

1973

## Political development, the People's Party of Pakistan and the elections of 1970.

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**FIVE COLLEGE  
DEPOSITORY**

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, THE PEOPLE'S  
PARTY OF PAKISTAN AND THE  
ELECTIONS OF 1970

A Thesis Presented

By

Meenakshi Gopinath

Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

June 1973


Political Science

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
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June 1973



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## PREFACE

Pakistan stepped into 1970 with renewed hope and vigour. Democratic political processes which had remained suspended since Ayub Khan's military coup in 1958 were restored on New Year's Day. The country witnessed an eleven month period of hectic political activity and campaigning by the aspirants to political power. On December 7, 1970, for the first time since independence in 1947, direct elections were held on a national scale. For the first time on the basis of universal adult franchise, and one man one vote, Pakistanis set out to vote in a National Assembly entrusted with the task of framing a new constitution. Ten days later they trekked to the polling stations again to elect members of provincial assemblies, for each of the five provinces of East Pakistan (now Bangla Desh), Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Even on a provincial scale they were the first direct elections since 1954 in East Pakistan, the first ever in Baluchistan, the first since 1951 in Punjab and NWFP, and the first since 1953 in Sind.

The results of the election at both the national and provincial levels showed a sweeping victory for the Awami League in East Pakistan, and a substantial majority for the People's Party in West Pakistan. The elections demonstrated that the East voted for an inward looking Bangali nationalism. It was both a protest vote against the hege-

mony of West Pakistan, and a positive vote for an autonomous Bangla Desh.

While the AL victory (given the emotion charged climate of the East) was not surprizing except perhaps in magnitude, the emergence of the People's Party of Pakistan (given its Socialistic platform) indicated an exciting, albeit unexpected direction in voting behaviour.

Subsequent events in 1971 focussed world attention on the secession of East Pakistan. The result was a fund of literature on the Bangla Desh crisis, and the relegation to the background of the elections themselves, especially in West Pakistan. The dearth of literature in this area is regrettable in that the elections themselves were a most significant manifestation of the process of political development that is underway in Pakistan, and the direction in which modernization had brought about the aligning of the electorate.

In this thesis, we shall attempt to evaluate the economic, political and psycho-social causes for the PPP popularity using the elections as a case study. We shall stress the significant correllation between the PPP success, the political development of Pakistan and the process of modernization.

Our further concern would be the role assumed by the PPP and the mediating situational inputs which fashion the role or roles -- as the case may be. Another goal would be

to examine the nature of the contribution of the party role to the process of political development.

Political parties are products of their environment, but may also be instrumental in generating new environments. Our further concern would lie in the fact that party roles and role perceptions may vary from time to time; according to socio-political conditions as generated by the process of modernization -- the success of a party ultimately being contingent upon its ability to accomodate change.

Various data sources have been employed. They include primarily newspapers, government and research publications. Pakistani newspapers covering the election period, have been a most valuable source of information in the absence of personal interviews and questionnaires. The method employed involves primarily an interpretive analysis of narrative and some statistical data from library sources and newspapers.

The PPP being a West-based party, our primary area of concern would be West Pakistan. The outcome of the election here is more complex than that of East Pakistan. This would however, not preclude all comparisons between the East based Awami League and the PPP.

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# C H A P T E R    I

## INTRODUCTION

From the standpoint of political development, party roles and configurations can be viewed as the outgrowth of the development process -- the culmination, as it were, of processes of social, economic and political change -- and also as institutionalized forces affecting political change, whether it be progressive or retrogressive.

Any discussion of the role of the Pakistan People's Party as a political phenomenon within the context of the elections of 1970, will entail an understanding of it as a dependent variable, influenced by interacting societal variables.

In developing areas, parties have been major instruments for political socialization, especially during the early phases of development, when they are among the few institutions concerned with affecting political attitudes. In more developed systems other institutions like the press, the educational system, assume this role. In the case of Pakistan, we found that the PPP was not the principal generator of the attitudinal change that ensured its victory. What then were the operating factors? We posit that, before the emergence of the PPP, the political system of Pakistan was faced with a series of crises (an elaboration of the concept and nature of crises will appear later in the chapter) which contributed to the attitudinal change

from which the PPP benefitted. In other words, political socialization was already underway in Pakistan. Social change and mobility is taking place much faster in Pakistan than most realize. Social stratification on the basis of class, caste and clans is breaking down.

A revolution of expectation sweeps the land. People at all levels are seeking material gratification -- comforts, better jobs, better standards of living. The advent of technology and the effects of modernization have given people the vision that they can, according to their will, change the circumstances of their lives. This has happened with rather explosive suddenness in Pakistan, as in other developing countries. The traditional attitude of resignation to conditions is changing to hope, and attendant discontent. However, out of this discontent and frustration are emerging creative factors resulting in a new view of man's potency for change.

The PPP's sensitivity to the intertwined political, social, economic and psychological components of the process and direction of change, contributed to its success. The theme has been developed throughout this work, that the party did not undertake an "educating" function. Its role was essentially an adaptive one, with mass aspirations forming the inputs that determined the nature and scope of its operation. There is an implicit argument in our analysis, that the other parties that contested elections

in West Pakistan, either failed totally to understand mass aspirations against the canvas of systemic change, or if they did, failed to incorporate and internalize them effectively enough.

The attitudinal change among the masses is, in itself, a consequence of the output of modernization. The very process of modernization has made obvious the discrepancy between the fulfillment of socially induced economic (and to some extent political) expectations, and a blind acceptance of an authority committed to an unfulfilling status quo. The socialist platform of the PPP was in harmony with the direction of changes in the mass perceptions.

#### Definition of Basic Concepts

Before we proceed any further, a clarification of basic concepts used in this study becomes necessary.

1. Political Party. A political party is seen in the popular mind as a symbol of political modernity, just as power dams or steel mills are conceived of by political elites in the developing areas as a symbol of economic modernity. Parties emerge whenever the activities of a political system reach a certain degree of complexity, or whenever the notion of political power comes to include the idea that the mass public must participate or be controlled. Using Weiner and LaPalombara's explanation, parties should be distinguished from cliques, clubs and

small groups of notables that can be identified as the antecedents of the modern political party in most Western countries. It is also important to distinguish parties from purely national "movements" and factions. The definition we adopt requires (1) continuity in organization -- that is, an organization whose expected life span is not dependent on the life span of current leaders; (2) manifest and presumably permanent organization at the local level, with regularized communications and other relationships, between local and national units; (3) self-conscious determination of leaders at both national and local levels to capture and hold decision-making power alone or in coalition with others, not simply to influence the exercise of power; and (4) a concern on the part of the organization for seeking followers at the polls or in some manner striving for popular support.<sup>1</sup>

2. Modernity/Tradition. Modernity entails a rationalization of ends. It does not involve a total rejection of traditional customs and values, but involves carrying out new roles and discarding purely inherited roles. In most developing countries (in the absence of an ideologically motivated revolution) the transition from tradition to modernity is a gradual continuous process. The develop-

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<sup>1</sup>See Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 6-7.

mental process, then, involves, in a sense, an interplay between the "modernization of tradition" and the "traditionalization of modernity."

The elections of 1970 demonstrated an unexpected direction in voting behaviour. "Baradari" or clan affiliations did not play a predominant role in determining the voting pattern. If this trend is reinforced in the elections of 1975, we can assume that the rationalization process is evolving in Pakistan.

3. Social Mobility. As countries move towards greater industrialization, changes occur in the system of stratification. With industrialization and the spread of education, stratification in Pakistan is now not so much on the basis of caste or clan and feudal relationships but on the basis of wealth and education. As education, which was once the privilege of a small elite, becomes available to a wider section of society, social mobility results. Then modes of obedience and loyalty, functional to a vertical hierarchical society, become unacceptable to those moving in a competitive, horizontal society. Freedom of thought instilled by the secularizing of education and consequent broadening of action is now provided. A change of values is brought about by social mobility. A most important value which may in turn be subsumed by all other values is what is identified in the West as humanitarianism, and which involves active concern for the welfare of all human

beings, irrespective of economic position, caste, color or creed, or inherited social roles. Egalitarianism, which is an essential element of humanitarianism, is seemingly becoming the most coveted value of the Pakistani masses.

4. Political Development. Considering the surfeit of definitions that have been attributed to the concept of political development, it seems desirable to elucidate, what we consider would be a valuable approach in understanding developing societies.

Political development has been identified as (a) the political prerequisite of economic development, (b) as the politics typical of industrial societies, (c) as political modernization, (d) as the operation of a nation-state, (e) as Administrative and Regal development, (f) as mass mobilization and participation, (g) as the building of democracy, (h) as functional specificity within a polity (i) as stability and orderly change (j) as mobilization and power and so on.<sup>2</sup> These definitions of absolute goals reflect an oversimplified view of political development and are indifferent to the complexity and multiplicity of determinants that fashion it. We understand political development as process oriented as opposed to a value laden or goal oriented concept.

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<sup>2</sup>For an elaboration of the varying definitions attributed to political development and further references, see Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966, pp. 33-45.



Both the historical and typological perspectives of political development imply or specify a beginning and end state of affairs, the latter characteristically being what purports to be a "developed" or "modern" polity. This approach seems to preclude any form of cultural relativism. It is also insensitive to the fact that the time span for development in the "Third World" as compared to the West has shrunk considerably, resulting in a "skipping of stages." These perspectives do not allow for political "breakdowns" and "decay" and imply that the movement between the two poles of traditionality and modernity is and must be irreversible and unilinear. At the "developed" or "modern" extreme there is the image of termination and the end of the line. It is virtually impossible to eliminate the suggestion -- to use a phrase from James Coleman -- of an ethnocentric, Western parochial normative bias.

The advantage of an evolutionary perspective is that it views political development as a continuous process, and views change as multilinear. Hence our preference for this approach.

From the evolutionary perspective one views the political development process as that open-ended increase in the capacity of political man to initiate and institutionalize new structures, and supporting cultures to cope with or resolve problems, to absorb and adapt to continuous change, and to strive purposively and creatively

for the attainment of new societal goals.<sup>3</sup>

Coleman's concept of "development" as a syndrome of summatory dimensions ("differentiation," "equality" and "capacity") provides certain a priori premises to channelize the scope of the phenomena. His conception of the political development process is a continuous interaction among the processes of structural differentiation, the imperatives of equality, and the integrative responsive and adaptive capacity of a political system.<sup>4</sup> Basic to the development syndrome are the contradictions among the rising demand for equality, which involves popular participation adherence to universalistic laws, and respect for achievement-performance; a greater need for capacity and for a more efficient and far ranging governmental system; and a tendency toward greater differentiation as the divisions of labor and specialization of tasks becomes more widespread. The very essence of modernization, thus may be viewed as a dynamic state based on the need to manage and ameliorate the tensions inherent in the development syndrome. In tracing the pressures basic to the development syndrome, some political

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<sup>3</sup>See James S. Coleman, "The Development Syndrome: Differentiation - Equality - Capacity," in Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba and Myron Weiner, eds., Crises and Sequences in Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 73.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 73-100.



theorists,<sup>5</sup> have arrived at five "crises" that have arisen in the process of political development. These are the crises of identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration and distribution.

### Methodology

We have used the crisis model as one approach in explaining the PPP emergence and success, at the same time taking into consideration the variable of modernization.

Our theoretical approach regards conflict as an essential ingredient of social existence. A theoretical approach that regards conflict as an index of decay, or invests equilibrium with any special value, can prove a handicap in studying developing societies. The several efforts to introduce dynamic elements into some models of general theory of politics never went further than implicit or explicit equilibrium.<sup>6</sup> To mention a few, the input-output models of David Easton,<sup>7</sup> the structural-functional analyses of Parsons

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<sup>5</sup>Of those who subscribe to this school are members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council -- Pye, Binder, Weiner, LaPalombara, Verba, Coleman.

<sup>6</sup>See for example David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951 and David Easton, The Political System, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953.

<sup>7</sup>See David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics IX (1957), p. 383-400. Another example of the model is that by G. Almond in the

and Smelser,<sup>8</sup> and to some extent the "cybernetics model" of Deutsch.<sup>9</sup> These models have assumed, more or less, harmony in the social system. Consequently they are greatly prejudiced in favor of societies that manifest "functional-integration," "structural equilibrium," "social solidarity" and so on.

We have kept in mind that in the course of political development there are three possible process sequences: new processes are initiated; old processes are modified; or old processes continue unchanged.

We have avoided making our approach too rigid, and thus pushing the argument to any one extreme. The role of the PPP in the elections of 1970 is a role that demanded the management of conflict that presented itself in the electoral environment. One such manifestation was the handling of the pulls between modernity and tradition -- more specifically between the requirements of Islam on the one hand, and socialism, on the other.

As indicated earlier, our attention will be focussed

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introductory chapter of The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

<sup>8</sup>See Talcott Parsons and Neil E. Smelser, Economy and the Society, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956, and Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, New York: The Free Press, 1960.

<sup>9</sup>Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control, New York: The Free Press, 1963.

on the West (in other words, what now remains of Pakistan) since this was the PPP's area of operation. Where the roles of other parties are discussed, it would be mainly as a comparison with the PPP, or to illustrate the implications they held for the PPP. This study does not provide an exhaustive account of the activities of other parties, rather they have been viewed from the interrelated, concurrent perspective.

The political path to modernity involves critical changes of identity from the parochial to the societal. It involves critical changes in legitimacy from transcendental to immanent sources. It involves critical changes of distribution from status and privilege to ability, achievement, and the control or management of capital. And it involves critical changes in the degree of administrative and legal penetration into social structure, and out to the remote regions of the country. We have said earlier that these crises have contributed to the political development of Pakistan, and brought about an attitudinal change among large sections of the citizenry, and this in turn has made possible the PPP success.

An understanding of the backdrop -- political, social, economic and psychological -- would thus entail a discussion of the crises that appeared in Pakistan's political history. We are not attempting here, a chronological narrative, but rather an analysis of the interplay of political forces that constituted the "crises."

## Crises in the Political History of Pakistan

1. Identity Crisis. In the process of political development, an identity crisis occurs, when a community finds that what it had once unquestionably accepted as the physical and psychological definitions of its collective self are no longer acceptable or operative in the same form, under new historic conditions, and need further elucidation. One form of identity crisis generally takes the form of deeply mixed feelings about the modern world, and one's own historical traditions.

In Pakistan, since its inception, the question of the place of Islam in politics has remained an unresolved issue.<sup>10</sup> The Pakistan movement was a product of nationalism. At the very least, it required the acceptance of a clear distinction between the Hindu and Muslim communities of pre-independence India. This patriotism is felt most strongly when looking over the fence to India. Internally the force of nationalism is less clear and strong. Islam was considered the focal point of the nationalism of Pakistan. It was often claimed to be the "ideology" (variously alluded

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<sup>10</sup> We touch upon this controversy to show that it contributed to a crisis. For detailed analyses of the place of Islam in the politics of Pakistan, see Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967, pp. 159-184 and Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, London: George Allen and Urwin Ltd., 1968, (3rd imp.) pp. 194-231. There is a fund of literature on this issue.

to as the Islamic ideology or the Pakistan ideology etc.) of the state.

Much of Pakistan's early history, and much of its attempts at constitution making, consisted of demands for the orientation of political, social and economic institutions in the light of Islamic doctrines, particularly the Quran and the Sunnah.

The struggle for Pakistan was led by men of politics, rather than by men of religion. The leaders of Pakistan -- Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan, Ghulam Mohammed, Suhrawardy, Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan -- have been men of Western education and a secular outlook. This elite chose a secular state without renouncing religion. The orthodox "ulema" (men of spiritual learning) on the other hand, preferred to start from the opposite direction and to attempt to reconcile some of the aspects of cabinet government with the injunctions of Islam.

One of the great weapons that the ulema have is the influence they wield, through the institutions of the mosque and madrasahs (where education with a heavy religious emphasis is imparted) on the Pakistani masses, especially the people in the rural areas, and among the poorer sections of the urban areas. Thus no public figure, including those of the Westernized elite has ventured to suggest that Pakistan should discard Islam as the basis of its policy. Consequently they tried, in the constitution of 1956, to

build an Islamic facade on to the structure of cabinet and parliamentary government.<sup>11</sup>

The difficult task was to get scholars to agree on what constitutes an "Islamic" state. Even on the question of ideology, no clear cut understanding was arrived at as to whether Islam did constitute the ideology of Pakistan or whether it ought to do so. The differences were more than questions of semantics -- rather they arose from the varying interpretations even among the Ulema, as to the content and spirit of Islam in relation to the political sphere.

Pakistan's modernist leaders have been on the horns of a dilemma which is both political and psychological. They knew that the great majority of Muslims supported the Pakistan Movement in the hope that Pakistan would bring into being an Islamic society. But they feel that the kind of Islamic state that the orthodox ulema recommend cannot and should not be established; yet they do not know how to modernize Islam without stretching the meaning and interpretation of some injunctions laid down in the Qur'an.

The "crisis" becomes apparant because Pakistani leaders had not (up until the period of our analysis) been able to construct an Islamic ideology which gives clear answers on problems like secular democracy, socialism, and

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<sup>11</sup>The Ayub Constitution of 1962, and the Constitution of Pakistan adopted in 1973, also declare Pakistan to be an "Islamic" Republic.



the rights of property. This gave them sufficient flexibility to cope with such problems in a pragmatic manner. In addition, there developed a cynicism on the part of the masses about the political elite, who, although they professed adherence to the spirit of Islam, and its "egalitarianism," adopted "Westernized" or what the masses viewed as essentially "un-Islamic" life styles. Bhutto's program of Islamic socialism, and the bridging of the gap between tradition and modernity, could be viewed as a starter in the direction of solving the discrepancies that contributed to the crisis.

It must be kept in mind that the formation of Bangladesh has raised legitimate questions on the building and sustenance of a nationalism based on religion alone without deference to ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences.

2. The Crises of Penetration and Integration. The concept of integration involves the amalgamation of disparate social, economic, ethnic and geographic elements into a single nation-state. This kind of national integration implies both the capacity of a government to control and penetrate the territory under its jurisdiction, as well as a set of popular attitudes towards the nation generally described as loyalty, allegiance and a willingness to place national above local concerns. From another point of view -- and one that is more crucial for our analysis -- integration means the regularization of structures and processes whereby

the discrete elements in a given national territory are brought into meaningful participation in the political system. Whether these processes are regularized and understood by participants to be legitimate, can be defined as "process integration."

Pakistan's political history is the history of relative failure in achieving this kind of integration. Besides the issue of Islam, the relationship between the Centre and Provinces, that is the nature of Federalism, had plagued constitution makers between 1950-56. Pakistan's constituent Assembly met with no success for many years, mainly because most West Pakistan deputies were unwilling to live permanently under an East wing majority. The search was for a formula that would prevent the "domination" of West Pakistan, especially of the Punjab by the East.

The Constituent Assembly (which functioned as a central legislative) became the main arena of conflict.<sup>12</sup> The East was further chagrined because of the initial reluctance of the West to concede to Bengali (the language spoken by the East and hence the majority) the status of the National Language, which was initially accorded to Urdu. Later this adherence to Urdu alone was abandoned and Bengali too was

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<sup>12</sup>For detailed analyses of Pakistan's attempt at constitution making see Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit., pp. 65-100 and K. P. Misra, M. V. Lakhi and V. Narain, Pakistan's Search for Constitutional Consensus, New Delhi: Impex India, 1967, Chapter I.



recognized as the National Language, following agitation in East Pakistan in 1954.

The first attempt to coin an acceptable formula was made by the Basic Principles Committee of the Constituent Assembly in Sept. 1950. It envisaged a bicameral legislature. The lower house was to be elected on the basis of population. In the upper house, the existing provinces of East Bengal, West Punjab, the North West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan, were given equal representation. The two houses were given equal powers in all matters including the budget and money bills. In cases of dispute, decisions were to be taken by joint sessions of both houses. This meant that even though East Bengal representation would be higher in the lower house, West Pakistan would be four times that of East Bengal in the upper house, if the four provinces of the West decided to vote as one bloc. The report met with considerable opposition from the Bengali group.

The Second Report of the Basic Principles Committee in 1952, in which parity was the principal feature, was abandoned because it was opposed by the Punjabees on the grounds that it was designed to establish Bengali domination over the whole of the country.<sup>13</sup> The argument was

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<sup>13</sup> Under this proposal, the Upper House of the federal legislative was to have 60 members from East Bengal and 60 from West Pakistan, distributed among the various units. The lower house would have 200 members from each of the two wings.

that the Bengalis would come as a united group; by winning support from the smaller West Pakistan provinces of Sind and the NWFP and by isolating Punjab, they would have sufficient majority to rule the country.

The constitutional proposals that the new Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra, announced in the Constituent Assembly in 1953, tried to meet most of the objections of the Punjabi group had brought against the Basic Principles Committee.<sup>14</sup> The mood in the Constituent Assembly seemed more conciliatory, and the formula was agreed to in principle. However, the crushing defeat of the Muslim League in the elections of East Pakistan in 1954, caused considerable alarm among the West Pakistani leaders, who saw it as a move toward "disintegration."<sup>15</sup> The Constituent Assembly became the venue of bitterness and controversy, and was dissolved in 1954 by the then governor-general, Ghulam Mohammed. This act, euphemistically called reconstitution, was accompanied by dismissal of a government headed by an East Bengali premier, who enjoyed the confidence of the sovereign assembly, by a West Pakistani dominated civil service.

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<sup>14</sup>See Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit., pp. 72-74.

<sup>15</sup>In addition anti Urdu riots in East Bengal, and the consequent breakdown of law and order resulted in clamping of Governor's rule in the Province and the dismissal of the United Front Ministry by the central Government.

The next attempt at constitution making was successful. The result was the constitution of 1956, and it was hurriedly adopted and passed.<sup>16</sup> By now the politicians felt that any constitution was better than no constitution, for subordinating the power hungry governors-general (Ghulam Mohammad had yielded power to Iskander Mirza) and the steadily growing influence of the army. The country and its political leaders looked forward to direct elections under universal franchise to be held soon.

The constitution of 1956, in its desire to circumscribe the power of the President, spelled out the mechanics of parliamentary government in all its essential details

In its attempt to accomodate the Bengali demand for autonomy and parity and the demands of the orthodox elements for an Islamic state, it came halfway<sup>17</sup> in making concessions to both these groups.

This move threatened Iskander Mirza's position of supreme political power. He fell back on his modus operandi of setting one group against another in the Constituent Assembly. After 1956, when there was no stable majority party in the Centre, Mirza sought supporters from several parties, and the conflict between the Governor-General and the Prime Minister continued. By 1958, there was total

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<sup>16</sup>A new Constituent Assembly was convened, under the order of the Federal Court of Pakistan.

<sup>17</sup>Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 81.

collapse of the Parliamentary system owing to internal dissension and largely Mirza's machinations. The expected elections were never held. On October 7, 1958, Iskander Mirza dismissed the Prime Minister, Firoz Khan Noon, dissolved parliament and proclaimed Marshal Law, with the Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan, as chief M.L. Administrator. On October 27, Ayub, in a bid to become undisputed sovereign, ousted Mirza and began more than ten years of authoritarian rule.

Processes of integration were thus not institutionalized. The East was becoming increasingly resentful of what it considered to be "internal colonialism" by the West, and the Punjab in particular. The Armed Services and the bureaucracy, two formidable power centres, continued to be dominated by West Pakistanis till 1964, and this further alienated the East.

There were other factors too that contributed to the crisis of integration. The East and the West being geographically divided and culturally so different, the heavy reliance on Islam alone as a binding force, by the leadership to foster integration, was naive and shortsighted. For instance, had Bengali been taught compulsarily in schools in the West and Urdu in the East, a process of bridging the linguistic gap could have conceivably been initiated, leading to greater cultural interchanges, and psychological bonds.

Why then was the West unwilling to initiate such processes? An answer could be sought in the realms of psychology. The Western attitude was probably prompted by a feeling of racial and cultural superiority. The West identified with the Turko-Afghan-Iranian tradition, and viewed the East Pakistanis as the progeny of a less pure, "Hinduized" Muslim culture. They were consequently unwilling to be directed and influenced by Bengalis.

Another question surfaces. Why did East Pakistan allow itself to be exploited? The logic of Bengali majority would have meant that the Bengali elite would preside over the distribution of resources. Conceivably, during the first two or three years of Pakistan's history, the Bengalis in the Constituent Assembly, could have taken charge, and threatened the West with "expulsion" if it did not concede to majority claims. But this did not happen because a strong dynamic Bengali elite with a Bengali consciousness was still to develop. The Bengali leadership in the initial years had been weak and conciliatory, or identified with the leaders of the West, more than they did with their constituents.

In addition, programs to forge integration can be expensive. Governments of the day never invested the kind of resources in East Pakistan that would be commensurate with the job.

The smaller provinces of West Pakistan, too, were

becoming uncomfortable over "Punjabi domination." The crisis of penetration became most manifest in the operation of the One Unit Scheme of 1955. This scheme had integrated all the provinces in the West into a single province of West Pakistan. Provincial legislatures had been cajoled, threatened and steam rolled into accepting One Unit. It had resulted in removing geographically the centre of power (the legislature was then located in Lahore) from the access of the people. It had reduced even more, the contact between local politicians and the district administration, and grass roots contacts were next to nill. The overwhelming unpopularity of the One Unit Scheme became most apparant when it became a crucial issue in the anti-Ayub movement of 1968-69.

3. Crisis of Participation. Modernization often generates pressures for political participation. A participation crisis can be defined as a conflict that occurs when the governing elite views the demands or behaviour of individuals and groups seeking to participate in the political system as illegitimate.<sup>18</sup>

The crisis of participation in Pakistan manifested itself most overtly during the Ayab Khan era. Ayub dis-

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<sup>18</sup>The socio-political concomitants that contribute toward participatory urges, are brilliantly discussed by Myron Weiner in "Political Participation: Crises of the Political Process," in Crises and Sequences in Political Development, op. cit., pp. 165-186.



played a soldier's characteristic distaste for politics in general and parliamentary democracy in particular. His remedy for Pakistan, placed primary emphasis on a unity of command, imported from his military background. Furthermore, he consistently argued that parliamentary democracy is not likely to work in Pakistan where literacy was low, and where the people are not informed or mature enough to use their votes to support certain national policies and programs. He displayed an elitist's abhorrence for the "crude masses" and for the politicians who were their representatives. (His predecessors, Mirza and Ghulam Mohammed, held the same views.)

Ayub proscribed political activity and moved against many of the country's prominent political figures (many of whom he kept in jail) with the Elective Bodies Disqualifying Ordinance (EBDO) banning them from politics until January 1, 1967.<sup>19</sup>

Again, the system of Basic Democracies formulated in 1959, (in which was rooted Ayub's view of electoral activity for Pakistan) heightened the participation crisis.

The BD system stipulated a hierarchical pyramidal structure of indirect representation consisting of four tiers of authority. Local representatives called Basic Democrats, were to be chosen by direct elections roughly

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<sup>19</sup>The ban on political parties was lifted in late 1962 by Ayub Khan.

at the rate of one for every thousand of the population (80,000 in all -- 40,000 from each wing) and were to form the lowest tier, and were responsible for local administration. The next three tiers comprised selected basic democrats, and an equal number of nominated civil servants. A unity of command was ensured, and the nominated civil servants, by virtue of the power and prestige they wielded, often intimidated the "elected" BDs into subservience.<sup>20</sup> The Basic Democrats collectively were to form an Electoral College to choose the President and the members of national and legislatures. Martial law continued and the only electoral function of the BDs was to confirm the continued rule of the President by an overwhelming majority in 1960.

The constitution promulgated by Ayub Khan in 1962, institutionalized his ideas of controlled democracy, and further precipitated the participation crisis. According to this document, all power revolved around the President, and everything was subordinate to his authority. Other important features were the election of the President and the National and Provincial Assemblies by an electoral college consisting of Basic Democrats, the absence of justiciable, fundamental rights and the inferior position of the judiciary

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<sup>20</sup>A critique of the BD system is offered by K. J. Newman in "The Constitutional Evolution in Pakistan," International Affairs, July 1962, p. 359. See also chapter entitled "Basic Democracies and Development in the Rural Sector," in Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit., pp. 244-260, for details on the workings of Basic Democracies.



vis-a-vis the legislature. Polling for Basic Democrats was held in 1964, and followed by Presidential elections in 1965.

In addition to repressing the participatory urges of the masses, Ayub also freely employed the Defence of Pakistan Rules to subjugate his critics and potential opponents. The freedom of the Press was severely curtailed. The crisis of participation became even more crucial because governmental output did not satisfy the people's expectations.

4. Crisis of Distribution. The crisis of distribution<sup>21</sup> has received considerable mention in subsequent chapters. However, it must be stressed that the crisis of distribution highlighted all the other crises, making the masses increasingly impatient with the status quo.

In East Pakistan, there was much bitterness about the economic disparities between the two wings. The eastern region had lagged far behind in the private sector, and had a lower per capita income as compared with West Pakistan. In addition, the East felt that the allocation of resources by the centre was unbalanced and unfair. A major source of grievance of East Pakistani industrialists and political leaders has been the way the Pakistan Industrial Develop-

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<sup>21</sup>See conclusive chapter for a more detailed analysis of this crisis.

ment Corporation (PIDC) has disinvested certain big companies in East Pakistan. The PIDC took the initiative in floating certain big industries in West and East Pakistan, when private capital was reluctant to embark on such ventures. As soon as these ventures became profitable the PIDC sold them to few big industrialists from West Pakistan. In addition, the Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry was dominated by West Pakistan's big industrialists. Later attempts on the part of the Ayub government to remedy the situation did not allay the resentment in East Pakistan which had been building up over the years.

The crisis of distribution did not stem from interwing economic (and political) disparities alone. Even within separate wings the gap between the "haves" and the "have nots" seemed to widen. It had been one of the cardinal policies of the Government of Pakistan to allow free enterprise full play in the development of Pakistan. The Ayub government too, was perceived to be the ally of big capitalists and landowners. Ayub's land reforms too went only a short way in arresting the evils of landlordism. The ceiling imposed on land was so high -- in some cases even this was evaded by powerful landlords bribing local officials -- that the political power of landlords remained intact. This was amply demonstrated by the fact that in the New National Assembly elected after the promulgation of the Constitution in 1962, landlords constituted the single

largest group.<sup>22</sup> Although there was a good deal of propaganda effort on the part of the Ayub regime concerning its economic achievement, there was a difference between the government's and people's interpretation of economic improvement. The officials spoke in aggregate terms -- GNP, structural changes within and between the productive sectors of the economy, trade balance etc. The people viewed it in more disaggregate terms -- purchasing power of the rupee, spatial income differences, personal income disparities. A Pakistani economist commented:

The rising prices of 1965-68 reduced the purchasing power of rupee; rapid strides in agriculture and some sectors of industry increased inter-personal and inter-regional income disparities. Therefore, the government's view of economic development was not only misunderstood by the people, it was treated as a fraud that a handful of vested interests were perpetrating on the society. The people's reaction was accordingly sharp and violent.<sup>23</sup>

The dissatisfaction on the part of the people, concerning governmental output, (in terms of its effect on the masses) accentuated the desire for political participation, and when this was denied, it precipitated a serious legitimacy crisis.

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<sup>22</sup>Of the Assembly's total strength of 156, their number was 70 out of which 58 were from West Pakistan alone. This proportion was not different from that of the first and second constituent Assemblies, where the landlords accounted for 27 out of 79, and 28 out of 80 seats respectively.

