This dissertation investigates the mechanisms through which financial elites and financial institutions accumulate power in contemporary capitalism. Drawing from the political economy of finance, it explores how financial actors exert and benefit from influence across regulatory, political, and market domains—consolidating infrastructural, instrumental, and structural forms of power. Through three essays, the dissertation examines how financial institutions are embedded within governance frameworks that advance financial interests, how financial elites invest in connections to secure favorable outcomes, and how tighter financial regulation in overfinancialized economies can enhance economic growth—challenging academic narratives that have long sustained finance’s expansion. The first essay analyzes the infrastructural power of finance through the case of the European Banking Union’s Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Although formally designed to promote financial stability, the SRM steers interventions toward private market solutions, leading to greater banking consolidation and marketization, particularly in bank-based systems. By prioritizing subordinated debt, limiting public intervention, and embedding high levels of discretion in resolution practices, the SRM reshapes the European banking landscape in favor of large, market-oriented institutions—entrenching financial interests in EU governance. The second essay examines the instrumental power of financial elites by comparing traditional finance actors with the crypto elite. Using a novel dataset of board members from the 50 largest US-registered crypto firms, the top 50 US financial firms, Fortune 1000 companies, and policy-planning organizations, it applies cluster and network analysis to compare socio-educational traits, corporate affiliations, and political connections. Results show that the crypto elite closely mirrors traditional finance in background and power investments—such as political donations and revolving doors—while occupying a more peripheral position in the US business network. The White House emerges as a key site of past employment for both elites. The third essay empirically assesses the relationship between macroprudential policies and growth. Using a Local Projections methodology on a panel of Advanced and Emerging Market Economies (2000–2017), it finds that tighter policies are associated with higher GDP growth in overfinancialized economies, with highly liberalized and intermediated financial sectors. No significant effect is found in Emerging Markets. Supporting the “too much finance” literature, the essay contributes to efforts to curb finance’s size and structural importance.