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PREDICTORS DISCRIMINATING MORALITY FROM LEGALITY:
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY'S BOTTOM LINE

A Thesis Presented

by

KATHLEEN M. SHANAHAN

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE


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
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
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
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
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still be a dream. Finally, my thanks goes to Lisa, whose extraordinary patience and gentle reminder ("It's only a thesis-") enabled me to persevere.

ABSTRACT

PREDICTOR'S DISCRIMINATING MORALITY FROM LEGALITY: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY'S BOTTOM LINE

FEBRUARY 1994

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While the existence of the self-nonsel self boundary is thought to be universal, the nature and location of this boundary appears to vary widely among cultures, between genders, and even among persons. American individualism exemplifies the extreme Western conception of self as separate and autonomous, and the field of moral development traditionally has equated moral maturity with autonomous reasoning and "blind" justice. More recently, an alternative morality of care has been posited, rooted in the conception of the individual as ensembled and relational. This study tested directly for a systematic relationship between gender, self-concept, conflict domain, and moral orientation. A sample of 72 undergraduate women and men were asked to recount two moral dilemmas, one involving a person with whom they have a close relationship, another involving a person with whom they do not have a close relationship. These narratives were interpreted to identify the use of care and justice in the formulation, resolution, and evaluation of each self-generated dilemma. Subjects also participated in a self-concept interview which was interpreted for degree of connection and autonomy, and completed a battery of self-report measures.

As hypothesized, gender and self-concept were found to be related, but not synonymous; while the majority of women were categorized as connected and the

majority of men as autonomous, a significant minority of women and men described themselves in terms that ran counter to predicted gender patterns. Moral orientation, too, was found to be related to gender and conflict domain, with women preferring care themes in the framing of both "close" and "not close" relationship dilemmas, and men preferring care themes in the framing of "close" dilemmas and justice in the framing of "not close" dilemmas. These findings place in question the relative significance and stability of gender as a variable in predicting moral orientation and lend support to the hypothesis that variables other than gender play a significant role in predicting moral reasoning.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The current social science debate over the nature of the self (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Brown & Gilligan, 1992; Bruner, 1990; Cushman, 1990; Hermans, Kempen, & van Loon, 1992; Lykes, 1985; Perloff, 1987; Sampson, 1988, 1989; Shweder, 1991b; Spence, 1985; Waterman, 1981; White, 1992; Williams, 1978) has raised an issue of fundamental importance to psychological theory, research, and clinical intervention. Inherent in the dispute and central to the conception of the individual is the two-fold nature of human experience: the individual as autonomous, and the individual in social context, or in relationship with those who lie beyond the boundaries of the self (Sampson, 1988, 1989). While the existence of a self-nonself boundary is thought to be universal, the location, flexibility, and permeability of this boundary appears to vary widely through history (Ariès & Duby, 1988; Hermans et al., 1992; Sampson, 1988, 1989), among cultures (Heelas & Lock, 1981; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Shweder, 1991b; Tuan, 1982; White, 1992), between genders (Benjamin, 1988; Chodorow, 1979; Gilligan, 1982; Miller, 1976), and even within persons (Bowlby, 1969; Zerubavel, 1991). Dominating modern Western society has been the conception of the individual as self-contained with sharply defined boundaries, such that others are excluded from the region belonging to the self (Bellah, 1985; Cushman, 1990; Sampson, 1977, 1988, 1989). A second, broader, and more globally prevalent conception of the individual involves boundaries that are more flexible, permitting the inclusion of others in the conception of self (Hermans et al., 1992; Sampson, 1977; Tuan, 1982). These two conceptions, one exclusionary, the other inclusive, have been viewed traditionally as antithetical and dialectically

dichotomous (Sampson, 1988; Waterman, 1981). In fact, they are manifestations of distinct cultural traditions, or "indigenous psychologies" (Heelas & Lock, 1981), which in turn maintain, regulate, and define the predominant views and values that mark their respective cultures (Sampson, 1988, 1989; Shweder, 1991b; Waterman, 1981).

Similarly, traditional moral theory, concerned with the negotiation of boundaries and derived from the conception of the individual as self-contained and autonomous, has defined moral judgment in terms of reason, abstract principles, competing rights, and social justice (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Rawls, 1971). This perspective has been challenged recently on theoretical, methodological, and heuristic grounds, its critics proposing that the identification of morality exclusively with the concept of justice, measured and evaluated in terms of an individual's application of universal laws to hypothetical dilemmas, constitutes a grave misrepresentation of the diverse psychological constructions of personal identity and social interaction (Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, Miller, & Argyris, 1989; Gilligan, 1982, 1988; Noddings, 1985; Shweder, 1991a; Shotter, 1981; Tappan & Packer, 1991). Informed by a more expansive conception of self, an alternative morality of care recently has been posited, assessed by means of personally generated moral dilemmas, represented in narrative form, and based on an ethic of interpersonal responsibility, compassion, and relational nonviolence (Gilligan, 1982, 1987; Noddings, 1985). The resulting debate within moral theory, rooted as it is in distinct conceptions of the self, has invited programmatic research designed to test the underlying theoretical association of self-concept and moral orientation.

The Concept of the Self

Self-contained Individualism

The transition in Western society from the Medieval to the modern era brought with it the emergence of the individual as the basic component of a newly defined social order (Aries & Duby, 1988; Sampson, 1989). No longer were individual members of society subordinate to the larger community; rather, the "self-contained individual emerged from embeddedness in various collectivities to become the free-standing, central unit of the new social order" (Sampson, 1989, p. 914). This new social order was maintained in turn through the impartial protection of individual rights and interests (Sampson, 1988, 1989).

American individualism exemplifies this exclusionary or self-contained form of individualism (Sampson, 1988). With its accompanying tenets of self-interest, individual freedom, and personal achievement, it is synonymous with the extreme Western conception of the self as separate and autonomous (Bellah et al., 1985; Cushman, 1990; Sampson, 1988; Spence, 1985; Waterman, 1981). Not surprisingly, indigenous psychological theories generated within Western culture have focused on the individual as the sine qua non of human functioning, defining mental health and positive social interaction in terms of personal autonomy, agency, and boundary maintenance (Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Erikson, 1968; Freud, 1933; Kohlberg, 1969; Kohut, 1977; Maslow, 1968; Perloff, 1987; Spence, 1985; Waterman, 1981). Janet Spence (1985), in her presidential address to the American Psychological Association, acknowledged that individualism and the rights of the individual have found "full expression within contemporary American psychology" (p. 1288), citing as examples attitudes toward child rearing and theories of ego and moral development. Similarly, Robert Perloff (1987), in his presidential address the

following year, noted the ubiquity and value of individualism, enumerating the "benefits of self-interest as an effective incentive for psychological decision making" and positive social functioning (p. 7).

Despite their advocacy of self-contained individualism, both Spence and Perloff admitted the need to temper personal autonomy with relatedness. Central to Spence's (1985) conclusion was David Bakan's (1966) contention that every living thing possesses two fundamental and antagonistic orientations, one toward "agency", i.e., a desire for autonomy and differentiation, and the other toward "communion", i.e., a desire for inclusion and connection. Bakan challenged the traditional assumption that agency alone is the keystone of psychological maturity, and argued instead that maturation involves a complex and ongoing process of self regulation in an effort to achieve a balance between agency and communion. Thus, a more autonomous or self-contained individual strives to correct the imbalance by moving toward greater mutuality, while a more connected or ensembled individual requires a complementary shift toward greater autonomy. The concurrent survival of the individual and of society at large requires that these contradictory impulses be reconciled (Bakan, 1966; Bellah et al., 1985; Kegan, 1982; Spence, 1985).

Applying this model to her own thesis, Spence warned that the American proclivity toward agency, when divorced from its original foundation in social responsibility, can easily deteriorate into selfishness, narcissism, and feelings of alienation (Spence & Helmreich, 1983). Commitment to the larger community, whether family, country, or the whole of humanity, provides a necessary corrective to the excesses of American individualism. "If only because of enlightened self-interest," Spence concluded, "we are obligated as citizens and human beings to

renew a national sense of commitment to larger causes that go beyond narrow self-interest and the search for self-satisfaction" (1985, pp. 1293-1294).

Following another line of argument, Perloff (1987) reached a similar conclusion. Like Spence, Perloff maintained that self-interest is best served when the interests of others are likewise promoted. This may take the form of prosocial behavior (Staub, 1978) or altruism (Hirsch, 1901; Jonsen, 1983), both of which place the autonomous individual in a relational context, and promote the well-being of both the agent and society. Perloff found in the writings of Emil Hirsch an expression of his position: "The highest aim in the economy of society and of creation is self-assertion in the service of all. Not egoism which feeds self at the expense of others, nor altruism which effaces self while thinking of others, but mutualism as implied in the words, 'Love thy neighbor as thyself.'" (Hirsch, 1901, p. 476, quoted by Perloff, 1987, p. 8). Thus, committed though he was to the ideals of self-contained individualism, Perloff was unable, ultimately, to argue for the good of the self without consideration of the good of the other. The self-contained individualism defended by Spence and Perloff, then, far from reducing the individual to a state of isolation, unequivocally situates the individual, autonomous though she or he may be, within a relational context.

Ensembled Individualism

Departing from this more conciliatory position, Edward Sampson (1988) rejected self-contained individualism as antithetical to the very body of cultural values it was intended to realize. Arguments that support autonomous individualism as the optimal or even requisite means to achieving those values were dismissed by Sampson as tautological; they both assume the self-contained individual to be the actor, and assume a system of universal, abstract, and impersonal rules and principles to be the norm. Instead, Sampson (1988) noted, it

could be argued equally successfully that ensembled individualism, with its emphasis on the collective bonds that unite people in a common enterprise, is not only a valid, but a more effective model for realizing the values of Western culture. In defense of his posture, Sampson cited historical, cross-cultural, social class, and feminist analyses, including (a) the religious traditions of Confucianism (Tuan, 1982) and Islam (Harre, 1981), (b) Japanese (Kojima, 1984), pre-Renaissance Western (Baumeister, 1987), and contemporary urban (Tuan, 1982) cultures, and (c) current feminist and self-in-relation psychological theories (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984) to demonstrate the precedence, prevalence, and viability of a more relational conception of the individual and her or his boundaries.

Sampson (1989) further proposed that with the current historical transition from the modern era to the postmodern, global era, the self-contained, psychologically sovereign individual is no longer an effective construct. Indeed, the autonomous, agentic self constitutive of contemporary Western society is, in the words of Phillip Cushman (1990), an "empty self," diminished by its social and psychological isolation. Similarly, Sampson (1989), citing Sandel's (1982) critique of individualism, argued that individuals in the postmodern era must be viewed as intrinsically contextual, "constituted in and through their attachments, connections, and relationships" (p. 918). Together, Sampson and Cushman concluded that psychology must develop a new model of the self to reflect the emerging paradigm of a global community. Jerome Bruner (1986), too, speculated that the present era is a transitional stage in human development. Envisioning the future of developmental theory, Bruner (1986) imagined that "it will not...be an image of human development that locates all of the sources of change inside the individual, the solo child." Rather, "man [sic], surely, is not 'an island, entire of itself' but a

part of the culture that he inherits and then recreates. The power to recreate reality, to reinvent culture...is where a theory of development must begin..." (p. 149).

Yet another permutation of the relation between self-contained and ensembled individualism was posited by several feminist theorists (Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan, Lyons, & Hanmer, 1990; Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stiver, & Surrey, 1991; Miller, 1976, 1991). Jean Baker Miller (1976), in her seminal study of women's development, proposed that differences in self-concept are gender based. Whereas men's development traditionally has been defined following a linear progression toward increasing differentiation and self-sufficiency, women, whose development and experience are fundamentally different from those of men, are uniquely oriented toward affiliation and relationships. This, Miller (1976, 1991) noted, is not indicative of women's weakness, as more traditional theories have maintained; rather, awareness of connection and relationship is an indispensable condition for psychological maturation. In conceptual solidarity with Bakan's model of agentic and communal selves and Sampson's vision of ensembled individualism, self-in-relation theorists (Jordan et al., 1991; Miller, 1976) proposed that interdependence constitutes a more advanced and accurate model for human development. Autonomy and separation are useful only insofar as they give form to the "self-in-relation". "Indeed," observed Marcia Westkott in her analysis of self-in-relation theory, "maintaining the larger relational unit becomes the ultimate end, because it is the condition *sine qua non* that meets the needs of the self." (1989, p. 242).

Adults' investment in affiliation, feminist theorists have claimed, derives from their earliest experience of their mother's involvement in their care (Jordan et al., 1991). Nancy Chodorow (1978, 1989), for example, examining the mother-

child relationship from an object-relations perspective, identified this gender difference in self-conception and boundary location: "girls come to experience themselves as less differentiated than boys, as more continuous with and related to the external object-world, and as differently oriented to their inner object-world as well" (1978, p. 167). This form of "being-in-relationship" (Miller, 1991), once modelled by the child's mother and natural to the child's innate capacity for connection, continues to be fostered in girls while at the same time discouraged in boys. Similarly, while adolescent boys are encouraged to develop ever greater autonomy, adolescent girls are invited to maintain a fundamental core of connection, particularly with their parents. Conflict serves ideally as a catalyst for change, without necessarily threatening the female adolescent's underlying commitment to the relationship. Reaching adulthood, women continue to value and to assume responsibility for maintaining relationships with men, with other women, and with their children, while men's capacity for connection remains limited as a result of a developmental pattern valuing independence and task-orientation (Stiver, 1991).

This perspective was developed further by Carol Gilligan (1977, 1982), who, noting the dearth of developmental research and literature on women's experience, concluded her own study of psychological theory and women's development with the following observation:

From the different dynamics of separation and attachment in their gender identity formation through the divergence of identity and intimacy that marks their experience in the adolescent years, male and female voices typically speak of the importance of different truths, the former of the role of separation as it defines and empowers the self, the latter of the ongoing process of attachment that creates and sustains the human community (1982, p. 156).

Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan (1992) later underscored a point frequently overlooked following Gilligan's (1977, 1982) initial assessment of women's and

men's distinct paths of psychological development; the association between gender and self-concept, though empirical, is not absolute. "To call women connected and men separate," Brown and Gilligan (1992) observed, "seems to us profoundly misleading; to say that men wanted domination and power while women wanted love and relationship seemed to us to ignore the depths of men's desires for relationship and the anger women feel about not having power in the world" (p. 11). Thus, while women and men appear to differ developmentally with regard to self-concept and boundedness, both retain a need and capacity for that which will either define their connection or transcend their boundaries.