<sup>23</sup>S. J. Burki, "Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation," Asian Survey, March 1972, p. 202.

## 5. The crisis of legitimacy.

The basic cause of the legitimacy crisis is the fact that the development syndrome always produces a widening of perceptions on the part of ever larger numbers of people, and therefore, an increase in sensitivities about the possibilities of alternative ways of doing things. Psychologically, the development process is thus a broadening one in which people steadily learn that there are fewer and fewer absolute limits of life. Lucian Pye has elucidated the legitimacy crisis as follows:

Often in the development process we find that after a people have achieved a greater sense of common identity, the resulting spirit of greater equality may leave them less prepared to accept the apparently arbitrary distinctions associated. ....(T)he legitimacy crisis is peculiarly linked to the stresses between equality and capacity in the development syndrome.<sup>24</sup>

Since legitimacy is an attribute of the political system, it is associated particularly with the performance of the governmental structure, and hence it is fundamental in determining the capacity of the system. On the other hand, the acknowledgement of legitimacy resides with the people, and it is only likely to be given when those in authority seem to appreciate the principles of equality and distinctions as being only the realities of appropriate

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<sup>24</sup>See Lucian Pye, "The Legitimacy Crisis," in Crises and Sequences in Political Development, op. cit., p. 35.

forms of differentiation.

The legitimacy crisis in Pakistan was built up, partly because of the polity's inability to handle the identity crisis, and its failure at institutionalizing and legitimizing processes in the form of a constitution.

In addition, government began to be viewed by the people as the ally of vested interests, an excuse for holding power, and a method of self aggrandizement. In other words, the governments in Pakistan, and the Ayub government in particular, failed to invest itself with a legitimate national purpose; it was government for its own sake. In addition, corruption in the higher and middle echelons of society became widespread resulting in increased deprivation of the poorer masses.

After 1950, the Civil Service of Pakistan and the Army, became the defacto power centres in Pakistan. Until 1958, they functioned behind the facade of parliamentary and cabinet rule. In this context, the political instability that is often attributed to Pakistan's early years (50-56) needs qualification. There was probably a high degree of ministerial instability at the centre (Pakistan had six Prime Ministers in a period of three years) but in the Provinces there was relative stability. The dismissal of cabinets and ministers by the Governor Generals, drawn from the higher bureaucracy, was merely an instrument to consolidate the power of the Civil Service.

Elected representatives of the people were relegated to the background, and people's participation in politics was nonexistent. Professional politics was thwarted, while the bureaucracy and the army became formidable power centres. The cohesiveness and the discipline and the unity of command of these establishments made it impossible for individual or groups of politicians to challenge their power or weaken them. The principle of public accountability was steadily on the wane. While becoming more powerful, the army and the bureaucracy became increasingly aloof from the people. The bureaucracy in particular resisted functional deconcentration of authority, while continuing to be an elite service.<sup>25</sup>

All these factors contributed to a serious legitimacy crisis in Pakistan. Masses questioned the validity of the political system operative in Pakistan and the legitimacy of regimes that had used religious symbols and the crutch of Islam to pacify them and perpetuate power. Resignation changed to indignation and later to violent action.

By 1968, the fires of resentment had grown into a nation wide movement, absorbing various interest groups, particularly students and labor. Strong anti-Ayub rioting

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<sup>25</sup>The role of the bureaucracy in Pakistan has received a great deal of attention. See Chapter 6, Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit., pp. 127-158, and Ralph Braibanti's "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in Joseph LaPalombara ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967 (2nd ed.) pp. 360-440.



grew and by early 1969, there was a near collapse of the law and order situation. After the failure of initial conciliatory gestures, Ayub succumbed to the storm. On March 25th, 1969, he stepped down in favor of Yahya Khan, the then Commander in Chief of the army.

### Yahya's Promise

Upon assuming office, Yahya Khan pledged to restore democratic political processes, and the creation of conditions conducive to the establishment of constitutional government. He promised a smooth transfer of power to the representatives of the people, elected "freely and impartially on the basis of adult franchise."

The Legal Framework Order (LFO), provided the general pattern within which the elections were to be contested. The order stipulated that the elections would be held on the "new" basis of one man one vote, giving East Pakistan 169 seats in the contemplated National Assembly of 313. The National Assembly (NA) was to provide the country with a constitution within 120 days and was to draft a constitution in accordance with the principles in the LFO.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>The LFO declared that the future constitution of Pakistan must preserve 5 fundamental principles: an Islamic ideology; territorial integrity; free elections and the independence of the judiciary; a federal system ensuring autonomy of the provinces as well as adequate legislative, administrative and financial powers for the Central Government; and full opportunities to the people of all regions

By announcing the break up of the One Unit System in July 1970, Yahya Khan went one step further in demonstrating his deference to public sentiments. The nature of Federalism however, was to be deliberated and decided upon by the NA. The stage was thus set for the elections of 1970, against which framework our study is conducted.

### Direction of Chapters

Chapter two will deal with the Genesis of the People's Party of Pakistan, its objectives, its election Manifesto and configuration. All these factors will be analyzed against the theoretical concepts of the role of political parties in the process of political development. Chapter Three, will be primarily a narrative account of the PPP Election Campaign, its strengths and weaknesses, in relation to the other political "actors." Chapter Four will evaluate the election results and PPP victory in the context of the modernizing political culture of Pakistan. In our concluding chapter, we shall engage in speculation about the possible future role of the PPP, in the light of our earlier findings. The party's interrelationship with the process of political development will receive attention. In addition, we shall evaluate the "crises" mentioned in

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to participate in national affairs. Ultimate power to authenticate or reject the Constitution was to rest with the President.

this chapter, and their implications for the PPP, and the political development of Pakistan.

## C H A P T E R   I I

## THE PEOPLE'S PARTY OF PAKISTAN:

## AN ANALYSIS OF ITS ORIGIN, MANIFESTO AND FORM

The emergence of mass political parties is a useful institutional index of a level of political development attained in a given developing polity. Political development implies, among other things, a high degree of organization. Political parties emerge wherever the activities of a political system reach a certain degree of complexity, or wherever the notion of political power comes to include the idea that the mass public must participate or be controlled. Nonetheless, the circumstances under which parties first arise in a developing political system -- together with their tone and configuration -- have an important effect on the kinds of parties that are shaped. The relative success and failure of these parties, similarly, will depend on the manner in which they assess, manipulate or suit these circumstances.

Political theorists<sup>1</sup> have suggested the concept of crises as historical -- situational developments that

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<sup>1</sup>The concept of crises has received substantial attention. See, for example, Leonard Binder, James Coleman, J. LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, Sidney Verba, Myron Weiner, Crises and Sequences in Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971 and Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966, pp. 3-42 and pp. 399-435.

political systems typically experience when they move towards more developed forms. We subscribe to Weiner's and LaPalombara's thesis,<sup>2</sup> that such historical crises not only often provide the context in which political parties first emerge, but also tend to be a critical factor in determining the pattern of evolution parties later take. These internal crises may be precipitated by a wide variety of parametric changes.

We have seen in the previous chapter how Pakistan was increasingly beset by crises of participation, integration and distribution which combined to erupt in the form of a legitimacy crisis in the Ayub Khan period. The People's Party of Pakistan -- which is the chief subject of our investigations -- was a product of that environment of crises. Hence its existence and future growth would depend upon its ability to demonstrate that it is capable of handling the "loads" on the political system, and move the system from one stage of development to the other with minimal "strain."

#### The Genesis of the PPP

(a) Bhutto's disenchantment with Ayub. The Pakistan People's Party was launched at the end of November, 1967. Its primary architect was Mr. Zulfikar. Ali Bhutto, who had

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<sup>2</sup>Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, op. cit., pp. 14-19.

held many important portfolios in Ayub Khan's cabinets from 1958 to 1966. He grew to be one of Ayub's most trusted lieutenants, and was often referred to as "Ayub's protege." Bhutto established himself in Ayub Khan's favour by volunteering for difficult and unpleasant chores at home. Bhutto's unchallenged gift of oration and rhetoric paid good dividends at home and abroad. His brilliance was recognized, his popularity mounted, whetting his vaulting political ambition. It was, however, as Foreign Minister that Bhutto enjoyed the greatest prominence. The departure from an unpopular pro-Western orientation in foreign policy became associated with him in the public mind, adding to his popularity. He became simultaneously a symbol of resurgent nationalism and anti-Indian sentiments. His youth and dynamism enhanced his charismatic appeal. Pakistan's consolidation of relations with Peking owed a great deal to Bhutto's single minded efforts.

After the 1965 war with India, the first manifestations of the growing disenchantment with Ayub Khan's leadership were to be seen in the student demonstrations in the West Wing that rocked Lahore and Karachi immediately after Ayub Khan's announcement of September 22, 1965, that Pakistan had agreed to a ceasefire as urged by the UN Security Council. The events that followed in its wake demonstrated clearly to Bhutto that the Ayub era was in its last days. Simultaneously, there was a growing divergence



between Ayub and Bhutto over foreign policy, and over the Tashkent Declaration in particular.<sup>3</sup> During a visit to East Pakistan in November, 1966, Bhutto openly attacked Ayub's policies and expressed his support of the Six Point Program of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. Only a few months before, as Foreign Minister, Bhutto had condemned Mujib and volunteered to debate the Six Point program with him. Bhutto was to claim later that he had offered his resignation on three occasions following Tashkent, but was told not to desert Pakistan at a time of serious crisis. In any event, whether by choice or forcibly, Bhutto's assignment as Foreign Minister came to an end on the 30th of November, 1966.

(b) Bhutto mobilizes. During the years that he served on Ayub's cabinet, Bhutto's support for Ayub's political system and its machinations seemed unequivocal, and he played a major part in strengthening Ayub's position. Among various manifestations of this support was Bhutto's upholding of the Presidential system in 1961, and his vehement support for Ayub's candidacy during the 1965 presidential election, when he publicly castigated the combined opposition parties. Curiously, in spite of his close asso-

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<sup>3</sup>The deterioration of Bhutto-Khan relations and the subsequent break has been discussed by Dilip Mukherjee, Z. A. Bhutto, Quest for Power, New Delhi: Vikas, 1972, pp. 50-66. See also Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-69, Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1971, Chapters IV and V.

ciation with Ayub, Bhutto was able to maintain an identity of his own. He had made quite an impression on the people and his ability and flamboyance had a great deal to do with it. This was to tilt the scales in his favour in his mobilizing a movement against Ayub.

After his dissociation from Ayub's cabinet, Bhutto roamed the political wilderness. He first engaged in a number of low-key manoeuvres; wanting to set up a forward bloc within the ruling party -- Ayub's Convention Muslim League. The move was not welcomed by stalwarts of the party, who viewed it as nothing more than rebellion against Ayub Khan. Malik Khuda Buksh Bucha, the then President of the West Pakistan Convention Muslim League remarked that "there was no place for any Forward or Backward bloc in the Muslim League."<sup>4</sup>

When, on January 1, 1967, the period of ban on a number of politicians under the Election Bodies Disqualifying Order (EBDO) came to an end, most of them joined the anti-Ayub ranks. The Awami League, the Council Muslim League, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Nizam i Islam -- parties that had existed on the scene -- formed the Pakistan Democratic Movement. However, Bhutto did not join any one of these parties for many reasons. As a close associate of Ayub's, he had in the past condemned the opposition parties,

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<sup>4</sup>L. Ziring, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

and while they would have now welcomed him in their ranks, they could not accept him as their leader. Moreover, the opposition parties had demonstrated their inability to break away from the past. Few of them recognized the gravity of the deprivation that the masses had suffered. They continued to cling to abstractions of ideology and persisted in invoking Islam as the only panacea of all ills. After the "restoration" of constitutional life in 1962, internal dissensions and constant bickering had characterized their politics. Bhutto did not want to identify himself with any of them.

Bhutto realized that a new generation had come of age in Pakistan -- a generation that had not witnessed the atrocities of foreign rule. They were the product of an era when fellow citizens exploited one another, economic disparities widened, and political freedom had become a mockery. Later events were to demonstrate that this "deprived" generation (the students in particular) was Bhutto's strongest power base. The time was indeed ripe for an entirely different approach to the problems that faced Pakistan.

Underlying the need for a new political party, it was pointed out at its foundation meeting:

A growing and powerful body of the people, spear-headed by the younger generation, firmly believes that the old ways and the traditional methods are not sufficient to surmount the colossal problems of Pakistan. Each epoch has its

own seismic pattern. This epoch, which is both so exciting and full of challenge, requires a new party with a new face and vitality to build the new society sought with passionate zeal by the entire population of Pakistan.<sup>5</sup>

Until late in 1967, with this realization in mind, Bhutto travelled around the country trying to build up political contacts at the grass roots level with the aim of launching a party of his own. He moved gradually -- sensing the responses of the people -- from discreet and indirect criticism of Ayub Khan to harsh and direct attacks. In the meantime his following grew. By November, 1967, Bhutto was ready to form the Pakistan People's Party. It was formally inaugurated in Lahore, which proclaimed its political credo in the form of four slogans -- Islam is our Faith, Democracy is our Polity, Socialism is our Economy, and All Power to the People.

By 1968, when the anti Ayub uprising in Pakistan assumed the dimension of a public cause, several groups, students and workers, rallied behind the PPP flag for support and strength. Luckily for Bhutto, the students had, from the very beginning, involved him in the events.<sup>6</sup> Bhutto's subsequent arrest by Ayub Khan was the final flourish needed to establish his bonafides as a dedicated

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<sup>5</sup>Quoted in Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan People's Party -- The First Phase, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1973, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup>Dilip Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 58-63.

crusader against Ayub Khan. The public sympathy for Bhutto, simultaneously enhanced the status of the People's Party of Pakistan (PPP).

(c) The PPP origin -- a theoretical explanation.

Maurice Duverger<sup>7</sup> has classified parties on the basis of the source of the impetus provided for their creation. He is of the view that it is of great importance to ascertain whether parties are created "internally" or "externally" for, according to him, this provides a useful indicator for determining the trends that might determine their future working. An internally created party, he defines as one that emerges gradually from the activities of the legislators themselves. Duverger observes that such local level organization may be simply the result of the fact that certain legislative blocs or factions share nothing more than origins in the same geographic section. Another potent force for the creation of such parties was the extension of suffrage. Externally created parties are those that emerge outside the legislature and invariably involve some challenge to the ruling group and a demand for representation. Such parties may receive their original organizational impetus from such varied sources as trade unions, cooperatives, university students, intellectuals, religious organizations and so on.

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<sup>7</sup>See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1955.

Duverger's classification is not useful for our analysis, since it assumes the existence of a kind of Parliamentary circumstance, which was not operative in Pakistan. There being situations in which mass parties materialize where there is neither a purely colonial regime, nor a Parliamentary one, Duverger's classification can hardly be applied to most developing areas.

As indicated earlier, the concept of "crises" can be adopted for our analysis. However, an additional variable was at work in Pakistan, which is worthy of consideration and which we shall attempt to discuss. This was the variable of modernization. Parties emerge in political systems when those who seek to win or maintain political power are required to seek support from the larger public. There are at least two circumstances under which such a development occurs; 1) a change may already have taken place in the attitudes of subjects or citizens toward authority; individuals in society believing that they have a right to influence the exercise of power, and 2) a section of the dominant political elite or aspiring elite may seek to win public support. A non-participant population may thus be aroused into politics. These circumstances cannot exist without a process of change that has been at work which propels and even compels the public to participate or helps politicians to arouse the public. However, it is still important to ascertain which of these circumstances precedes



the other in a given polity.

In colonial India, the process of awakening first affected the elite and through them was generated to the public. The Indian National Congress, which spearheaded the independence movement, initially comprised a section of the Indian elite. For the first forty years of its history, the Congress elite operated as an interest group seeking access to power, for their upper class and upper middle class constituents. In the perceptions of the elite, there existed crises of participation and legitimacy. However, it was only after the advent of Gandhi, that these perceptions were generated to the public and the Congress began to work as an integrationist party with a view to mobilizing the masses.

The people of what is now Pakistan had been at least initiated into this politicization process before 1947, as a result of the nationalist movement on the subcontinent. It is therefore not necessary to argue that politicization began in Pakistan only after 1947. At the time of Pakistan's creation, the ground had been ready for mass politics, and the people had been expecting this to happen. However, in the two decades between independence and 1969, the people were being constantly pacified by promises, and pleadings for more time on the part of the politicians and their expectations of the political system were not fulfilled. The final upsurge in 1969 was an overt manifestation of an in-

creasingly politicized public's resentment for a political system which to them was illegitimate.

Thus, in Pakistan, preceeding the formation of the PPP, a change was already underway in the public attitude toward the existing power alignment. Unlike the Indian National Congress, the PPP did not generate this awareness; rather it rode on its crest. The crises that have been mentioned in the previous chapter were being increasingly recognized. This was the result of a variety of other changes that brought in its wake greater aspirations on the part of the people. A growing sense of occupational independence, brought on a realization of the capacity of different social strata to participate in politics. The role of students as a group (with little regard for social or caste cleavages) during the anti-Ayub movement, was to demonstrate that the traditional boundaries of social stratification had begun to break down and a greater degree of class and caste mobility had occurred.<sup>8</sup>

The appearance of labor unions on the scene, albeit limited in power, and the awareness on the part of peasants of their role in production, demonstrates this change.

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<sup>8</sup>The student demonstrations drew its forces from such diverse institutions like the "elitist" Gordon College in Rawalpindi, and less reputed and less affluent colleges all over the country. This idea of student solidarity is brought out in Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power, London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1970. Chapters 5 and 6.

"False consciousness" was giving way. Increases in the flow of information, a growth in technology, the expansion of transportation networks and above all, increases in social mobility have profound effects upon the individual's perception of himself in relation to authority.

One might argue that in the Pakistani context, the absence of universal literacy did not act as a deterrent. The transistor revolution had brought politicization to the masses faster than programs of literacy would have done. With roads and electricity coming to remote parts of Pakistan, public broadcasting reached more people. The homogenizing effects often associated with urbanization lent a helping hand. One may cite the example of students of Punjab University, who are not all residents of urban Lahore, (where the University is located) but of outlying areas. These students, on visits back home, provide the links between the city and the village or town, and right there a process has begun.

A certain amount of secularizing was underway, by which individuals were increasingly coming to believe that through their actions they were capable of affecting the political process in ways which are favourable to their interests and sentiments. This could account for the slow waning of traditional loyalties as those to the "baradari" or clan, in more developed parts of Pakistan. We are in-

clined to accept the view of Weiner and LaPalombara<sup>9</sup> that the origin of political parties, while deeply associated historically, with what we identify as "crises," is also closely bound up with the process of modernization.

The birth, and to a large extent, the success of the PPP has a causal relationship to the above set of developments in Pakistan. The PPP sensitivity to the prevailing discontent, prompted its articulation of aspirations that had hitherto existed in a rather diffused manner in the minds of the masses. The PPP did not initiate the process of change, but came into being as a function of it. The nature of this role will be modified considerably now that the PPP is the party in power, and this will be discussed in our concluding chapter. It will suffice at this juncture to say that the PPP emerged in response to or as a result of an awareness of the socio-political and economic climate of Pakistan. The place of Bhutto's political ambition, in the formation of the PPP, cannot be undermined when discussing the formation of the PPP. However, it is our contention that although it might have provided a potent motive, it could not, in isolation, have facilitated the successful formation of the PPP.

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<sup>9</sup>M. Weiner and J. LaPalombara, op. cit., pp. 21.

## Declared Objectives of the PPP<sup>10</sup>

During the spring and summer of 1968, when the PPP was gradually building its base, Bhutto toured the West extensively and addressed numerous public meetings. Three themes dominated his speeches. First, a criticism of Ayub's rule and the various methods adopted by the regime to control government's opponents and dissidents. Second, a condemnation of the government's policy of providing a maximum protection to private enterprise at the expense of other groups, the growing economic disparity between various classes of the people and the different regions of Pakistan; and the exploitation of the "have-nots" by the "haves." Third, a plea to introduce socialism to create an egalitarian structure of society and rehabilitate the dignity of labor, peasants and workers.

The PPP aims and objectives were outlined in its first convention, and can be summarized as follows:

1. The transformation of Pakistan into a socialist society. (A fuller explanation of this aspect appears later in the chapter.)
2. Egalitarian democracy, or a classless society, and the application of socialist ideas to realize economic and social justice.

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<sup>10</sup>Quoted in Hasan Askari Rizvi, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1973, p. 21.

3. A Republican pattern of government, responsible to a directly elected legislature.
4. Universal adult suffrage to both sexes.
5. Full protection of civil liberties, particularly freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, rights of assembly and right of free association.
6. The peasants and working class must, as producers of the National Income, enjoy the full fruits of their labor. All agrarian and industrial programs must be directed towards the welfare of the laboring masses.
7. Nationalization of finance and key industry in order to promote rapid industrial progress, to eliminate the exploitation of the people by the privileged few and to eradicate foreign interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan.
8. Agrarian measures to abolish exploitation of cultivators by the remnants of feudal practices. Positive steps to organize the peasantry in self-help groups and cooperatives.
9. Strengthening of trade unions. Recognition of the right to strike as inalienable. Implementation of the IL.O principles.
10. Fixation of minimum wages.
11. National health service for peasants and workers



and progressively for all sections of the population.

12. Mobilization of the masses.
13. Abolition of illiteracy. Direction of Education to the formation of a classless society.
14. Promotion of the cultural life of the people.
15. Rapid Development of the state languages to replace the employment of an alien tongue (namely English) in the conduct of the affairs of the country. Full opportunity for the cultivation of all regional languages.
16. Equal rights to women.
17. Independence of the judiciary.
18. Annulment of archaic laws.
19. Academic freedom, and autonomy of the University.
20. Mobilization of the youth for nation building purposes.
21. Right of the people to participate in national defense. The formation of a People's Militia in both wings and in all regions of the country.

These aims and objectives captured the aspirations of the deprived sections of Pakistani society that were becoming increasingly aware of their exploitation at the hands of a few. The objectives said nothing about Foreign Policy or confrontation with India, for example. These were to be highlighted later in the PPP election manifesto. At this

juncture, the party was primarily concerned with setting the internal house in order, the essence of which it felt lay in removing the economic disparities through Socialism.

It is interesting to note that the word "Islamic Socialism," that is identified with the PPP, is nowhere appearing in the official documents of its first convention. It only emphasized Socialism and a classless society. It was changed to Islamic Socialism and subsequently the term "Musawaat-i-Mohammadi" was employed by the PPP leadership to counter the propoganda of the right wing political parties, that Socialism as pleaded by the PPP was the negation of Islam. (Bhutto's election speech on television and radio in November mentioned the term Islamic Socialism in 8 places.)

The PPP commitment to Socialism, and its references to a classless society probably attracted to the party the radical and ideologically motivated elements who would go out and campaign for the party and build a mass base for it. On the other hand, it provided room for the more conservative sections of society to read all kinds of alarming connotations into the term, and they did. It was then that the need was felt within the PPP to allay the fears that such interpretations might evoke.

#### Socialism Explained

Soon after the PPP was launched, Bhutto in a dis-

cussion of the "Political structure of Pakistan"<sup>11</sup> described socialism as the highest expression of democracy and its logical fulfillment. He added:

The range of socialism is as wide as conceivable... The socialism applicable to Pakistan would be in conformity with its ideology and remain democratic in nature. If there can be a Scandinavian form of Socialism, why cannot there be a Pakistani form of Socialism suitable to our genius...<sup>12</sup>

Bhutto gave assurance that a socialist government would not compromise the supremacy of Islam. On the contrary, he indicated that the socialism he advocated would make the whole population the custodian of Islamic values.

In this document, Bhutto also highlighted the danger to national unity posed by crass exploitation. While emphasizing that Pakistan could not be preserved merely by exhortations of presidential orders, he pointed out that the solution to the critical relations that existed between East and West Pakistan lay in giving the people their political rights, including their economic equality. The political argument in favor of more balanced regional development was one manifestation of what Bhutto's socialism was to mean.

He also formulated that "all enterprises that constitute the infra-structure of the national economy must be in public ownership." This was qualified by the assurance:

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<sup>11</sup>Quoted in Dilip Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 179.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 179-180.

The control of the essential means of production and of the medium of exchange by the people does not mean the private sector will be eliminated. Private entrepreneurs will be permitted to play their own useful role but will not be able to create monopolistic preserves. The private sector must flourish under conditions appropriate to private enterprise, namely those of competition and not under the shield<sup>13</sup> of the state protection such as at present.

It is clear that whatever the extent of Bhutto's commitment to socialism, he was not willing to incur the wrath of any section of Pakistani society by extreme stances. He displayed remarkable prudence in making his moves after carefully assessing the situation. He was still a long way from power, and it would not have been to the advantage of either socialism or the PPP to lay all his cards on the table.

When the storm broke against the Ayub regime towards the end of 1968, there was no denying the part played by the longstanding economic (and resulting social) grievances of industrial workers who had suffered a decline in real incomes, the indignation of peasants at their perennial exploitation, and the frustrations of the middle class students and their families over the shrinking employment opportunities. Bhutto wisely gauged that the time had come for him to adopt a more pronounced radical posture especially towards economic matters.

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 179-180.

## The PPP Election Manifesto (1970)<sup>14</sup>

The manifesto that the PPP drew up during the election period amply demonstrates this move towards a more "radical," a more emphatic and a more specific stance on matters that had hitherto been dealt with amorphously.

A "manifesto" outlines the measures that a party pledges to adopt if returned to power. Party manifestos are usually published during an election campaign period, and in Pakistan they appeared in all prominent newspapers as well. A manifesto provides a point of reference primarily to those who wish to read beyond the promises that are made by candidates vying for votes. It is also a framework that prescribes the limits within which party notables and workers may operate. Care is taken to maintain a consistency between verbal pronouncements and the party manifesto.

Although the masses seldom concern themselves with the formalities of election manifestos during elections, it is invoked as the "directive principle" that theoretically holds a candidate accountable for his election promises. It is interesting to note that during the election

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<sup>14</sup>Four committees (Steering, Constitution, Resolution and Draft Declaration) were instituted during the first convention of the PPP, with Mr. Bhutto as the Chairman of each committee. The manifesto probably grew out of the deliberations of these committees. Their primary purpose was to outline the aims and objectives of the PPP.

campaign, Bhutto accused some rival parties of "stealing clauses" from his party's election manifesto.

The PPP manifesto is rather a lengthy document and has been divided into six chapters. It begins with the fourfold motto outlined earlier in this chapter, and affirms its faith in the teachings of Islam.

It provides a sharp criticism of the prevailing socio-economic and political system of Pakistan. Its main thrust is towards matters economic. Running right through it is the theme that all the maladies of Pakistan are a direct or indirect consequence of the system of economic inequities, manifested in the exploitative Capitalistic structure that had prevailed.

The manifesto decried the subservience of Pakistani rulers to the "neocolonialist powers" which had led to the economic exploitation of Pakistan as a country. It condemned what it called the "internal colonial structure" as a result of which East Pakistan was submitted to "ruthless exploitation:"

The decline of East Pakistan began during the lifetime of the first National Assembly, and the farce of the last one under the dictatorship of a military usurper failed even to disguise the brutal facts... It is no remedy to brand the victims of exploitation as traitors because they are driven<sup>15</sup> to protest against the treatment they receive.

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<sup>15</sup>Election Manifesto of the Pakistan People's Party, 1970, p. 9.



This stand is interesting in view of the fact that the People's Party had initially toyed with the idea of contesting from the Eastern wing and having abandoned the idea, had not openly sympathized with the grievances of the people there. The manifesto went on to add that the ruling clique supporting the vested interests of banking, industry, and commerce had nothing to offer to save the situation except the same old magical incantations of budgetary formulas and development plans. It posited that the PPP programme would abolish the system of "wholesale expropriation of the underprivileged people of Pakistan" by seizing the means of production, which in the hands of the privileged few were the means of exploitation.

The ultimate objective of the PPP, the Manifesto said, was the attainment of a classless society, which was possible only through socialism,

This means true equality of the citizens, fraternity under the rule of democracy in an order based on economic and social justice. The aims follow from the political and social ethics of Islam. The Party thus strives to put in practice the noble ideals of the Muslim faith. ...The party's endeavour is to bring about peacefully early changes in the economic structure, leading logically to a juster socio-economic order.<sup>16</sup>

Having enumerated these broad principles, the manifesto then moved to specifics, which we shall now enumerate.

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

(a) Foreign policy. It was proposed that Pakistan should follow an independent foreign policy. The first step in this direction was to be achieved by getting out of entanglements with "imperialist-neocolonialist powers." This would involve withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO. Pakistan would also quit the Commonwealth, as it had been "serving the neocolonialist interest of its white members." The manifesto accused the United States of interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan and referred to the dispute with the Soviet Union over the U-2 American spy plane in 1960. The manifesto stated that Pakistan would support the "oppressed" peoples of Asia in their struggle against imperialist powers and in "particular, the cause of the heroic people of Vietnam who have for long years held the imperialist aggressors at bay." Voicing the then prevalent and wide spread anti-American sentiment existing in the country, the manifesto said:

We shall join hands with other nations in an effort to bring about the evacuation of Asian soil occupied by the military forces of the United States and other Western Colonialist powers.<sup>17</sup>

The manifesto advocated a policy of confrontation with India until the question of Kashmir, Farakka, Berubari and other pending disputes were settled. Entirely in consonance with the principle of supporting liberation move-

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

ments, it said Pakistan would uphold the cause of the people of Assam (in India) who were "fighting for their independence." The Tashkent Declaration was to be repudiated, being a treaty extorted under duress. Pakistan would follow a positive policy to promote solidarity among Muslim peoples.

The manifesto recorded "complete and unreserved support to Arab states and the Palestinian movement in their fight against Israel." It stressed solidarity with oppressed peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The party pledged to protect the rights of all nationals living abroad whose labour was "adding wealth to the employing country," but were being "rewarded with ingratitude."

(b) Economic policy. The manifesto said that while the party accepted the possibility of a mixed economy, "all major sources of the production of wealth" would be placed in the public sector. The document then listed 12 sectors of industry which qualified for nationalization under the category of "basic and key industries." These identified industries were: iron and steel; non-ferrous metals; heavy engineering; machine tools, chemicals; shipbuilding; motor car assembly and manufacture; equipment for electrical power production, distribution and use; electronics; production of arms, ammunition and armaments for defense; cement; and paper. To these were to be added "new industries which must be established to enable the autonomous

growth of the national economy." Textile and jute mills over a certain production capacity were to be nationalized. In the public sector were also to be included nuclear material, gas, oil and coal. All exploitation of mineral wealth both mining and ore-processing were to be in the public sector. The public sector would completely control major means of public transportation, namely railways, shipping and airways. A special concern would be conveyance of workers and employees between their homes and their places of work. Large scale export trading, such as jute and cotton, would be conducted by state corporations.

Retail and distribution was to be left in private hands. Cooperatives would be encouraged and all manufacture would be strictly regulated according to quality norms.

In the financial sector there was an unequivocal commitment to nationalize "forthwith" all banks and insurance companies. A system of public investment corporations was to be established to attract savings. In the "interim period before large scale socialist reforms are effected" tax reforms would be introduced to eliminate the "iniquitous and inefficient" taxation system. The system which enables executives of companies to live in extravagance was to be drastically amended, with the state prescribing the norms for housing, transport and other facilities for them. Competition through unfair advertising was to be disallowed. Strict norms would be laid down for the adver-

tising of medicines and drugs.<sup>18</sup>

(c) Agrarian measures. The party would set out to destroy the power of the feudal landlords who constituted a "formidable obstacle to progress." The manifesto committed the party to breaking up the largest estates through legislation and other measures like setting a ceiling on the size of holdings. The ownership of a maximum of 50-150 acres of irrigated land, the maximum varying from tract to tract on the basis of productivity was set as the norm.

