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NATO and the future of European security.

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NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

A Dissertation Presented

by

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DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to several people who have provided me essential support, encouragement, and perspective throughout my ongoing educational career. To my parents, David and Jennifer Kay, my deepest thanks and gratitude go beyond what words can express. Simply put, this effort would not been possible without your confidence and insights. To my father and mother-in-law, Matt and Anna Madigan, I thank you for opening my eyes to your vision of the world and a special place in Europe. Indeed, I am especially honored to dedicate this dissertation to the living memory of Matt Madigan. Most importantly, thank you to my lovely wife Anna and our beautiful daughter Cria Anne. You are the light of my life and my inspiration. Thank you for your love, wisdom, insight and support. Here's to the many adventures that lie ahead.

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ABSTRACT

NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

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This dissertation examines the general proposition that formal international institution promote national security in Europe. Analytically, the features of international institutions are the independent variables and the degree of security is the dependent variable. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the primary focus of the analysis. The project draws from realist and institutionalist approaches to the study of international relations to assess what institutional characteristics of NATO have developed over time which may contribute to national security into the 21st century. The dissertation is organized into seven chapters. The empirical research is based on primary and secondary sources including personal interviews conducted with senior policy makers and academic sources in Europe and the US ongoing since 1991. The dissertation is divided into seven chapters including a theoretical and methodological overview; the origins of NATO; NATO during the Cold War; NATO's post-Cold War

institutional adaptation (including the Partnership for Peace and the Balkan crisis); NATO enlargement; and NATO's internal transformation and the future of the transatlantic relationship. This dissertation moves the debate over the relationship between international institutions and security in international relations theory. The general conclusion is that variations in institutional form can have a dramatic impact on the degree of security, positive or negative, in the European context and that a major test of that claim is coming in the next several decades.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe
ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
CCMS	Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJCIMIC	Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CMO	NATO Crisis Management Organization
CPC	Conflict Prevention Center
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EC	European Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EMU	European Monetary Union
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
EU	European Union
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IEPG	Independent European Program Group
IFOR	Bosnia Peace Implementation Force

IGC	Inter-Governmental Conference
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
IPP	Individual Partnership Program
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JRDF	Joint Rapid Deployment Force
KYP	Greek Central Intelligence Agency
LTDP	Long Term Defense Plan
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MC	Military Committee
MLF	Multi-Lateral Force
NAA	North Atlantic Assembly
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NADGE	NATO Air Defense Ground Environment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBMR	NATO Basic Military Requirement
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NSC	United States National Security Council
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PARP	PFP Planning and Review Process
PCG	Policy Coordination Group
PFP	Partnership for Peace
PMSC	Political Military Steering Committee

PPS	Policy Planning Staff (US Department of State)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SEA	Single European Act
SFOR	Bosnia Stabilization Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SRG	Strategic Review Group
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
WEAG	Western European Armaments Group
WEU	Western European Union
ZOS	Zone of Separation

CHAPTER I

NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

> NATO does not need an enemy to exist. The Alliance remains as relevant today as it ever has. NATO's members work together in the Alliance because they can bring their combined energy to bear in shaping European security. NATO's key strategic objective is to help create political conditions which make crises and conflicts less and less likely. This is what we mean when we speak about building a new European security architecture: building a set of political relationships where each state feels secure and at ease.
>
> -NATO Secretary General
> Javier Solana, Lisbon, Portugal
> 25 November 1996.

Since the end of the Cold War, formal international institutions including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) have been tasked by their member states to help them map a course through the general uncertainty, and at times dangerous instability, of contemporary Europe. Among these institutions, increasing pressure has fallen on NATO to enhance national security in Europe into the 21st century. While NATO has received increasing theoretical and policy analysis, little attention has been given to what institutional characteristics of NATO contribute to national security. NATO was established in 1949 as an institutional arrangement incorporating balance of power alliance characteristics while promoting reassurance and community among its member states. However, there is little evidence

of NATO's institutional functions acting independently to cause peace and security. As NATO neared the end of the Cold War, it was fundamentally a military alliance with institutional attributes that facilitated the exertion of American power balanced against the Soviet Union. These constraints of alliance make adapting NATO's institutional form after the Cold War a formidable challenge. However, this dissertation shows that for NATO to increase security in the future it must be carefully, but dramatically, transformed.

So long as there is no major threat to its members' interests, the degree to which NATO can contribute to security in the future will be dependent on its institutional form. In examining that proposition, this project seeks to answer five main questions about institutions and security in Europe:

*What are the sources of national security in Europe?

*What is the relationship between international institutions and national security?

*To what extent do variations in institutional form affect the degree of security in Europe?

*What institutional attributes of NATO have enhanced security over time?

*Through what institutional form is NATO most likely to increase security in the future?

Analytically, this project uses contemporary realism to test NATO's institutional relevance independently enhancing security in Europe. Many institutionalist scholars and senior policymakers in NATO capitals have concluded that

NATO can contribute to security by aiding information exchange among the member states, promoting transparency in national security planning, enhancing reassurance among states, and socializing national decision-makers toward more peaceful national security policies. Alternatively, realists are skeptical of the role that NATO can play after the Cold War. Realism predicts that, as an alliance, NATO will sooner or later dissolve in the absence of an immediate and credible threat. The US will return home and Europe, led by Germany, will seek a more independent role promoting its own security interests. Realists warn that a reliance on institutions for national security promotes a dangerous false promise of peace.

This dissertation draws from insights provided by realist and neoliberal institutional analysis to offer propositions about NATO and the future of European security. The central argument is that NATO can enhance European security by enlarging to include Poland and the Czech Republic and creating a hedge between Germany and Russia - two major powers with a long history of security competition over this region. For enlargement to succeed, NATO's institutional architecture will have to be adapted so that its primary task is to preserve the existing general peace in Europe and that it should not be viewed as a threat to the security or stability of any state - particularly Russia.

To understand the relationship between NATO's institutional attributes and the degree of security in Europe, this dissertation surveys NATO's history and post-Cold War development. Analytically the different features of international institutions are the independent variables and the degree of security is the dependent variable. The project shows that, to the extent that NATO did promote security in the past, its institutional form was a dependent variable adapted in response to external events and member state demands. In the absence of the Soviet threat, NATO members have sought to adapt its institutional form by expanding its mission and tasks with mixed results. To date, NATO has not been sufficiently adapted to the requirements of post-Cold War European security to justify optimism for its playing a strong role enhancing European security in the absence of a threat.

Chapter II demonstrates the salience of realism and institutionalism as analytical tools for understanding the sources of national security in Europe. It shows that there are major differences within the realist and institutionalist schools about the potential for institutions to affect security and over what institutional form is likely to promote security in Europe. This chapter establishes the framework for an institutional analysis of NATO carefully tested against realist propositions about the sources of national security.

Chapter III provides a study of NATO's formative period. This chapter shows that the creation of NATO was the culmination of momentum toward institutionalized security cooperation after World War II between the US and its wartime allies. The chapter demonstrates that NATO was intended to be an institutional mechanism to promote reassurance and self-help in Western Europe in conjunction with its primary function as a collective defense alliance organized against the Soviet Union. The actors who constructed NATO were building upon a broadening intellectual understanding of how to promote national security in Europe. An analysis of the negotiations leading up to the NATO treaty demonstrates the value that its founders placed on its institutional characteristics. In particular, the founders articulated a priority of using NATO to promote burdensharing and self-help among the West European countries and an expansion of shared western values.

Chapter IV shows how the Cold War forced an adaptation of NATO into its classic institutional form. There was considerable institutional activity in NATO during the Cold War, and it was during this period that the "O" was put in NATO. This chapter shows that NATO's institutionalization had value as a means toward the exercise of power and deterrence but that the institution did not act independently. The key determinants of its institutional form were the structure of the international system and the

demands of collective defense. In each of three cases, collective defense, burdensharing, and enlargement, NATO institutional activity was dependent upon other variables - primarily the distribution of power in the international system.

Chapter V examines variations in NATO's institutional adaptation after the Cold War beginning with efforts to build interlocking institutions via the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE - renamed OSCE in December 1994), the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) to promote stability in Central and Eastern Europe during a period of dramatic change. It demonstrates the false promise of institutions to address the early period of the Balkan war in spite of the fact that institutions were identified by member states as the primary means for resolving the conflict. However, it also shows that despite these failures, NATO did eventually play a major role promoting peace in Bosnia in late 1995 and that some of its institutional characteristics had a decisive impact. Yet little had actually changed - NATO only functioned when the US led it in its traditional alliance functions.

Chapter VI surveys NATO planning for post-Cold War enlargement to include new members from Central and Eastern Europe. This chapter traces the development of the policy and summarizes realist and institutionalist arguments for and against NATO enlargement. It shows that there is

considerable disagreement among analysts making for some unique cross paradigm policy advocates on both sides of the issue. The chapter concludes that the best premise for NATO enlargement is to create a hedge, via the expansion of American political reassurance, between Russia and Germany. If the primary objective is to enlarge the western community of nations, there are other institutions better suited for this activity - including NATO's own Partnership for Peace.

Chapter VII examines NATO's internal adaptation after the Cold War. Attaining an operational burdensharing arrangement is necessary to keep the American commitment to Europe politically sustainable in the absence of an immediate threat to vital US national interests. The chapter traces the failure of Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security through an independent European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and explains the objective of restructuring NATO's operational functions via Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). Chapter VII shows that, once operational, the CJTF can serve as the basis for an institutional framework for crisis management promoting European security into the 21st century. Organizing for such missions and providing facilities for multilateral consultation would become the primary peacetime activity of NATO. The movement of France back toward NATO integrated military planning demonstrates that trends favor such a development. However, Chapter VII also shows that any successful burdensharing arrangement in NATO faces

considerable constraints and must be based on a reinvigorated transatlantic relationship.

Chapter VIII provides general conclusions about NATO and the future of European security and establishes a framework for a broader research agenda. This chapter advances the importance of testing institutional form against realist concerns about the ability of institutions to create security. The general conclusion of the project is that NATO faces considerable constraints in its post-Cold War adaptation and, to date, NATO has not been sufficiently transformed to justify optimism about its relevance for the future. Failure to adapt may cause its member states to, over time, increasingly question its value to their security. NATO can have an important role to play in the future of Europe. However, considerable work remains to be done to move from theory to practice in European security.

CHAPTER II

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

European Security after the Cold War

This dissertation addresses the proposition that formal international institutions promote national security in Europe. Analytically the features of international institutions are the independent variables and the degree of security is the dependent variable. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the primary focus of the analysis. The project draws from realist and institutionalist approaches to the study of international relations to assess what institutional characteristics of NATO have developed over time which may contribute to national security into the 21st century.

After the Cold War, European security has become a multi-dimensional concept that includes military, political, economic, societal, and environmental issues.[1] Nevertheless, national security remains the primary factor

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1. The complex task of defining security is surveyed by Barry Buzan who lists over a dozen attempts to give a specific definition to security. Barry Buzan, People States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era, 2nd edition, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991) 16-17. Also see Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, World Security: Trends & Challenges at Century's End (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). For specific attempts to conceptualize and redefine security in the European context see Barry Buzan, et al, The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the post-Cold War Era (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990); Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe (Princeton University Press, 1991); Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Stephen Iwan Griffiths, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threats to European Security (Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, 1993); and Simon Duke, The New European Security Disorder (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

motivating states in the international environment. What is new about today's quest for national security are formal international institutions which are an important element of the environment in which states assess their national concerns and implement national security strategies. NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Partnership for Peace (PFP), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the United Nations (UN) have all been promoted by states as mechanisms to reduce the potential for conflict in post-Cold War Europe. Among these institutions, NATO has emerged as the core of a future institutional security arrangement in Europe. However, NATO is a military alliance whose successful Cold War institutional characteristics were dependent on the alliance function of collective defense. If NATO is to survive as an institution in the absence of a threat, it will have to be adapted fundamentally to meet the new challenges to national security that states face after the Cold War.

European security has become interdependent to the extent that events which affect the national security of one state can have profound impact on others. For example, the Balkan crises of the early 1990s were not an immediate threat to general security in Europe. However, if the war had spread it had the potential to draw in larger countries and decrease security in Europe at a much more general

level. Because of this complexity of the new European security environment, a state pursuing its own security may cause regional instability - which can lead to security competition, possibly draw in large states, and lead to war. Thus national security is more than territorial defense or promotion of key interests. It includes confidence on the part of states (and their leaders) of relative safety within an uncertain international environment. Confidence is enhanced when a state is reassured that events occurring in one state or region will not have an adverse effect on it.

National security in Europe is challenged by the need to manage the collapse of the last great 20th century empire - the Soviet Union. Russia could become a resurgent nationalist military power seeking to restore order and dominance in the former Soviet Union and thereby protect 22 million ethnic Russians scattered throughout its near abroad. Alternatively, Russia and its neighbors could collapse internally - a Balkan analogy but with nuclear weapons. Central and Eastern European states are challenged by existing and potential crisis which could have spill-over effects for the entire Continent. The fragility of new democracies and post-Communist economic transformations combines with ongoing territorial and ethnic tensions, refugee movements, the potential for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, and environmental crisis to make Central and Eastern Europe insecure.

Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and the institutions which link them, are especially challenged to promote security and stability in the new Europe. Yet the West is internally confronted by the possibility that the US could leave the Continent in a resurgence of its dominant historical pattern of isolationism from Europe. A continued disproportionate operational burden on the US role in European security could accelerate an American withdrawal. Such a move could revive the security dilemma that the US and NATO helped eliminate between France and Germany and possibly prompt Germany to obtain nuclear weapons, pursue offensive-based national security arrangements, and establish unilateral alliances with its neighbors to the East.[2] Such a move would be viewed as provocative in both Russia and the West. It is within this international environment that NATO's institutional form must be adapted if it is to have continued relevance. To date, such changes have not occurred. At the core of this institutional challenge is a need to use international relations theory to clarify what NATO as an institution can, and can not do, to enhance national security.

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[2]. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better," Adelphi Paper 171 (Autumn 1981); Kenneth N. Waltz, "The New World Order," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 22:2 (1993) 187-195; John J. Mearsheimer, "Disorder Restored," in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992) 213-237; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security 17:4 (Spring 1993).

Realism and Institutionalism as Analytical Tools

Realists assert that institutions do not have a positive impact on national security because they do not cause peace. Power is the primary source of national security and explains how and under what circumstances states cooperate.[3] Realists remind scholars and practitioners of national security that material power and national interest remain primary concerns for states. States are the key actors in an international system of anarchy and their primary objective is survival and advancing the means to that end. Realism assumes that, at best, international institutions are an intervening variable in security.[4] At their worst, institutions can cloud and confuse the balance of power in the international system and promote a false promise of security.

The realist view of institutions is essential to testing an institutional perspective to national security in Europe. For example, when institutionalist claims are made

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3. Power (anything which aids in the control of man over man) can be measured in terms of capacity to use force, the ability to use authority or influence to attain voluntary or involuntary cooperation from another. Power includes both "hard" (military/capabilities) and "soft" (socio-economic/the ability to use institutions to promote national interest) forms. For the formative statement of contemporary realism in international relations see Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed., (New York: Knoph, 1978) 5-12. Also see Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press 1986) 304-305; David Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989); and Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

4. For a classic realist critique of institutions see George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951) 95-103. This analysis of institutions has been revived by John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," in Michael E. Brown (et al), eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995) 332-376.

supporting the enlargement of NATO into Central and Eastern Europe based on the positive impact that NATO's institutional structures had on managing relations between Greece and Turkey, a realist counterfactual exposes this claim as both untrue and a dangerous premise for NATO enlargement. The pessimistic nature of realism helps policymakers and scholars know what to avoid when using institutions to promote security and what can go wrong if they fail to do what is expected of them.

There is empirical justification for the realist view of institutions given that three efforts to create formal security architectures in Europe based on collective security institutions (in which states organize military power to manage crisis on the principle of all against one) have been attempted and each failed to prevent war or end conflict. The Concert of Europe, which formed the basis of 19th century European security, had some nascent institutional functions. However, it was a system of great power management that only worked well while there was a general agreement among the five major actors and the individuals representing them. Once interests diverged, the institution could not adapt and the elite participants lost their common goal of great power system management.[5] The

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[5]. For analysis of the Concert of Europe as an institution see Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981); John Meuller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy 77 (Winter 1988-1989); Charles A. and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16:1 (Summer 1991) 114-161; Stanley Hoffmann, "Balance, Concert,

League of Nations was a hierarchical security architecture which sought to redefine national security as a collective good through legal mechanisms mandating a commitment to intervene on the principle of all against one when institutional norms and principles were violated. However, the League of Nations was neither collective nor secure and was an institutional shell under which anarchy ruled in spite of some minor successes.[6] From 1991 through 1994 Europe embarked on a concerted effort to build a new amalgamated form of collective security based on "interlocking institutions". While there was considerable institutional activity during this time, over 200,000 people were killed in the Balkan wars.

Realism is, nevertheless, limited as an analytical tool if it assumes that an institutional analysis intrinsically means a belief that collective security is attainable. In fact, there are three institutional approaches with relevance to understanding the sources of national security.

Anarchy, or None of the Above," in Gregory R. Treverton, ed., The Shape of the New Europe (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992); Patrick M. Morgan, "Multilateralism and Security Prospects in Europe" in John G. Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 327-364; Richard Rosecrance, "Trading States in a New Concert of Europe," in Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff, eds., America and Europe in an Era of Change (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1993) 127-146; and William H. Daugherty, "System Management and the Endurance of the Concert of Europe," in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, Coping with Complexity in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).

6. For analysis of the League of Nations see C.K. Webster and Sydney Herbert, The League of Nations in Theory and Practice (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933); E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan Press, 1940); and Inis L. Claude Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th edition (New York: Random House, 1984).

The first is neoliberal which stresses national interest and gains that states might make by cooperating within institutions. Neoliberal institutionalism recognizes the predominance of states and the importance of power but maintains that some institutional arrangements can help states better understand each other's aims and thereby reduce uncertainty in the international environment. The second school includes advocates of collective security who would establish a hierarchical security architecture for Europe attempting to make up for the failings of the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations. A third is constructivist and focuses on security communities and the possibility that institutions can promote the evolution of a community in which there is virtually no possibility of war among a group of states.

This project utilizes a neoliberal approach to understanding international institutions and their relationship to European security by testing the claim that institutions, properly designed and adapted by their members when necessary, can enhance national security in Europe. While this school is the closest to realism among the three institutional approaches to understanding European security, there remain clear differences between the two. These two traditions of international relations therefore provide a rich analytical testing ground for adapting NATO's institutional form as Europe moves into the 21st century. As E.H. Carr writes:

> ...pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible...The human will continue to seek and escape from the logical consequences of realism in the vision of an international order which, as soon as it crystallizes itself into concrete political form, becomes tainted with self-interest and hypocracy and must once more be attacked with the instruments of realism.[7]

There is no harder case for the role of institutions than security.[8] Looking at institutions in terms of what they should do rather than what they can do is not only inapplicable to meeting challenges to European security - it may be dangerous.

Realism

Among realist scholars, Kenneth N. Waltz and John J. Mearsheimer provide the most unyielding application of realism to international security. To Waltz, the international system is one of anarchy "...taken to mean not just the absence of government, but also the presence of disorder and chaos[9] The anarchical nature of international

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7. Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939, 2nd ed., (London: Macmillan, 1969) 93.

8. A hard case for the success of institutions is one in which the interests in defection from an institution are greater than those of cooperation, but cooperation occurs nevertheless. See Oran Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 160-194.

9. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978) 114. To Waltz all states are similar actors within the international system and domestic identity is not relevant to the primary objective of all states - survival. See Kenneth Waltz, Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). For additional analysis of the role of anarchy in international relations see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia

relations forces states to pursue self-help and avoid relying on the good nature of other states because "in an unorganized realm each unit's incentive is to put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so."[10]

In the absence of a balance of power, interdependence and relative gains competition among states are causes of instability and thus states pursue self-help by increasing power for a minimum of survival or a maximum of hegemonic dominance. As Waltz writes: "Interdependent states whose relations remain unregulated must experience conflict and will occasionally fall into violence...If interdependence grows at a pace that exceeds the development of central control, then interdependence hastens the occasion for war."[11] To Mearsheimer, states recoil from interdependence which can infringe on sovereignty and even survival. Interdependence may lead to conflict because states will struggle to escape the vulnerability that it creates. "The greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the more secure it is," Mearsheimer concludes.[12] Interdependence is likely to decrease as the number of great powers diminishes and two is the lowest possible number.[13]

University Press, 1977) 23-27 and Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 1-79.

10. Waltz Theory, 107.
11. Waltz Theory, 138.
12. Mearsheimer "The False Promise...", 338-339.
13. Waltz Theory, 145.

Waltz concludes, for example, that a bipolar Europe is most stable for: "Although we would prefer that East Europeans freely choose their governors, we may nevertheless understand that the Soviet Union's managing a traditionally volatile part of the world has its good points...in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, a division of managerial labor is more readily arranged in bipolar than multipolar worlds."[14]

To realists, balance of power systems are the most stable and peaceful. Absent a balance of power, actual or perceived shifts in relative power in one state can cause fears in another thereby prompting security competition or conflict.[15] If one state makes gains at the expense of another, this can produce a security dilemma. As Robert Jervis writes, "many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others."[16] Waltz suggests that when considering security cooperation states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided - not "will both of us gain?" but "who will gain

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14. Waltz Theory, 208-209.

15. The theoretical debate over relative gains has evolved so that the general concern is not whether they matter, but under what circumstances. Relative gains are likely to matter most when security is at stake or when gains in capabilities can be easily transformed into military capabilities. However, it is possible that when the number of actors increases, relative gains concerns will be lowered because coalitions are more easily formed in response to a shift in capabilities. For discussion of the degree to which relative gains matter in security see Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Security and Economic Affairs," and Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," in David Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 60-84 and 209-233.

16. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," in Robert Art and Robert Jervis, International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and Decision Making, 2nd ed, (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1984) 88.

more?"[17] Similarly Robert Gilpin maintains that political change is not the static distribution of power in the system (bipolar or multipolar) but the dynamics of power relationships over time. It is the differential or uneven growth of power among states in a system that encourages efforts by certain states to change the system in order to enhance their own interests or to make more secure those interests threatened by multipolar security competition. Changes in relative power among the principal actors in the system are precursors of international political change - which can include systemic war.[18]

Even the perception that any state is making relative gains at the expense of another can prompt a state to maximize its own national security and possibly lead to instability or conflict.[19] As Mearsheimer writes: "Another state may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be certain of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty."[20] Even states that are currently allies may become competitors or enemies in the future.[21]

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17. Waltz Theory, 105.
18. Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 93.
19. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) and Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Baldwin 85-115.
20. Mearsheimer "The False Promise...", 337.
21. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," in Baldwin 128-129.

Realism and NATO

Without the Soviet threat to unite the West in NATO, contemporary realism predicts that the US will eventually leave Europe and the Continent will enter a state of anarchy - with a strong and united Germany exerting more influence over European security.[22] For example, Mearsheimer writes that:

> NATO provides a good example of realist thinking about institutions. NATO is an institution, and it certainly played a role in preventing World War III and in helping the West win the Cold War. Nevertheless, NATO was basically a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War, and it was that balance of power, not NATO per se, that provided the key to maintaining security on the continent. NATO was essentially a tool for managing power in the face of a Soviet threat. Now with the collapse of the Soviet Union, realists argue that NATO must either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new distribution of power in Europe.[23]

Mearsheimer concedes that: "With the United States serving as a night watchman, fears about relative gains among the Western European states were mitigated, and furthermore, those states were willing to allow their economies to become tightly interdependent."[24] Yet realist analysis suggests, as Waltz concludes, that after the Cold War: "NATO's days

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22. See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1993) 188.

23. Mearsheimer "The False Promise...", 340-341.

24. John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic 266:2 (August 1990).

are not numbered, but its years are."[25] To realists, the most pertinent question is: "How can an alliance endure in the absence of a worthy opponent?"[26]

Some realists acknowledge that, because of its institutional qualities, a non-traditional alliance such as NATO may survive for a time on bureaucratic inertia and familiarity. However, NATO will eventually become a hollow shell due to an inevitable decline in the American political and military role in Europe. Realists do not necessarily discount institutional shells for, once created, it is easier to maintain an existing institutional arrangement than to create a new one. As Richard K. Betts writes: "Shells are far from useless - they can maintain the base from which re-mobilization and coordination can be accomplished in a shorter time than if they had to be accomplished from scratch - but they do not provide the animation or originality that revolutionary political changes seem to mandate."[27]

Though historically alliances dissolve in the absence of a threat, institutionalized patterns of behavior can be adapted to changed realities in the international system.[28] While the power foundations of an alliance may recede, its

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25. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," in Brown (et al), The Perils of Anarchy 74.
26. Kenneth N. Waltz "The Emerging...", 73.
27. Richard K. Betts, "Systems of Peace as Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," in Snyder and Jervis 272.
28. See Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies 3 (Autumn 1993) 3-43.

institutional characteristics can give it life beyond its original purpose. As Steven Walt has shown, an alliance can have appeal not just because of actual capabilities a threat may possess, but also the perceived danger or the aggressiveness of a particular states' intentions.[29] Thus while a threat may not be immediate, perception (based largely on historical experience of interested states) can give value to an alliance as an institution surviving in the absence of a major threat. Fear of instability and the unknown can be as much a unifying factor as a clear and present danger. In this sense, cooperation may be an important element of self-help. Thus Charles S. Glaser notes that a policy is thought to provide a state with gains when it increases what the state values, not when it increases the instruments the state has available or employs.[30] A state will primarily value security and if it views institutions as helping to achieve that goal, then participating in international institutions can be an important part of self-help.[31]

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29. Steven M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security 9:4 (Spring 1985) and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). Also see Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36 (July 1984) 461-495 and Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies 3 (Spring 1992) 383-416.

30. Charles S. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help," in Brown (et al) The Perils of Anarchy 400-405.

31. This is an important element of the concept of "cooperative security" which stresses the complexity and inter-related challenges of international security so that the security of one state is intrinsically linked to, and dependent on, the security of another state (or states). This interdependence of security challenges motivates states to increase their security by utilizing multilateral forums including formal institutions. See Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security (Washington D.C.: The

The strongest realist argument for maintaining NATO is to expand the Alliance into Central and Eastern Europe. Alliance-based NATO enlargement would help the West consolidate the new status quo after the Cold War, fill a security vacuum in the region, reassure Germany's neighbors of its growing power in the heart of Europe, and increase the West's deterrence capacity against an inevitable rise of a new Russian challenge. In this realist view, the basic premises of NATO - its alliance functions - will not be sustainable unless those functions are expanded by purposefully drawing new lines to the East reflecting the balance of power. Even if Russia does not pose an immediate threat, NATO enlargement would contain the zone of instability in the post-Soviet region while at the same time adding considerable assets to the power of the West, particularly through the inclusion of Poland and its sizeable armed forces.

Alliance enlargement as the solution to NATO's uncertain role after the Cold War is not shared by all realists. Some realists warn that enlargement is a relative gain by the West at Russia's expense and that it unnecessarily risks a provocative security dilemma and confrontation between NATO and Russia while undermining pro-Western politicians in Moscow. Moreover, it is an overextension of American security commitments promoting a

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Brookings Institutions, 1992) and Janne E. Nolan, ed., Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).

dangerous false promise of security when the trend in European geopolitics is toward a decreasing US role and a rising influence of a German dominated European Union. Indeed, an alternative conclusion drawn from realist propositions about power and balancing is not that NATO should enlarge based on a potential Russian threat but, rather, on furthering the American-led internal containment of Germany by increasing US influence in the countries to Germany's East.

Realism is limited in its overall explanatory power because its conclusions are not based on detailed analysis of institutions and their potential for enhancing national security. To realists, all that mattered in NATO was the Soviet threat - without that threat NATO is unlikely to survive and its institutional attributes will have little relevance.[32] Realism is successful in explaining NATO's institutional form during the Cold War, but then loses its primacy as it alone can not explain why NATO appears to be transforming into a new institutional form with the potential to play a major role increasing security in Europe in the 21st century acting in conjunction with power realities. However, while institutional approaches to the study of NATO have provided good descriptions of its institutional activity, institutionalism has yet to offer

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32. See John Gerard Ruggie, "Realism, Institutions, and U.S. World Order Policy," International Security (Summer 1995) and John Gerard Ruggie," America and the New World Order: Multilateralism after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) 33-34.

rigorous proof that such activity actually increases security. Because the risks of insecurity can be extraordinarily high, the pessimism inherent in realism must therefore be a core aspect of testing what NATO can, and can not, do for the future of European security. This is especially true after the Cold War because as Jack Snyder warns: "...institution building will do great damage if it is attempted, but doesn't work...It will damage the West by embroiling it deeply in the possibly insoluble problems of the East."[33]

Institutionalism

International institutions are persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavior roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations through international regimes and organizations. Institutions are characterized by the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which state expectations converge in a given issue area.[34] The study of international institutions can be divided into rational approaches which stress formal regimes and organization, and reflectivist which emphasize

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33. Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," in Brown (et al) The Cold War and After, 139.

34. See Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989) 3-5 and Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983) 1-5.

values, norms, and practices that vary across cultures and can affect the nature of institutions.[35]

This project assesses the relevance of NATO as a formal organization enhancing security by drawing from a neoliberal institutional perspective tested against realism. Neoliberal institutionalism places a priority on explaining the conditions under which states may use institutions to their advantage and for mutual gain. The approach does not explicitly reject realist propositions about institutions and national security. Indeed, neoliberal institutionalists do not claim that all institutions, in all circumstances, have a major impact on outcomes. Most importantly, neoliberal institutional analysis departs from the hierarchical approaches of collective security or the constructivist approaches of security community analysis. As Robert O. Keohane maintains: "Neoliberal institutionalists accept a version of liberal principles that eschews determinism and that emphasizes the pervasive significance of international institutions without denigrating the role of state power."[36] Similarly, Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane assert that institutions and their regimes: "...do not enforce rules in a hierarchical sense, but they do change patterns of transaction costs and

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35. See Keohane International Institutions, 166-179.

36. Keohane International Institutions, 11. Also see Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond." In Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 195.

provide information to participants, so that uncertainty is reduced."[37]

Unlike realism, neoliberal institutionalism is cautiously optimistic about the impact that international institutions can have on outcomes promoting security and lowering the prospects for war. Institutions are relevant to security because they can make international cooperation promoting security in an uncertain environment easier to attain than in their absence. This is especially important for, as Alexrod and Keohane suggest, the shadow of the future and the uncertainty of anarchy in the international system allow for an environment in which international institutions both embody and affect state expectations.[38] As institutions gain permanence in the international system, they can become important factors that states use to assess their national security objectives and requirements. Neoliberal institutionalists claim to have more explanatory power than realism because the approach sees institutions as fundamentally rooted in the realities of power and interests. As Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin write: "Liberal institutionalists...do not argue that NATO could have maintained stability under any imaginable conditions...What we argue is that institutions make a

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[37]. Axelrod and Keohane, in Baldwin, 110.
[38]. Axelrod and Keohane, in Baldwin, 94.

significant difference in conjunction with power realities."[39]

Since the end of the Cold War scholars and policymakers have increasingly asserted that institutions can apply to security. For example, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye suggest that some types of security institutions aid the exercise of influence, constrain bargaining strategies, balance or replace other institutions, signal governments' intentions by providing others with information and making policies more predictable, specifying obligations, and impacting both the interests and preferences of states.[40] Charles A. Kupchan maintains that institutions are relevant to security because they: increase the level of information available to all parties by enhancing transparency; raise the costs of defection; and define what constitutes defection, increase the likelihood of issue linkage, and advance interstate socialization by promoting the concept of an international community.[41] Regarding Europe, Robert O. Keohane asserts that: "If the theories of institutions have any validity, the rich tapestry of institutions should both constrain states, through the operation of rules, and provide them with opportunities without positing the threats

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39. Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20:1 (Summer 1995) 42.

40. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994) 2-3.

41. Charles A. Kupchan, "The Case for Collective Security," in George W. Downs, ed., Collective Security after the Cold War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994) 50-51.

to other states that are so characteristic of realistic anarchy."[42]

Institutionalism and NATO

Addressing NATO, John Gerard Ruggie notes that among the options that the US had in establishing its post-World War II security ties, the US adopted an explicitly institutional approach via NATO.[43] Thus institutions, adapted to reflect fluctuations in the international power structure, have been an important element of NATO since its founding. Steven Weber observes that as the alliance developed over time, NATO facilitated communication through a network of permanent and intermittently meeting bodies as well as ad-hoc groups set up at the request of member states.[44] Explaining NATO's post-Cold War adaptation John Duffield asserts that "...NATO's institutional character has probably contributed to the alliance's persistence...(NATO's) supranational bodies and the individuals who head them have almost certainly helped the alliance to adapt to changing external circumstances by

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42. Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," in Baldwin 272.

43. Ruggie "Realism...", 4-5. These options included unilateral US security guarantees to one, several, or an organization of European states; one or more US bilateral alliances with European states; or a "dumbbell" model linking North American and European alliances. The US, Ruggie maintains, chose the model which most closely approximated collective security commitments.

44. Steve Weber, "Does NATO Have a Future?" in Beverly Crawford, ed., The Future of European Security (Berkeley, CA: Center for German and European Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1992) 369-370, 381. Also see Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966-1967 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

defining new tasks, identifying ways to achieve them, forging compromises, and otherwise providing leadership."[45] A similar analysis has been forwarded by Robert McCalla who explains NATO's persistence after the Cold War in neoliberal institutional terms but without assessing whether or not institutional activity is relevant to security.[46] In fact, despite the growing institutional analysis of NATO and other formal institutions with security functions, little detailed consideration has been given to the basic challenge raised by realism - do institutions affect the degree of national security and, if so, how?

There is an increasing tendency among institutionalist theorists to assume that NATO had independent institutional functions relevant to security beyond its traditional alliance activity during the Cold War. For example, many advocates of post-Cold War NATO enlargement assume that NATO as an institution had an independent affect on

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45. John Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Alliance Theory," in Ngaire Woods, ed., Explaining International relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 343-345. In a previous study, Duffield assessed NATO's role in helping to clarify boundaries for state behavior in Cold War Europe, reinforcing the US commitment to European security, and influencing military planning and capabilities. John S. Duffield, "Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes," Review of International Studies 20:4 (October 1994) 369-388. In a more detailed analysis, Duffield has shown that NATO's Cold War conventional force posture was affected independently by the norms and rules of the institution, reinforced via rational incentives for compliance, which in turn reinforced a process within states affecting the views and calculations of decision-makers. See John Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995) 251-257.

46. Robert McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," International Organization 50:3 (Summer 1996). Also see Fred Chernoff, After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, Theories of Cooperation, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1995).

democratization in Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain. Moreover, NATO's institutional characteristics are often assumed to have had an independent impact constraining Greece and Turkey from waging war against each other and grounding Germany into the West. Some high-level NATO oriented policymakers tend to view the institution as a "club" of democracies expanding a zone of peace and stability.[47] Wanting to accelerate NATO toward enlargement in late 1994, a senior Clinton Administration official opined that the (existing) Partnership for Peace "...is like getting guest privileges at the club - you can play golf once in a while...Now we want to send the bylaws and ask, "do you want to pay the dues?'"[48]

Such comments demonstrate allow utopian wishes to overcome practical understanding of just what NATO is and whether it has adapted sufficiently to the post-Cold War security environment to justify claims of institutional relevance. Certainly NATO is not a club. It is a military alliance that performs military functions in the heart of a Continent that has witnessed the repeated horrors of millions of dead through war and aggression in the 20th century. Moreover, NATO is neither exclusively a collective

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47. Analytically, Thomas Risse-Kappen has attempted to demonstrate that NATO's institutional functions were explicitly reflective of the identity of its members and the fact that they were primarily democracies. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

48. "US Wants to Expedite Entry of Eastern Nations into Alliance", The New York Times, 27 October 1994, A5.

security architecture or a security community. Traces of each are present but neither have been decisive in establishing what institutional characteristics of NATO have been relevant to security during its history or in the contemporary context.

At its founding, NATO was endowed with a positive view of the world and given internal functions of consultation should the actions of one member raise security concerns in relation to another. Like the League of Nations and the UN, NATO was endowed by its members with substantial organizational attributes. However, NATO's institutional architecture was created to facilitate a state-dominated atmosphere with few, if any, independent characteristics. Common practices and daily interaction in a multinational setting, especially military planning and exercises, helped increase the level of trust and transparency among the member states. However, these institutional consequences of NATO were secondary to maintaining collective defense and alliance cohesion in times of Cold War tension and detente. Thus, while NATO did provide for consultation, NATO was a collective defense institution - not collective security.[49]

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[49]. In collective security states are organized for multilateral military responses to internal challenges within a grouping of states and in collective defense, states organize their military efforts against an external threat. For a classic assessment of the differences between collective defense and collective security in relation to NATO, see Arnold Wolfers, "Collective Defense versus Collective Security," in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959) 49-74. For a contemporary analysis based on assumptions that NATO had collective security attributes see Charles A. and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security." International Security 20:1 (Summer 1995) 52-61.

The primary difference being that NATO's institutional attributes as developed during the Cold War were dependent upon the international system and the demands of its member states whereas, in collective security, the institution should have shown clear indications that its form was an independent variable affecting the degree of security.

Somewhat less obvious, but equally problematic, are statements that NATO embodies a security community - or more specifically, a pluralistic security community as described by Karl Deutsch. A security community is a region in which there is virtually no prospect for war among a group of states. Deutsch described such a community as a group of people which has become integrated within a territory based on a sense of community and institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for durable and dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population.[50] Deutsch established the concept of "pluralistic security communities" which retain the legal independence of separated governments but comprise relationships among a group of states which share commonalities between the process of domestic security

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[50]. Sense of community is defined as: "...a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'." Peaceful change is "the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force." Karl Deutsch (et al), Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957) 5.

establishment and that among states in the international system.[51]

As NATO developed during the 1950s and 1960s many integrationist scholars, including Deutch, looked at NATO as a means toward a pluralistic security community based on its apparently integrative trends.[52] However, by the mid-1960s the dominance of NATO's alliance functions, which reflected American dominance, combined with the French withdrawal from NATO to lead integrationists away from NATO and toward the European Community as a case study for regional integration analysis.[53] The institutional processes in NATO that some observers saw as promoting a nascent pluralistic security community had much more to do with neoliberal institutional activity intended to resolve problems associated with collective action.[54] When these processes did have a

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51. Deutsch 6.

52. In his analysis of security communities, Deutsch argued that NATO could contribute to the evolution of a pluralistic security community by developing its economic and social potential to make it "more than a military alliance." Deutsch 203. For an analysis of trends toward interdependence in NATO during the 1960s see Alastair Buchan, NATO in the 1960's: The Implications of Interdependence (New York: Praeger, 1963).

53. Even the regional integration focus lost much of its appeal among integrationist scholars by the 1970s. See Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, 1975). In his analysis of NATO, Steven Weber revitalized debate about NATO as a pluralistic security community by asserting that NATO has always been a peculiar mix of alliance and security community. Weber suggests that a security community can be institutionalized as equivalence is favored over hierarchy with decisions requiring unanimity and with formal organization existing primarily to enhance transparency and to facilitate the transfer of information among states. Weber, in Crawford, 369-372.

54. For discussion of nascent security communities, see Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, "Security Communities," Paper prepared for delivery at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-3, 1994, 44-47. Adler and Barnett maintain that a nascent security community exists when governments of two or more states begin to consider how they might coordinate their security relations in order to increase their mutual security.

positive impact on security beyond NATO's alliance functions, it was dependent upon strategic calculations related to the needs of collective defense. The period after the Cold War has shown that NATO has adapted its institutional form so that it may contribute to the idea of an emerging pluralistic security community. However, a more clearly defined geographic basis for an expanding security community is more likely to be found in the European Union.[55]

Despite the absence of collective security or security community and the constraints of its predominant institutional form of allied collective defense, this project shows that NATO has the potential to promote security in the future if it is carefully adapted to meet the evolved security needs of its member states. NATO can reduce uncertainty in international security relations by facilitating the flow of information among its members and between members and non-members. Such information flows also can also lower the transaction costs of identifying challenges early and responding effectively to crisis.

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[55]. See Emanuel Adler, European Union: A Pluralistic Security Community (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991). Adler challenges the premise that NATO can promote a pluralist security community after the Cold War. To Adler an enlarged pluralistic security community in Europe cannot be constituted in the absence of a deepening and enlargement of European economic and political integration. Efforts by institutions to create or promote a security community are likely to fail because a security community must evolve from below and cannot be imposed from above. In this view, it is the grass roots, lower level, activity of the OSCE, and not NATO, that should be the "institutional embryo" of a growing pluralistic security community in post-Cold War Europe. Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community," in Crawford 287-326.

Through multinational military planning NATO can enhance transparency among members and non-members so that the danger that misperception of state intentions might lead to security competition or war can be lowered by contributing to an institutional culture of trust, confidence-building, and reassurance while helping to identify defectors from international security cooperation. As a result, NATO can enhance confidence on the part of states (and their leaders) of relative safety within an uncertain international environment. Moreover, NATO has not yet, but might contribute to the socialization of states toward more peaceful state domestic and foreign policies.

Whether the NATO member states will translate this potential into reality via a major institutional adaptation remains to be seen. To date, NATO's members have not settled on a new form that will ensure the relevance of these institutional functions to the security of its members, and non-members, in the future. To examine the challenge confronting NATO, it is necessary to measure its variations in institutional form over time and assess what elements, if any, are worth retaining.

Measuring Variations in Institutional Form

There has been little analytical study of the impact that variations in institutional form have on security.[56] However, formal institutions have specific characteristics which are measurable over time and which can have a direct impact on the relevance of institutions for enhancing national security. To measure institutional form and the affect of institutions on security this project assesses four key elements of institutional design including: tasks; organizational capabilities; norms, principles, rules, and procedures; and capacity for change. It examines variations in NATO's institutional form measured over time and assesses whether changes in institutional form affected the degree of national security in Europe.

Tasks

The primary indicators of institutional form are the particular problems that an institution is designed to address. In this sense, institutional form is dependent upon the demands that states place on it based on the nature

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56. Deborah D. Avant has shown how differences in national institutions can affect military doctrine within states. See Deborah D. Avant, "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars," International Studies Quarterly 37 (1993) 409-430. Similarly, Peter J. Katzenstein has shown that variations in domestic norms and the institutional structures within states can impact the means through which states seek to enhance their internal security. Katzenstein concludes that while norms are both contested and contingent, it is not possible to adequately explain state behavior without an examination of the normative context. Peter J. Katzenstein, "Coping with Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security in Germany and Japan," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) 265-295.

of security challenges. At their inception, or as part of an institutional transformation, institutions are a means to a particular end and the nature of the goals and priorities of the member states will affect institutional form. Once tasks are defined, institutional effectiveness is measured by the degree to which an institution aids states in meeting particular goals. Once tasks are given to an institution, then the form will depend upon the nature of those tasks. In this sense, international institutions are both constituted by, and constituted of, state actions.[57]

Organizational Capabilities

The degree of institutional autonomy and formalism are important measures of institutional form.[58] Autonomy is the degree to which an institution has a capacity to act independent of its member states and enforce compliance with institutional objectives. Because of the dangers inherent in security cooperation and the historical failures of collective security, states are not likely to give institutions a high degree of autonomy to affect national

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57. See Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization 41:3 (Summer 1987) 335-370; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989) 51-73; and Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46:2 (Spring 1992) 391-425.

58. Marc Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zurn, "The Study of International Regimes," Working Paper Prepared for the International Institute for Applied System Analysis WP-94-113 (November 1994) 10.

security independent from state control. Therefore, institutional enforcement mechanisms rest on the willingness of states to utilize them. Absent a convergence of interests based on a shared threat, security institutions must depend on less reliable secondary compliance methods such as long-term socialization. Autonomy is measured by the degree to which institutional attributes have a measurable impact on the tasks it is designed to undertake. Formalism is measured by the physical organizational structure of an institution and the means through which it facilitates problem solving.

Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures

Institutional principles, norms, rules and procedures, particularly those affecting membership, can also affect institutional form. Principles are the fundamental beliefs that the members of an institution hold. Norms are the standards of behavior established in terms of rights and obligations that states agree to assume when participating in a formal institution. Rules specify the boundaries of state behavior, and thus help to define and identify defection, for members of an institution. Procedures facilitate multilateral decision-making and help ease tension or conflict among institutional members. Principles, norms, rules, and procedures contribute to institutional legitimacy, the capacity for action, and help

measure compliance in an institutional setting.[59] Membership in an institution can be classified as restricted, conditionally open, or open. Restricted institutions limit membership to a small group of states that have some particular set of interests in common, or those which have specified standards of domestic political structures within states. Conditionally open institutions are accessible in principle to states that are willing to accept a set of prescribed commitments, which not all states may be able or willing to make. Open institutions are universal and accessible to all states with the exception of those whose policies represent gross violations of specified institutional norms.[60]

Capacity for Change

International institutions are not static entities - they can evolve, enlarge or contract, or be realigned and redesigned if states see value in their maintenance. Institutional change can result from internal contradictions, a shift in the underlying structure of power, and exogenous forces such as the transformation of

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59. See Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political Science Review 80:4 (December 1986) 1095-1111; Friedreich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 48-57; and Elinor Olstrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

60. Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes," in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 39. Keohane assesses restricted institutions as promoting cartelization, conditionally open institutions as fostering collaboration, and open institutions as limited to consultation and sharing of opinion.

technology.[61] States learn and adapt to changed circumstances and if they find that an institution has benefit for their national security, then a demand for maintenance and transformation may occur. Rather than fundamentally reconceptualizing the nature of an institution, states are likely to pursue adaptation of existing institutions when old challenges disappear and new ones arise. This is especially true because it is less costly to adapt an existing institution than it is to create a new one from scratch. When national security is at stake, adaptation is the most likely outcome of major institutional efforts to meet new challenges. Such adaptation can occur incrementally or in an ad-hoc manner.[62] Adaptation is a process controlled by member states with minimal hierarchical insights provided by the institution itself.[63]

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61. Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," in Krasner 106-110.

62. For discussion of institutional adaptation patterns see Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990) 7-15.

63. It is important to distinguish between adaptation and learning. Institutional learning is a process in which institutions themselves recognize, through a variety of means, that a new problem has emerged in international relations requiring a fundamental rethinking of past institutional form and change in state behavior. In this sense, institutions which learn become the causal factor educating members as to the nature of the new challenge. Learning is rare and because states are most concerned about security, state driven adaptation is the most likely, if not desirable, means of institutional change when national security is the policy problematique. See Peter M. Haas and Ernst B. Haas, "Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance." Global Governance 1 (1995) 255-285.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Subsequent chapters are organized around the central thesis of this project - that variations in institutional form can affect the degree of national security in Europe. Each chapter begins with a short introduction and overview relating the case study to the thesis. Each chapter concludes with an analysis of the four measures of institutional form including tasks; organizational capabilities; principles, norms, rules, and procedures; and capacity for change and assesses their impact on the degree of security. More general conclusions about institutions, NATO, and the future of European security are made in the final chapter.

CHAPTER III
BUILDING AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM: THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF NATO

Introduction and Overview

This chapter shows that, in creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the key actors incorporated a sophisticated analysis of security challenges, alliances, and institutions. The negotiators created an institutional form that drew from both realist and institutionalist considerations about the sources of national security. The Soviet threat was the primary factor which caused American and West European diplomatic elites to consider responses to enhance their security. However, a more complex understanding of security emerged - one that viewed Western Europe as threatened by instability and a lack of confidence. In the negotiations over NATO's institutional form, the parties rejected the arguments of the primary realists involved in the negotiations. Instead, they intentionally shaped NATO's institutional form to withstand the challenges that realists warned of by making it more than a traditional alliance. NATO was established on a unique blend of realist and institutionalist assessments of the sources of national security in Europe.

European Security After World War II

After World War II, European security was challenged by a number of factors. To the East stood a massive Soviet

presence consolidating its gains through the creation of puppet regimes throughout Eastern Europe.[64] Western Europe was economically devastated and militarily weak so that it could not balance the Soviet Union alone. Economic disaster, fragile democracies, and dispirited populations also made West European states susceptible to internal Soviet-backed communist influence or destabilizing nationalism. The US was dramatically reducing its troop presence in Europe and those that remained had low combat potential.[65]

Toward the end of World War II, Britain considered such potential postwar developments and sought to institutionalize the integrated wartime military cooperation in the combined US and British staffs. In September 1943, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted in a speech at Harvard University that: "...it would be a most foolish and improvident act on the part of our two Governments, or either of them, to break up this smooth-running and immensely powerful machinery the moment the war is over...we are bound to keep it working and in running order after the

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64. The Soviet Union maintained approximately 30 divisions in Eastern Europe (including 9 tank and 11 motorized infantry divisions). Western intelligence estimates concluded that in the immediate postwar years, the Soviet Union had some 5 million men in the armed forces with 175 divisions in the western Soviet Union and another 125 divisions in strategic reserve. Richard Kuglar, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993) 30-36.