In this sense, although the focus of feminist theorists has been on the psychology of women, there is implicit in their work the conviction that both women and men stand to benefit from greater appreciation for the value of connection. The dichotomous division of psychological labor, in which men traditionally have shouldered the burden of autonomy and women have assumed responsibility for relationships, limits the development of both genders; the validation of connection, and of the contextual dimension of individuals' interpersonal identity, is vital to the psychological well-being of all persons, male as well as female.

Summary

In the debate on individualism, then, the point of interest is not the extent to which an individual exists in isolation rather than in a social context; no matter what its conclusion, each of the arguments examined above places the individual in a relational medium. Disagreement is focused instead on the form and location of the boundaries which distinguish the self from others, and further, on the ways in which individuals, groups, and societies negotiate those boundaries that distinguish the agent from her or his relational context. Two fundamental paradigms can be

identified among the arguments outlined above, each of which finds favor with one or the other conception of the individual and her or his boundaries. On the one hand, traditional psychological theory has upheld the self-contained individual as the standard of psychological maturity. Separation and boundedness are valued while affiliation and interdependence are dismissed as developmental arrests. In modified form, such as that advocated by Spence (1985) and Perloff (1987), the autonomous excesses of self-contained individualism need to be mitigated by a commitment to mutuality. By contrast, Sampson (1988, 1989) has argued that ensembled individualism, with its more inclusive and interdependent conception of self, is uniquely suited to realize the values of an emerging global community, and that the continued adherence to a more self-contained model of individualism will be counterproductive. This position, too, has been modulated by feminist theorists (Chodorow, 1978, 1989; Gilligan, 1977, 1982; Jordan et al., 1991; Miller, 1976), who, allowing for autonomy, define the self-in-relation with its more flexible and inclusive boundaries as essential to self-esteem and human development. Both paradigms of the self are derived from distinct conceptual frameworks and both serve in turn to maintain the structures and values constitutive of the perspectives they reflect.

Theories of Moral Judgment

The debate on self-contained versus ensembled individualism and the optimal nature, location, and negotiation of the boundaries separating the self from others both mirrors and informs a synchronous controversy within the field of moral judgment. Traditional moral developmental theory, rooted in the conception of the individual as self-contained and essentially autonomous, formally regards moral judgment as prescriptive and universalizable, i.e., obliging an autonomous agent to an action specifiable as a rule or principle, universally

binding and independent of culture, context, or personal bias (Kohlberg, 1984). The leading spokesperson for this conceptualization of moral theory has been Lawrence Kohlberg (1969, 1981, 1984), whose theory of justice reasoning, derived from a conception of the self as having fixed boundaries (Vitz, 1990), stands as the dominant model of modern moral psychology (Pritchard, 1991). A second theory of morality, posited by Carol Gilligan (1977, 1982, 1987, 1988) and rooted in the conception of the individual as ensembled and relational, claims the existence of a second, distinct, and complementary injunction: to respond to the needs of others in such a way that hurt is minimized and relationships are maintained. The predominant theory reduces morality to a single, universally applicable theme of justice. The latter theory underscores the duality of experience: of universality and particularity, thinking and feeling, separation and connection. At issue are the means by which individuals conceptualize and successfully negotiate conflicting rights and needs involving both those with whom they are in close relationship and those who exist beyond the bounds of their immediate community.

Morality of Justice

Kohlberg's theory follows from the cognitive model of moral development first proposed by Jean Piaget (1932/1965). Further influenced by the philosophical tradition of Immanuel Kant (1965) and John Rawls' (1971) theory of justice, Kohlberg argued that justice is the most satisfactory criterion for fairly and objectively evaluating the conflicting rights of self and others. Like Piaget, Kohlberg ignored the relational and affective components of decision making, determining that "justice reasoning would be the cognitive actor most amenable to structural developmental stage analysis" (1984, pp. 304-305). Using data gathered from adolescent boys' resolutions of hypothetical moral dilemmas, Kohlberg (1958) concluded that moral development follows an invariant, six-stage sequence.

Advancement through the stages is motivated by cognitive disequilibrium and reflects the replacement of social convention with commitment to abstract moral principles. Later cross-cultural and longitudinal designs involving samples of women as well as men have provided additional support for the transcultural applicability of Kohlberg's developmental theory (Logan, Snarey, & Schrader, 1990; Snarey, 1985; Walker, 1984, 1986, 1989; Walker, de Vries, & Trevethan, 1987).

Persistent controversy has attended Kohlberg's model, however, much of which has placed in question Kohlberg's theoretical assumptions and research design (Bloom, 1986; Blum, 1990; Bruner, 1986; Gilligan, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1988; Haan, 1982; Kohlberg et al., 1983; Lyons, 1983; Puka, 1991; Shweder, 1991a; Snarey, 1985; Stiller & Forrest, 1990; Vitz, 1990; Yatsko & Larsen, 1990). Bruner (1986), critical of Piaget's and Kohlberg's structural approach to moral development, took aim at moral stage theory's "glaring deficiencies": "no place for human dilemmas, for tragic plights, for local knowledge encapsulated in bias" (p. 147). Developmental stage theory is flawed, Bruner (1986) expanded, because it has "failed to capture the particularity of Everyman's [sic] knowledge, the role of negotiations in establishing meaning, the tinkerer's way of encapsulating knowledge rather than generalizing it, the muddle of ordinary moral judgment" (p. 147). Such a perspective is not unlike that which inspired Gilligan's reformulation of moral theory.

In addition, Kohlberg's research instrument, as he himself acknowledged, was designed to measure justice concerns, and the hypothetical dilemmas, probing questions, and scoring procedures were all directed toward "eliciting judgments that were prescriptive and universalizable, while ignoring statements of personal feeling and those that attempted to rewrite the dilemma situation in order to

resolve it" (1984, p. 304). Thus, Kohlberg intentionally avoided material most likely to support other conceptual models of moral judgment, including emotional empathy (Bloom, 1986; Hanson & Mullis, 1985; Hoffman, 1987), prosocial behavior (Staub 1978), everyday morality (Haan, 1982), and conceptions of caring and responsibility (Gilligan, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1988; Lyons, 1983; Noddings, 1984). While each of these omissions reflects a general bias equating moral judgment with the limited values and characteristics of self-contained individualism, it has been Gilligan's (1982, 1987, 1988) formulation of a situation specific, relationally based, and affective system of moral judgment that has offered the most direct and compelling challenge to Kohlberg's emphasis on universality, reciprocity, justice, impartiality, and individual rights (Pritchard, 1991).

Morality of Care

Gilligan's (1982, 1987, 1988) indictment of Kohlberg's claim of universality has constituted nothing less than a Kuhnian (Kuhn, 1970) leap in moral theory. Firstly, it has challenged Kohlberg's deontological equation of morality with an objective, prescriptive, and justice based response to the question, "What ought I to do?" (Kahn, 1991, p. 326). Advocating an ethic of care, Gilligan attempted to redefine both the question and the range of moral responses. Thus, an equally valid moral question was, for Gilligan, "What sort of person ought I to be?" (Kahn, 1991, p. 326, which, in the philosophical tradition of Hume, assumes a relational self as the actor and favors a morality which is virtue-based and contextual (Baier, 1987). Secondly, Gilligan (1988) argued that Kohlberg's theory is fundamentally flawed insofar as it is rooted in the traditional Western view of the self as separate and bounded, ignoring the conception of self as connected and contextual. Stated in more general terms by Bruner (1986), Gilligan's (1982) argument is based on the premise that "the truths of theories of development are relative to the cultural

contexts in which they are applied....To say that a theory of development is 'culture free' is to make not a wrong claim, but an absurd one" (Bruner, 1986, p. 135). As a consequence of this error, Kohlberg's supposedly universal theory of justice-based morality has discounted a different and equally valid orientation concerned with the maintenance of relationships and a commitment to do the least harm to self and others. In positing the existence of this "different voice," Gilligan (1977, 1982) reasserted the historical tension between justice and charity, obligation and desire, mind and heart, reason and affect, universality and particularity, which has characterized much of philosophical, scientific, and religious discourse (Puka, 1991). That these contrasting virtues traditionally have been ascribed to male and female experience respectively and valued differentially lends credence to Gilligan's (1982) claim that a "different voice" is associated primarily with women's identity and moral development.

Gilligan was not the first to identify a gender difference in moral reasoning, nor was she the first to acknowledge two types of morality. Sigmund Freud, for example, concluded earlier that women "show less sense of justice than men," (1925, p. 258) while Piaget (1932/1965), whose work predated Gilligan's research by fifty years, noted in his observation of children's games that, "the legal sense is far less developed in little girls than in boys. We did not succeed in finding a single collective game played by girls in which there were as many rules and, above all, as fine and consistent an organization and codification of these rules as in the [boys'] game of marbles examined above" (1948 ed., p. 69). Curiously, Piaget also distinguished an externally defined, collective, and "heteronomous" morality characteristic of children and primitive societies, from a more highly evolved, internally motivated, "autonomous" morality, characteristic of greater maturity and societal development (1932/1965, p. 195). As Freud and Piaget

demonstrated, however, differences in moral development, like differences in self-concept, were being interpreted according to a bias favoring individual rules and rights over a more inclusive model of relationships and mutuality. Deriving his theory from Piaget's cognitive-developmental model, Kohlberg posited that, "justice is the normative logic, the equilibrium, of social actions and relations"; it is that which is "most distinctively and fundamentally moral" (1984, p. 184).

Feminist critics, however, were growing suspicious of the claim of universality being attributed to Kohlberg's theory of moral development when women, now being evaluated with an instrument developed on adolescent boys, allegedly were scoring consistently below men (Gilligan, 1977). Women, it appeared, commonly manifested stage three moral reasoning of "Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships and Conformity," while men tended to be scored at the more advanced stage four, equating "right" with fulfillment of duties, respect for laws, and commitment to society. As a consequence of this discrepancy, effort within the field turned toward explaining this apparent gender difference. Gilligan (1977, 1982), using personally generated experiences of conflict rather than hypothetical dilemmas, with samples of women rather than men, and attending to the affective rather than rational dimension of subjects' responses, identified a "different" moral perspective, i.e., an orientation of care:

In this conception, the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract. This conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care centers moral development around the understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights and rules (Gilligan, 1982, p. 19).

Gilligan's (1977) conception of a morality of care, while not developmental in the sense that Kohlberg's stages are cognitively distinct and stable, nonetheless

involves evolving levels of care, ranging from an initial concern solely for the survival of the self, to a contrasting ethic of self-sacrifice, and finally to an appreciation for the need to balance the needs of the self with the needs of others, a "morality of nonviolence," not unlike that advocated by Hirsch. Gilligan (1982) further concluded that a care orientation, although most apparent in women, was "characterized not by gender but theme" (1982, p. 2). This distinction is important, though frequently it has been overlooked by Gilligan's critics, whose efforts to discredit her theory have focused on demonstrating an absence of gender differences in moral reasoning under controlled conditions. Justice and care are not masculine and feminine modes of moral reasoning per se, but are instead consequences of divergent developmental paths and distinct conceptions of the self-other boundary. Nevertheless, because women, given current patterns of gender socialization, are oriented more often toward attachment and relationship, they are more likely to conceive of morality in terms of conflicting responsibilities and potential harm, while men, more inclined toward separation and autonomy, tend to conceive of morality in terms of conflicting claims and competing rights (Ford & Lowery, 1986; Gilligan, 1987, 1982, 1987, 1988; Lyons, 1983; Noddings, 1984; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988b; Stiller & Forrest, 1990).

Current Research on Moral Theory

Gilligan's (1977, 1982) theory has generated extensive investigation and polemic in the field of moral reasoning in the decade since its publication (Brabeck, 1983; Brown, 1989; Brown & Tappan, 1991; Colby & Damon, 1983; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Galotti, 1988; Kerber, Greeno, Maccoby, Luria, Stack, & Gilligan, 1986; Kittay & Meyers, 1985; Lidell, Halpin, & Halpin, 1992; Lyons, 1983; Mednick, 1989; Philibert, 1987; Pratt et al., 1988b; Puka, 1989, 1991; Stimpson, Jensen, & Neff, 1992; Walker, 1984, 1986, 1989; Walker, De Vries, &

Trevethan, 1987; Wingfield & Haste, 1987; Yacker & Weinberg, 1990). Despite the high volume of research, however, the tension between Kohlberg's model of the justice-motivated, autonomous self and Gilligan's model of the care-oriented, relational self has remained more "noted than resolved" (Pritchard, 1991, p. 5). Gilligan's "different voice" has drawn impassioned criticism as well as praise; dismissed as a "conceptual bandwagon" (Mednick, 1989, p. 1121) by one critic, it has been endorsed as worthy of "long-term theoretical research and development" (Puka, 1991, p. 63) by another. Specifically, research on moral reasoning over the past ten years has focused on the following controversial points: (a) the nature and extent of gender differences in Kohlberg's moral stages, (b) the validity of Gilligan's claim of two distinct moral orientations of justice and care, (c) the relationship of gender and other variables to preference for justice or care in moral reasoning, and (d) the influence of the form and content of a particular moral dilemma on the use of justice or care in its resolution. Each of these issues shall be examined below.

Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning. Much of the empirical research in the field of moral decision making has concentrated on the first point of controversy noted above, namely, whether the alleged discrepancy between women's and men's scores on Kohlberg's stages of preconventional, conventional, and postconventional moral reasoning is due to sample variability or to a fundamental gender bias in Kohlberg's stage theory. Walker's (1984) meta-analysis of the literature on gender differences in moral stages found little evidence to support a claim of gender bias. On the contrary, Walker reported that of the 108 studies he reviewed, only 8 indicated significant differences favoring males, and of those 8 studies, gender and other variables such as education and occupation often were confounded. A second meta-analysis

(Thoma, 1986) further challenged the charge of bias, insofar as women were found to score consistently higher than men on Kohlberg's stages. In response, Gilligan (1986) reiterated that the bias to which she referred exists on a level more fundamental than statistical analyses can address. It was in Kohlberg's original formulation of a theory of moral development, in which he claimed universal applicability for a theory derived from research on males, that Gilligan (1977, 1982) found fault. The issue was not, as subsequent meta-analyses attempted to test, whether women are able to function in a way comparable to that of men, but whether something may have been omitted from Kohlberg's theory of moral development itself by the exclusion of women from the initial stages of research and theoretical formulation (Gilligan, 1986). Gilligan's discovery of themes of connection and care in the narratives of women, she and her colleagues (Brown, 1989; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Lyons, 1983) maintained, confirmed her charge that Kohlberg's theory does not represent the diversity of individuals' moral reasoning.