In relation to the rural sector, the PPP was only a few steps ahead of its rivals in pleading for this ceiling of irrigated acres in West Pakistan. The council Muslim League was setting the limit at 250 acres of optimum land, while the Jamaat-i-Islami promised to limit holdings to less than 150 acres.

The manifesto prescribed that all those surrendering land over and above the established limit will be compensated "in the form of a terminable life annuity with a maximum duration of twenty five years heritable and negotiable within this period." Landless peasants and peasants holding land below the level of subsistence will be given land and cooperative farming will be encouraged to improve

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<sup>18</sup> During early 1973, Bhutto managed to get a bill passed that would require drugs to be known by their generic rather than trade names. This was expected to lower the prices of drugs that have big company trade names. It was later modified by introducing a list of exemptions.

agriculture and animal husbandry. To spread urbanization, totally self sufficient units of urban settlements linked functionally with rural areas and called "agrovilles"<sup>19</sup> will be founded.

(d) People's rights. Every able bodied person would be provided work according to his abilities and qualification irrespective of class or social origin.

The growth of trade unionism and the rights of trade unions were to be promoted in all sectors of industry. A system of minimum wages was to be enforced in both the private and public sectors of industry. The manifesto decried the system of Basic Democracies that had served to "bolster up the edifice of the corrupt dictatorship." The socialist regime of the PPP was to replace it by local self government, comprising urban municipalities and agglomerations in convenient sizes of rural areas corresponding somewhat to district councils. Even before the goal of socialism is attained the party would have measures of reforms carried through in the existing local self government bodies.

The administrative machinery of the state which Pakistan inherited from the British will be overhauled keeping in view the requirements of the socialist order.

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<sup>19</sup>The "agrovilles" were to have hospitals, dispensaries, markets and civic centres and offices and provide all services to surrounding rural areas.



It will be made responsible for its dealings with the public. In order to protect the rights of citizens, vis-a-vis the administration, a system of administrative courts will be set up and the office of ombudsmen will be created. It is significant that the PPP had taken in its manifesto, the first step in challenging the uncurtailed powers exercised by the bureaucracy in the Pakistani polity. The extent to which the PPP has gone in diminishing the supremacy of the bureaucracy as a formidable power centre will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

The manifesto also specified that the minorities will enjoy equal political rights, protection before the law, access to occupation of public office and shall not be discriminated against.

The manifesto proposed a number of jail reforms. The "jirga"<sup>20</sup> trials were to be abolished and the normal system of criminal and civil courts were to be introduced. The manifesto spelt out the abolition of all honors and decorations of a civilian nature awarded to Pakistani citizens by all previous regimes. There was to be no room for the existence of Princely states.

(e) Education and culture. The PPP manifesto declared that education would be free up to matriculation and

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<sup>20</sup>Jirga trials were conducted by village headmen who were in charge of dispensing justice.

that primary education would be compulsory and free. The manifesto promised reforms in the institutions of higher learning to enable students and teachers full academic freedom.

University students were a strong power base of the PPP, and care was taken in the manifesto to register their disenchantment with the existing educational system.

The universities of today are the image of the despotic rule of the Ayub Khan regime... The vice chancellors advised by foreign 'experts,' assisted by rubber stamping syndicates, aided by educational bureaucracy and blue eyed favorites, helped by police, is on the rampage to exploit the students by awarding them worthless degrees and diplomas and impoverishing their parents. All this must change...<sup>21</sup>

The manifesto advocated full freedom of conscience, thought and expression to apply to literature and the news media.

(f) National health. The manifesto spelled out a detailed program to tackle the various aspects of the problem of National Health in Pakistan. It registered that "diseases, malnutrition, environmental insanitations and squalor" were widespread in the society and took a heavy toll of human life. The PPP recognized the right of every citizen to enjoy good life and its health program was to include:

the provision and improvement of hospitals, the

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<sup>21</sup> Election Manifesto of the PPP, 1970, p. 44.

enforcement of measures to improve sanitation in towns and villages, the local manufacture of as many essential drugs as possible, health care of school children and where malnutrition is present, the supply of a balancing diet for children.

(g) National defense. The manifesto set out to rectify the shortcomings of the Pakistani system of military defense. The defense industries comprising iron and steel, and the manufacture of machine tools were to be set up in Pakistan to reduce her dependence on foreign countries for the import of various types of weapons and military equipment. Pakistan would also develop her nuclear capability to prepare for all eventualities. The defense of East Pakistan was to be strengthened by the establishment there of adequate military installations for ground forces, the air forces and the navy. The PPP upheld in its manifesto the right of every man to bear arms to protect his own life and the life and honor of his family and the right to defend his home and people against foreign aggression. A "People's Army" was to be created in all regions of the country to strengthen defense.

(h) The Constitution. The manifesto records that the "legal framework of a constitution can guarantee no progress if it is made in the interest of the ruling class." The PPP believed that under any constitution, the unity of the country can be preserved only on the condition that the economy of the country is not fragmented. The PPP's conception of a progressive constitution, included full democ-

racy, parliamentary government, a federal system, the extension of local self government and a guarantee of the freedom of conscience. The minimum voting age for both sexes was to be reduced to 18 years.

The electoral system was to be ammended to allow them to minimize the influence of money so that poorer candidates would not be eliminated from contesting elections. The manifesto pointed out that the greatest defect of the system inherited from the British lay in the emphasis on the influence and power the candidate personally wielded in his constituency and the relegation to the background of the political ideas he is supposed to be holding.

The "list system" would be introduced for elections. The voters would cast their votes to political party. Every party will get seats in Parliament in proportion to votes cast to its list. In order to discourage the presence of splinter groups, any party securing less than 5% of the total votes cast will not be allocated a seat.

The PPP manifesto concludes on the note:

The Pakistan People's Party came into being in the hour of need and has performed its duty unflinchingly to overthrow a corrupt dictatorship and awaken the people to the consciousness of their own power. It... proposes radical change of the social, economic and political structure. The people of Pakistan will themselves bring this revolution to pass. Hence the party says

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE...

The manifesto of the People's Party, as we have seen,

held out the promise of a new era in Pakistan. By and large, most other parties promised the same. But the PPP steered clear of old cliches and worn out symbols. It did not talk in terms of abstractions like the ideology of Pakistan, for instance. The "setting of standards," and "educating the masses," the PPP realized, were a spent role in the Pakistan of the 60s and 70s. These proprieties had been a relic of the British tradition in Pakistani politics and it had suited the "drawing room" politicians of yesteryears to adopt it. The PPP manifesto, on the other hand, had set out with the purpose of assimilating the aspirations of the masses. That was the standard it had followed in outlining the specific measures the Party would employ.

#### Mr. Bhutto's Radio and Television Broadcast

When Bhutto took the opportunity offered by the government to all party leaders to make a nationwide TV and radio broadcast just before the election, he reiterated the major themes outlined in the manifesto.

We do not accept Mukherjee's argument that Bhutto probably had second thoughts about his manifesto, since in his broadcast he "slurred over the commitments to social and economic changes incorporated in the manifesto."<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Dilip Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 183.

In the broadcast, there was an unequivocal plea for fundamental changes in the economic structure to stem the rising tide of discontent and disaffection. Mukherjee suggests that Bhutto had modified his stance in order to appease industry, but nowhere in the speech does this become apparent. In fact, Bhutto had commented:

The real reason for the spiritual trepidation of Big Business and its hirelings is the prospect of nationalization of industries and banks.<sup>23</sup>

In fact, the only significant modification to the manifesto was in Bhutto's constant emphasis on the Islamic character of his socialism and his protestation that he was next to none in upholding Islam. Bhutto had said:

This intolerable state of affairs has to be brought to an end. It is our moral duty to lift the people of Pakistan from the Quagmire of poverty. There was a time in the history of Islam when the Great Umar declared that if along the banks of the Euphrates should a dog die of starvation, the Khalifa of Islam would be answerable before Almighty Allah. Here in Pakistan -- in the largest Islamic State -- men and women die of starvation by the thousand. Our children sleep in the streets without shelter. Our toiling masses live an appalling life. This has to be changed.<sup>24</sup>

This change in emphasis was essential to give a boost to the PPP which was a perennial target of attack by the right wing anti-socialists (discussed in a subsequent chapter). Bhutto was also speaking on the basis of some of the responses

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<sup>23</sup>For a full text of the speech, see Pakistan Review, December, 1970, Vol. XVIII, No. 12, pp. 57-61.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 57.



he had received during campaigning. The success of the elite of a party depends in the final analysis on its sensitivity to the feedback from the bulk of the populace.

### The Power Configuration Within the PPP

The reader might sense in our descriptions a tendency to use the People's Party and Mr. Bhutto almost interchangeably. This stems from the fact that at the stage of the PPP's evolution under consideration here, Mr. Bhutto is the indispensable element. The fortunes of the Party are inextricably linked to the success of Mr. Bhutto's political career. The party in itself is his brain child, and its manifesto the product of his political beliefs. While Mr. Bhutto does not owe his political prominence to the People's Party alone, its success and popularity are to a large measure the outcome of his charisma and political doctrines. The PPP has not yet evolved into an independent entity recognizable by virtue of its platform and party members alone. (While party leaders play an important role, the Muslim Leagues and the Jamaat-i-Islami have, to some extent, assumed a personality of their own.)

The PPP, moreover, is linked in the public mind with Mr. Bhutto. Secondary leadership is in the process of evolving. Mr. Bhutto provides the nucleus around which the PPP revolves. This awareness of Bhutto's primacy exists among all the members of the party. While, within the PPP,

some members are more prominent than others, even this elite does not have the power to question Mr. Bhutto's actions by and large.

The only registered opposition from within the ranks before and during the campaign came from Maulana Nuruzzaman of the PPP, on February 1, at Dacca. He accused Mr. Bhutto of "running the party on a purely dictatorial basis."<sup>25</sup> Mr. Nuruzzaman's only option was to dissociate himself from Mr. Bhutto's party. By and large, it has been surmised that Mr. Bhutto does not accomodate criticism from within the party ranks.

Most of the important PPP party members have had little or no political experience before their association with the PPP. Many of the candidates who contested on the PPP ticket (and with success) were relative newcomers to politics. Most of the PPP dignitaries had gained prominence as lawyers, engineers, or were known as landlords. Mustapha Jatoi and Mustapha Khar belong to the latter class. Khar was a constant companion of Bhutto during his political wilderness. His loyalty to Mr. Bhutto has remained unquestionable. It is said that he risked his life to save Bhutto's when the latter was shot at in Multan. This loyalty has won him Bhutto's confidence and the governorship of Punjab where he exercises a greater amount of power

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<sup>25</sup> See Dawn, February 2, 1970.

than the present Chief Minister. Jatoi had limited experience as a Sindi politician. He was a member of the National Assembly during the Ayub era, but had remained an inconspicuous backbencher.

Another political adviser is calcutta born J. A. Rahim, whose connections with the Bengalis are as slender as those of Iskandar Mirza were. Rahim, now 65, is reputed to be one of the PPP's ideologues. A retired member of the Pakistan Foreign Service, his calibre as a decision maker has been recognized by Bhutto. It is said that of all his party subjects, Mr. Rahim enjoys the sole privilege of exerting a considerable amount of influence over Mr. Bhutto. He is respected by the PPP leader for his sagacity and scruples. Mr. Rahim, also now holds a cabinet portfolio.

Another member of the inner clique is Abdul Habuz Pirzada, a 37 year old barrister who is the youngest Minister in Islamabad and served Bhutto as a trouble shooter. A fluent speaker, he was the PPP chairman of the Karachi Zone. Mubashir Hasan (now Finance Minister) functioned as a close associate of Mr. Bhutto, from the inception of the PPP. A man with no political experience, he had distinguished himself as an engineer and architect. He owes his political fortunes to his friendship with Mr. Bhutto.

Another important personality within the PPP "inner crust" was Mahmud Ali Kasuri, a renowned jurist who had established a reputation as a radical. Kasuri and Bhutto

fell out over the formation of the constitution in February, 1973. (Kasuri, who had enjoyed one of the longest associations with the PPP, was expelled from the party, but this was a post election development.)

The inner circle of the PPP consists of half a dozen persons whose relationship with Mr. Bhutto (with the exception of Rahim) is essentially a combination of friendship, loyalty, obligation, subservience and dependency.

In the past few pages, we have described the PPP as a progressive party that stands for a change in the socio-economic and political structure of Pakistan. We have suggested that its relative popularity incurred the wrath of the right wing parties. No such explanation can be comprehensive unless we examine the nature and political leadership of the other major parties that contested the elections in Pakistan. Distinctions of degree or kind cannot be made without comparison. Hence, we felt that a brief description of the other parties is imperative for our purpose.

#### Rival Parties -- Described and Explained<sup>26</sup>

The decline and disintegration of the once comprehen-

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<sup>26</sup>Analysis of other political parties appear in Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes -- 1970," Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 3, pp. 203-209, from whom I have borrowed heavily. Also see Political Parties, Their Policies and Programmes, Karachi: Ferozsons Limited, 1971.

sive independence party, the Muslim League, in the early fifties, led to the rise of splinter groups around dissident and disgruntled leaders. This in turn initiated a trend towards launching parties purely on the basis of personal popularity thereby to advance their claims at times of political crises. The factions of the Muslim League and the National Awami Party emerged as a result of this.

With the passage of the political parties act in 1967, Ayub Khan tried to seize control of the League as a vehicle for his regime and his supporters, and he called it the Convention Muslim League. Other Leaguers saw Ayub as the anti-thesis of the program of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan and under the inspiration of Mian Mumtaz Khan Daultana, formed the Council Muslim League.

#### Council Muslim League (CML)

The CML claimed to be the true successor of the party of Jinnah. Many of the older CML members had been Leaguers since the mid forties. The principal area of strength appeared to be the Punjab, from which both Daultana and provincial president Shaukat Hayat Khan came. The party could justifiably claim that unlike other factions, it had not cooperated with Ayub Khan because one of its leaders, Sardar Bahadur Khan, had led the opposition against Ayub in the 1962-64 assembly. It appeared that the CML gained ground in Sindh when M. A. Khuhro, a former Chief Minister

and Defense Minister, joined the party. The party was weak in East Pakistan, but a number of politicians who had achieved a certain level of prominence, like Khairuddin, joined it. The CML stood for the unity of Pakistan, but had adjusted itself to recognizing the claim of East Pakistan for greater autonomy and the greater share of the economic development funds of the country.

### The Pakistani Muslim League (Convention)

Following his ouster, Ayub yielded his Presidentship to A. K. M. Fazlul Quader Choudhury of East Pakistan. The party amassed a considerable treasury and set about using it. Litigation began and government froze the assets of the party. In addition, the opponents of the PML (c) depicted it as a party of "collaborators" of Ayub. Many members left the party, but the stigma remained with the party. Those who stayed, presumably, felt that their local influence was sufficient to overcome such charges and ensure their election, and they were sorely disappointed.

The Party program looked toward a unified Pakistan with less concessions to provincial autonomy than espoused by the CML, toward a continuation of "free enterprise" economy of the Ayub period, (This was the chief cause of its downfall.) and toward a firm rooting of the society in Islam. In the last two, the differences with the CML were minimal, but the PML's association with Ayub prompted the



Council League to view any electoral alliance with disdain.

### Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum) (QML)

Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan former chief minister of the MWFP and central minister was president of the Muslim League in 1958 when Ayub took over. After release from the EBDO restrictions, he joined the PML, supported a candidate against Daultana and eventually split with the party. He then became a rallying point for dissidents of both CML and PML (c). In the East, Qayyum attracted such former Ayub associates as Khan Abdus Sobur and Wariduzzaman; while in the West, he brought together a number of important Punjabi landed families of conservative political background, such as the Noons of Sargodha, the Gilanis of Multan. In Sindh, he won over old Leaguers and in the Frontier, he reconstructed the local party structure which kept him in office as Chief Minister.

Qayyum's party stands for a strong central government and less provincial autonomy than would be acceptable to the PML and CML. It advocated some kind of a confederate arrangement with Islamic countries to the West, especially Afganistan and Iran.

The term Islam Pasand (Islam loving) was used specifically by Pakistani press and the public to describe a group of political parties which, in varying degrees, were seen as religious oriented. In general terms, all these

parties stood for a social, economic and political structure rooted in Islam, but there were sharp differences in the interpretation of "Islamic system," especially in the economic field.

#### The Jamaat-e-Islami (J.I.)

This is the best known of the group and one of the best organized parties in Pakistan, led by Maulana Sayed Abul Ala Maudoodi. It was accused by Muslim Leaguers and the PPP as opposing the partition of India. It reflected an overly rigid adherence to Islamic ideology. Its appeal lay with the middle class in larger cities and small towns, particularly with refugees from India who clung to their Islamic culture and values more devoutly. The Jamaat influence is much less in the rural areas. Karachi, with its greater refugee population supported the Jamaat more during the election than Lahore, its headquarters. The Jamaat has developed effective secondary leadership and responsibility was delegated to other members, unlike the PPP situation. The Jamaat enlisted the support of some prominent pre Ayub politicians and retired military generals.

#### The Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP)

This party was put together from a group of disparate elements. Former East Bengal Chief Minister, Nurul Amin,

brought his National Democratic Front to the PDP and became the all Pakistan leader of the party. A group of dissident Awami Leaguers who opposed the Six Point autonomist program of the party came into the PDP led by Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. Former Prime Minister, Choudhury Mohammad Ali, brought in a major segment of the Nizam i Islam party. The Justice party, the political vehicle of a prominent Ayub counter poise, Asghar Khan also merged into the PDP, but eventually left to follow an independent court -- the "non-party" Tehrik-i-Isliqlal movement. These groups and some independents make up the PDP and organization was loose and disjointed. The party stood for autonomy, but not to the degree advocated by the Awami League, for a strong Islamic base to the country and a general commitment to social justice falling far short of the Islamic Socialism of the People's Party. The PDP was essentially an eastern based party.

#### The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam

The Deobandi school of "nationalist" Muslims is one of the ancestors of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, another is the Majlis-i-Ahrar, an Islamic political party that cooperated with the Indian National Congress before independence. The principal leader of the stronger and leftist faction, the JU(H) was Ghulam Ghauz Hazarvi which tried to form an electoral alliance with the PPP, favors labor participation

in the ownership of industry and abolition of "landlordism." The more conservative faction, the JU(T), is led by Ehteshamul Haq Thanvi. It associated with the Jamaat Islami and other Islam Pasands in a loose, almost ineffective electoral alliance. The JU(H) drew its support from the frontier and Balchistan, while the Thanvi faction had a following in Sindh and Punjab.

#### Markazi Jamiat Ulema i Pakistan

This party was created at a rally of Sunni theologians rather late in the election game, June, 1970. The leader is Khwaja Qummaruddin Sialvi, a Sunni divine. Its party platform on political and economic issues was not well defined. Its priorities lay in the advocacy of an "Islamic system" that rejected both capitalism and socialism. Strength was found in areas where associated pirs (Islamic divines) had a following, i.e., in Jhang district in Punjab and among refugee groups in Karachi.

#### The National Awami Party (NAP)

The "old Guard" Left is represented by the NAP, now divided into three factions. The unified party was too diverse in its range of political views for the party to

continue as one unit.<sup>27</sup> Besides, personalities and regional pulls within the party too contributed to its division. A split occurred in December 1967 with the NAP(W) representing the "pro Moscow" and NAP (B) representing the "pro Chinese" segments. The NAP (W) split further when a group from Baluchistan under the leadership of Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai withdrew when the campaign opened.

The NAP (W) is led by Wali Khan, son of Abdul Gaffar Khan and is identified with the Pathan claim for autonomy. Its principal demand was the break up of One Unit, a general demand met by Yahya Khan before the campaigning began. It supported maximum regional autonomy and its differences with the Awami League were in the economic field where it advocated a more strongly socialist program. The party had little following in Punjab and Sindh. Its strength lay in the Peshawar plain of the Frontier and to some degree in Baluchistan where it was the arch enemy of the QML. It was charged by Qayyum as favoring separation of the Pathan areas of Pakistan and collaborating with India.

The other faction, the NAP (B), was led by Hamid Khan Bhashani, an octogenarian belonging to the farthest left. It comprised a dissident faction of the Awami League that

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<sup>27</sup>For a detailed discussion of the NAP, see M. Rashiduzzaman, "The National Awami Party of Pakistan, Leftist Politics in Crisis," Pacific Affairs, Vol XLII, No. 3, Fall 1970, pp. 394-409. This article, however, does not deal in depth with the party in the West Wing.

split with it in December 1957. The program of the NAP (B) supported provincial autonomy to the same degree as the Awami League, extreme measures in the nationalization of the economy and closer relations with China. The thrust of the program was the emancipation of peasants. In the West, the party had almost disappeared and lacked organizational structure. Bhashani had vacillated about participation in the election, but had finally asked his party candidates to retire from the contest.

### The Awami League

As the campaigning progressed, the Awami League became exclusively a party of the East. The party in the West was quite insignificant. In this sense, the Awami League did not function as a contender to the PPP in the elections in West Pakistan. It did, however, have a tremendous impact on the political development of Pakistan and the formation of Bangla Desh. In the period following the election, the Awami League was to become the most serious opponent to the People's Party. Its massive victory in the East was to indicate that it had internalized the growing Bengali nationalism and the aspirations of the people there. During the election period, however, it operated primarily in the East wing and there was no conflict of spheres with the PPP. The majority it received in the elections, however, entitled it to the position of the



ruling party of Pakistan, for it had won 167 out of a total of 330 seats allotted to the National Assembly. The PPP was determined not to be relegated to second place, and there began the momentum to the eventual bifurcation of Pakistan. The basic platform of the Awami League is the Six Point Program<sup>28</sup> which may be summarized as: a federal parliamentary government for the country; transfer of all subjects except defense and foreign affairs to the provinces; separate but convertible currencies for each wing; and a separate militia for East Pakistan. (It had been charged by opponents of the AL that the party's autonomist program implied separation.) Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the AL draws his support from virtually all areas of East Pakistan and the student community in particular. The membership of the party is drawn from the Bengali petty bourgeoisie. The party favors a moderately socialist program, but its chief platform was the articulation of Bengali grievances. Thus, in contrast to the clearcut alternatives presented in the 1965 presidential elections, there were similarities in the manifestoes of the various parties. The differences were in the measure of emphasis they place on various points and the priorities they assigned.

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<sup>28</sup>A detailed study of the East Pakistan wing of the A.L. is embodied in M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan," Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 7, July, 1970, pp. 578087.

Almost all parties, including the socialist oriented ones, pledged not to make any law repugnant to the injunctions of the Quaran and the Sunnah. Second, there was a general consensus for an independent foreign policy and for the resolution of basic disputes between India and Pakistan as a prerequisite to normalizing relations. Third, all parties stood for resolving interregional disparities and economic inequities, offering a fair deal to industrial workers and tillers by fixing a ceiling on land holdings, distribution of excess land to landless peasants and giving industrial workers a share of industries profits. Most of them also stood for placing heavy industry in the public sector, nationalizing banks and companies, or at least subjecting them to social control.

On the most controversial issue -- regional autonomy of the provinces, the parties may be classified in three broad categories. Most of the rightist and centrist parties like the Jamaat Islami, the Qayyum Muslim League, Pakistan Muslim League (Conventionist) stood for a reasonably strong and viable centre; the two leftist NAPs would concede the centre only foreign affairs and defense and currency, while remaining silent on the centre's powers to tax the provinces; some parties, like the Awami League would concede the centre only foreign affairs and defense and claim for the provinces a separate currency, the right to a provincial militia control over the provinces' foreign trade and taxation rights.

## Conclusion

The primary distinction that can be made between the PPP and other contenders is that it was a newly formed party. Unlike the Muslim Leagues, the Islam Pasands or the NAPs, the PPP did not emerge as an offshoot or as a product of factionalism. Initially, its members and supporters came, not from EBD Oed politicians or Ayub dissidents, but from the student groups. The PPP put together a completely new coalition of forces. The "inner core" of the PPP were supporters and friends of Bhutto who had little connections with the Ayub regime or other parties. Later, however, and especially close to the 1970 elections, dissidents from other parties did join. However, in the initial phases of the party, Bhutto was the only dissident. Bhutto was the only opposition leader who publicly opposed the regime when it was not yet fashionable to do so and his stand won the PPP a certain amount of support, particularly among the students and also among the masses. Many political activists who had been repelled by the pro-Ayub or passive role of other parties also joined Bhutto. The party began to establish its identity as a mass party and not as a dissident group or faction. Certain convention Muslim Leaguers deserted Ayub and joined Bhutto when they discerned that Bhutto was a potential winner.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>See Tariq Ali, op. cit., pp. 190-95.

The People's Party had emerged apparently to uphold a certain ideology on which there existed considerable agreement by the members. Personality conflicts, which promote factions within parties and blur and distort the program, had not yet surfaced. The party thus retained a distinctive appearance.

Most other parties, with the exception of the Awami League, had developed a system where leadership was either shared or delegated. The PPP leadership configuration differed markedly.

Another distinction is that many of the other major parties, with the exception of the Jamaat i Islami, had held power at one time or another, and had accomplished little or nothing. Bhutto had also held power, but in a subordinate role. He was now appearing in a role which repudiated his earlier connections. Thus, only the PPP, being new, was without a credibility gap to contend with.

We will see, in the following chapter, the extent to which the PPP manifesto was incorporated in the intricacies of campaigning.

It becomes apparent that to the mechanics of election strategy, the PPP approach was essentially pragmatic. It must be kept in mind, however, that the electorate voted it into power, not for its pragmatism, but for its professed ideology.

Two different inferences can be drawn from its prag-

matic role. First, that the PPP despite its protestations, is not really a "revolutionary" party, but merely a progressive one, sympathetic to the condition of the masses. Second, that, like most ideological parties (working within the system) it was forced under the duress of the elections to adopt, merely as strategy necessary for survival, the "pragmatic" or "brokerage" role. Time alone can define the future direction of the PPP.

We wish to emphasize, however, that all predominantly "ideological" parties (including the CPSU under Lenin) are pragmatic to a degree and pure "ideological -- pragmatic" dichotomy may be an oversimplification. While it may well be that the PPP might turn out to be a predominantly "brokerage" type party, it was not on this basis that it won the people's confidence and later the election.

The future role of the PPP can only be speculated, not definitely prophesied. We have engaged in such a speculation in our conclusive chapter.

C H A P T E R   I I I  
THE PPP AND THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The wide spectrum of political contestants that faced the election displayed a striking similarity. They were all virtual amateurs to a campaign that appealed to and realigned a universally enfranchized electorate in a nation wide poll.

The political institutions that existed in Pakistan before January 1, 1970 had precluded any intensive activity in this direction. The country had never before witnessed direct elections on a national scale. The "Old Guard"<sup>1</sup> politicians had managed a limited exposure to campaigning for provincial elections,<sup>2</sup> but in terms of the electorate which confronted them in 1970, that experience was paltry and meaningless. Here was an electorate that could not be pacified by mere promises of an Islamic Utopia, where the spiritual welfare of Muslims would be safeguarded, or by abstractions like the "Ideology of Pakistan." The new electorate that emerged -- increasingly politicized -- preferred that its earthly aspirations be translated into policy.

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<sup>1</sup>The "Old Guard" in this election would comprise politicians like Qayyum Khan, Daultana, Maulana Maudoodi, Nurul Amin, Nasrullah Khan, Fazlul Quader Chowdhury.

<sup>2</sup>The last provincial elections were held in 1954 in East Pakistan. See Abstract.



The contestants were confronted with the syndrome of rising expectations. This being present in a rather diffused form, they had to articulate effectively, these expectations, within the context of their perception of the same. Their campaigns, in addition, had to seek to activate the indifferent and uninterested, re-enforce the partisan, and convert the doubtful. The time provided for this activity was ample. The campaign lasted over eleven months.

The resumption of unobstructed political activity witnessed rallies, processions and public meetings all over the country. The People's Party, threw itself into the fray with the utmost fervour right from the start. The PPP organized various rallies and processions, and was the only party, for instance, to observe a "Tashkent Day"<sup>3</sup> early in January in all important cities in the country. It was a spectacular affair, where party dignitaries spoke, and several resolutions were passed demanding that the Government renounce the declaration signed by India, Pakistan and the Soviet Union, after the 1965 conflict with India. It was a wise and opportune move by the PPP to exploit the anti-Tashkent feeling in the West, before other parties had a chance to cash in on the same issue.

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<sup>3</sup>Tashkent Day was January 11. See Dawn, January 12, 1970.

Of all the parties in the West<sup>4</sup> the PPP was most militant and vociferous, indulging in rather indiscriminate name calling and mudslinging at their opponents. Of all important campaigners, Bhutto was the youngest, "the most energetic, agile, and the most indefatigable, conducting a gruelling campaign and drawing the largest crowds."<sup>5</sup> Bhutto made the most violent speeches, and PPP party workers mostly figured prominently in inter party clashes. Whether the PPP legions confronted the Pir of Pagaro's followers during the infamous Sanghar incident,<sup>6</sup> or when they threatened Qayyum's supporters in Peshawar,<sup>7</sup> Bhutto's rhetoric always succeeded in projecting these clashes to the advantage of the People's Party. This will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.

Owing to the multitude of parties that had appeared on the scene in 1970, almost every party tried to identify itself with at least one well known party member with national prominence. Thus, the "personality angle" figured as prominently in campaign strategies as did party manifestoes,

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<sup>4</sup>In the East, Mujibur Rehman's Awami League conducted a campaign equally, if not more vociferous than that of the PPP.

<sup>5</sup>See Sharif Al Mujahid, "Pakistan: First General Elections," Asian Survey, Vol. XI, Feb. 1971, p. 166.

<sup>6</sup>One person was killed in an attack on a PPP procession in Sanghar (Sindh). See Dawn, March 31, 1970.

<sup>7</sup>See Dawn, April 2, 1970.

issues or style. In this the PPP had an edge over all other parties. Bhutto had been in the political limelight far more than any other party leader. His political activities, having been more recent than that of a Daultana or a Qayyum Khan, were still fresh in the public memory. The struggles and sacrifices of the Independence workers and those who fought for Pakistan had faded into the background. Twenty years had taken care of that. The memory of the anti Ayub uprisings and the ouster of Ayub, stirred up greater fervour in the minds of the masses. The bulk of the new electorate had lived through the Ayub era, and a great many of them had identified with the forces that had evicted Ayub from office in 1968. Bhutto had cast himself in the role of a crusader and liberator in 1968, becoming the symbol of a resurgent nationalism. In 1970, the People's Party was careful to play up the Bhuttoian element in its election strategy. This image association was particularly helpful since a great many PPP candidates were relative novices in politics. That this strategy worked to the PPP's advantage is demonstrated by the fact that relatively unknown PPP candidates were able to defeat stalwarts of other parties. A classic case in point is the defeat of Mian Tufail Mohammed (a strong arm of the Jamaat-e-Islami) at the hands of one Sheikh Rashid of the PPP in the National Assembly election from Lahore constituency NW61.

