the coverage of both the Vietnam Veterans' Demonstration and the Ervin Sub-

committee on Freedom of the Press, CBS did not "balance" the prevailing opinion with interviews representing the opposite opinion. Based on these four examples, it does seem that CBS will not actively seek out all opinion, but will seek out certain opinion. Here, CBS sought out opinion which was critical of 1) the reaction against the conviction of Calley and 2) the Vietnam War. It did not seek out opinion critical of 1) the Vietnam Veterans Against the War Demonstration or their views or 2) the "pro-press" opinion being articulated before the Ervin Subcommittee.

7) Creating or Determining Issues

The analyses in this study documented two good examples of the ability and capacity of a reporter to help create an issue by giving it notice and attention. The coverage of Campaign '70 contained references by Cronkite to the economy as being the important issue. The analysis of the Son Tay Prison Raid discussed how Cronkite, on three different occasions, defined the "big question." Though these examples are limited, it is interesting that both of these issues or questions, as defined by CBS, were negative towards the Nixon Administration. Since the economy in 1970 was having problems, it would not be good for the Administration-supported candidates to have the economy as the "major" issue. And, as discussed in previous sections, the

"big questions" cited by Cronkite were all negative towards the raid or its possible effects.

8) Absence of Issues in Campaign Reporting

This was illustrated by the analysis of coverage of Campaign '70. The coverage primarily dealt with the campaign style of the candidates and predictions of who was going to win. This coverage, by necessity, has to be superficial. But, it was made even more superficial by not including coverage of the major issues or concerns of the campaigns.

9) Institutional Bias

Institutional bias is a form of bias which is a product of both the unique nature of television itself and some of the norms of television news. Television news seems to place great emphasis on visual and action-oriented behavior which can be captured by television camera. This means that certain types of behavior, such as organized or group behavior, are more "televisable." A comparison between two different expressions of opinion, the reaction to Calley's conviction and the Vietnam Veterans' Anti-war Demonstration, illustrates the nature of this bias. The mass reaction to Calley's conviction involving many thousands of people did not receive the same degree or quality of coverage as the Vietnam Veterans because either 1) CBS was in support of the con-

viction and/or 2) the mass reaction was neither organized nor visual and thus was not "televisable" or conducive to coverage. In comparing the size of both groups it is obvious that something is being distorted when the smaller of the two groups receives superior quantitative and qualitative coverage, while the larger group received very little coverage relative to both its size and the coverage received by the Veterans' Demonstration. This, in part, would seem to indicate that to receive coverage, one must be organized and be active.

10) Subjective Role of the Reporter

Reporters are not necessarily neutral. They, themselves, can be actual sources of opinion or can assume roles which are not neutral. While, by necessity, much of journalism incorporates professional interpretation, there is a significant difference between professional interpretation and plain old subjectivity on the part of the reporter. Dan Rather's remarks, as previously discussed, during the Marine ceremony seem to illustrate the latter. The same is true of Cronkite's "big questions" during the coverage of the Son Tay Prison Raid. Another example found in the same coverage would be the descriptions of the award ceremonies as "unusual." The coverage of Campaign '70, "explaining" what Speaker McCormack and George Meany "really" meant are other examples. The following examples provide further ex-

amples of the line between interpretation and subjectivity being crossed.

These briefings have now become part of the normal orchestration of diplomatic policy, the impression of big things happening. --Kalb, (10/7/70, page 4)

But the unwritten rule on membership applications of almost every craft union seems to be if not for whites only, for whites mostly.

--Fromson, (10/13/70, page 14)

Not everyone would agree that this President is that well informed. In fact, critics charge that President Nixon is even more isolated than some of his predecessors. But, if that charge is true, it certainly would not appear to be the fault of the President's own private news organization.

--Pierpoint, (12/7/70, page 17)

New Mexico's Governor David Cargo is an expert with snowmobiles. He says you can get rid of frustrations by riding them, the frustrations any governor has when his party is the party in power in Washington, and the economy is sagging so badly.

--Drinkwater, (12/14/70, page 10)

Mrs. MacDaniel, would you like to see anything different being done to help get the prisoners back?

--Joe Krebbs, (1/21/71, page 18)

. . .even in its original form, it is heavy on philosophy and background, short on specifics. Besides the hints without details of a new China policy, the President speaks of a new Latin American policy, but he doesn't say what it is.