65. The US position in Western Europe was especially tenuous because the Americans were unable to send more than a division anywhere without resorting to partial mobilization. As a result, the entire defense of Western Europe relied on American air power and its nuclear component. Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962) 29-30.

war - probably for a good many years."[66] On 9 November 1944 the British Chiefs of Staff issued a classified report which concluded that Britain's security interests lay in the formation of a West European security group which could cooperate with the British commonwealth and the US. Such a security group would begin with an Anglo-French alliance and then expand to include closer cooperation with Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and perhaps Germany. At Potsdam in 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff proposed that the US and Britain have continued machinery for the mutual exchange of information.[67]

By early 1946 postwar allied security cooperation took on a sense of urgency. On 22 February the top US government Soviet expert in Moscow, George Kennan, warned that the West faced a political force committed "fanatically to the belief that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life destroyed, the international authority of our state broken, if Soviet power is to be secured."[68] On 5 March, Churchill gave a speech at Fulton, Missouri, warning of an "iron curtain" descending on Eastern Europe in the form of Soviet

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66. Richard A. Best, Jr., "Cooperation with Like-Minded Peoples": British Influences on American Security Policy, 1945-1949 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986) 28.

67. See John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939-1980: The Special Relationship (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981); Joseph Smith, ed., The Origins of NATO (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1990); and John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

68. "The Long Telegram" (Kennan) 22 February 1946. FRUS, 1946, 4:706.

domination. Churchill proposed a "fraternal association" between Britain and the US. This required: "...not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instruction, and to the interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges."[69] Churchill concluded that: "If there is to be a fraternal association of the kind I described, with all the extra strength and security which both our countries can derive from it, let me make sure that great fact is known to the world, and that it plays its part in steadying and stabilizing the foundations of peace...Prevention is better than cure."[70]

American involvement in postwar European security had become increasingly important for the Europeans because of the immediate concern over Soviet intentions in the East, the potential for a renewal of German nationalism, and the inability of Britain to maintain its traditional stabilizing influence on the Continental balance of power. In an effort to address the German question, Britain and France signed the Dunkirk Treaty on 4 March 1947 which committed them to mutual assistance in the event of German aggression and to

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69. Don Cook, Forging the Alliance: NATO, 1945-1950 (London: Secker and Warburg, 1989) 52-53.

70. Cook 52-53.

cooperate in their postwar reconstruction efforts.[71] However, the British dilemma had come to a head in Greece where London could no longer afford to furnish military and economic assistance to the western-oriented Greek monarchy that was engaged in an intense civil war against Soviet backed communist rebels. Britain hoped the Americans would fill the void.

The US responded with the Truman Doctrine announced on 12 March 1947 in a presidential address to Congress. Truman announced direct American aid to Greece and Turkey but based the program on universal principles of freedom, democracy, and peace.[72] In June the US Secretary of State George Marshall announced an American program of economic assistance for Western Europe to prevent a rise of nationalism, promote democracy, and establish economic containment of the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan implicitly recognized the growing convergence between interdependence, stability, and security. However, it was designed to promote independence from, and not dependence on, the US.[73] With the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the US entered into a gradual process of

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71. See John Baylis, "Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO." Journal of Strategic Studies 5 (June 1982) 236-247.

72. Message to a Joint Session of Congress, 12 March 1947. Public Papers of the Presidents, 1948, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963) 178-179.

73. Marshall Plan aid was to be distributed to the recipient countries to promote self-help once they had first designed their own reconstruction programs. For detailed analysis of the program and its security implications see Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

institutionalized regional commitments to promote security in areas understood to be key to its national interest.

The Rio Treaty

In December 1947 Congress approved the Rio Treaty which bound the US to a regional security guarantee in the Americas. The accord stressed mutual aid and raised hope that it might have broader implications for preserving peace in Europe. While primarily an institutionalization of the Monroe Doctrine - the Rio Treaty was an important signal to the world that the US favored regional security institutions as a basis for its postwar global involvement. This pact was justified by Article 51 of the UN Charter which guaranteed states the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence."[74]

The Rio Treaty provided for mutual assistance in the event of an aggressive action against any American state. Internal procedures were created to promote the peaceful settlement of regional disputes prior to referring them to the UN. Such a regional pact would promote the same principles institutionalized in the UN charter but, at the same time, circumvent a Soviet veto over security issues in

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[74]. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations states that: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

areas of vital US national interest. The treaty condemned war, and its signatories agreed to resort to the threat or the use of force only in a manner consistent with that provided for by the UN. Following passage of the treaty on 8 December 1947 by a vote of 72-1, the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur Vandenberg, stated that: "We are building upon mutual trust...This is a true partnership which represents the greatest advance ever made in the business of collective peace."[75]

On 15 December The New York Times columnist James Reston noted that some US officials hoped "to negotiate a regional alliance within the United Nations for the defense of those areas of Western and Southern Europe that are considered by our strategic experts to be essential to our own security." He concluded that "...it is gradually becoming recognized in the Capital that economic security and political security, like peace, are indivisible, and that classic diplomatic statements of concern are no answer to the problem of communist internal power."[76] Reston, who had very close ties to senior US officials, was reflecting a growing understanding that the threat to European security

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75. "Americas' Treaty Ratified, 72-1: Vandenberg Cites Bar to Veto," The New York Times, 9 December 1947, A1,4. Vandenberg, from Michigan, was the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a senior member of the Republican leadership with broad bi-partisan respect in the Senate.

76. James Reston, "Need for Firm U.S. Stand in Support of Italy is Seen," The New York Times, 15 December 1947, A3. Also see Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981) 37-41.

more complicated than a direct Soviet invasion. West European democracies struggling with economic disaster after the war needed a sense of reassurance as to their relative safety and stability to deter the political challenge that communism, or nationalism, might pose.

The Brussels Pact

On 15 December 1947 British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin met with US Secretary of State George Marshall in London following the collapse of four-power dialogue over the future of Germany.[77] Bevin told Marshall that Europe and America must increase their commitment to each other. He suggested that this need not necessarily come through a formal alliance, but rather an "understanding backed by power, money and resolute action...sort of a spiritual federation of the West."[78] Summarizing his view of the Soviet challenge Bevin said:

> I am convinced that the Soviet Union will not deal with the West on any reasonable terms in the foreseeable future and that the salvation of the West depends upon the formation of some form of union, formal or informal in character, in Western Europe, backed by the United States and the Dominions - such a mobilization of moral and material force will inspire confidence and energy within, and respect elsewhere.[79]

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77. The four powers controlling their respective sectors in Germany were the US, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.

78. "The Charge in London (Gallman) to the Secretary of State," London, 22 December 1947. FRUS, 1948, 3:2.

79. Quoted By Theodore C. Achilles, "The Omaha Milkman: The Role of the United States in the Negotiations," in Andre de Staercke, ed., NATO's Anxious Birth (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985) 30.

Marshall generally supported Bevin's sentiments. However, he was adamant that Bevin proceed under the same formula as the Marshall Plan and that the Europeans should first institutionalize a defense community in Western Europe. Marshall advised Bevin that the Europeans should "come together for their own protection, see what they could do, and then turn to the United States, and see what we could do to make up the difference between what the situation required and what they were able to do by their own efforts."[80]

On 13 January 1948 Bevin informed Washington that, in his view, Marshall Plan aid alone would not prevent further Soviet encroachment on the West. "Political and indeed spiritual forces must be mobilized in our defense", Bevin suggested. This would be attained by seeking: "...to form with the backing of the Americans and the Dominions a Western democratic system comprising Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, Italy, Greece and possibly Portugal...As soon as circumstances permit we should, of course, wish also to include Spain and Germany without whom no Western system can be complete."[81] The American response was positive but not as specific as Bevin might have liked. In a 20 January letter to Lord Inverchapel (the British Ambassador in

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80. Charles E. Bohlen, Transformation of American Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969) 92-93.

81. "Summary of a Memorandum Representing Mr. Bevin's Views on the Formation of a Western Union." FRUS, 1948, 3:5.

Washington), Marshall wrote that: "As in the case of the recovery program, we heartily welcome European initiative in this respect and Mr. Bevin may be assured of our wholehearted sympathy in this undertaking."[82] Contrary to realist assumptions about maximizing gains, self-help and power, the next day John Hickerson (Director of the State Department's Office of European Affairs) told Inverchapel that the US hoped to help create "a third force which was not merely the extension of US influence but a real European organization strong enough to say 'no' both to the Soviet Union and to the United States, if our actions should seem so to require."[83]

On 22 January Bevin informed parliament that he had instructed British representatives in France and the Benelux countries to begin negotiations on the creation of a Western Union. The rationale for this departure from Britain's traditional avoidance of Continental security commitments was placed in the context of West European integration. Bevin asserted that: "The nations of Western Europe have much to unite them - common sacrifice in two wars, their parliamentary democracy, and their striving for economic

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82. "Secretary of State to the British Ambassador," 20 January 1948. FRUS, 1948, 3:8.

83. "Memorandum of Conversation, by Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)." FRUS, 1948, 3:11. Hickerson had been advising Marshall that a regional security pact should be negotiated with Europe based on the Rio Treaty. In a memo to Marshall he wrote that: In my opinion a European Pact modelled on the treaty of Rio de Janeiro is the best answer to the security problem for Western Europe. For such a pact to be really effective, the United States would have to adhere." "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State." FRUS, 1948, 3:7.

rights and conceptions of and love for democracy."[84] However, a Western Union alone would have been inadequate for the security of Western Europe. As the Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak asserted: "...any defense arrangement which did not include the United States would be without practical value."[85] The Western Union was a bold initiative that risked prompting Soviet aggression taking advantage of this institutional weakness. The Western Union thus became an institution primarily designed to help its members increase their security via a broader, transatlantic institution involving an American security guarantee.

American reassurance was a primary concern for France. Because any real defense of Western Europe would require meeting the Soviet challenge as far East as possible, Germany would have to be a part of Western defense plans. Such a forward defense strategy would require German rearmament to be credible. Additionally, the success of the Marshall Plan and European integration would likely hinge on economic development in Western Germany. France promoted forward defense and hoped to make substantial gains from Marshall Plan aid and European integration. However, France could not easily forget its adversarial history with Germany and its recent Nazi occupation. Nevertheless, as Kennan concluded, only a Western Union "...holds out any hope of

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84. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1947-1948, 5th series, 446, columns 383ff.
85. FBIS, 1948, 3:76-78.

restoring the balance of power in Europe without permitting Germany to become again the dominant power."[86] While Kennan was correct in this assessment, he failed to understand that a successful Western Union, which would ultimately rest on Franco-German reconciliation, could not emerge in the absence of direct American reassurance of its commitment to West European security.

On 28 February Marshall related French fears about the German question to the continued presence of American troops:

> The French are secure against Germany as long as (the) occupation continues...In view of Communist integration of a third of Germany and the likelihood of continuing stringent economic conditions, a united Germany bereft of Western occupation force would be an easy prey to Communist domination. As long as European Communism threatens US vital interests and national security we could ill afford to abandon our military position in Germany...The logical conclusion is that three power occupation may be of unforeseeable and indefinite duration, thus offering protracted security guarantees and establishing a firm community of interests.[87]

This desire to reassure France was shared in London where Bevin wrote to Prime Minister Clement Atlee on 1 March:

> Instead of being bottled up in Central Europe, we feel the Germans have a great contribution to make to the world's industrial and social development. Our aim is to protect ourselves against any further aggression by Germany and at the same time to bring her back into the community of nations as a united entity on a democratic basis, with democracy as Western civilization understands it. In this connection of course, you must not forget the French. We all talk too much about Germany. Our approach, therefore, to a reorganization of economic, social

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86. "Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State." FRUS, 1948, 3:7.

87. "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom," 28 February 1948. FRUS, 1948, 2:101.

> and defence weapons is a good neighbourly policy, first with the French and now with Benelux. In view of the fact that France has been invaded so many times and paid such a price, we must therefore arrange our defences and our responsibilities to give the French the assurance of her security as far as we humanly can.[88]

Marshall and Bevin had signaled a clear understanding of the need to alleviate French fears by institutionalizing a policy of reassurance in the form of a general US commitment to European security.

After Soviet-backed communists took over Czechoslovakia in late February and the pro-western Czech Foreign Minister Masaryk was murdered on 10 March, Western states became fearful of so called "5th column" Soviet invasions in which covert activity might be used to rally communist forces in a fragile democracy and turn that states' policy toward the Soviet sphere of influence. Western concerns were heightened by ongoing civil war in Greece, scheduled elections in April showing the possibility of a communist victory in Italy, and Soviet pressure on Finland and Norway to enter into non-aggression pacts with Moscow. French national security concerns were intensified by these developments as it had recently undergone major work stoppages and had a large communist presence in its National Assembly.

France had few options for increasing its national security. France could not isolate Germany as it had in the early 1920s for fear that such a policy could push Western

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88. Quoted in Alexander Rendel, "Secret Explorations: the Anglo-American initiatives," in de Staercke 12.

Germany into the Soviet orbit. "Going it alone" was no longer an option as the threat was much greater than the resources France could marshall. Establishing bilateral alliances in Eastern Europe was not possible so long as the Soviet Union occupied the region and political accommodation with Moscow was not an option. France was thus left with little choice but to seek hard security guarantees from Britain and the US. Even the French nationalist General Charles de Gaulle said on 7 March that:

> It is necessary that there be formed among the free states of Europe an economic, diplomatic, and strategic grouping, joining their productions, their moneys, their exterior action, and their means of defense...It is necessary that the effort of old Europe and that of America be joined to put our poor world back on its feet again. Their support must extend at the same time to the domain of defense and in a manner as precise and explicit on the one hand as in the Marshall project in the matter of credits and imports.[89]

France especially wanted direct military assistance to rebuild its national security capabilities. Paris maintained a deep concern, based on the failure of the League of Nations to provide for its security before World War II, about reliance on institutions for national security.

Nevertheless, a Western European security institution was created in Brussels by the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries on 17 March 1948.[90] The Western

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89. Lansing Warren, "De Gaulle, Asking for French Power, Seeks Our Arms Aid, The New York Times, 8 March 1948, A1,9.

90. Formally called "The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense." Department of State Bulletin 18:462 (9 May 1948) 600.

Union, as it was informally called, sought to promote integration and mutual assistance in a range of political, economic, and military activities. The Western Union established a Consultative Council to "promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries (Article II)." The members agreed to make "every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means (Article III)."

Article IV of the Brussels Treaty stated that if any member should be the object of attack in Europe, the others will, "...in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." Article VII specifically mentioned Germany but had further implications for the emerging Soviet challenge. It mandated consultation in the event of aggression at the request of any member "...in whatever area this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy; or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability." Additionally, the treaty established a principle of internal conflict resolution by requiring member states to resolve

internal conflicts according to the rules of the International Court of Justice (Article VIII).

Worried about a potential isolationist backlash at home, the Truman Administration was careful not to associate publicly with the formation of the Western Union. However, privately the Western Union was encouraged by Washington as a prerequisite for discussing a transatlantic security institution. By building a security institution from scratch, the West European countries had made a substantial step toward coordinating their long-term national security objectives. Where collective security had failed in the League of Nations, an emerging convergence of interests was growing between the US and Western Europe that an alliance built upon partnership and community would succeed thirty years later.

Framing the Transatlantic Community

On the day that the Brussels Treaty was signed, President Truman delivered a foreign policy speech to a joint session of Congress. Truman suggested that national security must be understood in a broad context. Western Europe needed to integrate its economic resources to escape its history of war and defend itself against the Soviet Union. However, if Western Europe was going to unite economically it must feel reassured of its security. Truman said:

> The free nations of Europe realize that economic recovery, if it is to succeed, must be afforded some measure of protection against internal and external aggression. The movement toward economic cooperation has been followed by a movement toward common self-protection in the face of the growing menace to their freedom...This development deserves our full support and I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires.[91]

On 22 March American, Canadian, and British officials began secretive discussions deep within the Pentagon over the prospect of creating a formal transatlantic institution to be based either on the Brussels Pact or the Rio Treaty.[92]

The two main Soviet specialists in the US State Department, Kennan and Charles Bohlen, opposed a formal treaty on realist grounds - arguing that it was an inappropriate security commitment for the US to make and that it might foreclose on a political settlement with Moscow.[93] While taken into account, Kennan's and Bohlen's views were dismissed in favor of an institutionalized security commitment to Western Europe, enshrined in a formal treaty, and built upon a common threat perception and shared

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91. Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 17 March 1948. Public Papers of the Presidents 184.

92. The talks were preliminary but resulted in a working paper presented by the US drafted principally by John Hickerson. The central recommendations included having the President of the United States invite thirteen other countries (U.K., France, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Italy) to negotiate a collective defense agreement for the North Atlantic. Pending conclusion of an agreement, the President would issue a unilateral declaration that the US would consider an armed attack against a signatory of the Brussels Treaty as an armed attack against itself. "Final Draft," undated, identified as "Pentagon Paper, 840.00/3-1748. FRUS, 1948, 3:72-75.

93. Kenan summarized his and Bohlen's views in a note to Marshall and Lovett on 29 April 1948. "Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary and Undersecretary of State (Robert Lovett), April 29, 1948." FRUS, 1948, 3:108-109.

values.[94] They wanted it to reflect political, moral, even "spiritual" elements which united the North Atlantic community of nations. As Escott Reid, a key figure in the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had written in a draft internal memorandum to the Prime Minister on 13 March:

> ...the purpose of the pact is to rally the spiritual as well as the military and economic resources of western Christendom against Soviet totalitarianism; that it must therefore not be merely a negative anti-Soviet military alliance but must be the basis for a dynamic liberal counter-offensive. The pact may succeed in giving us a long period of peace if it results in creating an overwhelming preponderance of force against the Soviet Union, but the force to be overwhelming must not only be military and economic force; it must be the force that comes from ability to rally to our side all non-Communists in all countries, including our own, who are now apathetic, fearful or doubtful. A bold move is necessary to raise the hearts and minds and spirits of all those in the world who love freedom that confidence and faith which will restore their vigor. The pact must set forth the gospel - the good news of our faith - for which we are willing to live and die. It must make as clear as possible the methods which the peoples and governments of the Free World intend to follow to make good their faith in human rights and fundamental freedoms, in the worth and dignity of man and in the principles of parliamentary democracy, personal freedom and political liberty.[95]

Reid's suggestion became formal Canadian policy. On 29 April Canadian Foreign Minister Louis St. Laurent stated that it may be necessary for free countries of the West to establish a security league whose purpose would be to "create a dynamic counter-attraction of a free, prosperous,

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94. Robert H. Ferrell, "The Formation of the Alliance: 1948-1949," in Lawrence S. Kaplan, ed., American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1991) 24.

95. Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope (Toronto, Ontario: McClelland and Stewart, 1977) 135-136.

and progressive society..."[96] On 27 May British Prime Minister Clement Atlee denied that a "power pact" was sought but rather "an association of free peoples, based on a community of ideas, cooperating economically and defensively to provide a firm material basis toward spiritual unity."[97]

The Vandenberg Resolution

Gaining US Senate approval for a treaty establishing a peacetime entangling alliance in Europe would require a strong bi-partisan effort to overcome isolationist sentiment in the US. Key State Department figures (primarily Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett) consulted with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Arthur Vandenberg who indicated his support for a treaty.[98] Passed by the Foreign Relations Committee on 19 May and approved by the full Senate on 11 June, the "Vandenberg Resolution" endorsed the "progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles and provisions of the (UN) Charter."[99]

The Vandenberg Resolution showed that the institutional form of the US security commitment would proceed according

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96. P.J. Philip, "Canada Endorses Free Nation Unity," The New York Times, 30 April 1948, A5.
97. "Attlee Ties Peace to Brussels Pact," The New York Times, 28 May 1948, A10.
98. "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State," 11 April 1948. FRUS, 1948, 3:82-83 and 93-94.
99. The Vandenberg Resolution was formally titled "Resolution of the Foreign Relations Committee Number 239)." Congressional Record, 80 Congress., 2nd session, (11 June 1948) 4:7791.

to clearly defined constitutional means and that it would rest on the principle of popular legitimacy. Popular support for the new institutional form would aid in the task of promoting a positive view of the world based on shared democratic principles. The resolution reaffirmed American support for the UN but at the same time endorsed going outside the UN to avoid a Soviet veto as in the Rio Treaty. It also sought to assure that the new pact would remain consistent with the general principles of international relations that the US had initially hoped would prevail in the UN.

The Vandenberg Resolution stressed that American association with regional and other collective arrangements must be "based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." Thus Vandenberg sought to assure that the Europeans would be producers, and not solely consumers, of security. This principle was included to strengthen European integration as a front line of containment and to help gain Senate support for a treaty based on burdensharing principles. The Europeans were not pleased with this provision as they continued to feel vulnerable without assurances of direct military aid from the US. However, they would have to agree to the burdensharing principle if they wished to make the American commitment to European security lasting.

Uniting Power and Community

Formal negotiations began in Washington D.C. on 6 July 1948 between the US, Canada, and the Brussels Pact states to shape the institutional form of a peacetime security pact. During the talks, two differing perspectives emerged - one realist and the other institutionalist. The realist viewpoint was generally represented by George Kennan who intervened at the beginning and at the end of the discussions. At the outset, Kennan proposed that the institutional form should be based on a "dumbbell concept" of alliance in which the Europeans would assume primary military responsibility.[100] In this view, the US would provide aid while reducing its direct presence on the ground. Kennan also warned of a potential dilemma regarding talk among the representatives of principles and community on which the institutional form would rest. He asked what would happen in a future situation "in which the countries of Eastern Europe might come out from under the Iron Curtain and "be able to come into the European family?" Kennan advised that the "...US would not wish to do anything that might hinder the ultimate unification of Europe."[101]

Kennan's realist interventions not withstanding, the Americans most involved in the Washington negotiations were

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100. The Dutch representative at the Washington talks, suggested an alternative "peach" shape with the Brussels Pact serving as the "...hard kernel in the center and a North Atlantic Pact the somewhat less hard mass around it." "Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 9 July 1948. FRUS, 1948, 3:171.

101. Cook 173.

John Hickerson and Theodore C. Achilles of the State Department European Desk who held strong views that any transatlantic treaty be more than a traditional alliance. Both were influenced by a book published in 1939 by the American journalist Clarence K. Streit titled Union Now. Streit called for the unification of the North Atlantic democracies based on citizenship, defense, customs union, currency, and postal/communications systems.[102] In his memoirs, Achilles notes that he and Hickerson had both read and been impressed by Union Now and that they "shared enthusiasm for negotiating a military alliance and getting it ratified, as a basis for further progress toward unity."[103] Hickerson and Achilles entertained "a lot of generalization about common interests, democratic values, Atlantic civilization and the threat of Communism."[104] For example, the British representative Sir Oliver Franks noted that whatever their differences over the institutional form, all of the countries at the meetings shared a common conception of democracy: "...the conviction that the state existed for the individual" - and that the Soviet challenge

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102. Clarence K. Streit, Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Free (New York: Harper Brothers, 1949) 3-5. For analysis of Streit and the relationship of his work to the conception of NATO see Kaplan The United States and NATO 51-52 and Elliot R. Goodman, The Fate of the Atlantic Community (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975) 12-24. Later in his career Streit made a comparison of NATO and the Articles of Confederation in the US formative period. See Clarence K. Streit, Freedom & Union (February 1964) 4-5.

103. Achilles 13. Achilles notes that after the US Senate approved the NATO treaty in August 1949, he said to Secretary of State Dean Acheson: "Dean, now that we've got this one wrapped up, let's go after a full Atlantic federal union." Achilles quotes Acheson as responding that "I'd rather start with Britain, Canada, and ourselves." Achilles 32-33.

104. Cook 173.

was a "collective concern for all members of the North Atlantic community."[105]

Though principles and ideals were important in Paris, France primarily came to Washington seeking urgent military assistance to enhance its immediate national security concerns.[106] The French wanted to ensure that if a third world war broke out it would be fought East of the Rhine and that American forces and military supplies would be available from the start to defend French territory.[107] The French were adamant to the point of intransigence about direct military assistance programs coming in conjunction with a formal institution.[108] As Lester Pearson (who headed the Canadian delegation) reported to Ottawa: "...the attitude of the French is causing increasing impatience and

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105. "Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security," 6 July 1948. FRUS, 1948, 3:153. Escott Reid saw values that united the western countries personally represented among the individual negotiators in Washington. Fourteen of the fifteen (with the exception of St. Laurent) were "by origin, upbringing and careers members of the group of Protestant British and Protestant Irish origin which at that time dominated national political activities in the United States, Britain and Canada...It was thus natural for them to become advocates of a North Atlantic alliance of which these three countries would be the core." Reid 67.

106. "The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State." FRUS, 1948, 3:142.

107. Henderson 38.

108. The French insistence on material security guarantees was consistent with its proposals during the creation of the League of Nations. In Versailles, France proposed creating a permanent military staff prepared to intervene immediately in the case of aggression. France proposed that the League Council should have standing troops at its disposal and be recruited specifically for the League of Nations or composed of national forces put under League of Nations command. These forces would have included a standing military staff to be organized by the League of Nations which would train contingents and take responsibility for military planning in advance of war. This plan received no serious consideration by the US or British governments and thus the French accepted the institutional form of the League of Nations on terms which did not provide it with sufficient reassurance. See James Avery Joyce, Broken Star: The Story of the League of Nations, 1919-1939 (Swansea: C. Davies, 1979) 45 and Byron Dexter, The Years of Opportunity: The League of Nations, 1920-1926 (New York: Viking Press, 1967) 39.

irritation here and is incomprehensible to everybody."[109] The Americans were more blunt in their assessment which was summarized by Robert Lovett in a personal letter to the American Ambassador (Jefferson Caffery) in Paris which began: "Dear Jeff: The French are in our hair."[110]

The French concerns were eased when their representative Henri Bonnet, was given a lengthy opportunity to air his position in an informal discussion at the home of Robert Lovett.[111] This style of formal and informal multilateral airing of grievances, compromise, and consensus-building played a key role in the development of the institutional form. The founders saw a clear benefit in institutionalizing a process that would facilitate the exchange of information among the member states and their representatives. As Achilles observed:

> The "NATO spirit" was born in the Working Group. Derick Hoyer-Miller (of the British delegation) started it. One day he made a proposal which was obviously nonsense. Several of us told him so in no uncertain terms, and a much better formulation emerged from the discussion. Derick said: "Those were my instructions. All right. I'll tell the Foreign Office I made my pitch and was shot down, and try to get them changed." He did. From then on we all followed the same system. If our instructions were sound and agreement could be reached, fine. If not, we'd work out something that we all, or most of us, considered sound, and whoever had the instructions undertook to get them changed. It always worked, though sometimes it took time.[112]

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109. Cook 185.

110. Cook 185.

111. See Henderson 52-54.

112. Theodore C. Achilles, "Fingerprints on History: The NATO Memoirs of Theodore C. Achilles," Occasional Papers I (Kent, OH: Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Community Studies, 1992) 19.

While the end result might not necessarily be exactly what one country wanted, short term interests were set aside for long-term mutual gains.

The negotiators believed that such forms of multilateral security cooperation might spill-over into issue areas beyond collective defense. The Canadians, in particular, wanted to institutionalize consultative forums addressing non-military issues. Ottawa felt that a peacetime alliance required a political foundation so that it would have longevity, provide a positive alternative to communism, deepen transatlantic political and economic integration, and promote cultural cooperation.[113] Lester Pearson was quite prescient in his concern that security cooperation not be tied too closely to Soviet intentions. He argued that this "might mean that if the danger were removed, or appeared to be removed, this justification for a collective system would disappear...Such a system was justifiable on broader grounds and should have a positive

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113. On 18 March, Escott Reid had proposed in an internal Ministry of Foreign Affairs memo that a provision in the treaty include: agreement by the Atlantic Nations to organize their economic activities to produce the greatest possible returns by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the coordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges; promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their people and greater economic and social justice, and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries; to work towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote cultural exchanges between themselves; and to use their best efforts to secure those amendments to the international instruments setting up the specialized agencies as are necessary to ensure that the agencies become the most effective possible instruments for the speedy attainment of the objectives set forth in the charter. Reid 168.

and not merely a negative purpose."[114] Pearson's comment demonstrates that the actors who designed NATO's early institutional form had a forward-looking conception of power, threat, and alliances. They sought to preempt realist predictions about alliance cohesion by creating an institutional form with a broader purpose than collective defense. Such an approach represented a sophisticated assessment of the fact that detente could be as much a challenge to alliance cohesion as war and that the Soviet Union might use peace initiatives to divide the alliance. Thus the new transatlantic security institution was given a broader foundation as part of its institutional form so that it could survive Cold War tension, detente, and even peace - if the member states so desired.

Interestingly, Kennan endorsed this analysis, emphasizing that: "...the community of interests of the participating governments was wider than military, it was traditional, historical, and would continue...Association was necessary entirely aside from the troubles of the moment and might well go far beyond the military sphere."[115] Nevertheless, the Washington working group was careful not to endorse too broad a concept of a formal Atlantic Community. The British in particular did not want to intrude on the efforts being made toward European

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114. "Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 7, 1948," FRUS, 1948, 3:159.

115. "Minutes of the Third Meeting..." 159.

integration via the Brussels Pact. France saw it as irrelevant to their immediate quest for military assistance. The US was also concerned that language promoting "cultural cooperation" (for example) would hurt the treaty's chances for approval in the Senate.[116]

All of the parties except Britain supported the creation of a high level council for political consultation and cooperation within the institution. The British worried that excessive consultative structures could delay a response to a crisis rather than facilitate military action. London did not force this position and the decision was made to give the institution a formal structure. However, the working group did not envisage NATO as a supra-sovereign political authority.[117] States would remain the final arbiter of how the institution would be utilized. At its founding, NATO was not intended to be an "independent actor" in international relations. Instead, it would be a standing structure designed to aid the needs of its member states.

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116. By fall 1948 the US supported inclusion of some non-military issues in the treaty to make it more palatable to the Senate. However, in early 1949 the new US Secretary of State Dean Acheson sought to dilute the Canadian initiative. Acheson felt that language stressing the "general welfare" would not be accepted in the Senate and he believed that such language was not practical without a mechanism for its implementation. The issue was settled permanently after a direct intervention by Louis St. Laurent (now the Canadian Prime Minister) to President Truman who subsequently endorsed the Canadian proposal. Lawrence S. Kaplan The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984) 117-118.

117. Henderson 70.

The Rationale for a Treaty and a Realist Backlash

On 9 September 1948 the Washington working group completed a highly classified document for home government review explaining the rationale for a North Atlantic security pact.[118] The report - referred to as the "Washington Paper" - concluded that the nature of the problem facing transatlantic relations was "to consider how the countries of Western Europe and those of the North American continent can most effectively join together for mutual aid against this common danger and achieve security." The common danger was identified as the Soviet attempt to use indirect or direct aggression. The Soviet Union was termed an "implacable enemy of western civilization." However, the Soviet threat was not to be the sole purpose of the institution. The purpose would be to deter a Soviet attack and to restore confidence among the people of Western Europe. "United States and Canadian association in some North Atlantic security arrangement would be a major contribution to this", the report concluded. The presence of American forces in Germany guaranteed US involvement in any hostility in Central Europe. However, the report stressed that: "If the arrangement is...to contribute to the restoration of confidence among the peoples of Western Europe, it would not be possible to base it on the presence

118. "Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security Talks July 6 to September 9, Submitted to their Respective Governments for Study and Comment." FRUS, 1948, 3:237-45.

of U.S. troops in Germany", the report asserted. A broader American commitment to Europe was necessary to guarantee successful reassurance.

The Washington Paper concluded that a formal treaty was essential to meeting the dual objective of collective defense and reassurance. To make a treaty more palatable at home and to score propaganda points vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the report recommended that: "Soviet criticism could be offset by fitting the arrangement squarely into the framework of the United Nations and by providing not merely for defense but also for the advancement of the common interests of the parties and the strengthening of the economic, social and cultural ties which bind them." However, the report underscored that the political concept of the treaty went beyond propaganda and that a North Atlantic pact "should be more than an arrangement for defense alone; it should serve both to preserve the common civilization and to promote its development by increasing the collaboration between the signatories and advancing the conditions of stability and well-being upon which peace depends."

The working group concluded that a pact would require "adequate machinery for implementing its terms, in particular for organized coordination and strengthening of the defense capacities of the parties, beginning immediately as it comes into force." The working group summarized Canada's position noting that cooperation in fields other

than security would contribute to general security. "The Canadians," the Washington Paper stated, "felt that the purpose of a treaty should not be merely negative and that it should create the dynamic counter-attraction of a free, prosperous and progressive society as opposed to the society of the Communist world."

As the negotiators moved toward formal treaty language, they were aided in their efforts by the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin who had begun implementing a lengthy blockade of Berlin to break Western resolve over Germany. The Dutch representative suggested that the preamble to the treaty simply read: "Dear Joe:".[119] However, in late September, George Kennan re-entered the discussions and expressed serious reservations about the alliance's institutional characteristics and their potential impact on security. On 26 September, Kennan prepared a draft memorandum for Marshall and Lovett which was remarkable for its realist overtones. Kennan stated that:

> Instead of the development of a real federal structure in Europe which would aim to embrace all free European countries, which would be a political force in its own right, and which would have behind it the logic of geography and historical development, we will get an irrevocable congealment of the division of Europe into two military zones: a Soviet zone and a U.S. zone. Instead of the ability to divest ourselves gradually of the basic responsibility for the security of Western Europe we will get a legal perpetuation of that responsibility. In the long run, such a legalistic structure must crack up on the rocks of reality; for a divided Europe is not permanently viable, and the political will of the U.S. people is not sufficient to enable us to

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[119]. Achilles 27.

support Western Europe indefinitely as a military appendage.[120]

In late November a formal memorandum from the Policy Planning Staff (PPS 43) drafted by Kennan emerged. The memo warned that: "There is a danger that we will deceive ourselves, and permit misconceptions to exist among our own public and in Europe, concerning the significance of the conclusion of such a pact at this time."[121]

Kennan was especially concerned that a military alliance could prevent a permanent settlement with the Soviet Union. He continued to stress that the primary Soviet challenge was political and that for Moscow, "military force plays a major role only as a means of intimidation."[122] Thus:

> A North Atlantic Security Pact will affect the political war only insofar as it operates to stiffen the self-confidence of the western Europeans in the face of Soviet pressures. Such a stiffening is needed and desirable. But it goes hand in hand with the danger of a general preoccupation with military affairs, to the detriment of economic recovery and of the necessity for seeking a peaceful solution to Europe's difficulties...We should have clearly in mind that the need for military alliances and rearmament on the part of the western Europeans is primarily a subjective one, arising in their own minds as a result of their failure to understand correctly their own position. Their best and most hopeful course of action, if they are to save themselves from communist pressures, remains the struggle for economic recovery and for internal political stability.[123]

Kennan concluded that a North Atlantic pact should not be the main answer to the Soviet challenge in Europe. A

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120. Gaddis 63.

121. "Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, 29 November 1948." FRUS, 1948, 3:283-289.

122. PPS 43.

123. PPS 43.

transatlantic institution could not substitute for "the other steps which are being taken and should be taken to meet the Russian challenge, nor should they be given priority over the latter."[124]

Kennan wanted an integrated Western Europe to be the main political and military component of containment in Europe. However, the European unity that Kennan sought could only be attained after these countries had been sufficiently reassured of their security. Thus Kennan's arguments were rejected on the basis that, with its nuclear umbrella and troops in Germany, the US could institutionalize a security guarantee and thereby provide the reassurance Western Europe needed to build its resources for self-help. As Bevin had suggested in a April 1948 memo, the most important result of a treaty would be to provide confidence which would make a Western Union more effective. "If the new defense system is so framed that it relates to any aggressor, it would give all the European states such confidence that it might well be that the age-long trouble between Germany and France might tend to disappear," Bevin concluded.[125]

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124. PPS 43.

125. "Paraphrase of a Telegram from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) of April 9th Regarding Recent Talks on North Atlantic Security Arrangements." FRUS, 1948, 3:80.

Membership: Geostrategic or Principles?

Early in the Washington talks, the geographical scope and membership was discussed. Options ranged from concluding an agreement only among the core nations involved to inviting other countries to join with "graded" or "associate" status.[126] The group decided that all members must be full members and share in the benefits, risks, and costs that would come from collective defense. The working group also worried that membership not be viewed as an effort to encircle Russia - perhaps provoking a preventive war. For example, the French representative asked: "Would it be wise, for example, to enlarge the system in such a way that could, however wrongly, be considered by Russia as encirclement?"[127] At the outset the decision was made that, where possible, membership would reflect shared values and principles - but the primary factor would be geostrategic.

Norway, Denmark, and Sweden had hoped to create a regional collective security institution based on shared cultural identity, commonality of interests, and (at Sweden's insistence) neutrality. This policy suited Sweden which had not been occupied during World War II. However, Norway and Denmark had suffered from direct Nazi occupation. Additionally, Norway shared a border with the Soviet Union which placed considerable pressure on Oslo either to take

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126. Henderson 37, 50.

127. "Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 7, 1948." FRUS, 1948, 3:167.

measures to enhance its security or negotiate a compromise with Moscow. Thus recent Norwegian and Danish historical experiences made Sweden's insistence on neutrality unappealing. The US wanted Iceland, Norway, and Denmark (which was located at an important position at the entrance to the Baltic Sea and possessed the territory of Greenland) in the alliance because of their strategic importance as stepping stones to Europe. Early in 1949 Norway came under strong pressure from Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact (as had been previously signed with Finland). This accelerated the collapse of the Scandinavian defense pact discussions and caused Norway and Denmark to move toward the Atlantic alliance.[128]

The Republic of Ireland was invited to join the discussions on membership. Dublin responded that it would join the negotiations as representatives of a united Republic of Ireland. While the Americans wanted the island state in the treaty within the context of "stepping stones" (as a base for antisubmarine warfare), Dublin's linkage of the partition issue was unacceptable. The US neither wanted to incorporate a problem of the nature of Ireland's partition into the treaty nor offend its key ally - the United Kingdom. According to Achilles, Washington's

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[128]. See Henderson 83-89.

response to Dublin was in effect: "It's been nice knowing you."[129]

The US and Britain also wanted Portugal as an original treaty member. The Azores and the position of the Iberian peninsula as a gateway to the Mediterranean placed a strong geostrategic priority on Portuguese membership. However, the authoritarian dictatorship of Antonia Salazar stood in direct contrast to the non-military foundations of the institution in the final decision. Strategic necessity won over principle in this first test of institutional principles. Salazar labeled the proposed preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty as "manifestly unfortunate." Nevertheless, he added: "Be that as it may, we feel bound by the obligations of the treaty and by its general aims - not (in any way) by a doctrinal affirmation pointing to the uniformity of political regimes, of whose virtues in our country we have learnt enough."[130]

Canada raised fundamental concerns about Portuguese membership. Lester Pearson told a British representative early in the negotiations: "If a pact were to be worked out which included declarations of belief in democracy, free institutions, etc., such as were included in the Brussels pact, it would be a little anomalous to have Portugal as an

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129. Achilles 28.

130. Albano Nogueira, "The Pull of the Containment: Portugal Opts for a European Role," in de Staercke 70.

original signatory."[131] In the US, Senator Forrest Donnell questioned whether Portugal was a democracy.[132] Senator Henry Cabot Lodge asked Achilles in a classified meeting how the US could square the "common heritage of freedom with the Portuguese tradition." To this Achilles responded that "although its government is not the same form of democracy as we have it, it is authoritarian, but it is not totalitarian...If it is a dictatorship, it is because the people freely voted for it."[133] Portugal's entry into NATO required some careful diplomatic maneuvering in selling a treaty based on shared principles.[134] It also set a precedent that when considering rules for membership, geostrategic needs would outweigh the stated principles of the institution.

Italy, Greece, and Turkey presented an additional problem for the negotiators. In April 1948 Italian voters had overwhelmingly rejected communism despite direct Soviet support for the Italian communists.[135] Nevertheless, there was a general concern among the negotiators that if Mediterranean states were admitted, they would diminish the

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131. Reid 198.

132. Dean Acheson, The Struggle for a Free Europe (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1971) 61.

133. Kaplan The United States and NATO, 110-112.

134. Because it shared the Iberian Peninsula with Spain, Salazar wanted Madrid invited to the treaty negotiations. The US had sought ways to bring Spain into the pact given the strategic importance of the peninsula. However, no European power was prepared to support Spanish membership so long as its dictator (who had also sided with Hitler) Francisco Franco ruled.

135. Western countries also tried to influence the election through overt and covert methods. The most important was a statement from Secretary of State George Marshall prior to the vote that Italy's application for Marshall Plan aid would be considered on the basis of whether or not the Communist Party was defeated in the elections.

"North Atlantic" character of the pact. Having secured Scandinavian participation, there was a legitimate concern that extending the scope of the treaty could harm the principle of mutual aid. Broadening the geographic scope of the institution raised a fundamental question of collective defense: Would Norway go to war to defend Mediterranean states (or vice-verse)? Moreover, could a treaty covering too large an area make effective decisions or lose its cohesion in a crisis? The negotiators in Washington agreed that Italy had an important role to play in Central Europe and should be invited to join the final treaty negotiations.[136] Greece and Turkey were not invited over concern that they would dilute the "North Atlantic" element of the pact and possibly force the consideration of inviting Iran to join the treaty as well. There was, however, a general understanding that the Truman Doctrine made Greece and Turkey part of the area covered by the treaty. Greece and Turkey would have been defended by the US whether or not they were part of NATO.

The North Atlantic Treaty

In his first public comments as the new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson said on 27 January 1949 that:

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[136]. Initially France opposed Italian participation as it had been disarmed after World War II and would not offer any tangible military contribution to western defense plans. However, their position changed in relation to Algeria which France wanted in the area covered by the treaty. Thus giving the institution a Mediterranean element via Italy might help its position vis-a-vis Algeria.

> We North Atlantic peoples share a common faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty...We believe that these principles and this common heritage can best be fortified and preserved and the general welfare of the people of the North Atlantic advanced by an arrangement for cooperation in matters affecting their peace and security and common interest.[137]

Shortly thereafter, key elements of the security pact between the US, Canada, and Western Europe were carefully leaked to the press. On 18 March 1949 the treaty was made public in advanced of signing ceremonies planned for early April. Publishing the treaty prior to its signing was a first in diplomatic history. The public presentation of the accord prompted the Belgian Prime Minister to call it - "diplomacy on the open market."[138] However, despite claims of transparency in international security cooperation, the accord was the result of over a year of highly secretive negotiations. The NATO Treaty was neither open market diplomacy nor, as Dean Acheson would call it, "an open covenant openly arrived at."[139]

The pact institutionalized a balance of power security arrangement and reflected a growing sense of a transatlantic community among those who crafted the institutional form. As Acheson said in a radio address to the nation on 18 March:

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137. "Text of Acheson Remarks," The New York Times, 27 January 1949, A4.

138. "Spaak Hails Publication of Treaty's Text as Victory for Diplomacy on Open Market," The New York Times, 19 March 1949, A3.

139. Acheson The Struggle, 49.

> It is important to keep in mind that the really successful national and international institutions are those that recognize and express underlying realities. The North Atlantic community of nations is such a reality. It is based on the affinity and natural identity of interests of the North Atlantic powers. The North Atlantic treaty which will formally unite them is the product of at least 350 years of history and perhaps more.[140]

Similar sentiments had been repeatedly stressed in public and classified statements throughout the negotiations over the treaty; they were the primary focus of the speeches given by the signators at the treaty signing ceremonies; and they were formally institutionalized in the legal language of the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed by representatives of the participating states on 4 April 1949.[141]

The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty committed the members to "faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments." The institution would be built by the members "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." The members agreed to "promote

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140. "Text of Mr. Acheson's Broadcast on Atlantic Accord," The New York Times, 19 March 1949, A4.

141. For formal interpretations of the treaty see "Minutes of the Ambassadors' Committee," 15 March 1949. FRUS, 1949, 4:222-223. Minutes of the Ambassadors' Committee, 15 March 1949; The Department of State White Paper on the North Atlantic Treaty: "The North Atlantic Pact: Collective Defense and the Preservation of Peace, Security and Freedom in the North Atlantic Community," U.S. Department of State Bulletin 20:507 (20 March 1949) 342-350; and "Signing Ceremony of the North Atlantic Treaty: Statements by the Foreign Ministers and President Truman," The Department of State Bulletin 20:511 (17 April 1949) 471-482.

stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area", through collective defence.[142]

Article 1 of the Treaty required that the members not use force in "any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Article 2 incorporated the Canadian design for general security stating that: "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being...They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them." Burdensharing was identified as a priority institutional goal through Article 3 which states that: "The Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." Should any member feel threatened by any state (including another member), Article 4 facilitates consultation within the institutional structure of the Alliance and Article 5 provides the security guarantee (under the right to individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of

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142. Text of the North Atlantic Treaty. Signed in Washington D.C., April 4, 1949. In Claude 491-494.

the UN Charter) that an "armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all..."

The treaty provided for formal organization to aid multinational security cooperation and consensus through a North Atlantic Council (Article 9) which would "set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary." Also, the treaty allowed for enlargement in a manner that furthers its principles and contributes to the security of the North Atlantic area (Article 10). The treaty affirms that member states are the key actors by insuring that the treaty "shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes" (Article 11).

Analysis

NATO's formative period reflects the competing themes of realism and institutionalism - both of which were incorporated into its original institutional form. The primary factor leading to the NATO alliance was the Soviet challenge in Eastern Europe. In that sense, realist assessments of NATO's formation are correct: NATO was an alliance created in response to a threat. As Charles Bohlen wrote in his memoirs: "...our participation in the North Atlantic Treaty arrangement was entirely due to Soviet policy and power...Had the Soviet Union not chosen to prevent the unification of Germany in 1947 and 1948, there

would have been no North Atlantic Treaty."[143] However, to explain primary causality is insufficient to understanding why the states chose the particular institutional form that emerged in April 1949. A variety of factors beyond the Soviet threat coalesced to shape the form that the NATO alliance would take in its early years.

First, the national representatives who negotiated the NATO treaty placed a high value on using the alliance to enhance the principles that they believed united their countries - peaceful international relations and democracy. The negotiators recognized that if a peacetime alliance was to withstand ebbs and flows of the Cold War, it would have to reflect a broader purpose than collective defense. Second, the negotiators had a concept of national security challenges that went beyond the Soviet threat. They saw states challenged by fragile economies, weak political systems, and the potential for internal Soviet influence or traditional nationalism spreading from within and threatening regional stability. Third, the US insisted on a specific institutional form that would prioritize burdensharing. Washington was wary to make certain that the European members would be more than security consumers - they had to contribute as well. Fourth, during the negotiations, a pattern of consultation and information exchange developed in which short-term compromises were made

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143. Bohlen 114.

in the interest of long-term security interests. This so-called "NATO spirit" of consultation and consensus was not only viewed as beneficial to the negotiations - it was institutionalized in the North Atlantic Council and its subsidiary organs.

Realist critiques of this institutional form were present during the negotiations. Later, realists would discount non-military tasks given to NATO as window dressing designed to sell a peacetime entangling alliance with Europe to the US Senate. Indeed, the 9 September 1948 Washington Paper recommended that if the treaty were placed within a UN context it could have positive propaganda results. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in particular, saw value in a limited acceptance of the Canadian proposals regarding a broader community as having value in attaining Senate approval of a treaty. In 1949, Acheson spoke of NATO in colorful language stressing its foundations in western civilization. However, in 1966 he wrote that:

> The plain fact, of course, is that NATO is a military alliance. Its purpose was and is to deter and, if necessary, to meet the use of Russian military power or the fear of its use in Europe. This purpose is pretty old-fashioned. Perhaps to avoid this stigma, Canadian draftsmen had Article 2 inserted into the treaty.[144]

Reflecting on NATO's founding, Henry Kissinger writes that: America would do anything for the Atlantic Alliance except call it an alliance...It would practice a historic policy of

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144. Dean Acheson, "Canada, 'Stern Daughter of the Voice of God'," in Livingston Merchant, ed., Neighbors Taken For Granted: Canada and the United States (New York: Praeger, 1966) 141.

coalition so long as its actions could be justified by the doctrine of collective security."[145]

These realist analysis stand in contrast to that of the widely recognized founder of contemporary realism, Hans J. Morganthau. In his Politics Among Nations, Morganthau wrote that: "In its comprehensive objectives and the techniques used to accomplish them, NATO indeed moves beyond the traditional alliance toward a novel type of functional organization."[146] Realist criticism of NATO's non-alliance functions implies that statesmen such as Bevin, St. Laurent, Pearson, Lovett, Marshall, Acheson, and Truman advocated institutional principles to intentionally misinform public opinion. However, similar sentiments were pervasive in the classified discussion during the treaty negotiations and the records show that the participants placed a high value on the principles on which the institution would be founded. Realism was not rejected in creating the institutional form. Realism was transformed into an understanding that a particular institutional form would shield this peacetime alliance because it was founded upon a broader concept of security challenges than the Soviet threat alone.

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145. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1994) 460.
146. Morganthau 530.