In this chapter we shall discuss different aspects of

the PPP campaign. The Election Strategy of the People's Party, the Image that it wished to project of itself, its campaign Style, the Issues and Themes that its candidates projected, the kinds of Slogans that were employed by it, will all be considered as different elements that made up the campaign. Finally, we shall try to register the kinds of reactions that the PPP campaign evoked from other parties and the effect that it had on their campaigns. There is an underlying assumption in this chapter that the PPP held a pivotal position in the 1970 elections in West Pakistan, perhaps the most important one. As a generator of issues, its role was central.

### Election Strategy

The PPP campaign followed a well planned strategy. There was hardly any tactical blunder worth the mention, except perhaps Bhutto's repeated chastizing of the Press -- his constant allegation that the National Press Trust was a capitalistic oriented organization.<sup>8</sup>

One of the principal elements of the PPP's modus operandi, was the maximum exploitation of Bhutto's charisma. For instance, in the West, the only meetings and processions to display huge portraits of their leaders were those of

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<sup>8</sup>As President, Bhutto is encouraging increased participation of journalists and editors in the management and policy decision of respective newspapers and other publications.

the PPP.<sup>9</sup> Bhutto was presented as the Quaid-i-Awam (Leader of the masses) and his election symbol, the sword, was represented as the Zulfiqar-i-Ali.<sup>10</sup>

Since Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Bhutto was the only politician in Pakistan who was also a charismatic leader. The kind of charisma Bhutto generated however, differed markedly from that of Jinnah. The Quaid-i-Azam<sup>11</sup> (the Great Leader) was deeply revered and inspired awe in his masses. He stood on an elevated pedestal in the eyes of his followers. He addressed himself to the elite, spoke their language,<sup>12</sup> and it was only through the elite that the masses understood him. His personal life was scrupulously austere and exemplary.

Bhutto's appeal, on the other hand, lay primarily in his ability to project himself as a man of the people, in his youth and in his flamboyance. His remarkable fluency in English and Sindhi, and a growing fluency in Urdu and Punjabi, enabled him to sway a wider range of the electorate -- an advantage none of his political rivals possessed. He

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<sup>9</sup> See Sharif Al Mujahid, op. cit., p. 166.

<sup>10</sup> The famous sword of Ali the fourth Caliph which had, it is believed, significantly contributed to Islam's glory during its early and critical years.

<sup>11</sup> A name reverently attributed to Mohammed Ali Jinnah in Pakistan.

<sup>12</sup> Jinnah's upbringing was in the classic style of contemporary Indian elite in that it was British oriented. Almost all Jinnah's political speeches were in English, not Urdu.

could speak the language of the elite when he chose to, but was equally comfortable speaking the language of the masses. However, early enough in his political career, he had learned that the key to success in post-independence Pakistan was the ability to mobilize the "common people." An extemporaneous speaker with oratorical overtones, his speeches were noted for their emotional outbursts. (It has been reported that Bhutto could summon tears whenever he wished.) A section of the elite, notably the lawyers, viewed what they considered to be Bhutto's "critics" with disdain, and at times alarm. The masses however flocked to hear him and the public meetings that Bhutto addressed were the best attended, with the exception of those addressed by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in East Pakistan.

With improved systems of communication, the speeches of political campaigners were relayed over government owned radio and television for equally allotted time periods, but the public meeting proved the most popular tool of campaigning. It enabled access to a varied spectrum of people, and also gave the satisfaction of maintaining direct contact with the masses. Such conditions were necessary for the Bhuttoian charisma to thrive.

Table I is a schedule of important public meetings addressed by prominent members of the PPP in West Pakistan. Table II deals similarly with the Council Muslim League. The CML was chosen here because it polled the largest number



of votes next to the PPP in the National Assembly elections in West Pakistan [see Table VI]. We accept the responsibility for a small percentage of error.

The PPP addressed roughly 88 to 90 prominent public meetings in West Pakistan, the CML roughly 79, the QML (Qayyum) around 60. The Convention Muslim League spent a good bit of their time campaigning in East Pakistan and as a result could address only around 30 public meetings in the West. The NAP (Wali) addressed around 80 public meetings. The Jamaat Islami probably did the best among the religious-oriented parties, addressing around 56 public meetings. A comparison between Table I and Table II will reveal that while Daultana delegated responsibilities to other CML party leaders. Bhutto took on the personal responsibility of steering the PPP campaign. Bhutto himself addressed more than 90% of the total PPP public meetings. This was partly due to the fact that most PPP contestants were newcomers to politics. The fact that Bhutto himself contested from 6 constituencies simultaneously also required such intensive campaigning on his part. His most concentrated campaigning was in areas where a degree of industrial development had taken place, resulting in social mobility and where stratification was being redefined on the basis of status, wealth and education rather than on caste, and traditional factors. Bhutto did not expend much energy campaigning in Baluchistan or the area along the Indus river, which continued as strong-

holds of "Islam Pasands." However in the midst of his whirlwind tours in West Pakistan Bhutto made time to visit shrines to show deference to the religious sentiments of the people. [As late as Nov. 8, Bhutto went in a big procession to Noorpurshahan near Rawalpindi to visit the mazar of Barri Shah Lateef, one of the most revered shrines in West Pakistan.]

But Bhutto was not relying on charisma alone. His speeches at public meetings stressed the priorities of the people in the region. He was the only political campaigner who did this successfully. For instance, in the Punjab he stressed his confrontation stance vis-a-vis India. In the NWFP, he wooed the Pathans and recalled the glorious history of "his brave brethren," whom he claimed to love like his Sindhi people. At public meetings in and around Peshawer, he promised prosperity. In Sindh he promised to curb the power of the Waderas (landlords) to improve living standards of the toiling masses. It was in Sindh (more than in Punjab) that he stressed the evils of the One Unit System, for Sindh had been traditionally opposed to it. It was in the Karachi industrial belt that he spoke the most about Islamic Socialism. At Lahore he reiterated that he stood for the merger of Bhawalpur with Punjab.

The success of these meetings lay in the fact that Bhutto was the first to give vent to the economic frustrations of the people and articulate effectively their aspira-

tions. In addition he showed greater deference to the set of proprieties (as to what determines the rules of the game in campaigning) of the masses, rather than those embedded in perceptions of the Western educated elite. His campaign style reflected this. For instance, his personal assaults on his political rivals, while it may not be considered "good form" among the Westernized elite, does certainly constitute an integral component of the bravado and excitement that campaigning is supposed to generate in the mass perceptions of the same. In a polity where the traditional elite is being challenged, and a new and different elite is emerging, reflecting the political culture of the old order, would be (for a politician aspiring for power) tantamount to political suicide.

Another aspect of the PPP election strategy was to project absolute confidence of the party's popularity and certainty of its success in the approaching elections. For instance, at a Press conference at his Karachi residence as early as January 17, 1970, Bhutto declared that his party was fully geared towards election. He had received a great response from the people during recent visits to Rawalpindi and parts of Sindh.<sup>13</sup>

Later<sup>14</sup> addressing the Peshawar District Bar Associa-

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<sup>13</sup>See Dawn, January 18, 1970.

<sup>14</sup>See Dawn, January 20, 1970, p. 1.

tion, he claimed that the PPP enjoyed great support "from Karachi to Torkam." "Every meeting of the party was an eye opener to those who doubted our popularity." He had no doubt that his party would "emerge most successful in the forthcoming elections in West Pakistan."

The PPP was presented as a party which was the vanguard of students and the youth and the ally of the deprived people of the nation. The image projected was that of a party which was sympathetic to the demands of young people, and which encouraged young blood within its ranks. Bhutto addressed student federations in Punjab, Sindh and the NWFP.<sup>15</sup> He alluded to old politicians as the "relics of Mohenjodaro civilization." At a reception hosted by students in Nawabshah, Sindh, for instance, he advised "politicians who exploited the country and the nation for the last twenty years, to retire, and vacate the place for the youth of the country." He regretted that the "old politicians had exploited students in the past and hoped that they (the students) would now never become tools of such politicians."<sup>16</sup>

Yet at the same time, the PPP worked behind the scenes to find allies among the disgruntled veteran politicians. The PPP backed several Independent candidates in the Provin-

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<sup>15</sup> See Table I.

<sup>16</sup> Quoted in Dawn, January 15, 1970.

cial Assembly elections in Sindh. Nine of the PPP's 18 candidates elected to the National Assembly from Sind are former conventionist leaders. Pir Ilahi Bux, a former Chief Minister of Sindh, and Sadiq Ali Memon, a former member of the earlier National Assembly joined the PPP. While including young blood like Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, a 36 year old barrister, the PPP prudently retained experienced politicians like Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri, 61 and J. A. Rahim, now 64 who is reputed to be the PPP's ideologue, and has been the party's Secretary General since 1967.<sup>17</sup>

A closely related strategy was the game of keeping "all options open." It was a step toward consensus politicking. This might seem incongruous to the many who view the PPP stance essentially as one of confrontation. Although this might apply to the PPP position vis-a-vis India, it certainly did not hold true for its election strategy in West Pakistan. The stance of confrontation was part and parcel of the image that the PPP projected of itself to the electorate; and this it did with remarkable success.

All the trimmings of the PPP image and all its idealistic slogans notwithstanding, reading between the lines, it becomes apparant that the party strategy in terms of cold behind-the-scenes politics was tied up with aggregating the diverse interests within the West. An analytical

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<sup>17</sup>See Illustrated Weekly of India, April 9, 1972, p. 13.

study of the PPP campaign would demonstrate that Bhutto displayed a Bismarkian sense of the art of politics by promising something or another to everyone. Sharif al Mujahid, an analyst of Pakistani politics, comments:

He promised an economic nirvana to peasants, workers and underprivileged through Socialism, while adopting landlords and moneyed people as candidates for the most part. He exploited the lack of leadership among leftists in the West after the NAP's fragmentation to win their support, by calling for a socialist revolution, but at the same time, he dispelled the Islamist misgivings by interpreting his Islamic socialism in terms of Islamic Masawat (egalitarianism) and Masawat-i-Mohammadi, by dangling before them the prospect of Shaukat-i-Islam (victory of Islam) day in Delhi and Shrinagar....<sup>18</sup>

We are disinclined to accept the confrontation theory, since, as a result of Bhutto's campaign style, no single group felt directly threatened by his protestations. He enlisted the support of different socio-economic groups and was careful not to alienate any one group or power centre. We shall now attempt to demonstrate this.

The most important of the existing power centres -- the Army -- felt the least threatened by Bhutto. The entire elections were being conducted, presumably, with the blessings of Yahya Khan and the ruling junta. Bhutto did allege in some campaign speeches that certain cabinet members were dabbling in politics, and that Sher Ali, the Minister for Information was working toward the detriment of the People's

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<sup>18</sup> Sharif Al Mujahid, op. cit., p. 168.



Party. However, he was careful not to antagonize Yahya, and often credited the President with a great deal of sincerity. (Poste election events indicate that Bhutto enjoyed the favor of Yahya Khan.)

In addition, the Army knew that it had the trump card in the whole gambit. The Legal Framework Order invested the President with the final power of approving or rejecting the constitution that would be drafted by the future Constituent Assembly. Later events demonstrated that Yahya Khan had never intended to abrogate all his power.<sup>19</sup>

The bureacracy in Pakistan enjoyed powers infinite. The security it enjoyed was so tremendous that it seemed virtually impossible to dislodge it as a formidable power centre. Bhutto has attempted, as President, the Herculean task of limiting the powers of the bureacracy and with considerable success, it seems at present.<sup>20</sup> In early and mid 1970, many bureacrats of the higher and middle echelons were dismissed on charges of corruption and nepotism. All this happened only after Bhutto was secure in office. No indication of any intention in this direction was given during his campaign. Bhutto had promised to eradicate corruption and nepotism, but like the Garibi Hatao slogans of Mrs. Gandhi, was not definite enough to send the bureacratic

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<sup>19</sup>See Dilip Mukherjee, Zulfigah Ali Bhutto - Quest for Power, New Delhi: Vikas, 1972, p. 2-3.

<sup>20</sup>This will receive attention in our concluding chapter.

juggernaut into a panic.

It was only after he took over as President that Bhutto, in his inaugural address on December 20, 1971, declared:

I warn the bureaucracy to do its job, its duty -- the tea parties must come to a stop -- and when I talk of the bureaucracy, I do not mean only the Secretariat at Islamabad. I mean each and every bureaucrat wherever he is.... If the common man had not been humiliated for 24 years Pakistan as a nation would not have been humiliated today. I want each and every individual to be regarded as important. I do not want him to get his justice through Sifarish [recommendation]. Nobody will do sifarish through my relations or my party.<sup>21</sup>

To the large crowds that flocked to his public meetings Bhutto symbolized a changing order. He was the first politician that had articulated the common man's yearning for social and economic justice in a country where wealth resided in the hands of a privileged few. Bhutto's fervent cries held out promise of a day of redemption and recompense. But Bhutto was not relying on crowds alone. He took care to enlist the support of religious divines (a force to be contended with in the Pakistan polity), political notables and local worthies who for one reason or another were not joining other parties. He particularly needed the blessings of the divines because the Islam Pasands had, in a bid to damn him, mobilized 133 Ulema to issue an edict declaring socialism as anti-Islam. Makhdoom Sahib of Hala, was one

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<sup>21</sup>Quoted in Dilip Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 73.

such divine that he roped on his side. He was a pir of some consequence in the Hyderabad and Nawabshah districts. This enabled him to counter in some measure the influence of an adversary, the Pir of Paqaro, a divine with a considerable following.

Bhutto brought in radicals too from the other end of the political spectrum. Miraj Mohammad Khan was a fire-brand student leader of Karachi in the 1950's and later a trade unionist. Bhutto recruited him to break into the Karachi industrial belt where the PPP faced formidable competition from the Jamaat-e-Islami on the one hand and from Bhashani's lieutenants on the other.

On the other hand, Bhutto enlisted the support of local landlords to swing the vote for him in some rural areas where the influence of the baradari or clan was still a major factor and landlords could capitalize on feudal loyalties. The men in this category included Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, a scion of a family of Sindh landlords that had dominated the politics of Nawabshah district for three generations. Ghulam Mustapha Khar, a member of a family of large landlords settled in Muzaffargarh near Multan, was a staunch companion when Bhutto was in political wilderness. The chief of the NWFP wing of the People's Party, Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, comes from a wealthy landed family of Peshawar. These recruits served Bhutto well, and earned for themselves the rewards Bhutto handed out after

assuming office. The presence of these wealthy members in a party committed to radical economic reforms elicited caustic comments from Bhutto's rivals. Bhutto however was not perturbed, but claimed, on the other hand, at a public meeting in Multan on September 24:

Some capitalists and feudals have joined my party, but it does not at all mean that the PPP has been converted into a party of jagirdars to suck the blood of the poor people. The capitalists and feudal lords who joined the party have already taken an oath before me to abide by all the conditions laid down in the manifesto.<sup>22</sup>

Bhutto met as many different occupational groups as possible. This was usually accomplished in small informal receptions, where he could conveniently trim his public stance to suit the occasion. For instance, when he addressed the Karachi Press club, on January 2, 1970, he spoke garrulously on economic disparity, on the ills of the system of monopolies, on Islamic Socialism, on the urgency of Democratic rule and on the tyranny of the Ayubian era. However when, on February 23, he addressed persons belonging to various trades who were comfortable with the economic status quo, he was silent about nationalization. He spoke at length on matters of national security, the position of Muslims in India, and dwelt on the evils of regional prejudices. The Bhuttonian charisma which stirred crowds at public meetings also worked toward dispelling the fears of

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<sup>22</sup>See Dawn, January 1, 1970, p. 1.

smaller groups.

The above examples are ample proof of the fact that the PPP strategy was geared towards a policy of aggregating interests, in spite of the associations in people's mind of the PPP with confrontation policies. This strategy helped Bhutto cut across not only geographical and provincial boundaries, but enabled him to direct his appeal to every important tier of the socio economic hierarchy.

The PPP strategy also involved concentrated campaigning in areas where success was anticipated. Unlike some other parties, notably the Convention Muslim League, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal movement which dispersed a lot of their energy and time campaigning in East Pakistan, the PPP realized early enough in the game that the East did not provide a fertile ground where the party platform could flourish. Catering to this region would mean a serious setback to the strategy of consensus politicking in the West.

Bhutto made an overture to Bhashani early in January by declaring that his party stands committed to having a working alliance with the two leftist NAPs and the Jamiatul Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi group).<sup>23</sup> This was probably done with the intention of undermining Mujib's popularity in the

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<sup>23</sup> See Dawn, Jan. 21, 1970. This stance is interestingly astute, keeping in view that the NWFP, of all provinces in the West was favorably disposed to the Awami League and did not feel threatened by its popularity in the East.

East, and also to test the ground. A short visit to Dacca (the Eastern capital) from March 13 to March 16, 1970, and an announcement that he would attend Bhashani's proposed peasant rally at Toba Tek Singh in Multan (Punjab) on February 10, failed to elicit a favorable response. Bhutto reconciled soon enough to the realities of the Eastern situation, declaring at a meeting of students in Peshawar that "like Sheikh Mujib's party in the East, the PPP was most popular in the West."

In the West too, the party contested more seats in states where the "transistor revolution"<sup>24</sup> had more or less set in, and where the newly literate were influenced and prompted by rising expectations. [See Table 1] Within the Frontier, the largest number of public meetings addressed by the PPP were in the relatively progressive Peshawar region. On a state basis, Baluchistan which was a reputed stronghold of the NAP (Wali) was given low priority in the PPP campaign. Bhutto addressed only one public meeting in Quetta and virtually paid no heed to Kalat. Not having too many irons in the fire, paid the PPP good dividends.

As a corollary of PPP's attempt to aggregate diverse interests was its simultaneous adoption of candor on issues that would work to its advantage, and discretion on highly

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<sup>24</sup>A term synonymous with increasing urbanization. See M.B. Naqvi, "West Pakistan's Struggle for Power," South Asian Review, Vol 4, No. 3, April 1971, p. 221.



explosive issues. Bhutto's announcement<sup>25</sup> that he stood for the merger of Bhawalpur with Punjab improved his party's standing in the state.

This ambiguity regarding the powers of the Centre, kept the provinces in West Pakistan guessing, and they gave him the benefit of the doubt. A stand in favor of a strong centre would have provoked the ire of Sindh, Baluchistan and NWFP, feeling increasingly threatened by the prospect of Punjabi domination. The Baluchi, Pathan and Sindi minorities have always been apprehensive of the Punjabis who are numerically superior, economically stronger, hardworking, aggressive and more prosperous. On the other hand, an opposite stance by the PPP would have seriously undermined its popularity in Punjab. A strong centre, would have meant in effect, Punjab enjoying commensurate power, being the most prosperous and progressive state. When asked by a press reporter whether he was in favor of a strong centre, Bhutto quipped:

... Unfortunately the word strong centre or weak has caused misgivings in the minds of the people. There are very good reasons for it also. In the name of strong centre many arbitrary and dictatorial violations have been made in the past. However, I think that an efficient, efficacious and viable centre having a harmonious relationship with the provinces would not be grudged. But there should not be any confrontation between centre<sup>26</sup> and the provinces. In the past this was not so.

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<sup>25</sup>This announcement was made on January 1, 1970.

<sup>26</sup>Dawn, Jan. 2, 1970.

While to many contestants notably Qayyum Khan and G.M. Syed, the quantum of autonomy was a burning issue (some even demanded a settlement before the election). Bhutto dismissed it as a matter that could not be settled "arbitrarily" before going to the polls. It was a matter that had to be deliberated upon and decided by the future Constituent Assembly working as one body. Bhutto's platform being broad-based and anti-regional, he could not risk the fanning of regionalistic jingoism that a settlement of the autonomy question would ignite. Furthermore, any politician that wished to carry Punjab in terms of votes would have had to de-emphasize regionalism. Punjab accounts for 65% of the population of West Pakistan and has been traditionally anti-regional. Being the most prosperous state, it had a pivotal role in the control of the economy. Regional autonomy would entail a reduction of Punjabi control over national policy. The dominant position it enjoyed in the political and administrative spheres, would also be severely curtailed. Bhutto could not afford to alienate the Punjab at any cost. Strategically the anti-regional platform of the PPP catered to Punjab. On face value it seemed to embody a nationalist's commitment to the interests of the country as a whole, and an abhorrence for parochialism of any kind. It worked to the PPP's advantage that Yahya Khan chose not to settle the issue of autonomy before the nation went to the polls.

The PPP was also careful not to get enmeshed in any

formal alliances or Fronts, like the short-lived CML-Sindh United Front Pact, or the chaotic Islamic United Front. Since the PPP wished to represent itself as a new and different party, formal alliances would have proved more a liability than an asset. In terms of the time dispensed for negotiations, they would prove an encumbrance and above all, they would have bound the party to pledges compromising the freedom of promising something to everyone. Where an understanding was arrived at, it was with the "leftist" Jamiatul Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi) and the NAP (Wali), for specific constituencies and particular contests. On January 20, 1970, speaking to students in Peshawar, Bhutto declared that he had

no plan to merge or make alliances with other parties, especially small parties or splinter parties... However, there could always be an understanding with such parties that stand for economic emancipation of the downtrodden masses, subject to the condition that those parties are broad based.<sup>27</sup>

#### The PPP Image

The image that the PPP projected was that of an organization which exuded youthful vigor, enthusiasm, dynamism and modernity. It sought to link itself in the minds of the electorate as the ally of the underprivileged and oppressed; a staunch crusader for the rights of the people.

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<sup>27</sup>See Dawn, January 1, 1971.

At a packed public meeting in Mirpurkhas, on March 27, 1970, Bhutto said that his party stood for a people's constitution, people's democracy and an end to economic exploitation in the country. "Our party program," he said, "is the voice of the people." His party was ready to cooperate with other parties in making a constitution in accordance with people's wishes

...but at the same time, we will not allow anybody to betray the people... Today's fight is not between Muhajirs and Sindi's or Punjabis but it is the fight of the oppressed and exploited peoples of all nationalities for rights<sup>28</sup>-- a fight between oppressor and oppressed.

On January 7, speaking to the Karachi Bar Association, Mr. Bhutto reiterated that the party stood for the elimination of exploitation under capitalism, and the revival of human dignity and honor, as preached by Islam.

Bhutto promised that through the efforts of the PPP, "revolutionary changes" would come to the economic and social structure of Pakistan. The party would augment a new dynamism in which the masses would break loose from the shackles of stagnation of the old order.

At one of the best attended public meetings in Mardan, Bhutto told a crowd on Feb. 25, 1970, that with the help of students and workers and the common man, the PPP had overthrown the Ayub regime and now it would bring an industrial

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<sup>28</sup>See Dawn, March 28, 1970.

and economic revolution to the country.<sup>29</sup> On June 12, in Quetta he elaborated the same essential idea:

The party, through selfless service, has been able to gain ground to a considerable extent with people and is pursuing a revolutionary program, despite innumerable difficulties and hardships, with a view<sup>30</sup> to achieving the basic rights of the common man.

He stressed that his party could meet the demands of time, and render service in improving the economic condition of the people.

In terms of image the PPP, despite its socialist slogans, did not make a clear break with the traditional proprieties of using Islam as a political talisman. Its cry of Musawaat-e-Mohammadi (Islamic equality) was, if anything louder than that of most other parties.

During a one hour address on January 4, 1970, in a conservative section of Karachi, Bhutto stressed the party's deference to Islam. "Islam our faith, democracy our policy, Socialism our economy, and all power to the people." Elaborating these three principles he proclaimed that the "workers of the People's Party will sacrifice their lives for the sake of Islam."<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Dawn, Feb. 26, 1970.

<sup>30</sup>Dawn, June 13, 1970.

<sup>31</sup>Pakistan Times, January 5, 1970.

While projecting itself as a party that stood for revolutionary change, the PPP vindicated its image of extreme patriotism. The oft heard PPP cry, during the campaign, was that no sacrifice was considered too great by it for the honour and integrity of Pakistan. It boasted that the party workers were willing, if the need arose, to shed the last drop of blood for their country.<sup>32</sup> (Such dramatic slogans during election time are characteristic of politics in South Asia.)

The PPP also projected itself as the pioneer in Pakistan's long desired march toward democracy -- persevering through trials and tribulations to realize (in its own political jargon) the "Dream of the Quaid i Azam." Mr. Bhutto spoke of democracy, as he did of socialism, in the Islamic context and tried to link the two concepts. At a public meeting in Karachi, on Jan. 4, 1970, he said that his party had always championed the cause of democracy. The struggle for democracy was not averse to Islam. If there is no conflict between democracy and Islam, there should be no clash between Islam and Musawaat (equality). Since Musawaat was one of the cardinal principles of Islam, therefore, Pakistan's economy should be based on socialism.

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<sup>32</sup>Public meetings addressed by Bhutto, especially in September, were colored by such dramatic claims.



Integral to the party image was its anti-regional, anti-parochial character. This was carefully worked into the PPP strategy primarily because in the West Bhutto's appeal could reach a wide range of people-regional and provincial differences notwithstanding. When speaking on the subject, Bhutto's favorite refrain was:

To me every region and province of Pakistan is equally dear and I will pay equal attention to the development of all parts of the country and prosperity of the people belonging to all classes and sections in case my party comes to power.<sup>33</sup>

Prominent leaders of the party often displayed disdain for the various Fronts and alliances that emerged during the campaign period. This was done to elevate the party image, and claim that it was untarnished by smears of inter party skirmishes and intrigues.

Bhutto often decried and denounced, what he called "drawing room" politics, and in speeches impregnated with sarcasm, lashed out at politicians like G.M. Syed and their "contrived alliances and Fronts." Bhutto's boast was that he was not intimidated by such Fronts, and said that his Front -- the students -- would inflict a crushing defeat on all "anti people" alliances. He also alleged that the parties forming such alliances were being financed by capitalists. Throughout the campaign, it was being stressed by the PPP, that its success was certain because "nothing

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<sup>33</sup>At a public meeting on Oct. 31, at Larkana.

but peoples' politics would triumph in Pakistan" -- and the PPP was the most sincere ally of the people.

An attempt was also made by the PPP officials to give to the party, the distinction of a socio-political movement, prompted by altruistic motives and sublime ideals. It must be noted that all parties during an election aim at presenting a similar image. The strength of the PPP lay in Bhutto's brilliant rhetoric which could be relied on to give an element of substantiveness to election promises and infuse it with an element of apparent sincerity. The PPP, so it was claimed had no craving for power; the PPP decided to fight elections only because it was determined to fight for the people's rights. Dubious logic, though it might seem, this was one of the key slogans of the party.<sup>34</sup> At a public meeting in Khairpur on May 18, 1970, Bhutto made the following dramatic statement:

... the PPP is not here to beg you for votes. Mere elections and votes will not build up a strong and prosperous nation. If we had any lust for power, we would not have quit the government. I did so when Ayub betrayed the interest of Pakistan at Tashkent.<sup>35</sup>

The PPP's increasing threat to rightists, capitalists and imperialists was often played up at public meetings. Party leaders claimed that because its programme instilled

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<sup>34</sup> Bhutto made this claim often. See "Details of Bhutto's public meeting at Kahuta," in Dawn, July 6, 1970.

<sup>35</sup> See Dawn, May 19, 1970.

a feeling of fear and insecurity in all self seekers, many PPP supporters were being persecuted. In public meetings throughout September, Bhutto, complained that most people serving political sentences belonged to the People's Party.

In the Pakistani mind, Bhutto is linked as the one man who can stand up to India. This association was exploited to the maximum in the PPP campaign. Bhutto claimed that India and Mrs. Gandhi felt threatened by the PPP popularity. India had tried all kinds of maneuvers to deter Bhutto from going to the United Nations when Kashmir was being debated. At public meetings and press conferences, Bhutto vowed that if his party came to power, he would make India resolve outstanding disputes including Kashmir and Farraka. He would not tolerate submission and humiliation at the hands of India.<sup>36</sup>

#### Issues and Themes of the PPP Election Campaign

The entire election campaign of 1970 was threatening to spill over into left-right confrontation, with the ideology and Islam lovers and the "socialistic" parties on opposite ends of a spectrum. In our reading, it was to capitalize on this state of affairs that the PPP emphasized Islamic Socialism as the pivot of its campaign, by providing

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<sup>36</sup> See public meetings addressed by Bhutto on March 8, November 7.

a compromise formula to the apparant priorities of both kinds of voters -- those preoccupied with earthly comforts and those concerned with celestial salvation.

Islamic socialism was presented as the translation of the egalitarian principles of Islam to the economic realm. Only by this indigenous system, it was claimed, could Pakistan banish poverty and the hated capitalism which was eating up the vitals of society. Fearing that he would be branded as the preacher of violent and radical doctrines, Bhutto took the stand that he was not the innovator of the concept. He was merely elaborating the doctrines of Quaid-i-Azam, Jinnah, and following the dictates of his conscience in preaching Islamic Socialism. To substantiate his contention, he quoted from speeches made by Jinnah on March 26, 1948, and his principal lieutenant, the late Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, on August 25, 1949 where they recommended the system of Islamic Socialism in no unsure terms.<sup>37</sup>

Bhutto offered Islamic Socialism to the people of Pakistan, as the panaacea of all ills and the very elixir of "democracy." It was the only effective tool through which the exploitation by the hated capitalists -- especially the 22 families could be terminated.

"Islam", juxterposed with Socialism, had the effect

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<sup>37</sup>In Bhutto's TV broadcast, outlining the program of his party, in November 1970.

of rendering the anti Socialist and anti Bhutto outbursts of the rightists rather effete. At almost every major public meeting Bhutto took pains to impress on his audiences that Socialism was a pristine principle embedded in the Spirit of Islam. For the benefit of the masses, who were wary of Western concepts like Socialism, Bhutto used intelligible similies. Thus simplified, Socialism seemed more palatable to the masses, who failed to read the less desirable implications in the concept.

Addressing a public meeting at Jhelum on January 21, 1970, Bhutto analogized:

Just as democracy is the English word for Jumhuriyet, similarly Socialism, means nothing but Musawat. Islam is the greatest champion of Musawat, and this equality my party wants to establish.

Bhutto reiterated that Socialism was an economic method and that Islamic Socialism was essential for the "glory" of Pakistan. His logic worked something like this:

Pakistan will not be able to play its rightful role as the biggest Islamic republic unless its people were relieved of economic misery. Our party is advocating Islamic Musawat because it wants the country to be strong and prosperous. Our country cannot secure the right of self determination for our oppressed Kashmiri brethren or protect suffering Muslims in India, if it was not strong internally. This is possible only when fundamental changes have been made in the economy to banish feudalism and capitalism from the society.<sup>38</sup>

The ideology mongers had, during the campaign, alleged

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<sup>38</sup> Bhutto addressing a public meeting at Jhelum on January 21, 1970.

that the PPP program threatened the sanctity of the ideology of Pakistan. Bhutto reacted, claiming that his party was the "real protagonist of the ideology of Pakistan which stood for complete social and economic justice for all and the sovereignty of the people"<sup>39</sup> In the absence of any clear cut definition of the oft invoked abstraction -- the ideology of Pakistan -- every politician interpreted it as profitably as he could. Bhutto's brand of ideology made Islamic Socialism coterminous with it.

As a corollary to Islamic socialism, Bhutto at various public meetings promised a new era for the common man where there would be land reforms, nationalization of insurance companies and big industries, and equitable redistribution of the resources of the land.<sup>40</sup> Bhutto was the first man who went further than anyone before him, or any of his contemporaries, in registering his commitment to improving the lot of the deprived and underprivileged of Pakistan. In other words, through Islamic Socialism, he claimed that he had a workable system to alleviate the sufferings of the economic underdog.