--Rather, (2/25/71, pages 10-11)

Do police have the right to raid newspaper offices in the dark of night and ransack reporters' files in search of evidence? With our Bill of Rights guaranteeing freedom of the press, this sounds like a question for some remote totalitarian state. But, it's a live issue now on the campus of Stanford University. . .

--Cronkite, (4/13/71, page 8)

. . .It remains a popular theory around Washington, however, that President Nixon may have privately orchestrated the Vice-President's statements as a way of quieting the fears of conservative hard liners on China within the Republican Party.

--Rather, (4/21/71, page 4)

The President responded with the kind of speech he and Alabama Governor Wallace gave often in the 1968 campaign. Mr. Nixon charged that some people-- unidentified, but presumably including other politicians--do not fully back police. He promised law men that they could count on him.

--Rather, (6/30/71, page 10)

With the economy shaping up as a major presidential issue next year. . . --Cronkite, (8/6/71, page 2)

. . . If candidates' platforms are truly tailored to offer what the voters want, then the message to read in this campaign is that the Vietnamese people want peace, now or at least very soon. . .

--Dunning, (8/24/71, page 11)

Mr. Agnew now says he is probably closer than ever to the President, and that his relationship with him more closely resembles the one between Eisenhower and Nixon. Obviously, the Vice-President did not have in mind Eisenhower's famous answer when asked which of Nixon's ideas had become policy: "If you give me a week, I might think of one," said Ike. I just don't remember.

--Mudd, (8/25/71, page 6)

I get a feeling that somebody's trying to cover up something. How can I escape that conclusion?

. . . I can't escape that there is a credibility gap.

--Schakne, (9/15/71, page 5)

What do you think of Governor Kirk, Senator?

--Mudd, (10/27/70, page 14)

The peace army tried to do that today, but it failed. Washington faltered, but it was not shut down, perhaps because the peace army lacked the organization. . . So the peace army changed tactics, burned guerrillas, hit and run raids. . .

--Morton, (5/3/71, page 2)

These examples, purposely chosen to illustrate subjectivity, are limited but they do seem to represent certain aspects of CBS' coverage. It should be remembered that newscasters and reporters can be important sources of opinion.

11) Coverage of a Nonentity

This pattern was exemplified in the coverage of

Vietnam Support and Opposition. There were occasions, such as the Debra Sweet episode or the West Point graduate who applied for C. O. status, when CBS seemed to really extend itself to give coverage to anti-war opinion. Another example, not included in the analysis, was the coverage CBS gave to five soldiers in Vietnam who refused an order to go on patrol. At this time, there were 205,000 troops in Vietnam. (10/15/71, page 9) CBS had three different stories on the five soldiers who refused the order. (10/11/71, page 5; 10/12/71, page 11; 10/13/71, page 8) Was this an example of journalism's preoccupation with the unusual? Or was it an example of giving coverage to anti-war opinion?

From this analysis it is obvious that there is a definite pattern to CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite. An interesting concern is the degree to which CBS approximates the evening news of the other two major networks. It is quite possible that comparative analysis of the network's evening news would demonstrate a very close similarity between their content and patterns of coverage. It can be argued, for reasons which will be discussed, that the view of the world presented by each of the three networks is relatively the same.

While this similarity has not been documented over an extended period, two arguments can be made in support of the argument that the patterns of coverage, no matter

which network, are basically the same--though individual biases may differ. First, a superficial viewing of the three networks does indicate that they are relatively similar. Second, all three of the networks have to react to the same basic "realities" which can function as a theoretical framework since they both limit and orient the nature of television journalism. Because of these "realities," it is argued, television news will be very similar. These realities" include both values and physical and technological considerations.

One basic "reality" of television network news is that the networks have limited resources. This, in turn, limits what they can cover. With their flexibility of coverage limited, it stands to reason that the networks would tend to have a consensus as to what is and what is not important. Limited resources obviously mean more concentration on "hard" news and less concentration on peripheral news. Limited resources would mean less discretion and more reaction to developing events.

A manifestation of the limited resources is that most newsgathering facilities and, therefore, coverage is concentrated in two cities--New York and Washington. Of the two, Washington is the more important and does have the higher concentration of coverage. With all three networks concentrating their newsgathering resources in Washington, it is apparent that there is going to be much overlapping and similar coverage.

