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The United Nations' success in resolving disputes in the post Cold War era.

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THE UNITED NATIONS' SUCCESS IN RESOLVING
DISPUTES IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

A Thesis Presented

by

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DISPUTES IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

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
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The destructiveness of 20th century military technology has made it all the more important to reduce the incidence of war. The United Nations was founded, as the preamble of the charter puts it, “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” The organization was created around the assumption of great power unity and this was expressed in the charter which gave special privileges and responsibilities to the Big Five powers, such as the right to veto in the Security Council.¹ The founding fathers of the UN assumed that the major powers would not fight each other or any other nation, and that they would work together to maintain peace. It was also expected that the Big Five would provide leadership and be willing to use their forces to “prevent or suppress all cases of aggression.”² However, this great power unanimity and collective action were rarely present in the UN during the years of the Cold War, due to the ideological conflict and competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. The UN was often unable to take any action to maintain peace and security because of a lack of cooperation between the two superpowers. On many occasions both sides threatened or used their veto power to prevent the organization from getting involved in international conflicts.³

¹ Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random House, 1959) 79.

² Claude 83.

³ Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations: Reality and Ideal (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984) 97.

In this thesis I assess whether the UN actually enjoyed the increased efficacy in helping states settle conflict and prevent or limit warfare that many analysts of international relations believed would follow the end of the Cold War.⁴ I first establish the level of UN Security Council involvement in dispute settlement by tracking what proportion of interstate disputes were referred to it. I then assess the extent of UN success in helping abate, isolate, end armed hostilities stemming from the conflict, and settle each conflict. Since UN success may depend on features of the particular conflicts referred to it, I look for patterns of success by examining certain basic characteristics of each dispute: its intensity, the extent of actual warfare, its spread to include additional states and the relative power of the states involved. Doing so helps establish whether features of the dispute have an effect separate from the degree of great power unity and leadership displayed by the permanent members of the Security Council.

To provide a fuller assessment, I look at not only the activities of the Security Council, but also to activity in the judgments of the International Court of Justice in cases relating to political conflicts. I also assess the activities of the three regional organizations most active in regional dispute settlement- the Organization of American States, Organization of African Unity and the Arab League- since they can serve as alternatives to or supplements of UN efforts to help settle disputes.

⁴ Such as Ingvar Carlsson, "A New International Order through the United Nations," Security Dialogue 23(1992) 8; and Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, "Moscow's U.N. Policy," Foreign Policy 79 (1990) 94

To permit direct comparison with earlier periods, I analyze the UN's post Cold War experience, employing the methods used by Ernst B. Haas in the most extensive study of UN efforts to resolve disputes during the Cold War era. In his analysis, Haas identified several distinct periods of UN activity.⁵ In the period from 1945 to 1947, according to Haas, the UN operated in a duopolistic system, with consensus between the Soviet Union and the United States facilitating its success in conflict resolution. However in the period between 1948 and 1955 bipolarity developed and the Soviet Union vetoed any actions that it thought would increase American dominance. The US then used its majority to establish the "Uniting for Peace" norm of using the General Assembly to authorize conflict resolution efforts when the Security Council became stalemated. Haas noted that this was followed by a period of "permissive engagement" from 1956 to 1970 during which the salience of the Cold War ebbed. UN conflict resolution efforts were backed by a changing coalition of states and often the US was an enthusiastic supporter while the Soviets decreased the use of their veto. However, in the period after 1970, superpower readiness to use the UN declined; the superpowers only supported UN involvement when they perceived that it would accord with their own interests. In some cases they were indifferent to the conflict; in others they were closely involved, either to weaken the other's global position or prevent the other from weakening its own.

⁵ Ernst B. Haas, "Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organization, 1945-1981," International Organization Vol. 32, no. 2 (1983): 189.