In a commentary on the justice-care debate, Bill Puka (1991) ascribed to Gilligan's hypothesis the authority due any psychological theory in the making:

As such it invites further research and development on a distinctively theoretical plane. As an interpretive alternative to the 'dominant voices' in moral development, Gilligan's 'different voice' also models a crucial research strategy - that of comparative theoretical analysis and assessment. And in presenting the 'different voice' for assessment, Gilligan invites us to take part in this comparative research program (p. 64).

In keeping with Puka's assessment, efforts to confirm or disprove Gilligan's theory have proceeded along both theoretical and empirical paths. These shall be reviewed in brief below.

The Validity of Care as a Moral System. A critical issue raised by the generation of any theory is the extent to which it accurately represents the data

which it has been proposed to describe. This question has been implicit in Gilligan's formulation of a 'different voice', and explicit in the research that has since put her theory to the test. Specifically, of fundamental concern has been the validity of her claim that alongside justice there exists a second, equally compelling moral orientation rooted in an ethic of care. Needless to say, psychologists have been less than consonant in their analyses. Notably, Kohlberg (et al., 1983, Kohlberg, 1984) himself, despite his initial, unambiguous endorsement of justice, grew increasingly supportive of Gilligan's broadening of the moral domain. As his position evolved, however, Kohlberg came to reject the notion of care as a distinct path of moral development, describing it instead as a supplementary "ethic of personal responsibility" (1984, p. 229) concerned with immediate relationships but lacking in impartiality, universalizability, and consensus (Pritchard, 1991). Puka (1989, 1991), in contrast, proposed that Kohlberg's and Gilligan's theoretical and research agendas constituted theoretically distinct models of morality. Kohlberg's intention, Puka (1989, 1991) noted, was to define a universal, "common voice" morality that provides shared guidelines for human cooperation and conflict resolution," whereas Gilligan envisioned not a more expansive common voice, but a chorus of "distinctive moral voices, relativized to gender and social outlook" (Puka, 1991, p.71). From Gilligan's (1987) perspective:

It calls attention to the fact that all human relationships, public and private, can be characterized both in terms of equality and in terms of attachment, and that both inequality and detachment constitute grounds for moral concern. Since everyone is vulnerable both to oppression and to abandonment, two moral visions - one of justice and one of care - recur in human experience. Two moral injunctions, not to act unfairly towards others, and not to turn away from someone in need, capture these different concerns (p. 20).

Brown (1988), underscoring both Gilligan's (1987) perspective and Puka's (1991) subsequent critique, argued that justice and care are indeed distinct and equally

valid moral responses, "generated by concerns for specific visions of ideal human relationship," and framed in terms of "equality, reciprocity, and fairness" on the one hand and "attachment, loving and being loved, listening and being listened to, and responding and being responded to" (p. 6) on the other. The former relational paradigm implies a sensitivity to the threat of oppression and inequality, the latter to the pain of detachment and lack of responsiveness. Like Gilligan, Brown, too, maintained that these perspectives, though not gender-specific, are clearly gender-related.

Finally, several critics (Brabeck, 1983; Ford & Lowery 1986; Galotti, 1988) have posited that Gilligan's most significant contribution may not have been in suggesting that women and men differ in their orientations to moral conflict, but in broadening the definition of what constitutes an adequate description of the moral reasoning process. While the validity of care remains in question, with few notable exceptions (Walker, 1984, 1989; Walker, et al., 1987), the vast majority of current studies have proceeded under the assumption that Gilligan's conceptualization of two distinct moral orientations of justice and care is at best valid and useful, and at worst deserving of further investigation. In those studies that have assumed two orientations, the most pressing question has been the extent to which differences in morality are correlated with gender.

Gender Differences in Moral Orientation. Regarding Gilligan's claim of gender differences in the use of justice and care, research remains inconclusive. Several studies (Brabeck, 1983; Galloti, 1988; Walker, 1984, 1986; Walker et al., 1987), for example, found little evidence to support the thesis that women and men differ in their reliance on justice or care perspectives when making moral decisions, while others (Crow, Fok, Hartman, & Payne, 1991; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Galotti, Kozberg, & Farmer, 1991; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Lyons, 1983;

Pratt et al., 1988b; Pratt, Diessner, Hunsberger, Pancer, & Savoy, 1991; Stiller & Forrest, 1990) reported gender differences in keeping with Gilligan's theory.

An interesting though limited body of research testing the hypothesis that women value care over justice has found cross-national evidence of a preference among female college students for traits associated with care, i.e., women are significantly more likely than men to rate more favorably such items as understanding, sensitivity, sympathy, compassion, and reliability (Stimpson, Jensen, & Neff, 1992; Stimpson, Neff, Jensen, & Newby, 1991). Although this finding lends indirect support to the existence of a gender difference in moral orientation, the higher ranking by female students than by male students of individualism and independence, two traits indirectly associated with justice, suggests the possibility that female college students constitute a restricted sample in which ostensibly justice-oriented traits have been assimilated by those who typically might favor a care orientation (Stimpson et al., 1992). It also underscores the need for closer examination of the relationship between gender, self-concept, and moral orientation. Gilligan's claim of gender differences in moral orientation has been explored and challenged on a theoretical basis as well. Catherine Greeno and Eleanor Maccoby (1986) dismissed the notion of a "different voice" as little more than a recycled gender stereotype, which lacked sufficient quantitative data to make it credible. Zella Luria (1986), too, criticized Gilligan's allegedly inadequate methodology, e.g., her use of a gender exclusive moral dilemma to evaluate gender differences, her lack of data regarding the reliability of her coding system, and the use of shared samples for generation of data. In response to this characterization of her research as "unscientific," Gilligan (1986) reiterated that her work was not intended as a statistical argument, but as a qualitative demonstration of a distinct perspective on self and relationships. Subsequent studies confirmed her

hypothesis, she maintained, by demonstrating both that distinct perspectives exist and that the reasoning of the women and men sampled could be characterized along the lines predicted by her theory.

Martha Mednick (1989), framing the debate in political terms, charged that Gilligan had overestimated the significance of personal variables (e.g., gender) and underestimated the significance of situational variables in conceptualizing moral orientation. In other words, Gilligan had fallen prey to the fundamental attribution error (Mednick, 1989). Gilligan's theory has garnered support, Mednick continued, not because of its scientific validity or compelling evidence, but by virtue of its intuitive appeal to an essentially political, as opposed to psychological or scientific, agenda, derived from inequitable power relations in society. Similarly, Sandra Harding (1988), Rachel Hare-Mustin and Jeanne Marecek (1988), and Carol Stack (1986) hypothesized that differences in moral orientation are a consequence of differences in social and interpersonal power and status, rather than a function of gender; those with power are more inclined to rely on rules and laws, while those in subordinate positions are more likely to emphasize interdependence and care.

Mednick's (1989) criticism, however, overlooked Gilligan's (1982) caveat that the "different voice" is "characterized not by gender but theme" (p. 2). Gilligan (1982, 1986) herself maintained that care is neither exclusively nor innately a female virtue; indeed, she shied away from the nature-nurture conundrum, making no claims "about the origins of the differences described or their distribution in a wider population, across cultures, or through time" (p. 2). She did, however, contend that themes of connection and care are consonant with women's distinct developmental path. In this regard, Mednick's (1989) critique, far from discrediting Gilligan's theory (1982), actually provides a broader basis for

her claim. As suggested above, neither the absence of empirical evidence supporting gender differences in moral reasoning nor the implication of other confounding variables to justify differences when they are present adequately tests Gilligan's (1982) charge of theoretical bias. Such results could as easily indicate that women, particularly women whose life experiences are similar to those of men, have mastered the views and assumptions more typical of men (Gilligan, 1986; Puka, 1991). In terms of Gilligan's metaphor, an absence of gender differences could reflect women's bilingualism, wherein, as members of a subordinate stratum of society, they have learned to speak the rational, individualistic, rights-oriented language of the dominant culture (Gilligan, 1988). Curiously, far less attention has been directed toward the possibility that men, when functioning in the sphere traditionally designated as "feminine", i.e., in the realm of close, personal relationships, might be equally capable of framing conflict and its resolution in terms of care. Along these lines, Brown (1989), citing Mikhail Bakhtin (1986), has argued that "human beings are fundamentally polyphonic" (p. 9), i.e., they are able to shift frequently and effortlessly among multiple perspectives, often speaking with multiple voices simultaneously in their relational interactions. A similar observation was reported by Pratt et al. (1988b), based on their study of gender differences in adult moral orientation: "the dichotomous nature of Gilligan's ideal types for self-concept and moral orientation," they concluded, "does underemphasize the actual complexity [empirically demonstrated] here" (p. 386). Additional research designed to test for the possible plurality of women's and men's self-concepts and moral orientation, rather than focusing primarily on gender differences per se, is required in order to address more thoroughly the theoretical basis of Gilligan's claim of distinct moral orientations.

Faced with inconclusive results and controversial analyses, researchers have moved beyond an exclusive consideration of gender in an effort to identify other variables which may be better predictors than gender of moral orientation. Among those variables frequently cited as significant have been age, educational level, socialization, socioeconomic status, life cycle stage, professional experience, cognitive style, and self-concept (Boldizar, Wilson, & Deemer, 1989; Brabeck, 1983; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Kohlberg, 1984; Lyons, 1983; Mennuti & Creamer, 1991; Pratt et al., 1988b; Pratt et al., 1991; Walker, 1986, 1989; Walker et al., 1987; Wingfield & Haste, 1987). Pratt et al. (1988b), for example, reported a significant relationship between self-concept and the differential use of care and justice in parenting dilemmas, lending empirical support to the theoretical association of moral orientation, self-concept, and situation. More recently, Clopton & Sorell (1993) tested the significance of current life situations in determining moral reasoning. Similarly restricting the domain to parenting dilemmas, they found that women and men did not differ in their use of care and justice, placing in question the relative significance and stability of gender as a variable in predicting moral orientation, and lending credence to the hypothesis that situational factors play a significant role in predicting moral reasoning. Given this empirical association of conflict domain and moral orientation, and the inherent relation of self-concept to moral orientation, further research clearly is needed to address and test explicitly the implications and extent of these interactions.

Hypothetical vs. Real-Life Moral Dilemmas. A final point of controversy, i.e., the form and content of moral dilemmas used in research, also has invited closer scrutiny. In general, interest in and use of narrative in research on morality has increased steadily, and with this has developed a growing body of literature

examining the value of narrative as a research instrument (Attanucci, 1991; Brown et al., 1989; Brown & Tappan, 1991; Bruner, 1986, 1990; Hill & Anderson, 1993; Howard, 1991; Mishler, 1986; Sarbin, 1986; Tappan & Packer, 1991; Vitz, 1990; Witherell, 1991). The use of narrative, however, poses a particular challenge to the researcher, whose responsibility it is to interpret the meaning which already has been constructed by the participant (Bruner, 1990). Mark Tappan (1990), citing Wilhelm Dilthey's (1900/1976) "hermeneutic circle", described the relational dynamic of this interpretive methodology: "the 'meaning' of a particular text can not be determined from some objective, value-neutral, Archimedean point. Rather, not only must a text be engaged in its own personal and historical context, but the interpreter must also acknowledge his own perspective and point-of-view. Then, and only then, can the reciprocal dynamics of interpretation proceed" (p. 248). Not only is meaning made in the context of the interpreter-participant dyad; the validity of interpretation is determined by the "interpretive community" in which it has been formulated (Tappan, 1990, p. 256). Sensitive to potential charges of subjectivity, Tappan (1990), citing Stanley Fish (1980), continued:

What an interpreter does when she interprets a text is not to construe or detect its 'true' meaning, but rather to construct or produce its meaning, based on her response to that text. This view that meaning is made, not found, however, does not lead inexorably to subjectivism and relativism, because the means by which meaning is made are social and conventional, and thus are limited by the institution or community of which the interpreter is a part (p. 256).

In other words, interpretation is a transactional process, defined by the social community in which the interpreter and participant co-exist, such that only a finite number of meanings can be derived from the participant's account. Thus, personal narrative is a particularly rich resource for the interpretive analysis of moral identity and reasoning.

Initially, Kohlberg's (1958, cited in Attanucci, 1990) use of narrative for the evaluation of moral development constituted a departure from the experimental methodologies traditionally preferred in psychological research. Kohlberg (1984) selected hypothetical dilemmas, he explained, because they encouraged objective and detached reasoning and evoked responses favoring principles of equality and reciprocity. Standardized and codable, hypothetical dilemmas became the research tool of choice for assessing moral development. Gilligan (1977) later challenged Kohlberg's reliance on hypothetical moral dilemmas, however, citing in her criticism the very reasons for which Kohlberg favored them. She advocated in their place the use of personally generated dilemmas, which she found yielded more contextual reasoning favoring situational variables and care responses. Like Gilligan, Vitz (1990) concluded along with many of his colleagues (Attanucci, 1991; Brown et al., 1989; Hermans, 1992; Tappan & Packer, 1991), "that to the extent that people interpret moral issues in the context of a personal narrative, their moral life is operating in a qualitatively different realm from any propositional or logicoscientific theory, in particular from the abstract cognitive principles of Kohlberg's model" (Vitz, 1990, p. 711). Subsequent studies (Clopton & Sorell, 1993; Galotti, 1988; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Norris, 1988a; Pratt et al., 1988b; Walker et al., 1987) have supported Kohlberg's and Gilligan's evaluation of the significance of the moral dilemma in eliciting either a justice or care response. Accordingly, the selection of a particular dilemma format is assumed to play a critical role in research on moral orientation. It is now common for personally generated dilemmas to be included either in addition to or in place of hypothetical dilemmas in studies of moral orientation. A small cadre of researchers (Attanucci, 1991; Brown & Gilligan, 1992; Mishler, 1986; Tappan & Packard, 1991) also has advanced the use of unstructured, dialogic interviews with minimal interruptions,

to maximize participants' control over the form and content of their recounted experience (Attanucci, 1991). Inadvertently, perhaps, this has led to an even broader interpretation of morality to include previously dismissed dimensions of moral reasoning (Attanucci, 1991).

A related issue has concerned the finding that the selection and personal significance of self-generated dilemmas differ according to gender (Ford & Lowery, 1986; Pratt et al., 1988b; Walker et al., 1987). In these studies, women have been found to be more likely than men to report dilemmas involving personal relationships, while men have been found more likely to describe work related dilemmas. When the nature of the dilemma is controlled for, as, for example, when the same personal dilemma is posed to both women and men, or when participants are asked to generate dilemmas of comparable personal relevance, gender differences in moral orientation have not been found (Clopton & Sorell, 1993). Similarly, Pratt et. al (1988b) concluded from their research that "sex differences in personal moral orientations [empirically] observed may be at least partly mediated by differences in the types of moral problems presented by men and women for discussion" (p. 381). Thus, there is reason to suspect that the quality of the conflict and the domain of the dilemma may influence moral orientation. As indicated above, further research is needed to determine the contributory role of dilemma form and content.