Tasks

There were four tasks that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was intended to perform at its founding. The first, and primary function, was to promote collective defense by signalling to the Soviet Union the collective will of the member states to come to each other's aid in the event of an attack. The second was to promote reassurance among the West European countries so that they could pursue their own self-help objectives free from internal instability. The third was to strengthen and expand an international community based on democratic principles, individual liberty and the rule of law in the context of a peaceful international society. The fourth was to build institutional structures to aid the completion of these goals.

Organizational Capabilities

The organizational capabilities present at NATO's founding were minimal. The institutional form was premised on state-dominance and avoidance of hierarchy. NATO was never conceived of as having institutional autonomy in peacetime. Even in the event of an attack on a member, Article 5 only committed states to respond: "individually and in concert with the other Parties, such actions as it deems necessary...." It would be incumbent upon the member states to implement the security guarantee and the response would not necessarily be automatic. In its earliest days,

NATO had no standing organization and relied on the underdeveloped Western Union for military planning. A North Atlantic Council was created to lower the transaction costs of international cooperation and it was tasked to establish a Defense Committee responsible for making recommendations on meeting the needs of collective defense. Early NATO meetings initially consisted only of the foreign ministers of the member states meeting on an ad-hoc basis with no standing procedures or structures to facilitate or implement institutional objectives.

Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures

Principles and norms were defined in the treaty negotiations and were enshrined in the preamble and the treaty language. Specific rules and procedures were narrow and left for further development. Yet it was also clear that collective defense needs outweighed principle in the decision to include Portugal as a founding member. Procedurally, Article 4 promoted formal consultation in the event that a member felt threatened from any source. The Treaty also established procedures for national adherence to constitutional procedures of each member. The institution was restricted in its membership rules. Becoming a new member would require a contribution to the principles of the treaty and to the security of the North Atlantic area.

Capacity for Change

The founders of NATO intended that the institution have the capacity for change. The decision to endow this traditional alliance with institutional characteristics was in part to aid the process of adaptation. For example, the North Atlantic Council was empowered to set up subsidiary bodies as might be necessary; the institution could enlarge under restricted circumstances; the treaty was open to review by the members after a ten year period; and after twenty years in force, any party could leave one year after a notice of denunciation had been given. The decision on how to advance variations in institutional form was reserved for the member states.

Conclusion: Getting from Here to Where?

During the intensive information exchange in the treaty negotiations, a sophisticated understanding of the complex security challenge was attained which affected the institutional form of NATO. By institutionalizing a US security commitment, Europe attained a period of reassurance in which military assistance could flow to them and in which Marshall Plan aid could stabilize their economies. The information exchange created a better understanding of national security concerns and the participants learned to work together, and make concessions when necessary, toward common objectives in a multilateral framework. However, at its founding, NATO held considerable potential as a false

promise of security for, in fact, little actually changed immediately following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is for that reason that the song selection played at the treaty signing ceremonies was ironic - "It Ain't Necessarily So" and "A Whole Lot of Nothin'" from the musical Porgy & Bess.[147]

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147. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969) 284.

CHAPTER IV

NATO DURING THE COLD WAR: THE PRIMACY OF ALLIANCE

Introduction and Overview

Chapter Four surveys variations in NATO's institutional form during the Cold War. It assesses the extent to which NATO performed its tasks of promoting collective defense, burdensharing, restricted enlargement, and creating institutional structures to facilitate these goals. As an independent actor, NATO performed poorly in all four areas despite considerable institutional adaptation. This chapter confirms the realist proposition that, as it evolved during the Cold War, NATO was primarily a US-led alliance and its formal institutions were, at best, intervening variables aiding collective defense.

NATO and Collective Defense

At its founding, NATO was an institutional shell promoting reassurance for Western Europe via a general US security guarantee. In September 1949, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was identified as the principal authority of the Alliance. The NAC would meet at the request of any of its members and periodically as the situation required. Soon a pattern emerged of the NAC meeting in formal ministerial session biannually and in weekly meetings at the ambassadorial level at NATO Headquarters established outside

Paris, France.[148] The NAC established a Defense Committee consisting of Defense Ministers responsible for defense planning. A Military Committee was created to meet at the Chiefs-of-Staff level to advise the NAC on military issues. A Defense Financial and Economic Committee and a Military Production and Supply board soon followed.

Missing from this security institution was a military capability. As US Secretary of State Dean Acheson asserted, NATO was conceived as a "pre-integration organization, aimed to produce general plans for uncoordinated and separate action in the hope that in the event of trouble a plan and forces to meet it would exist and would be adopted by a sort of spontaneous combustion."[149] NATO had no integrated forces, no defense plan, and no real means to mobilize against a Soviet attack. However, dramatic global events rapidly prompted a major adaptation of NATO's institutional form. The Soviet attainment of nuclear weapons, the victory of communists on mainland China, and the war in Korea globalized the Cold War and had a major impact on NATO as it was transformed into a highly formal standing military alliance.[150]

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148. Relocated to Brussels, Belgium in 1967. Each NATO ambassador would have a Deputy Chief of Mission, or secondary representative, to do the primary senior level preparatory work for the ambassadors. National delegations were given offices near the NAC and the Private Office of the Secretary General to facilitate communication between representatives. National delegations varied in size proportionate to the country and their relative influence within NATO.

149. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969).

150. See Walter LaFeber, "NATO and the Korean War: A Context," in Lawrence S. Kaplan, ed., American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991)

In Europe, the divide between East and West had become startlingly unbalanced in the early 1950s with 12 NATO divisions and under 1000 combat aircraft to defend against an estimated 210 Soviet divisions accompanied by over 6000 aircraft. President Truman thus asked Congress for $15 billion dollars of military assistance for Western Europe. This included a planned increase of US troops stationed in Europe from 145,000 to 346,000 by 1952. NATO was given a formal military command structure to be headed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The first SACEUR was the popular American general Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Eisenhower inherited a military command with no military structure.[151] NATO planning was based on limited chiefs of staff cooperation that had begun in the Western Union and on regional national commands. In 1952 the NATO ministers met in Lisbon and agreed to establish a US-dominated military structure and to a force structure including 25-30 divisions stationed in Central Europe - primarily in western Germany. Development of such an ambitious force goal would require multilateral consultation to avoid duplication in defense planning. As Eisenhower commented on early NATO planning: "...devising an organization that satisfies the nationalist aspirations of

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33-51 and Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1971 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1972) 95-145.

151. US defense plans had assumed an evacuation strategy in the event of an attack while holding a line at the Pyrenees. "Text of Strategic Plan." FRUS, 1949, 4:353-356.

twelve different countries or the personal ambitions of affected individuals is a very laborious and irksome business."[152] The NATO members thus created an international political and military bureaucracy to aid the process of multilateral defense planning. NATO was given a political organization to be headed by a Secretary General in charge of an international secretariat staffed by representatives from the member states. The Secretary General was to speak for and prepare matters for the NAC, and implement NAC decisions with the help of the international secretariat.[153]

Political Consultation

Absent an international government, consultation became the primary decision-making procedure in NATO. The "habit of consultation", as President Eisenhower described it in 1958, did not come easily.[154] The demand for increased consultation among NATO members arose from the need to prevent conflicts occurring outside of the NATO area involving its members from decreasing alliance cohesion.[155]

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152. Gregory Pedlow, "The Politics of NATO Command," in Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, eds., U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993) 18.

153. See Robert S. Jordan, The NATO International Staff/Secretariat, 1952-1957 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) and Robert S. Jordan, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multilateral Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).

154. "Text of Letter from President Eisenhower to General de Gaulle," October 20, 1958. In Senator Henry M. Jackson, ed., The Atlantic Alliance: Jackson Subcommittee Hearings and Findings (New York: Praeger, 1967) 285-286.

155. Several events accelerated this demand for consultation. In 1954 the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the departure of France from Indochina strained relations between Paris and Washington as the US was quick to fill the strategic void left by the French. Both French and British relations with the US were strained during the Suez crisis of 1956. Additionally, the inability to coordinate a

In 1956 the "Committee on Non-Military Cooperation" was established by the NAC to be headed by the foreign ministers from Italy, Norway, and Canada - commonly referred to as the "Three Wise Men".[156] They completed a report which concluded that:

> Consultation within an alliance means more than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions...It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.[157]

In accepting the report, the NAC empowered the Secretary General to take a lead role in settling crisis among the allies by using his good offices. If the parties consented, the Secretary General could initiate or facilitate procedures of inquiry, mediation, conciliation or arbitration. In addition to the increased scope of activity for the Secretary General, NATO further enhanced its organizational structures and consultation was increased at all levels of the organization.[158]

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unified political response to the Soviet repression of Hungarian reform movements in 1956 made NATO appear ineffective and irrelevant in a time of crisis. The process of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union and the potential for an East-West detente also placed pressure on NATO to consult on an effective response or risk losing relevance as external events out-paced its ability to adapt.

156. The committee included Gaetano Martino, Halvard Lange, and Lester Pearson respectively.

157. Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO. NATO Information Service, December 1956.

158. Harlan Cleveland, who served as US Ambassador to NATO in the mid-1960s has noted that consultation in NATO took a variety of forms including: imparting information unilaterally;

Despite this expanded institutional activity, many problems emerged in the institutionalized consultative procedures.[159] First, the sharing of information, even among the strongest of allies, on sensitive issues of national security policy is something that states are hesitant to undertake. Second, members tend to utilize consultative mechanisms solely to enhance their interests - not necessarily those of the institution. Third, excessive consultative mechanisms can prove time consuming therefore a state is likely to circumvent the institution if a situation requires quick decisions. Fourth, national bureaucracies can frustrate, delay, or even block collective action due to their own decision-making procedures. Fifth, the flow of information can highlight differences among allies and

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exchanging information bilaterally or multilaterally; notifying others of national decisions already taken, but without expecting any reaction on their part; notifying others of decisions already taken, in such a way as to build consent for them; consulting in advance on national actions that affect the interests of others; consulting internationally to ascertain in advance the possible reaction to a national decision not yet made (that is, as an input to the national decision itself); consulting in advance on a matter lending itself to separate parallel national actions by others; or consulting for the purpose of arriving at a decision by which its nature must be taken or carried into action collectively. Harlan Cleveland, The Transatlantic Bargain (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) 19. As another study by a former NATO official, Roger Hill, has shown, the institutional network gave rise to a heavy flow of activity, including information exchange, advice-giving, decision-making, communications to capitals, formal meetings, informal gatherings, distribution of documents, translations visits back and forth, report writing, and collective drafting. The headquarters machine, bureaucracies in capitals, and other parts of the network continuously process the tide of inflowing requests, initiatives, draft documents, and memoranda. Roger Hill, Political Consultation in NATO (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1978) 74.

159. The following overview of NATO's political and military processes is based on information available from NATO including NATO: Facts About the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures, and the NATO Handbook published by the NATO Press Service in Brussels. That information is supplemented by personal discussions with NATO and member state officials and via direct observation of NATO activity.

possibly contribute to a public crisis of cohesion and lower the deterrent value of the alliance.

Most importantly, NATO's formal political structures were not designed to have an independent affect on state behavior. The decision-making heads of state met rarely and then only to endorse previously debated and approved documents. Foreign, defense, and military staff leaders would generally meet twice a year. Lower level NATO committees, chaired by representatives of the International Secretariat (to ensure continuity of committee mandates and provide a neutral voice) was where the everyday institutional activity occurred.[160] Committees were often instructed by the NAC or other organs to conduct particular tasks such as short and long-term studies (eg. of Soviet threat assessments or Warsaw Pact capabilities). If, in committee work, an impasse would arise which could not be resolved via consensus, the dispute would be referred to the NAC or to the member states for instructions. After completion of their work, committees might forward their recommendations to the NAC for action. This advise would then be reviewed by member state governments and a final decision taken by national ambassadors in the NAC acting on instructions from their home governments. NATO's committee activity did contribute to collective defense by aiding the

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[160]. As one study has shown by the end of the Cold War, formal and ad-hoc NATO structures totaled over 400. Dan Smith, Pressure: How America Runs NATO (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd., 1989) 10.

flow of information and expertise - but not by making independent decisions.

Despite these obstacles, the NATO members saw benefit from institutional consultation. Larger states gained from consultation by attaining a better knowledge in advance of other members' national security perspectives so as to avoid confrontation when gaining support for a policy. Alternatively, bargaining or coercive strategies could be more readily developed by the larger states in the attempt to bring others toward a particular position. Smaller members also gained as the institutional structures facilitated efforts to organize coalitions to influence the larger states with more leverage than when acting alone. Additionally, because each member of the NAC had a veto over formal NATO activity, maintaining alliance cohesion often required considerable time and effort when bargaining with a state for its support in the NAC - thus a small state could exact concessions from a larger member via the consultative process.

In this environment, the most effective form of consultation that developed in NATO was informal. "Hallway negotiations" among national representatives were often the best way to get an understanding of the reasoning behind another member's formal positions or toward building consensus on a particular initiative. However, the very nature of such negotiations - private and confidential - makes it difficult to demonstrate specific linkage to an

increase in national security.[161] One indication that states saw benefit in this form of consultation was the emergence in the early 1960s of a lunch among the NAC ambassadors where no subject was barred. The lunch occurs prior to the weekly NAC ambassadors meeting so that the participants have a better sense of what to expect in the NAC. The meetings were institutionalized but remained informal and off-the-record. Each member state hosts the lunch on an alphabetical rotation giving Iceland or Luxembourg as much opportunity to shape the agenda as France or the US. The Secretary General was invited to participate as an equal voice among the member states at the table. Participants give personal views of international events occurring in or out of NATO. The ambassadors are free to challenge or debate their own national instructions - possibly leading to a request for a change of instruction if it would facilitate consensus.[162] Nevertheless, consensus among NATO ambassadors did not guarantee that anything substantive would result in the NAC. In their formal activity, representatives still had to act according to their national instructions.

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161. The same can be said of semi-official discussions between member states held in the Private Office of the Secretary General. Such meetings are conducted primarily absent staff and are held in strict confidentiality.

162. Jordan 127, 184.

Defense Planning

NATO's military organization was based on integrated regional command headquarters under the command of SACEUR based at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) who, by tradition, was always a senior American general.[163] The standing NATO commands were assigned personnel by member states and organized as an integrated military staff. Three kinds of forces were made available for military planning in NATO: forces assigned to NATO and which are either under the operational control or command of SACEUR or which would come under SACEUR's operational control or command during periods of emergency; those nations which have agreed to assign forces to the operational command or operational control of a NATO commander at some future date; and forces under national command such as land, sea, and air forces not specifically assigned to or earmarked for a NATO command but which might be placed under the operational command, control, or cooperation with a NATO command under certain circumstances. Effective collective defense required that national military planning take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. NATO was thus tasked to lower the transaction costs of collective defense planning by overcoming

[163]. Also by tradition the NATO Secretary General is a European. Since 1966, SHAPE has been located outside of Mons, Belgium.

disparities between collective defense needs and national military planning.

This process was completed through a defense planning cycle conducted by NATO.[164] The process was initiated with "Ministerial Guidance" as approved by Defense Ministers. Once guidance was given to the NATO staff, military planners developed force goals to be met by the member states. Then a follow up was carried out to review national actions during the current year and adapt lessons learned into the next cycle of defense planning. Transparency was enhanced via an annual exchange of information on national military planning. Additionally, NATO conducted command post and live action exercises to better refine the planning process and expose national militaries to the technical requirements of collective defense. This annual defense review would then be incorporated into a common NATO Force Plan which came to provide the basis for NATO defense planning over a five year period.

If collective defense planning were to succeed in an efficient manner, NATO would have to promote the national adoption of common standards to assure interoperability of forces and equipment and to promote efficiency in multinational military planning and effectiveness in

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164. This cycle was initially conducted as an annual review begun in 1951, which evolved into a triennial review in the 1960s and a two year review by the 1980s.

multilateral military operations.[165] NATO made numerous attempts to promote standardization including independently aiding in the development of common military equipment via the NATO Basic Military Requirement (NBMR) procedure beginning in the late 1950s. However, the NBMR could not overcome national perspectives on defense requirements and was abandoned in 1966.[166] Subsequent efforts, including statements endorsing standardization in formal NATO communiques, proved equally ineffective. By the 1980s NATO efforts were limited to promoting "interoperability" of equipment.[167] Member states would endorse standardization but in practice they supported it to the extent that their own national model was to be the standard for common NATO purchases.[168] The inability of NATO to affect the collective defense requirement of standardization demonstrated the weakness of NATO's institutional functions and the primacy of its member states. As one observer concludes of NATO's standardization efforts: "The biggest impediment stemmed

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165. Standardization goals in NATO included equipment, components and parts for systems, maintenance and training systems in a way that assures the most economical and effective use of the research, development, production and logistical resources of member states. "Allied Interdependence: Trade and Cooperation in Military Equipment," Transatlantic Policy Panel Report, CSIS Special Report 16, (May 1977) 7.

166. Robert R. James, Standardization and Common Production of Weapons in NATO (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967) 1-11.

167. Interoperability is the degree of compatibility between national military equipment. Though not based on one standard, the goal was that national planning would promote systems that could be integrated into a NATO command on an effective basis.

168. For example, in the cases where NATO did attain some standardization of equipment (the M-44 torpedo, the F-104F fighter, and several missile systems), it was on the American model - attained only after hard leverage was exerted by the US and its related defense industries. See General E. Vandervater Jr., Coordinated Weapons Production in NATO: A Study of Alliance Process (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1967).

from the need for unanimity at each individual decision level; centralized control proved to be impossible because the (members) jealously guarded their independence."[169]

The identification of areas for infrastructure development - fixed military installations for the deployment and operation of integrated armed forces in the event of war - was another major task for NATO defense planning.[170] Infrastructure facilities could also provide early warning and enhance information available to decision-makers.[171] NATO was granted authority to identify infrastructure needs and for aiding the flow of budgetary resources for infrastructure activities. The NATO member states would then jointly contribute to a common NATO infrastructure fund. Impetus remained with host countries (those which would host infrastructure) and user nations (those who would contribute forces to the program). NATO civilian and military committees played an important advisory role in the process, but initiative and

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169. James R. Carlton, "NATO Standardization: An Organizational Analysis", in Lawrence S. Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson, eds., NATO After Thirty Years (Wilmington, DL: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981) 211.

170. NATO infrastructure needs included sites such as airfields, signals and telecommunications installations, military headquarters, fuel pipelines and storage, radar warning and navigational aid stations, port installations, and missile installations.

171. For example, the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) was established as a linked system of standing sites ranging from Norway to Turkey equipped with radar and communications systems designed to alert NATO military authorities of an incoming air attack. This early warning capacity was adapted further in the 1980s with the acquisition of a NATO commanded fleet of E-3A Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) which serve as mobile information gathering systems and control centers. At NATO headquarters crisis management was aided by the NATO Situation Center which was linked to the major NATO commands and infrastructure warning systems as well as to the member state capitals with the highest available quality equipment.

implementation remained with the member states. Pressure for infrastructure expansion grew from smaller states who saw it as a means of enhancing their security and as having spill-over economic benefits. However, once implemented and running NATO could not justify or originate program expansion as it had no independent control over funding. The primary criteria for national contributions to the common infrastructure program was state-based and did not result in substantial financial resources.[172] Moreover, NATO did not administrate the distribution of infrastructure funds. The members would enter into mutual financial commitments and pay each other the requested amounts on request as needed. NATO's primary administrative role was to keep account of such transactions. The responsibility for actual administration lay in the Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee composed of member state delegations operating under national instructions.

Toward Integration or Disintegration?

While NATO had the appearance of accelerating institutional integration based on its increased consultative and defense planning characteristics by the

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172. The criteria for establishing national contributions was decided by NATO authorities and included: 1) the contributing capacity of the member countries; 2) the advantage accruing to the use country; and 3) the economic benefit for the host country. Though it was central to NATO military planning, the infrastructure program on average totalled less than .3 percent of total combined NATO national defense spending. See James A. Huston, One For All: NATO Strategy and Logistics through the Formative Period, 1949-1969 (Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 1984) 157-183.

1960s, the trend in the institution was actually toward disintegration.[173] The successful Soviet launch of the Sputnik rocket in 1957 meant that Moscow now had the capacity to reach US territory with intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, in which the Soviet Union deployed intermediate range missiles 90 miles off the US coast, had given the world a glimpse of a superpower standoff bordering on intercontinental nuclear war. Ongoing crisis in Berlin leading to the construction of the Berlin Wall heightened tensions between the US and the Soviet Union in Europe. This new strategic environment tested the credibility of NATO's collective defense function and contributed to France's withdrawal from the integrated military command in 1966.

Initially, the ultimate deterrent value behind NATO was the principle of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) which threatened massive retaliation with US nuclear forces in the event of a Soviet attack. By the late 1950s MAD was undermined by a fundamental challenge to the principle of collective defense - would the US risk its own territory for that of its NATO allies once the Soviet Union could threaten American soil? So long as the US maintained control over nuclear decisions in the Alliance, reassurance had decreasing value for some European members. With growing

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173. See Francis A. Beer, Integration and Disintegration in NATO: Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects for Atlantic Community (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 1969).

nuclear parity emerging between the US and the Soviet Union, the concept of MAD actually increased the potential for a lower level conventional attack in Europe should the Soviet Union wish to test US resolve to defend Western Europe. As Roger Hilsman, a senior State Department official, wrote in 1959: "In the face of this new strategic situation, Europeans have begun to translate E=MC2 into local terms."[174]

To reassure the European allies, and prevent a conventional war in Europe from escalating into a major global nuclear exchange, the US backed a plan (conceived by SACEUR General Laris Norstad) for a Multi-Lateral Force (MLF) which would have made NATO a fourth nuclear power. The US would not put all of its nuclear forces under a NATO command but would grant NATO a role in the decision to use nuclear weapons. The primary hope of the MLF was to reassure France (in particular) about the quality of the security guarantee it received in NATO and thereby convince Paris not to develop an independent nuclear force. However, to President de Gaulle, the MLF was an insincere effort to enhance European reassurance that strengthened NATO integration and which increased the US role in Europe and thereby constrained independent French action.

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[174]. Roger Hilsman, "On NATO Strategy," in Wolfers 152. For further discussion of nuclear issues see Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957); Pierre M. Gallois, "U.S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe," Orbis 8:2 (Summer 1963) 226-249; Hedley Bull, "Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance: A Critique of United States Doctrine," Policy Memorandum No. 29 (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, 1964); Kugler 141-190; Weber Multilateralism in NATO 48-80; and Duffield Power Rules, 151-232.

De Gaulle's concerns were heightened when, after first promoting the MLF, the Kennedy Administration decided that crisis decision-making required maximum US control over nuclear forces and that multiple decision-making centers could cloud the capacity to respond quickly. As an alternative, the US advanced a policy of "flexible response" in which NATO would respond step-by-step to a crisis by continually assessing the degree to which escalation might be necessary. Reassurance to the European members of NATO was offered via the creation of a ministerial level (ministers of defense) Defense Planning Committee (DPC) with primary responsibility for military affairs (replacing the Defense Committee) and a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) to increase smaller NATO members' involvement in the development of nuclear policy.

None of these institutional efforts satisfied General de Gaulle who increasingly worried about the US commitment to its security. For several years, the US used NATO planning structures to sooth French worries, but strategic concerns and national pride were driving France away from NATO. To the extent that France was participating in NATO, it was as an obstacle to NATO planning. In 1966, France informed its allies that it would withdraw from the NATO integrated military command and that all NATO installations should be removed from French territory. De Gaulle was careful to distinguish between NATO as an organization and the "Western Alliance" of which France still considered

itself a part of. Moreover, France did not completely withdraw from NATO's political structures thereby confirming the proposition that states found value in non-military participation in NATO institutions. By continuing its political role, France could continue to raise concerns about, and even block, NATO policy.[175]

Little changed with the French withdrawal - the structure of the international system remained intact and NATO cohesion was actually enhanced as the remaining allies were able to proceed with decisions that had been held up by France. France also maintained its role in areas where it felt that NATO increased its security - such as in the NADGE early warning system of which France continued to pay about 12 percent of the costs. Realizing that little had actually changed with the withdraw of France, the US was not especially critical. The US remained committed to West European security and the primary means to reassuring security in Europe remained forward defense in Germany. That policy was revised to account for nuclear planning via flexible response, but it was unaffected by the absence of France. Paris and Bonn negotiated a new status of forces accord allowing France to maintain its forces in West

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175. De Gaulle's actions were not universally welcomed in France. For example, in the national assembly, former Premier Rene Pleven launched a strong attack on the unilateral nature of the decision and the fact that France appeared to be weakening NATO without any concessions from - or weakening of - the Warsaw Pact. Mr. L. Radoux (Rapporteur), France and NATO (Paris: Western European Union, 1967) 65-78.

Germany outside of the NATO command structure and thus the balance of power remained unchanged.

The dramatic external and internal changes which created crisis in NATO in the 1960s produced a reassessment of NATO's institutional tasks. The Harmel Report of 1967, as accepted by the NAC, broadened NATO's scope to include coordinating a multilateral detente strategy toward the Soviet Union.[176] The report concluded that:

> Military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complimentary. Collective defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interests of detente.[177]

The report recommended that NATO coordinate a multilateral approach to bridging gaps between East and West; commit the major powers to full consultation with NATO allies on German reunification; overcome the division of Germany and foster European security; and coordinate and consult on arms control and mutual and balanced force reductions between East and West.[178] Despite this continued adaptation, NATO

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176. Named after the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel who proposed, and led, the study.

177. "The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)." December 1967. NATO Office of Information and Press.

178. Future Tasks. The proposal for Mutual and Balanced Forced Reductions (MBFR) signaled acceptance of a Warsaw Pact offer for negotiations the year before. NATO's formal activities were expanded via the creation of a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS). The committee was chartered to improve: "...the exchange of views and experience among the allied countries...with the deliberate objective of stimulating actions on problems of the human environment by member governments. Mandate of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society 17 November 1969, NATO Press Service. For full discussion of the role of the CCMS see Edwina Campbell, Consultation and Consensus in NATO: Implementing the Canadian Article (New York: University Press of America, 1985).

increasingly appeared to be an alliance that had outlived its usefulness and was struggling to find new missions.

In a comprehensive overview of NATO's consultative functions written in 1969, Robert Hunter noted that NATO's institutions have "...been unable, perhaps inevitably, to affect seriously the complicated process of diplomatic bargaining that have been the life-blood of the Alliance and the relations conducted among fifteen nations within that context."[179] Indeed, a short list of major challenges to international security during the Cold War shows that NATO had little if any direct role. During the Suez, Cuban, and Vietnam crises, the views of European allies were largely ignored by the US. Major decisions related to Berlin and Germany were taken by the US, Britain, and France, outside of the consultative framework of NATO. The US and its allies were in disarray by the mid-1970s over disputes related to the Middle East. In the 1980s, Britain ignored its allies concerns over its war in the Falkland Islands and the US launched air attacks on Libya over the objections of all of its allies except Britain.[180] By the 1980s, the Soviet deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles targeted at Western Europe, the Soviet invasion of

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179. Robert Hunter, Security in Europe (London: Eleks Books, 1969) 54. For a similar analysis, see Morton A. Kaplan, "NATO in the International System of the 1970s," Orbis 8:1 (Spring 1969) 28.

180. See Douglas Stuart and William Tow, The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems since 1949 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Beer; and Chernoff for detailed discussion of NATO's role, or lack of role, in these and other Cold War crises.

Afghanistan, and the violent repression of the Solidarity reform movement in Poland renewed the American commitment to a global Cold War strategy with NATO its centerpiece. However, the same kinds of problems that the institution failed to ameliorate before returned to divide NATO in this new phase of Cold War tension. In particular, differences between the US and Western Europe over the perceived danger of the Soviet threat prompted increased resentment in the Washington DC over the failure of Europe to share in the burdens of collective defense.[181] US Senator Ted Stevens symbolized a growing frustration in the US commenting that: "If they (the Europeans) feel so secure in their relationship with the Russians, then I think it is time for us to re-examine the number of troops we have in Europe."[182]

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181. For example, the Afghan invasion signaled what the Americans viewed as a threat to US and European access to Persian Gulf oil. The US hoped to get European commitments to offset any reallocation of American resources from the Continent to the Gulf theater of operations while establishing a US-led Rapid Deployment Force for the region. However, the Europeans did not share this assessment and indeed rejected American opposition to a planned sale of gas pipeline materials to the Soviet Union.

182. Simon Lunn, Burdensharing in NATO (London: Royal Institution of International Affairs, 1983) 49. Editorials published in major US newspapers in late 1981 took an even harder line questioning the US commitment to West European security. As an editorial in The Chicago Tribune opined: "The heirs of Talleyrand, Bismarck and Disraeli (and of Petain, Hitler and Chamberlain) tell us that we don't know how to deal intelligently with the Soviet colossus. We are hamhanded, they say, unsubtle, and simpleminded...But look at the record. These paragons of diplomacy managed twice in this century to get Europe in such an unholy mess that the U.S. was called upon to rescue it at a vast cost in wealth and blood." Quoted in Simon Serfaty, "Atlantic Fantasies," in Robert W. Tucker and Linda Wrigley, eds., The Atlantic Alliance and its Critics (New York: Praeger, 1983) 122.

Burdensharing in NATO

NATO institutions did not perform well in the task of promoting burdensharing. In fact, the primacy of alliance contributed to a political economy of West European security dependence on the US and NATO. This contradiction constrained Europe's capacity to act on its own and became a constant irritant for many American members of Congress who felt that the Europeans were "free-riding" on the US which spent disproportionate amounts of its Gross National Product (GNP) securing Western Europe.[183] The lack of burdensharing in NATO became ingrained in the political economy of West European integration. Empirical evidence for disproportionate cost sharing in NATO is demonstrated by comparing relative defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP among major Alliance members:[184]

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183. Free-riding is a public choice dilemma for collective action. During the Cold War, the collective defense became a public good - a benefit which, once provided, is utilized by all recipients whether they contribute to the costs of service provision or not. If one nation has a greater demand for a public good than others, it will place a higher valuation on its provision. Ultimately, that state provides a disproportionate level of the collective good as the smaller members of an alliance tend to supply only suboptimal amounts. Moreover, a small country which views defense costs as a burden could withdraw from (or not contribute to) the military obligations of an alliance knowing that the larger power and its remaining allies would still come to its defense if attacked. See Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," The Review of Economics and Statistics 47:3 (August 1966) 266-279 and Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). For a mathematical application of the Olson and Zechauser study see Gavin Kennedy, Burden Sharing in NATO (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979) 18-21.

184. The figures on European and American defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP are compiled from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: Brassey's, 1960-1993). These dates reflect various stages of shifts in the Cold War including the impact of the Korean War (1953), limited detente (1958), Vietnam and the French withdrawal from NATO (1965 and 1970), 1970s detente (1980), the new Cold War and the Reagan years (1985) and the impact of Soviet reform under Mikhail Gorbachev (1991). There is dispute over the best way to measure burdensharing including the military plans that are set out

Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross National Product among Major NATO Members During the Cold War

Country	1953	1958	1965	1970	1980	1985	1991
United States	14.7	11.1	8.0	7.8	5.5	6.5	5.1
Federal Republic of Germany	4.9	3.8	4.4	3.3	3.2	3.2	1.9
France	11.0	8.0	5.6	4.0	3.9	4.0	2.8
United Kingdom	11.3	7.8	6.0	4.9	5.1	5.2	4.2

As the major power in the Alliance, the US maintained a larger percentage of the defense burden in NATO.[185] Other major NATO powers did maintain a relatively high level of peacetime defense spending.[186] However, over time, European contributions averaged just above or below 3.0 percent.

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by NATO members, the ability of a country to contribute to those plans, and a variety of economic factors including relative growth in defense spending over time. The relevant figures prompting political disputes over NATO burdensharing were drawn from comparisons of the percentage of GNP allocated to national defense. See James R. Golden, The Dynamics of Change in NATO: A Burden-Sharing Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1983) 24-54 and Simon Duke, The Burdensharing Debate: A Reassessment (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) 124-150.

[185] Adjusting for non-NATO national defense outlays is difficult as the US and its allies had numerous military commitments and related costs. This is especially true for the US which saw its defense spending rise considerably during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Nevertheless, Leonard Sullivan Jr. and Jack A. LeCuyer show that the US, with 48 percent of the aggregated NATO Gross Domestic Product (GDP), provided 66 percent of NATO defense costs when Vietnam is excluded. Sullivan and LeCuyer maintain that for equity to have been attained the US would have spent $1.1 trillion less between 1961 and 1988 on defense. Leonard Sullivan Jr. and Jack A. LeCuyer, Comprehensive Security and Western Prosperity (Washington D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1988) 48. Also see Melvin Krauss, ed., How NATO Weakens the West (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986) 32-33 and David P. Calleo, "Inflation and American Power," Foreign Affairs 59:4 (Spring 1981) 781-812.

[186] The different levels of percentage of GNP allocated for defense among the major NATO members can be explained by a number of factors. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany maintained a large standing army as the front-line state in Europe. However, the internal and external constraints on West Germany assuming any role outside its own territory kept West German defense expenditures low. France maintained a relatively high share of the defense burden because of its perception that the American commitment to France's security could not always be counted on. Nevertheless, France's defense expenditure actually fell after its withdrawal from the NATO integrated military command - suggesting that France's self-help goals were also motivated by soft security gains.

American gains in political influence in NATO were somewhat offset by opportunity costs in soft security - where Europe made gains under the US security guarantee. Differences among the main NATO countries in terms of government expenditures for social security programs as a percentage of GNP were very disparate during the Cold War.[187]

Government Expenditures on Social Security Programs as a Percentage of GNP Among Selected NATO Countries

Country	1957	1960	1963	1966	1971	1977
Canada	6.5	8.7	9.4	9.0	14.8	14.6
United States	5.0	6.29	6.8	7.7	11.1	13.7
Federal Republic of Germany	16.6	16.2	16.9	18.4	18.8	26.5
United Kingdom	10.0	11.0	11.1	12.3	13.5	17.1
United States	14.3	13.7	15.4	16.6	N/A	26.5

European government investment into human and industrial resources through welfare states was part of a strategic effort to provide an alternative economic model to Soviet communism. Yet as the European welfare states grew, so did domestic bureaucracies resistant to reallocating resources that might have reassured the US that European promises to share the costs of European security were sincere. Even if there had been a desire to contribute more to the costs of collective defense, the political economy of NATO and European integration made this an unlikely policy option in

[187] David Calleo, The Imperious Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982) 96. These figures include old age, survivors and incapacitated, public health insurance, workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance, family allowances, public employee programs, and public assistance. Also see David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1987); Krauss 28 and 138; and Catherine M. Kelleher, "Enduring Interests and Negotiable Bargains," in Stanley R. Sloan, ed., NATO in the 1990s (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989) 93-95.

Europe.[188] Forced to choose between continued free-riding on the US versus raising taxes, reducing popular welfare-state spending, or increasing budget deficits, European politicians were left with an easy decision - though often publicly berating NATO and the US, they continued to support the Alliance.

The European Pillar of NATO

One day after signing the NATO Treaty the Brussels Pact countries submitted a formal request to the US for military and financial aid.[189] This request fueled congressional concern that the US was expected to underwrite the economic and military recovery of Western Europe.[190] Therefore, at the outset, pressure was placed on the US to establish its forward defense plans in Europe on a basis of burdensharing - initially focusing on German rearmament. As President Truman wrote in his memoirs:

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188. See Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); Leon N. Lindberg and Charles S. Maier, eds., The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985) 213; Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State? (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991); and Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act," in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991) 73.

189. "Requests from the Brussels Treaty Powers to the U.S. Government for Military Assistance", 5 April 1949. FRUS, 1949, 4:285-287.

190. George Kennan worked against large scale military aid to Europe arguing that the militarization of NATO would hinder efforts toward a political settlement with the Soviet Union. Senator Vandenburg felt that it was inappropriate to over-emphasize the military aspects of NATO as the Senate was about to debate its ratification. A compromise was reached to postpone congressional debate on military assistance until after the Treaty was approved. See Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951 (Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, 1980).

> Without Germany, the defense of Europe was a rearguard action on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. With Germany there could be a defense in depth, powerful enough to offer effective resistance to aggression from the East...Any map will show it, and a little arithmetic will prove what the addition of German manpower means to the strength of the joint defense of Europe.[191]

Moreover, as Lawrence S. Kaplan asserts: "Not only was it illogical to omit the German component to NATO, it was also unfair...Why should Americans - and Europeans - labor to defend a West that includes Germany without the Germans participating in the common defense?"[192]

France insisted that German rearmament be done through an all European army which would grant Paris authority over German military activity. To that end, French Premier Rene Pleven proposed creating a European Defense Community (EDC) which would also accelerate European economic integration via the creation of a supranational integrated planning structure. The EDC would be based on a Special European Force with its own European Minister of Defence and with an independent command staff under the authority of existing NATO command structures.[193] The US endorsed the EDC as a means of strengthening the European contribution to collective defense while maintaining the primacy of NATO and

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191. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956) 253.

192. Kaplan NATO and the United States, 45.

193. Germany would have contributed manpower but would not have its own General Staff, defense ministry, or armaments industry. See Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). Unlike NATO, the EDC would decide independently the direction and control of arms industries. See Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980).

attaining both through the inclusion of West Germany in NATO.

The EDC Treaty was signed on 27 May 1953.[194] Though a number of parliaments soon approved the EDC, France - who had originated the concept - caused it to fail. Because of historical sensitivity toward military integration with Germany, concern that French colonial distractions in Indochina would allow Germany to increase its power in Europe, and intense differences of domestic opinion between pro-NATO forces and nationalist Gaullists, the French National Assembly defeated the EDC on procedural grounds on 30 August 1954. For its part, Washington had not helped promote a favorable climate in France for the EDC, NATO, or the US. For example, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had warned that failure of the EDC might prompt an "agonizing reappraisal" of the American commitment to Europe.[195]

As an alternative to the EDC, Britain proposed an institutional solution - backed by power - as a means of managing Germany and promoting reassurance for its neighbors. In September 1954 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden proposed revitalizing the Brussels Pact to create a Western European Union (WEU) to include Germany and Italy. Because

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194. The signators of the EDC included France, Belgium the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The US and Britain provided support via protocols (signed the same day) on mutual security guarantees between EDC and NATO members. Britain did not sign the EDC as it could not accept the supranational element of the accord.

195. FRUS, 1952-1954, 5:711-712.

the security guarantees of the WEU would apply to the same states as the NATO guarantee, the WEU became the means of bringing West Germany into NATO. This institutional option avoided militarizing the WEU and was thus more a political event than an effort to create a functional European pillar of NATO.[196] Nevertheless, the WEU settled the question of forward defense, included Britain, reassured France, and promoted the principle of a European pillar of NATO and operational burdensharing therefore satisfying the US for a time. This institutional evolution facilitated an acceptable compromise among disparate national security concerns in which the major participants believed that their security had increased.[197]

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196. The Modified Brussels Treaty specified that: "Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters." Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty: Paris, France (October 23, 1954). For discussion of the WEU see Alfred Cahen, The Western European Union and NATO: Building a European Defence Identity within the Context of Atlantic Solidarity (London: Brassey's UK, 1989).

197. After its creation, the WEU could claim only one major achievement - aiding in the settlement of the Saar lands in 1955 which further eased historical tensions between France and Germany. See Cahen 4-5. The European members did apply some elements of economic integration to security, primarily through the creation of the EUROGROUP in 1968. This was an inner-NATO caucus of European ministers of defense. The EUROGROUP received a degree of institutionalization (though without French participation) with high level staffing from European defense ministries responsible for coordinating European activity in communication (EUROCOM), logistics (EUROLOG), and defense procurement (EURONAD) designed to enhance Europe's commitment to NATO. In the European Community, France participated in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) which included all of the EC member states (except Ireland) and Turkey and Norway. The Single European Act of 1984 gave the IEPG a goal of creating a European defense industry. See Trevor Taylor, European Defence Cooperation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) 17-27 and Jeffrey Harrop, The Political Economy of Integration in the European Community (Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing, 1989) 10.

Institutional Bargaining and Economic Burdensharing

The failure to establish a functional European pillar to NATO continued to cause concern in Washington and in the US Congress. Such distress was reflected in a growing dispute over balance-of-payments deficits between the US and Europe.[198] The issue took the political form of American pressure on Germany to provide "offset" payments for maintaining US forces there. Germany agreed to a program of arms purchases from the US and some direct payments for American troop activities.[199] However, in Europe there was an increasing sense of already shouldering the greatest burden given that war would most likely take place in the European theater. Additionally, the German public was increasingly frustrated with the presence of foreign troops stationed on their land.[200] Off-set payments not withstanding, the primacy of NATO's alliance functions brought about by the structure of the international system impeded the ability of the institution to meet one of its primary tasks.

In 1966, US Senator Mike Mansfield began a series of Senate Resolutions stressing that NATO would not be

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198. Caused by the costs of maintaining troops and variations in currency exchange rate losses. See Gregory Treverton, The Dollar Drain and American Forces in Germany: Managing the Political Economics of Alliance (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1978).

199. This included a $2.2 billion program over two years based on military procurements, loans, and German coverage of some property costs of the US in Germany. Golden 54-59.

200. Intangible forms of burdens for Europeans included the US force presence in Germany (in particular), the physical presence of nuclear weapons in Europe, and general dislike for US Cold War strategy. Duke 211-213.

fundamentally harmed by substantial reductions in US troop levels in Europe. Senator Mansfield hoped to use legislation to return NATO to its origins with a strong European self-help component organized within the transatlantic context. The original Mansfield Resolution (1967) declared that:

> The condition of our European allies, both economically and military, has appreciably improved since large contingents of forces were deployed. The commitment by all Members of the North Atlantic Treaty is based upon the full cooperation of all Treaty partners in contributing materials and men on a fair and equitable basis, but such contributions have not been forthcoming from all of the Members; relations between the two parts of Europe are now characterized by an increasing two-way flow of trade, people and their peaceful exchange; and the present policy of maintaining large contingents of US forces and their dependents on the US continent also contributes further to the fiscal and monetary problems of the US.[201]

Seeking to reassure the NATO allies, President-Elect Richard Nixon wrote to NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio in early 1969 that: "There will be no diminution of America's commitment to the defense of Western Europe or to the Organization you so ably serve..."[202] The Nixon Administration persuaded its allies to agree that any reductions in NATO troop levels be done in the context of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) to be negotiated between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and not through unilateral declarations. The claim that support for Mansfield-style

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201. "United States Troops in Europe: Hearings Before the Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and Arms Services Committees on the Subject of United States Troops in Europe", United States Senate Ninetieth Congress, First Session on S. Res 49 and S. Res 83, 26 April and 3 May 1967.

202. Joan Hoff-Wilson, "'Nixingerism,' NATO, and Detente," in Kaplan American Historians, 99.

legislation could harm arms reduction efforts (and thus hinder military cost-reductions) took some steam out of Mansfield's legislative efforts.[203] Nevertheless, Mansfield had struck a chord in Congress which was increasingly frustrated with maintaining 315,000 uniformed troops, 235,000 dependents and 14,000 civilian employees stationed in Europe which all contributed to a dollar gap in foreign exchange amounting to a $1.5 billion annual deficit.[204]

In 1977 NATO members agreed to an institutional strategy to promote burdensharing as measured by percentage of GNP. As part of US President Jimmy Carter's proposal for a Long Term Defense Plan (LTDP) to modernize conventional and nuclear capabilities and promote standardization of equipment among the Allies, the DPC agreed on 18 May to fund the project from 1979-1984 with a required three percent annual increase in NATO related defense expenditure in real

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203. Mansfield continued his efforts with an amendment to the Selective Service Act of 1971 requiring that US force levels in Europe be reduced by 50 percent - to about 150,000 troops by the end of the year. The White House enlisted former SACEURs, former Secretary of State(s) George Ball and Dean Acheson, and former President Lyndon Johnson to lobby against the amendment which was defeated by a vote of 61-36. In 1973, the Senate approved a similar Mansfield Amendment by a vote of 49-46. Caught by surprise, the Nixon Administration defeated a bill put forward by Senator Alan Cranston (which contained virtually the same language as the Mansfield Amendment) thus assuring Mansfield's procedural defeat. Senators Sam Nunn and Henry Jackson continued the Mansfield tradition through an amendment to the Defense Department Authorization Act of 1974. This amendment stated that a failure of the European members to offset fully the costs of troops in Europe would result in automatic reductions in troop levels. Had the amendment passed, it would have required the President to reduce US forces in Europe on a percentage equal to the amount of the balance of payments deficit the European members of NATO failed to offset. For detailed discussion of Mansfield's efforts see Phil Williams, The Senate and US Troops in Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985) 169-204.

204. Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO: The Second Generation," in Kaplan and Clawson 7.

terms by each member state.[205] A senior Carter Administration official told a closed meeting with US Senators that, the three percent solution was based on "...our perception that we needed some kind of an agreed program whereby we could get the Allies to come along with us in the rearmament we saw as necessary in NATO."[206] This was in spite of the fact that European defense expenditures had actually been rising on average of about three percent during the 1970s as part of national force modernization programs - while US spending had been in decline.[207]

In calling for a three percent solution to promote burdensharing, the NATO members had created a supranational institutional guideline to which member states were expected to adhere. However, there was no mechanism for guaranteeing compliance.[208] For example, in Washington the program sparked bureaucratic debate with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) insisting that only defense outlays for NATO should be counted and thus there may not be a need for an overall increase in national defense spending. Meanwhile the National Security Council and the Department of Defense

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205. Defence Planning Committee Communique, 18 May 1977. NATO Office of Information and Press. The DPC recommendations became formal NATO policy at a Washington D.C. Heads of State NATO Summit in May 1978.

206. Quoted in Lunn 17-18. The official, Robert Komer (Special Assistant for NATOAffairs to the Secretary of Defense) noted that in reality the US had already included increases into its own planning for the time period covered by the LTDP and that the only countries who would have to increase their percent of GNP toward defense would be European members of NATO.

2 0. Duke 73.

208. The DPC Communique qualified the plan by adding that: "This annual increase should be in the region of 3 per cent, recognizing that for some individual countries economic circumstances will affect what can be achieved."

asserted (successfully) that the NATO plan should apply to the entire defense budget.[209] The internal American debate over how to measure national commitments to this burdensharing plan suggested to the Europeans that creative legerdemain might allow members to circumvent the institutional directive. The result was a divisive program based on redundant military planning. Even if successful, the results would have maintained the "unfairness" aspect of burdensharing - only measured at a higher proportionate level of GNP. Thus as NATO moved toward the end of the Cold War it had failed to achieve the institutional task of burdensharing. The objective of a reassured and economically strong Western Europe was attained in the form of West European economic integration, but it was built upon a political economy of security dependence on the US.

NATO Enlargement

Article 10 of the NATO treaty states that: "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."[210] The relevant principles are "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles

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209. Foreign Policy Research Institute, The Three Percent Solution and the Future of NATO (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1981) 29-30.

210. North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949.

of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law."[211] NATO expanded three times during the Cold War - to include Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955), and Spain (1982). Each enlargement was done for strategic gain. Principles were secondary and in some cases ignored entirely.

Greece and Turkey

Though Greece and Turkey were the core states of the Truman Doctrine, they were not original NATO members.[212] The changed strategic environment in the early 1950s facilitated their entrance into NATO. Greece could serve as a containment point on the Balkan peninsula and Turkey would cut off Soviet naval access to the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey would provide NATO planning with one of the largest standing armies in Europe - up to 25 divisions which could tie down and distract the Soviet Union should it attack Central Europe. Enlargement would also shore up NATO's southern command and open the way for US bases in Turkey.[213]

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211. North Atlantic Treaty, Preamble.

212. A number of strategic and political objections were raised against Greece and Turkey having a formal relationship with NATO. Central to these arguments were concerns over extending NATO's defense into the Middle East and up to the Caucasian border of the Soviet Union. Neither country could really be considered "Atlantic" and as Greeks were Orthodox Christians and Turks Islamic, neither were representative of the western understanding of the "Atlantic Community". Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972) 83. Additionally, Britain was more interested in establishing a non-NATO alliance in the Mediterranean that would look toward the Middle East.

213. S. Victor Papacosma, "Greece and NATO," in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo Luraghi, eds., NATO and the Mediterranean (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1985) 192.

In September 1950 Greece and Turkey were invited to coordinate with NATO defense planning. On 22 October 1951 Greece and Turkey signed protocols on their accession to the North Atlantic Treaty - which was formalized on 18 February 1952.

After joining NATO, Greece made initial steps to promote democratic civilian control of its military by sending officers to the NATO Defense College in Rome. However, in 1967 Greek colonels staged a coup. The junta took control using a NATO counterinsurgency plan (called Prometheus) intended for use in response to serious internal subversion.[214] NATO faced what one observer termed a "crisis of conscience" regarding one of its members.[215] However, NATO did nothing to discourage the Greek military.[216] American, British, and NATO officials met regularly with the coup leaders.[217] Reflecting the realist policies of US

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214. Several of the coup leaders had served with the Greek Central Intelligence Agency (KYP) which had close ties to the American CIA. The coup leader Papadopoulos had served as liaison between the two services. Theodore Couloumbis, The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983) 51.