It must be kept in mind that the "revolutionary" changes he advocated were geared to the economic aspect of

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<sup>39</sup> Bhutto speaking at a mammoth public meeting at Lahore on March 8, 1970.

<sup>40</sup> Notably at public meetings on Jan. 4, Mar. 8, and Nov. 4, 1970.



life. His main target was not the (purely) social ethos of Pakistan. Bhutto would preserve a substantial area of social norms, from which derive certain beliefs and prejudices of the people. Not once in his campaign did Bhutto think it wise or proper to speak up against the caste system or Purdah (the custom of wearing a veil by Moslem women) nor did he question the economic drain caused by thousands of Pakistanis, going to Mecca for pilgrimages every year.

Aside from Islamic Socialism, there were other issues and themes in the PPP agenda. In fact, during the entire campaign period, Bhutto's role as an issue generator was pivotal. A great many PPP contentions were challenged, (or endorsed) by other political parties. Some of the reactions that the PPP evoked will be registered later in the chapter.

In East Pakistan, Mujibur Rehman's campaigning had turned the election into a referendum on his six points.<sup>41</sup> This had its repercussions in the Western wing. Parties with a regional character like the NAP (Wali) and Syed's SUF, supported the demand for autonomy. Bhutto denounced these West wing parties, which were thought to be taking a soft line on the Six Points, and claimed that such divisive forces threatened the integrity of Pakistan. Bhutto, a

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<sup>41</sup>For a full discussion on the Six Points, see M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan," Asian Survey, Berkeley, July 1970.

Sindi had to retain the confidence of the Punjab, which viewed with extreme suspicion, the East Pakistani bid for autonomy. Bhutto, however, was extremely reluctant to be dragged into a debate with Mujibur Rahman.

A leading Pakistani journal, Holiday, observed:

...significant in the present political context is the Mujib - Bhutto relationship. Whatever they may say in private neither Mujib nor Bhutto has yet publicly criticized each other... They have been maintaining a correct relationship. Both of them it seems now realize that alone, they can at best carry a region with them, but would need each other to decide national issues.<sup>42</sup>

As has been discussed in the introduction chapter, the three other issues that fomented constant controversy and frequent agitations were the One Unit question, universal adult franchise and the place of Islam in the Pakistan polity. Yahya Khan eliminated the first two issues before the campaign began by announcing his intentions to disband the One Unit (a relic of the pre Ayub era) and by enfranchising the people of Pakistan.<sup>43</sup> The Islam issue remained tentatively "unsolved." Since the inception of Pakistan the Islam controversy occupied, perhaps excessively, politicians and jurists within the country. Contending points

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<sup>42</sup>Quoted in Dilip Mukherjee, Z. A. Bhutto, Quest for Power, New Delhi: Vikas, 1972, p. 86.

<sup>43</sup>At zero hour on the morning of July 1, 1970, the old provinces of Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan officially reappeared on the Pakistan map, as West Pakistan said good-bye to One Unit, an administrative cum political system, which failed to withstand the test of time and never gained the support and confidence of the people.

of view were expressed and no satisfactory "solution" had been reached. Each view had supporters to endorse it. No referendum had been conducted to obtain a consensus of the masses on the question of the influence that Islam should exert on decision making in Pakistan politics. It is difficult to say whether such a referendum would have been feasible if not practicable. At any rate, an abstract assumption pervaded politics, that Pakistan being an Islamic state would not pass any laws inimical to the "spirit of Islam." That a variety of interpretations was possible had a great deal to do with the demand for a more explicit and tangible commitment incorporated into a constitution. [I have discussed this in greater detail in the introductory chapter.]

As was expected, the Islam question figured prominently during the campaign of 1970. Most Pakistani politicians had not yet outgrown the habit of using Islam as a crutch to gain credibility. The greatest miscalculation on their part was the failure to recognize, that (except in extremely rural and relatively underdeveloped areas) the market of 1970 did not demand such an emphasis on Islam. The priorities had shifted to economic ones, and people were more concerned with the requisites for staying alive than a life hereafter. Credit should go to Bhutto for correctly gauging the public mood. He never discredited Islam, but he stressed the priorities in the same order

that the masses would have liked them to be stressed. Giving Islam constitutional sanctity was of little meaning to a peasant who tilled the soil all day for a square meal. In 1970, as the election results demonstrated, Islam had ceased to be the "opiate of the people."

The right wing political parties<sup>44</sup> seemed either oblivious to this fact or unwilling to accept it. Their failure in 1970 was a clear pointer to their inability to identify themselves with the hankering for change. However, by June, the rightist parties sensed the serious challenge that the PPP platform presented. An effort was made to work together to undermine Bhutto's strength, but failed. By mid August, the prospects of forming a formidable United Front of all the Islamic parties, seemed increasingly elusive. After a great deal of negotiations, on Sept. 25, a semblance of a United Front was set up,<sup>45</sup> but by mid December, the wastefulness of the entire undertaking was demonstrated, when efforts to put up a joint

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<sup>44</sup>These include the Three Leagues and three of the religion-oriented groups i.e., Pakistan Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and Nizam-e-Islam, Jamaat-e-Islami, Markazi Jamaat i Ahle Hadith. The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, although a group of Ulema, was left of centre on economic matters, and cooperated with Bhutto's PPP and more so with Wali Khan's NAP in Baluchistan and NWFP.

<sup>45</sup>The Front comprised PDP, the Jamaat-e-Islami, Markazi i Jamiat Ahle Hadith and splinter groups like Maulana Gulzar Ahmad Muzhari, Jamiat Ittehadul Ulema, Pakistan Sunni Tanzeem, Jamiat Ihya i Millat and Jamaat Ghurabea Ahle i Hadith.

candidate by the Islam loving political parties against the PPP in Lahore constituency No. 1 failed.<sup>46</sup> The Ulema (religious leaders) however, did succeed in passing a fatwa (decree) against Bhutto, declaring Socialism unIslamic. This undoubtedly elicited angered responses from Bhutto. While the Islam Pasands expended much energy negotiating, Bhutto was busy consolidating and clarifying his stand vis a vis Islam.

The performance of the Islam pasands became an issue in the PPP campaign. Many rightist parties sought to discredit Socialism, with the battle cry of "Islam in Danger." The PPP, on the other hand, argued that it was not Islam that faced a threat of annihilation; rather it was capitalism and the system of monopolies that would be threatened if the PPP should succeed.

Addressing a mammoth public meeting at Larkana on Feb. 23, 1970, Bhutto emphasized just this theme and went on to say that the PPP wanted to establish a democratic social order. Those who said that Islam was in danger lacked faith in the promise and authority of the Almighty. He condemned those who frequently levelled shameful charges of "kafir" (infidel) against Muslims. The same class of Maulanas (religious leaders) who were accusing him (Bhutto) of being

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<sup>46</sup>Two candidates, Mian Abdul Khaliq (CML) and Mian Mohammed Farooq (Ind.) were contacted; but no one acceptable compromise could be reached. Bhutto later referred to this division in ranks, various times with pungent sarcasm.

a kafir had said the same about Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Allama Iqbal, and the Quaid-e-Azam. He went on to clarify that the socialism pleaded by his party differed from Russian and Chinese communism. The socialism of Islam meant equality, and in Pakistan, socialism could be practiced in accordance with the basic tenets of Islam. Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto went on to claim, was not achieved for the well being of the few, but for the benefit of all living there.

While the right wing parties rallied together against the PPP, Bhutto went all out to challenge the image of patriotic fervour that they wished to build for themselves. He mounted all kinds of attacks and systematically went about casting doubts about his opponents' devotion and sincerity to Pakistan. He claimed a host of things, including that some (rightist) parties were the agents of Imperialist powers and were working toward keeping Pakistan at a degrading level of development. He also alleged that some of the religious oriented parties had vehemently opposed the creation of Pakistan. These elements, Mr. Bhutto claimed, were working toward the detriment of Pakistan.

The campaign in the West also focussed on demands for social justice which had brought students and workers into the streets in the upsurge against Ayub Khan not surprisingly. Ayub Khan figured prominently in the election campaign of most parties. In him they found a convenient scapegoat, and chose to blame all the ills of the system on him. His con-



tributions to Pakistan (few though they were) never received mention. Qayyum Khan, an inveterate foe, demanded the freezing of Ayub Khan's family bank account, charging that the money was being used to influence the campaign. Others like Asghar Khan alleged that Ayub was trying to get his sycophants elected. All parties tilted their lances against the old "tyrant," who according to them had reduced the country to shambles. Bhutto and the PPP went one step further. Bhutto claimed sole credit for spearheading the anti Ayub movement, and focussed on the risks he ran in the undertaking.

Bhutto's role in the upsurge against Ayub cannot be underestimated. During those days of resentment and uncertainty, it was to Bhutto that the students and workers flocked for leadership and direction. Bhutto's subsequent arrest by Ayub only enhanced his value in the minds of the people. In 1970, this was an issue that the PPP could exploit to the maximum, since it was not likely to be dismissed as a dubious claim. Bhutto at a public meeting in Quetta on June 15, 1970 remarked that Ayub Khan had made attempts to end his life, and had ultimately put him behind bars. These were the kind of speeches that dramatized the PPP campaign, and ornamented it with that extra sensationalism which attracts extra large crowds.

An often stressed theme of the PPP campaign was the dependence of workable political institutions on the con-

sent of the people. The Pakistani voter, deprived so long of political rights was attracted to this idea like a nomad to an oasis. Bhutto played on this theme at many well attended public meetings. A classic example was one he addressed at Kahuta, near Rawalpindi on July 8, 1970 where Bhutto said that the constitution to be a success has to be an Awami Constitution. Previous constitutions had foundered because they lacked the people's consent. His party had decided to fight the coming elections because it was determined to fight for the people's cause.<sup>47</sup> At Lahore on February 14, he declared, "let it be made clear that the will of the people will prevail."

The economic program of the PPP was highlighted at various public meetings and the party's commitment to the uplift of the masses registered. During the campaign it pledged to continue its struggle against feudalism and capitalism, and to establish a democratic rule which benefitted the peasants, workers and other suffering sections of the country. Bhutto reiterated at various public meetings that while people had been groaning under the shakles of capitalism for twenty three years, only 22 families in Pakistan had amassed wealth and had deprived the toiling masses of the basic necessities of life. While all parties, had during the campaign tilted their lances against the so-called

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<sup>47</sup>Dawn, Karachi, July 9, 1970.

forces of capitalism and exploitation, the PPP was the only party that projected an underlying commitment of taking from the rich to give to the poor. Bhutto's "Robin Hood" image was gratifying to those who had ceased to view their condition as the "will of the Almighty," and who recognized the causes of their deprivation. At a public meeting at Rawalpindi on Sept. 1, the PPP chief claimed:

We would ensure that those rolling in wealth are brought down to a reasonable level and the poor lifted up.

The PPP promised better working conditions for labor and claimed that it would make the workers and peasants "owners of mills and lands." Bhutto gave assurance that his party would make education up to matric -- free, provide free medical aid to farmers and laborers and increase the salaries of the low paid employees of the government. All these would be achieved with the introduction of Islamic socialism.

At a meeting at Quetta on June 12, Bhutto reiterated that elections alone could not provide a solution to the problems faced by millions who were subjected to what he called economic exploitation at the hands of the capitalists. "Unless people were happy and contented," he said, at Lyalpur on January 31, "raising of slogans, elections and the writing of constitutions would be of little use."

A West wing PPP leader, Mubashir Hasan, called for scrapping the Fourth Five Year Plan (introduced in 1970).

He protested that there was a direct confrontation between the wishes of the planners and the aspirations of the people. It was aimed at producing a super class of capitalists that could control the country politically. Hasan demanded a total break from the imperialist yoke of economic exploitation of the economy from monopoly capitalism and feudalism, and finally a total mobilization of the masses and basing the plan on manpower instead of capital. Bhutto was prudent enough to direct such explicit attacks on the Establishment through other party leaders, refraining from open personal involvement in these matters. Should the need arise he could easily dissociate himself from the acts and comments of other PPP workers. The PPP image was so closely allied in the minds of the electorate with Bhutto, that an unsavoury incident involving him directly would have affected the party adversely.

The PPP pioneered the demand for the release of all political prisoners. Often, Bhutto went so far as claiming that the PPP decision to contest the election was conditional upon the release of political prisoners. He also made the assertion that most of those held were active workers and supporters of the People's Party. Bhutto held out the threat of launching a mass movement if release were denied.

As has been mentioned earlier, in addition to claiming that certain ministers were aiding and abetting the oppo-

nents of the PPP, Bhutto carried on a running war with the National Press Trust. His protestations were woven into the campaign, and sometimes took the dimensions of a theme. In fact, this war continued, and one of Bhutto's first acts as President was to terminate the appointment of Habibullah, Chief of the NPT, and L. A. Suleri, Chief editor of Pakistan Times, and Ghauri, Resident editor of the Morning News.

Many a party like the Awami League and the NAP(Wali) expressed serious misgivings about the authentication clause of the LFO -- enough to include it as an issue in their campaigns. Bhutto made only nominal references to it. On April 12, 1970 at a public meeting in Karachi, he alluded to the LFO and politely reminded the President that should he refuse to authenticate the constitution placed before him by the elected representatives of the people, he would be violating the democratic principles which he himself had enunciated in the LFO. A month later on May 9, when asked about his views on the LFO at a Press conference, Bhutto brushed it aside saying that his party was still discussing the question of authentication and sovereignty.

While the Jamaat-e-Islami, and PDP campaigned in favor of the restoration of the constitution of 1956, Bhutto rejected it outright. He said that he was in favor of a Federal Structure. The greatest defect of the 1956 Consitution was that it provided two provinces. While a truly Federal one would provide for at least three provinces. He

was also in favor of a bicameral legislature. The creation of an upper chamber was not merely to balance the population representation from East Pakistan. It was the basic requirement of the principle of equality of federated states. Bhutto registered his strong opposition to the system of parity as embodied in the One Unit Scheme.<sup>48</sup> He said that he was in favour of voting on the constitution by a simple majority. This was the exact antithesis of his later stance demanding a two third majority vote. Bhutto probably did not anticipate the landslide victory that Mujibur Rehman emerged with. Mujib would have carried a simple majority, and Bhutto would have had to be content with playing second fiddle. The Bangla Desh debacle, fortunately for Bhutto, averted such a state of affairs from coming to pass.

Foreign policy figured prominently in the election campaign; and foreign policy was Bhutto's forte. Here he was in his elements. His earlier assignment as Foreign Minister proved to be both a liability and an asset in 1970. His opponents alluded to his erstwhile position to demonstrate that Bhutto was once a trusted lieutenant of Ayub, and being a political opportunist was now merely clipping his sails according to the breeze. His brilliance, however, in the realm of foreign policy could not be denied. Foreign

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<sup>48</sup>These views were expressed by Bhutto on Jan. 7, at a Karachi Bar Association meeting and Jan. 19, March 26, at Peshawar and Hyderabad.



policy debate afforded fertile ground for him to strike the stance of confrontation -- a role which he relished and in which he excelled.

Several parties demanded Pakistan's withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO, but this was flogging a dead horse, since Pakistan had been entering only a token presence at the meetings of these organizations since 1956. The mood was in favour of a bold but practical slant in foreign policy. The public sentiment was definitely anti American. The PPP went all out to capitalize on the prevailing mood. Bhutto reminded the people, that he had been the uncompromising, undaunted champion of an "independent foreign policy."

At a public meeting in Khairpur, on May 18, giving an account of his accomplishments as foreign minister, Bhutto said, that he gave Pakistan an independent foreign policy and "maintained on an equal footing, relations with other countries." Due to this policy, he claimed, the Indian government was compelled to elect a Muslim Head of State.

Bhutto offered the assurance that if his party came to power, it would never let Pakistan get inveigled into imperialist clutches. It would also make every effort to safeguard Pakistan's internal policies from foreign interference. At a large public meeting at Lyallpur on Jan. 31, Bhutto had asserted that previous governments had taken directions from the U.S. and nothing was done to promote relations with the Soviet Union, China, and African and

Asian countries, with the result that Pakistan's prestige abroad had suffered. As Pakistan's foreign minister he had raised Pakistan's status in the comity of other nations to the highest level. Bhutto was also arguing in favor of closer links with Muslim countries.

China was brought into the campaign by Sarfaraz Khan of the PDP. He claimed that Bhutto was making irresponsible and jingoistic statements at China's behest, and charged the Chinese with making lavish use of money to influence Pakistani political developments. There were counter accusations that the United States embassy was supplying funds to certain rightist parties. The charge became briefly an election issue with the PPP, the Hazarvi group of the Ulema, and the NAP (Wali) demanding the recall of the U.S. ambassador.

Vis a vis India, the Awami League, and the two NAPs in essence expressed interest in a peaceful and just solution of the Kashmir dispute. Other parties were in favor of continuing confrontation with India. Daultana argued that the concept of Pakistan was incomplete without the freedom of Kashmir. Qayyum Khan took a more hawkish position declaring that his party would strive for the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir, by all possible means. The Jamaat-e-Islami's stand was relatively bland. It argued that Kashmir, Farakka barrage and the persecution of Indian Muslims were outstanding disputes which had to be solved

equitably before normalized relations with India could be resumed.

The most strident stance was Bhutto's. He interjected a good deal of rhetoric against India, and it was Bhutto's posture on these issues that made the strongest impression on the electorate. The voters were aware of his record as a consistent and fiery advocate of the policy of confrontation. At a reception at the Karachi Bar Association on Jan. 7, 1970, Bhutto talked about India's "nefarious designs" and reiterated that Pakistanis as a nation would not mind fighting for 1,000 years. Yet, he cautioned the people of Pakistan that the country could not secure the right of self determination for "oppressed Kashmiri brethren" or protect suffering Muslims in India until it was strong internally. This was possible only when fundamental changes had been made in the economy to banish feudalism and capitalism from the society. "We will not allow the Kashmir issue to be forgotten," he said at a public meeting in Jhelum on Jan. 21, 1970.

Bhutto blamed Pakistan's failure to secure Kashmir on Ayub Khan's inability to take bold action. He took the stand that during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, Pakistan had let slip an opportunity of liberating Jammu and Kashmir, which according to him, was almost vacated by the Indian army. If something had been done then, Bhutto said, the world would have said that the right of a people had been

restored. Cynically referring to Ayub, he said

our Shahsavar (equestrian) was sitting in Hunza at the time of the Sino-Indian conflict and later said that if Pakistan liberated Kashmir, world opinion would turn against her.<sup>49</sup>

Bhutto said, he was ready to "own" the charge that he "engineered" the war with India in 1965 after making sure of China's political support. Mr. Bhutto accused Field Marshal Ayub Khan of accepting a cease fire in the Rann of Kutch "under foreign pressure" on the plea that there should not be a fight for a piece of desert.

A retired Air Marshal, Nur Khan, who had entered politics and was contesting elections under the CML banner disputed Bhutto's claims. He stated "It was we [military leaders] who wanted the war in 1965.] He accused Bhutto of supporting Ayub in his decision to restrain the military when India was locked in battle with China across the Himalayas in 1962.

Bhutto focused public attention on his role in bringing about a beneficial friendship with China, claiming that it gave a realistic angle to Pakistan's foreign policy. This was no hollow boast. Bhutto was the first to articulate publicly in 1968 that neither the USA nor the Soviet Union was really interested in helping Pakistan to secure satisfaction from India. "The People's Republic of China

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<sup>49</sup>At a public meeting in Rawalpindi on January 11, 1970.

is the only country," he said, "which will be sympathetic to Pakistan's real requirements. This is because that country's interests in the subcontinent coincide with those of Pakistan."<sup>50</sup>

The Tashkent Declaration, next to Islamic Socialism, seemed to be a central theme of Bhutto's campaign. It figured in many of the public meetings he addressed, especially those in the Punjab. In answer to critics who viewed with cynicism Bhutto's "newly found" opposition to the Tashkent Declaration, he claimed that he had offered his resignation on three occasions after Tashkent, but was told not to desert Pakistan at a time of serious crisis. This was why he held back until mid-June. This claim has been upheld by independent observers like Nevil Maxwell,<sup>51</sup> who points out that there was growing divergence between Ayub Khan and his erstwhile protege, Bhutto, over foreign policy. Whatever reservations Bhutto may have had about the outcome of Tashkent he defended it at the time and claimed that it did not detract one iota from Pakistan's resolve to seek a just solution of the Kashmir dispute. However, he had reportedly leaked it out to the press that he and Ayub were at odds over Tashkent. After resigning from Ayub's cabinet, he threatened that he would disclose the

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<sup>50</sup>See Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>51</sup>See The Times, London, 14 November, 1968.

Tashkent secrets, implying that Ayub had made a secret deal with Shastri. In 1970, Bhutto claimed at a public meeting in Khairpur on May 18:

If we had any lust for power, we would not have quit the government. I did so when Ayub betrayed the interests of Pakistan at Tashkent.

Again, at various public meetings, he announced that he was bent upon exposing to the people "the story of the Tashkent Declaration." If there were such secrets, they never came into the open in 1970. At one such meeting at Peshawar on January 19, when the crowds demanded that he disclose the "Tashkent secret," Bhutto suggested that he was under governmental pressure to remain silent. "Why are we being gagged," he pleaded, "in spite of our solemn promise not to reveal anything contrary to national interest... The people of Pakistan have a right to know how they were betrayed." These Bhuttonian tactics, impregnated as they were, with a flair for the dramatic, attracted crowds to PPP public meetings.

Bhutto claimed that in 1965, the then President had promised the United States not to send him to the United Nations, where the Indo-Pakistan conflict was being discussed. However, he had flown to the U.N., although India had sent men to kill him and despite serious odds, he (Bhutto) had spoken his mind and the hearts of all those present went out to Pakistan. The anti India theme, was thus heavily stressed. Bhutto went to great lengths to



suggest that Mrs. Gandhi had often registered her disapproval of him. The reason being, that he was a threat to India's nefarious designs.

### Favorite Slogans of the PPP Campaign

Party slogans are an inescapable part of campaigning. They appear conspicuously painted on billboards and even walls of public buildings. They are woven into the speeches of party members. In South Asia, they are chanted by party enthusiasts and supporters moving in a procession and when emotions are high are even shouted into microphones. In South Asia, probably more than anywhere else, they are viewed as the essentials that infuse a party campaign with life and vigor.

The slogans used by the PPP were numerous and we shall discuss them here.

The PPP promise of "Roti Kapra Makan, (food, clothing and shelter) was louder than that of any other party, and was perhaps the most often repeated slogan.

Another slogan often used by the PPP was that it would launch a Jehad (a Holy War in Muslim polemics) against capitalism and the agents of exploitation. PPP members argued that the polls were only part of a bigger struggle launched by the party for the uplift of the poor masses. While addressing a public meeting in a relatively backward area (SWAT) in the NWFP, on Sept 10, Bhutto said:

Islam enjoins every Musalmaan to wage a jehad against all forms of aggression and injustice.

He asked all the people to join hands with his party in this Jihad.

Another related slogan of the PPP was that political freedom was meaningless without economic freedom.

Bhutto never ceased telling the people that he considered no sacrifice too great for the glory of Pakistan, and that PPP members were willing to shed the last drop of blood for the country. Jingoistic slogans are still digested well almost all the world over; the difference being one of degree. While a Nixon would defend American Honor, the political culture of Pakistan demanded a more dramatic and vociferous expression of patriotism. The commitment to a thousand years of war with India over Kashmir was another slogan in this category, that the PPP employed.

As a retaliatory stance to undermine the Islam Pasands expressed disquiet over Islamic socialism in their Islam in Danger slogan, the PPP used the Capitalism in Danger slogan. Islam, it claimed, was always safe in Pakistan since it was a Muslim State.

As an alternative to Islam Pasand, the PPP declared itself as an Awam-Pasand (people loving) party. The PPP popularity demonstrated that political symbols in themselves, without necessarily being qualified by Islamic connotations were beginning to register with a greater section of the people. Islamic qualifications were desirable -- but not

indispensable.

Another favorite slogan of the PPP was that nothing but people's politics will triumph in Pakistan. The party decried what it described as the "Drawing room politics" in which its opponents indulged. While this discredited some older politicians by branding them as behind-the-scene manipulators, it gave to the PPP image an aura of openness in its dealings.

One of the most popular refrains of the PPP was its party credo:

Islam is our Faith, Democracy is our Polity,  
Socialism our Economy, and All Power to the  
People.

It can be said that all PPP slogans grew as offshoots of this essential theme.

#### The Campaign Style of the PPP

Sensationalism was an important tool of the PPP campaign style. It proved to be that extra element that sustains the interest of all sections of the audience at a political meeting. Integral to this style was the conspiracy theme that the People's Party emphasized. Party leaders, notably Bhutto, claimed that "sinister plots were being hatched to impede people's movements launched under the PPP banner." Bhutto claimed that "capitalists and imperialists had created a conspiracy" to defeat him in the forthcoming elections.

At other times he suggested that India had conspired with Super powers to try and keep him out of office. He claimed that certain countries were trying to influence the elections in Pakistan, and were being aided and abetted by parties that were against the creation of Pakistan (an inference to the Jamaat e Islami, and its chief, Maulana Maudoodi). The only other party that stressed the conspiracy theme was the Qayyum Muslim League -- but it was to a much lesser extent.

Another manifestation of the sensationalist style of the PPP campaign was the exaggeration and dramatization of incidents involving the party. March 30, 1970, witnessed a serious clash between the followers of the Pir of Paqaro (a popular divine) and PPP processionists, at Sanghar, the stronghold of the Pir. A PPP member was killed but Bhutto escaped without any injuries. At a public meeting in Hyderabad on April 1, Bhutto said "the attack was pre-meditated, pre-planned, and cold blooded to murder me." He claimed that the events had proven beyond doubt that it was a massive deep rooted conspiracy to eliminate him and his friends. Never before had he escaped death as closely as he did at Sanghar.

Bhutto saw an imperialist plot behind the tragic incident in November 1970 in which an employee of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), shouting "Death to the Communists" deliberately charged his truck into a VIP reception

line killing Zygfried Wolniak, Poland's Deputy Foreign Minister, then on a visit to Pakistan. The Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) was at the time dominated by Jamaat-e-Islami supporters -- perennial critics of Bhutto.

He claimed that during the three years of his political wilderness his "enemies -- external and internal -- hatched conspiracies" against him and even tried to eliminate him. The treatment meted out to him was a long story, and he and his friends had suffered greatly.

The PPP used simple intelligible similies (identifying democracy with "Jamhuriat" and socialism with "Musawat") to make its platform comprehensible to the masses and to relate it with their aspirations. In addition to Islamic symbols, the PPP identified itself with certain other political symbols that had gained wide acceptance by the political culture of Pakistan. Whenever the opportunity presented itself, PPP leaders invoked the Father of the Nation -- the Quaid-i-Azam, and a beloved Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan as the foremost champions of the socialism that was embodied in the PPP manifesto.

As discussed earlier, Bhutto displayed a kind of charisma that was new to Pakistani politics. The political "elite" had traditionally followed the British-Indian bureaucratic and Sandhurst models. Bhutto's style embodied the handshaking, back slapping, baby kissing techniques that were reflected in certain American election campaigns.

It also accomodated the religious sentiments of the people. These were reflected in Bhutto's much publicized visits to Jinnah's mausoleum and prayers during festivals like Id, with a band of PPP workers and followers.

Another manifestation of the PPP style was an expression of confidence at times bordering on defiance. Bhutto challenged his opponents like a swordsman challenges to a duel. He defied M. A. Khuhro, a one time chief minister of Sindh to contest the Larkana seat (a constituency that has traditionally returned Khuhro), against him. He challenged the Islam Pasands to reveal their strength in terms of influence vis-a-vis the People's Party. He warned the agents of "imperialism and capitalism" to watch their step, since the people now backed him and his party. Bhutto's style related to the Pakistani mass value system.. For instance, the challenge tactics incorporates the common man's regard for "courage," "manliness," "fearlessness," and other related "virtues."

Mudslinging, was employed by most parties in the election campaign. The PPP, however, out did almost every party to the point of being (what would be considered by the 'sophisticated' elite) ruthless. Very few opponents escaped the PPP insults and allegations. When some individuals associated with the Islam Pasand parties sought to discredit Bhutto, he left it to his Mullah (priest) Kausar Niazi, to dig up scandals about rival mullahs. (Niazi was



a one time Jamaat-e-Islami member, but quit, following a quarrel with its leadership.) Bhutto made the chief of the Jamaat-e-Islami a frequent target of attack. He cast doubts on Maudoodi's devotion to Pakistan, and claimed that he was now trying to suppress the rights of the people by being sympathetic to capitalists. Bhutto's ire was partly due to the fact that Maudoodi had been in the forefront to propogate the "Islam in Danger" slogans.

Others too became the target of Bhutto's attacks and insinuations. Daultana, he said, was an avowed communist in his early career, but had switched political allegiences to suit his ends -- a rather bold allegation, considering that the title of "turncoat" would be more befitting to Bhutto himself. Qayyum Khan, he claimed, was "chicken hearted. He did not have the courage to oppose ex-president Ayub's dictatorship and instead retired from political life... He emerged to the political surface only after he was sure that the people's struggle had shattered the dictatorship."<sup>52</sup> Of Asghar Khan, an ex-Air Marshall who had entered politics, Bhutto commented that the former, had been changing his views and platforms and was a "political novice" without any convictions. "What was the need of entering politics," Bhutto asked, "for a man whose services were not needed in his own profession."

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<sup>52</sup>At a public meeting in Karachi on Nov. 21, 1970.

The comment is interesting in view of Asghar Khan's political career. He had emerged on the political scene, when Bhutto was arrested in 1967 and had cast his lot with the anti Ayub forces and many at the time, saw him as a far more serious challenge to Ayub than Bhutto.

Commenting on the trading of insults, a Pakistani writer, Mushtaq Ahmad, commented:

Villification and abuse took the place of argument and discussion. Incitement and vituperation were carried beyond the propriety of debate, in which even loyalties to the state were questioned. It was a philosophy of hate totally alien to the spirit of democracy.<sup>53</sup>

This definitely reflects an elitist view of what should constitute the "rules of the game." In this context, Pakistani mass value orientations must not be forgotten. Mudslinging for example, caters to Pakistani ideas of personal honor. The distinction between a "political opponent" and an "enemy" has not been drawn in the minds of the masses, yet. Charges of being unpatriotic relate to the Pakistani political tradition since 1947, which branded opponents as traitors and reflected a tendency to identify one's party with the state. It also gives vent to Pakistan's perennial insecurity vis-a-vis India. To be branded pro-India is tantamount to political suicide in Pakistan. There is another dimension to the phenomenon of mudslinging in the

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<sup>53</sup>Quoted in Mukherjee, op. cit. p. 70.

Pakistani context. Considering that the country had not received the political education that successive elections bring with them, such exchanges were inescapable. It is also possible that the politician had been particularly insensitive to a transition of attitudes that was taking place in Pakistan i.e. that the masses were increasingly beginning to relate to politics as issue oriented as opposed to the traditional personality oriented form. It is also conceivable that even though the politicians did sense the change to some measure, they were unwilling to take any chances. They could not draw on any previous election trends for guidelines. No sample surveys were conducted and few parties were willing to lose votes in order to carry on an "education function."<sup>54</sup> The politicians saw mudslinging as a requirement in soliciting votes and converting the undecided, and used it sometimes, unsparingly. The success of the PPP lay in the fact that while it paid attention to the "personality angle," while criticizing opponents, it placed primary emphasis in framing issues that articulated the aspirations of the people.