Haas noted that the UN had been successful prior to the 1970s when the two superpowers, though at odds with one another, had taken an active interest in the organization, so that it could demonstrate some success. However, as the superpowers began to lose interest in the organization, they came to develop a more tolerant attitude towards the nonresolution of conflict and the principle of collective security weakened. Haas observed a lower rate of UN success in conflict resolution in the 1970s and concluded that the UN would continue to do poorly as long as the superpowers maintained their indifference and chose not to get involved or to cooperate to bring about the settlement of conflicts.⁶

The fact that the UN was still able to have an impact on 24% of interstate disputes in 1950-55⁷ when superpower cooperation was at its lowest shows that the UN's success in conflict resolution is dependent upon many factors. Readiness of the parties to use the UN, readiness of the parties to settle, readiness of a broad coalition of the membership to see the UN get involved, absence of a veto by any of the 5 permanent members of the UN and readiness by others to provide a lead all contribute to success. However, superpower involvement and leadership is very important, particularly in efforts involving massive peacekeeping presence, because they can supply the UN with resources such as money, as well as political and diplomatic backup.

In the early 1990s, the end of the ideological conflict between the East and the West not surprisingly prompted many observers to assume that the UN would

⁶ Haas 234.

⁷ Haas 220.

enjoy greater success.⁸ However, recent failures of UN efforts suggest that the high optimism of the 1990s was premature. By analyzing the experience of the 1990s as systematically as Haas analyzed earlier UN efforts, I will show that the same factors affecting UN success during the Cold War continue to operate today.

⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy: The Role of the United Nations and its General Secretary," Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start, ed. Kevin M. Cahill, M.D. (New York: BasicBooks, 1996) 17.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

To assess the success of the organization in the post Cold War period, I employ the method used by Haas in his 1981 article. In his study Haas identified 282 disputes that had taken place between July 1945 and September 1981,⁹ and determined that 123 of them had been on the agenda of the UN. He measured the success of the organization in settling these disputes. First he determined whether UN activity had made a difference in the disputes referred to it. Second, he compared the end results of disputes handled through the UN and of disputes not referred to the UN to see whether UN involvement affected the likelihood of settlement. Furthermore, Haas looked at the 80 disputes¹⁰ which had been referred to the regional organizations and examined their efforts at resolving conflicts.

Haas used the same definition of a dispute, specifications of variables, and coding procedures that he had created with Robert L. Butterworth and Joseph S. Nye Jr., for an earlier study.¹¹ For Haas to consider a case as a “dispute” it had to meet three conditions. First, there must be a definable issue at stake and not merely general charges of “aggression,” “genocide,” or “intervention”. Second it should involve clearly visible parties having specific claims on one another and possessing a political organization, a military command structure, and a leadership

⁹ Haas 194.

¹⁰ Haas 194.

¹¹ Ernst B. Haas, Robert L. Butterworth and Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Conflict Management by International Organizations* (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1972)

able to utilize both to implement whatever it agrees to do. Finally, the dispute must be of an interstate character, with civil strife included only if at least one side enjoyed the support of another government.¹²

The dependent variable is the degree of success in dispute resolution. Haas wrote that successful conflict management involves four aspects: “abatement,” “isolation,” “stopping hostilities” and “settlement.” He scored every dispute on whether the organization had a great impact, whether it was somewhat successful on each of the dimensions applicable to the dispute, or if no impact could be determined. He assigned a 0 for no impact, 1 for some, and 2 for great impact to each of the dimensions.

Haas regarded the organization as having great success in the first dimension of abating the conflict if the hostilities slackened, disputants scaled down rival claims, disputants initiated negotiations, or accepted third party intercession. If some of these measures were adopted, then the organization was seen to have met with limited success. If none of these measures were adopted by the parties, then the organization was seen as having no impact.¹³

Haas perceived success in stopping hostilities if the parties followed a cease fire that had been ordered by the organization. If the cease fire was obeyed sporadically, then the organization was seen as having limited success. It was considered to have met with no success when the hostilities continued despite calls for a ceasefire. If the organization had no opportunity to stop the hostilities

¹² Haas, Butterworth, and Nye 4.