215. D. George Kousloulas, "The Origins of the Greek Military Coup, April 1967," Orbis 8:1 (Spring 1969) 332.

216. The Scandinavian NATO members did raise the issue of the Greek regime for discussion in the NAC. However, their efforts were deflected by more powerful members. NATO Secretary General Brosio also opposed discussion of the Greek regime - an act which the Scandinavian members believed went beyond the authority of his office.

217. Though the US embargoed heavy weapons sales to Greece, Washington continued to be the highest supplier of weapons to Greece. In fact, there were more US military supplies transferred to Greece in 1967-1970 than there had been in the three years before the coup. In 1972 Washington negotiated an "open-ended" home-port agreement for the stationing of US Naval forces in Greece (rescinded in 1974 after the junta fell). Both France and Germany also traded with, and sold military equipment to Greece. Benjamin Cameron Sharp, NATO and the Mediterranean, 1949-1979: Deterioration on the Southern Flank (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 1981) 102-103.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (after 1969), these officials believed that it was necessary to live with the Greek coup out of strategic necessity - even if it meant working with a military that was using NATO plans to subvert democracy.[218] The coup leader, George Papadopoulos, responded with decidedly pro-NATO policies.[219] However, NATO paid a price for this sacrifice of principles for, after the military government fell in 1974, the new civilian government quickly withdrew from the NATO integrated military command.[220] Short sighted realist policy had actually decreased the security of NATO member states by damaging collective defense.[221] Greece eventually decided that it could better constrain its historical enemy in Turkey with a voice in NATO affairs. However, Athens was not able to negotiate re-admission to the NATO integrated military command until 1980.[222]

Turkey experienced a series of military coups, restrictions on the press, violent public protests, and martial law. By 1987 Turkey had parliamentary elections

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218. Robert Jordan and Werner Feld, Europe in the Balance: the Changing Context of European International Politics (London: Faber and Faber, 1986) 216.

219. For example, in 1967 he withdrew a Greek brigade from Cyprus rather than allow tensions there to exacerbate - much to Washington and NATO's pleasure.

220. Couloumbis 101-102.

221. See Laurence Stern, The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy (New York: Times Books, 1977). Stern notes similarities between Kissinger's willingness to overlook principles in Greece with the approach taken by Metternich during the Greek uprising against the Ottoman Empire in 1821.

222. Greece's re-entry was delayed due to obstacles raised by Turkey over command and control issues and territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea. See Thanos Veremis, "Greece and NATO: Continuity and Change," in John Chipman, ed., NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (New York: Routledge, 1988) 269-270.

showing momentum toward democracy. This movement continued in 1995 when parliamentary elections brought a peaceful change of government. Democracy appeared to function marginally in Turkey - but not due to NATO. In fact, in the 1995 elections the victorious Islamicist Welfare Party campaigned on a platform that included withdrawing from NATO and establishing an "Islamic NATO." As a former US Ambassador to Turkey asked: "How do you deal with a NATO ally led by a man who is fundamentally anti-NATO, fundamentally anti-Semitic and fundamentally pro-Islamist, even when he's largely behaving himself?"[223]

NATO's record of managing relations between Greece and Turkey is equally weak. In 1964 Greece and Turkey were nearly drawn into a civil war on Cyprus which held sizeable Greek and Turkish populations. NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker attempted to mediate on behalf of NATO.[224] There was also inconsequential debate in the NAC about the possibility of deploying a NATO peacekeeping force.[225] However, war was only deterred by the US acting unilaterally with power politics. On 5 June 1964 US President Lyndon Johnson

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223. Steven Erlanger, "Turkish Prime Minister's Islamic Tour Worries U.S.," The New York Times, 10 August 1996, A2.

224. Jordan 136. In 1956 NATO Secretary General Lord Ismay suggested that NATO serve as a forum for mediation of Greek-Turkish disputes over what was then the British mandate of Cyprus. In 1957 Secretary General Paul Henri-Spaak proposed that the NAC sponsor a conference on Cyprus. Spaak advocated a federal arrangement for Cyprus composed of Greek and Turkish assemblies which would work with a British governor over a period of seven years. In the first case, a lack of consensus in the NAC prohibited NATO from acting and in the later the parties were unwilling to place good faith in NATO as a mechanism for resolving their disputes.

225. Sharp 85-86. UN peacekeepers were eventually deployed to the region.

dispatched a personal letter to Turkish Prime Minster Ismet Inonu asserting that: "I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies."[226] While Johnson appealed to the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes in his letter - it was the implied threat that the US might not come to Turkey's defense in the event of a Soviet attack that prompted a change in Turkish policy and not NATO. The Turkish Prime Minister replied that the tone and substance of the US letter raised "great sorrow and concern" for Turkey.[227] NATO did reassure Turkey somewhat as the NAC instructed Secretary General Stikker to observe Greek-Turkish disputes and report to the Council. Given disparate views between Athens (which preferred the UN) and Ankara (which preferred NATO) of NATO's role, it was necessary for Stikker to distinguish between facilitating information flows and mediation. Thus Stikker was limited to stating

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226. The Johnson letter was published in the Middle East Journal (Summer 1966) 386-389.

227. The Turkish response stated that: "Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance. If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist this member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning." Published in the Middle East Journal (Summer 1966) 389-393.

that: "I am a watch-dog trying to diminish tensions between Greece and Turkey."[228]

In 1974, civil war in Cyprus again drew the two NATO allies to the brink of conflict. While negotiating with Greece in Geneva, Turkey quietly built up 40,000 troops on Cyprus and then in a quick action took over 40 percent of the island in August. The US Senate responded by imposing an arms embargo on Turkey (lasting from 1974-1978). This restriction on Turkish freedom to act angered Ankara which temporarily closed over two dozen US military installations on Turkish territory.[229] Turkish foreign policy toward Cyprus had been constrained by balance of power on the island and by the US - NATO had no independent role to play beyond reinforcing the American pressure on Greece and Turkey in at least ten special sessions of the NAC. However, Turkey built up considerable resentment for the US and, by association, NATO for the constraints it felt had been unjustly placed on its foreign policy.

By 1996 Greece and Turkey were still close to war (in this case over small rock islands in the Aegean Sea).[230]

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228. Jordan 136. In 1967 renewed strains over Cyprus nearly brought Greece and Turkey to war once again. NATO Secretary Brosio was given a mandate by the NAC to use his office to lower tensions. Although the US approved of Brosio's mission in the NAC, President Johnson appointed his own special representative (Cyrus R. Vance) to mediate between the countries. Though the two worked in a complimentary manner, it was the influence of the US and not NATO which brought the two countries away from the brink of war.

229. James Brown, Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey (London: Brassey's, UK, 1991) 9.

230. For the roots of this particular crisis see S. Victor Papacosma, "More than Rocks: Greek-Turkish Discord in Historical Perspective," Association for the Study of Nationalities: Analysis of Current Events 7:9 (May 1996) 3-6.

NATO did provide a forum in the NAC where they were "read the riot act" for setting a poor example while NATO was implementing peacekeeping plans in nearby Bosnia-Herzegovina.[231] However, when NATO Secretary General Javier Solana offered his good offices for mediation, Athens rejected his participation as it would imply there was even something to negotiate over - in Greece's view the rocks were non-negotiable and protected by international law.[232] Once more, the tensions between Greece and Turkey were resolved by US diplomatic pressure - this time by President Bill Clinton and his top foreign policy representatives.

Ongoing differences between Greece and Turkey have been time consuming for NATO - taking up considerable amounts of staff energy and often distracting NATO from more important security issues. NATO did play a constraining role and, at times, served as a channel for information between the two thereby lowering the risk that each member's military maneuvers (for example) might be misinterpreted as plans for an attack. However, constant tension over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea ruined any chance at institutional socialization. From the mid-1970s through 1990 there were no significant joint military exercises between the two allies which might have contributed to a culture of cooperation between the two. Most of the exercises that Greece and Turkey have

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231. Interview with senior NATO official, Brussels, February 1996.
232. Interview with senior NATO official, Brussels, February 1996.

undertaken in the Aegean Sea since 1974 have not been with, but rather against, each other.[233]

Germany

The inclusion of West Germany in NATO was part of strategic defense plans requiring West German rearmament and forward defense. To attain these goals, NATO leaders looked to institutions to allay its neighbors' fear of this postwar German gain. As the US representative in western Germany John J. McCloy, asserted in a classified memo in 1950 the challenge was: "...to foster the right kind of Germany and have that Germany accepted by other Western powers, and indeed the whole democratic world, as an equal partner."[234] Even in France the issue was not "whether" western defense plans should include West Germany, but rather "how". West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer believed that West Germany's future lay in identifying with Western institutions. Although the West German public largely opposed rearmament, Adenauer felt that West Germany's strategic position could be used to bargain for formal West German statehood.[235] For West Germany, statehood meant voluntary restraint insured by NATO - but guaranteed by US (and British and French) ground troops.

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233. Brown 5.

234. "The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State," April 25, 1950. FRUS, 1950, 4:634.

235. John A. Reed, Germany and NATO (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987) 37, 43.

Meeting in Paris with its soon-to-be Allies in October 1954 West Germany agreed as a condition of statehood not to manufacture atomic, chemical, biological weapons, guided missiles, magnetic and influence mines, warships, or long-range bombers, except at the request of NATO.[236] West Germany also promised not to use its new military forces (which became the 500,000 man Bundeswehr) to force German unification. Upon entering NATO, West Germany agreed: "...never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other states."[237] The US, Britain, and France added that any event which would "threaten the integrity and unity of the Atlantic alliance" from within, would result in the "offending government as having forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty" and will act with a view to "taking other measures which may be appropriate."[238]

The entrance of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO was a compromise among diverse national interests. As Richard Kugler writes: "...each participant was required to

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236. Modified Brussels Treaty, Protocol Number III: Paris, France (23 October 1954).

237. Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany: Paris, France (23 October 1954).

238. Declaration by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France. Paris, 23 October 1954.

undertake important, enduring obligations of the sort that sovereign nations do not normally accept...(The Paris Agreements) made these obligations acceptable by offering each participant offsetting strategic gains that exceeded the costs of these commitments."[239] Moreover, as Joseph Joffe concludes, the resolution of the German question created a situation in which "...collective gain could overwhelm the zero-sum logic of rivalry and relative gain."[240] This transparency and reassurance in turn provided an opportunity for complementary institutional activity - especially economic integration - to bind Germany to the West as a stable and peaceful democracy.

West German public opinion occasionally ran counter to NATO interests and periodic popular movements supporting German neutrality as a means of gaining unification arose during the Cold War. In the 1980s considerable West German public opposition grew on West Germany over NATO nuclear deployment strategy during the INF crisis. Nonetheless, West Germany remained firmly embedded in NATO. The end of the Cold War has shown the continued validity of this "dual-containment" function of NATO. When proposing "2 plus 4" negotiations on German unification to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in February 1990, US Secretary of State James Baker asked: "Would you prefer to see a united

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239. Kugler 66.

240. Joseph Joffe, The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987) 184.

Germany outside of NATO and with no U.S. forces, perhaps with its own nuclear weapons?...Or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO's jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position?"[241] By 1991 Germany was unified as a member of NATO - with Soviet approval.[242]

Spain

Although NATO was comfortable with dictatorships in Portugal and Greece, the Spanish ruler General Francisco Franco's support for Hitler during World War II prevented Spain from entering NATO. Nevertheless, the US viewed Franco as a useful ally based on in his virulent anti-communism and Spain's strategic location at the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea. In 1953 the US began providing Spain with economic assistance in return for basing rights on Spanish territory.[243] Spain gained economic assistance and aid in military modernization from the bilateral relationship but ceded considerable sovereignty through a secret accord granting US access to Spanish territory in the

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241. Quoted in Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1993) 185-186.

242. See Stephen F. Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Gregory F. Treverton, America, Germany, and the Future of Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Peter H. Merkl, German Unification in the European Context (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1993) 312-313; and Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

243. See Esther Barbe, Espana y la Otan: La problematica europea en materia de seguridad (Barcelona: Editorial Laia, 1981) 51-90.

event of war without previous consultation with the Spanish government.[244]

After Franco's death in 1974, Spain began a period of gradual democratic reform - with only one major setback - a failed coup attempt by armed forces associated with the Franco regime in 1981. Under Franco the primary function of the Spanish military was to prevent domestic unrest with no independent civilian oversight of this responsibility. In its planning and operations, the Spanish military was thus oriented toward domestic rather than external activity. To maintain loyalty to this arrangement, Franco established an officer-heavy patronage system. When democratization and military reform arrived in the late 1970s, the military thus became a formidable source of resistance.[245] The 1981 coup attempt demonstrated that weak civil-military relations posed a serious challenge to democratization in Spain.

Spain's path to NATO was guided by a desire among post-Franco Spanish political elites to use European institutions to aid democracy and decrease the likelihood of another coup. Once Spain joined NATO, the Socialist Government of Felipe Gonzales resolved to hold a referendum on Spanish membership. While the political leadership backed

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244. Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, "On Spain, NATO and Democracy," in Douglas Stuart, ed., Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press) 99.

245. Angel Vinas, "Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges," in John Chipman, ed., NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External challenges (London: Routledge, 1988) 153-154.

membership, the public was hostile to the US (and, by association, NATO) for its past support of Franco.[246] Two key strategies combined to win public support for Spain's membership in NATO. First, foreign leaders and domestic politicians informally linked Spain's membership in NATO with membership in the European Community - a more popular proposition.[247] Second, the Gonzalez government made concessions to public opinion on the status of Spain's membership in NATO. Spain would remain in NATO without joining the integrated military command, there would be no deployment of nuclear weapons in Spain, and efforts would be made to reduce the role of the US military on Spanish territory. With these concessions to public opinion, the 12 March 1986 referrendum affirmed Spain's conditional membership in NATO by a vote of 52 percent in favor and 40 percent opposed. NATO and democracy had been directly linked through the Spanish referendum. However, other variables besides NATO were at work - including the US desire for formal inclusion of the entire Iberian peninsula into NATO defense planning and Spain's desire to join the European Community.

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246. See Javier Perez Royo, "Repercussions on the Democratic Process of Spain's Entry into NATO," in Frederico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., Spain's Entry into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, 1988) 20-28 and Javier Ruperez, Espana en la Otan: Relato Parcial (Barcelona: Plaza and Janes, 1986) 141-187.

247. Sanchez-Gijon (in Stuart) 112. Spain signed a Treaty of Accession to the Treaty of Rome admitting it to the EC in June 1985 and became a full member of the EC in January 1986.

Though Spain did not join the integrated military command, NATO military goals were incorporated into Spain's national security planing. The Spanish military began preparing and organizing for external activity rather than civil-control functions.[248] The Spanish government instituted a comprehensive reform of its civil-military relations including a pardon of those who had been punished for support of democracy in the military and full civilian control over the Ministry of Defense.[249] Since the end of the Cold War, the trend in Spain has been toward increased support for NATO - with Spain sending considerable peacekeeping forces, first under a UN mandate and then under NATO command, to keep peace in the Balkans. In November 1996, the Spanish Parliament voted to join the NATO integrated military command.

Analysis

This chapter shows why realists are pessimistic about NATO's capacity to function in the absence of a unifying Soviet threat. During the Cold War, NATO developed considerable institutional attributes. However, the

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248. The Spanish military was assigned five key tasks within NATO planning: assuring security on the Iberian peninsula; contributing to the strengthening of the defense of the western Mediterranean flank; participating in keeping the Atlantic routes open and assuring the aero-naval passage between the US and Spain in the event of conflict; to monitor and control the two approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar; and to integrate the Spanish air-warning network into the NATO-wide early warning systems. Vinas, in Chipman, 183.

249. Gregory F. Treverton, "Spain, the United States, and NATO: Strategic Facts and Political Realities," in Gil and Tulchin 129-132.

structure of the international system and the relative balance of power between the US-led West and the Soviet-dominated East was what kept war from breaking out in Europe - either between East and West or, at a lower level, between Greece and Turkey. NATO did enhance collective defense through institutional mechanisms but key areas such as consultation and defense planning were dependent upon other primary factors - mainly the distribution of power. This does not imply that NATO was irrelevant - only that as an institution NATO was a dependent variable during the Cold War.

Tasks

The primacy of collective defense led to an expansion of institutional tasks to include intensive consultation and defense planning. The Secretary General was empowered to facilitate consensus and resolve disputes among allies. Military representatives were responsible for coordinated planning of the contributions made by member states to collective defense. In Germany, NATO was given a formal task of internal containment. The changed strategic environment accompanying advancements in nuclear weapons technology highlighted the importance of institutional efforts to strengthen the credibility of collective defense during the 1960s. Also in the 1960s, NATO was given an increased political role as part of a general detente with the Soviet Union. Formally, burdensharing remained a task

of the institution as did enlargement consistent with institutional principles. However, only in the case of Spain did NATO have an independent role affecting national security.

Organizational Capabilities

The organizational capabilities of NATO were expanded to include political and military headquarters involving representatives from member states and including a secretariat and staff serving the institution. Nevertheless, in its efforts to meet its tasks, NATO had no independent peacetime authority despite the growth of its organizational attributes. Thus, NATO's institutional characteristics had little measurable independent impact affecting the national security of its member states. NATO's dominant organizational capabilities were highly formal with low autonomy.

Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures

The principles upon which NATO was founded were secondary to geostrategic concerns during the Cold War. Consultation and defense planning became institutional norms and were given formal rules as the primary decision-making procedures for NATO. However, it is not clear that they had any measurable impact beyond enhancing collective defense. Consultation and military planning were dependent on the extent to which states chose to share information with their

allies. The primary area where consultation may have been effective was in the informal and highly secretive discussions held by national representatives at NATO. However, without a full historical disclosure, a direct relationship between informal consultation and increased security can only be inferred. Military planning did enhance the capacity for action in the event of a conventional war and states that were not contributing fully to collective defense were more easily identified through the information sharing process in NATO. However, there was no independent enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with common objectives. Membership remained restricted and enlargement was based on geostrategic objectives. In the most serious threat to security within the alliance, NATO's institutional attributes had no impact on relations between Greece and Turkey. Strong institutional rules were placed on Germany with the objective of socializing it into a peaceful democratic state and limiting its capacity for independent action. However, these rules were enforced by NATO only to the extent that it symbolized the presence of foreign occupation forces on German territory. Only in the case of Spain can a clear linkage be shown between NATO enlargement and institutional principles.

Capacity for Change

The expansion of NATO's institutional tasks demonstrated a capacity for change. However, institutional

adaptation was responsive and did not shape events. For example, one major change - empowering the Secretary General to resolve disputes among allies had no measurable impact on Greek-Turkish tensions. Additionally, in the changed strategic nuclear environment the ability of the MLF or flexible response failed to assure France that NATO had adapted sufficiently to have continued relevance to its national security. In the case of burdensharing, change was largely cosmetic after the failure of the EDC. In fact, the primacy of NATO's alliance functions contributed to a West European political economy of security dependence on the US which constrains the ability of NATO to adapt to the absence of a threat after the Cold War. Change in NATO was responsive, slow, and dependent on the structure of the international system.

Conclusion: The Constraints of Alliance

Realists have good reason to be skeptical of NATO's ability to adapt to the absence of a threat after the Cold War. Even in areas where NATO is generally thought to have been highly successful during the Cold War, it did not always function well - if at all. As NATO developed, the variations in institutional form were dependent upon external events and the interests of the member states. That is not to say that NATO was irrelevant to national security. NATO facilitated the essential elements of stability in Europe for over forty years - it helped keep

the Americans involved in Europe, reassured Germany's neighbors that it would not easily become a military threat to their security, and deterred the Soviet Union from encroaching into the West. However, this conclusion does suggest that for NATO to have relevance for the post-Cold War European security environment it would have to be substantially transformed as an institution.

CHAPTER V
NATO AFTER THE COLD WAR: NEW CHALLENGES AND INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION

Introduction and Overview

Chapter Five demonstrates the high value that the member states of NATO placed on institutional adaptation to enhance post-Cold War European security. It shows that, contrary to some realist predictions, NATO did not dissolve but actually became central to the concept of "interlocking institutions" designed to enhance security in Central and Eastern Europe. However, despite considerable institutional activity involving NATO, the EU, WEU, the CSCE and the UN, the promise of institutions failed to deliver peace in the Balkans. NATO did produce two effective institutional programs promoting stability in Central and Eastern Europe via the Partnership for Peace and the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force. However, in the Balkans, NATO only functioned when its traditional alliance mechanisms were activated via US leadership. This chapter therefore shows that its members have considerable work to do if NATO is to have lasting relevance in the absence of a threat.

Winning the Peace?

By the late 1980s economic and political crisis forced the Soviet Union to withdraw from the Cold War stalemate in Europe. This process began in December 1987 when the US and the Soviet Union eliminated an entire class of nuclear

weapons in Europe through the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). A year later Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced a reduction of 500,000 personnel from the Soviet military to include a withdrawal of the most threatening Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. In November 1990 the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) was concluded by all NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.[250] Conventional reductions were followed by agreements between the US and the Soviet Union to reduce strategic nuclear weapons through START I and START II.[251] In the long-term, a revitalized Russia could challenge European security with its large inventory of nuclear and conventional weapons and the capacity to promote instability in its neighboring states. However, there would be considerable warning time of a direct Russian threat to Central Europe as it would require large scale violations of the verifiable CFE treaty. The immediate danger from post-Cold War Russia was not expansion - but implosion, disintegration, and the potential for nuclear proliferation.

Absent the Soviet threat, democracy appeared to be spreading after the dramatic post-Communist revolutions of

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250. CFE limits the deployment of military equipment between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact to 40,000 battle tanks, 40,000 artillery, 60,000 armored combat vehicles, 13,600 combat aircraft, and 40,000 attack helicopters to be implemented by each participating country with intrusive verification procedures. CFE troop levels would lower (between 1989 and 1997) NATO collective force levels from 3,410,600 persons to 2,158,000; East European levels (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary) from 820,200 persons to 452,000, and former Soviet Republic levels from 4,260,000 to 2,124,000 persons. This included an estimated size of the Russian armed forces of around 1,500,000 personnel by 1997.

251. Together the two treaties would eliminate nearly two-thirds of existing strategic nuclear forces.

1989. Yet democracy did not necessarily mean stability. As Czech President Vaclev Havel told NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner in early 1992: "We have a country that is run by dissidents, but none of whom have studied tax law."[252] What is most telling about Havel's comments is the person to whom they were made. As NATO Secretary General Worner observed in 1993, NATO's members and many countries from Central and Eastern Europe looked to the institution to: maintain the transatlantic relationship; manage international conflict by serving as a forum for multilateral diplomacy toward the East backed by substantial military resources; alleviate traditional conflicts within Western Europe and contain a united Germany; provide predictability and reassurance in European-American relations in a time of increasing economic competition; and lower the costs of national security by pooling defense resources in cooperation with like-minded states.[253] Additionally, because NATO command and control arrangements, logistics, communications, and some forces were used with considerable success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, some of its members hoped that NATO could facilitate the multinational use of force outside the NATO area. With its standing structures and years of consultative patterns and

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252. Interview with a senior NATO official, Brussels, March 1992.

253. Manfred Worner, "European Security: Political Will Plus Military Might," in Manfred Worner, et al, What is European Security after the Cold War? (Brussels: The Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy Research, 1993) 12.

mutual trust among its members, NATO members preferred it to the G-7, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe for addressing their national security concerns.

Contrary to realist predictions, rather than dissolve as most alliances have in the absence of a threat, NATO moved to the core of an emerging European security architecture. Yet, for a time, it also became the core of false promises of security in Central and Eastern Europe. While NATO countries would use the institution to make overtures toward "winning the peace" - little security was provided on the Balkan peninsula between 1991 and 1995. Events in the former Yugoslavia out-paced the ability of institutions to adapt to new security challenges and the willingness of states to make them work. In fact, some institutions such as the EU and UN often caused more problems than provided solutions in post-Cold War Europe. Nevertheless, there were some important successes as a secure environment was established with NATO in the Balkans in 1995-1996.

Early Adaptation of NATO: Promoting Stability in the East

Meeting in London in July 1990, the NATO heads of state stressed the continued task of collective defense while acknowledging that challenges to that mission had been radically transformed to include promoting stability among its former adversaries:

> We recognize that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbors. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.[254]

NATO invited East European leaders, including Soviet President Gorbachev, to address the NAC and to establish regular diplomatic liaison with the Alliance. "This will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change", the NATO leaders proclaimed.[255]

In November 1991 NATO adopted a new strategic concept after 16 months of work and 12 different drafts by its Strategy Review Group (SRG). The process was completed with the understanding that the new strategic concept would represent the collective diplomacy of the NATO members.[256] NATO agreed that the primary challenge to the security of its members was uncertainty and instability in the former Warsaw Pact:

> ...the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members

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254. London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, July 1990. NATO Office of Information and Press.

255. London Declaration.

256. Reflecting the political nature of the drafting process, France joined the SRG. However, France only participated when it became clear that major strategic decisions affecting the future of European security were being made in its absence.

> of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.[257]

NATO outlined four "fundamental tasks" for the Alliance after the Cold War:

1. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolutions of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

2. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

3. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

4. To preserve the strategic balance of power within Europe.[258]

During the drafting there were divisions within the SRG.[259] Some members opposed the stress on preserving the strategic balance of power in Europe given that the Warsaw Pact was in rapid dissolution. Additionally, some Alliance officials and member states were deeply divided on whether NATO's

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257. The Alliance's Strategic Concept. Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991. NATO Office of Information and Press. The Communique also specified potential challenges arising from the Mediterranean region and nuclear proliferation.

258. The Alliance's Strategic Concept.

259. Discussion with J. Michael Legge, Chairman of the SRG and NATO Assistant Secretary General, at the Belgian Royal Defense College, Brussels, 23 January 1992.

successful adaptation would require amending its mission to include action outside of its territorial area. Indeed among senior NATO officials, there was considerable enthusiasm for giving NATO an out-of-area role - some arguing that NATO's future depended on it.[260] France, in particular, opposed any "out-of-area" language in the document - insisting that NATO should be maintained in reserve as a hedge against a Soviet threat while not taking on new missions.[261] Thus, NATO's most dramatic military adaptation was to establish an Allied Rapid Reaction Corps within the new strategic concept. However, its function was to respond to Article 5 challenges within the NATO area.

A key area of agreement was a general understanding that NATO should be placed within a new framework of interlocking institutions. The intent was to use international institutions to aid post-Communist democratic and economic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and to establish a mechanism for early warning, preventive diplomacy, and conflict management as an amalgamated form of collective security. Though European security institutions would remain controlled by states, their members sought to enhance the capacity of institutions for meeting the evolving challenges of post-Cold War European security. The primary impetus in this outreach to Central and Eastern

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260. Interviews with senior NATO officials conducted by the author from 1991-1993.

261. See "Transatlantic Relations and the Management of Disorder," Report to the Netherlands Atlantic Commission (The Hague: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1993) 27.

Europe came from NATO which continued to represent the collective diplomacy of its member states.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Early NATO initiatives to the East focused on strengthening the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a "Pan European" institution ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostock.[262] Established through the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the CSCE promoted international norms of the rule of law, non-aggression, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.[263] For NATO, building a working partnership with the CSCE was a pragmatic means of reaching out to the nascent democracies to the East without expanding formal security guarantees. As a senior NATO official commented: "...at the London Summit in July of 1990, the decision was that we would establish a friendly relationship, that we would cooperate, and as this has

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262. See Sean Kay, "NATO and the CSCE: A Partnership for the Future," in Paradigms 7:2 (Winter 1993) 59-77 and Sean Kay, "NATO and the CSCE: A New Russian Challenge," in S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss, NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does It Have a Future? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 113-133.

263. The original members of the CSCE included 35 states from Europe and North America - expanded to 53 by 1992. During the Cold War, the US and its NATO allies emphasized CSCE norms to expose contradictions in the Soviet system and as part of the general policy of detente. However, they were reluctant to grant the CSCE operational authority as this would have allowed the Soviet Union a veto over matters of direct concern to the Alliance since CSCE decisions were taken with unanimity. The Soviet Union liked the CSCE stress on the inviability of existing borders - which codified the division of Germany and their incorporation of the Baltic countries in the USSR. Leaders of the post-Communist revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe valued the CSCE as a forum to raise security concerns and credited the institution with exposing their populations to Western norms and values.

evolved, this has taken more and more concrete forms - but membership is not one of these."[264]

The CSCE heads of state met in Paris in October 1990 and approved the Charter of Paris emphasizing that: "Our common efforts to consolidate respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, to strengthen peace and to promote unity in Europe require a new quality of political dialogue and cooperation and thus development of the structures of the CSCE."[265] The CSCE leaders established a Secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw. Furthermore, the members created a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs for political consultation, to take appropriate decisions, and to prepare biennial CSCE summits. A Committee of Senior Officials was established to endow the CSCE with a standing body and a permanent structure.

The trends in NATO toward engagement with former Warsaw Pact countries were accelerated at the Copenhagen meeting of

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264. Comments of a senior NATO official visiting Riga, Latvia, April 1992. At the London NATO meeting, the members proposed that the CSCE endorse, inter alia: CSCE commitments to respect and uphold the rule of law; CSCE guidelines for enhancing economic cooperation, based on the development of free and competitive market economies; and CSCE cooperation on environmental protection. NATO also encouraged the CSCE to adopt a structure for regular consultations among member governments to meet at the heads of state or ministerial level at least once a year; a schedule of CSCE review conferences once over two years; a small CSCE Secretariat to coordinate meetings and conferences and serve as a data and information center; a CSCE mechanism to monitor elections in all the CSCE countries; a CSCE Center for the Prevention of Conflict; and a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

265. CSCE Charter for a New Europe. Available from the CSCE (OSCE) Secretariat in Prague, The Czech Republic.

the NAC on 6-7 June 1991 where the foreign ministers declared that NATO's security was linked to that of Central and Eastern Europe and provided further encouragement for the CSCE. However, wanting to insure that the primary decisions affecting security in Europe were taken in the institution where it had the most influence, the US insisted that the Copenhagen Communique state that: "...NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty."[266] Further measures to strengthen the CSCE mandate were taken by its foreign ministers in Berlin on 20 June 1991. At that meeting, agreement on an emergency mechanism for consultation and cooperation on violent conflict in Europe was reached.[267] In December 1991 the NATO foreign ministers agreed to exchange information and documents and expressed a desire to make the collective experience of NATO available to the CSCE. NATO offered to contribute to seminars sponsored by the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center on defence conversion and the role of armed forces in democratic societies. The ministers also invited military

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266. North Atlantic Council Communique, Copenhagen 6-7 June 1991. NATO Office of Information and Press.

267. Such situations were defined as a violation of one of the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act or as the result of major disruptions endangering peace, security, or stability. A state with a particular security concern resulting from the actions of another state could request explanation for that state's behavior and be entitled to receive a response within forty-eight hours from the requested date. The foreign ministers agreed to allow twelve or more members to call an emergency meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials in the absence of the violating state should the time limit be breached.

officials from all CSCE states to attend special courses at the NATO Defense College in Rome and the NATO School in Oberammergau. NATO's parliamentary organization, the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), sponsored special CSCE interparliamentary conferences on European security and provided staff support for CSCE parliamentary meetings.[268]

Increased institutional activity originating from NATO enhanced stability in the East by reassuring new democrats that they had the moral support of the West during a time of uncertainty and rapid change. They also gained practical benefit from interacting with Western officials within this institutional context. For example, in the NATO military schools, the participants were exposed to principles of civilian control of the armed forces - a key aspect of stable democratization. In the North Atlantic Assembly, Central and East European parliamentarians gained practical experience in parliamentary procedures which they could then use to educate colleagues in their capitals. High level exchanges of military officials coming from Central and Eastern Europe to NATO headquarters - and NATO officials traveling to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe - helped raise the awareness of the challenges these countries faced and began to build a sense of trust and

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[268]. The North Atlantic Assembly is independent of NATO. Complimentary to NATO, the NAA began an extensive program of outreach to Central and Eastern Europe and the FSU by granting of associate membership and funding for their participation in seminars addressing areas such as democratization, civil-military reform, and broader issues of European security.

transparency. By increasing their understanding of the challenges facing Central and Eastern Europe, NATO members could also more efficiently plan programs for multilateral or bilateral assistance. All of these actions were designed with the intention of enhancing the principles and norms of the CSCE.

However, as the Balkan crisis escalated in 1991-1992 Europe needed action beyond social activity if its institutions were to have any direct capacity to deal with violent conflict. The immediate problem was a CSCE decision-making procedure requiring that all decisions be unanimous. This procedural arrangement in the CSCE made it a useless institution for conflict resolution as an aggressor could use CSCE procedures to block any effective action against it. Gathering at Prague in January 1992 the CSCE foreign ministers amended the consensus rule so that in situations where there are clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of CSCE commitments, a majority of member states could act in the absence of the state concerned. Consensus would remain an institutional norm of the CSCE. However, this new approach - called "consensus-minus-one" - could allow the CSCE to take political action against a member state that was in violation of its principles.[269] Thus

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[269]. The ministers also agreed to strengthen the Conflict Prevention Center by reinforcing and increasing its role in fact-finding missions, the monitoring of disputes, and implementation and verification of arms control agreements. The CSCE thus sent an observer mission to Nagorno-Karabakh. Other such missions undertaken since 1992 include fact-finding, rapporteur and monitoring in Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina, Skopje, Georgia, Estonia, Moldova, and Chechnya.

Europe had taken a small step toward rationalizing the institutional capacity to promote security.

Meeting in Helsinki in July 1992, CSCE foreign ministers called for the continued strengthening of orderly procedures for conflict prevention and crisis management by seeking the support of other international institutions and organizations, the strengthening of the chairman-in-office, the establishment of a high commissioner for national minorities, and the creation of a Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) to meet regularly in Vienna. The ministers also established procedures for crisis prevention and management to include: early warning mechanisms (focusing on human rights and the development of democratic institutions); political management (drawing attention to non-violent measures available for lowering tensions); specific instruments (such as fact finding missions); and formal peacekeeping operations.[270] Further steps to build CSCE institutions were made by the CSCE foreign ministers meeting in Stockholm in December 1992 where they established a commission of Conciliation and Court of Arbitration to examine and rule on disputes. The ministers also created an Office of CSCE Secretary General. However, despite these institutional advancements which were encouraged by NATO, the CSCE did not have the joint planning, training, and

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[270]. "Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change." Available from the CSCE Secretariat in Prague.

infrastructure that would be needed to assume responsibility for peacekeeping even if a consensus could be attained among the 50-plus members.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

Hoping to promote a more direct relationship between NATO and the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at the Rome Summit in November 1991. An American initiative, the NACC was a new "institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues" open to all of the former (and newly independent) members of the Warsaw Pact.[271] The NACC states consult on issues including national defense planning; principles and key aspects of strategy; force and command structures; military exercises; democratic concepts of civil-military relations; civil/military coordination of air traffic management; and the conversion of defense production to civilian purposes.[272]

As one senior NATO official suggested, the objective of the NACC was to promote extended security based on assessments of self-interest by the NATO members:

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271. Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, November 1991. NATO Office of Information and Press.

272. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995) 44-45. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the NACC grew to include 38 members. The NACC also serves as a technological forum for sharing information on scientific and environmental issues and to facilitate in the dissemination of information about NATO among the NACC countries.

> What we are after is our own security. In the kind of situation in which we live now, the security of any state in Europe is linked to the security of all other states. If there is chaos throughout Europe, if there are local conflicts, if there is ethnic strife, our own security in the long run will suffer. So this is one of those circumstances where it (security) is not a zero sum game. Increased security for one does not mean less security for another. Increased security for us means increased security for the rest of Europe. It is in that spirit that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was set up.[273]

NATO officials stressed that the NACC was a consultative forum and not a decision-making body. Rather, the NACC would permit formal and informal exchanges of views and promote a long-term understanding of national and multilateral security concerns. Nevertheless, the NACC alone was insufficient to meet the security demands of Central and Eastern Europe. The NACC had a limited budget (1.5 million dollars in 1993), no secretariat, no formal doctrine, and no security guarantee.

The most important function of the NACC was to provide a multilateral forum for discussion and sharing of information on peacekeeping. The NACC partners created an Ad Hoc Committee on Peacekeeping, which released an extensive report on NATO/NACC peacekeeping planning in June 1993.[274] The group sponsored a number of high level seminars focusing on the peacekeeping experiences of individual

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[273]. Comments of a senior NATO official visiting Riga, Latvia, April 1992.

[274]. The report stressed that peacekeeping can be carried out only under the authority of the UN Security Council, or of the CSCE; on a case-by-case basis; with the UN or CSCE defining peacekeeping operations, including command relationships; and that peacekeeping requires a clear political objective and a precise mandate. Report of the NACC Ad Hoc Committee on Peacekeeping, June 1993. NATO Office of Information and Press.

participants and on cooperation with other relevant institutions. They also received detailed studies from NATO's military authorities addressing technical issues of peacekeeping.[275] In sharing military experience in the NACC, military-to-military contacts between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact nations grew considerably to the extent that military relations out-paced political cooperation. Due to French opposition, there was no (ministers of) defense component to the NACC. Thus, one of the most important aspects of democratization, that of civilian control over the military, was missing from the NACC experience.[276]

Because it is a multilateral forum with no decision-making structures, a participating state could create major obstacles within the working agenda of the NACC thereby limiting its potential. This became clear after a NACC meeting in Istanbul, Turkey on 10 June 1994. The Russian delegation haggled over the final communique (forcing the NACC to drop any language related to NATO enlargement) and CFE deployment levels for five hours causing an embarrassing

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275. This included detailed presentations addressing assets and capabilities required for the conduct of peacekeeping operations; the possibility and utility of developing a database of available resources; and the requirement for forces, procedures, and equipment to facilitate cooperation in peacekeeping operations. NATO also developed a paper for the NACC covering theoretical and generic planning issues relating to command and control standards and procedures, standard operating procedures, and rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations. The NACC also created its own Ad Hoc Technical Sub-Group to facilitate the development of technical issues affecting peacekeeping missions

276. S. Nelson Drew, NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic Security in Transition (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1995) 25-26. Absent France, the remaining NATO countries created a Group of Defense Ministers which is a non-decision-making body that channels requests for assistance from Central and East European countries to NATO member nations most willing or capable to deal with a particular problem.

delay in the release of the NACC Final Communique. A senior NATO diplomat described Russia's behavior in the NACC as a "pretty bloody affair...an absolutely Soviet exercise, a disastrous performance by the Russians and it does not augur well."[277] Another NATO official openly pondered whether there could ever be another working NACC meeting if this was the way the Russians would behave in the future.[278] After the Istanbul meeting, the NACC stopped issuing a formal communique and instead opted for a chairman's summary - thus weakening the importance of the NACC for some non-NATO participants who had seen it as a way to move closer to formal NATO activities leading toward membership.

The Partnership for Peace (PFP)

By 1993 several Central and Eastern European states felt that only full membership in NATO would resolve their (real or perceived) security dilemmas; promote stability to attract economic investment and membership in the EU; and provide reassurance for democratic and market reformers. This view was promoted by three senior American analysts at the RAND Corporation who circulated a draft paper in the summer of 1993 calling for NATO to reassess its mission to focus on internal and external restructuring - including a gradual enlargement of NATO membership to include Hungary,

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277. Reuters. 10 June 1994.

278. Interview with a senior NATO official, Brussels, Belgium, June 1994.

Poland, the Czech Republic and possibly Slovakia. Failure to do so would make NATO: "...like the aging knight replete in splendid armor, impressive to admire until someone one day lifts the visor to discover it is a hollow shell. NATO will go out of area or out of business."[279] Arguing that the challenge in Europe was between forces of integration and forces of disintegration, the authors felt that the Alliance could encourage the former by shifting its focus to Article 4 of the NATO treaty to include issues such as peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian/disaster relief.

There was a sense of urgency for the US to address the question of NATO enlargement. Germany had begun quietly but assertively pushing to expand NATO to stabilize its Eastern border and provide economic stability and reassurance for the growing free-markets in the region. Germany suggested Associate Membership in NATO for some Central and East European countries. Defense Minister Volker Ruehe (in particular) argued that Associate Membership could speed full entry into NATO for the Visegrad countries. In theory, if NATO did not engage the East, Germany might act unilaterally to provide security guarantees to its Eastern neighbors - something that both Russia and the West would view as provocative.

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[279]. The RAND analysts were Ron Asmus, Richard Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee. See Frederick Kemp, "NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business," The Wall Street Journal, 11 August 1993. A formal version of the RAND paper appeared in Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kuglar, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO", Foreign Affairs 4 (September/October 1993) 28-40.

Senior officials in the US State Department and National Security Council agreed that NATO enlargement could be used as a tool to encourage and promote political and economic reform to the East. However, the pace and scope of enlargement was hotly debated with serious inter-agency differences emerging.[280] Supporters advocated a policy of gradual enlargement to show Europe that the US was committed to its security, that Germany was not driving the Alliance East, and that NATO was relevant after the Cold War. Enlargement would also satisfy a number of American ethnic groups of Central and East European origin lobbying for their home country's inclusion in NATO. This domestic appeal might give members of Congress, who were becoming increasingly skeptical of funding a US role in Europe, with new justification for supporting NATO. Thus a prolonged debate over NATO enlargement would shift discussion from whether NATO was needed after the Cold War, to whether or not it should expand. A major initiative toward NATO would also help President Clinton establish his foreign policy credentials.

National Security Advisor W. Anthony Lake and key State Department figures (including Ambassador to Germany Richard Holbrooke and the US negotiator at the Helsinki CSCE conference John Kornblum) were convinced of the institutional value of using enlargement to encourage

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280. Interview with a former senior Administration official, Washington D.C., March 1996.

reform. A gradual approach to NATO enlargement fit well into the new US policy of "enlargement and engagement" formulated by Lake and his National Security Council staff. This approach stressed the importance of international institutions where the US could best direct policy - such as NATO. The goal was to expand the number of democratic nations in the world while engaging troubled areas through partnership where possible and with power if necessary.[281] Nevertheless, as support within the Clinton Administration for NATO enlargement grew, senior officials in the Department of Defense, and especially in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed concerns about taking on substantial new military commitments while downsizing US capabilities. Such concerns combined with caution signals from Russian experts in the Department of State to produce an inter-agency compromise - the Partnership for Peace.[282]

On 6 October NATO Secretary General Worner met with President Clinton and his top foreign policy advisors in

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281. See United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995).

282. Within NATO there was shared sentiment that some sort of compromise was necessary to go beyond the NACC but stop short of membership as there was no consensus in NATO for enlargement. As a senior NATO official told The Washington Post on 31 August: "Right now, the prevailing wisdom is that bringing in Poland or any other state would be risky and self-defeating for the Alliance as a whole." William Drozdiak, "NATO Balks at Opening Pact to E. Europe," The Washington Post, 1 September 1993, A25. The name Partnership for Peace grew out of discussion in SHAPE about giving the NACC a "Partnership for Peacekeeping" function. While the PFP was the result of considerable inter-agency review, the primary impetus was the European and NATO policy office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. If any one individual can be most closely identified with the initiative it was Dr. Joseph Kruzel, who headed that office as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO, and his accompanying staff.

Washington DC and received a briefing on the US plans for partnership with Central and Eastern Europe. The stated intention was to use perspective toward NATO membership to maintain momentum for reform in Central and Eastern Europe while buying the Alliance time. NATO partnerships would be open to all NACC/CSCE countries and they would gain all of the institutional benefits of NATO - except a security guarantee. Practical security cooperation could be attained through training and exercises in preparation for joint peacekeeping operations.[283]

At a meeting of NATO defense ministers on 20-21 October in Travemunde, Germany an informal agreement was reached that new members would only be admitted in the long term and the PFP was endorsed as an alternative. Reflecting concerns in the Alliance that premature discussion of NATO enlargement would isolate Russia and perhaps hinder reform in Moscow, NATO Secretary General Worner affirmed that the: "Western Alliance would consider the legitimate concerns of Russia" and that "we do not want to isolate Moscow."[284] These comments reflected an informal response to a letter sent by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 15 September to NATO Headquarters and to the major NATO countries outlining strong Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. Yeltsin indicated that enlargement would violate the 2-plus-4

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283. Interview with a senior NATO Official, October 1993.

284. Comments to the Press by NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner, 21 October 1993. NATO Office of Information and Press.

arrangement for German unification. As an alternative, Yeltsin proposed a NATO-Russian security guarantee for Eastern Europe.

In a speech to the Atlantic Council of the United States on 3 December 1993 US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin identified five key benefits of the PFP:

> First, it does not redivide Europe...Partnership for Peace gives all nations the same chance to take part, but makes the results dependent on the effort of each partner. Second, Partnership for Peace sets up the right incentives. In the old Cold War world, NATO was an alliance created in response to an external threat. In the new, post-Cold War world NATO can be an alliance based on shared values of democracy and the free market. Partnership for Peace rewards those who move in that direction. Third, Partnership for Peace requires that partners make a real contribution. It doesn't just ask what NATO can do for its new partners, it asks what the new partners can do for NATO...Fourth, it keeps NATO at the center of European security concerns and thereby keeps American involvement at the center of Europe. Finally, it puts the question of NATO membership for the partners where it belongs, at the end of the process, rather than at the beginning.[285]

The PFP would, according to Aspin, allow those partners which take full advantage of the program to "pick up NATO's standard operating procedures, habits of cooperation, and routines of consultation."[286]

Personally briefed on the PFP by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Russian President Boris Yeltsin described the plan as "brilliant". Central and East

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[285]. Les Aspin, "Partnership for Peace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to the Atlantic Council of the United States," J.W. Marriott Hotel, Washington D.C., 3 December 1993.

[286]. Aspin "Partnership for Peace..." For official discussion of the objectives behind the PFP see Joe Kruzel, "Partnership for Peace and the Transformation of North Atlantic Security," in Papacosma and Heiss 339-346.

European countries were not as thrilled but a promise to keep open the door to NATO via the PFP was intended to provided reassurance that they might ultimately attain Article 5 membership in the Alliance. Despite promises from US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Stephen Oxman on 26 October that "we do not want to be perceived or in any way treat others as second-class citizens", some critics felt that PFP did exactly this. Polish officials were especially animated in their rhetoric - disturbed by what they perceived as a "Yalta II" in the PFP. US Senator Richard Lugar called PFP a "band-aid offered in place of corrective surgery."[287]

The PFP was approved by the NATO heads of state meeting in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994 who stated that: "We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe."[288] The NATO leaders invited NACC and other CSCE countries that are able and willing to join the PFP which: "...will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of

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287. Senator Richard G. Lugar, "NATO's 'Near Abroad': New Membership, New Missions: Speech to The Atlantic Council of the United States on 9 December 1993." Lugar criticized the PFP as a bureaucratic half-step that had a "Russia-first" orientation that would give Moscow a defacto veto over NATO's future and encourage neo-imperial tendencies in Moscow.

288. Partnership for Peace Invitation. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 10-11 January 1994. NATO Office of Information and Press.

NATO."[289] The NATO countries would establish 16-plus-1 consultations with permanent offices at NATO Headquarters and at a SHAPE Planning Cell in Mons.[290] 16-plus-1 refers to the multilateral relationship of the 16 NATO members with each individual Partner country.[291] Consultation would include the right to call a 16-plus-1 PFP meeting "...if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security."[292] The heads of state added that: "At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed."[293]

NATO did not have a strong history of effective institutional efforts in the new missions that it was advancing vis-a-vis the PFP. However, given the demand from some Central and Eastern European countries for direct cooperation with NATO, the Alliance was in a strong position to use its leverage to link cooperation and consultation

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289. Partnership for Peace Invitation.

290. The actual Planning Cell is located near the Allied Command Europe Headquarters outside the SHAPE compound.

291. The actual Planning Cell is located near the Allied Command Europe Headquarters outside the SHAPE compound.

292. Partnership for Peace Invitation.

293. Partnership for Peace Invitation.

with certain behavior from the states that joined the PFP. Therefore at the Brussels meeting, NATO approved a uniform document for each country to sign when joining the program. Participation was contingent upon adherence by the partner to the "...protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy (which) are shared values fundamental to the Partnership."[294] The PFP required NATO partners to cooperate with the Alliance in pursuing the following objectives:

1 Facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes.

2. Ensuring democratic control of defense forces.[295]

3. Maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE.

4. The development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed.

5. The development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.[296]

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294. Partnership for Peace Framework Document.

295. This point was left vague by NATO as it was unclear to whose satisfaction democratic control of armed forces had to be maintained.

296. Partnership for Peace Framework Document.

Each partner would submit an Individual Partnership Program (IPP) identifying ways to work with the Alliance and what assets it might contribute to joint planning for peacekeeping and other forms of 16-plus-1 (or multilateral) activity. Partner countries were required to list the steps that have been, or will be undertaken to promote transparency in the national defense planning and budgeting processes, and to ensure democratic control of the armed forces. Operationally, the program required an indication of long-range plans, force development goals, and other planning factors that could affect a Partner's future involvement in the Partnership (such as changes in the structure of the armed forces or the setting up of special peacekeeping units). Partners were required to fund their own PFP activities and share the full burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part.