Also, in Washington, the networks have a tendency to allocate their newsgathering resources in the same strategic places. While they primarily center on the White House and other elements of the Executive branch, the Capitol, and the Supreme Court, also receive permanent coverage. Because of this, much of the networks' Washington "news" is going to be similar. It will also be similar since most coverage will be directed to the President--who is the action-element of the national government. And, there seems to be a certain logic which will dictate similarity of coverage. This is simply the logic that since areas in Washington are permanently covered these must be areas which produce "news." Therefore, "news" in Washington may be a product of where the correspondents are. The Washington news of all three networks will be similar since they have their permanent correspondents in the same places. Thus, coverage, especially in Washington, can be a function of resources.

Another "reality" which helps to explain the relative similarity of all three networks involves the degree to which the networks react to each other and to the major sources of the attentive public--the New York Times and the Washington Post. The networks do monitor each other's evening news programs. Thus, each network can be influenced by what the other networks are covering and emphasizing. The networks can also be influenced by the Times and the Post--which are the two most influential newspapers in the country. The point

is that all three networks, like most informed opinion in Washington, are influenced by the same sources of information.

Another "reality" concerns journalistic preoccupation. Many times the networks will react to and concentrate on some phenomenon with a high degree of intensity for a short period of time. Some of this involves important news such as Nixon's resignation. Other times, this preoccupation will involve such things as Patricia Hearst or Clifford Irving. And, sometimes there will be a mutual preoccupation where both the network news and certain political actors will key on and react to, the other. This seemed to be happening during the Nixon Administration when press relations were so adverse and intense. Each party was reacting to the other which would create more "news"--which would precipitate more reactions.

Journalistic values and technology are other factors which contribute to the similarity of the three networks. Television is a visual medium. Therefore, there will be an emphasis on action and that which is "televisable." This, of course, was very true during the 1960's--with the emphasis on demonstrations and other forms of overt behavior. Also, the network news is only about twenty-three minutes of actual news. Thus, each program has to be selective. The more selective the producers are, the greater the chance of similarity and overlapping--especially since their view of the world would be relatively similar due to the influence

of journalistic values on common perceptions of the role of journalism. Another source of similarity would involve one form of newsgathering common to all three networks. This is simply "news by handout" which involves reading announcements which have been handed out by the various departments and agencies of the Executive branch such as the Department of State, Department of Defense or the Federal Trade Commission or Food and Drug Administration. All three networks do devote considerable time to these announcements. Similarly, when a major political actor issues a press release or statement in most cases it will be covered by all three networks.

These, then, are some of the factors which function to explain why there potentially would be great similarity between the three major networks' news programs. It does appear that the news programs are relatively similar--especially in the area of political coverage. While this paper argues that comparative research would document this similarity, it should be noted that there is still a vital need for comparative content analysis covering the three networks over an extended period of time. The differences may be small, but they should be documented.

The patterns of coverage presented in this section were meant to provide illustrations of some of the types of coverage prevalent in CBS News with Walter Cronkite. It should be obvious that these patterns of coverage and examples seem to document journalism which at best can be termed "non-neutral." Does this mean that CBS News is biased?

Before answering that question, it is imperative to examine some of the problems inherent in the concept of bias.

Any definition of bias, itself, is going to be non-neutral. It may be, in the final analysis, best to paraphrase Justice Stewart's thoughts on pornography and incorporate them into the concept of bias: "I can't define bias, but I know it when I see it." Or, another adage, with perhaps more fact than fiction, may provide a clue: "Bias is in the eye of the beholder." This latter thought may be an important one since it can be argued that there are two dimensions of bias. One is bias which is documented by scholarly analysis. The other is bias which is perceived by the average viewer. This latter process seems to be more important--especially in consideration of one of the basic concerns of this type of study--the effects of television on public opinion and political behavior.

Still, it is important to discuss some of the conceptual problems of bias. Most conceptions of bias inherently begin with some notion of "balance" or mathematical equality. And, this is what the Equal Time Provision of the FCC Fairness Doctrine is all about. As documented in this study, there were instances where CBS did achieve a mathematical balance and instances where it did not. However, it is important to realize that there is more to bias than "balance," and that there is more to "balance" than mere mathematical equality. The following discussion will expand on this.