¹³ Haas 240.

because none had started, or they had already ended by the time the organization was asked to get involved, then this dimension was marked “not applicable.”¹⁴

Success in conflict isolation occurred if the organization was able to prevent member states who had been asked to intervene from aiding one or both of the parties. If some members obeyed, but others sided with one of the parties, then it was seen as having met with limited success. In an instance where it was unable to prevent any member states from getting involved in the conflict, it was rated as having no success. In case the parties had no opportunity to seek aid, this dimension was marked “not applicable.”¹⁵

Success in conflict resolution was judged by Haas based on the degree of compliance with the organization’s suggestions on substantive settlement of the conflict. The organization was considered to have met with great success if the final outcome reflected the content of the applicable resolutions. If some of the intent of the resolution was followed by the parties, then it was seen as having had limited success and when no part of the resolution was followed by the parties involved, then it was seen as having had no success.¹⁶

Haas then established an overall assessment of the dispute by adding the scores on all the dimensions together. The actions of the organization were classified as having no impact when the raw score was equal to a 0 indicating that the action taken by the organization had made no difference to the outcome on any dimension. It was classified as having limited impact when the added scores were

¹⁴ Haas 240.

¹⁵ Haas 241.

¹⁶ Haas 240.

1 or 2; such scores indicate that it had made some difference on at least one of the dimensions. The organization's role was classified as having had a great impact when the raw scores ranged between 3 and 8. In these cases, the organization's actions either made some difference on three or four dimensions or made a great difference on one dimension and at least some difference on one other.¹⁷ Haas defined failure as occurring when the dispute "remained unsettled," "petered out without resolution," or the end result was the "victory of one party."

Haas also sought to determine whether characteristics of a dispute affected the prospects of settlement by coding disputes on various dimensions. The first of these was intensity¹⁸ which was coded in terms of duration, the number of fatalities, the chances that nuclear weapons might be used, and the likelihood of escalation if any organization did not intervene. The next variable was extent of warfare.¹⁹ For this characteristic, each dispute was coded as having "none" if it involved no armed hostilities, as being "skirmishes" where fighting was in the form of clashes designed to frighten an antagonist, as being "limited military" where the operations were a way of strengthening diplomatic claims and not about conquering territory, and "military" where the operation was designed to defeat an enemy and conquer its territory. A third variable was the spread²⁰ of the dispute, or whether it was bilateral, local, regional or global. A bilateral dispute involved only two parties and a local dispute was one restricted to a particular area. A regional

¹⁷ Haas 241.

¹⁸ Haas 195.

¹⁹ In his study Haas labels this dimension "type of warfare". I have used the term "extent of warfare" to prevent confusion between it and the first dimension "intensity" of the dispute.

²⁰ Haas 197.

dispute arose when neighboring states were willing to enter the fighting and a global dispute was one where states external to the region entered the conflict. Another variable determined if the issues involved regarded Cold War conflicts or decolonization.²¹ The fifth variable was the alignment²² of the participants in the Cold War divide while the sixth variable looked at the participants²³ in the dispute to see if they were great powers, regional powers or weak states.

Using Haas' criteria, I have looked at the universe of international disputes from January 1989 through December 1996, involving a clear issue, with clearly visible parties and being of interstate character. I have not included cases that involve issues like terrorism, as often in these instances the identity of the parties are not clear and they are not of interstate character. I compiled a list of the cases from 1989 until 1996 from "The New York Times Index- Years 1990 (Vol. 77) to 1996 (Vol. 84)" and "The Times Index- Years 1990 to 1996" I acquired further information on these disputes by searching through the Lexis-Nexus information system.

As I wanted to make a full comparison of Cold War with post Cold War UN activity and success I also analyzed the disputes taking place between September 1981, the endpoint of Haas' study, and December 1988. A later article by Haas also covered the disputes in 1981- 1984,²⁴ identifying an additional 37 disputes. Thus Haas identified 319 disputes in 1945-84, of which 137 were

²¹ Haas 197.

²² Haas 197.

²³ Haas 197.