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<sup>54</sup>Some parties like the NAP(W) did recognize the need for change. Wali complained that the leadership that emerged in 1970 were stereotyped and used formulae that were applicable 23 years back.

## The Reactions to the Campaign of the PPP

Starting around June of 1970, most parties began to feel that Bhutto was a force to be contended with. They observed how crowds flocked to hear him speak even in their strongholds and were apprehensive. By November, almost all parties were attacking Bhutto; but they did not go about it in an organized manner. Their criticisms of Bhutto seemed rather feeble and belated. In any event they were nowhere near as vociferous as their opponent. The failure of the Islam Pasands to unite against Bhutto also proved a definite drawback. Most party campaigns had reached their peak a little too early and seemed watered down as election day neared. The PPP campaign was gruelling throughout. Had the opponents of Bhutto concentrated more on areas that he had partially neglected, things could have been different. In any event they did register their disapproval and a revelation will provide an insight into what the "opposite camp" felt about the PPP and its leader. It will be interesting to observe whether their attacks were merely personality oriented or issue oriented.

We have tried to present a spectrum of reactions and have attempted as far as possible to adhere to the actual text.

Bhutto is neglecting the sacrifices of ten lakhs (1 million) of Muslims in espousing the creation of an unIslamic society. He is creating disunity in the youth, by raising false and deceptive slo-

gans. He remained the right hand of Ayub for ten years, but never thought of giving land to Haris and Kisans after snatching it from big Zamindars. He is now duping them for his selfish ends. Mr. Bhutto, everyday in his speeches befools people about Tashkent but never dared to expose the real drama played there... The society advocated by Bhutto is entirely against Islamic traditions. In India Mrs. Gandhi is shouting slogans of socialism, while in Pakistan Mr. Bhutto is raising the same slogans...

[Qayyum Khan, President Pakistan Muslim League at a public meeting at Multan, Sept. 10, 1970.]

Why did Mr. Bhutto who is now posing as the saviour of students, keep quiet when students who protested against Tashkent were fired at?

Shaukat Hayat (CML) at public meeting at Muree, June 20.

Mr. Bhutto was the great exponent of autocratic rule in the country and extended unquestioned support to Ayub... the PPP stands for socialism based on aethism.

M.A. Khuhro (CML) addressing party workers in Larkana, July 9.

Bhutto... is making erratic and self contradictory statements which are creating confusion in the public mind, and his slogan of socialism is another attempt to import alien ideologies into Pakistan.

Nasrullah Khan (PDP) at Hyderabad June 19, 1970.

...Socialist ideology will lead to disintegration  
...Instead of giving the people their daily needs as it says it will, socialism will snatch away what they have. ...No sane person can call socialism a system akin to Islam... we will launch a movement against anti Islamic systems.

Mian Tufail Ahmad (Jamaat-e-Islami) at Lahore, March 1, 1970.

...Socialism is a fraudulent idea that has lost its efficacy... and Islam is a potent force that has been giving a fight to one or the other "ism" for over 1,400 years.

Maulana Thanvi (Jamiatul Ulema i Pakistan) in Hyderabad, Jan. 6, 1970

Asghar Khan of the Tehaik i Istiqlal party, conveyed in most speeches that there was no more than "complicity and duplicity in the political life of Bhutto." He told a press conference on Sept. 10 that Bhutto was actively trying to create chaos and confusion "in a bid to come back into power through the back door."

The leftist NAP(W) maintained a discreet silence about Bhutto and the PPP. The Jamiatul Ulema i Islam (Hazarvi group) while it was definitely a religion-oriented party was the sole endorser of the PPP economic platform. Mufti Mahmud, general secretary of the party said:

Socialism has a foreign ideology, but Islamic socialism has stood<sup>55</sup> for Social justice based on Islamic ideology...

A prominent section of the intelligensia, the lawyers, however, viewed the Bhuttonian tactics and the PPP platform and promises with growing disquiet and disdain. Another, larger section of the intelligensia, the student, gave a large part of their support to the PPP and the party was happier for it. Students figured prominently in the PPP processions and were actively involved in the door to door canvassing in the last stages of the campaign.

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<sup>55</sup>See Dawn, January 4, 1970.



## Conclusion

This chapter has primarily been a detailed narrative of the PPP election campaign, based on our observations. An attempt has been made to interpret the motives behind its formulation and manifestations.

The deeper theoretical considerations that arise from the success of such a campaign and the socio- political determinants that contributed to its formulation and success will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. Any definition or interpretation of the role of a party, in the process of politicization of a society in transition -- whatever the nature of that role may be -- must be based on empirical evidence. This chapter attempts to provide such an evidence.

## C H A P T E R    I V

## THE ELECTORATE RESPONSE TO THE PPP

## Introduction

The elections of 1970, in their actual conduct and their results, proved beyond doubt that the people of Pakistan were ready to participate in a democratic process, thereby refuting the Ayubian dictum that democracy is not suited to their "genius."

The elections were significant for they demonstrated that the Pakistani "genius" had begun to look at political processes differently. The people of Pakistan were saying anew, through the voting process, that political life must be maintained, not be accident or force, but by rational judgement and free choice. They were saying anew, that officials could not be self-appointed, but must be picked by the people according to certain specified methods. They were saying anew and effectively, that political power does not dwell in perpetuity in a distinctive governing group but is transmitted by the people for a term of years to a provisional governing personnel. They were saying anew that the authority transmitted to officials is not boundless. In short, the elections demonstrated that a period of public quiescence had come to a close in Pakistani politics.

What we wish to emphasize here is that political devel-

opment strikes at the roots of the people's beliefs and sentiments about politics and hence, the process of development must be profoundly affected by the character of the political culture<sup>1</sup> of a society. It is our contention that the elections amply illustrate a process of evolution whereby the political culture of Pakistan is changing complexion. This does not involve the assumption that all of the components of the previous political value structure are being indiscriminately discarded. We mean to suggest that a process of change is at work whereby, certain beliefs are being increasingly de-emphasized and newer determinants are being absorbed. The new values of political participation, for example, will replace gradually the older attitudes supporting political deference. The traditional Pakistani attitude toward authority is worth mention here. The "older" political values were reflections of essentially feudalistic relationships. Power was deployed upon a patron-dependent basis. In a village for example, the "lowly folk" would approach one held in high esteem by the village when they wished to undertake almost any transaction -- perhaps involving village sanction, the consent of the village leaders, or a boon from the landlord. The patron assisted his depen-

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<sup>1</sup>We subscribe here to Sidney Verba's definition of political culture, as the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place, and which provides the subjective orientation to politics.

dent in return for a specific "douceur," but also in order to maintain a fund of loyalty so that in any dispute or struggle for power, he would be able to mobilize a following which would demonstrate his ascendancy. This tradition of loyalty and unquestioned obedience in the client-patron relationship, when translated into the political sphere, contributed to a viewing of government as a dome of absolute authority suspended high above "ordinary folk." Thus, while there existed an implicit expectation that rulers should be just, it was compromised by the idea that rulers know their business best -- resulting in an overall absence of the value of public accountability. However, with the politicization that took place during the independence movement on the Indian sub-continent, more specific expectations of government began to evolve. Although, the patron-client relationship was not totally discarded, the idea began to take shape that the patron too had certain obligations towards his client, in return for loyalty and obedience.

The political culture of a nation derives among other things, from the experiences that individuals have had with the political process. While this is not the sole determinant, it is an important variable that affects political culture. The attitudes towards governmental output -- the expectations that exist, and the satisfaction derived from it -- will obviously be affected by what output the government produces. It is in this context that "handling" of

the crises discussed in the first chapter becomes relevant. That they have greatly contributed to the current change in the political culture of Pakistan -- particularly in the attitudes towards political participation -- is obvious.

Sidney Verba has suggested that the political socialization process is linked to the "learning experiences by which a political culture is passed on from generation to generation, and to situations under which political cultures change."<sup>2</sup> Such a trend is discernible in Pakistan. While we do not deny the importance of other political, economic and social variables that affected the election outcome, our emphasis on political culture leads to a new perspective on the political history of Pakistan. We have kept in mind the mutually dependent relationship between modernization and this evolution in political culture. At the same time it must be remembered that Pakistan's mode of development is one in which traditional and modernist orientations have been welded together. It is possible to view Pakistan's modernization as a response to the challenge of systemic change against the canvas of a continuing civilization.

The victory of the People's Party in West Pakistan can be understood in the context of this change. We view the PPP as a beneficiary of the changing pattern of beliefs.

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<sup>2</sup>See Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Development and Political Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 515.

By playing an essentially adaptive role<sup>3</sup> the PPP kept pace with the evolving political ethos, and its success demonstrates this fact.

### The East And West Social Structure -- Contrasted

The results of the election both at the national and provincial levels, showed a sweeping victory for the Awami League in East Pakistan and a substantial majority for the People's Party in West Pakistan. While the East Pakistan outcome was not unexpected, except perhaps in its magnitude, the voters of West Pakistan, did not follow the

conventional judgement of the prognosticators who had predicted that the traditional leaders -- the so called 'old Guard' -- would resume the political leadership they had exercised before Iskander Mirza<sup>4</sup> and Ayub instituted martial law in October 1958.

The elections in the East had virtually become a referendum on the Six Points of the Awami League. The East had voted as one unit against the "hegemony of the West" and for an

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<sup>3</sup>A term borrowed from Weiner and LaPalombara. They define an adaptive party, as one whose primary concern is its adaptation to the attitudes of the public in its quest for electoral support. See Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 424-426.

<sup>4</sup>See Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes," Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 3, March 1971, p. 198.



inward looking Bengali ethnocentrism.<sup>5</sup> The Awami League had echoed the feelings of the not much differentiated population of East Bengal. The East Pakistani society comprised a miniscule number of upper middleclass industrialists and traders (quite a few of them non Bengalis) forming an apex, while a huge sub-stratum of peasants, workers and newly emerging urban dwellers rested massively below. The social situation in the west, is much more complex and differentiated, and defies such simplification. Since our chief concern is with the People's Party, and since it operated as a West based party, our primary emphasis while examining the results will be on West Pakistan.

Until quite recently, West Pakistani society was dominated by an aristocracy comprising the wealthy echelon which was essentially "westernized" in its socio-political orientation. It provided all the elites in politics, the professions, the services and in large scale commerce and industry. Only a few from the lower classes climbed to competing positions. After independence, for instance, middle class competitors got into the higher bureaucracy -- the Civil Service of Pakistan -- but since their numbers were small, they soon internalized the ethic of the larger group.

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<sup>5</sup>The voters had united behind a single party, and gave the Awami League its extraordinary 167 out of 169 seats to the National Assembly and all of the 288 seats to the Provincial Assembly of East Pakistan. It did not win a single seat in West Pakistan.

The old ICS aristocratic, British oriented ethos, thus continued to be dominant. The lower classes continued to be deprived of any active voice in the political process.

The Hindu exodus at independence had its consequences: landlords had a vacuum to fill, and they did it by becoming money lenders, contractors, wholesalers and small industrialists. In the earlier years large scale industry and commerce was monopolized by Muslim immigrants from India, mostly concentrated in Karachi's metropolis. With the exception of a few big cities, most areas of West Pakistan continued to have strong feudal loyalties. There were differences in degree -- Punjab and Baluchistan being on two opposite ends of a continuum. The vehicle of aristocratic politics in post independence West Pakistan was the Muslim League, and its theoretical equipment was the mystique of Islam.

From the mid 'fifties things began to change. Constant inflationary pressures, high prices of consumer goods, transfer of wealth from peasant to landlord, from the countryside to the urban sector, and within the urban sector to the "haves" through fiscal and monetary policies, rising unemployment, increasing urbanization and the "transistor revolution," tended to break up traditional, chiefly feudal patterns of social living in West Pakistan.<sup>6</sup> These changes,

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<sup>6</sup>See M. B. Nagvi, "West Pakistan's Struggle for Power," South Asian Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, April 1971.

albeit gradual, are by degrees affecting all the provinces of West Pakistan. In Punjab and Sindh, they are more discernably manifest. The PPP victories were in areas that have been most influenced by the modernization process, and the resulting change in attitudes towards politics. It would not be inaccurate to assume then, that there is a definite correlation between the success of the party, and the transforming political culture. This theme will be developed in the course of the chapter.

#### The Election Results Described

When the results came in, it was seen that 63 percent of the 56.94 million registered voters had turned out to exercise their franchise in the Western wing, compared to 57 percent in East Pakistan. Punjab led with a turnout of about 69 percent. Sindh came next with 60 percent voter turnout. In NWFP 48 percent of registered voters had cast their vote and in Baluchistan around 40 percent.<sup>7</sup> These figures suggest a correlation between voter turnout and levels of development. Table III indicates that of a total of twenty five parties, eighteen contested elections in the West wing. There was a surfeit of candidates too. For example, for the 82 seats to the National Assembly from

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<sup>7</sup>Figures from Sharif Al Mujahid, "Pakistan's First General Elections," Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 2, Feb. 1971, p. 169.

Punjab, there were 463 contestants; 171 contestants for the 27 seats from Sind; 152 for the 25 seats in the Frontier, and 25 for the 4 seats in Baluchistan. Of the total candidates as many as 1,229 belonged to major political parties, and about 320 were contesting as independents!

In the West, the PPP bagged 81 seats (see Table IV) almost three-fifths of a total of 138 seats filled by direct elections. In the National Assembly it secured only 37.7 percent of the aggregate vote in West Pakistan (see Table VI). Relatively speaking, it was still impressive, since the CML polling the second largest number of votes, secured only 10.3 percent. It put up its best performance in Sindh, where it took 44.9 percent of the vote, and two thirds of the seats. In Punjab, its share was 41.6 percent of the votes, but the fragmentation of support among its numerous rivals gave it three fourths of the seats.

In NWFP, the PPP secured only one seat in Mardan out of the 18 contested National Assembly seats (no party nominated any candidates for the 7 centrally administered tribal areas). In terms of votes, it polled 14.2 percent in the Frontier. Considering that the NAP(W) secured only 18.3 percent in its home ground (see Table VII) the PPP performance in terms of votes was not bad. It is significant that even in the NWFP, the People's Party polled a greater percentage of votes, than did any other party, in the Punjab and Sindh where the PPP was victorious.

In Baluchistan, the PPP hardly made an impression; it claimed only 2.3 percent of the vote, too few to win any seat.

The Provincial elections, were marked by candidate withdrawals on party, as well as individual bases, and the regrouping of parties in several places following the setbacks suffered by a majority of the parties in the National Assembly elections.<sup>8</sup> Even so, the 579 seats for which polling was held on December 17, 1970, were being contested by over 4,100 candidates of whom 1,600 were independents. The province wide break up of the candidates were: 1744 from East Pakistan, 1,322 from Punjab, 575 from Sindh, 320 from NWFP, and 164 from Baluchistan.

The National Assembly election results had demonstrated that the independents had polled the third highest percentage of votes (10.04%). The PPP therefore set out to support a larger number of independents more openly in the Provincial Assembly elections.

The PPP showing, in these elections was less impressive than in the national poll; local factors were bound to play a larger part in the smaller provincial constituencies. In Punjab, the PPP received a minor setback, for it claimed

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<sup>8</sup>The purpose of these withdrawals was to weaken the PPP by presenting a united opposition to it, and limiting the number of opposing contestants. The CML and the Islam Pasands (particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami) were in the forefront of this move.



63 percent of the seats, as opposed to the 75.6 percent in the National Assembly election. The PPP took 113 of the 180 seats. It gained six of the women's seats later.

On December 19th, 1970 Dawn reported that the party position would further improve, as out of the 28 successful independents, about 15 candidates, most of whom won the contest through PPP support would join the Assembly party. This would take the PPP strength as the ruling party in Punjab to a proximity of 130 members. The PPP strength is further enhanced by the fact that the CML emerged second with only 15 seats. The other party positions are seen in Table V.

In the elections, Bhutto's party failed to get a majority in Sindh, but came close to it by taking 28 of the 60 seats filled by direct elections. With the two women's seats taken later, the PPP strength was enhanced to 30 in a house of 62. The party had openly supported four independents, and more independents were reported by Dawn (December 19, 1970) as joining the party, reportedly bringing the total strength to 40.

The only flaw in Bhutto's success in Sindh was his inability to carry the settlers from India, especially in the National Assembly elections. The refugees concentrated in Karachi, preferred the religious parties,<sup>9</sup> which won

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<sup>9</sup>The Jamaat Ahle Sunnat, and the Jamaat-e Islami, won two seats each.



four of the seats in the National Assembly, while another went to an independent supported by them. This left the PPP with only two seats, and that too from the more suburban and affluent areas.

The party position in Karachi, improved considerably in the provincial election, where it took 8 out of the total 15 seats. This was probably a "snowballing" reaction to the overall PPP success at the national polls, emerging from the psychology of supporting the winning horse. In the remaining seven seats, Markazi Jamiat-e-Ulema-e Pakistan won four, the Council Muslim League two, and the Jamaat e Islami one. The PPP performance here was also partly due to the fact that in the provincial elections, it fielded refugee candidates.

The PPP performance in Karachi is significant because prominent Karachi veterans were defeated by relatively young PPP candidates. For example, Mr. Mobinul Haq Siddiqui, a former speaker of the now-defunct West Pakistan assembly lost to PPP Mohammad Ali Gabole. Mr. Gaffar Pasha, a former West Pakistan minister, was defeated at the hands of a former student leader Syed Saeed Hasan, contesting on a PPP ticket.

In the NWFP, the PPP fared badly, but there was some satisfaction for it in the fact that no other party had got a clear majority. It managed only 3 out of a total of 40 contested seats. The PPP in the Frontier was greatly handi-

capped by the lack of leadership. The Frontier PPP chief, Sherpao, was a political novice, and could not match tactics with seasoned politicians like Qayyum Khan. Dawn reported (on December 11th 1970) that mishandling had been the root cause of the PPP's drawbacks, and its poor performance in the National Assembly elections. For example, it was reported that the PPP had no organization for women's polling and the QML polled 2,000 votes, mostly of women. However, poor organization was by no means the sole cause of the PPP defeat, and we shall elaborate the other causes later in this chapter.

The PPP, moved toward a close alliance with NAP(W) in the provincial elections against Qayyum Khan, who at the time was viewed as a common enemy. A key contest was between Hayat Khan Sherpao and Qayyum Khan in the PW1 Peshawar constituency. Sherpao's victory was largely due to the official NAP(W) support for the PPP. The PPP took two other seats, one in Mardan, and the other in Malakand protected area. Wali Khan's NAP secured 13 out of 40 seats, while its ally, the Hazarvi group of the "leftist" Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, got 4. Including the two women's seats taken by the NAP, the final position along with its ally was 19 seats out of 42. Qayyum Khan's PML took 10 seats.

The PPP was nowhere in the picture in Baluchistan. The NAP combine had only 11 seats to start with (including

the Pakhtoonkhawa's one seat, NAP's 8 and the 3 of the Hazarvi group). The NAP since won the women's seat, and its total strength is now 12. The QML took three seats, independents 5, and the Baluchistan United Front took one.

Although 62 votes out of a 100 cast in West Pakistan went against the PPP, it did gain a pivotal position in the political process. The PPP victory is significant because it focuses the success of a socialistic program in what was considered to be essentially a feudal set up. Again, no other individual party could claim the magnitude of success that was bestowed on the PPP in West Pakistan. However, in an overall sense, the Council Muslim League, did not fare badly in Punjab and Baluchistan, while the Qayyum faction proved that it had significant support in the NWFP, and some in Sindh and Baluchistan. The Convention Muslim League, in spite of the legacy inherited from Ayub Khan, did better than the Jamaat-e-Islami in Punjab.

Among the religious groups Jamiat-e-Ulema e Pakistan or the Sialvi group, put in a better performance than its peers in terms of the aggregate West Pakistan vote. The Hazarvi group JUI(H) however, secured for itself an important role in the NWFP and Baluchistan assemblies. Baluchistan's major support went to the National Awami Party (Wali).

#### Surprise Victories for the PPP

A great many veteran and influential politicians were

dislodged by relatively unknown PPP candidates, indicating that in substantial areas of West Pakistan, the votes were cast for ideology in preference to local personalities. While this might or might not be viewed as an index of political development, it certainly does indicate that the old order was beginning to change in Pakistan.

In the eyes of the man in the street the measure of the PPP's success was (to use a phrase borrowed from Mukherjee) the tally of heads which rolled in the dust. One unexpected outcome was the defeat of Air Marshall (ret'd) Asghar Khan, at the hands of a relatively unknown PPP candidate Khursheed Hasan Mir from the Rawalpindi NW-26 constituency. (Asghar Khan had been a much idolized hero, during the anti Ayub agitation, and had been mentioned in political circles as a prospective successor after the Field Marshall's ouster). Another PPP candidate defeated Rafiq Saigol a leading industrialist who was seeking election from his hometown, Lyallpur, on a Jamaat-e-Islami ticket. In a Karachi suburb (Lyari) too, Syeed Haroon a leading businessman found that his erstwhile stronghold was now in PPP hands. Mian Tufail Ahmad, a firebrand speaker and a prominent member of the Jamaat-e-Islami was beaten in a Lahore constituency, by PPP member, Sheikh Mohammed Rashid. In Muzzaffargarh II, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, a prominent PDP hopeful lost to Mustapha Khar of the PPP. Several other creditable, but unexpected, PPP victories stand out -- like

those scored against a retired major general, Umraokhan of the Jamaat e Islami, in Sahiwal and members of the prosperous and influential Gilani and Qizilbash families in Punjab.

Mr. Bhutto himself won five out of the six seats he contested (two in Punjab and three in Sindh) losing only one seat in D. I Khan constituency in the Frontier to JUI(H) General Secretary Mufti Mahmood. The Sindh victories were in Hyderabad, Thatta and Larkana, Mr. Bhutto's hometown; and his Punjab gains were registered in Lahore and Multan. The most prestigious victories were in Larkana, where he defeated the man once regarded as the "uncrowned king of Sindh," former Chief Minister M.A. Khuhro, and in Lahore, (Punjab) where he defeated CML's Javed Iqbal and PDP's Maj-Gen. (ret'd) Sarfaraz Khan, by substantial margins.

An interesting fact that emerges from the elections is that in areas where the PPP secured victories, particularly to the National Assembly, it did so with wide margins. On an overall basis, the differences in votes was not as great in constituencies in Punjab and Sindh, where the PPP lost. The highest number of votes in the elections was polled by a PPP candidate, Maqsood Ahmad, in the NW74 Sialkot constituency. He polled 605,499 votes. Of the nine other candidates who secured the highest number of votes, seven belonged to the Peoples Party.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>They are M. Mohammad Ataullah (92,001), Sultan Ahmad (91,252), Ghulam Hyder Cheema (90,962), Maulana

The PPP could also claim that it enjoyed the privilege of conducting the cheapest possible campaign albeit on a single constituency basis. Dawn of December 11, 1970 reported that the Thatta constituency, in which Bhutto emerged victorious, witnessed the least expensive campaign in the political history of the area. Bhutto won the election reportedly without spending anything in terms of money; his two day tour of the area having generated sufficient enthusiasm in favour of his party to enable it to sweep the polls in the National Assembly elections.

#### Patterns in the PPP Victories -- and Reversals

We have seen that the PPP did not fare equally well in all areas in West Pakistan, although its landslide victories in Punjab and Sindh elevated it to the position of the dominant party. However, even in Punjab, the vote for the PPP did show distinct regional patterns. Craig Baxter, a political observer surmised that the party did well in the relatively prosperous areas of Lahore Division, eastern Multan Division and along the Grand Trunk Road as far as Rawalpindi, areas where industrial development has taken place and agriculturists are moderately prosperous landowners. Along the Indus River Valley, traditional factors continued to operate as representatives of the Islam

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Kausar Niazi (95,201), Malik Mehraj Khalid (84,421), Abbas Hussein Shah (87,064) and Mubashir Hasan (85,601).



Pasands won many national and provincial seats.<sup>11</sup>

This observation can be generally applied to the whole of West Pakistan to explain the PPPs marked victories and losses: on a province wide scale, the PPP made a far better showing in the more prosperous and modernized Punjab and Sindh than it did in NWFP, and backward Baluchistan.

A more detailed survey will necessitate the differentiation between the greater and lesser developed areas in West Pakistan. We have based our analysis on the results computed by S. J. Burki in a recent article.<sup>12</sup> Burki has constructed an index of modernization based on a weighing in equal proportions of three characteristics: urbanization, industrialization and education. Urbanization was defined in terms of the proportions of each district in the total urban population; similarly industrialization and education in terms of industrial output and literate population for the entire region. Although Burki's data is far from exhaustive for our purposes (not having accounted for all possible variables of modernization, and not having included all areas of Pakistan) it is still a valuable index.

On the basis of this combined index of modernization, the advanced parts of West Pakistan included eleven districts

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<sup>11</sup>See Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes, 1970," Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 3, March 1971, p. 213.

<sup>12</sup>See Shahid Javed Burki, "Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation," Asian Survey, Vol. XII, No. 3, March 1972, pp. 201-212.

in Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujrat, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Lahore, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Sargodha, Multan and Sahiwal), one in the North West Frontier Province (Peshawar) and two in Sindh (Karachi and Hyderabad). Twenty three districts were grouped together to constitute the intermediate region on the scale of modernization -- eight in Punjab,<sup>13</sup> nine in Sindh,<sup>14</sup> five in North West Frontier<sup>15</sup> and one in Baluchistan<sup>16</sup> and NWFP fell in the backward region category.

A look at the election returns<sup>17</sup> will indicate that, in Sindh and Punjab and NWFP, the PPP did best in the more advanced regions, within the context of its performance in individual states. Even within areas that the PPP did not win any seats, a distinction can be made, for it polled more votes in those that were on the advanced side of the advanced-backward continuum. Within the Punjab, the PPP suffered reverses at Jhang, D.G. Khan, Mianwali, Muzzafargarh and other less developed areas. In Sindh too the less developed areas of Sukkur and Sanghar, rejected the Peoples

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<sup>13</sup>Campbellpur, Jhang, Mianwali, D.G. Khan, Muzzafargarh, Bahawalpur, Bhawalnagar, and Rahim Yar Khan.

<sup>14</sup>Thatta, Dadu, Larkana, Nawabshah, Khairpur, Tharpar-kar, Jacobabad, Sanghar and Sukkur.

<sup>15</sup>Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Mardan, Kohat and Hazara.

<sup>16</sup>Quetta.

<sup>17</sup>For details of election returns, see Dawn, December 9, 10, 11, 19 and 20, 1970.

Party.<sup>18</sup> Successes registered in the advanced district of Hyderabad were greater in magnitude than victories in the "intermediate regions" (to use Burki's classification) of Larkana and Khairpur, although these did emerge as important PPP strongholds. Karachi's unique position as predominantly refugee settlement has been discussed earlier. This could in part explain the PPP, provincial election victory in Peshawar and Mardan within NWFP, although its alliance with the NAP, was the greater contributory factor.

#### Where Bhutto Lost to Mufti Mahmood

Mr. Bhutto's solitary defeat to Mufti Mahmud in the D. I. Khan constituency of the NWFP can also be understood in this context. D. I. Khan falls in the "intermediate region" of advancement which would register as a relatively developed region within the Frontier. This constituency did not reject Bhutto outright, as it did the NAP or the Awami League. Mr. Bhutto scored second in the race polling; 32,976 votes to Mahmood's 45,340. D. I. Khan, although an advanced region within NWFP, is still greatly influenced by religious and traditional values. Mahmud's party, the JUI (Hazarui) in addition to standing slightly left of centre on matters economic, retained a religious character which

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<sup>18</sup> Sukkur was one district in which the PPP failed to get even one out of six seats to the Provincial Assembly. It managed one out of three to the National Assembly. The party did not claim a single seat in Sanghar.

appealed to this constituency more than that the PPP had to offer in terms of Islamic socialism.

### What the Election Results Demonstrated

The election results made it clear that at least in Punjab, the old order had changed, that the politicization of the countryside had progressed much farther than expected, and that many an urban dweller was willing to seek what seemed radical solutions to his problems. One significance of the PPP's overwhelming victory in Punjab was that the refusal of the right-wing elements to deviate from the status quo rendered their own destruction.

Bhutto's victory proved that the influence of the landed gentry was no more the dominant factor in Punjab politics and the "baradari" (brotherhood) of caste and clan connections had broken down in this province. As noted earlier, the PPP did have allies among the landlords, but the more prosperous and influential of them were aligned to the Council Muslim League or Qayyum Khan's rival faction. It became apparent that an effective appeal could be made to the voter over the heads of the maliks, nawabs and sardars. The classic example is that of Multan in Punjab, where it was felt, "the scales would be tipped by feudal lords." Dawn reporting on Dec. 6, 1970 commented:

.... This area is dominated by feudal lords (Makhdooms and Nawabs) who are uncrowned kings in their respective areas, having absolute power

over the poor people. Nothing can be done without their approval... There are rival groups which are important -- one is the Gilari group and the other is the Qureshi group...

Contrary to speculation in political circles, scions of both these groups were defeated by the PPP candidates. Alamder Hussain Gilani who was a former provincial minister was defeated from the NW80 constituency of Multan by relatively unknown Sadiq Hussain. A similar fate befell Makhdoom Sajjad Hussain Qureshi in the Provincial Assembly election, when he was floored by Mukhtar Ahmad, polling 85 votes to the latter's 19,115. Maulana Hamid Ali Khan, of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (nominated by the Islamic Milttehada Mahaz of Multan), who was defeated by Bhutto in another Multan constituency during the National Assembly elections, drew the majority of his supporters from the Qureshi Baradari; but that did not alter his fate. Dawn, reporting on December 13, 1970, changed its earlier assumptions, saying:

... The general reaction of the residents of Multan city and Cantonment areas is now against feudal lords, and such politicians who have been in power for considerable periods, but did nothing to solve the problems of the town.

The newspaper quoted the labor class in particular as saying that they would not be misled by feudal lords and politicians who did not care for the improvement of the economic condition of this section. The case of Multan is not a solitary one. Families that had been represented in legislative bodies -- Qizilbash, Gilani, Noon, Shah Jiwana --

were defeated. Only in rare cases did feudal influences bring success; the Mianwali seat remained as always with the Kalabagh family, while a member of the old ruling family of Bahawalpur met with success in a constituency falling within the former state.

Those who foresaw a revival of the "Old Guard" in Punjab, and a result along tribal clan and feudal leadership were surprized. Perhaps the biggest surprise was the reduction of the CML which was generally expected to fare better in Punjab. In the changing mileu, therefore, the plethora of rightist parties sustained by the priveleged classes to maintain and protect their position was rejected by the masses. One inference that can be drawn from the returns in Punjab is that the province has ushered itself into a post aristocratic, or in Marxian terms a bourgeois democratic, stage of development.<sup>19</sup> There seemed to be an indication that people voted for parties in preference to personalities, but where the two factors combined (as they did in the case of Bhutto and the PPP) a happy medium was struck from the voters' point of view.

In Sindh, the pattern of support for the PPP differed from that of Punjab. Outside Karachi, the party was able to enlist many of the wadera and pir type of traditional leaders on its side. However, it was the younger and less

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<sup>19</sup>See M. B. Naqvi, op. cit., p. 221.



conservative members of the families who looked to the PPP as a political vehicle, for they were also attracted to the dynamic Sindhi personality who attained such popularity throughout the West wing. More conservative traditional leaders went to the various Muslim Leagues and (with one exception) were defeated in the National Assembly contests and did relatively poorly in provincial contests. Although the Sindhi face of the PPP has feudal elements, it enlisted a new type of landlord who is anxious to mechanize, to improve his lands, and to invest his income without impairing middle class interests.