Summary

In conclusion, then, these four basic points of controversy between Kohlberg's theory of a justice morality and Gilligan's theory of two moral orientations of justice and care have been addressed with varying degrees of success. Regarding gender differences in Kohlberg's moral stages, Walker's meta-analysis empirically discredited claims of male moral superiority and, more

generally, systemic gender bias in Kohlberg's stage theory. Gilligan, however, has maintained that Kohlberg's theory is flawed on a fundamental level insofar as it reflects a Western bias in favor of autonomous individualism and justice, and was derived from research on male samples. This charge has not yet been resolved. Second, Gilligan's claim of a distinct moral orientation has been challenged on a theoretical basis, but has not yet been discredited. Empirical research testing directly the validity of Gilligan's "different voice" hypothesis has been limited, and research on the care orientation generally has been predicated on the assumption that justice and care exist as distinct modes of moral reasoning. Third, verification of gender differences in demonstrated preference for justice or care in moral reasoning has proven more elusive, and empirical evidence is inconclusive. Recent attention has focused on likely alternative (i.e., nongender-based) predictors of moral orientation in an effort to discern another pattern in the consideration of justice or care in moral decision making. Finally, researchers have agreed on a methodological point, namely, that the form and content of a particular moral dilemma is a critical variable in studies of moral reasoning, particularly in regard to the positive correlation between form and content of moral conflict and observed moral orientation.

Hypotheses

Despite the vast quantity of research generated by Gilligan's theory, very few studies have examined explicitly the relationship of moral orientation to self-concept, in which the self is defined as either separate and autonomous or connected and interdependent. Among those studies that have examined this connection, the focus often has been indirect; self-concept, when considered, has been examined along with moral orientation as a function of gender (Lyons, 1982, 1983; Gilligan, 1988; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Stiller & Forrest, 1990). Studies

that have tested this relationship explicitly have found support for Gilligan's hypotheses regarding a link between self-concept and moral reasoning (Pratt et al., 1988b). At present, then, the theoretical framework of two models of individualism, one valuing autonomy, separation, and firmly delineated self-boundaries, the other valuing connection, mutuality, and more inclusive self-boundaries, invites further research testing whether self-concept and conflict domain are significant in predicting individual preferences for justice or care.

This study was conducted to examine more explicitly the relationship of self-concept and conflict domain to moral orientation, using participants' self-generated narratives of identity and interpersonal conflict. Given that women have been found to be more likely to generate dilemmas involving personal relationships and men have been more inclined to generate work related dilemmas, this study was designed to include as a variable the personal relevance of the self-generated dilemmas. Accordingly, two types of conflicts were solicited involving the participant and another person, one involving a relationship defined as "close" by the participant, the other involving a relationship defined as "not close". The following hypotheses were posited prior to the onset of this study, based on the strength of the conceptual relationship of self-concept and conflict domain to moral orientation: (a) women would be more likely to frame their self-descriptions in terms of connection and men would be more likely to define themselves in terms of autonomy, although both women and men would describe themselves in terms of both connection and autonomy, (b) women would be more likely than men to frame their conflicts in terms of care, while men more commonly would define their dilemmas in terms of justice, although again, both women and men would utilize care and justice in framing personal dilemmas, (c) gender and self-concept would predict moral orientation in the "not close"

situations, but would not predict moral orientation in the "close" situations, (d) self-concept and conflict domain would be significant predictors along with gender of moral reasoning across domains, and (e) self-concept, conflict domain, and gender together would be more powerful than any one variable or combination of variables in predicting moral orientation across domains.

CHAPTER 2

METHOD

Subjects

The sample for this study consisted of 72 undergraduate women and men recruited from the University of Massachusetts. Thirty-six of the participants were female and 36 were male. The mean age of the participants was 21 years ($SD=4.3$), with ages ranging from 19 to 43 years. Participants were fairly evenly distributed among class levels: 24% ($n = 17$) freshmen, 22% ($n = 16$) sophomores, 33% ($n = 24$) juniors, and 21% ($n = 15$) seniors. Seventy-two percent ($n = 52$) of the participants were enrolled in the College of Arts and Sciences; of these, 60% ($n = 31$) were psychology majors. The remaining participants were enrolled in the Schools of Management, Education, and Nursing, and the Colleges of Engineering, and Food and Natural Resources. Eighty-three percent ($n = 60$) of the students identified themselves as having predominantly middle or upper-middle class backgrounds; 17% ($n = 12$) of the students reported a lower socioeconomic background. Eighty-eight percent ($n = 63$) of the students were white, 11% ($n = 8$) were Asian, and 1% ($n = 1$) was Vietnamese-African-American.

Instruments

Demographic Information Form

This brief form was designed to identify participants' gender, age, educational level, field of study, professional goals, and socioeconomic background (see Appendix A). These variables were chosen on the basis of research that has suggested that factors such as age, educational level and socioeconomic status may be more significant than gender in predicting moral orientation. The sample was

largely homogeneous in respect to these variables, however, and as a consequence only gender was selected for analysis.

Moral Dilemma Interview Schedule

Moral orientation was assessed by means of a modified form of a semi-structured interview schedule (from Lyons, 1983; see also Brown, Argyris, Attanucci, Bardige, Gilligan, Johnston, Miller, Osborne, Ward, Wiggins, and Wilcox, 1988) developed by Gilligan in her initial investigation of moral orientation (see Appendix B). The interview consisted of standard and spontaneous questions designed to facilitate a conversation between the principle investigator and the participant regarding her or his construction, resolution, and evaluation of two personal dilemmas, one involving someone with whom the participant did have a close relationship, and another involving someone with whom the participant did not have a close relationship. The interview also included standard and clarifying questions addressing the participant's understanding of morality, responsibility, and moral conflict.

The audiotaped interviews were transcribed by undergraduate research assistants. Transcriptions of the "close" and "not close" personal dilemmas then were interpreted for themes of justice and care using A guide to reading narratives of moral conflict and choice for self and moral voice (Brown et al., 1988). In brief, the reading guide operationalizes justice in terms of relational reciprocity, equality, fairness, individual rights, and adherence to principles. Care is characterized in terms of relational attachment, responsiveness, situational context, and concern with relationships (Brown et al., 1988). This reading guide assumes the interplay of justice and care themes in an individual's conception of interpersonal conflict. Further, it is based on the premise that "two moral voices, justice and care, are spontaneously revealed not by any key words but by the

explanatory framework provided by the narrator," "illuminated by the reader," and then "subject to further interpretation by readers of the research report" (Brown et al., 1988, p. 33). The "voices" of the narrator self, of justice, and of care are discerned through multiple readings of the narrative text; the first reading allows the reader to hear the story, the second allows the reader to hear the perspective of the narrator "self", the third allows the "justice voice" of the narrator to be heard, and the fourth allows the "care voice" to surface. These voices are underscored, literally, through the use of colored pencils to highlight the corresponding portions of the text, and figuratively in summary worksheets (see Appendix C). Finally, the interpretation summarized in the worksheets enables the reader to determine (a) the presence of justice and care themes within the narrative, (b) the predominance of justice or care in the construction, evaluation, and resolution of the dilemma, and (c) the alignment of the narrator self with either or both moral orientations (see Appendix D). Three digits are assigned to the narrative to represent presence, predominance, and alignment respectively; the resulting three digit code is referred to as the "narrative type" (see Table 2.1).

Brown et al. (1988) reported interrater reliability scores among five readers interpreting the personal dilemma narratives of ten high school students. These ranged from .64 to .90 for presence, from .70 to .93 for predominance, and from .70 to .86, for alignment. Inter-rater reliability for overall narrative type ranged from .50 to .71. Construct validity was demonstrated in the authors' interpretation of the high school students' narratives in terms of group differences. Whereas both justice and care themes were present in male and female high school students' narratives as predicted by Gilligan's theory, justice and care differed in predominance between genders, a result also predicted by Gilligan's theory of gender-related moral orientation.

The training of readers for this study was accomplished by means of a two-fold process. The principal investigator trained eight research assistants in the use of the reading guide over a six week period. These eight research assistants, working in two teams of four over a span of eight weeks, then read and summarized the "close" and "not close" dilemmas using the method outlined above. Each team coded all of the dilemmas, so that each dilemma was coded a minimum of two times. Interrater reliability between the two teams was found to be inadequate, and so the coded transcripts and summary worksheets next were reviewed by the principal investigator in order to identify potentially misleading data. Then the personal dilemmas were analyzed by the principal investigator and another trained research assistant over the course of eight weeks. A consensual coding system was used for a sample of thirty-six randomly selected transcripts. This method, encouraged by the authors of the reading guide (Brown et al., 1988), allowed for the additional training of the principal investigator and research assistant in the use of the reading guide. Because of time constraints, the remaining transcripts were interpreted independently by the principal investigator and research assistant, and reliability was calculated by means of the percent agreement between the principal investigator and research assistant on these remaining transcripts. The narrative type scores used for data analyses were those of the principal investigator. Interrater reliability between the principal investigator and research assistant for identification of moral themes was as follows: presence, .83; predominance, .67; alignment, .74; and overall narrative type, .49. These levels of interrater reliability are comparable to those reported by Brown et al. (1988) in the reading guide. The portion of the interview data addressing participants' abstract conceptions of morality and responsibility were not interpreted for use in this study, but were retained for future analysis.

In order to facilitate statistical analyses, the narrative type, a categorical variable, was recalculated as an ordinal variable according to the following procedure. An ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 7 was designed to represent the relative degrees of justice and care articulated within each dilemma. One (1) on the scale represents an exclusive articulation of care in terms of the presence and predominance of care, and the alignment of the narrator with the care perspective. Two (2) represents a high predominance of care themes. Three (3) represents a moderate emphasis on care relative to justice. Four (4) on the scale represents a perspective in which justice and care are equally present, and, either predominance and alignment are equally balanced, or one perspective predominates while the narrator aligns with the other perspective. Five (5) represents a moderate reliance on justice themes; six (6) represents a high predominance of justice relative to care. Finally, seven (7) represents an exclusive articulation of justice in the personal dilemma narrative (see Table 2.2).

The reading guide (Brown, et al., 1988) proved superior to the Manual for coding real-life moral dilemmas (Lyons, 1982), the coding system originally proposed for this study. Developed by Lyons (1983) as the first systematic procedure designed to test Gilligan's hypothesis of two moral orientations, Lyons' method required both the identification of "considerations," i.e., independent units of thought, and the assignment of each consideration to either the justice or the care category. Moral orientation was determined by the sum of considerations assigned to each category. Three research assistants were trained initially in the use of Lyons' coding system, and both independent and consensual coding were attempted. Independent coding proved unsuccessful, however, with the coders unable to achieve adequate reliability in the identification of considerations; this was due in part to the lack of clarity in Lyons' definition of the structural

parameters of a consideration. Consensual coding improved reliability, but proved impractical given the large number of transcripts to be coded. More importantly, however, Lyons' system was conceptually problematic in its selection of individual considerations as the basic units of analysis. This design, in giving equal weight to each consideration, effectively obscured the quality of the narrative themes and disrupted the coherence of the dilemma. Furthermore, the dynamic interplay of justice and care concerns was overlooked and data inadvertently misrepresented by a reductionistic assignment of justice and care to mutually exclusive, dichotomous categories. These limitations were rectified in this study with the replacement of Lyons' (1983) coding system with the narrative reading guide (Brown et al., 1988).

Self-Concept Interview Schedule

Participants' self-concept also was assessed using a modified form of the semi-structured interview schedule (from Lyons, 1983; see also Brown et al., 1988) developed by Gilligan (1977) in order to test her hypothesis regarding the relationship of self-concept and morality (see Appendix B). In the course of the interview, participants were asked a series of standard and spontaneous questions covering the following three areas: (a) how the participant would describe her or himself to her or himself, (b) what stands out for the participant in looking back over the preceding one year and the previous five years, and (c) in what ways the participant sees her or himself as having changed over the years and what she or he would identify as catalysts of that change.

The self-concept narratives were interpreted for themes of autonomy and connection as operationalized by Brown et al. (1988), Gilligan (1977, 1982, 1988) and Lyons (1982, 1983), using A guide to reading narratives of moral conflict and choice for self and moral voice (Brown et al., 1988). In brief, connectedness is

conceptualized in terms of themes of attachment, communion, and concern for and investment in relationships, whereas autonomy is conceptualized in terms of themes of personal agency, relational obligations, differentiation from others, and psychological independence. Using the same method described above, each narrative was read four times: the first time for plot, the second time for narrator self as agent, the third and fourth times for themes of autonomy and connection, respectively. Designated passages were color-coded and worksheets were completed to reflect the interpretation of self-concept formulated by the reader on the basis of the individual's narrative (see Appendix E). Finally, as described above, the interpretive summary enabled the reader to determine (a) the presence of autonomous and connected themes within the narrative, (b) the predominance of autonomy or connection in the conception of the narrator self, and (c) the alignment of the narrator self with either or both conceptual themes (see Appendix F). The self-concept "narrative type" is composed of three digits representing presence, predominance, and alignment, respectively (see Table 2.3). Two teams of four research assistants, trained for six weeks by the principal investigator in the use of the reading guide, interpreted the participants' self-descriptive narratives for themes of autonomy and connection. Each team coded all of the self-concept data, resulting in each transcript being coded a minimum of two times. This entailed four readings of the narrative, the underlining of illustrative text, the summary of readers' interpretations using summary worksheets, and the transfer of these data to a coded narrative type representing the presence and predominance of autonomy and connection, and the alignment of the narrative self with either or both themes. After approximately one-third of the narratives had been interpreted, it became clear to the principal investigator that one team of research assistants was demonstrating a better understanding of

the conceptions of connection and autonomy in their interpretation of the narratives, and so this team was selected as the primary team. In addition, the narratives also were interpreted independently by the principal investigator. The narrative type scores used for data analyses were those of the principal investigator. Interrater reliability was based on the percent agreement between the principal investigator, who scored all of the transcripts, and the primary team of research assistants, each member of which scored 24 transcripts. The percent agreement ranged from .83 to 1.0 ($M = .94$) for presence, from .50 to .68 ($M = .6$) for predominance, from .42 to .78 ($M = .63$) for alignment, and from .33 to .77 ($M = .47$) for overall narrative type. These levels of agreement, though slightly lower on average, are comparable to those reported by Brown et al. (1988).