²⁴ Ernst B. Haas, Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1986) 9.

referrals to the UN and 85 to the regional organizations. After examining data which I had gathered on disputes occurring between 1985 to 1988, I found that there had been a total of 346 disputes by the end of 1988, of which 142 had been on the UN's agenda and 89 on the agenda of the regional organizations.

To assess the UN's Post Cold War success, I first determined how many of these more recent disputes were referred to the United Nations and then how far the UN was successful in resolving them. My definitions of "success" and "failure" are the same ones used by Haas. I have determined how many of the four dimensions were applicable to each dispute and how successful the UN was in each of those dimensions. Using the formula for calculating organizational success developed by Haas, I have considered the UN to have met with no success in instances where it has a raw score of 0, to have met with some success when the raw score is 1 or 2, and to have met with great success when the raw score is 3 or greater in conflicts where there was no fighting or no spread. In disputes involving all four factors, the raw score had to be 6, 7 or 8 in order for it to be considered a great success. I have also looked at the those disputes that were never referred to the UN to see what their end result was. I have determined the success of the regional organizations using the same method as that for the UN.

As I deal with post Cold War disputes I have not used Haas' fourth and fifth variables. The ones that I have focused on are intensity, warfare, spread, and participants. In order to determine if the participants are great powers, weak states

or regional powers, I have employed the Cox-Jacobson scale²⁵ used by Haas which uses five indicators to figure out the power of each country: gross national product, gross national product per capita, population, nuclear capability, and prestige

My research shows that while the UN has had greater success in the post Cold War period, there is a clear pattern indicating that it was more successful in the period 1989-93 and that its rate of success has declined since 1994. The main reason for this change has been a reduction of US and Russian willingness and ability to provide leadership in conflict resolution and their reluctance to get involved in conflicts which do not affect their interests. This confirms Haas' findings that UN success in conflict resolution is heavily dependent on collective action by great powers and their commitment to prevent threats to peace.

²⁵ Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence: Decision making in International Organizations (Forge Valley, MA: The Murray Printing Company, 1973) 437.

CHAPTER 3

OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF THE UN

Security Council

In the period between 1989 to 1996 there were 62 disputes.²⁶ 30 or nearly 49% of them were referred to the United Nations. This is the second highest rate of referral in the UN's history, the highest being 57 percent in the period 1966 to 1970.²⁷

Of the 32 disputes not referred to the UN, 5 (16 percent of the nonreferred cases) have been settled through mediation or negotiations. Another 4 (12 percent of the nonreferred cases) have petered out. Meanwhile 23 (72 percent of the nonreferred disputes) have gone unresolved.²⁸ This is consistent with Haas' findings that while in the early years of the Cold War up to 65 percent of the nonreferred cases were resolved eventually, the proportion has fallen continuously since 1960.²⁹

According to Haas, the UN enjoyed its greatest Cold War era success from 1956 to 1960 when it achieved partial or great success in resolving 40 percent of the disputes referred to it.³⁰ The rate of success rose much higher in the post Cold

²⁶ I have not counted as disputes instances where the UN dealt with a conflict primarily by taking measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. The 3 post Cold War conflicts which were mainly dealt with under Chapter VII are the Gulf War, the sanctions imposed on Sudan, and the sanctions imposed on Libya. I have, however, looked at Libya's case against Britain and the US before the ICJ.

²⁷ Haas 196.

²⁸ Tables A.1 to A.10 in the Appendix contain the data which I have used to determine the performance of the UN and regional organizations.

²⁹ Haas 206.

³⁰ Haas 226.

war years with the UN showing at least partial success in 29 out of the 30 cases referred to it since 1989. The UN's success over the years can be seen in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1- Cases where the UN showed Limited or Great Success between 1945-1996.