Describing the PFP, a senior advisor to Polish President Lech Walesa commented to the press that: "We've gone from Chamberlain's umbrella to Clinton's saxophone."[297] Nevertheless, the PFP grew to include 27 partnerships - none of which were hampered by the size constraints of the NACC or CSCE.[298] Those countries who chose to integrate closely with NATO planning were invited to join the PFP Planning and

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297. United Press International. 12 January 1994.

298. This activity involved hundreds of PFP or "in the spirit of PFP" related NATO programs. PFP has included major peacekeeping exercises - largely modeled after hypothetical Balkan scenarios - held in Poland, the Netherlands, the North Sea, the Baltic, the US, the Czech Republic, and Hungary (for example).

Review Process (PARP) where they can (every two years) exchange data on their defense plans and budgets, and identify areas in which they agree to work toward improving interoperability between their military forces and those of NATO in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations (to include areas as specific as communications procedures and refuelling capabilities).[299] To facilitate this restricted opening of NATO to Partners, NATO committees were expanded in their scope to include direct activities in support of the NACC and the PFP.

The PFP was a creative compromise balancing between reassurance of Russia and of the smaller democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. PFP helps prepare interested Partners for NATO membership - thus lowering the costs of restructuring their militaries and integrating their forces into NATO military planning. Should the political and military situation in Russia and the former Soviet Union change or other unforeseen events threaten the stability of Central and Eastern Europe, NATO could expand quickly since the states will have had a period of working toward NATO standards via the PFP. Several months after the announcement of the PFP, a senior US official asserted that: "...should the situation deteriorate in the East and Russia, and it became necessary at some step to draw the line between Eastern and Western...the Partnership for Peace

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[299]. By 1996 15 PFP countries had joined the PARP.

would put us in a better position to do that."[300] Absent that worst case analysis, the PFP allowed for considerable flexibility in direct and multilateral relationships among potential partners - including Russia.

The PFP was not, however, without problems and contradictions. Because the PFP was seen by many Central and East European countries as a direct path into NATO, it unintentionally encouraged competition between some Partners racing to meet unspecified NATO criteria at the expense of bilateral or multilateral settlement of regional disputes. Also, by deferring enlargement, the PFP had the potential to undermine reform governments in Central and Eastern Europe who had made full NATO membership their primary foreign policy goal.[301] Like the NACC, the PFP tends to emphasize military-to-military cooperation with the potential to undermine civil-military reform efforts in Central and Eastern Europe.[302] Additionally, the trend in some PFP countries has been to stress quantity over quality in their IPP. Of the 232 PFP programs proposed by Hungary in its 1995 IPP there were only 4 that promoted democratic control

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300. White House Information Service, 27 May 1994.

301. The US hoped to show that participation in PFP would have visible gains by providing 100 million dollars for Fiscal Year 1996 for PFP support programs.

302. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995) 44. To compensate NATO created a Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) which links civilian oversight of PFP programs and their military implementation. Under the PMSC (Chaired by the Deputy Secretary General of NATO) countries can send representatives from any ministry that is most relevant to the issue being raised in the 16-plus-1 format or among a number of partners coordinating activities.

of the armed forces. These were limited to three information exchanges among experts and one conference.[303] The PFP process also failed to promote transparency because Partners have been reluctant to publish their IPPs with only Hungary volunteering. In a worst case, the PFP had the appearance of security enhancement without increasing deterrence capacity for the Partner states. A participant could participate in peacekeeping planning, but it was not clear how preparation for peacekeeping was relevant to the capability of, for example, the Baltic states to defend their borders against an attack.

Interlocking Institutions: A False Promise of Peace

By 1994 the elements of a new European security architecture were in place - NATO, the NACC, the PFP, the CSCE, and to a lesser extent the EU and the WEU. The missing ingredient was peace in the former Yugoslavia. In 1992 NATO embarked on a process of building peacekeeping capabilities via interlocking institutions for collective diplomacy to signal threats toward the warring parties. In practice, however, there was no consensus on how and when to conduct peacekeeping operations. What became a debate over institutional architecture for peacekeeping obscured,

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303. Jeffrey Simon, "Partnership for Peace: Guaranteeing Success," Strategic Forum 44 (September 1995) 3.

clouded, and inhibited the attainment of peace and security in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991-1995.

Institutions and Peacekeeping in post-Cold War Europe

At a June 1992 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Oslo, Norway, the US announced that it would contribute manpower to a NATO and CSCE peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslav republics.[304] Addressing the NAC, US Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger stated that: "The United States is prepared to make essential contributions, such as lift and logistics, to peacekeeping operations...We also do not exclude providing ground contingents on the same basis as other nations."[305] While the German delegation concurred, the United Kingdom and France were hesitant. Britain was especially distressed that NATO could become "Europe's policeman." In a speech to the Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association prior to the meeting, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stated that "neither marines nor parachutists nor new-fashioned Blue Helmets can fight their way to peace among peoples mingled together village by village." Yet Hurd conceded that: "NATO must make its resources available when the international

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304. At the Prague CSCE foreign minsters meeting in January 1992 the German delegation (with strong support from Italy, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and Poland) proposed creating standing CSCE peacekeeping forces. Because of opposition from the US, Britain and France, the proposal was tabled. However, the idea was kept alive by the Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek who suggested that NATO should have a peacekeeping role under CSCE auspices.

305. USNATO Wireless File: Security Issues Digest 1088:5 (June 1992).

community has decided that action needs to be taken."[306] For France, there was an ongoing concern that any overture from NATO to the CSCE would increase the role of the US in Europe. Therefore France (joined by Belgium and Spain) insisted that any peacekeeping request be made to individual governments and not to NATO as an organization.

Because of the differing perspectives among key NATO members toward peacekeeping, the Oslo meeting was mostly symbolic. However, a political framework had been established for institutional adaptation. The foreign ministers stated that:

> The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.[307]

NATO members were concerned not to create an automatic mechanism for NATO peacekeeping and thus the case-by-case language. Also, the offer included a requirement that NATO forces could be made available in response to an official CSCE request addressed to NATO (where consensus was required for a response) and to its individual member states. This procedural mechanism turned the relationship into "interblocking" institutions. A consensus would have to

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306. Michael Evans, "UK Reluctant to Use Troops in Bosnia," The Times, (London) 3 June 1992, 11.

307. Oslo Summit: Final Communique. NATO Office of Information and Press, 10 June 1992.

exist in NATO for CSCE peacekeeping. Should a NATO member (all of whom had overlapping membership in the CSCE) oppose peacekeeping, it could discourage or veto an initial CSCE request and still deflect blame for inaction onto the institution.

Nevertheless, NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner suggested that peacekeeping could cover "not only transport, other infrastructure facilities, and supplies of military equipment, but also troops if necessary."[308] While proclaiming the agreement historic, NATO stressed that it did not indicate a commitment to intervene in the Balkan conflict. Thus, the Oslo statement served two essentially symbolic roles. The first was a veiled threat to the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia that mechanisms for the possible use of force were being incorporated by NATO and the CSCE. The second provided continued impetus to the CSCE for its scheduled review conference the following month in Helsinki.

At Helsinki the CSCE foreign ministers welcomed the NATO initiative, but failed to act.[309] The false promise of NATO/CSCE peacekeeping in the Balkan crisis therefore prompted NATO to look to the UN for an out-of-area mandate

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308. See Robert Mauthner, "NATO Agrees to Peacekeeping Role in Europe." The Financial Times (UK) 5 June 1992, 4.

309. Meeting on the sidelines of the summit NATO and WEU members did agree to begin joint naval patrol exercises in the Adriatic Sea to enforce the UN arms embargo against the former Yugoslav republics. This was, however, a largely symbolic action as the major violations of the embargo were occurring over land.

in spite of the fact that its own members were largely responsible for blocking action in the CSCE. The CSCE did identify itself as a regional organization under Article VIII of the UN Charter (at Helsinki) and the UN was quick to call on the CSCE for peacekeeping assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A copy of a UN request for CSCE assistance was forwarded to NATO Headquarters prompting a divisive internal debate in the Alliance as to how to respond to these overlapping institutional requests. Some NATO members felt that to get a mandate for planning out-of-area activities, it was necessary to receive a formal request from the CSCE. However, others argued that since the CSCE was now a regional organization under the UN, the request to the CSCE was sufficient to justify NATO planning.[310] As a result, ongoing debates within and among institutions inhibited international efforts to bring peace to the Balkans.

The Rise and Fall of the United Nations in the Balkans

Absent a consensus among its members for direct NATO involvement in the Balkans, UN peacekeeping became the only alternative for arranging international efforts to promote peace. At the December 1992 NAC ministerial, NATO signaled that it was prepared to undertake peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council and to "respond positively to initiatives that the UN Secretary

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[310]. Drew 9-10.

General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions."[311] However, internal NATO disputes continued to block active consideration of policy options toward attaining peace in the Balkans. By early 1993, interlocking institutions were becoming, at best, excuses for national inaction and, at worst, obstacles to ending the conflict. In particular, the UN had imposed an arms embargo on all parties in the former Yugoslavia in 1991. Enforced by NATO (and the WEU), the embargo enhanced an imbalance of power favoring Serb forces (which had inherited most of the military apparatus of the Yugoslav National Army) allowing them to make territorial gains and carry out a policy of ethnic cleansing. Lifting the arms embargo became politically impossible once the UN had deployed peacekeepers on the ground in 1992 for contributing states worried that their troops would get caught up in increased fighting if more weapons flowed into the region.

This new procedural arrangement did mean that NATO could now support UN humanitarian efforts and enforcement of a no-fly zone over the region. By 1994 the NATO mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina included protection of heavy weapons exclusion zones and safe havens for civilian populations.[312]

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311. Communique Issued by the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 17 December 1992. NATO Office of Information and Press.

312. For an official UN perspective on the relationship with NATO see Kofi Annan, "UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO," NATO Review 41:5 (October 1993) 3-7. Also see Dirk A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia: Partners

Operationally, the institutional cultures of NATO and the UN clashed thereby contributing further to the false promise of interlocking institutions. In response to the initial UN request for assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO began planning for military operations in the region. Charged with making estimates on how to support the provision of humanitarian assistance to alleviate the Serb siege of Sarajevo, NATO planners began with the assumption that since a peaceful environment did not exist, the UN request to guarantee the delivery of aid in a hostile environment would require up to 100,000 troops. Because UN peacekeeping planning assumed a peaceful environment before forces were deployed, the UN had estimated needing only 2000-4000 troops.[313]

Though the US was extremely reluctant to place its forces on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1993 NATO military officials were instructed by the NAC to began informal planning for a force of around 50,000 peacekeepers - of which 25,000 would be US personnel - that could be deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the event that a peace settlement was reached. NATO planning included peacekeeping activities such as: monitoring cease-fires and withdrawals of forces; supervising disarmament and control of weapons; escorting, controlling and protecting convoys; creating

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in International Cooperation (The Hague, Netherlands: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1994).

313. Drew 12.

safe corridors; creating and monitoring buffer zones; providing logistical assistance; and removing hazardous munitions.[314] However, working simultaneously in the UN and NATO political bodies, and with troop commanders on the ground, France successfully blocked formal NATO consideration of command and control arrangements by insisting they remain in the UN and thereby effectively blocking any immediate or substantial NATO role in promoting peace in the region.[315] By this point 141,000 people had been killed and 3.5 million refugees had fled the conflict - all in spite of UN and EU negotiated cease-fires and the deployment of some 24,281 UN peacekeepers on the ground.

A New Russian Assertiveness and a Return to the CSCE

Just as Europe and the US were bypassing it in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the CSCE re-entered the debate over security institutions in autumn 1993. Russia promoted the CSCE as an alternative to NATO's increasing role and to codify Russian peacekeeping or peacemaking in the former Soviet Union. On 30 November Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev asked the CSCE to support (especially financially) Russian peacekeeping missions in the former Soviet Union and suggested that the CSCE should take over the political

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314. John Kriendler, "NATO's Changing Role - Opportunities and Constraints for Peacekeeping", NATO Review 41:3 (June 1993) 15-22.

315. Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. is Urging NATO to Prepare Force for Duty in Bosnia," The New York Times, 11 March 1993, A1,16.

coordination of peacekeeping missions organized by the CIS, NATO, the NACC, and the WEU.[316] The Russian proposal placed NATO members in the difficult position of balancing the strong opposition of the three Baltic countries and Ukraine to the Russian proposal; the reality that NATO would not assume a peacekeeping role in the former Soviet Union; and a desire not to alienate Russia over the expanding role of NATO.[317] Central and East Europeans were especially concerned that the Kozyrev proposals were part of a return to traditional Russian nationalism or even neo-imperialism. While Moscow's rhetoric out-paced Russian capabilities, growing public support for extreme Russian nationalists in the December 1993 parliamentary elections fueled this concern.[318]

The CSCE foreign ministers did not endorse the Russian proposal, but agreed to strengthen the CSCE as a pan-European forum for cooperative security and political consultation on the basis of equality. In deference to Russia, they also agreed: "...to pursue the possibility of enhancing capabilities to apply CSCE crisis management

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316. RFE/RL Daily Reports. 1 December 1993.

317. Estonia acknowledged that it may be necessary to allow Russia to undertake peacekeeping operations for the CSCE in some parts of the former Soviet Union in particular cases. However, Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste was adamant that Russia should only be permitted to do so under strict conditions and only on a case-by-case basis. He stressed that under "no circumstances should Russia be given a broad mandate to be the CSCE force." RFE/RL Daily Reports. 30 November 1993.

318. See Suzanne Crow, "Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, 6 May 1994 and Sean Kay, The Political Victory of the Russian Armed Forces: Assessing the Impact in the New Military Doctrine (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, NATODATA Service, 1994).

arrangements on a case-by-case basis to situations involving third-party forces when such arrangements are determined to be supportive of CSCE objectives.[319] However, most NATO and Central and East European countries had lost interest in the CSCE. Thus the challenge was to find a creative way to keep Russia facing West short of granting too much authority to the CSCE. The solution would be found in another institution - the PFP.

Though President Boris Yeltsin welcomed the PFP, Russia began using its participation in it to obstruct NATO enlargement and restore Russian national pride. When Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev addressed NATO defense ministers on 25 May 1994, he said that: "...it wouldn't be correct for Russia to set forth some specific conditions for cooperation or trying to say that we want to occupy a better place, a so-called warmer place under the sun, in the program." However, Grachev was also clear that Russia would request special privileges via an undefined "active mechanism" for consultation with the West over peacekeeping operations, strategic planning, and joint exercises outside of the PFP.[320]

The NATO members agreed to negotiate a "special status" with Russia but strove to avoid any perception that they were granting Russia a sphere of influence in the East or a

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319. CSCE Ministerial Final Communique, "CSCE and the New Europe - Our Security in Indivisible," November 1993. CSCE Secretariat in Prague, The Czech Republic.

320. Reuters. 25 May 1994.

veto over NATO policy. But at the 10 June NACC meeting, NATO appeared to defer to Russian sensitivities to the point of conferring a de facto veto for Russia within the Alliance. Kozyrev announced Russia's intention to join the PFP but insisted on first negotiating a detailed and signed cooperation program that would formalize a relationship based on what Kozyrev called "no mutual vetoes or surprises."[321] Kozyrev expected a formal piece of paper from NATO signaling broad deference toward Russia to prove to hard-liners in Moscow that NATO had given in to Russian demands.[322] At a press conference in Moscow that afternoon President Yeltsin said with regard to Russia's special status that: "NATO has agreed...it is necessary to sign such a protocol - even if some bureaucrats reject that protocol, we will sign it anyway."[323]

In Brussels, the NAC took up the prospects of increasing dialogue with Russia. After lengthy discussion between NATO Assistant Secretary General Gebhardt von Moltke and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin, a deal was announced on a framework for relations between Russia and NATO. Kozyrev traveled to Brussels on 22 June and signed the PFP coupled with a joint NATO/Russia declaration. The declaration stressed that both NATO and Russia have an important role in European security and that cooperative

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321. Reuters. 10 June 1994.
322. Interview with a NATO official, Brussels, June 1994.
323. Reuters. 10 June 1994.

relations of mutual respect and friendship between the Alliance and Russia are a key element for security within the entire CSCE area. The NATO/Russia special relationship was designed to promote dialogue and cooperation in areas where Russia has a unique and important contribution to make, commensurate with its size and role as a nuclear power, through the establishment of an extensive IPP. This relationship would be based on the sharing of information on issues regarding political-security related matters having a European dimension; political consultations, as appropriate, on issues of common concern; and cooperation in a range of security-related areas including, as appropriate, peacekeeping.[324] NATO officials expressed relief at the commitment by Russia to work with NATO which could pave the way toward close military cooperation in areas of shared interest - especially peacekeeping.

Toward Peace in the Balkans?

By 1995 several NATO operations were providing operational support to enhance UN peacekeeping in the Balkans.[325] Despite the hope that this institutional

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[324]. Joint NATO-Russia Declaration, 22 June 1994. NATO Office of Information and Press.

[325]. This included operation "Provide Promise" which flew humanitarian assistance into Bosnia (totalling several thousand sorties by 1995). Operation "Sharp Guard" was conducted jointly with the WEU to enforce the UN arms embargo against the warring parties. Operation "Deny Flight" used NATO air power to deny military flights by the warring parties over the region. Operation "Able Sentry" was a UN mission including several hundred US ground forces placed in Macedonia as a preventive "trip-wire" force to deter the spread of the war outside of its current boundaries.

activity could end the war, nearly 250,000 had now died. In the fall of 1993 the US sought consensus among its NATO allies for a more "robust" use of air power against violators of UN resolutions to include targeting transportation facilities, command and control sites, weapons storage depots and other non-civilian stationary targets.[326] European countries with troops on the ground were reluctant to support this policy. However, by spring 1995 NATO agreed on a more robust use of air power to support a new cease-fire negotiated by former US President Jimmy Carter.[327] Responding to Serb violations of UN resolutions in May, NATO bombed Serb ammunition depots and brought forth the UN peacekeeper's worst nightmare: Serb forces took several hundred peacekeepers hostage - some of whom were chained to likely NATO targets as human shields.

Shortly after the release of the UN soldiers, Croatia launched successful attacks against Serb-held territory it had lost in 1991 and Bosnian government forces massed near Sarajevo preparing to break the Serb siege of this so-called "safe haven". NATO was fundamentally split on its response

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326. This policy was publicly criticized by the UN political representative on the ground in Croatia, Yasushi Akashi. He insisted that Serb attacks on UN Safe Areas were not sufficient to call in NATO air strikes. Akashi publicly criticized US policy as "somewhat reticent, somewhat afraid, timid and tentative" and insisted that the US should send ground forces to Bosnia. These comments thoroughly discredited Akashi with the US, NATO Headquarters, and the Bosnian Muslims. US Ambassador to the UN Madeline Albright complained to Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali that Akashi was out of line and that international servants "should remember where their salaries are paid." Associated Press. 2 May 1994.

327. NATO also began planning for the possible deployment of forces to evacuate UN peacekeepers in the event that they might be withdrawn.

with the US quietly encouraging the Bosnian Muslims and the Europeans attempting to maintain neutrality. The essence of the crisis was summarized by a senior French military official on 30 June 1995 who stated that: "If the Europeans are on one side and the Americans on the other, it would be like an earthquake in the Atlantic alliance."[328] US Secretary of State William Perry was even more blunt in his assessment of NATO in the summer of 1995: "Paralysed into inaction, NATO seemed to be irrelevant in dealing with the Bosnian crisis...It appeared to me that NATO was in the process of unravelling."[329]

In July Bosnian Serbs over-ran UN safe havens (Gorazde and Zepa) in Eastern Bosnia in blatant defiance of NATO and the UN.[330] The offensive borrowed heavily from Serb forces occupying Muslim lands in Western Bosnia thus creating a power vacuum that allowed Muslim and Croatian forces to make simultaneous gains in Western Bosnia and Southern Croatia.[331] Recognizing this power shift on the ground, the US launched a major diplomatic initiative in July and August 1995 to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina and restore the

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328. Reuters. 30 June 1995.

329. Reuters. 20 November 1996.

330. According to some NATO officials, NATO sought to launch air strikes to protect these cities but the request was turned town by the UN.

331. While Bosnia had been under a variety of cease-fires in 1994 and 1995, the Muslim forces had regrouped and rebuilt their forces with outside assistance attained via violations of the UN arms embargo. This was aided by an informal decision by the Clinton Administration to permit Iran to export arms to the Muslims.

credibility of NATO.[332] US determination was heightened by the death of three of its most capable and experienced diplomats on the Mt. Igman road outside Sarajevo.[333] On 28 August Bosnian Serbs shelled Sarajevo killing 39 civilians. NATO responded with Operation Deliberate Force in early September. This was a major NATO air operation with narrow political objectives: to end the shelling of Sarajevo, to open the airport and the roads around Sarajevo, for safe transit, to remove all Serb heavy weapons from a 12.5 mile radius of Sarajevo and to deter attacks on other safe havens. The air power combined with Muslims and Croat territorial gains to push the Bosnian Serbs toward a negotiated settlement that would retain Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unitary state based on a 51-49% division favoring a US-negotiated Muslim and Croat Federation.[334]

Under the tutelage of US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Canada Richard Holbrooke, the warring parties

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332. On 25 July 1995 NATO agreed to prepare for a much more assertive use of air power should a political decision be taken by the NAC to protect UN Safe Areas.

333. This included Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy Joseph Kruzel, National Security Council official S. Nelson Drew, and Ambassador Robert Frasure. Dr. Kruzel and Col. Drew were the brain-trust of US action not only in Bosnia but toward NATO as a whole. This was particularly true regarding the PFP (Kruzel) and the Combined Joint Task Forces (Drew) proposals of the January 1994 NATO summit.

334. Domestic political calculations also contributed to the decision by President Clinton to engage the US. Congress had been asserting considerable pressure on the Administration with bipartisan support for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. The Administration argued that such "feel good" measures were endorsed by members who knew that such a step, taken unilaterally, would probably increase the bloodshed, split NATO and raise the possibility of US troops being deployed to evacuate UN peacekeepers while entering on the ground to train and supply Bosnian Muslims. Nevertheless, the Republican-led Congress was now directing US Balkan policy and thus President Clinton's political future was linked to an ability to reassert his authority in foreign policy. See Sean Kay, "Putting Bosnia on the White House Lawn," European Brief 3:1 (October 1995) 51-52.

met in Dayton, Ohio, in October and reached an agreement on a peace settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina signed on 15 December 1995. The political preconditions for peace were not entirely due to NATO activity. There had been dramatic shifts in the balance of power on the ground and the Yugoslav patrons of the Bosnian Serbs in Belgrade needed to gain favor with the West to end devastating UN economic sanctions. However, the accord and the peace it hoped to preserve depended on NATO and its institutional planning begun in 1993. Without a rapid deployment of strong and credible peacekeeping forces the agreement would likely unravel as adequate reassurance did not exist for the warring parties in the absence of a credible peacekeeping presence. Rapid deployment was necessary to reassure the Muslims and Croats who feared that the Bosnian Serbs might negotiate a cease-fire only to regroup in the hope that the Serb-led Yugoslavia would intervene and annex Serb territory in Eastern Bosnia in the name of "Greater Serbia". Such Serb actions might prompt Croatia to annex Western Bosnia.[335] Only NATO could meet these requirements because the plans that the Alliance had undertaken since 1993 in the NACC, PFP, and NATO were quickly put into place through the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force (IFOR).

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[335]. At a London dinner reception earlier in 1995 for Croatian President Fanjo Tudjman, the leader of the British Liberal Party Paddy Ashdown asked the Croatian how he viewed Bosnia in 10 years. Tudjman reportedly took his dinner napkin and drew a map of the region where there was no Bosnia at all - rather an expanded Croatia and an expanded Serbia having divided the territory.

Without NATO the warring parties would not have been sufficiently reassured of their protection while agreeing to end hostilities. A temporary international coalition might have been attainable for peacekeeping. However, establishing such a force would have required consolidating a multinational force, infrastructure, and a new command and control structure. Because there was urgency to the peacekeeping deployment, only NATO had the standing integrated plans, command and control and infrastructure to act quickly. Under the framework of Operation Joint Endeavor, NATO was able to deploy rapidly some 60,000 troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina - of which about 1/3 were Americans.[336] NATO troops were given a mandate by the UN Security Council to use "all necessary force" to maintain the integrity of its mission of peace implementation. In late 1995, NATO's Crisis Management Organization (CMO) was activated to coordinate operation Joint Endeavor. This included elements from operations, intelligence, logistics, systems divisions, and liaison elements coming together in one planning cell to streamline and lower the transaction costs of this

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[336]. The specific military tasks of IFOR as approved by the NAC were: to ensure self-defense and freedom of movement; to supervise selective marking of boundaries and Zone of Separation (ZOS) between the parties; to monitor and - if needed - enforce the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories, and the establishment of ZOS; to assume control of the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the movement of military traffic over key ground routes; to establish Joint Military Commissions, to serve as the central bodies for all Parties to the Peace Agreement; and to assist with the withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to IFOR. IFOR Fact Sheet (June 1996), NATO Office of Information and Press.

multilateral military action.[337] In so doing, NATO demonstrated that after four years of institutional activity, it had moved from adaptation in theory to practice in terms of its missions. NATO had become more flexible, could field new and creative command structures, and at the same time continue to facilitate the use of raw power when necessary. However, NATO had also shown that it could not function in the absence of American leadership.

IFOR and the Partnership for Peace

The multilateral nature of IFOR, which brought together military forces from thirty-three countries, was greatly enhanced by the PFP. Eager to show their willingness to contribute to a NATO operation, and hopefully enhance their prospects for membership in NATO, over a dozen PFP countries joined IFOR.[338] The exercises that PFP countries had taken with NATO paved the way for quick integration of contingents from PFP countries totaling nearly 10,000 personnel.[339] The importance of this contribution was acknowledged by the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Berlin in June 1996 who stated that:

> Partnership for Peace has become a permanent element of European security cooperation and has

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337. See General George Joulwan, "SHAPE and IFOR: Adapting to the Needs of Tomorrow," NATO Review 2 (March 1996) 6-9.

338. Including Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden and Ukraine.

339. For example, in October 1995 (just prior to IFOR deployment) staff officers from nine NATO/PFP countries participated in operation Cooperative Light as a command post exercise simulating the establishment of a buffer zone between two warring parties.

> demonstrated its value in the current IFOR operation. We are particularly pleased that 12 Partners have joined us in this endeavor, which has benefitted from the experience and interoperability gained in the last two years from the participation of Partner troop contributors in joint PFP exercises and other PFP activities. This first common experience in IFOR charts the course for future security cooperation. We hope to ensure that cooperative relationships developed during the IFOR operation between Allies and Partners continue in the future to enhance the Partnership.[340]

Through IFOR the PFP countries gained operational experience in the NATO command structure that could never be attained through exercises and seminars alone. For Hungary, IFOR meant a direct increase in its security as its territory was used as a staging ground for US forces going in and out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A former Warsaw Pact country now had a NATO base on its soil. More generally, PFP participation in IFOR could only help those countries sharing the risks in their quest for NATO membership.

The PFP also provided an institutional framework to bring Russia into IFOR under a NATO command. Russia had been critical of NATO's Operation Deliberate Force - with President Boris Yeltsin labeling the attack on Serbs genocide and threatening to withdraw from the PFP if the air attacks did not stop. Eventually realizing that the US initiative was bringing peace to the Bosnians, Russia co-sponsored the Dayton talks and agreed to send 2000 troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina under a NATO command with a Russian General serving in the IFOR command at SHAPE. Operating

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340. Final Communique of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session Meeting in Berlin, Germany, 3 June 1996. NATO Office of Information and Press.

under NATO command and alongside American troops in the Posevina Corridor (one of the most dangerous areas of operation) would help show Moscow that NATO was not working against Russia. IFOR had become an inclusive model for NATO-Russian cooperation.[341]

IFOR would also strengthen the PFP process itself. Military command and control problems are most likely to increase proportionally to the amount of participants in a multinational operation. However, the movement toward common procedures attained via the PFP had lowered this probability. Nevertheless, some serious interoperability and language barriers hindered the command and control of PFP participants in IFOR. Experiencing these problems in action would feedback to the PFP countries who might then compensate for them in their future military planning via their IPP and PARP, resource allocation, and future budget plans. NATO could contribute by helping to identify areas for further improvement in future exercises and training.

Peace without Security?

IFOR completed its major military tasks by the summer of 1996. Warring parties were successfully separated thereby creating an environment in which the non-military aspects of rebuilding could begin. The Dayton Accords were premised on the conclusion that a lasting peace would

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341. Interview with a senior US official at the Department of Defense, March 1996.

require reintegration of a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina requiring reconciliation among the parties. Thus freedom of movement, expression, and association guaranteed through free and fair elections was necessary. This responsibility fell on the Organization for Cooperation in Europe (OSCE - the CSCE was renamed OSCE in December 1994) and on the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).[342] In addition to organizing elections, the OSCE was responsible for arms control and human rights guarantees in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[343]

Successful implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton accords would be essential for lasting security. Thus IFOR was tasked to play a limited but important role in this process by the NAC. Within its capabilities and resources, and the limits imposed by carrying out its key military tasks, IFOR was mandated to:

1. help to create secure conditions for the conduct by others of non-military tasks associated with the Peace Agreement, including free and fair elections;

2. assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions and assist the movement of these organizations; assist in the observation and prevention of interference with the movement

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342. See Carl Bildt, "Implementing the Civilian Tasks of the Bosnian Peace Agreement," NATO Review 5 (1996) 3-6.

343. The Hague War Crimes Tribunal (established in February 1993) meeting in the Netherlands would indict and prosecute war criminals, and other international agencies including the EU would channel aid for economic reconstruction and provide administration in some cities (such as Mostar). Reconstruction costs were estimated by the World Bank to cost up to 6 billion dollars. Aid programs would be organized by the EU through a conference of donor countries. By summer 1996 $1.8 billion had been pledged. William Drozdiak, "European Governments Respond with Relief," The Washington Post, 22 November 1995, A22.

of civilian populations, refugees and displaced persons, and respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person;

3. assist in the monitoring of the clearance of minefields and obstacles.[344]

In carrying out its basic mission, NATO indirectly contributed to a number of non-military operations by contributing over 400 Civil Affairs personnel to IFOR in support of the Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation (CJCIMIC) program which unites active and reserve civil affairs officers from around the world. Their specific role was to identify needs and projects for rebuilding civil infrastructure and institutions and to coordinate with international organizations, non-governmental organizations and humanitarian agencies to obtain necessary materials, money, and manpower to meet these needs.[345]

NATO military and civilian representatives worked in consultation with the World Bank and a variety of non-governmental organizations to identify over 200 projects for infrastructure reconstruction.[346] IFOR also made use of

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344. IFOR Fact Sheet (June 1996).

345. IFOR Fact Sheet - Civil Military Cooperation. NATO Office of Information and Press, 20 August 1996.

346. Infrastructure rebuilding became a substantial challenge to creating peace in Bosnia. By summer 1996 there remained up to six million land mines; 80 percent of power generators were damaged or out of operation; 40% of bridges destroyed; and telecommunications inoperative in large parts of the country. Additionally, 30 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's health facilities, 50 percent of its schools and 60 percent of its housing have been damaged. Per capita income is $500, industrial output is 5 percent of its former level, and war has left an overwhelming external debt and arrears mostly owed to commercial banks and bilateral creditors. In addition to 250,000 dead, 200,000 were wounded, about one fourth children. There are some two million displaced persons within Bosnia-Herzegovina and some one million outside the territory. 80 percent of Bosnia's population depends upon humanitarian assistance. Central and federal ministries are weak and low level political institutions are embryonic at best. Christine Wallich (World Bank), "Policy Forum: Bosnia - After the Troops Leave," The Washington Quarterly 19:3 (Summer 1996) 82-83.

NATO's Infrastructure Program to build bridges, repair roads, and provide staff for similar projects such as power, natural gas, water, and telecommunications in carrying out its deployment mission.[347] By March 1996 80 percent of Bosnia's major roads were open for use - a key contribution to freedom of movement.[348] Small but symbolic steps toward reconciliation included IFOR assistance in transporting 87 school children on an educational field trip from Tuzla to Zagreb and arranging for local schools to receive computers as donations from private voluntary organizations. Computer and public administration expertise was also made available to the OSCE to help it prepare for the process of electoral reconciliation.

Most importantly, establishing a secure environment leading to new elections would require apprehension of indicted war criminals for trial in the Hague. NATO was willing to arrest such figures if they were to happen upon them - but not to seek them out. Not wishing to spark confrontations, NATO commanders applied a strict interpretation of this mandate. Thus while NATO could provide security as a rapidly deployed peacekeeping force to help aid the voluntary separation of the warring parties, it

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347. For example, IFOR provided increased security presence when cargo of a strategic nature such as electrical transformers and hydroelectric turbines and turbine shafts were transported over disputed territory.

348. Joint Press Conference of Secretary General and Supreme Allied Commander Europe at NATO Headquarters, 18 March 1996. NATO Office of Information and Press. For example, IFOR troops rebuilt the Sarajevo Airport access road and the road which leads to the primary gas facility outside Sarajevo.

was not well suited for policing or long-term security provision.[349] However, the other institutions charged with facilitating the civilian elements of long-term peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained weak. Thus on 15 November 1996 President Clinton announced what had been in the works for months - that US and NATO forces would remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in substantial numbers for an additional 18 months in a follow on Stabilization Force or SFOR.

Analysis

As realism predicts, the effort to build interlocking institutions failed to prevent or end war in the Balkans and at times made matters worse. Nevertheless, realism alone is insufficient to explain the institutional activity that did enhance reassurance in Central and Eastern Europe during a highly unstable period of European history and contributed to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995. Institutional planning and outreach to Central and Eastern Europe via the PFP allowed NATO to move quickly into effective peacekeeping via IFOR. However, NATO's capacity to move Bosnia-Herzegovina from peace to lasting security was extremely limited - as was that of other institutions such as the UN, OSCE, and EU. Most significantly, IFOR and SFOR

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349. The serious nature of this institutional weakness was underscored by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic in August 1996 who said that: "No one can expect us to legalize something that we have been fighting against and ask us to accept the results of a war of conquest and genocide...As days go by our doubts and questions are multiplying." Reuters. 14 August 1996.

demonstrated that NATO only worked when it was led by the US in its traditional alliance functions.

Tasks

NATO formally identified four tasks it was to perform after the Cold War: promote stability, enhance and expand consultation, deter aggression against member states, and to maintain the general balance of power in Europe. To this NATO added linking institutional cooperation with free-market and democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe and organizing and undertaking peacekeeping missions. Additionally, NATO sought a contradictory goal of preventing a Russian veto over Alliance activity while building a special NATO-Russia relationship.

Organizational Capabilities

After the Cold War, NATO remained a highly formal institution with low autonomy. However, its member states increasingly gave NATO authority to socialize states from the former Warsaw Pact into the West. NATO expanded its formal structures to give PFP participants access to NATO officials and national delegations. Through the NACC and PFP process, extensive opportunities were created for military-to-military cooperation designed to increase Partner security via training, expertise, and conditional integration into NATO. Nonetheless, as the Balkan experience shows, when a real crisis emerged and member

state interests diverged, NATO was ineffective. Only after the absence of action had threatened the institutional credibility of NATO and a balance of power on the ground was attained did the interests of its member states converge sufficiently to bring peace to the Balkans. When national interests coalesced, NATO's institutional functions were generally quite effective.

Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures

The desire to assist democrats in Central and Eastern Europe via NATO's institutional activity was sincere. The NATO countries felt a strong moral obligation to help those who endorsed principles of democracy and the peaceful resolution of international and domestic disputes. NATO also sought to enhance norms of acceptable international behavior by strengthening other institutions such as the OSCE. Indeed, NATO's formal membership rules were transformed from restricted to conditional to support these objectives. NATO decision-making procedures remained fundamentally unchanged. However, new NATO institutions, the NACC and PFP, developed independent procedures of their own addressing a range of direct and indirect NATO-related activities.

Capacity for Change

NATO's survival after the Cold War was dependent upon a capacity for change. As an institution, the evolution of

new tasks and institutional structures indicated a high degree of change. However, when the end of a war required peacekeeping and NATO was put into formal military action for the first time in its history, it was only with strong American leadership that it functioned. Therefore in key ways, NATO had not adapted sufficiently to the changing dynamics of European security.

Conclusion: The Mixed Record of NATO Adaptation

The primary lesson of the early years of NATO's post-Cold War adaptation was that the institution did not function in the absence of US engagement. The US placed a high value on NATO but had no clear vital interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina beyond containment of the conflict. However, when NATO's inability to act began to undermine its credibility and draw into question its very purpose, the US intervened. As President Clinton said addressing the US on 27 November 1995 on the NATO plans for peacekeeping: "The only force capable of getting this job done is NATO, the powerful, military alliance of democracies that has guaranteed our security for half a century now...And as NATO's leader and the primary broker of the peace agreement the United States must be an essential part of the mission...If we're not there, NATO will not be there."[350]

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[350]. President Bill Clinton, Address to the Nation, 27 November 1995. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary.

However, Europe's security dependence on the US after the Cold War would not be politically sustainable. Keeping the Americans in Europe would require Europeans to take more responsibility for their own security - even though they had performed so poorly in the Balkans prior to 1995. Pressure was also increasing on NATO from some PFP countries for enlargement as a reward for participation in IFOR and as a means of preventing a similar crisis from occurring in the future. Thus after Bosnia, European security would require a fundamentally new - and potentially conflicting - institutional processes of external enlargement and internal restructuring.

CHAPTER VI
NATO ENLARGEMENT: SHAPING THE POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Introduction and Overview

Chapter Six shows that the strategy of NATO enlargement as adopted in January 1994 is primarily institutional in the goals of rewarding political and economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe. However, this well-intentioned institutional strategy may actually decrease security in Europe depending on the form that NATO enlargement takes. This chapter traces the evolution of the NATO enlargement policy, surveys realist and institutional arguments for and against enlargement, and outlines a course of action that will allow enlargement to proceed in a way that increases security in Europe. Specifically, it argues that NATO enlargement primarily to build democracy and manage conflict promotes a false promise. NATO's Partnership for Peace and other complementary institutions are the best means for performing these tasks. The strongest argument for enlarging NATO is to stabilize the countries on the eastern German border to create a hedge, not against a Russian threat, but between Germany and Russia. However, NATO enlargement is fraught with danger and the primary task of NATO as an institution must be to adapt its institutional form to ensure that no state views enlargement as decreasing its security.

NATO Enlargement: Who, Where, When, How, and Why?

The policy of NATO enlargement was approved by its members at the January 1994 Brussels Summit. Formally, NATO enlargement (planned for April 1999) will be gradual, transparent, and contribute to a broad concept of European security of which NATO is an important, but not sole, element in a comprehensive security architecture.[351] While this was a well-intended policy of stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe and hedging against a renewed Russian threat, it was not well implemented and at times seemed to cause more problems than it solved.

NATO Enlargement and Russia: Cooperation or Competition?

Russia has been steadfast in its opposition to NATO enlargement. President Boris Yeltsin has warned of the flame of war spreading throughout Europe and his former National Security Advisor Alexander Lebed once warned of World War III if NATO enlarges.[352] Officials from the Russian Ministry of Defense have signaled that Russia will establish a new Warsaw Pact style defense alliance in the FSU and may re-target nuclear weapons at new NATO members. Pro-western Russian reformers are bewildered by the

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351. Correspondence from a senior US State Department official, July 1995. See Sean Kay, "American Strategies Towards the Enlargement of European Security Institutions: Partnership or Cold Peace?," in Jarrod Wiener, ed., The Transatlantic Relationship (London: Macmillan Press, 1996) 42-65.

352. Atlantic News 2711 (20 April 1995).

enlargement policy complaining that it feeds Russian nationalism.[353]

NATO has hoped to assuage Russia's concerns by claiming that enlargement would be formally open to all interested countries in the CSCE region - including Russia.[354] Privately, few officials in NATO countries considered Russian membership an option. The requirements for admission to NATO would be so high that if it qualified, "Russia would be a very different place - a true Western democracy."[355] Internal differences between the US and Germany over how to approach Russia became public in September 1994. At a conference in Berlin, German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe rejected Russian membership. Ruehe stated that it would "blow NATO apart, it would be like the United Nations of Europe, it wouldn't work."[356] He added that some former Warsaw Pact countries could join NATO before the year 2000. At the same meeting, US Secretary of Defense William Perry indicated that he would not rule out Russian membership in NATO but that it would not happen in the foreseeable future.

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353. For a survey of Russian views of NATO enlargement see Aleksandr Konovalov, Andrey Kortunov, and Sergey Oznobishchev, "The Bankruptcy of 'NATOmania': This Concept Offers Nothing Positively New for Either Russia or the West." Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 March 1996. In FBIS-SOV-96-086-S, 2 May 1996, 5-8.

354. Keeping the door to NATO membership open to Russia was pushed strongest by the US and Canada.

355. Interview with a senior official from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 1994. Setting high standards for membership would also likely exclude a number of Central and Eastern European states.

356. Reuters. 9 September 1994.

Wanting NATO to speak as one voice, the Clinton Administration formulated a dual-track strategy in the autumn of 1994 to accelerate an internal NATO dialogue over enlargement while accommodating Russian concerns by strengthening the CSCE - Russia's preferred security institution. The policy adapted American diplomacy to a perceived frustration with the PFP in Central and Eastern Europe. The US proposed the creation of a NATO working group to define criteria for expansion.[357] A State Department official insisted: "...this policy is not designed to create an obstacle but to begin a process."[358] However, the US supported enlargement while making it difficult in practice. According to US and NATO officials, it was hoped that the study would allow NATO to defer the hard decisions on enlargement by two years until after scheduled Russian and American presidential elections.

By stressing the CSCE, the US hoped to demonstrate to Russia that there are inclusive opportunities for security cooperation other than NATO - and to signal a change in the traditional American view toward the CSCE. As a senior Administration official stated on 1 December 1994, the US was:

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357. According to US Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe: "NATO should only want new members who have passed beyond ambitions toward the territory of their neighbors, who have accepted the rights of their minorities, and who have established real and working democratic systems." Presentation to the Defense and Security Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly. North Atlantic Assembly Annual Session Meeting in Washington D.C., November 1994.

358. Interview with a senior State Department official, November 1994.

> ...making clear that NATO will expand, but this is going to be part of a larger European security structure that involves many different institutions - the European Union and in particular the CSCE...We consider, for the United States, NATO still to be the number one organization from our point of view, but we certainly want to increase the role of CSCE...this is a strategy that emphasizes our desire to have an inclusive relationship between NATO and all the Partners for Peace, that when NATO expansion occurs, its not going to be directed against Russia, but part of the broader policy of integration. CSCE fits into this larger policy as an institution where Russia is a member.[359]

However, when NATO Secretary General Willy Claes met with senior US officials at the State Department in November 1994, the American participants said surprisingly little about the CSCE linkage. While the US did support a change of name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe - OSCE. The US appeared to want to create the appearance of a strengthened OSCE without granting the institution too much authority.[360]

From Partnership to Cold Peace: A New Approach

When Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev travelled to Brussels in December 1994 to sign Russia's PFP/IPP, he declined at the last minute. Kozyrev declared shock and surprise at NATO's discussion of expansion even though the US had briefed Russia on its plans in advance. America's NATO allies were also uncomfortable with the US approach. The US sought to complete the review of enlargement criteria

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359. White House Information Service. 1 December 1994.

360. The US did propose a "beefing up" of OSCE capabilities to include non-proliferation, peacekeeping within the CIS, preventive mechanisms for addressing ethnic conflict, economic development, and proposed involving the institution more directly in the resolution of long-term problems in the Balkans.

in the following spring but this was rejected by the European members as moving too fast.[361] On 22 November 1994 German NATO Ambassador Hermann von Richthofen cabled his foreign ministry complaining that: "...the US Administration is moving quickly to expand NATO without consultations on the consequences for the Alliance."[362] Von Richthofen concluded that without a clear sense of mission and strategy, "...the Alliance is divided and in crisis."[363] Intra-alliance differences were papered over on 1 December when NATO foreign ministers stated that:

> We expect and would welcome NATO enlargement that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. Enlargement, when it comes would be part of a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe. It would threaten no one and would enhance stability and security for all of Europe.[364]

The ministers approved the US plan for a NATO working group to review enlargement and to report to the NAC by the end of the year. They also endorsed the continued strengthening of the CSCE.

On 5 December President Clinton attended the Budapest CSCE Summit to advance the second track of US policy. He stated that:

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361. John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and Beyond," International Affairs 71:2 (1995) 245.

362. Associated Press. 1 December 1994. Richthofen specifically noted existing differences within NATO over expansion that included Greece and Italy favoring Romania, Bulgaria, and possibly Malta while northern NATO countries wanted to prioritize admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

363. Associated Press. 1 December 1994.

364. NATO Office of Information and Press. 1 December 1995.

> We must not allow the Iron Curtain to be replaced by a veil of indifference. We must not consign new democracies to a grey zone...We seek to increase the security of all, to erase the old lines without drawing arbitrary new ones, to bolster emerging democracies and to integrate the nations of Europe into a continent where democracy and free markets know no borders but where every nation's borders are secure.[365]

Russian President Boris Yeltsin responded that:

> ...a system of blocks, that is to say something we have left behind, is now coming back - the NATO bloc on the one hand - and Russia on the other...Without compromise on this issue between NATO and Russia, there would be no point in continuing a partnership...Otherwise we will go our own ways, and why have a partnership at all?[366]

Yeltsin added that if NATO expands, it risks bringing a "Cold Peace" to Europe. President Clinton was described by aides as expressing "concern and a state of perplexity about what the Russians were up to."[367] More rueful was the Georgian leader, and former Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze who lamented that: "The Cold War is over...Beware of the Peace."[368]

Responding to Russian sensitivities, the formal US view of enlargement was revised by US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke writing in Foreign Affairs in March 1995. Holbrooke wrote that:

1. The goal remains the defense of the Alliance's vital interests and the promotion of European stability. NATO expansion must strengthen security in the entire region, including nations that are not members. The goal is to promote security in Central Europe by

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365. White House Information Service. 5 December 1994.
366. Reuters. 5 December 1994.
367. Reuters. 5 December 1994.
368. Reuters. 6 December 1994. For a survey of the decisions made at the Budapest Summit see Victor-Yves Ghebali, "After the Budapest Conference: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe." NATO Review 43:2 (March 1995).

integrating countries that qualify into the stabilizing framework of NATO.

2. The rationale and process for NATO's expansion, once decided, will be transparent, not secret. Both Warsaw and Moscow...should have access to all aspects of the alliance's thinking in order to understand that NATO should no longer be considered an anti-Russian alliance.

3. There is no timetable or list of nations that will be invited to join NATO.

4. Each nation will be considered individually, not as part of some grouping.

5. The decisions as to who joins NATO and when will be made exclusively by the Alliance.

6. Although criteria for membership have not been determined, certain fundamental precepts reflected in the original Washington treaty remain as valid as they were in 1949: new members must be democratic, have market economies, be committed to responsible security policies, and be able to contribute to the Alliance.

7. Each new NATO member constitutes of the United States the most solemn of all commitments: a bilateral defense treaty that extends the US security umbrella to a new nation. This requires ratification by two-thirds of the US Senate.[369]

Holbrooke added that the US would make more vigorous use of the OSCE's consultative and conflict prevention mechanisms. Within this context he stressed that "...if the West is to create an enduring and stable security framework for Europe, it must solve the most enduring strategic problem of Europe and integrate the nations of the former Soviet Union,

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[369]. Holbrooke's reference to NATO as a bilateral treaty was misleading. The NATO treaty is not a bilateral document but rather a multilateral commitment to self-help and mutual aid. Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74:2 (March/April 1995) 45-46.

especially Russia, into a stable European security system."[370]

Holbrooke also endorsed a proposal by former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski that Moscow should be offered a formal treaty of cooperation between NATO and Russia.[371] Holbrooke noted that there would be numerous difficulties but that the US was not ruling it out: "...the US government as well as its major allies have supported development of this important new track (emphasis added) in the European security framework."[372] In early in 1995, Russia had quietly approached Washington indicating that it might accept a slow and limited expansion of NATO under certain circumstances. Moscow sought a guarantee that the process would not be rushed, that there would be no nuclear weapons stationed on the territories of new members, that Russia could be a member of NATO eventually, and that the end result would be a forum for East-West cooperation on security issues, and a NATO/Russia non-aggression pact.[373]

US and NATO officials characterized the Russian position as a substantial change in rhetoric though it remained unclear if Russia was seriously altering its stance

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370. Holbrooke 46.

371. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74:1 (January/February 1995).