It should, from the very beginning, be realized that television news, almost by definition, is biased, if bias is defined as a misrepresentation or distortion of reality. CBS News, and the other network news programs, have about twenty-three minutes of actual news. Therefore, three things are happening. One, the "view" of reality has to be a selective one where the selection is dictated by a relatively small, perhaps philosophically culture-bound, decision-making process. Two, this selective "view" of the world is not, and cannot be, a mirror reflection of reality. Three, this "view" of reality is a superficial one which may function to distort since it will reduce complexities to concrete generalities; thus, reinforcing prejudices rather than promoting understanding.

It can be argued then that to present a selective "view" of reality is to present a distorted "view" of reality. This may be belaboring the obvious, but it does raise important questions concerning the forms of information which are presented on television news. For example, who selects what will be shown? What are the values of those who select what will be shown? Would different values produce different content? What are the effects of this selective view of reality? Consider CBS' coverage of the Support and Opposition Towards the Vietnam War. This study suggests that CBS, in this selective view of reality, omitted a substantial segment of opinion—mass opinion which supported the war. Who made this decision?

Why was it made? Was it an error of commission or omission? What were the effects of this coverage on public opinion? During the turbulent 1960's, the television view of youth was primarily only liberal college youth attempting to change the system--even though non-college youth outnumbered those in college. What were the effects of this selective view of youth? The same points can be made in respect to the television portrait of Blacks during the 1960's. Therefore, to say that television news is selective should only be the beginning of important questions relevant to the nature of the content--and its effects.

In its analysis of the content, this study has discussed two forms of bias. Other forms can also be detected. The two forms of bias already discussed are ideological and institutional bias. The former involves an imbalance of one political or ideological point of view. The coverage of the Ervin Subcommittee on Freedom of the Press illustrated this form of bias. The second form, institutional bias, involved such things as 1) the limits of television coverage, 2) the philosophy of television news toward action and events which are visible and "televisable." The comparison between the reaction to Lt. Calley's conviction and the Vietnam Veterans' demonstration, which has been discussed, illustrated the nature of institutional bias.

Other forms of bias deserve discussion. The very nature of news stories, though presented in a balanced manner, can

constitute a form of bias. For example, if CBS were to do a series on political corruption involving only Democratic candidates, it could be argued that this does constitute a form of bias, even though the coverage itself might be balanced, since there was no coverage of corruption among Republican candidates. Therefore, the nature of news stories, especially in a series or taken as a group, can, irrespective of internal balance, reflect a form of bias.

Balance, therefore, cannot always be the primary determinant of bias. Other examples will further illustrate this. Coverage of an issue or controversy can be "balanced," but the reporter can be either objective or subjective. As previously discussed, newscasters and reporters are sources of opinion and also have the capacity to raise issues--or questions--and place the story, or aspects of it, within a certain context. Also, the type or quality of coverage is something that exists relatively independent of balance. For example, coverage of opinion can be "direct" or "indirect." Direct coverage is important as illustrated by the coverage of the Vietnam Veterans' Demonstration. Direct coverage, in some instances, especially if it involves something dramatic, may be more advantageous than "indirect" coverage involving a favorable imbalance. And, "balance" is not always contingent by an equal distribution of opinion, since the sources of opinion, themselves, are not always equal in stature, prestige, reputation or sophistication. This, until recent events, was especially true with opinion sources

competing against the President who, because of both the aura of the office and his access to vital information, has at his disposal built-in credibility of various symbols inherent in the office of the Presidency which competing sources of opinion cannot match. Sources of opinion, therefore, are not always equal.

And, what exactly is "balanced"? What is it relative to? Should each presentation of an issue or controversy contain an approximate 50-50 division of opinion? Or, should the balance of opinion be relative to the strength or composition of each side or position? Suppose an important bill has just been defeated by a 75-25 vote in the Senate. Should the distribution of opinion on the subsequent news story reflect this ratio? Or, should it try to approximate the 50-50 criterion of balance? Also, consider the problem of the active expression of opinion through group expression. Should this be "balanced" against competing opinion even though that opinion is not actively expressing itself? And, what if the group expression or demonstration of opinion represents a very minority segment of opinion? Constant coverage of minority opinion, no matter how it is expressed, soon merges into a distortion of reality. To what extent should television artificially "balance" group opinion by seeking out opposite opinion? Remember that CBS did try to "balance" the expression of pro-Calley opinion, but it did not "balance" the expression of anti-war opinion by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

Another problem inherent in the concept of balance concerns the natural dominance of policy-makers, especially the President. Because they make policy, they have natural access to television. Should policy-makers, especially those elected by the people, have unfiltered or uncontested access to television? Or, should their announcements and justifications of policy-decisions be automatically "balanced" by evaluations of that policy? An appropriate answer to this question, of course, would be contingent upon whether or not one's political favorites were in or out of office. Also, it should be remembered that there is an automatic imbalance here since it is one thing to actually make policy and another thing to be relegated to the role of evaluating policy.