Years	Number	Percentage
1945-50	7 out of 20	33%
1951-55	3 out of 12	25%
1956-60	6 out of 16	40%
1961-65	5 out of 26	19%
1966-70	3 out of 14	24%
1971-75	2 out of 12	17%
1976-80	4 out of 24	17%
1981-84	2 out of 13	18%
1985-88	1 out of 5	20%
1989-96	29 out of 30	97%

Since 1989 the UN displayed great success in resolving 5 of the 30 conflicts that were on its agenda: the civil war in Cambodia, the civil war in El Salvador, the civil war in Mozambique, the conflict over the Aouzou strip and the

conflict between Greece and Macedonia over the latter's name. In every other case except one, the UN had limited success. The exception was the dispute involving the US invasion of Panama, on which the UN could take no action because of vetoes by the US and its allies in the Security Council. Therefore the UN had great success in resolving 17% of the disputes that were referred to it and had limited success in another 80% of them. The proportion of disputes where the UN had great success and limited success was much higher in this period than during any other era of the organization.

Dividing conflict resolution into its four aspects in Table 3.2 shows that during the 1989-96 period the UN was most successful in abating conflicts and least successful in stopping hostilities.

Table 3.2- Rate of Success in the Four Fields between 1989-1996.

	Cases Referred	Success	Success percentage
Abatement	30	28	93
Isolation	24	14	58
Stopping hostilities	18	5	28
Settlement	30	14	47

The UN's success was also strong across disputes with differing characteristics as seen in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3- UN Success and Variables between 1989-1996.

	Great success	Some success	No success
Intensity :			
High	16%	84%	-
Moderate	17%	66%	17%
Low	20%	80%	-
Spread :			
Global	-	100%	-
Regional	8%	92%	-
Bilateral	33%	58%	8%
Extent of Warfare :			
Military	17%	78%	5%
Limited military	-	100%	-
Skirmish	17%	83%	-
None	25%	75%	-
Power of parties :			
Superpower	10%	80%	10%
Large power	-	100%	-
Middle power	29%	71%	-
Smaller power	40%	60%	-
Smallest power	-	100%	-

The post Cold War increase in UN success is even more striking when the characteristics of the disputes referred to it are compared to those of disputes not referred. More conflicts involving higher levels of intensity, warfare, spread, and superpowers or large parties were referred to the UN in the Post Cold War era than before as seen in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4- Rate of referral to the UN by Characteristics of the dispute between 1945-1996.

	1945-1988		1989-1996	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
High intensity	45 out of 142	32	20 out of 22	91
High Warfare	34 out of 142	24	18 out of 22	82
Reg./ Global spread	25 out of 142	18	18 out of 22	82
Super/ Large parties	74 out of 142	52	14 out of 26	54

The continuing importance of member state political leadership is revealed in the patterns of dispute resolution. In the 19 conflicts the UN helped resolve in 1989-96, it was successful in settling the conflict over the Aouzou strip and the conflict between Greece and Macedonia, only 2 of the 19 disputes, without the aid of a nation or another organization. In every other case where the dispute was

resolved, the UN collaborated with either other international organizations or nations. Within a short time after the end of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia worked with the UN to end several disputes which they had largely been involved in during the years of the Cold War. In the civil war in El Salvador, the US and Soviet Union gave support to the peace plan which ultimately led to the end of the conflict there. Namibia was another case where progress was made through US and Soviet cooperation. Recently the civil war in Angola was brought to an end with the help of the US, Russia and Portugal. The UN and the presidents of five Central American nations worked together to end the civil war in Nicaragua. Meanwhile the civil war in Mozambique ended when the Italian government assisted the UN. The French government worked with the Secretary General in mediating the conflict between Eritrea and Yemen over the Hanish islands. The situation in Haiti improved with the involvement of the UN, the US and the OAS.

The US appears to have been the most effective party in helping resolve disputes. It seems to have made progress in several instances where the UN was not making any headway in getting the various parties to come to a resolution. This was apparent in the Arab-Israeli conflict when through US efforts and mediation by Norwegian diplomats, the Israel-PLO accords were signed. In bringing this conflict closer to an end, the UN played only a marginal role. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, where the UN was unsuccessful in resolving the

conflict, the US and NATO forces eventually forced the parties to settle the issue. US actions also averted North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT.