372. Holbrooke 51. Holbrooke suggested that such an arrangement would require negotiation over a broad range of issues including the pace of NATO expansion, the state of other Russian NATO-ties such as the PFP, the degree to which the OSCE has been turned into a more useful organization and the implications of events such as the fighting in Chechnya.

373. R. Jeffrey Smith and Daniel Williams, "Russia Intends to Pursue Guarantees from NATO," The Washington Post, 11 March 1995, A21.

on NATO enlargement or if it was using a softer tone as part of its opposition strategy. The US hoped to renew the discussion of NATO expansion within the context of a NATO-Russian dialogue. As Vice-President Al Gore said in Tallin, Estonia on 14 March:

> It is important to understand that the process by which NATO expands is a process that must take place at the same time the relationship between NATO and Russia is deepened and clarified. Both processes must take place simultaneously and both processes must take place in full open, public view with no surprises and no sudden movements.[374]

Without detail, the Gore comments unintentionally obfuscated the issue of NATO enlargement and NATO-Russian relations. Nevertheless, the same week, EU foreign ministers meeting in France agreed that NATO should "consider an agreement, treaty or charter between the Atlantic Alliance and Russia in parallel with the enlargement of NATO to show Russia that we are not neglecting it", said French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe (summarizing the EU position). It was necessary in order to "find something to reassure Russia", Juppe added.[375]

In fact, the Russian position on NATO enlargement had not changed. On 15 March Boris Yeltsin sent a directive to

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374. Reuters. 13 March 1995. Vice-President Gore was invoking the language of Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev from June 1994 who agreed to sign the PFP while insisting on first negotiating a detailed cooperation program that would formalize a relationship based on what he called "no mutual vetoes or no surprises."

375. Reuters. 18 and 19 March 1995. Following this meeting British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stressed that while Russia could not veto NATO policy, such an agreement would be based on the principle of "no vetoes and no surprises" borrowing even more directly from Kozyrev's language. At this meeting differences were aired among the European members. France supported a formal NATO-Russia treaty while Germany pushed for a "charter" that would not require ratification by all members and would be less legally binding.

Kozyrev castigating him for being weak on NATO and ordering a harder line. Thus Kozyrev said in Paris on 20 March: "Why rush things if we run the risk of creating new lines of division?"[376] US Secretary of State Warren Christopher asserted that Kozyrev seemed to believe that "...there had been some change in the position of the United States or NATO, that we were going at a different pace than before...That is not correct."[377] Nonetheless, following a meeting in Geneva on 23 March with Christopher, Kozyrev declared: "The honeymoon has come to an end."[378]

The PFP and Russia: Bringing Moscow In

Following a Moscow meeting with US Secretary of Defense Perry on 3 April Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev linked Russian compliance with the CFE treaty to NATO expansion and insisted that: "Countermeasures could be taken...we might create necessary military groups in the most threatening directions and set up closer cooperation with other CIS countries."[379] The next day, the speaker of the upper house of the Russian parliament told Perry that the parliament was unlikely to ratify the START-2 treaty if

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376. Reuters. 20 March 1995.

377. Reuters. 20 March 1995.

378. Associated Press. 23 March 1995. At the meeting, Secretary Christopher delivered a personal letter from President Clinton to Boris Yeltsin outlining the US approach to NATO enlargement.

379. Reuters. 3 April 1995. The Russian military had been pushing for a renegotiation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty since early summer 1993. The NATO linkage may have simply offered the Russian armed forces an excuse to push their case.

NATO expanded.[380] Russia's first Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin was quoted by Nevazismaya Gazeta as saying that the expansion of NATO would create instability in Europe by removing the "semi-demilitarized zone which has now emerged in Central and Eastern Europe" and that "it is necessary to abandon the false impression that NATO expansion is inevitable and unavoidable."[381]

Russia's concerns were intensified by a series of public statements from Visegrad and NATO countries suggesting that the process of expansion was accelerating. For example, on 3 April Czech President Vaclav Havel said: "There are a number of indications that we are seeing a new momentum on the subject of future membership of the new democracies in the North Atlantic alliance...One year ago, NATO membership did not seem likely."[382] On 4 April President Lech Walesa told the BBC that, as during World War II, Poland was being "let down by the West" and that Russia threatened European security. The next day Polish Prime Minister Jozer Oleksy travelled to NATO Headquarters. Prior to his departure from Warsaw, Oleksy told reporters that in the debate over NATO expansion: "Russia has no significance...Poland defines its own aims and goals...Other countries can have their opinions on the subject, but they cannot have any influence." Oleksy told NATO ambassadors

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380. Interfax. 3 April 1995. In OMRI Daily Digest, 4 April 1995.
381. Nezavismaya Gazeta, 4 April 1995. In OMRI Daily Digest, 5 April 1995.
382. Reuters. 3 April 1995.

that: "Our answer to the question when NATO should open up to new members is - as soon as possible."[383] On 14 April Robert Hunter, US Ambassador to NATO, said in Prague that the decision to expand NATO "is made, now it's just a matter of doing it right."[384]

Though NATO's timetable had not changed, American officials sought to clarify the situation. On 24 April Secretary of State Christopher said that: "The processes of NATO expansion has proceeded on precisely the same timetable that we decided on last December...this timetable has not been altered because of other events since that time...It is a deliberate timetable." He added that "NATO is not a social club...Any decision on enlargement will be taken with great care and deliberation and precision."[385] In Brussels two days later, NATO Secretary General Claes insisted that: "The European security architecture is not possible without Russia...It is not possible to give an answer on the timing of expansion."[386] Nonetheless, the following week Russian Foreign Minister Kosyrev warned that if NATO expands,

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383. Associated Press. 5 April 1995.

384. Associated Press. 14 April 1995. Ambassador Hunter said that NATO rules would be applied strictly to each new member and that each would have to join and contribute to the NATO integrated military command structure. "An ally is an ally is an ally....You join the Alliance and you do what allies do...if necessary, countries joining NATO will accept deployment on their territory of whatever is required for security", he added. Also see Robert Hunter, "Enlargement: Part of A Strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe," NATO Review 42:1 (May 1995).

385. Reuters. 24 April 1995.

386. Associated Press. 26 April 1995.

nationalists could devour him and that he would have to write his memoirs "from the Gulag."[387]

At a Moscow meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in May 1995 commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, the US was prepared to assure Russia that it could be a member of NATO and that it would give written assurances to that effect and on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the new member territory.[388] The US worked tirelessly to get Yeltsin to commit fully to the PFP and attained a promise by Yeltsin to join it and begin a special NATO-Russia dialogue. On NATO expansion, President Clinton said that:

> I made it clear that I thought that anything done with NATO had to meet two criteria. Number one, it must advance the interests of all the Partners for Peace, the security interests of all of them, including Russia. And number two, it must advance the long-term goal of the United States which I have articulated from the beginning of my presidency, of an integrated Europe, which I believe is very important, and I think Russia shares both of those objectives.[389]

Assurances by Clinton may not have been enough for the Russians. As Sergei Karagonov, a Yeltsin advisor, said on 11 May: "You cannot build up a special relationship with Russia when you are talking about enlargement at the same time."[390] To this Andrei Androsov, head of the Russian

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387. Izvestia. 27 April 1995. OMRI Daily Digest, 28 April 1995.
388. Michael Dobbs and R. Jeffrey Smith, "US Offers Assurances on NATO", The Washington Post, 7 May 1995, A1.
389. Associated Press. 8 May 1995.
390. Reuters. 11 May 1995.

Foreign Ministry's NATO Department added: "We need NATO to change its attitude from expansion to real partnership...If the same treatment continues, I fear cooperation will be affected."[391]

At a 30-31 May NAC ministerial, NATO renewed its commitment to enlarge and welcomed Russia's decision to implement an IPP and begin a new NATO/Russia dialogue. Addressing the NAC Kozyrev insisted that:

> Russia's position regarding NATO expansion has remained unchanged. We continue to believe that it does not meet either the interests of Russia's national security or the interest of European security as a whole. Furthermore, the hasty resolution of the issue may threaten the establishment of truly mutually advantageous and constructive relations between Russia and NATO and the usefulness of Russia's involvement in the PFP. It will not create greater stability and security either...we suggest to halt and think rather than act hastily and blindly.[392]

In a formal letter to the NAC, Kozyrev was more blunt: "A decision about the enlargement of NATO to the East would create for Russia the need for a corresponding correction of its attitude toward the Partnership for Peace."[393] After the ministerial, NATO officials suggested that following the completion of the enlargement study the issue would be placed on a back-burner. "Something like this has to be

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391. Reuters. 11 May 1995.

392. NATO Office of Information and Press. 31 May 1995.

393. Associated Press. 30 May 1995. Also on 31 May, Segodnya quoted a high ranking Russian defense official as saying that: "A set of measures have been approved that should prevent NATO expansion." The report stressed that Russia's decision to join the PFP was conditional on NATO not expanding. OMRI Daily Digest, 1 June 1995.

driven through and there is not much drive in NATO at the moment", said one NATO official.[394]

Some American officials nonetheless sought to continue momentum toward enlargement. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott articulated a broad defense of enlargement on the basis of NATO's institutional functions.[395] According to Talbott, candidates for NATO membership should be judged according to the strength of their democratic institutions and their ability to meet the obligations of membership. The process would be transparent, open, and ongoing. NATO enlargement would promote reform in post-Communist Europe through respect for democracy and international norms of behavior and explicit preconditions for membership, so that enlargement of NATO would be a force for the rule of law both within Europe's new democracies and among them.[396] The institution would impact domestic politics within potential member states who would have full civilian control over the military by establishing parliamentary oversight over military affairs, and appoint civilians to senior defense positions. The policy would promote conflict or dispute resolution by making convincing progress in resolving disputes with their neighbors peacefully and show they are committed to multi-ethnic democracy. Finally, stability

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394. Reuters. 31 May 1995.

395. Strobe Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow," The New York Review of Books XLII:13 (10 August 1995) 27-30.

396. Talbott 28.

would be promoted via the extension of NATO's classic mission - as a hedge against a resurgent Russian threat.

The NATO Enlargement Study

In September 1995 NATO completed its enlargement study explaining the "how" and "why" of enlargement but not the "who" and "when" or airing potential negative consequences. NATO viewed the policy as:

1. Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military;

2. Fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building which characterize relations among current Allies;

3. Promoting good-neighbourly relations, which would benefit all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, both members and non-members of NATO;

4. Emphasizing common defense and extending its benefits and increasing transparency in defense planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defense policies;

5. Reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values and thereby curbing the countervailing tendency towards disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines;

6. Strengthening the Alliance's ability to contribute to European and international security, including through peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council as well as other new missions;

7. Strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic relationship.[397]

New members must conform to the "purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the safeguarding of the freedom, common heritage and civilization of all Alliance members and their people, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."[398] According to NATO, enlargement seeks to avoid drawing new divisions in Europe after the Cold War. In this context, the enlargement study stressed that: "A stronger NATO-Russia relationship should form another cornerstone of a new, inclusive and comprehensive security structure in Europe...This further development of the NATO-Russia relationship, and its possible eventual formalization, should take place in rough parallel with NATO's own enlargement, with the goal of further strengthening stability and security in Europe.[399] NATO-Russia relations

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397. "Study on NATO Enlargement," NATO Office of Information and Press (September 1996) 2.

398. Study 2. New members will be expected to: conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty: democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law; accept NATO as a community of like-minded nations joined together for collective defense and the preservation of peace and security, with each nation contributing to the security and defense from which all member nations benefit; be firmly committed to principles, objectives and undertakings included in the Partnership for Peace Framework Document; commit themselves to good faith efforts to build consensus within the Alliance on all issues, since consensus is the basis of Alliance cohesion and decision-making; undertake to participate fully in the Alliance consultation and decision-making process on political and security issues of concern to the Alliance; establish a permanent representation at NATO HQ; establish an appropriate national military representation at SHAPE/SACLANT; be prepared to nominate qualified candidates to serve on the International Staff and in NATO agencies; provide qualified personnel to serve on the International Military Staff and in the Integrated Military Structure if and as appropriate; contribute to Alliance budgets, based on budget shares to be agreed; participate, as appropriate, in the exchange of Allied intelligence which is based entirely on national contributions; apply NATO security rules and procedures; and accept the Documents which provide the basis for the existing policies of the Alliance. Study 24-25.

399. Study 9.

would reflect Russia's significance in European security and be based on reciprocity, mutual respect and confidence, and no "surprise" decisions by either side which could affect the interests of the other.[400]

While acknowledging that there are benefits from stationing allied troops on a new member's territory, the study underscored that the redeployment of existing Allied forces from current locations or pre-positioning of equipment would be expensive and potentially provocative. Thus the presence of Allied conventional forces on a new member territory might take a variety of forms in terms of exercises, dual basing of air assets, or the prepositioning of equipment and material. Nonetheless for new members, the peacetime stationing of other Allied forces on their territory should neither be a condition of membership nor foreclosed as an option. New members should be prepared in principle for such an event but there is no immediate necessity for allied forces to be stationed on new member territory. The collective defense principles of Article 5 would be applied to all new members - including nuclear defense planning and deterrence. However the study also concludes that: "There is no a priori requirement for the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members" and that there is no need to change current NATO posture under existing circumstances. New members would

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[400]. Study 9-10.

choose to accept the military consequences of membership not only in principle, but also in practice if the strategic environment changes. NATO walked a fine line by assuring that it would not invite in states solely as consumers of security while at the same time seeking to allay Russian fears.

Toward Enlargement?

Some partner countries welcomed NATO's discussion of the modalities of enlargement. Poland, however, remained skeptical and claimed that NATO was buying time with delaying tactics because of Russian opposition and American indecisiveness. These concerns were heightened by the formal NAC acceptance of the enlargement study in December 1995 which was coupled with a decision to begin a year long consideration of the implications of enlargement via briefings to interested parties and an invitation for countries to signal their intention to apply for NATO membership. The best thing that Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Towpik could say about the study was: "I am happy with this document for three reasons, it is on time...it is a very substantial document, and it takes the discussion into a new stage."[401] During the first week of October 1995, NATO officials confirmed that the Alliance would put enlargement "on the backburner" until after

[401]. Reuters. 28 September 1995.

presidential elections in Russia scheduled for June and July 1996.[402] US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake was reported to have suggested that NATO be "dull and boring" on enlargement.[403]

However, by the spring of 1996 the US had made a firm decision to move NATO toward enlargement. Concerned that the US was viewed as too deferential to Russia and hoping to attract votes from Americans of East European descent, senior US officials indicated that at a NATO heads of state meeting in early 1997 "two, possibly three, states" would be invited to initiate negotiations toward joining NATO.[404] The message to Moscow was firm - NATO will enlarge, it will do so on its own terms and Russia should take advantage of the opportunity to build a special NATO-Russia relationship.[405]

In March 1996 (newly appointed) Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenii Primakov suggested that Russia might be open to a deal on enlargement if new members agreed not to

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402. For further discussion see "NATO Seen Slowing Down Enlargement Process," Der Spiegel, 21 August 1995.

403. Interview with a senior European official, October 1995.

404. Interview with a senior National Security Council official, March 1996. There are some 23 million Americans who trace their heritage to Eastern Europe including over 9 million Poles. As there are a dozen states where they constitute more than 5 percent of the electorate, taking a firm position in favor of NATO enlargement is a no-lose political decision. See Michael Dobbs, "Enthusiasm for Wider Alliance is Marked by Contradictions," The Washington Post, 7 July 1995, A1, A6.

405. This view was put forward strongly to the Central and East European aspirants to NATO in a speech by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Prague in March 1996. Christopher suggested that a failure by Moscow to take advantage of the special relationship with NATO would be similar to the rejection of the Marshall Plan of the late 1940s and that only Russia could isolate itself. See Warren Christopher, "A Democratic and Undivided Europe in Our Time," Cernin Palace, Prague, Czech Republic, 20 March 1996. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman.

station nuclear weapons on their territory and if they only join NATO's political structures without military integration. Primakov and his staff at the Russian foreign intelligence services (where he was previously director) had decided that Moscow's hostile tone opposing NATO enlargement was accelerating the drive by Central Europeans into the NATO orbit. Primakov concluded that the best way to slow enlargement was to make friendly initiatives to the West knowing that they would be unacceptable to some NATO members and acceptable to others - thus dividing the Alliance.[406] Russia hoped to take the steam out of the enlargement process as Western countries entered into more serious discussions about the consequences and costs of the policy.

This shift in Russian rhetoric regarding NATO enlargement combined with a Russian effort to lobby individual NATO members against enlargement rather than

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[406]. These views were initially drawn out in a report by senior Russian officials in April and May 1995. Their report, titled "Russia and NATO: Thesis of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy" was chaired by senior Yeltsin Advisor Sergei Karaganov. The report recommended that the Russian government not accept NATO enlargement as inevitable and argued that an active and reasonable policy can enable deferment or even cancellation of NATO's enlargement plans. The report rejected seeking "compensation for NATO enlargement" as signaling consent. The study also rejected threats of costly countermeasures to enlargement which would undermine the Russian economy. The report stressed that supporters of enlargement are a minority in the West but that they occupy key decision-making posts, and they are the most active group. "As enlargement becomes a closer perspective, and its economic, military, political and cohesion-related costs become more obvious, the numbers of opponents of enlargement might grow, with their opposition getting stronger...This development can be largely prompted by debates in political and academic circles in NATO countries, first of all in the United States...", the report advised. Thus the group advised that: "We should not act against the West; instead, we should help it to avoid making a mistake dangerous for everyone, first of all for the West itself." Finally, the group advised that Russia should tone down its rhetoric and stress cooperation - thereby denying the West justification to enlarge the Alliance. Thesis of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy," May 1995.

addressing their opposition directly at NATO. For example, earlier in the year President Yeltsin appealed several times by telephone to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to stop the drive toward enlargement in the run-up to the June presidential election. Mr. Kohl responded positively to Yeltsin's appeal by urging NATO to be generally more sensitive to Russian security concerns at a gathering of NATO specialists meeting in Munich in February 1996. Kohl's shift was largely tactical but also showed that Germany was increasingly worried about the impact the policy was having on Russia. Nevertheless at the same meeting, US Secretary of Defense William Perry acknowledged that: "NATO enlargement is inevitable and if NATO enlargement is a carrot encouraging reforms, then we cannot keep that carrot continually out of reach."[407] Endorsing this perspective and hoping to appeal to voters of East European origins, President Clinton used his one foreign policy speech of the 1996 general election to commit the US to support NATO enlargement in 1999. As NATO accelerated toward its planned announcement of initial candidates for membership in 1997, NATO undertook serious efforts to decrease Russian opposition offering a formal NATO/Russia charter. The charter would reflect an ongoing process of building a special NATO-Russia relationship and codify a variety of

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407. Comments of Kohl and Perry at the annual Wherkunde meeting of defense specialists, Munich, Germany, February 1996.

institutional mechanisms enhancing a broad range of consultation (such as institutionalizing the military-to-military planning and cooperation attained in IFOR) to provide Russia with a voice, but not a veto, within NATO.[408]

The Great Debate: Turning Theory on its Head

Major differences exist between, and within, realist and institutionalist approaches to understanding NATO enlargement. Many analysts are skeptical about the prospects for enlargement. At a conference of senior international security specialists held at Harvard University in May 1995, an anonymous vote was reportedly taken 29-1 opposing NATO enlargement. As one senior State Department official concedes, enlargement is not popular among academics and the US and NATO have not done a very good job of explaining what it is about.[409] Another Administration official was more blunt complaining that "...there is a very adverse trend in the conventional wisdom on the part of the thoughtful elite."[410] Actually, there are some unlikely theoretical partnerships of realists and institutional scholars favoring enlargement and realists and institutionalists opposed. Many of these analytical perspectives have had a direct impact on the policy process.

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408. Interview with a senior NATO official, Brussels, Belgium, September 1996.
409. Interview with a senior State Department official, April 1996.
410. Reuters. 28 June 1995.

Realist Arguments in Support of NATO Enlargement

Realists favoring NATO enlargement generally draw from balance of power analysis which suggests that Europe is more secure if there is two-power balancing. Moving the Cold War line farther East will increase security in Europe because Russia remains a threat to the rest of Europe and it will lessen the chance that a united Germany will find itself in security competition with Russia. Realists assert that Russia may return to its great power status and pursue traditional imperialist behavior. Thus, according to this realist perspective, it would be best to enlarge NATO rapidly while Russia is incapable of mounting a major preventive response thereby assuring NATO's future as an anti-Russian alliance. Moreover, expanding NATO to include a group of willing countries with sizeable military assets would add to the West's resources (including some 100 million consumers in Central and Eastern Europe), defray some of the deepening cuts in defense spending among NATO countries, and open up new arms markets for current NATO member states.

Peter Rodman, a former National Security Council staff member, argues for NATO enlargement in such geostrategic terms, suggesting that: "The only potential great power security problem in Central Europe is the lengthening shadow of Russian strength, and NATO has the job of counter

balancing it."[411] Henry Kissinger concludes that without NATO enlargement, Central and Eastern Europe will again become a vacuum in which German and Russian security competition will develop.[412] Similarly, Zbigniew Brzezinski suggests that while NATO enlargement should not be viewed as hostile toward Russia, it should replace the strategic vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe.[413] Though Kissinger and Brzezinski put it more diplomatically, their view is summarized by William Safire as seeing Russia as "authoritarian at heart and expansionist by habit...The time to push the protective line eastward is now, while Russia is weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, when such a move would be an insufferable provocation to a superpower."[414] Moreover, as Jonathan Eyal maintains, delaying enlargement until Moscow does something to warrant a threat could provoke or escalate crises and thus it is preferable to enlarge during a time of peace.[415]

Some realists acknowledge that NATO enlargement will draw new lines in Europe but that this will be a positive development. Enlarging NATO to include Poland and the Czech

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411. Peter Rodman, "4 More for NATO," The Washington Post, 31 December 1994. Rodman suggests that the question is "whether the West is prepared to consolidate the new status quo that emerged in Central Europe in 1989, the present reality that the Central European and Baltic democracies are free and independent sovereign states that have opted to associate with the West." Peter W. Rodman, "Understanding with Moscow," The Washington Post, 16 January 1996, A9.

412. Kissinger Diplomacy, 823-825.

413. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe...".

414. William Safire, "Strategic Dilemma", The New York Times 1 December 1994, A32.

415. Jonathan Eyal, "Beware of Russians Bearing NATO Gifts," The Wall Street Journal Europe, 19-20 April 1996, A6.

Republic in particular would settle the question of the Eastern frontier of Germany and remove a major historical reason for German aspirations in the East. As Conor Cruise O'Brien speculates: "A new wave of national pride - perhaps early in the new century - might cause Germany to resent its subordinate position within a NATO perceived as dominated...by the United States, France, and Britain. Germany might then withdraw from NATO...and set up its own system of alliances in Central Europe."[416] Kissinger adds that, if the Visegrad states' requests to join NATO are rejected and the states bordering Germany are refused protection, "Germany will sooner or later seek to achieve its security by national efforts, encountering on the way a Russia pursuing the same policy from its side."[417] Stephen Pelz maintains that inclusion of the Visegrad countries into NATO would permanently settle Germany's eastern frontier, bind Germany in the West, and reassure both the West and Russia as to its growing economic and political power. Pelz suggests that this would provide a clear and defensible line between the West and the disputes to the East with a new buffer zone comprised of Finland, the Baltics, Belarus and Ukraine whose security would be respected by Russia and the West if guaranteed in a treaty.[418] This approach would

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416. Conor Cruise O'Brien, "The Future of 'the West'," The National Interest 30 (Winter 1992/1993) 9.
417. Kissinger "Expand..."
418. Stephen Pelz, "Enlarge NATO - Now", draft.

purposefully draw lines between East and West and recognize spheres of influence which already exist informally. Such a "Yalta II" would bring clarity and predictability to European security.

A similar argument has been suggested by the foreign policy spokesman of the German Social Democratic Party Karsten Voigt. Voigt believes that, left alone, "...the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could fall victim yet again to the rivalries and tensions that have plagued the region from time immemorial; only through integration can we ensure that the 'old game' of competing spheres of influence does not return."[419] Voigt stresses that: "...in so far as the Germans like happy neighbors, they also think that the presence of the United States is an insuring element, a stabilizing component to prevent our neighbors from perceiving that something might happen...This is what you objectively call a stabilizing factor...So it has not only to do with an outside threat, it's an internal balancing element inside the European security structure as such.[420]

Realist support for NATO enlargement also draws on alliance theory. Some Central and East European countries may naturally want to associate with the winning side in the

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419. Karsten Voigt, "NATO Enlargement: Sustaining the Momentum", NATO Review 2 (1996) 15-19.

420. Presentation by Karsten Voight, Social Democratic Party Foreign Policy Spokesman, to the Congressional Research Service NATO Conference, February 1996.

Cold War. By joining NATO, they hope to share the benefits of the West's relative gains - sort of "sharing the spoils of victory" as Randall L. Schweller puts it.[421] If NATO rejects their requests for membership, these countries may engage in destabilizing balancing behavior - by forming regional alliances, establishing bilateral security guarantees with countries from within NATO, or pursuing expensive and provocative self-help national military buildups.[422]

Realist Arguments Against NATO Enlargement

Some realists point to the absence of balancing alliances among the Visegrad countries or the Baltics as evidence that they do not really feel threatened. Looking at the facts on the ground, these realists point to the dissolution of the Russian armed forces and their dismal performance in Chechnya, and the fact that there would be considerable warning time of a renewed Russian threat to Central and Eastern Europe. To enlarge NATO in the absence of a threat may cause renewed security competition among states not included in NATO or provoke Russia to respond by reintegrating parts of the former Soviet Union as a defensive act. Rather than promoting stability, NATO

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421. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19 (Summer 1994) 79.

422. Joshua B. Spero and Frank Umbach, "NATO's Security Challenge to the East and the American-German Geo-Strategic Partnership in Europe," Bericht des BIOst NR. 39/1994, 16-17.

enlargement would thus create instability which does not currently exist. Placed within the context of the rise and decline of great powers, this relative gain by the West could prompt hegemonic war in the worst case. Some realists add that NATO is the wrong institution for consolidating democracy and with the US reducing its commitments abroad, the security guarantee would be a false promise of security for new members. Alternatively, the EU would be better suited for meeting new security challenges.

Michael Brown stresses that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe need membership in the EU, and not NATO. He notes that if the Central and East European countries were really threatened they would be increasing their defense capabilities. In reality Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have been reducing military conscription and their mechanized and infantry forces.[423] Moreover, despite the suggestion of a "security vacuum" in Central and Eastern Europe, the German government has urged NATO to move slow on enlargement and to signal restraint toward Russia.[424] Brown concludes that NATO should expand in the event of serious Russian threats toward the West.

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423. Poland, for example, is reducing its conscription time from 18 months to one year while disbanding entire divisions and reducing the total number of its armed forces. In August 1996 the Czech Minister of Defense proposed a draft plan for a major cut of 10 000 from its existing 60 000 troop levels combined with a costly force modernization program. Two similar plans which had previously been presented to the Czech Parliament were rejected as being too costly.

424. Michael Brown, "NATO Expansion: Wait and See," The Washington Post, 26 December 1994, A29. Also see Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion", Survival 37:1 (Spring 1995) 34-48.

However, if NATO enlarges toward Russia's borders in the absence of a threat, its future will be assured for a long time as it will have caused a new Cold War.[425] Ironically, such a development would be good for the new members but decrease the security of current members.

To Michael Mandelbaum, NATO enlargement represents a significant shift in the European balance of power likely to prompt balancing behavior by Russia. Mandelbaum asserts that Europe already has a functional security regime in the shape of the CFE (and START) agreement which would be seriously undermined by enlargement.[426] Mandelbaum notes that "...the countries under active consideration (Visegrad) are precisely those best placed to make a successful transition to democracy and free markets without NATO membership."[427] Theoretically, if Russia is to be contained it makes little sense to expand NATO only to the Visegrad countries and thereby create a buffer-zone open to Russian interference. If NATO is to be a neo-containment mechanism then it should include Ukraine and expand right up to Russia's borders.[428] However, even in this event, Richard K. Betts warns that: "Under realist norms, the West should

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425. Discussion with Michael Brown. Cambridge, MA, 20 May 1995.

426. See Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1996).

427. Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion," Foreign Affairs 74:3 (May 1995) 9-13.

428. Mandelbaum "Preserving..." 10.

leave Ukraine to its fate - tragic for the Ukrainians, but safer for everyone else."[429]

John Mearsheimer has reservations about NATO enlargement based on his assumption that institutions can do little to promote or cause peace and security. NATO enlargement clouds a more concrete debate over whether NATO should be maintained at all. Mearsheimer concludes that NATO is needed as an insurance policy against a new Russian threat but that enlargement may bring about that threat in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus not only do institutions not cause peace, but well-meaning institutionalists are promoting policies that may decrease security. Mearsheimer views NATO as provocatively backing Russia, like a wounded animal, into a corner.[430] Moreover, the only real security guarantee that comes from NATO is the stationing of US forces (conventional or nuclear) on a members' territory. Because new members are not likely to get this, enlargement could encourage new members to exacerbate small crises in order to get a firmer security guarantee. In this vein, George Kennan writes that: "...it never pays...for one great power to take advantage of the momentary weakness or distraction of another great power in order to force upon it concessions it would never would have accepted in normal circumstances...Over the long run, it almost always revenges

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429. Richard K. Betts, in Snyder and Jervis 278.

430. Discussion with John Mearsheimer. Cambridge, MA, 20 May 1995.

itself." To Kennan NATO enlargement is "...in the highest degree deplorable."[431]

Former National Security Council official Philip Zelikow suggests that NATO enlargement can do little to promote reform or resolve interstate conflicts because NATO is a state dominated institution and merely a tool of the member states. Zelikow suggests that "...NATO membership for Poland seems to confer few tangible benefits to Poland or to current NATO members that cannot be achieved through the Partnership for Peace."[432] "Citing other analogies, such as 'NATO membership helped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey', neither elaborates a chain of logic or applies that reasoning to, say, Poland or Hungary", Zelikow maintains.[433] Similarly, Fred Ikle, former Undersecretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration, notes that for five years before joining NATO, Greece and Turkey received considerable American economic assistance which aided their transition and that no such expenditure is likely to be forthcoming in the East. He also notes that if: "Slovakia is a vacuum,

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431. George Kennan, At Century's Ending: Reflections, 1982-1995 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996) 330.

432. Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions," Survival 38:1 (Spring 1996) 14.

433. Zelikow 15. Similarly, Owen Harries, stresses that even the idea that a "western" community can be expanded is based on a false premise. Arguing that the "West's" identity was based largely on a threat from the East, the cohesiveness of the West will disintegrate after the Cold War. Owen Harries, "The Collapse of the West," Foreign Affairs 72:4 (September/October 1993) 41-53.

why not Slovenia; if Slovenia, why not Macedonia, Moldova or Belarus?"[434]

Charles L. Glaser stresses national interest in security cooperation and maintains that NATO has an important role to play in the future of Europe as currently constituted. Glaser asserts that NATO remains the best mechanism for dealing with three major challenges to contemporary European security: resurgent Russia, war in the East, and improbable conflict in the Western community and that there remains a strong case for realigning NATO - not as an expanded collective security mechanism, but rather as a low-cost insurance policy.[435] The continued American military presence in Germany should decrease any German desire to attain nuclear weapons. However, the same policy will not necessarily be duplicated for countries such as Ukraine. Thus Glaser makes a case for revamping NATO rather than making it an expanded system of collective security.

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434. Fred Ikle, "How to Ruin NATO," The New York Times, 11 January 1995, A21. Ikle has also co-chaired a commission with Sergei Karagonov, an advisor to President Yeltsin, that included a number of senior American and Russian national security specialists. They conclude that the US and Russia share common security interests and that their policies should be harmonized. "Any eastward expansion of NATO that would exclude Russia would be detrimental to the harmonization of US and Russian defense policies," the study concludes. Fred C. Ikle and Sergei A. Karagonov (Co-Chairman), Harmonizing the Evolution of US and Russian Defense Policies (Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1993). Members of the study group included Alexei Arbatov, General John R. Galvin, Catherine Kelleher, Benjamin S. Lambeth, General Edward Meyer, Nikolai V. Mikhailov, Serge Rogov, John D. Steinbruner, Dmitri Trenin, and Paul D. Wolfowitz.

435. Charles L. Glaser, "Future Security Arrangements for Europe: Why NATO is Still Best," in George W. Downs, ed., Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994).

These theoretical concerns entered the US policy debate in the summer of 1995 when US Senator Sam Nunn announced strong opposition to NATO enlargement. Nunn suggested that no one had explained the "...why, or at least why now" of enlargement. Nunn argued that NATO enlargement would undermine reformers in Moscow and, because of Russia's conventional weakness, Russia would be forced to respond by deploying nuclear weapons - thereby undermining security for all Europeans. Nunn was concerned that enlargement was creating the worst possible scenario of decreasing military capabilities and increased political commitments. The senator charged that the policy was promoting a false promise similar to that offered by the League of Nations before World War II. According to Nunn:

> NATO is fundamentally a military alliance. If you denigrate the military side of it, then it becomes a political and psychological alliance, which is something very different...The last thing we need is a repeat of what happened before World War II, when commitments were made that were not backed up by military capabilities and intentions.[436]

Nunn suggests that enlargement should be dependent upon a country first qualifying for EU membership and that it be linked to Russian behavior. If Russia were to make aggressive moves against other states, violate arms control accords, or if democracy should collapse then NATO should enlarge.

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[436]. Senator Sam Nunn, "The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World," Speech to the SACLANT Seminar 95. 22 June 1995, Norfolk, VA.

Institutionalist Arguments in Support of NATO Enlargement

Institutionalists supporting NATO enlargement generally maintain that the goal is to promote a united Europe and expand a zone of democracy, stability, and peace. As NATO Secretary General Javier Solana suggests:

> ...what we are expanding is a European, indeed Atlantic, civic space. I deliberately include our military arrangements into this definition of "civic space". The postwar experience in Western Europe suggests that political and economic progress and security integration are closely linked. Once their security is taken care of, countries can devote themselves with more confidence to their longer-term evolution. And a responsible military, firmly embedded in our democratic societies and under civil control, is part and parcel of that civic space, as are military structures that are transparent, defensive, and multinational.[437]

Some institutionalists particularly feel that, once in NATO, new members will not nationalize defense policies in the pursuit of self-help because they will attain an important psychological reassurance. William E. Odom argues that the best argument for NATO's expansion:

> ...is found in its inception: the concern of its proponents with internal political and economic affairs in Western Europe. While their national motives were at odds - Germany seeking early independence, France seeking to prevent a new German military threat - leaders in both countries realized that a US military presence within an Atlantic alliance structure would create the security and political context for economic recovery and the building of new international relations. To play its role the United States had not only to be a military hegemon; it also had to bring its political ideology to Europe. A purely realist American approach to NATO would have failed.[438]

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437. Javier Solana, "Speech by the Secretary General at the North Atlantic Assembly Meeting," Athens, 20 May 1996. NATO Office of Information and Press.

438. William E. Odom, "NATO's Expansion: Why the Critics are Wrong," The National Interest 39 (Spring 1995) 45.

Ron Asmus, Richard Kuglar, and F. Stephen Larrabbee add that:

> East-Central Europe's democrats well understand that democracy will succeed only if their states belong to a secure European and Western political, economic, and military community. The West, too previously understood this link - as demonstrated with the case of West Germany. That nation might never have become a stable Western democracy had it not been accepted into NATO's fold. Similarly, NATO membership helped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey.[439]

Among the advocates of NATO enlargement, this trio of RAND analysts (Asmus, Kuglar, and Larrabbee) have had considerable influence on US policy.

Jamie P. Shea suggests that NATO enlargement should come before EU membership for the Visegrad countries based on NATO's founding principles which created "...a climate of confidence and stability which allowed governments not to overspend on weapons or to shut themselves off from their neighbors, but to use their scarce resources for infrastructure renewal, for education, and for social reform."[440] Though NATO may incorporate instability by enlarging, Shea maintains that it faces a dilemma of either taking in these countries or dealing with them from the outside. One way or another these crisis will affect NATO and are more easily managed within the institution. Thus Shea argues: "...if one is not actively spreading security, one is increasing one's own vulnerability to

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439. Asmus (et al) 30.

440. Jamie P. Shea, "Enlarging NATO Eastward?", in Marco Carnovale, ed., European Security and International Institutions after the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 86.

insecurity...The situation cannot be frozen in a timeless balance of calculable forces."[441] Shea stresses that the most important guarantee granted in NATO is reassurance and that NATO has always been:

> ...seen as providing political reassurance, and if push came to shove, the Americans would provide air support and logistics. It was the Korean War which produced US ground troops in Western Europe, not the Washington Treaty. NATO's security guarantee has always been much more a question of day-to-day cooperation, joint exercises, and military integration than of binding obligations. The credible guarantee has been the practice of 'doing' security together, not the legal document.[442]

For addressing Russia and Ukraine, Shea stresses the importance of the PFP where "...facile notions like a 'security vacuum' only disguise the large-scale military cooperation that is already taking place and that will give Central and East European countries special consultative rights vis-a-vis NATO through the PFP...This will convey a special responsibility, if not a binding security guarantee...This is no minor privilege."[443]

Some analysts conclude that the solution to potential security competition caused by one institution (NATO) can be offset by another institution (OSCE or EU). The dual-track strategy of strengthening the OSCE and institutionalizing a special relationship between NATO and Russia is a case in point.[444] In January 1997, Ron Asmus circulated a paper

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441. Shea 87.
442. Shea 88.
443. Shea 94-95.
444. See Sean Kay, "NATO and the CSCE: A Partnership for the Future," Paradigms: The Kent Journal of International Relations 7:2 (Winter 1993) 59-77.

among senior officials in the three Baltic countries advancing a multi-institutional solution to the inevitable sense of loss and insecurity that will result from the Baltic states being left out of NATO.[445] Resolving this issue would be central to NATO enlargement for as Asmus writes: "If mishandled, the Baltic issue has the potential to develop into the proverbial train wreck which could potentially derail NATO enlargement as well as poison the West's relations with Russia."[446] Asmus notes that, rightly or wrongly, many in the West do not see the Baltic states as an area of vital strategic interest; moving NATO into the Baltics would be completely unacceptable to Moscow; there are problems involving Russian minorities in some Baltic countries; the Baltics are largely indefensible in the absence of a credible deterrent; and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad being encircled would further add to Russia's heightened concerns over enlargement. As a senior Danish official, who is a firm supporter of NATO enlargement to include the Baltic countries, insists: "...it is of paramount importance that NATO enlargement does not decrease the security of the Baltic states."[447]

Asmus proposed that a multi-institutional strategy could resolve the Baltic security dilemma. First, the three

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445. Also see Hans Bennendijk and Jeffrey Simon, "Baltic Security and NATO Enlargement", Strategic Forum 57 (December 1995) 1-4.

446. Ron Asmus, "NATO Enlargement: An Alliance Strategy for the Baltic States," January 1996.

447. Personal correspondence from a senior Danish defense official, 11 May 1996.

Baltic countries should institutionalize defense cooperation among themselves. Second, involvement of the Nordic countries aiding and assisting Baltic hard and soft security via a wide range of cooperative programs should increase. The third (and central) pillar of the strategy would be coordination of NATO and EU enlargement policies so that "...the EU flag would go up in Estonia at the same time that the NATO flag goes up in Warsaw."[448] Fourth, the process of NATO enlargement should be clearly open-ended. Finally, further institutional efforts should be made to modify Moscow's concerns over NATO enlargement by including Russia in the emerging web of institutional security cooperation wherever possible and that the West should look for ways to encourage constructive Russian-Baltic security interaction. Because the Asmus draft advocated an "Estonia first" policy, the proposal actually had the adverse effect of decreasing Baltic cooperation as competition and jealously resulted in Latvia and Lithuania. More problematic, the proposal was viewed by some senior Baltic officials as trying to deal with the Baltic problem at the expense of their prospects for joining NATO. As a result, all three Baltic countries jointly and specifically rejected the Asmus proposal.[449]

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448. Asmus 13. Asmus maintains that of the three Baltic countries, Estonia is the most qualified for EU membership.

449. Personal correspondence from a senior Estonian official at the Estonian Ministry of Defense, March 1996. For further discussion see Einar Rull, "Russia Speeds Up NATO," The Baltic Times 28 March - 3 April 1996, 21.

Some advocates of NATO enlargement maintain that membership should come before linkage policies promoting reform. For example, Jeffrey Simon maintains that setting the criteria for civil-military relations too high may be an obstacle that is impossible to overcome. Effective civilian control over the armed forces includes constitutional provisions for a clearly-defined division of authority between the president and government over the running of the military in both peace and war. Civilian control requires parliamentary oversight of the military via effective control over the defense budget with a civilian defense ministry in control over the general staff and military commanders, and a general restoration of the prestige of post-Communist militaries. If NATO was to require all of these as pre-requisites for membership, the Visegrad countries would not qualify. Subsequently they would not be rewarded for the considerable steps they have made since 1989.[450]

Nevertheless, some observers see value in the process of promoting enlargement itself. Adrian Karatnycky suggests that the diplomacy of NATO enlargement has had a positive impact on Russian behavior by focusing Moscow on its relations with the West and constraining its capacity to do

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450. Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995) and Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996).

damage in its near abroad. Karatnycky notes that after NATO deferred enlargement in 1994, "Russia proceeded with a barrage of aggressive behavior in neighboring republics, threatened Ukraine with economic blackmail, acted as a bully at international forums, wooed Iran and Iraq, tried to topple Azerbaijan's president and launched a war against Chechnya."[451] If properly and carefully implemented in ways that reassure the Russian public", Karatnycky writes, "the process of NATO's eastward expansion can have a salutary effect on Russia's fundamental internal debate over its foreign and defense policies.

Some observers are sympathetic to the "democratic peace" theory which posits that democracies do not go to war with each other and thus spreading the zone of democracy in Europe is in NATO's interest.[452] For example, Harlan Cleveland suggests that NATO should be use to facilitate the creation of an informal "Club of Democracies."[453] Allen Sens maintains that the West's own principles are at stake and enlargement would: "...stand as a testament to the strength of Western commitment to its own principles...To refuse to extend NATO membership to peaceful, democratic countries

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451. Adrian Karatnycky, "Open Up the Club," The Washington Post, 7 July 1995, A21.

452. See Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) and "Bruce Russett, "Can a Democratic Peace Be Built?" International Interactions 18:3 (Spring 1993) 277-282, and Kim Edward Spiezio, Beyond Containment: Reconstructing European Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995).

453. Harlan Cleveland, Birth of A New World: An Open Moment for International Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1993) 204-220.

asking for admittance, especially when such membership has been openly suggested by Alliance leaders, would be an affront to those principles."[454]

Some supporters of NATO enlargement back its transformation into a collective security institution like the League of Nations. In this context, NATO should enlarge quickly and include Russia. Formally the US has pursued this option as a carrot toward Russia knowing well that Russian membership in NATO is not an option. However, former CIA director William Colby chaired a panel arguing for rapid expansion of NATO to include Russia on the premise of collective security.[455] Other observers sympathetic to collective security see NATO stopping short of Russian membership but support an expansion of its internal collective security functions. This perspective claims that NATO does impact Greek-Turkish relations and this can be duplicated by expanding NATO to include countries where there are similar tensions such as Hungary and Romania. In August 1996 Hungary and Romania successfully completed a treaty (signed on 15 September 1996) that would lower bilateral tensions over Transylvania which had been an increasing source of distrust between the two countries, because of the sizeable Hungarian minority population in the

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454. Allen G. Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance," International Journal L (Autumn 1995) 684.

455. Also see Coral Bell, "Why an Expanded NATO Must Include Russia," Journal of Strategic Studies 17 (December 1994) 27-41.

region. Because NATO had identified a need for a settlement of outstanding regional disputes for entrance into the Alliance, four years of delay over the treaty had begun hindering both countries' prospects for NATO membership by 1996. The pressure from American and NATO representatives on these two countries linking their cooperation with membership in NATO did have a positive impact moving them toward the treaty. However, US Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter may have overstated its importance when he proclaimed in Budapest on 28 August that: "It is now impossible for Hungary and Romania to go to war."[456]

Finally, some analysts conclude that NATO enlargement is necessary given that NATO has committed to it. After its leaders having said repeatedly that NATO will enlarge, failure would damage NATO's credibility. Thus NATO should proceed with a limited enlargement that would do the least harm - perhaps limited to the Czech Republic and Poland while keeping the option open to enlargement in the future.[457] Others argue that perhaps NATO should enlarge politically but not militarily. Using Denmark and Norway, or France and Spain as a model, NATO could bring in new members without provocative military deployments or integration into the NATO military command structures.[458]

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456. Reuters. 28 August 1996.

457. See James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Arrangements (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995) and Kay "American Strategies..."

458. See Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO Enlargement: Historical Aspects", in Jeffrey Simon, ed., NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options (Washington, DC: National Defense University,

Institutionalist Arguments Against NATO Enlargement

Though some institutionalists see value in maintaining NATO after the Cold War, many are opposed to NATO enlargement. Making NATO function in the absence of a threat is difficult enough - enlarging NATO could weaken consensus and decision-making in the institution. If it took 16 NATO members over three years to agree to intervene substantially in Bosnia, then it makes little sense to enlarge soon. Moreover, a public debate over the costs of enlargement could damage NATO as an institution. Others suggest that because NATO emphasizes military issues, the quest for membership is distracting aspirants from advancing economic reform. Forced to increase their defense budgets to become compatible with NATO standards, these countries will have to divert resources from precious social programs already being cut. In this view, if NATO is to expand to include countries that are full democracies, then how will it decide when a stable or a market economy is flourishing and is NATO the best institution to make that sort of judgement? Also, how will NATO reconcile leaving some countries that meet its standards out of enlargement because of strategic concerns vis-a-vis Russia? Faced with this sort of institutional dilemma, the EU, the OSCE, or the PFP would best promote security for post-Cold War Europe.

1995) 21-42 and Condalezza Rice, "Now, NATO Should Grow," The New York Times, 8 July 1996, A23.

Additionally, historical analogies which see NATO as the primary source of stability in Europe tend to forget that, at its origins, NATO came complementary to a massive infusion of US economic aid via the Marshall Plan. As neither the US or its European allies are prepared to accompany enlargement with this kind of economic assistance, sole reliance on NATO may offer a false promise artificially raising expectations of what it can actually do for new members.

Some institutionalists assert that NATO and Europe should have more urgent priorities than enlargement. As former EU chief Jacques Delors has complained, the US was "overhasty" in pushing for NATO enlargement which is "a premature initiative which was badly timed."[459] Karl-Heinz Kamp summarizes this dilemma for NATO: "...what is not needed now is a revived debate on a rapid expansion of NATO to the East, or even specific timetables for the admission of particular Central and Eastern European countries...This would put unhealthy pressure on an alliance still in the process of adjusting to new realities, and it would raise expectations in Eastern Europe that the West cannot realistically meet."[460] NATO enlargement may be a relative gain for the West and an irresistible temptation.

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459. Rick Atkinson and John Pomfret, "East Looks to NATO to Forge Links to West," The Washington Post, 6 July 1995, A1,16.

460. Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995) 116-129.

Nonetheless, gains often have costs which may be to the detriment of the institution.

Charles A. Kupchan asserts that enlargement would destroy consensus and turn NATO into a talk shop while drawing new dividing lines.[461] Kupchan agrees that NATO was an important institution promoting internal collective security during the Cold War. However, he is skeptical as to whether this can be duplicated in the absence of a threat.[462] Making NATO too large would destroy any ability of the Alliance to attain consensus in dealing with security challenges as disparate interests would collide among the member states. This position is supported by former Deputy Undersecretary of State Arnold L. Horelick. Testifying before the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe in April 1995, he asserted that enlargement without first reconceptualizing the nature of the Alliance "displays the same kind of logic that leads a couple in a deeply troubled marriage to forgo marital therapy and have a new baby instead."[463] Horelick was especially concerned than an expanded NATO would make institutional "governance matters

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461. Charles A. Kupchan, "Expand NATO - And Split Europe," The New York Times, 27 November 1994, E11.

462. Kupchan describes NATO enlargement as a train wreck waiting to happen. Either it will not proceed thus damaging the hopes of Central and East European and also NATO itself, or it will go forward and again divide Europe.

463. Testimony of former Deputy Undersecretary of State Arnold Horelick before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe, 25 April 1995.

worse" and thus it would be difficult to respond to challenges in a larger NATO.[464]

As an alternative to NATO enlargement, Kupchan calls for the creation of an "Atlantic Union" that would subsume the EU and NATO. The Atlantic Union would replace NATO's emphasis on territorial defense with a broad mandate to preserve peace in the Atlantic area via collective security. Such a move would not be based on an anti-Russian premise nor would it ask electorates in the West to extend new defense commitments. Kupchan writes that:

> The elimination of NATO's Article V guarantee would weaken the alliance's deterrent power, but as along as Russia continues to pose no danger to Western or Central Europe, the tradeoff makes sense. Western Europe enjoys a deep and stable peace that would not be shaken by a more relaxed American commitment, especially if US troops stay put on the continent. Indeed, although officials on both sides of the Atlantic are reluctant to admit it, the absence of a common threat has already eroded the credibility of Article V. By explicitly recognizing this change and seeking to include Russia in a new Europe, the Atlantic Union promises to make a pan-European community of democracies a reality, not just rhetoric to placate Moscow as Poland enters a NATO that everyone knows will never go further East.[465]

Kupchan concludes that: "By sacrificing depth for breadth, the Atlantic Union promises to lock-in the most profound transformation of our century; the creation of a community of North Atlantic democracies among which war has become unthinkable."[466]

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464. Horelick Testimony.