Following the method described above, self-concept narrative type was assigned a numerical value representing the degree to which autonomy and connection were articulated, each relative to the other. Thus, on a scale from one (1) to seven (7), one (1) represents the exclusive presence of a connected conception of the narrative self, two (2) represents a high degree of connection, three (3) represents a moderate preference for connection, four (4) represents the equivalent presence and importance of connection and autonomy to self-concept, five (5) represents a moderate preference for themes of autonomy, six (6) represents a high degree of autonomy, and seven (7) represents the exclusive articulation of autonomy in the self-concept narrative (see Table 2.4).

Self-Concept Questionnaire

Self-concept was assessed independently with the Self-Concept Questionnaire, a self-report inventory developed by the principal investigator to operationalize the concepts of autonomy and connection as described by Gilligan (1977, 1982, 1988) and Lyons (1983; see Appendix G). The questionnaire consists

of ten items, divided into two subscales of five items each. Responses are indicated on a five-point scale ranging from one (1), "strongly disagree," to five (5), "strongly agree." An example of self-as-autonomous is the statement, "When in a difficult situation, I like to be able to take care of things myself." An example of self-as-connected is the statement, "It is important to me not to be selfish."

This questionnaire was designed to replace Gordon's (1975) Survey of Interpersonal Values, the instrument originally proposed for use in this study, after it was found that Gordon's survey reflected a subtle conceptual bias against connection and in favor of autonomy; connection, for example, was associated with an individual's inability to stand up for her or his beliefs. Although the self-concept questionnaire used in its place has face validity, no other analyses of this inventory were done prior to this study.

Myers-Briggs Type Indicator

Personal preferences concerning the means by which individuals' perceive their environment and make decisions were assessed using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Briggs & Myers, 1943/1987; see Appendix H). The MBTI is composed of 92 items which measure individuals' preference for sensate perception versus intuition, rational versus value-motivated decision making, introversion versus extraversion, and structure versus spontaneity. This measure was administered for the purpose of future analysis of the relationship of self-concept and moral orientation to personality type, and was not analyzed for this study.

Procedure

All participants were recruited through the Psychology Department undergraduate subject pool at the University of Massachusetts. The subject pool consists of undergraduate students enrolled in psychology classes who are invited to participate in psychological research in exchange for experimental credit.

Experimental credits are applied to participants' psychology class grades as extra credit. A folder containing a brief description of the study was placed in the psychology department building in the area designated for recruitment of subjects. The description identified this as a study investigating the ways in which people perceive themselves and negotiate conflicts with others. Students interested in participating were invited to sign up for a specific interview date and time. Telephone contact was made with participants by the principal investigator 24 to 48 hours before their scheduled appointment to remind them of their upcoming interview.

Upon her or his arrival at the room in the psychology building where the interview procedure took place, each participant was greeted, invited to make her or himself comfortable in a seat facing the interviewer, and thanked for her or his time and cooperation. She or he then was invited to read the Informed Consent Form silently while the interviewer read it aloud. Within this form were described the interview focus and procedure; it was also explained that the interviews would be audiotaped and transcribed, and that afterward the audiotape would be erased to preserve confidentiality. Each participant then was invited to sign the form to indicate her or his consent. To build rapport, the interviewer asked the participant in a conversational manner about the information included on the Demographic Information Form. Then the participant was told that the interview portion of the procedure was about to begin and that that portion of the procedure would be audiotaped.

The actual procedure involved a two-part semi-structured interview designed to elicit self-concept and moral orientation narratives. First, participants were asked to recount two self-generated dilemmas, one involving the participant and another person with whom she or he did have a close relationship, the other

involving the participant and someone with whom she or he did not have a close relationship. Standard questions regarding the participant's construction, resolution, and evaluation of the dilemma were posed, along with spontaneous questions specific to the participant's narrative (see Attanucci, 1991). Half of the males and half of the females were asked to recount the dilemma involving someone close first; the other halves were asked to recount the dilemma involving someone not close first. After describing these two dilemmas, participants were asked general questions about their understanding of morality, responsibility, and moral conflict. Although participants appeared to have little trouble recalling dilemmas involving someone with whom they did have a close relationship, several participants were unable to recall a dilemma involving someone with whom they did not have a close relationship. When the question was rephrased, however, such that the phrase "I'd like you to recall" was substituted for "Can you recall," and participants were invited to take their time in recalling such a situation, all but 00X participant were able to complete the dilemma portion of the interview.

The second part of the procedure involved a semi-structured self-concept interview in which participants were asked how they would describe themselves to themselves, including any changes during the preceding year and the previous five years, and their assessment of the reasons for those changes. Again within the self-concept interview, the structured interview was punctuated with spontaneous questions posed in response to participants' idiographic narratives. The order of the personal dilemma and self-concept interviews alternated; half of the males and half of the females participated in the self-generated dilemma interview first and the self-concept interview second, while the other halves participated in the self-concept interview first and the personal dilemma interview second. Throughout the interview procedure, participants were encouraged to expand on their

responses, particularly when it appeared as though they were uncertain of the depth of response expected; when participants expressed hesitation about a particular question or response, they were assured that the interview was designed to elicit their experience and that there were no wrong responses. Upon completion of the interviews, the tape recorder was turned off and participants were asked to complete two written personality measures. The first of these was The Self-Concept Questionnaire; the second was the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator.

At the end of the procedure, each participant received four experimental credits and written feedback briefly explaining the study. The interviewer also described the study's hypotheses in greater detail, and invited participants to contact the interviewer at the psychology department when the study was completed if they should be interested in a report of the results. Participants then were thanked again for their time and assistance. Before leaving, several participants expressed their pleasure in having taken part in the study, explaining that they had found it interesting to reflect upon the interview questions. The entire procedure ranged in length from one to two hours, lasting one and one half hours on average.

Table 2.1

Moral Orientation: Coding Dimensions and Narrative Types

Coding Dimensions	Justice	Care	Narrative Code
Presence	Yes	Yes	1--
	No	Yes	2--
	Yes	No	3--
	No	No	4--
Predominance	Yes	No	-1-
	No	Yes	-2-
	No	No	-3-
Alignment	Yes	No	--1
	No	Yes	--2
	Yes	Yes	--3
	No	No	--4

Moral Orientation	Justice	Care	Narrative Type
Mixed Justice and Care	Yes	Yes	111
			112
			113
			114
			121
			122
			123
			124
			131
			132
			133
			134
Exclusively Justice	Yes	No	311
			314
Exclusively Care	No	Yes	222
			224
Uncodable	No	No	400

Table 2.2

Moral Orientation: Ordinal Scale of Narrative Types

Exclusively Care-----				Mixed Care and Justice-----			----- Exclusively Justice
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
222	122	123	112	113	111	311	
	224	124	121	114	314		
		132	133	131			
			134				

Table 2.3

Self-Concept: Coding Dimensions and Narrative Types

Coding Dimensions	Autonomy	Connection	Narrative Code
Presence	Yes	Yes	1--
	No	Yes	2--
	Yes	No	3--
	No	No	4--
Predominance	Yes	No	-1-
	No	Yes	-2-
	No	No	-3-
Alignment	Yes	No	--1
	No	Yes	--2
	Yes	Yes	--3
	No	No	--4

Self-Concept	Autonomy	Connection	Narrative Type
Mixed Autonomy and Connection	Yes	Yes	111
			112
			113
			114
			121
			122
			123
			124
			131
			132
			133
			134
Exclusively Autonomy	Yes	No	311
			314
Exclusively Connection	No	Yes	222
			224
Uncodable	No	No	400

Table 2.4

Self-Concept: Ordinal Scale of Narrative Types

Exclusively Connection-----	Mixed Connection and Autonomy-----					Exclusively Autonomy
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
222	122	123	112	113	111	311
	224	124	121	114	214	
		132	133	131		
			134			

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

All self-concept narratives were assigned an ordinal value ranging from 1 to 7. These values were derived by their component coding dimensions of presence, predominance, and alignment, and represent the degree to which themes of connection and autonomy were articulated relative to one another in participants' self descriptions. Frequencies of coding dimensions, narrative type, and ordinal value for women and men are presented in Table 3.1. Distribution of self-concept scores are presented in Table 3.2. Similarly, each personal dilemma narrative was assigned an ordinal value from 1 to 7. These values were derived from the same coding dimensions and represented the relative articulation of care and justice in the formulation, evaluation, and resolution of the "close" and "not close" conflicts. The frequencies of care and justice used in the close and not close situations for women and men are presented in Table 3.3. Distribution of moral orientation scores within close and not close dilemmas are presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. Means of self-concept and moral orientation in close and not close relationship dilemmas are presented in Table 3.6. Intercorrelations of gender, self-concept, and moral orientation are presented in Table 3.7. Predictors of moral orientation in close and not-close relationship dilemmas and across conflict domain are presented in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 respectively. All statistical analyses were calculated using these ordinal values of self-concept and moral orientation.

Gender and Self-Concept

As predicted, gender and self-concept were significantly related. Women's self-concept scores indicated a greater dominance of connection ($M = 3.44$, mode = 2, $SD = 1.63$) and men's self-concept scores demonstrated a greater dominance

of autonomy ($M = 4.83$, mode = 6, $SD = 1.65$). The gender difference in mean self-concept scores was highly significant ($t = 3.597$, $p < .001$). As a consequence, the correlational analysis indicated a significant relationship between self-concept and gender ($r = .395$, $p < .001$). At the same time, the vast majority (96%) of participants utilized both connection and autonomy in framing their self descriptions. The mean self-concept score was 4.14, ($SD = 1.77$), indicating a relative balance of themes overall. In addition, a not insignificant minority of participants' self-descriptions ran counter to hypothesized gender assumptions. Autonomy, for example, was the dominant theme for nearly one in three women (31%, $n = 11$) and connection was dominant in the self-descriptions of one in four men (25%, $n = 9$). Indeed, despite the significant correlation, gender accounted for less than 16% of the variance in self-concept ($r^2 = .156$).

Gender, Self-Concept, and Conflict Domain

Close Relationship Dilemma

As anticipated, care predominated in the close narratives across gender ($M = 2.75$, $SD = 1.64$). The majority of women (75%, $n = 27$) and men (69%, $n = 25$) relied predominantly on care in their framing of the close relationship dilemma. The difference in mean scores of women ($M = 2.44$, $SD = 1.54$) and men ($M = 3.06$, $SD = 1.71$) was not significant ($t = 1.596$, $p = ns$). Eighteen percent ($n = 13$) of participants relied exclusively on the care perspective in framing their close dilemmas, and women (28%, $n = 10$) were more likely than men (11%, $n = 4$) to rely exclusively on care. The remaining eighty-two percent ($n = 59$) of the participants utilized both care and justice themes in their narratives. A regression analysis indicated that gender accounted for less than 4% of the variance in moral orientation in close relationship conflicts ($R^2 = .035$). Self-concept was significantly related to moral orientation in the close relationship

dilemmas ($r = .235$, $p = .047$) and accounted for approximately 6% of the variance ($R^2 = .055$). Gender and self-concept together accounted for approximately 7% of the variance in scores ($R^2 = .066$).

Not Close Relationship Dilemma

Within the not-close relationship dilemma there was a significant gender difference in the relative predominance of care and justice, with women ($M = 3.19$, mode = 2, $SD = 1.62$) more likely to articulate care and men ($M = 4.50$, mode = 6, $SD = 1.99$) more likely to articulate justice ($t = 3.052$, $p = .003$). Twelve percent ($n = 8$) of the participants relied exclusively on either justice (6%, $n = 4$) or care (6%, $n = 4$); women and men did not differ significantly in this (n 's = 3 and 5, respectively). Eighty-eight percent ($n = 64$) of the participants articulated both care and justice themes in their formulation, resolution, and evaluation of their dilemmas ($M = 3.85$ $SD = 1.92$). A regression analysis indicated that while the effect of gender in predicting moral orientation in the not close domain was significant ($r = .343$, $p = .003$), gender accounted for less than 12% of the variance in the differential use of care and justice ($R^2 = .117$). Self-concept was not a significant predictor in the not close situations, and added nothing to the variance accounted for in moral orientation scores.

Effect of Conflict Domain

Statistical analyses revealed a significant difference between situational domains, with moral orientation in the close relationship situation ($M = 2.75$, $SD = 1.64$) differing significantly from moral orientation in the not close relationship situation ($M = 3.847$, $SD = 1.92$; $t = 4.527$, $p < .000$). The difference in moral reasoning in close and not close situations was also significant for both women and men considered separately (t 's = 2.423 and 3.922, respectively; both $p < .05$). Forty-nine percent (50% of women and 47% of men; $n = 35$) of the 72

participants were consistent in their use of either care or justice across dilemma types (scoring either 1, 2, or 3 in both situations or 5, 6, or 7 in both situations). The consistent use of care (38%, $n = 27$) was significantly more frequent than the consistent use of justice (11%, $n = 8$; Chi-square = 10.31, $p < .005$) for both women and men.

Optimal Prediction of Moral Orientation

Simple and multiple regression analyses using gender, self-concept, and situational domain as predictors for overall moral orientation indicated that each variable alone and in combination with the other variables was significantly related to the differential use of care and justice. Self-concept, for example, was significantly correlated with moral orientation ($r = .168$, $F = 4.131$, $p = .044$), and accounted for approximately 3% of the variance in moral orientation scores ($R^2 = .028$). Gender, too, was significant ($r = .258$, $F = 10.138$, $p = .002$), and accounted for approximately 7% of the variance ($R^2 = .067$). Gender and self-concept, which were moderately correlated with each other, together accounted for a minimal increase in r and R^2 (.268 and .072, respectively; $F = 5.456$, $p = .005$). The degree of relational closeness was the most powerful of the individual variables ($r = .296$), accounting for approximately 9% of the variance in overall moral orientation ($R^2 = .087$, $F = 13.591$, $p < .000$). Self-concept and situation together resulted in a further increase in r (.340) and in R^2 (.116; $F = 9.217$, $p < .000$). The addition of gender to conflict domain accounted for approximately 15% of the variance in scores ($r = .392$, $R^2 = .154$, $F = 12.832$, $p < .000$). Finally, the combination of self-concept, gender, and situational domain was the most powerful predictor, significantly correlated with the differential use of care and justice ($r = .399$, $F = 8.835$, $p < .000$), and accounting for approximately 16% of the variance in moral orientation scores.

