Quantifying resistance to the Sybil attack
Publication Date
2008
Journal or Book Title
FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY
Abstract
Sybil attacks have been shown to be unpreventable except under the protection of a vigilant central authority. We use an economic analysis to show quantitatively that some applications and protocols are more robust against the attack than others. In our approach, for each distributed application and an attacker objective, there is a critical value that determines the cost-effectiveness of the attack. A Sybil attack is worthwhile only when the critical value is exceeded by the ratio of the value of the attacker’s goal to the cost of identities. We show that for many applications, successful Sybil attacks may be expensive even when the Sybil attack cannot be prevented. Specifically, we propose the use of a recurring fee as a deterrent against the Sybil attack. As a detailed example, we look at four variations of the Sybil attack against a recurring fee based onion routing anonymous routing network and quantify its vulnerability.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_1
Pages
1-15
Volume
5143
Book Series Title
LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE
Recommended Citation
Margolin, NB and Levine, BN, "Quantifying resistance to the Sybil attack" (2008). FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY. 847.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_1