A related problem of balance involves the visibility of certain policy-makers even in non-policy roles. This visibility, whether involving the President or any incumbent, is important and non-neutral for three important reasons. One, visibility through the medium of television is an extension of "seeing is believing" and, therefore, in most cases, can have the important effect of solidifying or increasing credibility. Two, visibility enhances the recognition factor which, of course, is politically important. Three, visibility can also "humanize" political leaders--which may have important payoffs in enhanced credibility, better recognition and increased support.

It may be argued, though perhaps cynically, that this latter factor was an important motivating factor, if not the motivating factor, in President Nixon's decision to let the networks televise his farewell speech to the White House staff on the day of his resignation. This farewell speech was not directed to the public. Or, was it? As remembered, the farewell speech in front of the staff was one of genuine sadness irrespective of the degree to which the circumstances were self-imposed. Also, remember that President Nixon had, as we learned in television's rediscovery of Middle America, little support in the country, yet he emerged from the resignation with a high degree of support against further prosecution. The point is that the coverage of Nixon in the context of the farewell speech to his staff undoubtedly helped to create compassion and sympathy for him, which would be an important commodity in subsequent decisions affecting prosecution. It is quite possible that further prosecution will, to an important extent, be related to the national mood. President Nixon was not unaware of this-- and the televising of his farewell speech helped to formulate opinion which could quite possibly work to his benefit.

In most cases, television "humanizes." This is important since we all see into people what we want to see. Television makes this process much easier. Visibility, through the medium of television, is not neutral and any discussion of bias and balance must keep this in mind.

The above discussion should function to demonstrate some of the complexities involved in trying to operationalize the concept of bias. Based on this discussion, it can be argued that it would be more appropriate to understand "bias," not as a single entity, but as a plural one. Perhaps, the concept should be changed to "biases," since there is not just one form of bias, but many. Therefore, any assertion that television news is "biased" should be followed by the question: "What form of bias do you mean?"

This question should also be applied to the following discussion. Was CBS News with Walter Cronkite "biased"? Based on the results of the seven different subject areas analyzed in this study, it would appear that CBS News did contain many "biases" in its coverage of the areas studied during the period of analysis. This conclusion seems inescapable after reviewing the results documented in this study. But, two important points should be made. One is that this conclusion involves only one aspect of CBS News--those subjects which were analyzed, plus the quantitative analysis. Two, the biases documented in this study are not all consistent. They do not always "flow" in the same direction. Some flow "liberally;" some do not. For example, the coverage of the Son Tay Raid and the extensive coverage of President Nixon's role in Campaign '70 contain "biases" which were quantitatively and qualitatively "pro-Administration" in nature. Also, some of the coverage of the individual

ances of Campaign '70 favored Administration-supported candidates. On the other hand, some of the coverage, as documented, favored anti-Administration positions, opinions, and causes. Examples of this would be the coverage of the Ervin Subcommittee, the Vietnam Veterans Against The War Demonstration and portions of the Support and Opposition of the Vietnam War. And, as discussed, there were other biases present in CBS' coverage.

As it should be clear by now, bias is relative. This is true of the "biases" found in CBS Evening News With Walter Cronkite. The documentation of these "biases" is important because it helps to answer the major question of this research: "What kinds of information are being presented?" Thus, the discovery of biases" should be integrated with the other findings of this study to give a more accurate picture of the nature of the content and the kinds of information which are presented.

Even though this study has only analyzed one network over a certain period, it has helped to answer questions relevant to content and kinds of information which are presented. The answers provided here, however, are only a preliminary to the more significant questions concerning the effects of television on public opinion and political behavior. Subsequent research in the area of effects will have to integrate the results of studies such as this with investigation into audience perceptions, attitudes, and

behavior. This study has, in a limited way, documented the nature of the message. The reception, internalization, and subsequent political effects of that message still have to be examined. This study, hopefully has provided both a unique insight into television news and a foundation for subsequent research on the effects of television.