465. Charles A. Kupchan, "A More Perfect Atlantic Union", The Washington Post, 18 April 1996, A25; and Charles A. Kupchan, "Reviving the West: For an Atlantic Union," Foreign Affairs 75:3 (May/June 1996) 92-104.

466. Kupchan "A More Perfect..."

The Atlantic Union proposal did not gain serious support in US elite academic or governmental circles. However, Charles and Clifford A. Kupchan's arguments in favor of a new Concert of Europe have. Kupchan and Kupchan assert that as a military alliance, NATO's functional utility is limited after the Cold War and that a new form of collective security based on the Concert of Europe should form the basis of a European security order.[467] In this view, NATO would aid in a period of transition but would not be the dominant institution in the new order. Though the Kupchans have not specified it, the 5 Power Contact Group consisting of the US, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Russia meeting to promote peace in Bosnia represents such an informal concert arrangement.

Some institutionalists who oppose enlargement question the impact on economic and political reform in potential new members. If NATO membership is a carrot promoting reform, what incentive will new members have to continue reform once in NATO? Also, by emphasizing the need to move toward NATO military standards and NATO integrated command structures, the wrong aspects of reform may become prioritized in some Central and East European countries. Instead of working toward currency reform, for example, a state might be tempted to purchase expensive F-16 fighter planes to show

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[467]. Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security 16:1 (Summer 1991) 114-161.

their commitment to NATO. Indeed, in 1996 the Czech Republic sought to purchase six F-16s from the US in order to enhance its quest for NATO membership. At a cost of $25 million per airplane, six F-16s would take up one fifth of the entire Czech defense budget. If the Czech Republic were to actually replace its out-dated Soviet made Mig-21s, it would require 24, not 6 fighters. Clinton Administration officials responded by privately urging Czech officials to dramatically increase defense spending.

Finally, enlargement may enhance political and economic reform in a new NATO member but hinder it in a state left out. For example, a reform politician having strongly advocated NATO membership as the primary foreign policy objective could be punished by voters for not fulfilling a promise. Also a state like Romania, which has done nearly everything that has been asked of it, could be left out of NATO because of its history and geographic location - even after having reduced tensions with Hungary. Inclusion of Hungary absent Romania, could push Romania into a defensive arms race out of their historical fear of Hungary and the issue of Hungarian minorities living in Transylvania. Any arms race in Romania would come at the expense of economic reform there. In Russia, the most liberal and pro-Western of Russian thinkers are bewildered at the policy which they view as playing directly into the hands of nationalist and anti-democratic forces in Russia.

Analysis

NATO enlargement remains a work in progress. For the project to succeed, NATO will have to adapt its institutional form so that it does not decrease the security of current, new, or non-members. No matter how it is packaged, enlargement moves the military responsibility of the US and Germany - Moscow's two twentieth century enemies - closer to Russia's borders. Though not intended as such, enlargement challenges Russia's pride, serves as a bruising reminder that Moscow was on the losing side of the Cold War, and leaves even moderate Russians feeling that they are being punished for the sins of their Soviet forefathers. If enlargement proceeds in a way that appears threatening to Russia, it is not unreasonable to expect that Moscow might redeploy dilapidated nuclear forces with weakened command and control capabilities targeted at new NATO members and, possibly, current members. Additionally, Russia may take steps to de-stabilize states on its Western periphery in an effort to create a new anti-NATO alliance including Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic countries if the threat is perceived as high enough. In sum, if handled poorly, NATO enlargement risks decreasing security for nearly everyone involved.

NATO enlargement could damage the transatlantic relationship on which European security is currently dependent. Specifically, the US Senate may balk at the costs and the increased security commitments to regions that have never been considered vital to US national security.

Even the low end estimates of enlargement costs are extremely high. The RAND Corporation forecasts costs between 20-110 billion dollars and the US Congressional Budget Office between 61-125 billion dollars of which the US would be required to pay 5-19 billion. The wide range in estimates reflects variations in institutional form involving new NATO members. For example, the RAND estimates assess three military scenarios for NATO enlargement to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. A limited military enlargement based on existing self-defense support in the new members would cost $20 billion dollars of which 55 percent would be paid by new members, 33 percent by all of NATO, and 12 percent by the key members (US, Germany, Britain, and France). A strategy that would help prepare new members for joint power projection (such as IFOR) would cost $42 billion of which 25 percent would be paid by new members, 25 percent by full NATO, and 50 percent by the key members. Finally, a full forward presence based on a containment model would cost $110 billion of which 20 percent would be paid by new members, 25 percent by full NATO, and 55 percent by the key members.[468]

The US Congress will inevitably wonder why it should be spending money to protect countries that are not threatened while they are cutting US domestic spending. Many observers

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[468]. Carla Anne Robbins, "Devil is in Details of NATO Expansion: Cost Questions Cloud Plans to Add Three New Members," The Wall Street Journal, 9 August, 1996.

of the Congress point out that the Republican Contract with America supported NATO enlargement as did legislation introduced in the House of Representatives and by presidential candidate Senator Robert Dole. However, there was no substantial debate over the legislation. While voting non-binding legislation to enlarge NATO, Congress passed formal legislation cutting the routine US payment for NATO infrastructure from 229 million to 86 million dollars in 1995. Before departing the Senate to run for president, Bob Dole proposed a fund of 61 million dollars to aid the Visegrad countries in their efforts to join NATO. Given the estimated costs of enlargement, Dole's initiative was not a serious gesture.[469] A supporter of the Dole proposal, Congressman Benjamin Gilman (Chairman of the House International Relations Committee), was clearly playing election-year politics when he said that there was "...no excuse for the unending delay that the Clinton Administration orchestrated in expanding NATO."[470] Actually

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469. It was especially unclear where the money for the Dole initiative would come from. The 1997 State Department budget request included $60 million Foreign Military Financing for the U.S. government's Warsaw Initiative grant program which aids Central and Eastern European countries for their participation in the PFP. A separate State Department program provides $7.8 million in loan subsidies to finance up to 72.5 million in loans to qualifying countries. Philip Finnegan and Theresa Hitchens, "U.S. Budget Battle Brews Over Aid to Turkey, Greece," Defense News, 1 April 1996. Given the desire in Congress to cut State Department funding, it was unlikely that new money would be made available for the Dole initiative but rather redirected from other programs. As the 60 million for PFP programs appeared a likely candidate, the Dole initiative potentially risked drawing its own lines in Europe by diverting money away from countries most needing funding for their PFP activities and wealthier countries already in line for the first wave of NATO membership. More likely, nothing would really change at all as the PFP money already available might simply be renamed and remain available to all PFP countries.

470. Reuters. 4 June 1996.

the congressional action was dangerous to the candidate states, promoting a false promise that could lure them to believe that there would be automatic Senate approval for enlargement. Some NATO officials hope that when the time for ratification of NATO enlargement comes, the US Senate will go first as it would pave the way for the remaining parliaments. Thus, the US is in need of leadership and education in a Congress that is increasingly losing its institutional memory and reducing US commitments abroad. NATO enlargement needed a Vandenberg-style resolution in advance of negotiations on treaty accession - and yet the person sitting in Vandenberg's chair in 1996 was the most virulent isolationist in the US Senate, Jessie Helms.[471]

American public opinion is also a constraint on NATO enlargement. According to a study by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 24 percent of the US public support NATO membership for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. However, when the issue of sending troops to resist a Russian invasion of Poland is raised, 50 percent of the public is opposed and only 32 percent in favor.[472] If Americans are not willing to equate Warsaw with Wichita, Prague with Pittsburgh, or Budapest with Boston, then NATO cannot afford the loss of credibility that would come in the

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471. For a moderate example of Helm's views of international institutions see Jesse Helms, "Saving the U.N." Foreign Affairs 75:5 (September/October 1996) 2-7.

472. John E. Rielly, "The Public Mood at Mid-Decade", Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995) 89.

event of some (unlikely) attack on Poland or any other new member.

The third major problem with NATO enlargement is that, while increasing stability is the formal goal of the policy, the most likely new members are candidates primarily because they are stable and are not threatened. However, the Baltic countries are potentially unstable and threatened. NATO enlargement that does not include the Baltic countries - as it will not - will consign them to a grey area of Russian influence, possibly prompt serious Russian violations of the CFE treaty, and in a worst-case lead to overt or covert action against Baltic sovereignty with Russia drawing a new Cold War line at the Polish/Lithuanian border.[473] When Ukraine and Kaliningrad are added to the geostrategic setting, NATO could face a potentially explosive situation in the region. Only NATO troops or nuclear weapons stationed in the Baltic territories would provide for credible Baltic defense and that is highly unlikely. In this context, it is reasonable to question whether such potential instability right at Polish borders - which currently does not exist - would be in Warsaw's interests or that of any other NATO member.

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[473]. This possibility has raised serious concerns in Finland and Sweden who have both questioned how NATO enlargement increases security in the Baltic region. Not comfortably assured, both countries have indicated that for their part, they do not want NATO membership but rather will continue to work within the PFP.

On 14 May 1996 Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev warned that (Poland and Lithuania's) "...early entry into NATO would create definite difficulties for Russia in relation to the Kaliningrad region...We would not want to be cut off from the special defensive district of Kaliningrad by NATO states," Grachev said.[474] In response, Russia might create defensive alliances with its former Soviet allies and could not rule out preemptive military action by its armed forces against states determined to join NATO.[475] The same day that Grachev spoke, a Polish public opinion poll showed that 47 percent of Poles believed that an alliance between Russia and Belarus was a danger to their country's interests. Because the causal linkage accelerating Russian-Byelorussian strategic cooperation was Poland's quest for NATO membership, there appeared be a serious conflict between what Poland wanted from NATO and the security and stability that it thought it was getting.

In sum, there are many legitimate reasons to have serious concern about the potential impact of NATO enlargement as both realists and institutionalists opposed to enlargement warn. Nevertheless, a strong case for enlarging NATO to include Poland and the Czech Republic combined with an intensive institutional adaptation can be made. Drawing from realism, NATO enlargement would enhance

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474. Reuters. 14 May 1996.

475. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 April 1996. OMRI Daily Report, 12 April 1996.

NATO's traditional mission by keeping the Americans in, the Germans constrained, and the Russians out by permanently settling the border between Germany and its Eastern neighbors. Limited NATO enlargement can promote reassurance in an area where uncertainty has led to catastrophic war repeatedly in European history - not as a hedge against a Russian threat, but rather, a hedge between Russia and Germany.[476] The risks are extremely high in implementing this strategy. Therefore NATO's institutional form will have to be adapted considerably to ensure Russia that enlargement is not a threat to it and so that those countries left out of NATO are not destabilized in the process.

Tasks

The primary institutional task of NATO enlargement will be to promote reassurance for Russia and those countries left out of NATO. Reassurance can come in three ways. First, NATO and Russia can complete a charter specifying a new consultative arrangement opening a wide array of institutionalized NATO-Russia cooperation building on the positive experience of Russia's involvement in IFOR and stressing areas of shared interests. Second, NATO should leave enlargement open in principle but stop for a long

[476]. A look at the map suggests that including Hungary and Slovenia in this arrangement would contribute to this geostrategic foundation of NATO enlargement. However, under current circumstances, there is no need for haste in including these countries.

pause of five to ten years before additional members are admitted. If there is to be a "second wave" of enlargement to give aspirants a reason to continue to cooperate with NATO (eg by contributing to peacekeeping) invitations should be limited to small countries not bordering the former Soviet Union such as Slovenia or even non-traditionally neutral countries like Ireland or Austria. Third, NATO should be very cautious, and as transparent as possible, in how it expands its infrastructure in these countries. The primary focus of NATO activity for new members should be training for non-traditional challenges such as peacekeeping. Nuclear deployments and stationing of foreign troops should be explicitly ruled out unless defensive needs mandate such activity. Fourth, and most importantly, NATO must dramatically redesign its internal functions so that it is clear to Russia (and to the US Congress) that the Alliance has truly adapted to the post-Cold War security environment.

Organizational Capabilities

NATO's basic organizational capabilities need not change with regard to its new members except to the extent that headquarters installations will be required. NATO will remain a highly formal organization with low institutional autonomy. NATO's evolved rules for membership should remain conditionally open with one caveat. The new members must agree that they will not block further NATO expansion. In

this sense, new members will have an interim period in which they will not share fully in the decisions with regard to further enlargement as a condition of their own joining. Though NATO may never enlarge again, or only do so in a limited way, this option keeps the perspective towards membership open for aspirant countries.

Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures

Expanding democracy and promoting economic reform should be decoupled from NATO enlargement per se. NATO does not have a credible history in this area aside from Spain and there is no evidence that the Spanish experience is especially relevant to that of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Likewise, NATO should not promise to resolve all conflicts among new members though it can and should continue to promote consultation and the peaceful settlement of disputes when possible. Linking NATO too closely with internal crisis management may raise false hopes that NATO can independently cause peace. Indeed, this false promise may encourage NATO members to pursue dangerous policies against other states thinking that NATO will come to their aid if they get themselves into trouble. NATO should promote the norms and principles that its members value - through an enhanced and strengthened Partnership for Peace.

Capacity for Change

The entire success or failure of NATO enlargement to enhance security will rest on the capacity of its members to adapt NATO's institutional form to the post-Cold War security environment. This means implementing a major internal restructuring of NATO based on a new burdensharing arrangement. For NATO to increase security, it must move from theory to practice in its institutional adaptation by restructuring transatlantic security after the Cold War.

Conclusion: Enlarge NATO, But Do No Harm

Placing NATO, and therefore US influence, as a hedge between Germany and Russia can have a major effect on the future of European security. However, it will only be positive if democratic Russia understands that enlargement is not an anti-Russian act. The institutional form of enlargement will have a major impact on whether or not Russia is sufficiently reassured. If NATO is perceived as an implicitly anti-Russian alliance taking advantage of a weakened state with wounded pride and a lot of nuclear weapons, history will not be kind to those who rushed the expansion of NATO without a full airing of the potentially negative consequences. If NATO's institutional form is adapted with a careful application of both realist and institutional signposts of what might go wrong, then NATO enlargement may enhance peace and security into the 21st century. Most importantly, enlargement must not distract

from an even more central issue confronting NATO and the future of European security - internal restructuring.

CHAPTER VII
INSTITUTIONAL REALIGNMENT: RESTRUCTURING TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR

Introduction and Overview

Chapter Seven shows that, contrary to realist predictions, European members of NATO are either unwilling or unable to "go it alone" and scrap NATO in favor of an independent European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). It shows why efforts to build the EU, a Franco-German Corps, and the Western European Union were ineffective. NATO has established a framework for post-Cold War institutional functions based on the Combined Joint Task Forces concept. CJTF will bring the ESDI into NATO as an operational burdensharing mechanism making NATO a standing institution from which states that are willing, and have political support from the other members, can draw from NATO assets to manage European crises. With this internal transformation, France has gradually returned to NATO's military structures. If successful, internal restructuring will demonstrate the value of NATO's institutional functions as the primary peacetime activity of NATO will be based on Article 4 consultation and the procedures and infrastructure that NATO has available for coalitions of willing states to take on certain missions. Nevertheless, serious political and operational obstacles draw into question NATO's capacity for change. For NATO to continue to function, a renewed

transatlantic relationship which reflects the shared interests of the US and Europe is needed.

Institutional Realignment

As NATO members contemplated enlargement, they embarked on an internal adaptation to make the institution better reflect the changed dynamics in the transatlantic relationship. The end of the Soviet challenge, declining US involvement in Europe, and a growing potential for the EU to assume an independent security role were the major events leading to this institutional change. The process often took the form of competition between the US and some of its European allies who wanted a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) to be created independent of NATO. However, this option was constrained by the existing institutional framework which affected the means and approaches toward national security that key West European states pursued. Absent credible independent capabilities, an accord was reached in 1996 that the ESDI would be formed within NATO. This institutional realignment was dramatized by France's military rapproachment to NATO military planning.

Contending National Views and Institution-Building

The Maastricht Treaty on European Union completed in 1991 sought to create a common foreign and security policy via an ESDI built through a revitalized WEU. The EU members agreed that a community of 350 million citizens with two

nuclear powers should be able to exert influence in security matters and take more responsibility for their own affairs after the Cold War. However, the leading European states split over the form an ESDI would take; Britain wanted it subordinated to NATO, France wanted it fully independent of NATO, and Germany sought to reconcile both views.[477] France was most adamant in its support for an ESDI. Paris hoped to propel European integration and confine the united Germany within an institutional framework France could dominate. France also worried that the US presence in post-Cold War Europe would decline and that Washington could no longer be relied on.

Early signals from Washington suggested that the Europeans had reason for concern about the US role in European security. The Bush Administration began cutting US forces stationed in Europe dramatically and insisting that the Europeans take responsibility for burdensharing and management of the Balkan crisis while aggressively opposing an ESDI.[478] President Bush let the Europeans take the lead

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477. See United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Statement of the Defence Estimates 1994 (London: UK Ministry of Defence, 1994); French Ministry of Defence, Livre Blanc sur la Defense (Paris: French Ministry of Defence, 1994); and Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defence, 1994). Among the smaller states, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Denmark supported the British view. The remaining Continental powers were (to varying degrees) sympathetic to the French position. Italy was sensitive to both views.

478. Under President Bush the US promised to retain some 150,000 US troops in Europe or available to the European theater. However, some proposals popular in the US Congress suggested 25,000 would suffice while others counseled 50,000 - 70,000. For discussion of US force levels in Europe see Colin L. Powell, "The American Commitment to European Security," Survival 34:2 (Summer 1992) 1 and Don M. Snider, "US Military Forces in Europe: How Low Can We Go?", Survival 34:4 (Winter 1992-1993) 24-39. Snider maintains that a militarily

in the Balkans confident that efforts toward the ESDI would collapse there.[479] The Clinton Administration sent early signals that reinforced Europe's concerns about America's dependability. In May 1993 a senior State Department official said that economics would shape US foreign policy and that the US would have to define the extent of its commitments commensurate to this priority - suggesting a shift in attention from Europe to Latin America and Asia.[480] Secretary of State Warren Christopher mused that the US had been too Eurocentric in its foreign policy priorities.[481] In 1994, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin suggested in an annual report that: "For their part, US allies must be sensitive to the linkages between a sustained US commitment to their security on the one hand, and their actions in such areas as trade policy, technology transfer, and participation in multinational security operations on the other."[482] Also in 1994, the US House of Representatives approved a proposal (rejected by the Senate) calling for Europe to reimburse 75 percent of the total costs of stationing US troops in

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significant force would have to include 75,000 US ground forces. The Clinton Administration has settled on the figure of 95,000.

479. Interview with a senior Pentagon official, Washington DC, March 1996. This was a common view among US and NATO officials at NATO headquarters in 1992. European concerns were heightened when Canada announced on 5 February 1992 that it would withdraw its standing forces in Europe because of overstretched commitments and costs.

480. Daniel Williams and John M. Goshko, "Reduced US World Role Outlined but Soon Altered," Washington Post, 26 May 1993, A1. The official was widely recognized to be Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff.

481. Stanley R. Sloan, "Transatlantic Relations in the Wake of the Brussels Summit," NATO Review 42:2 (April 1994) 27-31.

482. Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1994) 9.

Europe. The proposal would have provided for the withdrawal of US troops if Europe did not agree.

Ongoing divisions between the US and its allies over the Balkans, especially American reluctance to commit ground troops, added to Europe's concerns. For France, this split was a clear indication of the need for Europe have an independent capability for handling crises. As French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said in November 1994: "...the conflict in Bosnia has shown the necessity to move beyond NATO and American guarantees to build a credible European defense that could back up our common foreign policy interests."[483] Conversely, in the US view, the futility of European efforts reinforced the view that an ESDI was unworkable.

Despite such European frustration with the US, an independent ESDI would be redundant to NATO (should the US commitment remain credible), expensive, and could harm European integration if EU members became worried about supranational intrusions into their national security. It might also damage the transatlantic relationship, on which Europe still depended, if not carefully managed. Thus the EU approach to building the ESDI took two conflicting forms: promoting a gain for the EU while strengthening the transatlantic relationship by demonstrating operational

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483. William Drozdiak, "US and Europe in Serious Rift Over Bosnia War," The Washington Post, 27 November 1994, A1.

burdensharing. Reconciling the desire to go independent from NATO and strengthen NATO at the same time would eventually prove insurmountable.

The Limits of European Union: A False Promise of Security

The Bush Administration sent strong signals in 1991 that European initiatives creating an ESDI at NATO's expense would be met with firm US resistance. For example, at the November 1991 NAC ministerial session in Rome, French President Francois Mitterand questioned the emphasis on NATO characterizing the Alliance as: "...a good one, but it is not a Holy Alliance." President Bush was terse in his response insisting that: "If you have something else in mind, if you want to go your own way, if you don't need us any longer - say so."[484] In compromise language, the Rome Summit endorsed the cost effective use of Alliance resources and concluded that: "Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European defense identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defense."[485] During the preparations for the Rome meeting, the ESDI language was the most contentious issue in the

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484. Quoted in Charles Krupnick, "Not What They Wanted: American Policy and the European Security and Defense Identity," in Alexander Moens and Christoph Antsis, eds., Disconcerted Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995) 130.

485. Rome Declaration of Peace and Cooperation, 7-8 November 1991.

discussion of NATO's new strategic concept. Some members viewed the language as carte blanche support for an ESDI. Others noted its placement, at the very end of the communique, showed the priority NATO put on the ESDI. Moreover, the language was clear - an ESDI would have to strengthen NATO.[486]

While NATO prepared for the Rome summit, Europe was engaged in a parallel process drafting the Treaty on European Union to be signed at Maastricht, the Netherlands, in December. The European leaders endowed the European Union (EU) with a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) based on an evolutionary construction of an ESDI. There was consensus among the Europeans on the need for an ESDI. Unable too speak or act with one voice during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, Europe had shown an inability to protect its vital interests on its own.[487] Thus many of the countries gathered at Maastricht believed it was necessary to build a European capability for defense and power projection. Nevertheless, major internal differences over the form of an ESDI and its relationship to NATO hindered the goal.

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486. Discussion with J. Michael Legge, NATO Assistant Secretary General and Chair of the Strategy Review Group at the Belgian Royal Defence College, Brussels, 23 January 1992.

487. The Gulf War borrowed heavily from NATO assets and command and control - including arrangements made for British and French forces under US command. Nonetheless, Europe was reluctant to grant political credit to NATO for aiding the mobilization and operation of forces in the Gulf while seeking to promote the WEU - even though the latter did very little.

In December 1990 France and Germany proposed a formal relationship between the EU and WEU so that the WEU would "...in time become part of Political Union."[488] The WEU had been dormant since the mid-1950s. In October 1984 it was reactivated to signal burdensharing intentions among the Europeans and to enhance movement toward the Single European Act (1986) which established the framework for political and economic union in Europe to take place in 1992. Operationally the WEU was limited to minesweeping activities during the Iran/Iraq war and coordination of European efforts to enforce a naval embargo against Iraq and perform mine-sweeping duties during the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991. Shortly after its reactivation, Portugal and Spain joined the WEU. The Franco-German initiative would have signaled a major increase in the WEU profile.

The US responded to the Franco-German proposal with a terse diplomatic demarche delivered to WEU members signaling strong US opposition to the Franco-German proposal. The US insisted that: all decisions to commit an ESDI to out-of-area activity involve consultation with the US; there should be no WEU integrated command structure duplicating that of NATO; and there should be no "backdoor" security commitment to Central and Eastern Europe via WEU enlargement

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488. Agence Europe 5388 (10-11 December 1990) 3-4. The WEU had been dormant during the 1970s.

that implicitly extended the American commitment to NATO.[489] A compromise was broached by Britain and Italy on 4 October endorsing an ESDI via the WEU which would be subordinated to NATO. The Anglo-Italian initiative would have reserved the WEU for out-of-area operations with NATO retaining sole responsibility for security within the European area. Such mission-based burdensharing would be attained via a Europe Reaction Force consisting of forces separate from the NATO structure. However on 14 October, France and Germany responded by insisting that the EU have clear ties to the WEU, that the EU promote an independent European armaments agency, and that Europe develop military units that would be solely allocated to the WEU.[490]

The Maastricht Treaty reflected a compromise between these competing views. The EU members agreed that: "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense."[491] The Maastricht accord did not create a formal tie between the EU and WEU. Instead it identified the WEU as an integral part of the development of the Union and as its defense

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489. See "NATO's Outlook Clouded by French-German Plan," The Washington Post, 19 October 1991, A20 and U.S. Wary of European Corps, Seeks Assurance on NATO Role," The New York Times, 20 October 1991, A12.

490. Kelleher 56-57.

491. Maastricht Treaty on European Union, J.4.1. The Treaty entered into force in November 1993 after receiving approval from the 12 member state parliaments.

component. Non-WEU members of the EU were invited to join or become observers. European members of NATO not belonging to the WEU were offered the same opportunity. In keeping the WEU informally linked to the EU, the problem of neutral countries such as Ireland using veto authority over WEU activity was avoided. Similarly Denmark, which is an EU member in NATO, but not the WEU, could not obstruct its development. In 1992, Greece joined the WEU. Iceland, Norway, and Turkey have become associate members and Denmark, Austria, Sweden, and Ireland observers. The members agreed that the EU may request the WEU to implement decisions and actions taken by the EU which have defense implications.[492] In a separate statement, the 9 WEU ministers at Maastricht affirmed the need for a genuine ESDI and a greater European responsibility on defense matters. Formally, the WEU would be the defense arm of the EU and at the same time strengthen the European pillar of NATO.[493]

The Franco-German Corps

The Maastricht compromise produced a disparity between the EU's foreign policy aspirations and its military capabilities. To compensate, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

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492. Treaty on European Union, Article J.4.2.

493. Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance. Maastricht, the Netherlands, 10 December 1991. EU members hoped that the WEU would develop through an evolutionary process beginning with a loose contribution to the development of the EU complementary to NATO and eventually leading to a common EU defense.

and French President Francois Mitterand announced the formal establishment of a Franco-German Corps on 21 May 1992.[494] The Eurocorps, as it became known, enlarged the existing Franco-German brigade to a corps-level unit of 35,000 troops. France and Germany hoped to use the Eurocorps to enable the WEU to act in accordance with the directives of the EU by: aiding in the defense of NATO territory; assisting in peacekeeping activities outside the NATO area; and assisting in humanitarian operations.[495] Operationally, the corps is composed of the French 1st Armored Division (based in Germany), and the German 10th Panzergrenadier Division which wears a dual-hat with NATO meaning that it is available both to the Eurocorps and NATO for planning and operational purposes. The forces are largely stationed in Germany with headquarters in Strasbourg, France. In peacetime the forces remain national with the only standing multinational activity taking place at the staff level in Strasbourg.

Initially, France hoped that Germany would assign specific forces solely identified as Eurocorps assets. However, Germany insisted that the Eurocorps be transparent

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494. The origins of Franco-German security cooperation lie in the Elysee Treaty of 1963 which outlined broad political and defense cooperation. In 1987 France and Germany created a joint brigade of 4000 troops. In 1988 they established a joint Defense and Security Council to oversee the brigade and identify other areas for cooperation - including sharing information on nuclear issues. See Scott A. Harris and James B. Steinberg, European Defense and the Future of Transatlantic Cooperation (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1993).

495. William Drozdiak, "France, Germany Unveil Corps as Step Toward European Defense," The Washington Post, 23 May 1992, A15.

and complementary to NATO command structures. Wanting the Eurocorps to provide momentum toward the ESDI, France was left with little choice but to accept the German position regarding NATO. American and NATO planners were especially concerned that the Eurocorps could contribute to instability and uncertainty in a crisis if command and control relationships were unclear. Adhering to NATO's concerns, Germany and France signed an agreement with SACEUR on 22 December 1992 to place the Eurocorps under NATO command in the event of a crisis.[496] France was integrating its military with Germany outside of NATO but allowing that the assets be available to NATO in a crisis. In theory, France was moving away from NATO to build an ESDI. However, in practice, Paris was actually moving closer to Allied military planning.[497]

Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain joined the Eurocorps which became operational on 30 November 1995. However, because the Eurocorps took three years to become operational, it was not a credible effort to deal with the immediate conflict in the Balkans. The EU participants were using action within an institutional context as a guise for

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496. According to one account, the classified details of the agreement between NATO and the Eurocorps consisted of three parts: the Eurocorps would be assigned to NATO command if the Alliance came under attack; under NATO command during crises and NATO-run peacekeeping operations; and in peacetime, when the Eurocorps was not under NATO command, NATO's command had the right to review its operations so as to determine its compatibility with NATO's planning, training, and doctrine. Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly 111:1 (Spring 1996) 29.

497. This point was stressed by German military officials who hoped to convince NATO of the value of the Eurocorps.

crisis management. As Peter Schmidt wrote: "...France and Germany tend to agree much more on institution building than on hard-core security policies."[498] The Franco-German corps did symbolize a fundamental reconciliation and unprecedented cooperation between these two historical enemies.[499] However, the popular refrain in NATO circles that the Eurocorps is little more than a "parade army" continues to ring true.

The Western European Union

The WEU faced similar constraints as the Eurocorps though its members hoped to give it a greater operational role. Meeting at Petersberg near Bonn on 19 June 1992, the WEU leadership agreed that while contributing to NATO's

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498. Peter Schmidt, "ESDI: A German Analysis," in Charles Barry, ed., Reforging the Trans-Atlantic Relationship (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996) 42. Shortly after activation, the Eurocorps began limited exercises including training maneuvers in the French and Belgian Ardennes. Additionally, the Eurocorps and WEU conducted a joint exercise called Crisex dealing with decision-making procedures, command and control, and eventual deployment of forces. Crisex took place in Brussels, Metz, and on the Canary Islands for each respective element of the exercise. European Information Service, European Report, "Defense/Security: From Bit Player to Major Actor for WEU," 11 November 1995. To complement the Eurocorps, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have organized a land force (EUROFOR) and a maritime force (EUROMARFOR).

499. Beyond the corps, France and Germany were pursuing further military cooperation including: regular meetings of ministerial working and expert groups, the purpose of which is to further develop common projects; an exchange of officers, including between staffs; intensification of leadership and language training by means of officer and officer candidate exchanges; cooperation in training and exercising, for instance by temporarily establishing Franco-German exercise naval forces; use and development of training facilities, for instance, the combined Army Aviation training center in Rennes/France; conduct of analyses and studies, for instance, in the field of air defense; promotion of friendly ties by way of over sixty affiliations; furnishing of mutual support in humanitarian operations, for instance, in the operations in Cambodia and Somalia, doing so at conceptual level by elaborating common airlift plans for providing humanitarian aid, and by devising a common medical training concept for humanitarian operations. Federal Ministry of Defense White Paper, 60.

common defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, "...military units of WEU member states acting under the authority of WEU could be employed for humanitarian and resource tasks; could be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."[500] However, the WEU also endorsed a proposal forwarded by British Minister of Defense Malcom Rifkind which assured that the WEU would not create its own independent military command structure. The WEU tasked its military officials to identify a variety of assets (such as the Eurocorps, the new British-Dutch amphibious force, or the Multinational Airmobile Division) which could be made available on a case-by-case basis.[501] This proposal was designed to avoid overlap between WEU and NATO member state commitments. As with the Eurocorps, institutional limitations of the WEU forced France to compromise and re-evaluate its security priorities.

Politically, the WEU kept apace of the changing institutional dynamics by reaching out to Central and

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500. Western European Union Council of Ministers, "Petersberg Declaration," Bonn, 19 June 1992. In accordance with these objectives, the WEU created a planning cell in Brussels as part of its WEU international secretariat (which was moved from London to Brussels). The cell was activated in October 1992 consisting of a forty member coordinating group of military officials tasked to: prepare contingency plans for the employment of forces under WEU auspices; prepare recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected; and to keep an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to the WEU for specific operations.

501. The British-Dutch amphibious force and the Multinational Airmobile Division (Central) are assigned to NATO but could be made available to the WEU.

Eastern Europe. Like NATO, the WEU was reluctant to expand a formal security guarantee. The Petersberg Declaration created a "Forum for Consultation" to bring interested countries from the former Warsaw Pact into a dialogue with WEU countries. Meeting in Luxembourg on 9 May 1994, the WEU foreign ministers invited nine Central and East European countries to join the WEU as "Associate Partners". The WEU now had four levels of participation including Members, Associate Members, Associate Partners, and Observers. The new Associate Partners included Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Associate Partners have no security guarantee and cannot veto decisions taken by the WEU. They can attend alternative weekly sessions of WEU ambassadors in Brussels where they can raise security concerns. Associate Partners could also contribute troops to WEU peacekeeping missions. The Associate Partners proposal was intended to limit WEU outreach to those Central and East Europeans most likely to qualify for EU membership. Some in the WEU hoped that this limited approach could be more effective than NATO's PFP - in spite of the fact that the WEU had no independent operational functions.[502]

Despite this institutional activity, the WEU's outreach to the East was not a major problem for NATO - or even

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[502]. Interview with a senior WEU official, Washington DC, November 1994.

Russia.[503] By 1995 the WEU had not become a credible institution for organizing the conduct of significant military operations. Recognizing its continued weakness, the WEU foreign ministers met in Lisbon on 15 May 1995 and took modest steps toward strengthening its operational role. At Lisbon, the WEU established a politico-military group to support the WEU Council, and created Situation and Intelligence Centers. Additionally, the ministers accepted an Anglo-Italian proposal to advance planning for a WEU intervention force in humanitarian crises, but failed to agree on procedures for financing such operations. The WEU also approved a White Paper which assessed security threats including: unresolved border disputes, terrorism, organized crime, migration, and proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Absent from the assessment was the sort of conflict immediately challenging European security - the Balkans.

Ultimately, the WEU is a security institution without a military infrastructure. Like NATO, peacetime forces which

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503. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling the WEU decision an attempt to "create a new model of military-political alliance in a limited space in Europe." This was mild language compared to the vehement Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. ITAR-TASS, 12 May 1994. In RFE/RL Daily Reports, 13 May 1994. On 1 December 1994 Russian Foreign Minister Kosyrev came close to endorsing the WEU's activities telling the WEU Parliamentary Assembly in Paris that: "NATO, which was born in response to the division of Europe, could promote partnership leading to European unity, if only the Alliance is not used to draw new dividing lines...Europeans themselves, including the WEU, should take care of the Unity of Europe." Address by Andrei Kosyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, to the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, Paris, 1 December 1994. Most Associate Partners appreciated the increased cooperation with the WEU as a potential link to the EU. However, some felt that they were being given "take it, or leave it" proposals from the West.

might be made available to the WEU remain national - including the Eurocorps. However, unlike NATO, the WEU has no peacetime supreme commander, no peacetime military headquarters, and no standing command and control structure. Without infrastructure, training, and major exercises, the WEU has no capability to project power or promote stability in the event of a crisis threatening its member states. Moreover, the absence of sufficient satellite, transportation, and other logistical capabilities, common language and compatible communication arrangements, the incorporation of standardized and interoperational equipment, or exact location of equipment made the WEU fundamentally weak.

Weaknesses in WEU satellite and intelligence capabilities were exposed in the fall of 1994 when the US announced it would no longer share intelligence with its European allies enforcing the naval arms embargo of the Balkans. Responding to the US announcement, President of the WEU Assembly, Sir Dudley Smith stated that: "The US dominate the NATO command structure in the Adriatic area and the withdrawal of US ships and aircraft would make a mockery of the embargo operations...This example also proves just how much Europe needs to be autonomous where intelligence gathering, satellite reconnaissance and logistical support

are concerned.[504] A week later, Smith qualified his remarks to stress that it is "vital not to weaken NATO because of its essential role in maintaining peace in Europe...any such weakening cannot be allowed to happen."[505]

An ESDI standing alone against a revitalized Russian challenge at current force levels would prove a destabilizing imbalance. At the conventional level the relationship between Russia and the combined French, German, and British forces is 4:1 for heavy tanks, 1.5:1 for light tanks, 2:1 for armored vehicles, 3.75:1 for towed or self-propelled guns, 7:1 for multiple-warhead rocket launchers, and 2.6:1 for combat aircraft.[506] Building a credible independent ESDI from scratch would thus prove very expensive. The lowest level of independent military capability is estimated to cost $27 billion over 25 years and would still require the aid of US systems to make it function. The highest level of independent ESDI activity would cost $95 billion over 25 years. The higher level

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504. WEU Press Release. 11 November 1994. To compensate for this technological weakness, a WEU Satellite Center was inaugurated at Torrejon, Spain on 28 April 1993. The center receives its instructions from the WEU permanent council and is responsible for intelligence gathering; the verification of arms-control agreements; monitoring crises affecting European security; and monitoring environmental hazards. The Torrejon project became a priority for France which hoped to give the WEU advance warning supervision of disarmament treaties, collection of strategic and wartime intelligence data, navigational assistance, electronic warfare capabilities, etc,. France and Germany have also begun a joint project to develop a new line of military spy satellites. In July 1996 Italy joined the project. The program is well-funded at $2.1 billion and is thus a priority for the EU.

505. On the record interview with Sir Hugh Dudley Smith, President of the WEU Assembly, Washington D.C., 18 November 1994.

506. Claude Carlier, "NATO and the European Union," in Papacosma and Heiss 145.

would be more effective but still not equal the capabilities available in the existing framework in NATO.[507]

Another constraint is the general inability of the European countries to form a European wide military-industrial base. Article 223 of the founding Treaty of Rome excludes the production of and trade in arms, munitions, and war material from the normal rules of the common market when essential security interests are involved and thus rather than integrate a European arms industry, states have continued to buy nationally. The EU and WEU have sought to identify areas of potential cooperation by incorporating the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) into the WEU and renaming it the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). Also within the WEU, the Political Division has created an Armaments Secretariat. In October 1993, France and Germany announced plans for the creation of a joint armaments agency to focus on procurement for the Eurocorps but possibly to be expanded in the future. The purpose of the armaments agency is to integrate national armaments responsibilities to the extent possible in terms of organization, administration, and implementation of projects.[508]

Assuming these high costs and military responsibilities would be very difficult given the steep decline in European

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507. Morton B. Berman, et al, The Independent European Force: Costs of Independence (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1993).

508. A major initiative under this framework has been a feasibility study for a Future Large Aircraft begun in 1993. Additionally, an industrial consortium (EUROFLAG) has been established within the EU to conduct other feasibility studies for joint projects.

defense spending. By 1994, 6 of the 16 NATO countries had reduced defense spending as a percentage of GNP to below 2 percent.[509] As former NATO Secretary General Willy Claes said in a speech to NATO parliamentarians in November 1994: "It is obvious that the sharp decline in most European defense budgets makes it inconceivable that Europe could create its own integrated military organization alongside the one in NATO - and it would be a useless waste of money anyway."[510] In an April 1996 speech in Washington D.C., German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe said that: "...we would be fools if we did not take advantage of the fact that we already have a solid and functioning Alliance with enormous capabilities...we do not have to start from scratch."[511] Any habits of political and military cooperation and practices in NATO had evolved over a 45 year period. Even then, mobilizing NATO for the use of force in Bosnia-Herzegovina proved extremely difficult. Recreating that same institutional culture within the WEU in the absence of a threat and in the presence of an existing

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509. Belgium 1.8, Denmark 1.9, Germany 1.8, Luxembourg 1.1, Portugal 1.6, and Canada 1.7. Two countries were just over 2 percent (Italy 2.1 and the Netherlands 2.2). The average of NATO Europe had dropped from 3.6 (1980-1984 average) to 2.5. NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook: Partnership and Cooperation (Brussels, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995) 358.

510. Willy Claes, "Address to the Fortieth Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly," Washington D.C., 18 November 1994.

511. Lecture by Volker Ruehe at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, "The New NATO", German Information Center: Statements and Speeches XIX:7 (30 April 1996) 3.

alternative in NATO would require a convergence of national interests which Europe was far from attaining.[512]

Combined Joint Task Forces

The failure of institutions to deal adequately with the early years of the Balkan crisis prompted the US to formulate a proposal to realign NATO in late 1993. Recognizing that NATO could not survive if its sole purpose was to deal with Article 5 missions and that there might be occasions when the US might not necessarily participate directly in a non-Article 5 NATO mission, the Clinton Administration recommended a reorganization of NATO command structures based on Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) that would permit the creation of an ESDI that was separable but not separate from NATO. A CJTF is a multinational, multi-service, task-tailored force consisting of NATO and possibly non-NATO forces capable of rapid deployment to conduct limited duration peace operations beyond Alliance borders, under the control of either NATO's integrated military structure or the Western European Union.[513] Drawing on a practiced US tradition of combining assets from the three services of the armed forces, CJTF would open up multinational command and control outside of the traditional

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512. Even in NATO, capabilities were being limited by a 60 percent cut in infrastructure spending between 1991 and 1995.

513. Charles Barry, "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," Survival 38:1 (Spring 1996) 84.

NATO structures so that coalitions of the willing could use assets from the NATO command structure once a political consensus was reached in the NAC.

The US had made a major policy shift in its endorsement of ESDI. As Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said in advance of the Brussels Summit:

> The European allies have had a long desire...for a capacity for military action for missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and other things that could be undertaken without American participation. They had the desire to have a European pillar to the NATO Alliance. In fact, we don't object to that.[514]

Addressing the NAC, President Clinton said that: "We support your effort to refurbish the Western European Union so that it will assume a more vigorous role in keeping Europe secure...While NATO must remain the linchpin of our security, all these efforts will show our people and our legislatures a renewed purpose in European institutions and a better balance of responsibilities within the transatlantic community."[515]

NATO endorsed the strengthening of the European pillar through the WEU and stated that NATO's organization and resources will be adjusted to facilitate this. Specifically, NATO agreed that:

> We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for

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514. Press Briefing by Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bensen, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 7 January 1994.

515. Remarks by the President to the North Atlantic Council Summit. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 10 January 1994.

> WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security.[516]

The NATO leaders directed the NAC and the NATO military authorities to study the development and adaptation of NATO's political and military structures and procedures for Alliance missions, including peacekeeping, and to improve cooperation with the WEU to reflect the emerging ESDI.

The institutional bridge between NATO and the ESDI/WEU would be CJTF. Since 1991 NATO had recognized the need for smaller, more mobile and more rapidly deployed forces via the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). However, the ARRC was designed for Article 5 contingencies (collective defense). As the crisis in Bosnia had shown, NATO would be most effective by using Article 4 (institutional consultative functions) to serve as a framework for organizing non-Article 5 operations. For Article 4 operations to succeed within the context of a shared NATO/WEU operational framework, it would be necessary to lower the transaction costs of building coalitions for peace by institutionalizing command and control arrangements that could be readily adapted to the specific needs of each operation.

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516. Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters. Brussels, Belgium, 10-11 January 1994. NATO Office of Information and Press.

As Charles Barry observes, the unique aspect of the CJTF is an unprecedented development in military doctrine. CJTF will:

> ...institutionalize the task force concept, a command and control arrangement normally employed for crisis response by ad hoc coalitions. In fact, deploying CJTF's is intended to become the primary modus operendi of NATO in peacetime. Task forces are formed rapidly, employed for specific short-term contingencies, and then disbanded. With the CJTF concept, NATO's military hopes to invent a unique, hybrid capability that combines the best attributes of both coalition and alliance forces: that is, rapid crisis response by highly ready multinational forces, backed by political terms of reference, standardized procedures, regular exercises and in-place infrastructure.[517]

CJTF would give NATO flexibility to respond to new missions in or around Europe, facilitate the dual use of some NATO command structures for NATO and/or WEU operations, and permit PFP countries to integrate themselves into NATO run operations.[518] This would be done by establishing multinational, tri-service headquarters, based on deployable self-contained elements in NATO common structures, but adapted further, whenever necessary, to incorporate forces from nations in and outside NATO that are not currently within the integrated military command.

Through CJTF full NATO contributions to a NAC-mandated or WEU-run operation would not be necessary as coalitions of the willing could engage in peacekeeping or other non-traditional activities while benefiting from existing NATO structures including areas such as logistics, airlift, and

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517. Charles Barry, "ESDI: Toward a Bi-Polar Alliance?", in Barry Reforming the Transatlantic 77.

518. Stanley R. Sloan, "Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and New Missions for NATO," CRS Report for Congress 94-249 S (17 March 1994) 2-3.

airborne surveillance. The Clinton Administration saw CJTF as a means of enhancing the PFP by using NATO commands to integrate partner countries which might participate in non-Article 5 NATO or WEU operations. Washington also hoped that, through the CJTF, France might be brought closer to NATO military planning. Most important for the US, CJTF would be a pragmatic means of ensuring that NATO remains the core security institution in Europe while Europeans assume greater responsibility for their own security.[519] Thus in principle, the policy could bring together what had been quite disparate national perspectives toward the future institutional form of transatlantic security cooperation.

Obstacles to Implementing the CJTF Concept

Failed attempts to implement the CJTF initiative demonstrated that the underlying tensions which had blocked the restructuring of West European security had not gone away. As Simon Lunn, Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic Assembly, asserts: "The general perception that the (Brussels) Summit reconciled differing attitudes among the Allies towards an ESDI did not happen...unfortunately that obstacles to creating a workable ESDI have been removed is far from true."[520] Though it initially appeared that a

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519. This assessment of CJTF and the ESDI was developed in a series of interviews with senior US officials and senior officials from two European defense ministries in November 1994. See Sean Kay, "Common Defence, Common Burden." European Brief 2:3 (December 1994) 13-15.

520. On the record interview with Simon Lunn, Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic Assembly, Washington DC, 18 November 1994.

major compromise on the ESDI had been reached, the CJTF quickly stalled. NATO and WEU military officials were able to complete planning early but without further political guidance, military planning could only proceed so far.[521]

The US was particularly concerned that NATO's infrastructure for Article 5 missions remain intact and that no duplication take place. Additionally, the US worried that while formulated under an Article 4 mission such as humanitarian relief, natural disasters, or peacekeeping a CJTF could come under attack and possibly involve Article 5 of the NATO treaty. Washington wanted assurances that CJTF, especially those used by the WEU, would not drag the US into conflicts where it had no desire or interests in intervening. Moreover, for nearly a year France insisted on a separate command structure for non-Article 5 NATO missions such as those which do not involve existing command structures. The French position raised serious questions about the continued relevance of the NATO integrated military command and why the US should remain a part of it given that Article 4 missions were those most likely to be carried out by NATO or the ESDI.

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521. By March 1994, SACEUR completed a draft operational concept for CJTF command and control. On 28 June the WEU sent NATO a detailed analysis of operational requirements for a CJTF. Follow-on studies were presented to the NATO Military Committee in September 1994. Differences on the WEU role emerged over defining the support role of NATO commanders in WEU-led CJTF operations; the potential for the WEU to select their own headquarters (including national commands or in the Eurocorps headquarters) to function as a CJTF; and the WEU's access to NATO assets. Barry "ESDI:...", in Barry 77.

Also because it did not participate in NATO military planning, France sought to increase political oversight of CJTFs. In the US view, CJTFs, once mandated by the NAC, would answer directly to the immediate field commander with command support from SACEUR. Increasing political oversight over CJTFs was viewed by the US (and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in particular) as an unwarranted intrusion on the ability to carry out effective military operations. France also wanted one form of CJTF to be "national" meaning that a state acting alone could take on an independent mission with NATO assets or possibly head up a multilateral operation with its own command structures but drawing from NATO assets. This was rejected by Washington as a dangerous infringement on multinational military planning.

The US was sending conflicting signals in its endorsement of the ESDI. Since the debacle of US involvement in Somalia in 1993, the US military and US Congress were insisting that the US maintain clear command and control of its operations and assets. Moreover, the political leverage that the US gains in Europe stems not only from its overall capabilities and command structures, but also from its actual troop presence. The absence of direct US involvement in a ground operation, for example, would make it very difficult for the US to wield influence over its allies as the Bosnian experience prior to IFOR showed. For its part, France was internally divided as much of the posturing towards CJTF was related to forthcoming

presidential elections in 1995 and neo-Gaullist pressures to ensure France's distance from NATO. This political concern about the rapproachment to NATO was reflected in the fact that most of the problems with CJTF were raised by the quai-d'Orsay rather than the Ministry of Defense.

By summer 1995, with the West floundering in Bosnia and the future of CJTF unresolved, some NATO planners expressed exasperation that the prospects for making the concept operational were slim. As one senior NATO planner complained: "France insists on a special relationship and will likely continue to use the threat of its veto power to prevent such NATO operations from proceeding, if Frances' direct participation is not required."[522] Some military planners at SACLANT gave up on CJTF and proposed reforming NATO command structures based on functional responsibilities and new sub-commands to coordinate regional operations.[523] These planners proposed a NATO realignment which would redesign existing commands to allow NATO to act outside its geographical boundaries and even conduct offensive operations to meet future threats such as a ballistic

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522. Interview with a senior NATO official, Washington D.C., November 1994.