Supplemental Analyses

Statistical analyses of the Self-Concept Questionnaire indicated that it did not differentiate adequately between connected and autonomous self-concepts. For this reason the questionnaire was not used for further analysis of self-concept and moral orientation data.

Table 3.1


Frequencies of Self-Concept Coding Dimensions, Narrative Types,
and Ordinal Values

Self-Concept Coding Dimensions		Women ($\underline{n} = 36$) \underline{n} percentage		Men ($\underline{n} = 36$) \underline{n} percentage	
Presence					
1	(Both)	35	.97	34	.94
2	(Connection)	1	.03	1	.03
3	(Autonomy)	0	.0	1	.03
Predominance					
1	(Autonomy)	8	.22	24	.67
2	(Connection)	17	.47	6	.175
3	(Neither)	11	.31	6	.175
Alignment					
1	(Autonomy)	11	.31	22	.61
2	(Connection)	21	.58	10	.28
3	(Both)	4	.11	4	.11
Narrative					
Value	Type				
1	222	1	.03	1	.03
2	122	14	.39	4	.11
3	123	2	.05	1	.03
	132	5	.14	3	.08
4	112	1	.03	2	.05
	121	0	.0	0	.0
	133	2	.05	2	.05
5	113	0	.0	1	.03
	131	4	.11	1	.03
6	111	7	.19	20	.56
7	311	0	.0	1	.03

Table 3.2

Distribution of Self-Concept Scores

Number
of
Subjects





Women 
Men 

Table 3.3


Frequencies of Moral Orientation Coding Dimensions, Narrative Types, and Ordinal Values

Morality Coding Dimensions		Women (<u>n</u> = 36)				Men (<u>n</u> = 36)			
		Close		Not Close		Close		Not Close	
		<u>n</u>	%	<u>n</u>	%	<u>n</u>	%	<u>n</u>	%
Presence									
1 (Both)		26	.72	33	.92	32	.89	31	.89
2 (Care)		10	.28	2	.05	4	.11	2	.05
3 (Justice)		0	.0	1	.03	0	.0	3	.08
Predominance									
1 (Justice)		7	.19	8	.22	7	.19	20	.56
2 (Care)		27	.75	21	.58	20	.56	12	.33
3 (Neither)		2	.06	7	.19	9	.25	4	.11
Alignment									
1 (Justice)		4	.11	8	.22	25	.70	21	.58
2 (Care)		30	.83	22	.61	8	.22	13	.36
3 (Both)		2	.06	6	.17	3	.08	2	.06
Narrative Value Type									
1	222	10	.28	2	.05	4	.11	2	.05
2	122	17	.47	17	.47	16	.44	9	.25
3	123	0	.0	2	.05	0	.0	1	.03
	132	0	.0	1	.03	5	.14	2	.05
4	112	3	.08	2	.05	0	.0	0	.0
	121	0	.0	1	.03	0	.0	0	.0
	133	0	.0	4	.11	3	.08	1	.03
5	113	2	.06	1	.03	0	.0	0	.0
	131	2	.06	1	.03	1	.03	1	.03
6	111	2	.06	4	.11	7	.19	17	.47
7	311	0	.0	1	.03	0	.0	3	.08

Table 3.4

Distribution of Moral Orientation Scores in Close Domain

Number
of
Subjects



Women

Men





Table 3.5

Distribution of Moral Orientation Scores in Not Close Domain

Number
of
Subjects



Women
Men

Table 3.6
Means of Self-Concept and Moral Orientation

Variables	Mean	SD	By	t	df	p
Self-Concept						
Women	3.44	1.63				
Men	4.83	1.65				
All	4.14	1.76	Gender	3.597	70	.001
Moral Orientation Close Relationship						
Women	2.44	1.54				
Men	3.06	1.71				
All	2.75	1.64	Gender	1.596	70	ns
Moral Orientation Not Close Relationship						
Women	3.19	1.62				
Men	4.50	1.99				
All	3.85	1.92	Gender	3.052	70	.003
Moral Orientation Across Domains						
Women	2.82	1.61	Domain	2.423	35	.021
Men	3.78	1.98	Domain	3.922	35	.000
All	3.30	1.86	Domain	4.527	71	.000

Table 3.7

Intercorrelations of Gender, Self-Concept, and Moral Orientation
in Close and Not Close Domains

Variables	Gender		Self-Concept		Close Situation		Not Close Situation	
	r	r ²	r	r ²	r	r ²		
Gender	-	-						
Self-Concept	.395**	.156	-	-				
Close Situation	.187	.035	.235*	.055	-	-		
Not Close Situation	.343**	.117	.127	.016	.341**	.116	-	-

p < .05 *

p < .005 **

Table 3.8

Predictors of Moral Orientation in Close and Not Close Domains

Close Relationship Domain

Variables	r/R	r ² /R ²	df	F	p
Self-Concept	.235	.055	1/70	4.088	.047 *
Gender	.187	.035	1/70	2.547	.115
Self Concept + Gender	.256	.066	1/70	2.429	.096

Not Close Relationship Domain

Variables	r/R	r ² /R ²	df	F	p
Self-Concept	.127	.016	1/70	1.140	.289
Gender	.343	.117	1/70	9.312	.003 **
Self Concept + Gender	.343	.117	1/70	4.593	.013 *

p < .05 *

p < .005 **

Table 3.9
Predictors of Moral Orientation Across Domain

Variables	r/R	r ² /R ²	df	F	p
Self-Concept	.168	.028	1/142	4.131	.044 *
Gender	.258	.067	1/142	10.138	.002 **
Self-Concept + Gender	.268	.072	2/141	5.456	.005 **
Situation	.296	.087	1/142	13.591	.000 ***
Self-Concept + Situation	.340	.116	2/141	9.217	.000 ***
Gender + Situation	.392	.154	2/141	12.832	.000 ***
Self-Concept + Gender + Situation	.399	.159	3/140	8.835	.000 ***

p < .05 *

p < .005 **

p < .001 ***

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

Much of the theoretical and empirical literature in the field of moral reasoning, particularly that inspired by Carol Gilligan's theory of a "different voice" of connection and care, generally has presumed a powerful relationship between gender and self-concept, and gender and moral orientation. Less attention has been directed toward examining explicitly the relationship of self-concept and conflict domain to the differential use of care and justice. The present study was designed to test directly this hypothesized relationship. The results of this study are consistent with Gilligan's hypothesis of two, gender-related, although not gender-specific, moral orientations. Further, these results suggest that additional variables having to do with conflict domain must be considered in defining the parameters of moral orientation.

Gender and Self-Concept

As hypothesized by the literature and anticipated in this study, gender and self-concept were found to be significantly related. Women were significantly more likely than men to define themselves in terms of connection and communion, and men were significantly more likely than women to describe themselves in terms of autonomy and agency. This tendency among women to view themselves in terms of their attachment to others is illustrated in the narrative of one young woman scored as highly connected (ordinal value = 2). Invited to reflect on her life over the previous year, she frames her assessment in terms of her significant relationships:

LOOKING BACK OVER THE PAST YEAR, WHAT STANDS
OUT FOR YOU?

The past year? Hm. I would say my mother getting back with her ex-boyfriend. She broke up with him and it was just a mess because they really love each other. He went around the whole town begging people to talk to my mom because he wanted her back. He even went to the church, believe it or not. It was a big mess. But, I'm glad they're back together now because she is happier and he is happier. It makes home life better.

WHAT IMPACT DID IT HAVE ON YOU?

Well, believe it or not, she works for him. So economically we are a little more secure. I don't know. I guess I feel bad for my mother a lot because she gets depressed and upset. It's good to see her happy....Now that she is happier, I feel as though I'm happier. (16)¹

This passage reflects an intricate web of emotional interdependence between mother and daughter, mother and boyfriend, and daughter and boyfriend, and the subtle acknowledgement by the daughter that her own sense of well-being is intimately linked to her mother's happiness. Estrangement, she notes, especially when people love each other, is "messy"; disconnection and reunion affect not only the lives of those separated and reunited, but the lives of those emotionally bound to them as well.

These themes stand in contrast to those articulated by a young man scored as exclusively autonomous (ordinal value = 7). In the following brief passage, he, too, has been invited to reflect on the course of his life over the previous year. His response illustrates the themes of autonomy and agency characteristic of the majority of the men:

LOOKING BACK OVER THE PAST YEAR, WHAT STANDS OUT FOR YOU?

Going back to school. Finally.

WHAT IMPACT HAS THAT HAD ON YOU?

It allows me to continue with a career I picked out on my job where I was, I pretty much needed a degree, and the recession was a perfect excuse for me to go back to school. So I went back last semester.

AND WHAT DIFFERENCE HAS IT MADE TO YOU, COMING BACK TO SCHOOL?

¹ Interview transcript numbers are indicated in parentheses following each except.

Well, it opens up my future. I'm, um, I don't know, I'm happy, I'm enjoying myself, and I know that I'm bettering myself in the long run. So, it opens up my future. (49)

Like the woman above, this man, too, is "happy"; unlike her, he situates happiness in the context of personal agency and professional advancement. Similarly, they share a concern for economic security. She, however, quickly dismisses her framing of relationships in this manner: "Economically we are a little more secure. I don't know." In contrast to her reluctance, he unequivocally situates relationships and self worth in the context of financial independence: "I had nice things...but now I'm dependent on my parents....I'm just a lowly student again, and everyone thinks of me in this, you know, well, in this college student level." Each implicitly has embraced divergent values: she, affiliation; he, self-sufficiency.

Despite the significant relationship between gender and self-concept, the vast majority of participants in this study utilized themes of both connection and autonomy in formulating their self-descriptions. Indeed, all but three participants demonstrated what Bakhtin (1986) and Brown (1989) referred to as "polyphony", i.e., a tendency to frame experiences from distinct and shifting perspectives. Speaking with a multiplicity of voices, such individuals utilize themes of both connection and autonomy, sometimes contrapuntally, sometimes in synchrony. This interplay of themes is illustrated in the narrative of a moderately autonomous young woman (ordinal value = 5) who is reflecting on the significant transitions of the previous year:

LOOKING BACK OVER THE PAST YEAR, WHAT STANDS OUT FOR YOU?

Well...I became an RA [on campus]. That was a very big transition for me.

CAN YOU TALK ABOUT WHAT THAT MEANT TO YOU?

Um, it meant a lot, it was just, I was having a very hard time with it. I should mention before I go into that, a year ago today I was involved in a strong, serious relationship, and it ended the end of last semester in May. So coming back to school and being removed

from [a residential area on campus] where I was for two years and coming to [a different residential area on campus], there were two transitions. The relationship was based at school, where I lived. To change the two meant so much. I felt like I was becoming independent again. And then...not only did I move but I became an RA. So what I talked about before, I have all these roles to play out, which is what I wanted, why I took the job....I've done everything in the past year to get my name known within the residential education community....I've done a lot. (23)

In the course of the above passage, this woman is actively ascribing meaning to the losses and transitions she has experienced over the past year. She notes that a part of her has welcomed the change, insofar as it has provided her an opportunity to develop greater independence, agency, and authority. At the same time, she suggests, neither she nor others can fully appreciate her growing sense of independence without acknowledging the emotional price of disconnection.

Literally and metaphorically, she moves among these differing roles, speaking virtually simultaneously of relational vulnerability and psychological differentiation, using each perspective to inform the other.

In addition to this tendency toward multiplicity of perspectives, a significant minority of participants departed from predicted gender patterns of self-concept altogether. This occurred with a frequency not anticipated on the basis of previous studies. Indeed, nearly one-third of the women identified themselves primarily in terms of autonomy, and one-quarter of the men described themselves primarily in terms of connection. An older woman, for example, characterized as highly autonomous (ordinal value = 6), highlighted her return to school in her review of the previous year:

LOOKING BACK OVER THE PAST YEAR, WHAT STANDS OUT FOR YOU?

I've come a hell of a long way. Really, in the last year, I was working two jobs and saving money to go back to school and taking summer classes, and a busy fall semester, winter classes, winter session classes, and a very, very busy spring semester to graduate. So it's really a big sense of accomplishment to get all of these credits

together, to take all of these extra classes, to graduate this semester and start a graduate program this summer. So I'm very, I'm just really amazed at how much I've accomplished in the last year, just getting over some barriers, and not just accomplishing, but doing well. I really proved to myself that I'm very competitive academically and I've, I haven't had that same confidence in the past. I haven't felt like I was a great student, and now I've really proven myself and I am very capable. That's what really stands out in the last year. (33)

A sense of personal agency pervades this narrative excerpt. Self-concept is intimately associated with academic achievement. Whereas failure might have undermined her fragile sense of worth, success has emboldened her, and she speaks without apology of her many accomplishments. This focus on achievement as an interpretive framework again stands in contrast to that of a young man atypically characterized as exclusively connected (ordinal value = 1), who focuses on the significance of his relationships with others:

LOOKING BACK OVER THE PAST YEAR, WHAT STANDS OUT FOR YOU?

A couple of conversations I've had, probably, one with my grandfather, one with my girlfriend.

WHY DO THOSE STAND OUT?

Because they meant a lot to me.

WHAT IMPACT DID THEY HAVE ON YOU?

Um, they both taught me more to appreciate what I have now and what I want to give to others, or how I want to act towards others.

AND WHAT IMPACT HAS THAT HAD ON YOU?

I've probably become a little bit more responsible, maybe a little more understanding, compassionate, I would imagine.

WHAT ELSE STANDS OUT FOR YOU?

My cousin's wedding.

WHY IS THAT?

Well this is what brought on the conversation with my grandfather. He's a minister, so he took a small part in the wedding. And I was an usher so I was right up there, and he was trying to say stuff, and he was, you know, emotional, and he was crying, and then I started to cry because I saw him crying. Because he's like the best person. I love him more than anybody, probably. He's a great guy. (40)

This narrative is similar to that of the highly connected woman who described herself in terms of her mother's happiness. In both cases, significant relationships have provided the template with which the participants have assessed their own

development. For the young man, the encounter with his grandfather has assumed a kairotic significance. In their intense bond, which he experiences verbally, physically, and even ritually, he has come to a deeper understanding of his own goals and values. These two examples demonstrate the relative independence of gender and self-concept as personality variables. Gender alone is clearly an insufficient basis for assignment of women and men to one or the other categories of connection and autonomy.