A P P E N D I X

RELIABILITY TEST QUESTIONNAIRE

Directions: Read the rules for each subject before classifying the paragraphs. Having read the rules, simply read each paragraph and classify it +, -, O, DK - according to the "rules."

I. Reactions to the conviction of Lt. Calley.

+ = Any statement, opinion or behavior which opposes the conviction of Lt. Calley.
Ex. "I oppose the conviction."

O = Neutral.

- = Any statement, opinion or behavior which supports the conviction of Lt. Calley.
Ex. I support the conviction."

DK = Don't know.

1. George Latimer, his civilian lawyer, came out a few minutes later and talked to reporters.

LATIMER: I think it's a horrendous decision for the United States of America, the United States Army, and my client. (.97%)*

2. CRONKITE: Good evening. A nationwide protest, taking many forms, is building up against the conviction of Lieutenant William Calley, for the My Lai massacre. CBS NEWS has learned that the White House has been bombarded with telegrams at the rate of 250 an hour since shortly after the guilty verdict. (.40%)*

3. MEDINA: The verdict that was brought out by the jury was very harsh and very severe. I think we were all surprised by that. At the time that I heard the verdict over television at 4:30 yesterday afternoon, my reaction was maybe a little bit of bitterness. (.93%)*

*Indicates rate of agreement.

4. SP/5 JOHN TREDANAY: Well I feel that it's wrong in a sense, because they sent him out there to do-- to do a job, you know; he was sent out there by Medina to do a job, that particular purpose. And I don't understand why the Army would send somebody out there to do something like that and then turn around and prosecute him for it. (.97%)
5. SP/ MICHAEL CLUXTON: Well, I think it was very unjust, and the man was just doing his job, and it's--that's what we're over here for, and it just seems very unfair that he'd have to get that kind of a penalty for doing what he thought was right. (.93%)
6. FIRST LIEUTENANT TOM SHUGRUE: I feel the conviction was just. You know, I can't--I can't see any man using those types of actions, you know, actually killing civilians like that, lining them up together and giving the order, coming back again and demonstrating himself what he needed--what he wanted done, as far as murder. (.93%)
7. CRONKITE: In angry House speeches today, a half-dozen Southern Congressmen challenged the conviction and appealed to President Nixon to intervene. (.53%)
8. The objection to the verdict also took other forms. The Illinois legislature considered a resolution urging the President to grant clemency, and the Alabama legislature will take up a similar measure tomorrow. The five members of the Athens, Georgia, draft board said they are resigning because they can no longer in good conscience send young men into service. Radio stations in Wilmington, North Carolina, and Riverhead, New York, stopped broadcasting Army public service announcements. And the American Legion in Columbus, Georgia, began a drive for a \$100,000 appeal fund for Calley and a ten-million signature petition against the verdict. (.73%)
9. LATIMER: Another one: "This verdict is the worst injustice I know. We are sorry and angry with the United States Government, who let this come to trial. I feel cases like this have happened in every war. It's sad that in this society this was brought to trial. If I have my way, my son will never see the service. I want no hippie, but any time something like this can happen, I want no part. I am sending President Nixon a letter to this effect. I wish I could do more for you than say I'm sorry." (.87%)

10. CRONKITE: The furor touched off by Calley's conviction continued unabated today. Thousands of citizens made their objections known in a flood of telegrams to the White House, Congress, and the Pentagon. Many demanded clemency. (.70%)
 11. The White House said its telegrams were running a hundred-to-one in Calley's favor. The Army said it had received several hundred telegrams--all favoring Calley. (.73%)
 12. CRONKITE: A rally in Columbus, Georgia, last night, organized on three hours' notice, mirrored the intensity of the public support for Lieutenant Calley. Phil Jones was there.
- DEMONSTRATORS: Free Calley. Free Calley. Free Calley. Free Calley.
- JONES: A rally, for Calley, held in front of the Columbus, Georgia, stadium. More than 500--old men, young, women, children, and babies. They all came out to show their support for Calley. (.80%)
- WOMAN: Damned if you do and damned if you don't. It's not fair.
- DEMONSTRATORS: Free Calley. Free Calley. Free Calley.
13. JONES: And while the rally for Calley was in progress, downtown Columbus, hundreds of telegrams were pouring into the Western Union office, most all of them protesting the conviction of Calley, and promising their support. (.80%)
 14. CRONKITE: The sentence of life imprisonment instead of death for Calley has had no measurable effect in calming the public outrage. Pro-Calley rallies continue. At least eight state legislatures have received or will get resolutions seeking clemency. At Fort Benning, Georgia, some of that public anger is being turned toward the six officers who decided Calley's fate, each of whom got a new, unlisted telephone number during the night. (.67%)
 15. JONES: Are you worried now over the verdict? It's over, technically, but the public reaction--does it bother you any?