As if to support the comment that the districts of the Indus Valley showed stronger traditional voting patterns, the Westward expansion of this area into the Frontier Province also showed similar tendencies. The PPP could not influence the average voter who still lives in a largely tribal society. Old feuds are seldom forgotten; the battles of 1947 are still being fought, as is demonstrated in the bitter rivalry between the Pakhtoon oriented NAP (Wali) and the Qayyum faction of the Muslim League. The NAP leadership is not landlord dominated and is (as far as the NWFP is concerned) a middle class movement. The QML is supported by subsidy receiving tribal leaders and the traditional class of contractors and bigger landlords. The NWFP did not return a clear majority of seats for any party at either the national or provincial level. This could mean,

among other things, that there exists some kind of a conflict between traditional forces and middle class interests. That the latter force might be emerging to the surface, is in itself significant.

While Baluchistan (which had never before witnessed an election) did not seem ready for the more radical solution of the socialist PPP, the traditional leadership of the Baluchistan States Union was giving way. The cracks were beginning to appear as the younger generation succeeded in minimizing the influence of the tribal chiefs and leaders.<sup>20</sup> For example, the defeat of the Prince of Kalat at the hands of Mir Baksh Bizenjo of the NAP, from the Mekran-cum-Karan-cum Lasbela, indicates this trend. Another significant victory was that of Mr. Hayee Baluch, President of the Baluch Students Organization. The son of a peasant, he defeated the son of the Khan of Kalat, Prince Yahya, a candidate of the QML. Even in Baluchistan, deference to feudal authority is being gradually replaced by other loyalties.

By and large in the West, voters were disinclined to return candidates who had served in public or military office in the 1965-69 period. Several former MNAs, particularly in Sindh, overcame the onus of association with the Ayub regime, and allied themselves with the People's Party.

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<sup>20</sup> See Dawn, December 6, 1970.

Only 44 out of the 64 who then supported the government contested. Of the 39 who contested at the National elections, only ten won; one as an independent and nine as PPP candidates.

Some of the pre-1958 politicians who had been made subject to the EBDO restrictions campaigned in the 1970 elections. As few as four EBDOians won National Assembly seats, and three made it in the provincial contest. The losers were more numerous, and included such former high office holders as Abid Hussain in Punjab, Qaze Akbar, Pirzada Abdus Sattar in Sindh and Colonel Amir Muhammad Khan of Hoti in the Frontier.

The election results tend to indicate that the Ulema groups of the religious oriented parties do not have much of a future in Pakistan. It seems that the public have begun to draw the distinction between ecclesiastical realms and secular and political realms. While Islam still remains a powerful force, no religious group can hope to carry the day, unless it identifies itself with the hankering for change.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, it is unlikely that the religious groups will unite successfully to meet what they consider "the challenge" of Bhutto. The dissensions among the ulema derive from abstruse theological disputes, and the adversity of elections has only aggravated mutual bitterness.

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<sup>21</sup>The relative success of the Hazarvi group of the Ulema, can be understood in this context.

The PPP rode to victory chiefly on the basis of its overwhelming influence among newly mobilized groups that are increasingly politicized. Though the successful PPP deputies come from a broad enough social spectrum, ranging from lower middle class to scions of old aristocratic houses, a big majority of them are from the middle class. The extent to which it is composed of small town professionals and urban middle class professionals indicates that the People's Party has become the vehicle of the involvement of these middle sector groups in Pakistani politics.

This is not to say that the traditional political elite (landlords, soldiers, civilian bureaucrats) and economic elite are out; rather their role has become reduced, at least temporarily and the lower (middle) classes have achieved some measure of prominence.<sup>22</sup>

### Causes of the PPP Victory

In the preceeding pages we have dealt with the implications of the PPP victory at the macro level and the economic and political and social inferences that can be made. It is also important to know, at the micro level, within the context of the election, what made the PPP victory possible. Some of these factors have already been discussed in Chapter III, and we shall touch upon the others here.

The PPP benefited immensely from the disunity that

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<sup>22</sup>Robert LaPorte, Jr. "Pakistan in 1972: Picking up the Pieces," Asian Survey, Vol. XIII, No. 2, February 1973, p. 196.

prevailed within the rightist elements like the Muslim Leagues and the religious oriented parties. Not only were they unable to form a united front against Bhutto, but their internal conflicts reduced valuable campaigning time. The factions of the Muslim League found it impossible to cooperate with each other. Even within the leftist NAP(W) the Achakzai faction with its demands of Baluchi separatism, constantly warred against the Khair Baksh Marri faction.

Large scale defections took place within the Muslim Leagues, while the PPP generally increased the number of its supporters. For example, when Sadiq Ali Memon, a former member of the National Assembly from Thatta joined the PPP, several of his supporters followed suit. Another classic case was the defection of Raja Amir Anwar Hussain (a National Assembly candidate from Rawalpindi) from the Jamiat Ulema i Islam (Thanvi) to the People's Party. Throughout the campaigning period newspapers reported defections from the QML to the Convention Muslim League (Nawabzada Azmat Ali), from the Convention League to the CML, from the Qayyum League to the Awami League, ad infinitum. The Qayyum Muslim League faced the most serious rifts within, owing to factional strifes.

The PPP also benefitted from the chaotic assignment of rightist candidates for various contests. Out of the 82 seats to the National Assembly from Punjab, to cite an example, there were as many as fourteen constituencies where

none of the three factions of the leagues contested, while in three constituencies all of them nominated one candidate each. It is possible that the near uniformity of the party platforms of the Leagues rendered them indistinguishable, making the choice difficult for the voter. The PPP platform stood refreshingly different from that of the rightist parties, and also from those who were credited to be left of centre. This could have been a contributory factor in the PPP success.

Part of the PPP success is explained by the fact that in areas where it was not strong enough, it supported Independent candidates, rather than adding to the list of party casualties. Notable among these was the support it gave Ali Hasan Manghi, for the National Assembly elections from a Sukkur constituency. Some of these independents later joined the party, like one Zafarullah Choudhury a National Assembly elect from Jehanian.

As a corollary, the PPP, unlike other parties, was successful in securing the retirement of certain independent candidates to strengthen the position of its own contestants. Notable among these was the retirement of Ghulam Nabi Memon, a former Law Minister from Hyderabad, in favor of Mr. Lal Mohammed, a PPP nominee.

The PPP also steered clear of cumbersome alliances, the forging of which took up a great deal of the time of rightist parties. These alliances were mostly dissolved



later, and in the event that they endured proved to be rather effete. Prominent among these ad hoc arrangements was the Sindh Muhajir Punjabi Pathan United Front support for Qayyum (which was withdrawn on October 31), the support of the Sheikh Baradari for the Jamaat-e-Islami in Sahiwal, the alliance between the Jamaat and the Pir of Pagaro for elections in select constituencies of Sindh. These alliances were entered between a dominant rightist party and a small religious or region oriented group. The collapse of the Islamic United Front demonstrates that few dominant rightist parties were able to work in unison. However, the PPP proved far more adept at forging a beneficial alliance than any of its rightist opponents. The PPP successfully turned the Wali-Qayyum rivalry to its advantage in the Provincial contest by entering into a well timed alliance with the NAP.

By keeping aloof from such alliances, the PPP also steered clear of conflicts that emerged as a result. The wastefulness of such internecine quarrels as took place between the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Islamic Front over the support of candidates; and between M. A. Khuhro and the Convention Muslim League, and among the Leagues, was prudently avoided by the PPP.

The last minute withdrawals from the polls of some rightist parties, left their allies in a quandry, and the voters in confusion. The PPP on the other hand benefitted,

as it faced the electorate as one unified party with no demoralizing in the ranks to ebb its strength. In the wake of the PPP success in the National Assembly elections, several parties, the Jamaat-e-Islami, in particular withdrew some of its candidates in the P. A. elections in a last minute bid to put up a common candidate of right wing parties. This belated and desperate attempt failed miserably.

While its opponents were involved in bickering and compromises, the PPP maintained an even tempo in its campaign. After the suspension of active canvassing (as required by the election rules) Bhutto continued to address press conferences in an attempt to keep in touch with the voters till the last possible hour.

We have thus seen how the PPP profited where its opponents floundered. The other -- the positive and active dimensions of the PPP victory have been highlighted in an earlier chapter dealing with the party's election campaign; however, some factors need to be reiterated in perspective.

#### Aspirations, Charisma, Culture and the PPP

We mentioned earlier that the People's Party is the beneficiary of a change in political culture that is underway in Pakistan. The role of the PPP, as we have seen, was by no means a passive one. It accomplished the realigning of the electorate in its favor by a shrewd assessment of the situation, and an intelligent response to it.

Charisma does not grow in isolation. Social, economic, political and not least, cultural factors mould it and dictate its direction. While it is conceivable that without Bhutto, the agitation that built up during the anti Ayub period would not have gained the momentum required to dislodge the regime; it is conceivable that without the social and economic deprivations that arose during the rule of Ayub, the Bhutto phenomenon, despite its charisma would not have become the social and political force it did in 1968, and again during the elections in 1970.

We are tempted, here, to draw from Ruth Ann Willner's brilliant study on charisma. She says of the charismatic leader, that more than other aspirant or available leaders, he is capable of combining the grievances of a variety of socially and psychologically disoriented individuals and groups into a collective grievance and a common political goal. More than other aspirant or available leaders, he is able to formulate or elaborate a compelling doctrine that embodies the private dreams and desires of many different people and that elevates these into a public and frequently millennial vision.<sup>23</sup> Bhutto did just this. By absorbing the largely economic priorities of the large masses into his program for action (as opposed to the priorities of the

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<sup>23</sup>Ruth Ann Willner, Charismatic Political Leadership: A Theory, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, May 1968, p. 72.

priveleged political and economic elite) he kept apace with the changing political milieu.

It is conceivable that the phenomenon of charismatic political leadership can emerge in a society only if somehow sanctioned by the culture of the society. It is conceivable that such leadership cannot be generated in a society whose cultural definition of leader-follower relations precludes strong personal authority and impassioned personal loyalties to a leader. Thus while it would seem that in modern Britain zealous adulation of a leader is "bad form," no such limitations exist in the Pakistani context.

It must also be remembered that perceptions of an action vary from culture to culture. The dominant value orientations in one culture may rank modes of action indicating forcefulness and strength higher than those indicating subtlety and persuasion; in another, the opposite ranking might constitute "propriety."

Bhutto's strength lay in that he catered to the values and proprieties of the masses of Pakistan in his election style. His charisma was directed to the public (from where the bulk of the votes came) and thus was indifferent to the British oriented and acquired proprieties of the numerically miniscule elite. In the challenges that he threw to opponents, as if in combat, in the stances of emotional indignation that he betrayed, he was seen by

the masses as a "lion among men." Those who understand the significance of the concept of "sher" (lion) and the related values of courage and bravery in the Pakistani context, will realize the political sagacity of the Bhutto-nian stand.

Among the strategies of invocation employed by charismatic political leaders have been acts and symbols designed to tap the various values of the important segments of their pluralistic societies, and to project their images as men who have not lost the common touch. For those people, to whom certain aspects of tradition and continuity may be reassuring in a changing world, Bhutto invoked Islamic and traditional symbols. The use of the "sword" as the election symbol of the PPP was in response to such sentiments. To those whom the vision and proclamation of a new and different order constitute part of the basis for charismatic appeal, Bhutto offered the egalitarian ideas of a socialistic program. His emphasis on people's politics and "Awami" constitution registered the participatory priorities of the changing political culture of Pakistan.

Successful political leaders tend to be particularly sensitive and responsive to the dominant values in their societies relevant to political strategies. Those leaders who become charismatic tend to exhibit an extraordinary sensitivity and responsiveness to them, especially in the initial stage of their leadership trajectory before their capacity to re-orient values is clearly manifested. Moreover, they are

probably more aware than their less successful competitors of the areas in which some of these values<sup>24</sup> are susceptible to change and manipulation

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<sup>24</sup>Willner, op. cit., p. 80.



C H A P T E R     V  
A FUTURE ROLE FOR THE PPP  
IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PAKISTAN

Introduction

Political parties can be viewed not only as products of their environment, but also as instruments of organized action for affecting that environment.

In previous chapters, we have sought to relate the emergence and the subsequent success of the People's Party to a process of political development that is taking place in Pakistan. In our introductory chapter we have attempted to delineate the important variables that, in our estimate, are fashioning this process. We have found the populace is increasingly defining a new set of priorities (chiefly economic) that political authority must respond to; that traditional views with regard to authority are being affected substantially; that the participatory urges of citizens are increasingly seeking gratification and above all, that the masses are beginning to emerge with new confidence in the belief that they can effectively fashion their political, economic and social environment. Our observation has been that the PPP success lay in a prudent recognition of the direction in which these changes were taking place and its deference to them. We have noted the incorporation of the mass political culture in the PPP platform, and also a

reflection in its stances of sensitivity to areas where this culture is changing and where it is not. The PPP role in the process of establishing itself and especially within the election framework was primarily on the adaptive end of an adaptive-mobilist continuum. Such a role seemed prudent and inescapable in the PPP quest for electoral support as a stepping stone to power.

After the election and the subsequent Bangla Desh debacle, the PPP has emerged as the ruling party of the new Pakistan. Will there then be a transformation of its adaptive role in the face of the new realities confronting Pakistan? If so, in what direction will the change take place and what will be the variables affecting the party's future role? This chapter will attempt a speculative analysis of possible future trends.

The results of an election are explicitly or implicitly manifested in a party's future role definition -- although elections are only one in a list of variables that shape role patterns. The magnitude of electoral support that a party receives determines in some measure its future assertiveness or timidity, its confidence or vacillation. The nature of the constituency that figured most prominently as a support base, will influence the kind of policy adopted and the party's program for action. In the particular case of a ruling party, the nature of the electorate responsible for its victory (and the expectations of this

electorate) will determine whether the party will play a predominantly subservient role, or whether it will be more active in moulding the perceptions of this electorate.

#### Future Role of the PPP -- Prospects for Mobilization?

The manner in which the PPP deals with the tasks and crises that confront Pakistan will define its role; and the role that the exigencies of the Pakistani situation and mass aspirations carve for it, will in turn, decide the manner in which crises are tackled. In effect, a cyclical relationship exists here.

The political problems of Pakistan in the post 1971 period and especially those of the PPP, seem to be (to mention a few broad issues) the materialization of national integration, the meeting of the aspirations of the increasingly politicized masses, the development of political rules of the game, relations between the Centre and provinces (political and economic) and a redefinition of the roles of political parties, the military and the bureaucracy.

In essence it is the case of political redevelopment or political readjustment to a rather startling set of events such as those usually associated with the post World War II colonial independence movements, to which the 'birth' of Bangladesh might be compared.

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<sup>1</sup>See Robert La Porte, Jr., "Pakistan in 1972: Picking up the Pieces," Asian Survey, February 1973, Vol. XIII, No. 2, p. 188.

It is a truism that in economically "developing" societies the balance between economic and political freedom is difficult to maintain, and the PPP's task becomes all the more complex. If the PPP is to successfully deliver its election promise of bringing distributive justice to Pakistan, it will have to strengthen its own position and secure itself in power. During the elections it had promised not merely slight incremental change, but a reconstruction of society on the basis of Islamic socialism, giving priority to the economic field. If, indeed, this social reconstruction is to be undertaken by the PPP then "mobilization"<sup>2</sup> seems to be a possible tool for enhancing support, and getting recalcitrants to see the party's point of view. Although the existence of opposition parties might limit a purely mobilist role, the PPP has access to the state's repressive powers, if it desires to use them.

In an overall sense, the PPP has done exceedingly well in the elections, but it would be a mistake to overlook the fact that 62 out of 100 votes cast in West Pakistan went against it. It would thus be in the interests of the PPP to arouse a sense of public participation, not directly

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<sup>2</sup>For a fuller discussion of the distinction between adaptive and mobilist parties, and techniques of mobilization employed by party governments, see M. Weiner and J. LaPalombara, Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 400-427.

in decision making, but in carrying out the goals for which its constituency lent support. Thus, in order to effect a nationwide attitudinal change, it is conceivable that the PPP will gradually move toward the mobilist end of the continuum. The regime may be concerned with developing a subjective sense of participation.

The benefits of mobilization, however, are not too easily available to the People's Party. The use of the coercive powers of the State, alone, may not carry the day. Ayub's fall can definitely be a pointer in this direction. The PPP will have to maintain credibility among the populace; and find some basis for legitimizing its new authority in order to win popular support not only for the new government, but for the system of government that it formulates. During the early phases of party development it is common for pre-existing political groups -- a landed aristocracy or a military elite or religious groups -- to continue to exercise, or attempt to exercise, an emotional hold on certain sections of the populace. This is especially common in political systems in which parties are the outgrowth of changes in urban areas, are based primarily on urban support, and are confronted by some rural interests supporting the military or a landed oligarchy.<sup>3</sup> The PPP must therefore attempt to gain wide acceptance throughout the society for

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 408.

the political rules of the game that it establishes.

How then, can this be achieved? Our analysis seems to indicate that while the process of political development has sharpened the participatory urges of the people, the urge for distributive justice seems even stronger. The desire for social justice, in the form of a more equitable distribution of the society's wealth and more consumer as opposed to capital goods and a demand for greater social and economic opportunities are becoming increasingly manifest. This is happening before substantial economic growth has occurred in Pakistan. The margin of growth which made it possible for some countries, like the United States, to satisfy the demands of the working classes is absent in Pakistan. The PPP might, therefore, have to engage itself in reducing the economic gap if it is to mobilize support and demonstrate by its actions that it will redeem its pledge. It seems unlikely that the majority of the people of Pakistan will extend their support to or tolerate in office any government that seems hesitant to alter the economic status quo. The mood in Pakistan, does not warrant self aggrandizement or exploitative authoritarianism. The trend seems to indicate that a bureacratic or a military authoritarianism might not be tolerated, at least at present, in Pakistan. Ayub Khan's government lost legitimacy with the Pakistani people mainly because they perceived it as the ally of the exploiting groups in society. Political



repression undoubtedly added fuel to the fire, but it seems unlikely that it existed as the isolated cause of discontent. If a case can be made for the return of authoritarianism in Pakistan, it must take note of the fact that given the present mood there, the only authoritarianism that seems likely to survive is one that is ideologically oriented and left of centre.

While it is conceivable, therefore, that the PPP will attempt to become a mobilist party, it is equally conceivable, that mass aspirations and expectations will force the PPP to move further leftward and, as a tactic of survival, this will be the direction in which the PPP will mobilize.

This concern with distribution in developing societies emerges from the fact that among the broad range of concerns that may lead to political demands, many are indeed material. Even if we consider the crisis of participation or the central value of equality cited in James Coleman's "development syndrome,"<sup>4</sup> it is seen that the

demand to participate, to achieve equality as a citizen, may be and often is motivated by a great range and complexity of aspirations, from the calculated desire to exercise power in one's own material interest to the moral insistence that each citizen be accorded one vote in the

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<sup>4</sup>See James Coleman, "The Development Syndrome: Differentiation - Equality - Capacity," in Crises and Sequences in Political Development, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 73-100.

selection of those who will govern.<sup>5</sup>

The desire for equality implies redistribution, and aims at more or less profound changes in systems of stratification. For the developing nation, the responses to distribution demands, greatly escalated by mass participation, will determine the nature in which legitimacy problems may be resolved. In these circumstances, the pressure to resort to coercion or mobilization ideologies may be overwhelming.<sup>6</sup> We might speculate then that this could be the case with Pakistan.

Experienced in activism (during the anti-Ayub movement) and having felt a sense of personal efficacy in affecting their environment, the present generation of Pakistanis are not likely to lapse into quiescence. If economic aspirations are not met, the recourse to extra legal activity by the masses seems conceivable. It is unlikely that the masses will abdicate both their participatory urges and economic aspirations at the same time.

The initial years in office for the PPP, thus seem the most challenging. If it does not wish to risk tumult and expressed discontent before the benefits of promised economic distribution becomes manifest, the party must

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<sup>5</sup>LaPalombara, Joseph, "Distribution: A Crisis of Resource Management," in Crises and Sequences in Political Development, op. cit., p. 234.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 282.

mobilize support and create at least a subjective sense of participation. At the same time it must demonstrate effectively that steps are being taken in the direction of Islamic socialism.

The direction in which the PPP travels is also deeply tied up with the actions of Mr. Bhutto as President. We shall now attempt to review some post-election stances of President Bhutto, to give substantiveness to our speculations.

### Activities of the PPP Regime

1. Domestic Political Activities of Bhutto. Bhutto's first series of political moves were made to indicate to the people and to prospective opponents that the old regime was out and that he was in command of the situation. He proceeded to dispense with those groups that the masses considered as "agents of exploitation." Bhutto moved against ex-President Yahya Khan and Army Chief of Staff, General Abdul Hamid Khan, and appointed a Commission of Enquiry to investigate the military crackdown in East Pakistan. By arresting the chief representatives of the old regime, he indicated to Pakistanis that the situation had changed -- a subtle political move designed to establish control without eroding popular support.

Bhutto also sought to eliminate potential rivals long before they had the opportunity to "plot" against him.

This involved "demoting" those individuals who had helped in effecting the transfer of power from Yahya to Bhutto. The removal of Lt. General Gul Hasan, acting C-in-C since December 1971, and Air Marshal Rahim Khan along with six other military leaders was undertaken according to President Bhutto, "to prevent professional soldiers from becoming professional politicians."<sup>7</sup> Hasan and Rahim Khan were placated with ambassadorial positions. Bhutto replaced Hasan with Tikka Khan, the senior most field officer. His important qualification, from Bhutto's point of view, is his political non-involvement and his reputation for severity established in putting down an uprising in Baluchistan in 1962-63, and later in operations in East Pakistan. Bhutto may have intended through his appointment, to serve warning to potential trouble makers in Baluchistan and NWFP. Air Marshall Zafar A. Chaudhry, a quiet industrious officer from the minority Qadiani sect, replaced Rahim Khan.

In addition to the military shakeup, Bhutto dismissed 1,300 civil servants under Martial Law Order 114, to demonstrate that he would not permit obstructions to his policy

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<sup>7</sup>The disorders that rocked Pakistan in January - February 1972, highlighted by the strike of policemen in Hyderabad, Lahore and Peshawar, prompted these military leaders to indulge in the speculation that the armed forces might soon have to take over the country. This wishful thinking appears to have alarmed Bhutto. Another report indicated that Gul Hasan had had a series of private meetings with Wali Khan (leader of NAP in the NWFP) and had refused to inform President Bhutto of the nature of these discussions.

and program. By April 1972, real, potential or imaginary opponents in the civil service and the military had been dismissed or replaced with individuals more to Bhutto's liking. Bhutto has gone further than anyone before him in curbing the power of the Army and the bureaucracy. In fact, the constitution promulgated in 1973, does not provide the guarantees of tenure and status to higher civil servants that the earlier constitutions had. Bhutto wishes to demonstrate that the Civil Service is no more the formidable power centre it used to be.

In the initial phase, Bhutto's principal objective has been to maintain his own power and authority in the country. At the same time, he has demonstrated extreme unwillingness to tolerate opposition even from within his own official family. The resignation of Mahmud Ali Kasuri,<sup>8</sup> as Minister of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, and the subsequent harassment of this leader by PPP politicians (especially Governor Mustapha Khar of Punjab) in October 1972 points to this fact. Kasuri was later expelled from the party in March 1973.

The new Pakistan is more compact and homogeneous than

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<sup>8</sup>The resignation is reported to have been the result of irreconcilable differences between Bhutto and Kasuri over the powers of the executive as embodied in the Draft constitution. Kasuri is said to have a deep commitment to Parliamentary democracy with legislative checks on the executive.

the old, but the economic and political preponderance of Punjab is now even greater. Sind has benefited from industrial and commercial development, and has less reason for resentment against a Punjabi dominated centre than NWFP or Baluchistan. But even Sind has lately been eager to assert its separate identity as reflected in the demands for the use of Sindi as the language of administration in the province. However, in Sind and Punjab the PPP controls the government. Bhutto's cousin, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, is the Chief Minister of Sind and long standing supporter Khar is Governor of Punjab. Both are considered to be strong men in their respective provinces. In the crucial issue of centre-State relations, Bhutto's largest problem lies in the NWFP and Baluchistan. In both these provinces the National Awami Party, and the hand picked men of Wali Khan were in control. Bhutto's strategy seemed to be one of circumscribing the NAP's ability to govern with the goal of replacing NAP governments in both provinces. Robert La-Porte, an observer of Pakistani politics has observed that political harassment by PPP officials in both provinces, a fair amount of "touring" by PPP central government officials in both provinces, coupled with accusations by PPP officials of "plotting" and "disloyalty to Pakistan" on the part of the NAP and Wali Khan, are some of the tactics which have been employed.<sup>9</sup> Bhutto's concern has been how to maintain

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<sup>9</sup> See Robert La Porte, Jr., op. cit., p. 191.



both provinces within the Pakistan Union without compromising his own authority and that of his party. A fragile peace that had been worked out in 1972 with the opposition NAP, was threatened by Bhutto's actions in late February '73. In a bid to strengthen his hold, he ousted Governor Bizenjo and Chief Minister Ataullah Khan Mengal of Baluchistan and NWFP Governor Arbab Sikander Khan Khalil, all popularly elected leaders of the NAP. In their place he appointed the more sympathetic Akbar Khan Bugti and Aslam Khattak as the respective governors of Baluchistan and NWFP.<sup>10</sup> Bhutto also sent troops into Baluchistan, under Tikka Khan, to put down tribesmen sympathetic to the ousted governor. The discovery of large stocks of arms in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad, prompted Bhutto to claim that the arms had been smuggled in to aid a civilian coup against him and suggest that the NAP was involved in the incident. The alleged plot led to the ouster of the Iraqi ambassador, the sack of the two governors and the dispatch of additional troops into Baluchistan -- although the demands of the Azad (Free) Baluchistan and Pushtunistan (Pathan Nation)

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<sup>10</sup> President's rule was established in the two provinces till mid April, following which a three man cabinet headed by Jam Ghulam Qadir (QML) and including Yusuf Magsi (PPP) and Maulvi Hasan (JUI) was formed in Baluchistan. Governor Bugti claimed he had called on Qadir because he was convinced that Qadir had a majority in the provincial Assembly. In NWFP a cabinet headed by I. K. Gandapur in a PML(Q) -- United Front -- PPP combine was instituted. See Pakistan Times, April 28 and 30, 1973.

groups probably had a great deal to do with it.<sup>11</sup>

Bhutto's strategy in Baluchistan and NWFP, however, is not one of simple repression -- it is that of playing one group against the other. In these areas he is aligning himself with the power centres opposed to, or willing to oppose the NAP. Baluchistan, outside of Quetta City and perhaps Kalat, is still a tribal society. Bugti is the head of a tribe and commands the following of some other tribes hostile to the Mengal and Bizenjo tribes. Bugti was once with NAP, but Bhutto has lured him away. In NWFP, Bhutto has aligned himself with Qayyum Khan, in 1972 who enjoys a considerable following in the province.

However, with regard to certain Bhuttonian tactics, cracks were beginning to appear, even within the party. The governor of Sindh, Mir Rasul Baksh Talpur, resigned in protest against what he called "a wicked power hungry clique."<sup>12</sup>

The PPP is still far from a national party. Its main support comes from Punjab and Sind. Given Bhutto's preference for a strong centre, the differences over centre-state relations may yet prove difficult and divisive. The task of establishing a sense of legitimacy in a competitive

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<sup>11</sup>"Under the Velvet Glove," Time, March 5, 1973, pp. 24-28.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

party system, would involve for the PPP -- mobilizing popular support and maintaining cohesion within the party. Although its predominant complexion is middle class, the PPP is still a coalition in as much as it consists of middle class professionals, Sind and Punjab landlords, industrial workers, students, agrarian proletariat and few selected landlords. In order to carry out the socialistic program for which it was primarily elected, the party will have to evolve a resistance to possible pulls in diverse directions as a result of this coalition. The extent to which Bhutto is able to restrain the regional tendencies of his predominantly Sindi and Punjabi membership, will determine the continued cohesiveness of the PPP. Although 86 of the total 144 seats of the National Assembly are held by members of the PPP, some observers have noted that the actual opposition to Bhutto within the Assembly might be larger, totaling as much as 88 (the 58 non-PPP members, along with a dissident group of 30 PPP members.)<sup>13</sup> However, with a view to strengthening the party, and possibly developing secondary leadership, it was decided by the PPP (particularly Mr. Bhutto) early in 1973 that no individual could hold party office and public office simultaneously.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>See Werner Adam, "Pakistan in Search of a New Identity," Swiss Review of World Affairs, November 1972, p. 10.

<sup>14</sup>On the basis of information given by Sajjad Naseer, a Pakistani political scientist, who was on a recent visit conducting research in Pakistan.

The building of credibility for the PPP depends to a great extent on the delivering of the economic promises it made during the election. The first year of Bhutto's presidency was marked by seemingly "bold" economic reforms. These gave him a chance to strike the right radical note by making a show of force against "agents of exploitation." This had never happened before, on such a scale, and it enhanced its impact on the people.

## 2. Internal Economic Activities of Bhutto -- a Delivering of Promises?

(a) The twenty two families: Bhutto put the rich in the dock by demanding the return of funds taken out of Pakistan by them. Passports of some 200 persons -- belonging mostly to the notoriously rich "22 families" -- were impounded, to convey the message that the government intended to back up its threat by action. Some arrests were also made, both of businessmen and of top officials in key economic assignments.<sup>15</sup> These included General Habibullah, Ahmed Dawood, and Fakhruddin Valika -- all of them from the roster of the 22 families. The two officials sent to jail were S. U. Durrani, Managing Director of the State Bank of Pakistan, and Rear Admiral U. A. Sayeed, Chairman of National Shipping corporation.

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<sup>15</sup> Bhutto released all his "economic prisoners" in late January 1972.

(b) Takeover of industry. In the economic arena, one of Bhutto's first moves was the seizure of the management of 20 private firms, with assets of at least \$200 million.<sup>16</sup> Eleven more companies were placed under government supervision, later in the month. The industries that were taken over fell into ten categories among them iron and steel, heavy engineering, heavy electricals, assembly and manufacture of motor vehicles and tractors, petrochemicals, cement and public utilities. This move did not affect foreign owned firms or investment and in fact, was not a "pure" form of nationalization, since only the management of the firms was affected and not ownership. In addition, cotton textile manufacturing, the largest single industrial group in Pakistan, and also the larger foreign exchange earner, was not affected. The managing agency institution was abolished. Although the agency was intended to provide local management services, it led to increased economic concentration as well as many abuses. Agencies often skimmed profits from the managed firms to the detriment of individual shareholders by manipulating selling or buying arrangements.<sup>17</sup> The only industry to be completely nation-

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<sup>16</sup>See "Bhutto Seizes Industry," The Washington Post, January 3, 1972.

<sup>17</sup>For a comprehensive discussion of the operations of the Managing Agency, see Delip Mukherjee, Z. A. Bhutto: Quest for Power, Delhi: Vikas, 1972, pp. 191-194.



alized under Bhutto was insurance.

