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Author ORCID Identifier


Campus-Only Access for Five (5) Years

Document Type


Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Degree Program

Resource Economics

Year Degree Awarded


Month Degree Awarded


First Advisor

Nathan W. Chan

Second Advisor

John K. Stranlund

Third Advisor

Marta Vicarelli

Subject Categories

Agricultural and Resource Economics | Environmental Studies | Other Economics


This dissertation consists of three chapters about enforcing collective property rights systems. In the first chapter, we analyze how public co-enforcement affects a collective property rights regime's success. In the second chapter, we consider the problem of managing and defending the commons when common-pool resource coalitions form endogenously. We conducted experiments in the field with members of areas managed under a collective property rights system. Lastly, in the third chapter, we develop a method to estimate the direct effect of monitoring effort on non-recorded extraction (i.e., illegal extraction) of a natural resource. Each chapter has been designed around the territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs) management scheme implemented in Chile to enhance small-scale fisheries' sustainability.