MAJOR HARVEY G. BROWN: It bothers me from the standpoint that people are not stopping to think. They're letting their emotions rule their minds at this point. They haven't sat through four and a half months of trial, and heard the facts, and been able to scrutinize the evidence as we have. They feel morally that what we did is wrong, but then when you look at the legal standpoint, were we wrong? Were we wrong? Well, this is, as I said before, I'll have to live with it the rest of my life and for that reason alone, we--we gave Lieutenant Calley every benefit of the doubt. (.80%)

16. CRONKITE: Criticism of the Calley verdict came from all parts of the political spectrum, and for varied reasons. For instance, Vice-President Agnew has been quoted by the Chicago Tribune as criticizing those who would make heroes of military deserters and demand punishment of combat soldiers who err. Although denying that he was talking specifically about the Calley case, Agnew called it oversimplification to believe that persons involved in something such as My Lai should be punished for a war crime. (.70%)
17. SECOND MAN: He only did what he was told to do, what he was asked to do, what he was trained to do, and what millions of the rest of us did in World War One, Two, and the Korean War.
18. An example is a floor speech today by New York Republican Senator Jacob Javits. If Americans really believe that Calley did nothing wrong and is indeed a hero, then, in Javits' words: "We have changed as a people during the course of this tragic war even more disastrously than I had imagined." And Illinois Democratic Senator Adlai Stevenson III told a news conference that if Calley murdered women and children, he must pay the penalty. Stevenson added, in these words: and so must others, if their consciences--in their consciences or in the courts. (.80%)
19. TAYLOR: I think to reject the guilty verdict entirely would be a most unwise course of action. I hope that won't happen. I think a reduction of the degree of the offense, and a reduction of the sentence, would be very much in order, and were I in the position of reviewing authority, I think that's what I would do. But I could only repeat

that I think an acquittal here would be--would be disastrous. One thing about it which I think people should keep in mind is that there's no denying that the laws of war were grossly violated here. We have our own prisoners in the hands of the North Vietnamese. We have repeatedly demanded that they be treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. What is protecting those prisoners is not a total but at least a partial observance of the--the rules of war to the extent, at least, that they are not being killed, or at least some of them are not being killed. (.77%)

20. In Daniels' words: "For this nation to condone the acts of Lieutenant Calley is to make us no better than our enemies and to make any pleas for the humane treatment of our prisoners meaningless." (.83%)

II. Ervin Constitutional Rights Subcommittee: Hearings on Freedom of the Press.

+ = Statements or opinions which support "Freedom of the Press" and the press itself. And, statements and opinions opposing any form of governmental pressure on the press. Ex. "Nixon is out to get the press."

O = Neutral

- = Statements or opinions which argue that the Nixon Administration is not pressuring the press and that there is no threat to "freedom of the press." Ex. "Nixon is not threatening the press."

DK = Don't know.

21. SENATOR S. ERVIN: Our founding fathers understood that however incomplete, unfair and even vicious the press may be in its attacks upon government and government officials, the press cannot be censored or punished without undermining one of the cornerstones of free thought and expression. (.87%)

22. NORMAN ISAACS, Editor in Residence at Columbia University's School of Journalism, decried what he called persistent Administration pressure on the press and its effect in eroding press forthrightness. (.90%)