523. This internal NATO military adaptation would include regional coordinating of NATO commands with specific tasks including transportation; command, control, communications and intelligence; and logistics. Additionally, the SACLANT proposal would develop a common simulation and training system to help NATO militaries coordinate high technology warfare. In September 1996 the NATO Military Committee did agree to advise the NAC on creating a three-tier command structure based on current divisions between the Atlantic and European commands at the top, with the reorganization being done largely at lower levels.

missile attack on a member state or Persian Gulf style crisis.[524]

American representatives at SHAPE also expressed reservations about command and control in the event of a deal on CJTF. SHAPE stressed that non-Article 5 CJTF activity could become large-scale operations requiring NATO to have complete command and control. This position left some Europeans feeling that SHAPE was insisting on a veto over any European operation not involving the US.[525] By 1996, the NATO Military Committee had agreed to six main principles which CJTF must meet: 1.) preserve the integrated military structure; 2.) provide for separable but not separate forces in support of the ESDI; 3.) maintain a single command structure for Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions; retain the role of the Military Committee in advising and transmitting strategic guidance from the NAC to NATO Military Authorities (including the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, SACEUR, and SACLANT); avoid ad hoc participation in NATO bodies; and preserve the ability of Major NATO Commands to do timely contingency planning.[526]

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524. Theresa Hitchens and Robert Holzer, "Commanders: Reform NATO to Address New Missions," Defense News (26 June) 4,50.

525. Raphael Estrella, Rapporteur, "The Reformation of NATO," Draft General Report of the North Atlantic Assembly Defence and Security Committee DSC (96) 2 (May 1996).

526. Daniel W. Christman, "NATO's Military Future," Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 1996) 79.

Bringing the ESDI into NATO

Several factors contributed to a resolution of the disputes over CJTF leading to a deal codified at the Berlin meeting of NATO foreign ministers in June 1996.[527] Concern was growing in NATO that the one year time limit to the IFOR mission in Bosnia could bring about renewed war after its scheduled withdrawal in December 1996. NATO officials believed that it was important that IFOR meet its one year commitment so that the conduct of future Article 4 missions would not be impeded. The US and its allies thus needed a political means of reducing the US presence in Bosnia while keeping a meaningful force in place - possibly via a CJTF. CJTFs were used in IFOR though they were not formally placed within the conceptual debate in NATO or the ESDI. In order to accommodate force contributions and staff from non-NATO and non-European countries, AFSOUTH had been transformed into a CJTF headquarters. However, the European members insisted that without a US role after IFOR, they would also leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. As one senior European diplomat commented on 26 February 1996:

> IFOR will not be extended. We are now starting to discuss what, if anything, will replace it. European troops on the ground without any US involvement is not a good idea. But we're aware of the dangers of a vacuum...If Combined Joint Task Forces opened up -- and we are aiming for an agreement in Berlin...I would expect that to play a role.[528]

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527. Much of the information in this section was gathered in interviews with a senior official from the French Ministry of Defense in February 1996 and senior officials from the National Security Council and the Pentagon in Washington D.C., in March 1996.

528. Reuters. 29 February 1996.

A senior French official stressed: "The need to do something quickly for the European pillar of NATO because of a possible premature American departure from Bosnia is plausible...But we do not want to discuss that idea publicly."[529] Another European official said that: "The exit strategy is complete lunacy, it is hindering the long-term success of the mission."[530] In the view of many Europeans, with their forces accounting for 2/3 of the IFOR ground forces, burdensharing in NATO had arrived and the US had to continue its role if the Europeans were to stay.

France's return to NATO military planning also facilitated a deal on CJTF (see below). Additionally, NATO recognized that before it could enlarge to include new members, it needed to get its house in order. As Czech President Vaclav Havel said in a speech at SHAPE headquarters on 27 April 1995, NATO must redefine its aims and purpose before admitting new members. "The expansion of NATO should be preceded by something even more important, that is a new formulation of its own meaning, mission, and identity," said Havel.[531] By spending most of 1996 focusing on internal reforms designed to promote peace and stability,

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529. Reuters. 29 February 1996. After a visit to Washington in early May, EU External Affairs Commissioner Hans van den Broek indicated that he had found "widespread support" for the need for Europe to be prepared for a new responsibility in Bosnia after IFOR. Enraged by van den Broek's comments, French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette said: "It was irresponsible for people to talk of IFOR being replaced by the WEU. Everyone should stick to his job...then the cows will take care of themselves." Reuters. 7 May 1996.

530. Reuters. 12 March 1996.

531. OMRI Daily Digest, 28 April 1995.

NATO could downplay its plans for enlargement during the Russian presidential elections held that summer. NATO hoped to show Russia in advance of its June/July 1996 presidential elections that the Alliance which was enlarging was a transformed NATO.

In late February 1996 John Kornblum (Assistant Secretary of State for US and Canada) and Alexander Vershbow (Director of the European Directorate at the US National Security Council) traveled to Paris to broker a deal on CJTF. The agreement reinforced the principle that future European peacekeeping operations could draw on NATO force structures, equipment and logistical support even if US forces were not involved. France acknowledged that the ESDI must occur within NATO and the US accepted the possibility that NATO assets could be used for WEU operations in which the US would not participate.[532] Any WEU command arrangement would have to meet NATO standards, use equipment completely compatible with that of the Alliance and receive the prior approval of the NAC.

This Franco-American rapproachment paved the way for NATO to make the CJTF concept operational. Europe had not entirely reassured the US that they will not use NATO assets in a way that might draw the US into military conflicts that it does not have interests in. However, a stress on

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[532]. Paris also dropped a request for a form of CJTF to be organized around NATO headquarters where France had assigned officers and another based on national commands. See "Way is Cleared for Joint European Forces," Jane's Defense Weekly, 27 March 1996.

procedures in the NAC mandating the establishment and use of a CJTF headquarters would allow the US to exert influence over this possibility. Moreover, the continued weakness of the WEU meant that it was unlikely that the US would allow it to act if the challenge were serious. As one US official participating in the Paris talks asserted: "There's not going to be a separate WEU...There'll be one defense pot organized around NATO, with forces separable from NATO if the Europeans want to do something."[533] For the short-term, it was not necessary for the US to decide how far it might allow CJTF to go into WEU control because it was hard to imagine any situation serious enough to involve NATO assets in which the US would not lead.

The Berlin Accord: Political Guidance for CJTF

Meeting at Berlin on 3 June 1996, the NATO foreign ministers approved the CJTF compromise. Endorsing the development of the ESDI within NATO, the ministers welcomed the completion of the CJTF concept, directed the Military Committee to make recommendations for its implementation, and established a Policy Coordination Group (PCG) to link political oversight from the NAC to the military viewpoints developed in the Military Committee.[534] NATO established

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533. Craig R. Whitney, "NATO Looks to Peacekeeping by Europeans on their Own," The New York Times, 3 March 1996, A6.

534. Within the International Military Staff, a "Capabilities Coordination Cell" will be established to aid the Military Committee in providing planning guidance to the Major NATO Commander and aid in the Military Committee's providing advice to the NAC.

three principles to guide its adaptation including: performing its traditional mission of collective defense and adopting flexible and agreed procedures to undertake new roles in changing circumstances; preserving the transatlantic link; and the development of the ESDI within NATO.

NATO stressed the need to be able to mount non-Article 5 operations based on one integrated command structure that can perform multiple functions in a cost-effective manner. What had traditionally been ad-hoc task force arrangements would be institutionalized via the placement of CJTF headquarters "nuclei" permanently placed in selected NATO headquarters. The CJTF command nuclei would be the minimum personnel necessary around which a complete headquarters could be built once the NAC had a approved a NATO or non-NATO CJTF operation. The nuclei would provide the basic elements of necessary military experts for the implementation of multinational, multiservice military functions. To avoid duplication and reduce costs, nuclei command personnel would be dual-hatted to the parent institution (NATO or WEU). Once a CJTF had been approved by the NAC, the CJTF nuclei would be reinforced with "modules" which are additional staff elements to be assigned based on the particular political and military needs at the time. CJTF headquarters would have to meet a number of basic elements including: supporting the three main objectives of the NATO transformation process including responding to new

missions; be adaptable for new members and non-members alike; and provide support for the WEU's operational needs; ensure that collective defense requirements can take priority if they arise; preserve both the transatlantic nature of NATO and a single integrated military structure; and be done with minimum added costs.[535]

The ESDI would develop within NATO via full implementation of the CJTF concept grounded on "sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU."[536] NATO committed to prepare, within a transparent and complementary process, for WEU-led operations including planning and exercising of command elements and forces.[537] Additionally, NATO endorsed the development of the ESDI within NATO by: "conducting at the request of and in coordination with the WEU, military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU

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535. Barry "NATO's Combined...", 86.

536. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Berlin, Germany, 3 June 1996.

537. According to the final communique this would be based on: identification, within the Alliance, of the types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets, as well as, in order to prepare for WEU-led operations, separable but not separate, HQs, JQ elements and command positions, that would be required to command and conduct WEU-led operations and which could be made available, subject to decision by the NAC; and elaboration of appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking full advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations. This implies double-hatting appropriate personnel within the NATO command structure to perform these functions. Such European command arrangements should be identifiable and the arrangements should be sufficiently well articulated to permit the rapid constitution of a militarily coherent and effective operational force.

missions identified by the WEU."[538] The release of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations would be authorized by the NAC. The NAC would then keep itself informed on the use of NATO assets through monitoring with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities and through regular consultations with the WEU Council.[539]

Remaining issues to be settled by NATO included: ensuring that CJTF development complements any revision of NATO's command structure; taking account of the WEU via full development of "separable but not separate" capabilities; providing for the possible involvement of non-NATO nations in a CJTF; and maximizing cost-effectiveness and avoiding duplication. Additionally, considerable demands may be placed on CJTFs as they may need to be able to deploy at short notice, move at short notice, and take advantage of the most technologically sophisticated military systems.[540] Specific deployment strategies, the sharing of communications and intelligence, specifications for deployment time, and which of NATO's eight existing

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538. Berlin Communique. Such planning would at a minimum: prepare relevant information on objectives, scope and participation for illustrative WEU missions; identify requirements for planning and exercising of command elements and forces for illustrative WEU-led operations; develop appropriate plans for submission through the MC and NAC to the WEU for review and approval.

539. The Berlin communique also expressed satisfaction with the growing ties between NATO and the WEU. The ministers endorsed the completion of a new agreement between NATO and the WEU on security measures for the protection of shared classified information and expressed a desire to build on consultative mechanisms based on joint NATO-WEU Council meetings and those between the WEU Permanent Council and SACEUR.

540. Anthony Cragg, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning, "The Combined Joint Task Force Concept: A Key Component of the Alliance's Adaptation," NATO Review 44:4 (July 1996) 7-10.

Major Subordinate Commands would become CJTF headquarters also remained to be settled by NATO military planners.

Most importantly, the planning and conduct of exercises utilizing CJTF would help move the concept from theory to reality, incorporate lessons from IFOR, and help identify areas for further development. As Charles Barry notes, formulating a substantial program of CJTF exercises is essential to its success. Regular CJTF exercises, such as the large annual maneuvers that NATO undertook during the Cold War, will "gradually yield a valuable reservoir of staffs, units and service members experienced in new operations and procedures for NATO." This is especially important as it is "one thing to develop contingency plans, operational concepts and doctrine for one nation; it is quite another to harmonize the rapid deployment of forces by 16 or more nations."[541]

Central to the conduct of large scale exercise will be a realignment of the NATO integrated military command structure to increase the European role but preserve key US commands. A proposed reform popular in US planning circles would have SACEUR and SACLANT remain US officers and their deputies be Europeans. However, the Deputy SACEUR and Deputy SACLANT could be nominated by the members of the WEU or the EU and then approved by the NAC as part of an interlocking process. The Deputies could also be the most

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541. Barry "NATO's Combined...", 82-83.

senior military officers in the WEU defense structure. Should the NAC decide on a mainly European CJTF operation with only a supporting NATO role, the Deputy SACEUR (or Deputy SACLANT) would assume control of the operation, with full access to the assets of the integrated command structure. Alternatively, should the NAC decide on a WEU-run CJTF, the Deputy SACEUR (or Deputy SACLANT) would shift to his European (WEU or EU) command function and run the operation independent of US or NATO support.[542]

In mid-1996 the theoretical debate over CJTF took on a sense of urgency in NATO planning for a post-IFOR peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While the military tasks provided for by NATO were very successful, the civilian side of the Dayton accords had fallen behind and some sort of substantial military presence was required to maintain the fragile peace. Having committed to a one year mission in IFOR, the US was under considerable pressure to find a functional alternative through which it could reduce its commitment. A follow-on force might be a perfect opportunity for the Europeans to take responsibility for their own affairs backed by an American reassurance force in a nearby country such as Hungary or Croatia. In theory the US would be out of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Europeans

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542. This position was initially advanced by Stanley R. Sloan of the US Congressional Research Service. See Stanley R. Sloan, "NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense," CRS Report (September 1995 30-32 and Stanley R. Sloan, "Negotiating a New Transatlantic Bargain," NATO Review 44:2 (March 1996) 19-23.

would implement an ESDI under a NATO command via CJTF - after all, why have an ESDI if it can not be effectively used? This plan was popular among US military planners but diplomats could not reconcile the pressure from European members of NATO who were unwilling to take this responsibility and who thus insisted that "we went in as allies, we go out as allies." Thus this gradual exit strategy took on more long-term planning over the 18 month period of SFOR.

The French Return to NATO

An important impetus for the institutionalization of the CJTF concept was the return of France to NATO military structures. The Balkan crisis forced France toward a gradual return to the Alliance out of concern that it would be left out of military decisions that could impact its forces there. Bosnia had also shown the futility of the development of an independent ESDI and thus a deal with NATO that preserved the principle of the ESDI was in France's interest. The high costs of building an independent ESDI (estimated to be 27 to 95 billion dollars over 25 years) also collided with France's commitment to the EU and its monetary union (EMU) requiring domestic austerity programs in a climate of 12 percent unemployment and massive public strikes. As part of its belt-tightening, and to meet new strategic demands, French President Jacques Chirac (elected in May 1995) introduced dramatic armed forces reductions and

an end to conscription. The French return to NATO had two basic conditions: that NATO will continue to adapt its internal structures and that the ESDI should be visible and operational.[543] Contradictory institutional commitments and the political economy of European security had forced France to do what the Soviet threat could not - move Paris back into NATO.

France's movement toward NATO military structures began in 1993 with the agreement to place the Eurocorps under a NATO command in the event of an emergency. In September 1994, French Minister of Defense Francois Leotard participated in a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Seville, Spain. This was the first visit by a French Minister of Defense to a NATO meeting since 1966. To accommodate French sensitivities, the meeting was labelled an "informal" discussion. French officials from the Ministry of Defense insisted that Leotard's attendance was not a change in doctrine. Rather they intended to participate on a case-by-case basis to coordinate activities in the Balkans and to discuss Mediterranean security.[544]

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543. See "Allocution de Monsieur Charles Million, Ministre de la defense, Le 19 decembre 1995, lors du colloque organise par la fondation pour les etudes de defense," Defense nationale (April 1996) 12-13 and Charles Million, "Vers une defense nouvelle," Defense nationale (14 July 1996) 13-19.

544. Interview with an official from the French Ministry of Defense, Washington DC, November 1994. Leotard had pushed to attend the NATO defense ministerial at Travemunde, Germany, in December 1993 (where the PFP and CJTF were initially presented) but President Mitterand vetoed his participation. Similarly when the French Chief of Staff sought to attend a meeting of the NATO Military Committee in April 1994, Mitterand again refused. Nevertheless, at the Brussels NATO summit in 1994 France had informed its allies that it would attend NATO military meetings where issues that might affect French forces were on the agenda. France

President Chirac indicated in his campaign that he was prepared to seek closer ties to NATO. By summer 1995, he had made a firm commitment to deepen France's NATO ties.[545] In September, France hosted the first NATO military exercise on French territory since 1966.[546] Chirac next moved to strengthen ties with Britain. On 31 October Chirac and British Prime Minister John Major initiated a "global partnership" committing both sides to exchange classified nuclear weapons data with a long-term objective of coordinating nuclear policy and doctrine.[547]

On 5 December 1995 French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette announced that in order to strengthen French-NATO cooperation in Bosnia and aid the development of the European pillar of NATO, "France has decided to become more

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would not cross the line of reintegration into the military structure. Leotard had, nevertheless, signalled Paris' view that NATO's role in Europe was evolving. In fact, a key element of (unsuccessful) bilateral discussions between Leotard and US Secretary of Defense William Perry at the Seville meeting was to explore ways to make CJTF work. Interview with a senior official from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, October 1994. Also see William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell young, French Policy Toward NATO: Enhance Selectivity, Vice Rapproachment (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1994).

545. See Robert P. Grant, "France's New Relationship with NATO," Survival 38:1 (Spring 1996) 65.

546. The exercise included 60 aircraft and 1000 personnel in a four day Tactical Air Meet over Eastern France, with headquarters at a French air base in Toul. The exercise was designed to reflect NATO air strikes in Bosnia focusing on suppressing "enemy" air defense systems, practicing air-to-air refuelling and electronic warfare, and coordinating different aircraft types with ground air defenses.

547. Chirac and Major also agreed to pursue joint development and procurement of military equipment and to increase joint training. The respective naval chiefs were instructed to draft a letter of intent to promote naval cooperation by intensifying an existing program of military exchanges. They also initiated a Franco-British Euro Air Group at the headquarters of the Royal Air Force Strike Command. Chirac described the Air Group as a "symbol of a new credible European defense that must be based on a strong transatlantic relationship." Charles Miller, "France, U.K. Strike Defense Pact," Defense News 15 (6-12 November 1995) 4.

involved in NATO's various organizational bodies."[548] Though the extent of its long-term participation remained uncertain, France immediately took its seat on the NATO Defense Planning Committee and the Military Committee. NATO officials were elated with de Charette's announcement as it meant a return to NATO similar to that of Spain's.[549] The announcement effectively acknowledged NATO's central role in Europe and the need to reconsider the institutional form of the ESDI. As Dominique Moisi, Deputy Director of the French Institute for International Relations, told The New York Times: "The fact is that, militarily, we have depended on NATO and our margin of independence has been negligible...But our margin of political influence on NATO was also negligible before today...This was absurd."[550]

When President Chirac travelled to Washington in early February he told a joint session of Congress that the activity of US and European troops in IFOR signalled "...the need for the Alliance to adapt itself to a universe that is no longer that in which it was born."[551] The Franco-American

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548. News From France 95.19 (8 December 1995) 3.

549. On 16 January the French Ambassador to NATO told his counterparts that Defense Minister Charles Millon would now take part in formal meetings of the Defence Planning Committee (with the provision that matters relating to the integrated military structure are not raised) and that the French Chief of Staff would return to the Military Committee. He indicated that France was considering closer relations with SHAPE and SACEUR and that it was willing to discuss nuclear policy. France would also participate fully in the NATO Defense Colleges and in the NATO Situation Center. Interview with an official from the French Ministry of Defense, March 1996. Also see News From France (3 May 1996) 4 and Mariano Aguirre, "L'OTAN au service de quelle securite," Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1996.

550. Roger Cohen, "France to Rejoin Military Command of NATO Alliance," The New York Times, 6 December 1995, A1.

551. Address to a Joint Session of Congress by French President Jacque Chirac, 1 February 1996.

compromise on implementing the CJTF concept indicated the sincerity of France's position and the profound nature of the change underlying French NATO policy.[552] As a North Atlantic Assembly report concluded, beyond practical reasons related to military planning in Bosnia: "...there is a bottom line: France's will to engage in a real renovation of the Atlantic Alliance, including the development of a true European pillar...what is new is that France has declared its will that this European pillar must be built from within NATO, a stand that has been essential in clarifying France's position and giving reassurance to Americans and other Allies who had expressed concern on French intentions."[553]

Chirac's plan to restructure and reduce the French armed forces was central to the change in Paris' view toward NATO. As part of its commitment to attain European Monetary Union (EMU) by 2000, France needed to reduce its $59.3 billion budget deficit.[554] With high unemployment and the country paralyzed by strikes protesting government spending cuts, reducing the size of the French military was a partial solution.[555] Thus on 22 February President Chirac announced

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552. Interview with a senior National Security Council official, March 1996.

553. Estrella (1996) 10.

554. The EMU requirements in the Maastricht Treaty require states to have budget deficits below 3% of GDP, that the public ratio of debt to GDP be less than 60%, and that inflation be no higher than 1.5% above the average of the three lowest inflation countries in the EU. By 1996 France had a budged deficit of 3.7%; a debt of 56.9% as a percentage of GDP, and 1.3% inflation. OECD Economic Outlook, June 1996.

555. See Arthur Paecht, "La defense: Le temps des choix," Defense nationale (February 1996) 7-16.

sweeping reductions in the French armed forces to be accompanied by a new strategic doctrine which would save an estimated $1.2 billion a year.[556] In July 1996 Chirac announced a streamlining of the armed forces beginning with a disbanding of 38 regiments, closing barracks, army hospitals, and airbases, and retiring one of two French aircraft carriers. Central to Chirac's overall plan was a decision to end conscription and move to volunteer armed forces. With France's national defense capabilities being reduced to meet the pressures of one institution (the EU) Paris had little choice but to advance its national security interests by pooling its defense resources with its allies in NATO while negotiating the best deal it could get for its return to NATO.

Under the Chirac plan, France intends to reduce its total armed forces from 573,000-437,000 (400,000 - 250,000 when paramilitary forces are excluded) while retaining the capacity for rapid deployment of some 50,000-60,000 troops abroad. Some of its European allies worried that France would rely more heavily on its nuclear deterrent - a view hardened during France's undersea nuclear testing in the Pacific in 1995-1996. With an eye toward reassuring Germany in particular, Chirac announced that 15 short-range Hades

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556. Spending on defense research and equipment is to be cut by 18% annually (about $37 billion in 1997-2002 - $4 billion less annually than had been established in 1994). Total defense will add up to 3.1% of GDP (a 2 percent reduction from 1994) including military pensions. The Economist, 2 March 1996, 45.

missile launchers which can only strike targets in Germany, would be eliminated. Additionally, Chirac stressed that France's contribution (15,000) to the Eurocorps would not be affected by the reductions. However, privately some German officials indicated that French troops in Germany would likely drop to around 3000.[557]

The US endorsement of the ESDI made this rapproachment toward NATO more palatable for Paris. There was, however, some internal opposition to Chirac's plans. There will likely be a ten-year process of retiring all of the Gaullist, anti-NATO military officials, in France. Some French officials wanted the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) review of the Maastricht treaty in 1996 to promote the formation of a standing European army. For example President Chirac's former Prime Minister Alain Juppe wants an integrated European army of 350,000 that would be subordinated to the EU for rapid deployments.[558]

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557. See Craig R. Whitney, "Cold War Over, France Plans a Slim, Volunteer Military," The New York Times, 23 February 1996, A3 and The Economist, 2 March 1996, 45-46. Restructuring the armed forces also stemmed from difficulty Paris had in putting together a rapid deployment force during the Persian Gulf conflict. As the conservative parliamentarian and defense expert Pierre La Lellouche told The New York Times (23 February): "We had to beg, borrow and steal from 47 separate regiments to put together a 15,000-man intervention force during the war in the Persian Gulf...At the same time, the British army, which is less than half the size of the French Army now, managed to deploy more than 30,000 soldiers to the same theater of operations. Movement toward such national rapidly deployable forces has become common practice in national military planning with Germany developing a crisis reaction force of 55,000 deployable in 1999. On 1 August 1996, Britain announced the formation of a new Joint Rapid Deployment Force (JRDF), to be drawn from the army, navy, marines, and air force. The British force will have some units on 24 hour standby and quickly deployable at a reinforced brigade strength of 6000 - 8000 men.

558. In September 1996, Juppe did provide a strong endorsement for the NATO/ESDI relationship. Juppe suggested in a speech to the French Institute for Higher National Defense Studies that because of the realignment of NATO, he expected France to integrate fully into the NATO

In American military circles there is also some skepticism of France's ambitions. Some feel France returned to NATO so that it can have the greatest impact on European security - especially when the US chooses not to lead in a CJTF. For example, during the Bosnian crisis of summer 1995 while the US was reformulating its policy toward the Balkans, France was able to exercise considerable political guidance over NATO affairs. Thus CJTF could open up the way for France to work within NATO to limit the US role in Europe. This view was confirmed when France began insisting on a European general heading NATO's Southern Command. France suggested that failure on the US to hand over this traditional American command, (which includes the US 6th Fleet) would cause Paris to halt its return to NATO. The subject led to an ineffective exchange of personal letters between presidents Chirac and Clinton with diplomats hoping at best to "kick the ball down the road" a few years so that more urgent issues could be addressed in NATO. By the end of 1996, Franco-American relations had deteriorated to the point that the French foreign minister walked out of a

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military command structures. Meanwhile, in the IGC Britain continued to signal strong opposition to merging the WEU into the EU while France and Germany suggested that states might opt out of decisions on military or peacekeeping actions through a policy of "constructive abstention". A country might not participate in an EU military action, but would agree not to block its implementation if others wanted to do so. This was problematic as it would harm the consensus principle within the EU. Thus the most likely product of the IGC would be continued support for the WEU as a medium-term effort to build an ESDI to enhance the CFSP and contain a political solidarity clause. Going into the IGC, there was broad support for the creation of a special planning and analysis team and of a senior post to represent the EU internationally. "The IGC: Committed to Creating a Common Foreign Capability," Jane's Defence Weekly, 27 March 1996.

proposed toast by the NATO Secretary General Solana in honor of retiring US Secretary of State Warren Christopher at a lunch during the December 1996 NAC ministerial.

The change in French foreign policy is, nonetheless, substantial and the rapproachment toward NATO appears sincere - in spite of the political bargaining over its role in the command structure. In fact, France was left little choice but to move closer to NATO because of its commitments to another institution - the European Union and its EMU. Weary after four years of futility in Bosnia and unable to construct an independent ESDI, France was forced to change its national security priorities. As a senior official from an EU (but non-NATO) country observed:

> The European Union will not within the foreseeable future develop into an independent, credible defense alliance. Therefore the U.S. contribution as a guarantor of European security remains vitally important. Europe's own security policy interests may best be ensured within a NATO framework in cooperation with the United States. Without NATO Europe cannot be stabilized: this has been seen in Bosnia.[559]

Institutions and their changing role - especially the internal realignment of NATO - had a profound impact on both the goals and the means of promoting French national security policy.

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[559]. Informal comments of a high level Scandinavian official addressing the Annual Meeting of Maanpuolustuskurssiyhdistys (Society of Civil Defense Courses). Helsinki, Finland, 6 May 1996.

Analysis

The institutional approaches toward European security during the first half of the 1990s were largely theoretical and designed for long term implementation. The crisis in the Balkans reduced the US and its European allies into "making it up as we go along", as one US official described the process.[560] CJTF was a major institutional adaptation which could prevent future Bosnia-style conflicts from getting out of hand. Yet the CJTF is a means to an end - the broader objective being the vitality of the transatlantic relationship. If agreement could not be reached on a crisis in Europe's own backyard for four years in the Balkans, then disputes over Iran, Iraq, Cuba, international terrorism, and international trade might pull Europe and North America apart. The internal fabric of the Western community is challenged by the possibility of war between Greece and Turkey, Mediterranean concerns about North Africa and the rise of Muslim fundamentalism, and North European worries over the Baltic countries and environmental issues.[561] These diverging interests are

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560. Drew, "NATO from Berlin..." 11.

561. NATO Secretary General Solana has proposed the creation of a crisis management center at NATO headquarters so that information can be exchanged between Greece and Turkey and hopefully prevent small disputes from escalating into war. Addressing his personal frustration with Greek-Turkish disputes, President Clinton said on 12 June 1996 that: "As to Greece and Turkey I can tell you that I am very concerned about it...Both those nations are our allies and Europe's allies through NATO, and I believe that the future of the region which they both occupy would be immeasurably brighter if they can resolve their problems and are immeasurably darker if they cannot." Joint Press Conference by US President Bill Clinton and Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi. White House Information Service, 12 June 1996. Turkey's internal policy toward the Kurdish minority has also provoked disputes with its European allies. In

likely to increase absent the Soviet threat. Thus NATO's institutional form must not only be adapted to show it is not a threat to Russia - it must be fundamentally transformed if NATO is to remain viable in the future of European security. Successful internal realignment will best be served with the following institutional form.

Tasks

The fundamental goal of an institutional adaptation of NATO must be to attain an operational burdensharing arrangement to make the US commitment to European security politically sustainable. Implementation of the CJTF/ESDI concept is the best means to this end - perhaps implemented in the follow-on to SFOR in Bosnia in 1998/1999 if not sooner. Successful adaption of NATO based on CJTF will demonstrate that preparing and training for Article 4 style missions will become the primary peacetime institutional function of NATO. The US will be reassured vis-a-vis burdensharing and the European goal of implementing the ESDI can be met. This is not to say that making NATO a pool from which allies draw on to support coalitions of the willing

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1995, Turkey called an Article 4 consultation at NATO over the Netherlands decision to recognize and host a Kurdish parliament in exile. Turkey argued that the Dutch decision was an infringement on Turkish sovereignty and it thus represented a security threat to Turkey. Additionally in August 1996 Turkey angered Washington by proceeding with at $23 billion gas deal with Iran in defiance of a new US law which penalizes companies investing in energy projects in Libya or Iran. Washington's response was constrained by the fact that Turkey's compliance with US-led sanctions against Iraq had been causing a major shortfall in Turkey's energy reserves. The US policy on dealing with these states is compounded by the fact that not only Turkey trades heavily with these states but so does the entire EU. For example, the EU has a combined amount of annual trade with Iran of $893 million.

will always work. The states that are undertaking a mission will have to get the political support of the NAC. The important factor will be NATO's capacity to provide standing mechanisms so that when a consensus exists to utilize CJTF, it will be done rapidly and effectively.

Organizational Capabilities

The main physical change in NATO will be a restructuring of its regional and sub-regional command headquarters which will be adapted to accommodate CJTF planning. If non-members can contribute to CJTF planning for Article 4 missions, they should be able to join these standing headquarters via the PFP. NATO will remain highly formal with little autonomy but regional integrated headquarters will allow rapid and effective responses to crises. As PFP countries work within the CJTF framework and Article 4 missions come to be the main focus of peacetime NATO activity, the debate over whether a state actually joins NATO or not will blur as expanded multinational planning promotes practical solutions to real security problems. Collective defense will remain the linchpin of NATO but it will be held in reserve, through which NATO's traditional alliance functions can flow if some unforeseen major threat to Europe does appear.

Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures.

In the case of CJTF, institutional procedures take on an increased role with a greater opportunity for international socialization than previously existed in NATO - especially if CJTF headquarters are opened to PFP countries that are able to contribute. The procedures in NATO vis-a-vis the ESDI will remain largely unchanged - a consensus must exist in the NAC. However, consensus need not necessarily mean a commitment by all countries to participate in an operation. The principles and norms present in NATO will be enhanced because in order to use NATO assets via a CJTF, a state must meet the approval of all the members of the NAC. A state in gross violation of institutional principles and norms might form international coalitions for a particular objective - but it will be harder to do than in the absence of the institution as it will not be able to draw from standing NATO assets.

Capacity for Change

Absent a credible threat, NATO's future hinges on implementation of the CJTF concept and its internal restructuring. If it does not have the capacity for this sort of fundamental change after the Cold War, NATO may well go the way of most alliances. NATO has shown a potential for adaptation - particularly in its planning for CJTF. However, CJTF remains a concept that has yet to be implemented. If the member states can agree to its

implementation then NATO will have an important role to play in the future of European security - and its primary role will be institutional. NATO will avoid hierarchy but serve as a standing institution from which states might call on for expertise and assistance when a crisis occurs.

Beyond NATO: The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

NATO is not a panacea and its future is in not guaranteed. If NATO is to continue to contribute to national security in Europe it will require a deepening and widening of the transatlantic relationship between the US, Canada, and Europe. A new transatlantic institution established through a US/Canada/EU charter that creates procedures for political and economic cooperation would insulate NATO from non-security disputes spilling over into the Alliance. This would make NATO work more effectively as it carries out new tasks in the 21st century. If the only tie that binds the US directly to Europe is NATO, then the transatlantic relationship and the future effectiveness of NATO are in danger. Thus, North America and Europe must build upon the political, economic, and security ties that bind based on shared interests.

Politically, the transatlantic relationship symbolizes the promise of stable democratic societies working together to promote common interests. Democracy itself does not cause peace in international relations. Fragile democracies that have not fully developed respect for minority rights or

peaceful resolution of disputes may experience high instability and even civil war that can become internationalized. Democracies suffering economic catastrophes can also fall to nationalism and/or dictatorship with expansionist goals. Nevertheless democracy is, in the long term, the most stable system of government because of its basis on popular legitimacy and the rule of law. Moreover, open societies enhance transparency in military planning so that the possibility of uncertainty leading to instability in international relations is lowered. Thus the members of NATO have a unique responsibility and opportunity to serve as a model of international cooperation in military planning so that the possibility of uncertainty leading to instability in international relations is lowered.

Economically, the US and Europe are deeply interdependent with about $1.5 trillion in annual shared economic activities. Europe has more of the Gross World Product than any other region with 35 percent at market exchange rates and 27 percent at purchasing power parity exchange rates. Europe was America's second-largest customer in 1993 with 31 percent of US exports of goods and services; America's second-largest supplier in 1993, providing 29 percent of US imports of goods and services; and Europe provides the US with relatively balanced trade, with a $7 billion US merchandise trade deficit in 1993 (compared to 115 billion for Asia). Nearly 50 percent of US

direct investment abroad is in Europe, and over 60 percent of foreign direct investment in the US comes from Europe (about $260 billion) which provides an important source of capital to offset low national savings rates. These investment flows account for nearly 7 percent of all jobs in the US and 5 percent in Europe. Some 3 million American citizens are employed in the US by European-owned business and 1.5 million are supported by goods and services that the US exports to Europe. Combined, the US-European trade relationship accounts for about 14 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. Culturally, the US remains a strong relative of Europe. According to the 1990 US census, some 142.5 million Americans (about 56.9 percent) have sole or primary European ancestry or ethnic origins.[562]

Despite this political and economic transatlantic interdependence, the greatest challenge to European security in the 21st century will be the maintenance of the institutionalized security cooperation developed between the US and Europe since World War II. Though the successful US interventions in Haiti and Bosnia have shown that Americans can be rallied to support risky military engagement, their willingness to continually come to the aid of others with sufficient means to act on their own can only be tested so

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[562]. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995) 42. Also see Norbert Wieczorek (Federal Republic of Germany), General Rapporteur, "Europe and North America: Partners and Competitors," Draft General Report, The North Atlantic Assembly Economic Committee EC (96) 7 (May, 1996).

often. Domestic constraints on the American commitment to repeated international interventions is especially true in Europe where Americans often see wealthy Europeans with strong governmental safety nets built under the US security guarantee. This sense of frustration has strong voices in each major American political party and is more active in the Congress today than it was in the Cold War.[563]

Leaders in the US and Europe have expressed concern about growing trends toward American isolationism. In March 1995 President Clinton told a bipartisan audience at the Nixon Center in Washington DC that:

> The new isolationists are wrong. They would have us face the future alone. Their approach would weaken this country, and we must not let the ripple of isolationism that has been generated build into a tidal wave.[564]

In his address to the US Congress in February 1996, French President Chirac lectured the members on the benefits of foreign aid and chastised them for deep cuts in US aid programs. The speech was poorly attended by members and many seats were filled with congressional research assistants and pages. The declining interest in foreign affairs in the US Congress has combined with the lowering of

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563. In February 1995, the US House of Representatives passed a bill to deduct from regular US dues to the UN the amount the US pays for peacekeeping operations. Similar language was included in the American Interests Abroad Act of 1995 introduced in the House of Representatives on 23 May 1995. President Clinton described this legislation as the most serious isolationist threat to the US international role in the last fifty years. White House Information Service, 23 May 1994. Former Republican Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger described it in a 24 May 1995 interview with National Public Radio as "immature."

564. Remarks by the President to the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom Policy Conference. The Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC, 1 March 1995.

its institutional memory with the retirement of Senators Sam Nunn, Howell Heflin, Bill Bradley, William Cohen, and Nancy Kassenbaum. This diminution of internationalist members of congress has especially worried German Chancellor Kohl. While receiving an award from the Atlantic Bridge Group in Berlin for fostering ties between Germany and the US on 18 June 1996, Kohl said that: "The US elections in the autumn will see a series of senators and members of Congress drop out who know Germany and Europe and are bound to us in a special way...I do not for now see that the 'old guard' of senators and congressmen is being replaced with successors who approach Europe and Germany with the same intensity."[565]

A restructuring of NATO can provide a means of keeping the transatlantic security partnership vibrant in the future. However, it must proceed beyond theoretical applications into full implementation via CJTF. This may require a leap of faith on the part of the US and its European allies - and it may also require that European members of NATO spend more money on defense. If anything has been gained from nearly fifty years of cooperation in NATO, then now is the time to take practical steps to maintain the institutional security relationship between the US and Europe. A renewed transatlantic partnership institutionalized through a US/Canada/EU charter can focus on non-traditional security challenges such as trade

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[565]. Reuters. 18 June 1996.

disputes policing nuclear proliferation, environmental challenges, technology transfer, negotiating border disputes, international terrorism, organized crime and migration. In December 1995 the US and EU completed the New Transatlantic Agenda. Later, in September 1996, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher called for a "New Atlantic Community" in a major speech in Germany. These were important first steps reflecting shared interests that are the basis of the transatlantic relationship. Whatever form the new transatlantic partnership takes, its objective must be to ensure that disputes not immediately pertinent to national security do not damage the institutions which can affect the peace and stability of Europe into the 21st century.

CHAPTER VIII

TOWARD A BROADER RESEARCH AGENDA: COMPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONS

From Theory to Practice in European Security

While more research is needed on the question of whether institutions cause security, this project has shown that variations in institutional form can affect the degree of security in post-Cold War Europe. While NATO's institutional form has been primarily dependent upon the structure of the international system, it has evolved since the end of the Cold War. In its outreach to Central and Eastern Europe and in the planning for IFOR, NATO has enhanced security. However, NATO has yet to transform sufficiently to meet the needs of Europe in the future. If NATO is to promote security, it must move from theory to practice in its institutional adaptation. In particular, the degree of security in Europe's future may be dramatically affected, positively or negatively, by the form that NATO enlargement takes.

Early advocates of NATO enlargement oversold what NATO could do for new members and raised their hopes too high only to be dashed upon the rocks of geostrategic reality. These countries, particularly the Baltics, have suffered too much to deserve this kind of treatment from the West. Having raised false hopes among Central and East Europeans and risked a cooperative dialogue with Russia which appeared

at the end of the Cold War, NATO members have a responsibility to shape NATO's institutional form to ensure that it enhances security for the many and not only the few.

NATO's first attempt at adaptation was to promote mutual gain in European security through the amalgamated collective security of interlocking institutions. This failure to construct a new European security architecture confirms the realist critique of institutions and their capacity to independently affect peace. As the bloodshed grew in the Balkans, the multiple institutions tasked by states to resolve the conflict - the EU, CSCE, UN, WEU, and NATO - all failed to convince the warring parties to cease their violence. Even ethnic cleansing bordering on genocide could not mobilize member states to authorize institutions to respond effectively. Without shared national interests or independent capabilities, institutions promoted a false sense of security as Europe witnessed its worst violence since World War II. Paralyzed by the diverging interests of its member states, NATO was on the brink of collapse by mid-1995. NATO could not exist in a vacuum and if it was to have any relevance after the Cold War, it would have to play a role in resolving the Balkan crisis. By late 1995, a combination of power, diplomacy, and institutions caused a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina which led to a potentially stable peace. NATO's institutional attributes enhanced that peace in two key ways.

First, NATO planning substantially lowered the transaction costs of forming and maintaining a peacekeeping coalition to facilitate the agreed separation of the warring parties. The Dayton accords reached during the autumn of 1995 depended on a rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces which only NATO could adequately supply. This immediate intervention was possible because of two years of institutional planning and it was essential to the reassurance that each party needed to commit to peace. By organizing 60,000 troops for IFOR, NATO demonstrated that it had evolved to become more flexible and adaptive in its missions. NATO could field new and creative command structures, and facilitate the use of power. While still fundamentally an instrument of policy, NATO made the implementation of a collective decision easier to attain than it would have been in the absence of the institution.

Second, through the NACC and the PFP information exchanges, NATO integrated non-member countries into its military planning for peacekeeping operations based on Article 4 consultation. A better understanding of the capabilities available for multinational peacekeeping lowered the transaction costs of planning and reduced the danger that command and control confusion could harm this multinational coalition. NATO's coordination of IFOR included 10,000 personnel from PFP countries - some of whom took on very dangerous missions. The provision of non-NATO forces was politically significant as domestic constraints

limited the amount of forces the US was willing to commit to IFOR. NATO's new institutional characteristics thus helped make it possible for its leading member to provide only one-third of the forces. Additionally, IFOR would feed back on the PFP process as operational experience helped Partners better define their security needs in relation to NATO.

Despite these successes, NATO's institutional capacity to help Bosnia-Herzegovina move from a situation of peace to one of lasting security was confined. Though IFOR provided considerable infrastructure assistance in rebuilding the country, its limited tenure left the future of post-IFOR Bosnia very unclear. The removal of NATO from the region after one year would have once more exposed the weakness of other institutions such as the EU, WEU, and OSCE. Thus the scheduled end of IFOR prompted an ongoing discussion over what would best maintain peace in the Balkans - and renewed debate over the relevance of institutions in aiding reconciliation versus the less ideal but perhaps more stable partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The most important lesson of NATO's contribution to peace in the Balkans was that NATO only worked when the US was fully engaged and leading its traditional alliance functions. NATO could conduct planning for peacekeeping, but it was not effective in the absence of US leadership. The US has a vital interest in European stability and its presence and influence provides it. However, a failure of Europe to assume responsibility for immediate security

challenges in its own backyard, could drive the US away from Europe and thereby damage the insurance that the American presence provides against great power conflict. While US involvement in Europe is central to American and European long-term interests, it will only be politically sustainable with a major adaptation of NATO's institutional form via implementation of the CJTF initiative.

Why Variations in Institutional Form Matter

NATO remains insufficiently adapted to the post-Cold War security environment to justify optimism for its long-term survival. NATO did link membership with principles by adapting its membership rules from restricted to conditional. However, the policy of NATO enlargement was driven through, decided, and instigated without a full airing of the potential false promises that it promoted. For example, those analysts and policymakers who linked NATO and democracy were confusing cause and effect and those who implied that NATO had kept peace between Greece and Turkey had not read their history. For NATO enlargement to succeed, it must be based on the premise of promoting stability and proceed at the same pace as the Alliance's internal adaptation.

The strongest case for enlarging NATO is to include Poland and the Czech Republic, not as a hedge against Russia, but as a hedge between Russia and Germany. If Germany has no ambitions outside its territory, as its

behavior since unification suggests, then it should not have problems with this expansion of internal containment. Additionally, making NATO a hedge between Russia and Germany is probably the only argument that Moscow can accept for enlargement as it too has a shared interest in seeing this region stabilized. The US also has a long-term interest in promoting such regional stability via the reassurance that it provides Europe in NATO. America has lost too many soldiers this century to wars prompted by security competition over the region between Germany and Russia. Additionally, the US did not spend trillions of dollars fighting the Cold War only to see Europe destabilized in peace. It is true that the current security environment does not merit such pessimism. However, that is all the more reason to carefully lock in the peace and make it lasting as Europe moves into the next century.

It would be preferable for Russia to feel at ease with the geostrategic goals of NATO enlargement. NATO enlargement that merely moves the Cold War line East should be considered nothing but a failure and enlarging NATO as an explicitly anti-Russian act in the absence of Russian behavior that merits such a response would be a tragic mistake. By institutionalizing the NATO-Russia cooperation that has developed in IFOR and SFOR in the Balkans, NATO can show Russia that its intentions are peaceful and that the objective is to promote stability and not encircle Russia. A NATO-Russia charter can define this process. However,

unless there is a mutual gain from such a charter, it will have little relevance. NATO members tend to view consultation with Russia as informing Moscow of what NATO is doing while Russia views consultation as a right to veto Alliance activity. If enlargement is linked to sound geostrategic foundations and combined with a fundamental adaptation of NATO's institutional form, Russia and NATO will have a more solid basis for institutionalizing a consultative arrangement for the future of European security. So long as Russia is not a threat, NATO should demonstrate to Russia its peaceful intentions by transparently limiting the activity of new members to Article 4 planning and operations that will become the primary day to day activity of NATO. If member states are threatened, NATO can revitalize its Article 5 functions as a collective defense alliance. However, in current circumstances, there is no need for NATO to spread its infrastructure on new member territories in a way that decreases the security of any state.

To reduce the potential for false promises to new and aspirant members, NATO should be clear on what it can and can not do to promote democracy. NATO can provide an institutional forum for political and military socialization among new and old members but NATO per se is not an institution for building democracy. Other institutions - particularly the European Union - must take primary responsibility for building the substructure that lends to

stable democratic societies throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Overemphasizing what NATO can do to help democracies may actually create a sense among the European Union members that they do not need to enlarge into the places the EU should if it is to be consistent with the principles and norms that it promotes. NATO should play a complementary role consistent with its principles in promoting democracy and stability in Europe - and the PFP, not NATO enlargement, must become the principal means to that end.

PFP can aid non-members of NATO in four important ways. First, it opens NATO structures from which they can gain technical expertise that will help them enhance territorial national security as they see fit. Second, PFP can help states promote stability in their immediate regions. Integrated into CJTFs, PFP participants can more effectively address non-traditional challenges such as environmental catastrophes, natural disasters, and humanitarian crises. Third, at a general European level, PFP can contribute to stability as it has in the case of IFOR. Fourth, as the PFP countries join Article 4 related NATO structures and participate in other NATO programs and planning they will have the opportunity to continue to socialize within the principles, norms, rules and procedures of western political and military traditions. There is a danger that, given the high costs of integrating two or three new members into NATO, that the PFP will go wayside.

Thus, if NATO states are willing to invest in new members they must also be willing to ensure that enlargement corresponds to an increase in PFP funding and activities. This is especially true because the states that will become NATO members are stable and not threatened. However, by enlarging, NATO will spread its area of responsibility up to some very unstable areas. A broadened and enhanced PFP can help ease this dilemma.

A Broader Research Agenda: Complementary Institutions

As institutions become more active in Europe, institutional form will be increasingly important so that they do not decrease security. Thus the task of the student of international security in Europe should be to draw from realist and institutionalist schools of international relations to help guide the process of designing institutions so that they can do what they do best and not create false promises. NATO is at the center of a growing web of institutional security cooperation in Europe. However, NATO can not act alone and, unless it is fundamentally transformed internally, its future is not guaranteed.

Collective security in the form of interlocking institutions is not the path to a secure Europe. Europe is best viewed as a place with complementary institutions in which institutions perform clear tasks and are designed so that each can do what it does best. Just as this project

has taken a historical view toward NATO and the evolution of its institutional form, a broader research agenda can incorporate similar analyses of the EU, WEU, and the CSCE/OSCE. Complementary and mutually reinforcing institutions can form the basis of a growing institutional framework in Europe while institutional boundaries are made clear so that each can work most effectively.

To better understand how to avoid the pitfalls of interlocking institutions, a broader research agenda should include detailed study of collective security and why it has not worked. Historical analysis of the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations in particular can help aid the process of enhancing complementary institutions in a positive manner. Also as one studies NATO, it is always worth remembering that its presence means the failure of Europe to become a more peaceful place. The long-term purpose of studying European security is not necessarily the preservation of an institution such as NATO. The goal is to promote the circumstances in which NATO will no longer be needed - as far off as that ideal may seem. Thus, the relationship between institutions and security communities should be central to a broader research agenda. Finally, after the concept of complementary institutions is fully explored in Europe, it is worth looking at other regions of the world and assessing whether formal institutions might increase security, for example, in places such as Africa and Asia.

Conclusion

NATO remains essential to European security after the Cold War. While its independent capabilities are restricted, NATO has the potential to enhance European security if sufficiently adapted. To date, such an adaptation has not occurred and it is up to its members to provide the leadership for successful NATO reform. The stakes are high because the degree of security in the future of Europe can be positively or negatively affected by the institutional form that NATO takes. When NATO was first designed, individuals with creative vision assessed their short-term national interests in the context of long-term goals and mutual gains from security cooperation. Such vision and leadership is required again as Europe moves toward the 21st century. If it is forthcoming, NATO may have a strong and positive impact on the future of European security.

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