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An important body of literature explores the political economy reasons
underlying delays in macroeconomic stabilization. This paper develops
a framework to analyze conflict between two groups of economic actors,
one that has an endowment of internationally tradable goods and another
that is endowed with non-tradable goods. The focus is on the exchange
rate policy in a developing country set-up where the government employs
seigniorage revenue to finance spending pre-stabilization, and faces fiscal
and balance of payments problems that necessitate stabilization with a step
devaluation. The presence of exchange rate and endowment uncertainty,
the role of forward-looking expectations, and the possibility of IMF aid
influence the likelihood, timing, and terms of a national consensus on
stabilization in interesting ways.

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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.


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