At the same time, Bhutto's government has offered repeated assurances to businessmen and industrialists and to the "creative and humane landowner." The message being circulated is that although some changes had to be made, the Bhutto Government is neither anti-foreign investment, nor anti-capitalism per say, but this might be mere speculation. In May 1972, Bhutto told a group of Karachi businessmen:

You are at liberty to make reasonable profits as a reward for hard work and efficient use of talent and resources... We have no intention of curbing the freedom of the individual to pursue his vocation. We accept that private enterprise has a role to play in the economic progress of Pakistan....<sup>18</sup>

(c) Land reforms. On March 1, 1972, Bhutto announced his land reforms, in which he lowered the maximum limit on individual ownership of land from 500 to 150 irrigated acres, and from 1,000 to 300 non-irrigated acres. On April 23, the upper limit of permissible land holdings was reduced to 240 acres.<sup>19</sup> Along with the ceiling Bhutto decreed several changes in the landlord-tenant relationship to restrain eviction and prohibit "begar" or free labor, required by landlords. It was laid down that landlords

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<sup>18</sup>See "Bhutto Follows a Capitalistic Path," The New York Times, June 4, 1972.

<sup>19</sup>For a fuller discussion of Bhutto's economic reforms see Delip Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 177-206.



would henceforth be responsible for providing seed, while the cost of the remaining inputs would be shared equally. Liability for payment of water rates and other agricultural taxes was shifted from tenants to landlords throughout the country. Although time alone can prove the economic impact of these changes, Bhutto deserves credit for having made the effort to cut down in size the feudal elements in the country. However, the land reforms effected to date does not measure up to his pre-office promise of 12 acres to each Pakistani peasant.

(d) Labour policy. Along with dealing with businessmen in early January 1972, Bhutto, proclaiming a "new labor policy,"<sup>20</sup> offered to raise the workers' share in the annual profits of the undertaking from two percent fixed by Ayub in 1968 to four percent. If workers improved their productivity, they would be entitled to a share of 10 percent in the increased profits. Bhutto stipulated that employers would have to give reasons explicitly in writing before terminating the services of an employee. Workers participation in management "to the extent of 20 percent at the factory level." The role of work councils was enlarged to serve as a forum for discussion of collective disputes. Employers were made responsible for providing free education

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<sup>20</sup>The labour policy was outlined in a broadcast made on February 10, 1972. The text was issued by the Press Information Department, Government of Pakistan.

up to the school leaving stage for one child of each worker. A promise was made to provide old age pensions and compulsory group insurance, while the two percent of wages, contributed by workers towards medicinal benefits was waived. At the same time a warning was issued to strikers and demonstrators against "unruly and rowdy practices."

In addition, Bhutto introduced substantial education reforms, with a view to making the system more socialistic. Private schools were nationalized and education made free up to the eighth class.

Although Bhutto's economic reforms to date are not as sweeping as his "capitalistic" critics suspected or his socialist supporters hoped, the fact that he has made a bold attempt at bringing about economic change cannot be denied. It must be kept in mind that the PPP is faced with dual task of delivering its economic promises and at the same time consolidating its position.

In his political activity, Bhutto has sought a balance between political freedom and political repression. A possible tendency for authoritarianism in the PPP can be discerned. (One wonders whether the party is likely to apply to its future opponents similar standards and patterns of repression to which it was subjected.) Ironically, the government has come down with rather a heavy hand, to deal with the forces that its cry for distributive justice and political freedom has unleashed. After Bhutto's taking

office, peasants had pitched battles with landlords in NWFP, and occupied their land, workers seized a rayon factory in Lahore, industrial workers went on strike in Karachi, paralyzing industry. The government balanced these tactics by police and military action. An early move on the part of the regime was to lift press and other media controls. Soon after, however, (as has been mentioned in an earlier chapter) several leading editors, publishers and newsmen were arrested displaying Bhutto's lack of inhibition in settling old scores.

Another disconcerting element that has appeared on the scene, are the paramilitary forces that political parties have raised. Bhutto's "People's Guards," headed by his advisor on national security, Major General Akbar Khan (ret'd.), is 12,000 strong,<sup>21</sup> and is a cause of anxiety to PPP's rivals. Wali Khan is quoted as saying that the guards remind him of Hitler's stormtroopers. Wali Khan, too, has his own "Zalme Pakhtoon" volunteers. These two party militias have been known to freely settle political arguments in Peshawar and other towns of NWFP. The PPP manifesto had posited the formation of a "people's army," to act as an agent of national defence.<sup>22</sup> The rationale given for the People's Guard is that it performs service functions

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<sup>21</sup>See Illustrated Weekly of India, February 18, 1973, p. 39.

<sup>22</sup>See Election Manifesto of PPP, 1970, p. 50.

-- as it did during a strike of policemen in Lahore in early 1973. However, the People's Guard has been engaging in considerable violence and intimidation of political rivals. One wonders whether these are merely outbursts of over-enthusiastic PPP activists, or whether the purpose is fascist with the Guard acting as an agent of coercion for the government.

The PPP also seems intent upon involving the masses in confrontations it has with its rivals. One has heard about opposition parties mobilizing support and organizing processions (in democratic countries) against the government of the day. In Pakistan the reverse also seems to happen. The ruling party is taking a stance of "confrontation," and political opponents are being declared enemies of the people. A recent incident involving Asghar Khan is worth mentioning to illustrate these government tactics.<sup>23</sup> The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal chief at a press conference on April 27, 1973 at Lahore, alleged that democratic means of expressing political views had practically come to an end. Asghar Khan claimed that when Tehrik workers gathered at Kamoke (in Punjab) to attend a scheduled meeting, which was to be addressed by him, they were apprehended by a large number of people, who resorted to firing and manhandling. A jeep carrying nine Tehrik supporters was stopped by PPP

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<sup>23</sup>The incident involving Asghar Khan and the reaction of government has been given coverage in Pakistan Times, April 28 - 30, 1973.

workers patrolling the area and the workers were abducted. The Air Marshall called Bhutto a "sick man," "thoroughly evil," "insane," and a "dictator" and said that once the politics of bullets was resorted to by the party in power, "why did they forget that a bullet could also turn towards the Head of the State."

The government response to this outburst is interesting and indicative of the tactics of the ruling party. Several PPP dignitaries, including Miraj Khalid, Chief Minister of Punjab, and Iftikhar Ahmad Tari, Punjab minister for communications and works, exhorted the people and PPP workers to take out a procession to protest Asghar Khan's statement. Strong threats were used. Said Khaled,

if anyone hurls abuse at the President, he will have to incur the wrath of the people.

The people of Lahore have complete faith in the Quaid i Awam, Z.A. Bhutto, and the procession would be another manifestation of the same faith. ... We will not allow Mr. Asghar to use such undemocratic methods, and from now on he will not be able to hold any public meeting anywhere in Punjab,

said Ahmad Tari. A massive rally was held by PPP workers in Lahore in which the effigy of Asghar Khan was burnt, and thousands shouted "Down with Asghar, the traitor." The rally was addressed by various ministers of Punjab, in which they warned the delinquent of the consequences of the violence he preached. Newspapers, too carried editorials admon-

ishing Asghar Khan for going "berserk."<sup>24</sup> Mobilizing mass support for what are obviously repressive measures against threatening elements, is a tactic in which the government has so far met with success. It also seems possible that while these tactics may intimidate some opponents, a growing fear of Bhutto's authoritarian propensities might create factions<sup>25</sup> within the party and strengthen the opposition. At any rate it is interesting to note that the PPP, in its role as the ruling party at the centre, is acting like a party of pressure and confrontation, and not so much like a party of consensus.

Again, those familiar with Pakistani newspapers since the PPP took over, will notice the free use of Marxian dialect and rhetoric in the speeches of PPP leaders, openly calling for a "class struggle." The words "reactionary," "feudalistic," "exploitative" are freely used to describe moneyed landowners. At the same time industrialists and businessmen are being urged to go in for such ventures which would help generate more production and employment

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<sup>24</sup> See Pakistan Times, April 29, 1973.

<sup>25</sup> A rebel group of the PPP was opening consultations with Asghar Khan, relating to "ways to promote mutual co-operation for carrying on a united struggle for complete democracy in the country. This group comprises Mahmud Ali Kasuri, Mir Rasul Baksh Talpur, Mir Ahmed Talpur, Anwar Ali Noon, Manzoor Dhadra, Ahmad Raza Qasuri. See Pakistan Times, April 28, 1973.



opportunities.<sup>26</sup> The celebration of May Day for the first time in 1973, and the declaration of a public holiday, are indicative of the PPP move to initiate the masses into some symbolic essentials of socialist practice.<sup>27</sup>

In spite of all these tactics, it goes to the credit of the PPP (and particularly Bhutto) that it was able (after lengthy negotiations) to elicit support of all other political parties for the Draft Constitution. It was adopted by an absolute majority, with only two members of the National Assembly abstaining. The major task before the elected body has been successfully accomplished. The support that the PPP was able to gather is all the more surprising, since the constitution contains clauses that will make Bhutto's position stronger, and continue his rule for another fifteen years. The "constitution," however, guarantees a federal, parliamentary and democratic form of government. The spirit of (Islamic) socialism pervades, and for the first time in the history of Pakistan, the Preamble of the Constitution emphasizes economic justice in the following enunciation:

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<sup>26</sup> See Finance Minister, Mubashir Hasan's address to industrialists and businessmen, Pakistan Times, April 29, 1973.

<sup>27</sup> Several rallies were organized and processions attended by the PPP workers and labourers and trade unionists all over Pakistan. Bhutto, in a May Day message, pledged the government to secure a "better deal" for industrial and agricultural labor.

The State shall ensure the elimination of all forms of exploitation and the gradual fulfillment of the fundamental principle of, from each according to his ability, and to each according to his work.<sup>28</sup>

### Conclusion

The "crises" that the Pakistani polity faced contributed to a desire for change in the minds of the people. Since industrialization and social mobilization had altered in some measure, the traditional bonds of society, there was a redefinition of priorities on the part of the masses -- stressing the equality factor in the development syndrome.

The appeal of the PPP in the 1970 election seemed irresistible, because it emphasized the equality factor in its strategy for eliciting support. Its program of Islamic Socialism seemed the correct answer to the crisis of distribution and legitimacy. It is still to be seen how the PPP grapples with the problem of penetration.<sup>29</sup> The experience of East Pakistan secession has demonstrated that the imposition of unpopular processes is no dependable remedy. It goes to the credit of the PPP that the new constitution

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<sup>28</sup>Quoted in Pakistan Times, April 29, 1973. Robert La Porte has enunciated some salient points of power allocation in the Draft Constitution in "Pakistan in 1972: Picking up the Pieces," Asian Survey, February 1973, p. 192.

<sup>29</sup>To an extent the disinclination on the part of the PPP to compromise its power precipitated the crisis which eventually led to the break up of Pakistan.

gives more power to the provinces than any previously formulated constitution. However, in addition, other political, economic and social processes need to be instituted to forge a sense of national identity and unity.

The PPP success seems to depend to a large extent on a continual internalizing of mass aspirations and priorities. Any political system in which the governing group has to display continual sensitivity to mass priorities in order to survive, says something for the political maturity of its citizenry.

Our observations in this chapter, being futuristic, are necessarily tentative. The PPP and Bhutto have been in power for less than two years, and some severe problems with India and Bangla Desh (like the POW question) remain to be solved. If and when these are solved, Bhutto will be more free to push policies and programs on the domestic front with greater vigor. The next few years will show more fully which direction Pakistan's political development is going to take.

TABLE I

IMPORTANT MEETINGS ADDRESSED BY PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE PPP

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>NWFP</u>		
Peshawar	Jan. 1, '70	Mass rally and public meeting by PPP
	Jan. 18	Bhutto's first public meeting
	Jan. 19	Bhutto meets with prominent members of the Bar Association
	Jan. 20	Bhutto attends a big students' reception
	Feb. 25	Bhutto addresses public meeting
	August 17,	Hayat Khan Sherpao --- PPP organizer in the NWFP addressed a public meeting
	Sept. 6,	Bhutto addressed a public meeting at Peshawar airport
	Sept. 26	Mian Mahmud Ail Kasuri addresses a public meeting
	Oct. 7,	Bhutto speaks at a reception arranged by traders
	Oct. 21	Kasuri a prominent member addresses a public meeting
	Nov. 2,	Hkhan Sherpao, addresses a big public meeting

TABLE I -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>NWFP</u>		
Peshawar	Nov. 6, '70	Bhutto addressed women workers asking them to vote PPP into power
Mardan	Feb. 25	Bhutto addresses public meeting
Hatian village in Mardan Dist.	May 1,	Bhutto addressed public meeting
Swabi Tehsil	June 21	Hayat Khan Sherpao addresses public meeting
Dera Ismail Khan	June 25	Sherpao addresses public meeting
Chitral	July 11	Mr. Sherpao addresses a public meeting
Mingora village in Swat	Sept. 10	Bhutto addresses a public meeting
<u>PUNJAB</u>		
Rawalpindi	Jan. 11	Tashkent Day Public meeting
	June 25	A prominent PPP member, Haq Nawaz Gandapur, addresses public meeting
Kahuta town (near Rawalpindi)	July 8	Bhutto addressed big public meeting
Kalar Syedan (near Rawalpindi)	July 11	Bhutto addressed public meeting

TABLE I -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>PUNJAB</u>		
Rawalpindi	Sept. '70	Bhutto addressed public meeting at Fateh Jang, Khaur and Talagang
	Nov. 8	Bhutto addresses crowds at a massive procession on his way to Hyderabad
Jhelum	Jan. 21	Bhutto addresses public meeting
Lahore	Jan. 4	Bhutto addresses public meeting
	Feb. 14	Bhutto addresses party workers rally
	March 7	Reception to Bhutto by students
	March 8	Bhutto addresses public meeting
	March 17	Bhutto addresses an impromptu Press conference
	June 7	Bhutto addressing a Press conference
	Aug. 6 & 7	Bhutto addresses public meetings
Burki (a village near Lahore)	Sept. 7	Bhutto addresses a public meeting
Lahore	Oct. 3	Bhutto at a reception arranged by traders
	Oct. 4	At Gol Bagh, Bhutto addresses public meeting



TABLE I -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>PUNJAB</u>		
Lahore	Nov. 3 & 4	Bhutto addresses various roadside meetings during campaign at Lahore
	Nov. 29	H. M. Ali Kasuri, Vice Pres. of PPP at public meeting refutes the allegation that PPP has links with capitalists
	Dec. 9	K. M. Kasuri thanks people for enthusiastic support at elections
Lyallpur	Jan. 31	Bhutto addresses a mammoth public meeting
Gujrat	March 1,	Bhutto addresses public meeting
Murree	July 9	Bhutto addresses public meeting
Kasur	Aug. 9	Bhutto addresses public meeting
Muzzafergarh	July 29	Bhutto addresses public meeting
Mumtazabad	Aug. 1	Bhutto inaugurates party office
Timargarm	Aug. 2	Bhutto addresses public meeting
Multan (at Behari)	Aug. 3	Bhutto addresses public meeting
	Sept. 24 & 25	Bhutto addresses public meetings
Garth Mahraaj (near Multan)	Sept 27	Bhutto addresses public meeting

TABLE I -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>PUNJAB</u>		
Garth Mahraj	Nov. 8	Bhutto addressed 20 public meetings from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. during a whirlwind tour
Multan	Dec. 4	Bhutto addressing a big procession taken out in his honor
Bahawalnagar	Aug. 27	Bhutto addresses a public meeting
Gujar Khan	Nov. 7	Bhutto addresses big public meeting
<u>SIND</u>		
Karachi	Jan. 2	Bhutto speaks at Karachi Press club
	Jan. 6 & 7	Bhutto addresses public meetings
	April 12	Bhutto addresses public meeting
	May 9	Bhutto addressing public meeting
Malir (13 miles from Karachi)	July 26	Bhutto addresses public meeting
Memoozikon (near Karachi)	Sept. 20	Bhutto addresses public meeting
Karachi	Nov. 21	Bhutto addresses public meeting

TABLE I -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>SIND</u>		
Hyderabad	Jan. 13	Bhutto addressing a crowd which welcomed him at a railway station
Hyderabad	Jan. 11	Tashkent Day celebration addressed by Bhutto
	March 24	Bhutto addresses a big public meeting
	March 26	Bhutto addresses members of Hyderabad Bar Association
	March 31	Bhutto addresses a big public meeting
	Sept 21	Bhutto addresses public meeting
Kotri (near Hyderabad)	Dec. 15	Bhutto addresses public meeting (after N.A. electiona and before Provincial Assembly elections)
Larkana	Feb. 23	Bhutto addresses big public meeting
	June 18	Bhutto addresses a public meeting
	Aug. 17	Bhutto addresses a rally of party workers
Outskirts of Larkana	Sept. 17	Bhutto addresses public meeting
	Oct. 13	Bhutto addresses public meeting

TABLE I -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>SIND</u>		
Near Larkana at Shahdadt	Oct. 19	Bhutto addresses a big public meeting
	Oct. 31	Bhutto addresses a gathering
	Dec. 3	Bhutto addresses public meeting - claims credit for Ayub's downfall
Nawabshah	Jan. 14	Bhutto addresses public meeting of Sindh Students Federation
Mirpurkhas	March 27	Jampacked public meeting addressed by Bhutto
Jhudder	March 29	Bhutto addresses a huge public meeting
Sukkur	April 11	Bhutto addresses public meeting
	Oct. 21	Bhutto addresses a press conference
Khairpur	May 18	Bhutto addresses public meeting
	Dec. 14	Bhutto addresses public meeting
Chakwal	May 26	Bhutto addresses press conference
Liaqutabad	Sept. 23	Bhutto addresses public meeting
Jacobabad	Dec. 3	Bhutto addresses big public meeting

TABLE I -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>BALUCHI STAN</u>		
Quetta	June 12	Bhutto addresses press conference
	June 15	Bhutto addresses a public meeting

TABLE II

## IMPORTANT PUBLIC MEETINGS ADDRESSED BY PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE CML

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>NWFP</u>		
Peshawar City	Jan. 5	Mumtaz Daultana addressed public meeting
	Feb. 1	Yusuf Khatak, President NWFP CML, addresses a public meeting
	June 10	Yusuf Khatak addresses a public meeting
	Aug. 1	Shaukat Hayat, President of Punjab Muslim League addresses a public meeting
Mardan	Feb. 4	Daultana addresses public meeting
Village in Mardan	June 14	Khan Lund Khwar addresses public meeting
Village in Mardan Dist.	July 31	Khan Lund Khwar of the frontier CML addresses a public meeting
Two villages, Toredhar and Dhandao in Mardan Dist.	Aug. 10	Lund Khwar addresses a public meeting
	Oct. 12	Lund Khwar addresses a public meeting criticizing Wali Khan
	Nov. 4	Lund Khwar addresses a public meeting (most of the speech is geared against Bhutto)
Kohat (Dist.)	Feb. 4	Daultana addresses big public meeting



TABLE II -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>NWFP</u>		
5 villages in Kohat Dist.	July 4	Mohd. Yussuf Khattak addresses a public meeting
Village Makori in Kohat Dist.	Aug. 19	Yussuf Khattak addresses a public meeting
Village in Kohat	Aug. 26	Yussuf Khattak addresses a public meeting
Bannu	Feb. 5	Daultana, Chief of CML, addresses a big public meeting
Haripur Tehsil in Hazara Dist.	May 27	Daultana addresses public meeting
	July 26	Sardar Bahadur Khan, a prominent CML leader of the frontier, addresses a public meeting
<u>PUNJAB</u>		
Lahore (inside the walled city)	Jan. 1	Mian Mumtaz Daultana, Chief of CML, addresses a well attended public meeting
	April 14	Daultana addresses a big public meeting
	July 5	Daultana addresses a big public meeting
Lahore	Aug. 1	Daultana attends and speaks at a meeting organized by the W. Pakistan Youth movement

TABLE II -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>PUNJAB</u>		
Lahore	Oct. 5	(Retired) Air Marshal Nur Khan addresses a public meeting
	Oct. 30	Nur Khan addresses his first public meeting of the West after an extensive tour of East Pakistan (now Bangla Desh)
	Nov. 12	Nur Khan addresses big public meeting -- criticizes Bhutto
Rawalpindi	Jan. 24 & 25	Daultana addresses public meetings
	June 12	Shaukat Hayat, Punjab CML chief, addresses public meeting
	June 13	Hayat addresses regional conference of All Pakistan Students League
near Rawalpindi	Sept. 21	Hayat addresses public meeting
Rawalpindi	Nov. 24	Nur Khan addresses big public meeting -- criticizes Bhutto
Lyallpur	Feb. 28	Daultana speaks to the Bar Association
	March 24	Daultana addresses a big public meeting
	April 24	Daultana addresses public meeting
Sahiwal	Jan. 22	Daultana addresses public meeting

TABLE II -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>PUNJAB</u>		
Kamand in Sahiwal	Oct. 20	Daultana addresses public meeting
	Nov. 4	Daultana addresses public meeting
Sheikhupura	April 4	Daultana addresses a gathering at the Municipal Gardens
Jhelum	April 5	Daultana addresses a big public meeting
	Nov. 22	Nur Khan addresses public meeting
Gujrat Dist.	April 13	Daultana addresses a big public meeting
Multan	June 5	Daultana addresses District Bar Association
	June 6	Daultana addresses public meeting
	June 19 & 20	Daultana addresses party workers
	July 16	Daultana addresses public meeting
Near Multan at Luddan (Daultana's native place)	July 20	Daultana addresses public meeting
Multan	Aug. 9	Daultana addresses public meeting
	Dec. 5	Daultana at public meeting claims that socialism preachers demolish Islamic ideology

TABLE II -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>PUNJAB</u>		
Vehari near Multan	Aug. 6	Daultana addresses public meeting
	Oct. 10	Daultana addresses public meeting
	Oct. 30	Daultana addresse public meeting (CML to solve Kashmir issue)
	Nov. 22	Daultana addresses public meeting
Murree	June 14	Punjab CML chief, Shaukat Hayat, addresses public meeting
Campbellpur	July 28	Shaukat Hayat, Punjab CML chief, addresses public meeting
	Dec. 5	Shaukat Hayat and Javed Iqbal at a public meeting state Bhutto -- claiming that Bhutto in collaboration with foreign powers obliterated Pakistan. Bhutto -- biggest stumbling block in ushering of Islamic system
	Nov. 23	Nur Khan, brought in a big procession of cars, busses and trucks, addresses public meeting stating Bhutto, primarily
Sargodha Dist.	Nov. 14	Nur Khan addresses public meeting -- criticizes Bhutto

TABLE II -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>SIND</u>		
Karachi	Jan. 1	Illuminations by lanterns and a public meeting of CML at Nishtar Park -- Party leaders speak
	Jan. 2	Public meeting held under the auspices of the Karachi Zonal Council Muslim League
	Jan. 11	Daultana speaks at a reception hosted by a local leader
	Jan. 10	Daultana addresses a public meeting
	Feb. 21	Daultana addresses city "intellectuals"
	June 7	Shaukat Hayar addresses public meeting
	June 13	Z. M. Lari, a prominent CML leader, addresses a public meeting
	Sept. 21	Z. M. Lari again addresses public meeting
Balawalpur	Jan. 15	Daultana addresses students
Rahimyarkhan	March 2	Nizamuddin Haider addresses a public meeting
Latifabad	June 14	Nawab Mohd. Yamin Khan, Secty. Sindh Aone, addresses public meeting

TABLE II -- Continued

PROVINCE	DATE	TYPE OF MEETING ADDRESSED
<u>SIND</u>		
Sukkur	Mar. 5 & 6	Daultana addresses a public meeting
Hyderabad	Mar. 8 & 10	Daultana addresses public meetings
	Nov. 28	Kazi Mohammed Akbar, chief organizer CML Sindh, addresses public meetings, bitterly criticizing Bhutto
Larkana	July 9	Khuhro addresses workers of District CML
	Sept. 10	Khuhro addresses public meeting
	Nov. 4	Khuhro addresses public meeting
	Nov. 16 & 17	Khuhro addresses public meetings which are very well attended
20 miles from Larkana	Nov. 20	Khuhro addresses public meeting



TABLE III

## PROVINCE-WIDE BREAK-UP OF CANDIDATES CONTESTING NATIONAL

## ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS AND THEIR ELECTION SYMBOLS.\*

	E.Pak.	W.Pak.	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balu.	Pak.
TOTAL SEATS	162**	138	82	27	25	4	300
All Pakistan Awami League (Boat)	162	8	3	2	2	1	170
All Pakistan Central Jamiat-Ulma-e-Islam and Nizam-e-Islam (Thanvi) (Book)	49	6	4	-	2	-	55
Baluchistan United Front (Chair)	-	2	1	1	-	-	2
Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (Scales)	70	80	44	19	15	2	150
Jamiat-Ulma-e-Islam (Hazarvi gp.) (Date Palm Tree)	15	91	47	21	19	4	106
Jatiya Gana Mukti Dal (Candle)	5	1	-	1	-	-	6
Khaksar Tehrik (Spade)	-	2	2	-	-	-	2

TABLE III -- Continued

Markazi Jamaati Ahle Hadith (Flower)	-	2	2	-	-	-	2
Markazi Jamate-Ulma-e Pakistan (Key)	-	45	36	8	1	-	45
National Awami Party*** (Bhashani gp.) (Sheaf of Paddy)	14	5	2	2	-	1	19
Pakistan Democratic Party (Umbrella)	79	29	21	3	2	1	106
Pakistan Masihi League (Spectacles)	-	3	1	1	1	-	3
Pakistan Muslim League (Convention) (Bicycles)	93	31	24	6	1	-	124
Pakistan Muslim League (Council) (Lantern)	50	69	50	12	5	2	119
Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum gp.) (Tiger)	65	66	33	12	17	4	131
Pakistan National Awami Party (Wali gp.) (Hut)	39	25	-	6	16	3	64
Pakistan Peoples Party (Sword)	-	119	77	25	16	1	119

TABLE III -- Continued

Sindh Karachi Muhajir Punjabi Pathan Muthahida Mahaz (Horse)	-	6	5	-	-	-	6
Sindh United Front (Stick)	-	1	-	1	-	-	1
Islamic Gantantari Dal (Cow)	5	-	-	-	-	-	5
Krishik Sramik Party (Hooka)	4	-	-	-	-	-	4
Pakistan Daradi Sangha (Bullock Cart)	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Pakistan National Congress (Pen)	4	-	-	-	-	-	4
Pakistan National League**** (Plough)	12	-	-	-	-	-	12
Independents	114	210	114	45	45	6	324
Sources:							

\* Pakistan Affairs: Washington, D.C., Jan. 15, 1971, and M. B. Naqvi; West Pakistan's Struggle for Power, So. Asian Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, April 1971, pp. 224-225.

TABLE III -- Continued

Sources:

\*\* Elections to NA Constituencies in East Pakistan (now Bangla Desh) were held later because of devastation by the November cyclone.

\*\*\* The National Awami Party (Bhashani group) and the Pakistan National League boycotted the elections at the eleventh hour.

\*\*\*\* The National Assembly was to have a total of 313 seats of which 13 were reserved for women. They were to be elected indirectly by members of NA, two days before the Assembly convened.

TABLE IV  
PARTY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY<sup>1</sup>

Party	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balu- chistan	West Pak.	East Pak.	Total
Awami League	-	-	-	-	-	160	160
Pakistan Peoples Party <sup>2</sup>	62	18	1	-	81	-	+7 81 +5*
Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum)	1	1	7	-	9	-	9
Pakistan Muslim League (Council)	7	-	-	-	7	-	9
Jamiat Ulema e Islam (Hazarvi)	-	-	6	1	7	-	7
Markazi Jamiat e Ulema e Pakistan	4	3	-	-	7	-	7
National Awami Party (Wali GP)	-	-	3	3	6	-	6+1*
Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan	1	2	1	-	4	-	4
Pakistan Muslim League (convention)	2	-	-	-	2	-	2
Pakistan Democratic Party	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Independent	5	3	73	-	15	1	16

TABLE IV -- Continued

Total Seats	82	27	25	4	138	162	300 + .3
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## Sources:

<sup>1</sup>Pakistan observer, Jan. 20, 1971 and Craig Baxter; "Pakistan Votes" Asian Survey, March 1971 Vol. XI, No. 3, p. 211. The parties that contested and failed to win any seats have not been included in this table. See Table I.

<sup>2</sup>The PPP backed some independent candidates, notably in Sindh.

<sup>3</sup>No party nominated any candidate for the seven seats in the centrally administered tribal areas.

\*Indirectly elected women's seats totalling 13.



TABLE V  
PAKISTAN PROVINCEAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS<sup>1</sup>

Party	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balu- chistan	West Pak.	East Pak.	Total
Awami League	-	-	-	-	-	288	288
Pakistan People's Party	113+6*	28+2*	3	-	144	-	144
Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum)	6	5	10	3			24
National Awami Party (Wali)	-	-	13+2*	8+1*	21	1	22
Pakistan Muslim League (Council)	15	4	1	-	20	-	20
Markazi Jamiat Ulema e Islam	4	7	-	-	11	-	11
Jamiat Ulema e Islam (Hazarvi)	2	-	4	2	8	-	8
Pakistan Muslim League (Convention)	6	-	2	-	8	-	8
Pakistan Democratic Party	4	-	-	-	4	2	6
Jamaat i Islami	1	1	1	-	3	1	4
Nizam i Islam	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Jamiat Ahle Hadeez	1	-	-	-	-	-	1

National Awami Party (Pakatoon Khawa)	-	-	-	1	1	-	1
Baluchistan United Front	-	-	-	1	1	-	1
SKMPPM Mahaz	-	1	-	-	1	-	1
Independents	28	14 <sup>2</sup>	6	5	53	7	60
Total	180	60	40	20	300	300	600

## Sources:

<sup>1</sup>Pakistan Observer, January 20, 1971 and Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes," Asian Survey, March 1971, Vol. XI, No. 3, p. 211.

<sup>2</sup>Four of these Independents were openly backed by the PPP and later joined the party.

\*Indirectly elected women's seats

TABLE VI

## PARTY POSITION IN WEST PAKISTAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS\*

Parties	Votes polled	Percentage of W. Pakistan Total
PPP	61,48,625	37.7
Muslim League (Council)	16,89,109	10.3
Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan	13,08,578	8.0
Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum)	12,89,455	7.9
Jamiat-ul Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi)	11,47,980	7.03
Jamaat-e-Islami	9,45,275	5.3
Muslim League (Convention)	6,19,747	3.7
National Awami Party (Wali)	4,46,513	2.1
Pakistan Democratic Party	2,54,389	1.5
Awami League	22,939	negligible
Independents	17,39,544	10.04

Source:

\*Dilip Mukherjee, Z.A. Bhutto, Quest for Power, Vikas, New Delhi, 1972, p. 97.

TABLE VII  
PARTY VOTES BY PROVINCES IN WEST PAKISTAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

	(Percentages)*			
Party	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Baluchistan
People's Party	41.6	14.2	44.9	2.3
Muslim League (Council)	12.6	4.0	6.8	10.9
Jamiat ul Ulema i Pakistan	9.8	-	7.4	-
Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum)	5.4	22.6	10.7	10.9
Jamiat ul Ulema i Islam (Hazarvi group)	5.2	25.4	4.3	20.0
Jamaat-e-Islami	4.7	7.2	10.3	1.1
Muslim League	5.1	0.5	-	-
National Awami Party (Wali)	-	18.3	0.3	45.1

Source:

\*Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 97.

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