An examination of the disputes that the UN attempted to resolve between 1989 and 1996 shows that the organization was more effective prior to 1994. It settled three high intensity conflicts involving military warfare during 1989 and 1993. In 1994-1996, it showed more modest results, with great success in only two disputes that were not of high intensity and did not involve much warfare. It appears that the support and backing provided by the two superpowers was an important reason for the earlier success of the UN. Even in cases where the UN was given most of the credit for the resolution of the conflict, there was superpower involvement .

Russia, the Soviet Union's successor in the UN, seems to be plagued with too many domestic problems to become actively involved in efforts to end international conflicts. Therefore, the burden of making diplomatic efforts and providing troops seems to have fallen largely on the US as it is effectively the only superpower. In situations where the US has taken major initiatives to solve the conflict, as in the cases of the Haiti and North Korea, the conflicts have been resolved. Meanwhile in other instances where the US has chosen not to play a major role, such as East Timor and Afghanistan, the conflicts remain unresolved. In this more recent period, the US has become reluctant to get involved in conflicts which do not affect its interests. Meanwhile Russia remains in a position that keeps it from doing much on the international scene. Therefore with an end of

the joint efforts and commitment of these two nations to solve worldwide conflicts, the UN no longer has the backing which it had in the early years of the Post Cold War era to settle disputes.

The International Court of Justice

In his 1981 study Haas also looked at the judgments of the International Court of Justice in cases of a political nature. Haas considered those cases to be of a political nature which dealt with disputes that were also on the political agenda of the five international organizations: the UN, the OAS, the OAU, the Arab League and the Council of Europe. He found only 3 of 12 such judgments had been implemented. Judgments had been implemented in the Haya de la Torre asylum, Honduras-Nicaraguan border and the Temple of Preah Vihear cases. The nonimplemented judgments had been in the cases of the Corfu Channel, first Southwest Africa, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Portuguese Colonies in India, UN peacekeeping expenses, third Southwest Africa, Icelandic fisheries, Western Sahara and Iranian hostages. Haas found that since 1962, no decision of a political nature had been implemented and that there was a sense that the Court was failing in its task of judicial settlement.³¹

In the period from 1981 to 1988, three cases of a political nature were decided by the ICJ: Malta vs. Libya over their maritime boundary, Burkina Faso vs. Mali over their land boundary and Nicaragua vs. the US over mining of Nicaragua's harbors. The ICJ's decision was implemented in the disputes between

³¹ Haas, Butterworth, and Nye 4.

Libya and Malta and Burkina Faso and Mali. However, the US refused to abide by the Court's decision in favor of Nicaragua. Thus by the end of the Cold War period, the ICJ had made a decision in 15 cases of political nature. 5 of these had been implemented, bringing the ICJ's rate of success to 33%.

In the post Cold War years, the ICJ has looked at 8 cases of the political kind. The Court has yet to decide on 4 of these: Libya vs. United Kingdom and United States over the aerial incident at Lockerbie, Cameroon vs. Nigeria on land and maritime boundaries, Qatar vs. Bahrain on maritime delimitation, and Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Yugoslavia over the issue of genocide. Another 2 were settled out of court: the Nicaragua vs. Honduras case over the latter's support to contras and the maritime delimitation case between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. In the remaining 2 cases, the maritime and frontier case between El Salvador and Honduras, and the territorial dispute over the Aouzou Strip between Chad and Libya, the court's decision was implemented by both sides. The relatively high proportion of still undecided cases means it is too early to say if a greater number of decisions of a political nature made by the ICJ will be implemented in the Post Cold War period. However, implementation of even one ruling in the pending cases will show an increased level of success by the ICJ.