23. I could use a less polite word, Mr. Chairman. I could say the press was lied to, which it was. I can only consider this another broadside from an Administration determined to lower the public regard for the press, and to seek to create a public mood by which the news media can be forced into a subservient role. (.97%)
24. Later, Presidential Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler said the Vice President has every right to express himself, that the Administration is not trying to intimidate the press, and that the press is too sensitive to receiving the kind of criticism it likes to hand out. (.87%)
25. Representative Ogden Reid, former president of the New York Herald Tribune, said the press is now under the most serious attack in its history. He proposed legislation to restrain government control over broadcast news, plus a law to protect all newsmen from subpoenas of their notes and confidential sources.
26. The least that must be done, therefore--and really, it's only a minimal remedy--is to legislate assurances that no restrictive laws or government decrees interfere with broadcast journalism's full exercise of those freedoms of press and speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. (.97%)
27. Well, there's no reason at all that the press should not be criticized, that broadcasting should not be criticized. But, sir, when a high official of government, that holds the power to appoint the Federal Communications Commission, says that unless we put our house in order, that the broadcast medium must be examined, when another high official says that unless we put our house in order we must be called to account--account to whom, is the suggestion--and must be brought down from our ivory tower, by whom? Under what circumstances? That--that to me is a clear intimidation. (.87%)
28. HERMAN: Senator Kennedy again today wondered if the Administration attacks on broadcast news had any effect.

CRONKITE: . . .is, indeed, an insidious thing, even as intimidation itself is. It's like a poisoned gas in a room, or it's like the-- perhaps the first effects of narcosis on a deep sea diver. He's not aware of it, exactly. You're not sure you're dying, but you may have a sense that something's wrong. (.80%)

III. Demonstration of "Vietnam Veterans Against the War."

+ = Statements, opinions and behavior which supports the basic message of the anti-war veterans - that the war is wrong. Ex. "Veterans demonstrated against the war."

0 = Neutral

- = Statements, opinions or behavior which opposes the message and actions of the anti-war veterans. Ex. "I think they are a disgrace."

DK = Don't know.

29. JOHN KERRY: Congress is--is starting to listen. They're going to listen. I think they saw the fact that you can't talk to these veterans about bombing statistics, 'cause these men dropped the bombs, or were underneath them. You can't--they're just not going to listen to peace talk. They want peace action, and I think they're angry now. I think they're really very angry, and I think they're justified in their anger, because what happened at Arlington is disgraceful. These are the men--you know--these are the men who went out there, risked their lives, to pack those bodies up into body bags, to send them back here so that they could be buried in Arlington. These are the men who did that. And to tell them they can't go in there and honor those men is a disgrace, and--and they're right in being angry. (.90%)

30. CRONKITE: Commenting on the veterans' protest, Senate Republican Leader Scott said they are, quote, "A minority of one-tenth of one percent of our veterans. I'm probably doing more to get us out of the war than these marchers." (.77%)

31. McGOVERN: I think what they're demonstrating this week represents the very highest form of patriotism. I think sometimes it requires more courage to speak up for the national interest when one is here at home facing the political pressures of this nation, and I'm honored and pleased that they're here this morning to hear the deliberations before this committee. (.93%)
32. VETERAN: We're veterans of this war. This is the first time that veterans of a war that is still being fought have come back to the war machine to tell it to stop that war because we know that they're lying about it--we know it's being fought on a racial, imperialistic basis, and we want that stopped. (.93%)
33. JOHN KERRY: We are here to ask, and we're here to ask vehemently, Where are the leaders of our country? Where is the leadership? We're here to ask where are McNamara, Rostow, Bundy, Gilpatrick and so many others? Where are they now that we, the men whom they sent off to war, have returned? These are commanders who have deserted their troops, and there is no more serious crime in the law of war. The Army says they never leave their wounded; the Marines say they never leave even their dead. These men have left all the casualties and retreated behind a pious shield of public rectitude. They've left the real stuff of their reputations bleaching behind them in the sun in this country. And finally, this Administration has done us the ultimate dishonor. (.77%)
34. HERBERT RAINWATER: Their organization is little more than an ad hoc committee which by its own admission represents somewhere between three and twelve thousand veterans. Yet the group here, perhaps 1,000 in all seems to be generating news way out of proportion. I realize that remnants of uniforms, toy guns and spilled red ink are colorful and considered newsworthy by some of the media. But I question, and very seriously, the value of this type of publicity to the American people over an extended period of time. All this unwarranted attention leads many to believe they represent the average Vietnam veteran, and, as I said before, nothing is further from the truth. (.87%)

35. CRONKITE: Vietnam veterans, demonstrating against the war, discarded on the Capitol steps today, decorations they won in service. (.50%)

Number of Respondents = 30

Total Average of Agreement = 81.81%

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