National office consultations are an important aspect of the audit process and allow for engagement partners to obtain some additional assurance when faced with complex accounting or audit issues. The outcome of the consultations, however, can be unfavorable to the client and result in difficult conversations between the audit team and the client. I investigate how the type of national office consultation and the engagement partner’s communication of difficult news to the client affects the auditor-client relationship, as well as the outcome of discussions between the auditor and client regarding financial statement adjustments. I make predictions based on two competing theories, and find evidence showing that client concessions are being driven by trust and perceived credibility. I find that when a consultation is optional and the engagement partner takes greater (less) responsibility for the outcome of the consultation, clients will make smaller (larger) concessions during the discussions with the auditor. In contrast, when the engagement team engages in a mandatory consultation, I find that this pattern reverses. I also provide evidence that this effect is mediated by trust in the engagement team and perceived credibility of the national office. I discuss the relevant takeaways of these findings for theory, literature, and practice.