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Simples and gunk

Kris McDaniel, University of Massachusetts Amherst

Abstract

An object is a simple if and only if it has no proper parts. An object is gunk if and only if every proper part of that object itself has a proper part. In my dissertation, I address the following questions. (1) The concepts of simples and gunk presuppose the concept of parthood. What is the status of this concept? his question itself divides into the following: does the concept of parthood have universal applicability, so that, just as every object is self-identical, every object has parts? Finally, is the concept of parthood univocal, or are there different notions of parthood, each of which is defined on distinct ontological categories? I argue that the concept of parthood has univocal. I also argue that there is some evidence that the concept of parthood has universal applicability. (2) I address the Simple Question, which is “under what circumstances is it true of some object that it has no proper parts?” I argue against several popular answers to the Simple Question, such as the view that simples are all and only point-sized objects, and the view that simples are maximally continuous material objects. I defend the Brutal View, which holds that there is no true, finitely expressible, and informative answer to the Simple Question. In short, there is no criterion for being a simple. Along the way, I address the question of whether extended simples, i.e., simples that are extended in space, are possible. I argue that one popular argument against the possibility of extended simples is unsound. (3) I address the question of whether both simples and gunk are possible. I argue that it is metaphysically possible that material objects be composed of gunk.

Subject Area

Philosophy

Recommended Citation

McDaniel, Kris, "Simples and gunk" (2004). Doctoral Dissertations Available from Proquest. AAI3152730.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI3152730

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