In conclusion, as predicted on the basis of the literature on gender and self-concept, (a) women and men differed significantly in their reliance on connection and autonomy, respectively, and (b) gender differences in self-concept are less extensive than Gilligan and her colleagues would suggest. Indeed, the majority of women and men utilized both themes of connection and autonomy in their self-descriptions, consistent with the hypothesis that connection and autonomy, though gender-related, are not gender-specific. Not anticipated was the extent to which women's and men's self-descriptions diverged from general trends, with a significant minority of participants describing themselves in terms that run counter to predicted gender patterns. These results indicate that the popular partition of self-concept into two, mutually exclusive categories, and the a priori assignment of women and men to connected and autonomous classifications, respectively, is less than ideal. Such a model, although helpful initially in challenging the more traditional, monolithic conception of the autonomous individual, inaccurately reduces complex cognitive processes to simplistic dichotomies, and effectively obscures the significant variability within individuals and genders. This conclusion is underscored by the relatively low percentage of variance in self-concept scores accounted for by gender. Together these results demonstrate both the value and limitations of gender as a predictor of self-concept. A pressing issue then

becomes the extent to which gender and self-concept are useful as predictors of moral orientation. This shall be examined more thoroughly below.

Gender, Self-Concept, and Conflict Domain

The results of this study support the hypothesis that conflict domain, along with gender and self-concept, are significantly related to the differential use of care and justice. Specifically, dilemmas with relatively high personal significance ("close relationship dilemmas") were significantly more likely than dilemmas with low personal significance ("not close relationship dilemmas") to elicit care reasoning, and dilemmas with low personal significance were significantly more likely than those with high personal significance to elicit justice reasoning. This difference was significant across gender. Also as predicted, gender and self-concept together were not significantly correlated with moral reasoning in close relationship conflicts, but were significantly correlated with moral reasoning in not close relationship conflicts. Finally, gender and self-concept, although not consistently related to moral reasoning, were significant predictors of moral orientation across domains.

Close Relationship Dilemma

Consistent with the "different voice" hypothesis of Gilligan, a morality of care predominated in women's narratives of close relationship dilemmas, and women were more likely than men to rely exclusively on care (ordinal value = 1) in their framing of close dilemmas. These results also are consistent with the literature that has indicated that personally relevant dilemmas are more likely than hypothetical or less personally relevant dilemmas to evoke care responses. The following passage illustrates the caring perspective within a dilemma of high personal relevance. Scored as high in a care perspective, (ordinal value = 2) the

narrative traces a woman's response to her friend's pregnancy and eventual abortion:

WHAT WAS THE CONFLICT FOR YOU IN THAT SITUATION?

Because I wasn't her. Because I didn't want to condemn her if she chose to do something that I didn't believe in for myself. So that was a big conflict...my biggest one was that, um, to help her and just keep on her side even if everybody else wasn't on her side.

IN WHAT WAY WOULD OTHER PEOPLE HAVE NOT BEEN ON HER SIDE?

If they didn't accept her decision, which a lot of people didn't. Um, that's basically it.

AND IN WHAT WAY WOULD YOU NOT HAVE BEEN ON HER SIDE?

If I would have condemned her for her decision. I wouldn't have been on her side, and if I just didn't give her the support that she needed to get through the situation....

CAN YOU SAY A LITTLE MORE ABOUT WHAT THE CONFLICTS WERE FOR YOU IN MAKING THE DECISION TO ACT AS YOU DID?

Well, because I didn't believe in it for myself, too. I didn't believe in abortion. I would never have an abortion, but I'm in a totally different situation than her...and so there was a conflict because I couldn't really know how she felt. But I could just imagine, so there was a lot of conflict.

WAS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT YOU WANTED TO DO AND WHAT YOU THOUGHT YOU SHOULD DO?

Yeah. I wanted to make her feel better, but um, like my religion and my upbringing told me I shouldn't support someone who is going to have an abortion. Big conflict.

HOW DID YOU DEAL WITH THAT?

I thought of it as she's her own person and she lives her own life and she can ask me for advice on how I feel about abortion for myself, but for her it's a totally different thing. I told her how I felt about abortion, but that I'd still support her if she chose to do that....

HOW DID YOU DECIDE TO DO WHAT YOU WANTED TO DO RATHER THAN WHAT YOU THOUGHT YOU SHOULD DO?

Well, I thought, um, what would help her out the most was a friend and not like a nun or, you know. (Laughs). She just, I just felt that she um basically needed support from me and that's it and she didn't need criticizing, you know, or anything. I told her honestly how I felt, but I wasn't going to be critical of her. So, um, I didn't. I thought of it as her life and not mine and that made it easier....

WHAT IMPACT HAS THIS HAD ON YOU?

Well...I can say I'm, you know, not for abortion, but, you know, when it came down to it I don't think I could really say without pondering. (11)

Several themes common to the care perspective emerge in this woman's story. She frames her conflict in terms of the mutually exclusive moral imperatives of upholding her own objective moral standards and responding to a friend in need. In her construction of the dilemma, she is careful to point out the inadequacy of abstract principles in resolving conflict so charged with personal significance. With refrain-like persistence she iterates the particularities of the situation: "I wasn't her;" "I couldn't really know how she felt"; "I'm in a totally different situation." Although she admits that she cannot ignore entirely her own values ("I told her how I felt about abortion"), which are rooted in her religion and her upbringing, she recognizes that blind adherence to those principles ("I shouldn't support someone who is gonna have an abortion") would mean abandoning her friend. Ultimately, her understanding that her friend needs "a friend...not a nun," enables her to ascribe to her friend's need the greater moral imperative. The relatively greater good is to "be on her [friend's] side." In the coda of her story, the woman realizes that this encounter has caused a restructuring of her moral code. This process has not been an easy one for her, and in a passage not cited she describes the anger that she feels toward her friend, and her wish that these events had never happened. Almost wistfully, she comments on her loss of moral innocence, reluctantly admitting that by justifying her response to her friend, she has compromised unalterably the moral certitude she once possessed. Despite this young woman's alignment with a perspective of care, it is clear that she is able to articulate the values associated with a justice perspective. This excerpt demonstrates once again individuals' capacity and tendency to shift between perspectives, at one moment to frame and evaluate conflict in terms of care, in

the next to reframe the same conflict in justice terms. This tendency was also borne out in the finding that the majority of both women and men relied on themes of both care and justice in framing their close relationship dilemma.

Among the more striking of this study's results was that, predicated on the hypothesis that conflict domain could be expected to be a significant predictor of moral reasoning, women and men did not differ significantly in their reliance on care in their framing of close relationship dilemmas. Indeed, although more women than men relied exclusively on a care perspective, nearly as many men as women demonstrated a predominance of care in their moral reasoning. This finding is consistent with Gilligan's assertion that the "different voice" is "characterized not by gender but theme" (1982, p. 2). Men, when asked to focus on their interpersonal relationships, behave in a way similar to women, demonstrating concern for the maintenance of relationships and vulnerability to abandonment. Indeed, gender alone was not significant as a predictor of moral reasoning in close relationship dilemmas, and accounted for only a small proportion of the variance in moral orientation scores. Self-concept was slightly more powerful than gender, significantly correlated with the differential use of care and justice, and accounting for a slightly greater proportion of the variance in moral orientation scores. Thus, given these variables, it was not possible to predict moral orientation in close relationship dilemmas.

Not Close Relationship Dilemma

As anticipated, women and men differed significantly in their reliance on care and justice in framing conflicts in not close situations. Women, more likely to utilize care than justice in their close relationship dilemmas, were also more likely to utilize care than justice in their not close relationship dilemmas. In contrast,

men, similar to women in their reliance on care in close relationship dilemmas, shifted to justice to construct and resolve not close relationship conflicts.

This differential use of care and justice is consistent with the findings of earlier studies examining the association of gender and moral orientation. Women, more inclined in general to utilize a contextual, relational perspective, do so even when the dilemma posed or generated is of relatively low personal relevance. Men, on the other hand, traditionally tested using hypothetical dilemmas, and more inclined in consequent studies to generate dilemmas of low personal relevance, shift from care to a preference for an objective, principle based perspective to resolve dilemmas. Despite these trends, however, elements of both care and justice were noted in the not close narratives of the majority of women and men, and gender and self-concept together still accounted for less than 12% of the variance in moral reasoning scores.

The shift among men from care to justice is demonstrated qualitatively in the conflict narratives of an equally connected and autonomous young man (self-concept ordinal value = 4). His close relationship narrative, in which he describes himself as unable to confront his father, whom he suspects of being an alcoholic, was scored as high in care (ordinal value = 2). Asked if in that situation he felt that he had done the right thing in not speaking with his father, he responds:

No. The right thing to do would be to say, "Dad, you need help. Do this and this." Eventually he will listen, or have another glass. But no, it wasn't the right thing to do and it wasn't an easy thing for me to do either. It really wasn't because it could have been easier to close the door and be like, "This doesn't exist," or just sit and watch. That's not easy because I know he will continue to do it when I am gone. The right thing to do would have been to tell him, but I obviously didn't do the right thing. (8)

Navigating his way through this moral Scylla and Charybdis, the young man is both painfully aware and unwilling to concede that despite his concern he is ultimately

powerless to change his father's life. Hoping that it could have been easier to simply "close the door," on his father and their relationship, he explains that it really wasn't easier. But then, neither is speaking easier, for the young man knows that he will not be heard ("I know he will continue to do it when I am gone"). As is often the case from a caring perspective, there is no solution that is without emotional pain:

Knowing that I didn't do anything, that this is still going on, that this is hurting three other people including my brother, and that I'm not doing anything about it, and knowing it hurts me and knowing all I can do is just close my door and hope it goes away. But it won't. And that is guilt.

The guilt and powerlessness which pervade this account of a close relationship dilemma stand in stark contrast to the confidence and efficacy the same young man brings to a not close relationship dilemma. In the following conflict, scored as high in justice (ordinal value = 6), he recalls a fight in his residence hall and his decision to intercede:

CAN YOU DESCRIBE IN A LITTLE MORE DETAIL WHAT THE CONFLICT WAS FOR YOU IN THAT SITUATION?

It would have been real easy to keep the door closed and do nothing. It would have been real easy to just sit back and watch because to a certain extent, it was funny, watching everyone slap around at each other. They were saying the same stuff that the other person was saying to them and it was funny that they couldn't see each other's side and viewpoint. I could have egged each other on, but I chose to get in the middle and take a public stance and break up the crowd....A lot of it had to do with-I took a psychology class, Good and Evil, and there are real life examples there. I applied myself to them. But it didn't matter what people thought of me then, because I didn't think highly of the people anyways and I could take a stand. That's pretty much it.

WHAT WERE THE REAL LIFE EXAMPLES OF?

Bystandership. It really was. You could just close the door and hear nothing. I mean, it wasn't like, "Wow, they were killing each other," but it was to a certain extent. If my roommate was doing this to me, I would appreciate if someone did that and stand up for me when I wasn't there. That's it.

WHAT DID YOU DO?

....To a certain extent I was the mediator....

DO YOU THINK YOU DID THE RIGHT THING?

Yes, I really do.

HOW DID YOU KNOW IT WAS THE RIGHT THING?

...I think I played the neutral man and I think it was needed. I think both of them couldn't see each other's viewpoint. I mean if I really wanted to go deep into it I could have somehow gotten them together to talk to each other. But I think the best thing for both of them was to go their separate ways and leave each other alone. So, I think I did the right things. (8)

Using essentially the same framework and metaphor, the young man has rewritten his painful relationship with his father into an account of successful intervention.

The same door which served as inadequate protection from emotional vulnerability to his father's non-responsiveness is now the door which he opens to a role as an effective mediator. What distinguishes these situations from one another is the relative significance of each relationship; the narrator implicitly juxtaposes the intense emotional investment of the first relationship with the detachment of the second. "It didn't matter what people thought of me then," he explains, "because I didn't think highly of the people anyways and I could take a stand." Thus, in graphic form, this man's story illustrates the significant relationship of conflict domain to moral orientation.

Effect of Conflict Domain

Falling victim to the fundamental attribution error, moral theorists frequently have conceived of moral orientation as a stable dimension, consistent over time and across situations. In contrast to that position, the results of this study indicate that conflict domain, in particular, the relatively high and low personal relevance of the relationship involved in conflict, contributes significantly to the prediction of moral orientation for both women and men, and that differences in moral reasoning are at least partly mediated by degree of relationship closeness. This is consistent with other findings that have empirically demonstrated the significance of variables other than gender in predicting moral

orientation (Boldizar, Wilson, & Deemer, 1989; Brabeck, 1983; Clopton & Sorell, 1993; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Pratt et al., 1988; Pratt et al., 1991; Walker et al., 1987). Further, as hypothesized in this study, gender and self-concept together were significant predictors of moral orientation in not close relationship situations, but were not significant predictors of moral orientation in close relationship situations.

At the same time, it should be noted that nearly half of all participants were consistent in their use of either care or justice across domain, providing support for the hypothesis that at least in some individuals gender differences in moral reasoning may be stable. Although women and men were equally likely to be consistent in their preference for one or the other perspective, the consistent use of care was significantly more frequent than the consistent use of justice across gender. This analysis supports the interpretation suggested above, namely, that women appear to demonstrate greater stability in the use of care across domain, while men, when they do shift in perspective, are likely to shift from a use of care in close relationship dilemmas to a use of justice in not close relationship dilemmas.

Optimal Prediction of Moral Orientation

These trends in moral orientation indicate that neither gender, nor self-concept, nor situation alone is sufficient to predict moral orientation. While each of these variables was significantly correlated with moral orientation across domain, the amount of variability accounted for by each variable individually ranged from a low of 3% to a high of 9%. As hypothesized, self-concept and situation together were more powerful than gender in accounting for variance in moral orientation scores, although gender and situation proved the most powerful combination of any two variables. Finally, consistent with the primary hypothesis

of this study, the combination of all three variables proved more powerful than any individual variable or combination of variables, accounting for approximately 16% of the variance in moral orientation scores. Even this percentage is low, however, indicating that other variables such as age, educational level, life experience, and socioeconomic status, may contribute significantly to the variability in moral reasoning.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the results of this study are consistent with the spirit of Gilligan's different voice theory, insofar as they confirm both the power and the limitations implied by her assertion that differences in self-concept and moral orientation are related to, but not equivalent to gender. Further, they indicate that in regard to gender, self-concept, and moral orientation, (a) the assignment of women and men to dichotomous categories of connection and autonomy, although consistent with overall trends in self-concept, gravely misrepresents both the variability among individuals with respect to these dimensions, and the extent to which any one individual varies in her or his negotiation of self-other boundaries within a given situation or relationship, (b) the dichotomous conceptualization of moral orientation into mutually exclusive categories of care and justice, again consistent with overall trends in moral orientation, similarly misrepresents the variability in and complexity of individuals' negotiation of conflict, and (c) the a priori assignment of individuals to either self-concept or moral orientation categories on the basis of gender, although consistent with the overall correlational trends, constitutes an inadequate assessment of these dimensions.

