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Author ORCID Identifier



Open Access Dissertation

Document Type


Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Degree Program


Year Degree Awarded


Month Degree Awarded


First Advisor

Anna Nagurney

Subject Categories

Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods | Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering


The quality of the products produced and delivered in supply chain networks is essential for consumers' safety, well-being, and benefits, and for firms' profitability and reputation. However, because of the complexity of today's large-scale highly globalized supply chain networks, along with issues such as the growth in outsourcing and in global procurement, as well as the information asymmetry associated with quality, supply chain networks are more exposed to both domestic and international quality failures.

In this dissertation, I contribute to the equilibrium and dynamic modeling and analysis of quality competition in supply chain networks under scenarios of information asymmetry, product differentiation, outsourcing, and under supplier selection.

The first part of the dissertation consists of a review of the relevant literature, the research motivation, and an overview of methodologies.

The second part of the dissertation formulates quality competition with minimum quality standards under the scenario of information asymmetry, specifically, when there is no product differentiation by brands or labels. In the third part, in contrast, quality competition is modeled under product differentiation, when firms engage in distinguishing their products from their competitors'.

The fourth part concentrates on quality competition in supply chain networks with outsourcing. The models yield the optimal make-or-buy and contractor selection decisions for the firm(s) and the optimal pricing and quality decisions for the contractors. The impacts of firms' attitudes towards disrepute are also studied numerically.

In the fifth part, a multitiered supply chain network model of quality competition with suppliers is developed. It consists of competing suppliers and competing firms who purchase components for the assembly of their products and, if capacity permits, produce their own components. The optimal supplier-selection decisions, optimal component production and quality, and the optimal quality preservation levels of the assembly processes are provided. Such issues as the values of the suppliers to the firms, the impacts of capacity disruptions, and the potential investments in capacity enhancements are explored numerically.

The models and analysis in this dissertation can be applied to numerous industries, ranging from the food industry to the pharmaceutical industry, automobile industry, and to the high technology industry.