Off-campus UMass Amherst users: To download campus access dissertations, please use the following link to log into our proxy server with your UMass Amherst user name and password.

Non-UMass Amherst users: Please talk to your librarian about requesting this dissertation through interlibrary loan.

Dissertations that have an embargo placed on them will not be available to anyone until the embargo expires.

Date of Award


Access Type

Campus Access

Document type


Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Degree Program

Isenberg School of Management

First Advisor

Thomas Kida

Second Advisor

Christopher P. Agoglia

Third Advisor

M. David Piercey

Subject Categories



Since most audit engagements identify multiple proposed audit adjustments, auditors must decide how best to present and negotiate these adjustments with their clients. Auditors may negotiate adjustments individually as they are uncovered over the course of field work (a sequential strategy) or they may aggregate all identified adjustments together and negotiate them at the same time (a simultaneous strategy). This paper examines the relative effectiveness of a simultaneous versus sequential negotiation strategy in eliciting concessions from clients and engendering positive affect toward the auditor. Managers negotiated a series of audit adjustments with a simulated auditor who employed one of the two negotiation strategies. I find that a simultaneous strategy elicited significantly greater total concessions from participants and also generated greater positive affect. I also manipulate the magnitude of the issues negotiated and find that significantly greater concessions are offered when larger issues are presented first. The implications of my findings for audit research and practice are discussed.