These findings have several implications for future research in moral theory. Firstly, they indicate support for a finer classification of moral orientation such as that suggested by Brown et al. (1988), which includes distinct categories of

presence, predominance, and alignment. This distinction was obscured by the ordinal representation of moral orientation in this study, which assigned equal value to each of these categories. Although this was necessary in order to facilitate statistical analysis, the additional data provided by those conceptually distinct categories might have shed further light on trends in moral orientation across dilemmas. Secondly, these findings indicate that future research on moral orientation will require finer systems of classification than the dichotomous categorizations now in place. In addition, assessment of individuals' moral reasoning will require as a rule a broader sampling of reasoning across domains. Thirdly, additional research on Gilligan's different voice with regard to men's moral reasoning in self-generated, highly personally relevant dilemmas is warranted on the basis of the trends demonstrated by men in this study. It is likely that the relational voice is alive and well in men, but obscured by theoretical and methodological limitations. Finally, these results suggest that a focus on gender is less meaningful than has been implied by the literature to date, and that research on additional personality and situational variables is likely to yield a richer conceptualization of self-concept and moral orientation.

APPENDIX A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FORM

Gender: ☐ Female
☐ Male

Age:

Highest level of education completed:

Academic Interest/Academic Major:

Profession/Professional Interest:

Family Income: ☐ \$0 - \$20,000.
☐ \$20,000 - \$60,000.
☐ \$60,000 - \$

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Moral Dilemma Interview.

a. Discussion of a personal dilemma involving someone close to the subject will be generated by means of the following questions:

Have you ever been in a situation involving someone with whom you have a close relationship, where you were not sure what was the right thing to do?

Could you describe the situation?

What were the conflicts for you in that situation?

What did you do?

Did you think it was the right thing to do?

How did you know it was the right thing to do?

What were the conflicts for you in making that decision?

Was there a difference between what you wanted to do and what you thought you should do?

b. Discussion of a personal dilemma involving someone with whom the subject does not have a close relationship will be generated by means of the following questions:

Have you ever been in a situation involving someone with whom you do not have a close relationship, where you were not sure what was the right thing to do?

Could you describe the situation?

What were the conflicts for you in that situation?

What did you do?

Did you think it was the right thing to do?

How did you know it was the right thing to do?

What were the conflicts for you in making your decision?

Was there a difference between what you wanted to do and what you thought you should do?

c. General questions about morality to be asked at the end of the moral dilemma interview:

What does morality mean to you?

What makes something a moral problem for you?

What does responsibility mean to you?

When responsibility to self and responsibility to others conflict, how should one choose?

2. Self-Concept Interview.

a. A self-description will be generated using the following set of questions:

How would you describe yourself to yourself?

Looking back over the past year, what stands out for you?

Looking back over the past five years, what stands out for you?

Is the way you see yourself now different from the way you saw yourself in the past?

What led to the change?

APPENDIX C: MORAL ORIENTATION SUMMARY WORKSHEET

Interview # ____ Close ____/Not Close ____ Narrative Type ____
Reader _____

Be clear and concise. Use this worksheet to summarize your analysis.

I. Story

a) Note central characters/relationships, moral language, themes, repeated words, key images/metaphors.

b) What is the central conflict?

II. Self

a) Note self's process in resolving conflict.

b) Note self's perception of relationships in dilemma.

c) Summary Interpretation: "Who is this 'self'?"

III. Care

a) Is care voice articulated? Note evidence.

b) Does self align with care? Is it explicit or implicit?
Note evidence.

IV. Justice

a) Is justice voice articulated? Note evidence.

b) Does self align with justice? Is it explicit or implicit?
Note evidence.

V. Summary Interpretations

a) Describe relationship of care and justice voices.
(Which predominates? Explain.)

b) Does narrator align with care or justice? (Explain.)

APPENDIX D: MORAL ORIENTATION SUMMARY CODING SHEET

Interview # _____
Close _____/Not Close _____
Reader _____

Narrative Type _____

I. The two moral orientations and how they are represented: (check two)

1. Is the care orientation articulated? yes _____ no _____
2. Is the justice orientation articulated? yes _____ no _____

II. The relationship between the two moral orientations: (check one)

1. Care predominates _____
2. Justice predominates _____
3. Both care and justice are present, neither predominates _____

III. The Narrative Self:

1. Does the narrative self express an "alignment" in the conflict?

(Consider whether or not the narrator comes down on one side of her or his own values. Does the narrator perceive the values of care or justice in relation to her or his own integrity--so that compromising that set of values would be seen as losing a basic or central sense of self? finally, this "alignment" can be determined by the narrative self rejecting the values of another.)

yes _____ no _____

2. What terms/orientations does the narrator use to frame this this "alignment" in the conflict?

care _____ justice _____ both _____

APPENDIX E: SELF-CONCEPT SUMMARY WORKSHEET

Interview # _____
Reader _____

Narrative Type _____

Be Clear and Concise: Use this worksheet to summarize your analysis.

I. Story

- a) Note central characters/relationships, self-concept language, key events, themes, repeated words, key images/metaphors.

II. Self

- a) What does the narrator value? What "stands out?"

- b) Note self's perception of relationships.

- c) Summary Interpretation: "Who is this 'self'?"

III. Connection

a) Is connected voice articulated? Note evidence.

b) Does self align with connection? Is it explicit or implicit? Note evidence.

IV. Autonomy

a) Is autonomous voice articulated? Note evidence.

b) Does self align with autonomy? Is it explicit or implicit? Note evidence.

V. Summary Interpretations

a) Describe the relationship of connected and autonomous voices. (Which predominates? Explain.)

b) Does the narrator align with connection or autonomy? (Explain.)

APPENDIX F: SELF-CONCEPT SUMMARY CODING SHEET

Interview # _____

Narrative Type _____

Reader _____

I. The two self-concept orientations and how they are represented: (check two)

1. Is the connection orientation articulated? yes _____ no _____

2. Is the autonomy orientation articulated? yes _____ no _____

II. The relationship between the two self-concept orientations: (check one)

1. Connection predominates _____

2. Autonomy predominates _____

3. Both are present, neither predominates _____

III. The Narrative Self:

1. Does the narrative self express an "alignment" in the self-description?

(Consider whether or not the narrator comes down on one side of her or his own values. Does the narrator perceive the values of connection or autonomy in relation to her or his own integrity--so that compromising that set of values would be seen as losing a basic or central sense of self? finally, this "alignment" can be determined by the narrative self rejecting the values of another.)

yes _____ no _____

2. What terms/orientations does the narrator use to frame this "alignment" in her or his self-description?

connection _____ autonomy _____ both _____

APPENDIX G: SELF-CONCEPT QUESTIONNAIRE

Subject # _____

Please read each of the statements below and rate it according to how accurately you believe it describes you. Use the following scale:

1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. undecided
4. agree
5. strongly agree

Mark your responses on the line to the left of each statement.

- _____ 1. It is important to me that I be able to do many things well.
- _____ 2. Games are more fun when someone wins.
- _____ 3. I try to accept people just the way they are.
- _____ 4. When in a difficult situation, I like to be able to take care of things myself.
- _____ 5. It is important to me not to be selfish.
- _____ 6. My friends' support has gotten me through hard times.
- _____ 7. I like to be free to make my own decisions.
- _____ 8. I enjoy making other people happy.
- _____ 9. I need to be able to be self-reliant before I can be in an intimate relationship with another.
- _____ 10. When one person loses, everybody loses.

APPENDIX F: MYERS-BRIGGS TYPE INDICATOR

Part I. Which answer comes closer to telling how you usually feel or act?

1. Are you usually
(A) a "good mixer," or
(B) rather quiet and reserved?
2. If you were a teacher, would you rather teach
(A) fact courses, or
(B) courses involving theory?
3. Do you more often let
(A) your heart rule your head, or
(B) your head rule your heart?
4. When you go somewhere for the day, would you rather
(A) plan what you will do and when, or
(B) just go?
5. When you are with a group of people, would you usually rather
(A) join in the talk of the group, or
(B) talk with one person at a time?
6. Do you usually get along better with
(A) imaginative people, or
(B) realistic people?
7. Is it a higher compliment to be called
(A) a person of real feeling, or
(B) a consistently reasonable person?
8. Do you prefer to
(A) arrange dates, parties, etc., well in advance, or
(B) be free to do whatever looks like fun when the time comes?
9. In a large group, do you more often
(A) introduce others, or
(B) get introduced?
10. Would you rather be considered
(A) a practical person, or
(B) an ingenious person?
11. Do you usually
(A) value sentiment more than logic, or
(B) value logic more than sentiment?

12. Are you more successful
(A) at dealing with the unexpected and seeing quickly what should be done, or
(B) at following a carefully worked out plan?
13. Do you tend to have
(A) deep friendships with a very few people, or
(B) broad friendships with many different people?
14. Do you admire more the people who are
(A) conventional enough never to make themselves conspicuous, or
(B) too original and individual to care whether they are conspicuous or not?
15. Do you feel it is a worse fault to be
(A) unsympathetic, or
(B) unreasonable?
16. Does following a schedule
(A) appeal to you, or
(B) cramp you?
17. Among your friends, are you
(A) one of the last to hear what is going on, or
(B) full of news about everybody?
18. Would you rather have as a friend
(A) someone who is always coming up with new ideas, or
(B) someone who has both feet on the ground?
19. Would you rather work under someone who is
(A) always kind, or
(B) always fair?
20. Does the idea of making a list of what you should get done over a weekend
(A) appeal to you, or
(B) leave you cold, or
(C) positively depress you?
21. Do you
(A) talk easily to almost anyone for as long as you have to, or
(B) find a lot to say only to certain people or under certain conditions?
22. In reading for pleasure, do you
(A) enjoy odd or original ways of saying things, or
(B) like writers to say exactly what they mean?
23. Do you feel it is a worse fault
(A) to show too much warmth, or
(B) not to have enough warmth?

24. [On this next question only, if two answers are true, mark both.]
In your daily work, do you
(A) rather enjoy an emergency that makes you work against time, or
(B) hate to work under pressure, or
(C) usually plan your work so you won't need to work under pressure?
25. Can the new people you meet tell what you are interested in
(A) right away, or
(B) only after they really get to know you?
26. In doing something that many other people do, does it appeal to you more to
(A) do it in the accepted way, or
(B) invent a way of your own?
27. Are you more careful about
(A) people's feelings, or
(B) their rights?
28. When you have a special job to do, do you like to
(A) organize it carefully before you start, or
(B) find out what is necessary as you go along?
29. Do you usually
(A) show your feelings freely, or
(B) keep your feelings to yourself?
30. In your way of living, do you prefer to be:
(A) original, or
(B) conventional?
31. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
Think what the words mean, not how they look or how they sound.
(A) gentle
(B) firm
32. When it is settled well in advance that you will do a certain thing at a certain time, do you find it
(A) nice to be able to plan accordingly, or
(B) a little depressed to be tied down?
33. Would you say you
(A) get more enthusiastic about things than the average person, or
(B) get less excited about things than the average person?
34. Is it higher praise to say someone has
(A) vision, or
(B) common sense?

35. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) thinking
(B) feeling
36. Do you
(A) rather prefer to do things at the last minute, or
(B) find doing things at the last minute hard on the nerves?
37. At parties, do you
(A) sometimes get bored, or
(B) always have fun?
38. Do you think it more important to be able
(A) to see the possibilities in a situation, or
(B) adjust to the facts as they are?
39. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) convincing
(B) touching
40. Do you think that having a daily routine is
(A) a comfortable way to get things done, or
(B) painful even when necessary?
41. When something new starts to be the fashion, are you usually
(A) one of the first to try it, or
(B) not much interested?
42. Would you rather
(A) support the established methods of doing good, or
(B) analyze what is still wrong and attack unsolved problems?
43. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) analyze
(B) sympathize
44. When you think of some little thing you would do or buy, do you
(A) often forget it till much later, or
(B) usually get it down on paper to remind yourself, or
(C) always carry through on it without reminders?
45. Are you
(A) easy to get to know, or
(B) hard to get to know?
46. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) facts
(B) ideas

47. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) justice
(B) mercy
48. Is it hard for you to adapt to
(A) routine?
(B) constant change?
49. When you are in an embarrassing spot, do you usually
(A) change the subject, or
(B) turn it into a joke, or
(C) days later, think of what you should have said?
50. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) statement
(B) concept
51. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) compassion
(B) foresight
52. When you start a big project that is due in a week, do you
(A) take time to list the separate things to be done and the order of doing them, or
(B) plunge in?
53. Do you think the people close to you know how you feel
(A) about most things, or
(B) only when you have had some special reason to tell them?
54. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) theory
(B) certainty
55. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) benefits
(B) blessings
56. In getting a job done, do you depend on
(A) starting early, so as to finish with time to spare, or
(B) the extra speed you develop at the last minute?
57. When you are at a party, do you like to
(A) help get things going, or
(B) let the others have fun in their own way?
58. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) literal
(B) figurative

59. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) determined
(B) devoted
60. If you were asked on a Saturday morning what you were going to do that day, would you
(A) be able to tell pretty well, or
(B) list twice too many things, or
(C) have to wait and see?
61. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) hearty
(B) quiet
62. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) imaginative
(B) matter-of-fact?
63. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) firm-minded
(B) warm-hearted
64. Do you find the more routine parts of your day
(A) restful, or
(B) boring?
65. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) reserved
(B) talkative
66. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) make
(B) create
67. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) peacemaker
(B) judge
68. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) scheduled
(B) unplanned
69. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) calm
(B) lively
70. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) sensible
(B) fascinating

71. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) soft
(B) hard
72. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) systematic
(B) spontaneous
73. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) speak
(B) write
74. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) production
(B) design
75. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) forgive
(B) tolerate
76. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) systematic
(B) casual
77. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) sociable
(B) detached
78. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) concrete
(B) abstract
79. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) who
(B) what
80. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) impulse
(B) decision
81. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) party
(B) theater
82. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) build
(B) invent
83. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) uncritical
(B) critical

84. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) punctual
(B) leisurely
85. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) foundation
(B) spire
86. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) wary
(B) trustful
87. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) changing
(B) permanent
88. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) theory
(B) experience
89. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) agree
(B) discuss
90. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) orderly
(B) easygoing
91. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) sign
(B) symbol
92. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) quick
(B) careful
93. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) accept
(B) change
94. Which word in each pair appeals to you more?
(A) known
(B) unknown

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