Regional Organizations and the UN

In his study Haas looked at the performance of regional organizations in resolving disputes. He observed that prior to 1965, disputes referred to regional organizations were different from those referred to the UN and typically of low

intensity, involving minimal fighting and small powers.³² The regional organizations were often not successful in resolving these disputes. However, in the period after 1965, the disputes referred to the regional organizations were similar to those which were referred to the UN and the organizations became competitors for the same task.³³

According to Haas the regional organizations did not prove to be a better forum for settling disputes than the UN, though the reasons were different in each region. The Organization of American States became increasingly ineffective in settling conflict after 1965, prior to which the US had been a leader in the organization. However, as more left-leaning governments came to power in Latin America and the leadership of the US was challenged, deep divisions arose between the OAS' members and the success of the organization began to decline.³⁴ The Arab League performed poorly in the 1950s when Egypt tried to exercise hegemonic influence, but was challenged by Iraq. This often led to factions forming around the two leaders, which made the League ineffective in resolving disputes. Later on Saudi Arabia became more involved with the organization and financed its operations and made diplomatic efforts, as a result of which the Arab League improved its rate of success modestly during the 1960s. However, success in the Arab League depended on which nation was providing leadership to the organization during a certain period and whether other members

³² Haas 215.

³³ Haas 216.

³⁴ Haas 212.

of the League supported its initiative.³⁵ Meanwhile the Organization of African Unity improved its performance slightly with more effective mediation by the Secretary General and heads of states. However, it was incapable of mounting and financing operations on its own and its success was often dependent on extraregional actors.³⁶ Haas concluded that the “aggregate success scored by most international organizations in managing conflicts has declined steadily after 1970.”³⁷

In the post Cold War years, the regional organizations have shown some success in 6 out of the 10 disputes which came before them. In 5 out of those 6 disputes, they worked with the UN. The OAS showed some success in each of the two disputes, involving Haiti and Nicaragua, which were referred to it and it collaborated with the UN in settling both these disputes. The OAU showed some success in 3 out of 5 or 60% of the disputes which were referred to it. In 2 out of those 3 disputes, involving the Aouzou Strip and Western Sahara, it worked with the UN. Meanwhile the Arab League displayed some success in 1 out of the 3 or 33% of the conflicts referred to it. This was the dispute in Lebanon, in which the UN also played a role.

In the post Cold War period, collaboration between the UN and a regional organization has often led to some success. The example of the Aouzou Strip, shows how different organizations can together produce a very successful result. This twenty-one year old border dispute between Libya and Chad was successfully

³⁵ Haas 214.

³⁶ Haas 215.

³⁷ Haas 216.

resolved in 1994, following a cease-fire negotiated under the auspices of the OAU, a judgment by the International Court of Justice, and a small peace-keeping operation by the UN assisting the two nations in implementing the judgment of the ICJ.³⁸

³⁸ Jan Eliasson, "Establishing Trust in the Healer: Preventive Diplomacy and the Future of the United Nations," Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start, ed. Kevin M. Cahill, M.D. (New York: BasicBooks 1996) 322.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Following the end of the Cold War in 1989, the United Nations did become more successful at conflict resolution. Almost half of the disputes which occurred in the post Cold War period made it to the UN Security Council's agenda. The 49% rate of referral is the second highest in the UN's history, and a large increase over the rate of referral prevailing in the late 1970s and early 1980s. More nations were taking their disputes to the UN at a time when the conflict between the superpowers had decreased.

Additionally, the disputes referred were more significant in terms of potential harm because they involved higher levels of intensity, more warfare, greater potential for spread and more powerful parties. In the period from 1989-96, 91% of the disputes with high intensity were referred to the UN as opposed to 32% in the Cold War years. In terms of warfare, 82% of the disputes involving high military operations were referred to the organization as compared to 24% in the Cold War period. While only 18% of the disputes with regional or global spread were referred to the organization in the period prior to 1989, 82% of these kind of disputes were referred to it in the period following the end of the Cold War. In the Cold War years 52% of the cases involving superpowers and large powers were referred to the UN, and this rose to 54% in the post Cold War years.

In the absence of vetoes by the United States and Russia, the UN was able to show some success in almost all the disputes that were referred to it. The one instance where it could take no action, in the US invasion of Panama, was the only one where a veto was cast. There was an improvement over its performance during the years of the Cold War. The organization showed 93% rate of success in abating conflicts, 58% in isolating them, 28% in stopping hostilities and 47% in settling them. While in the Cold War years its highest rate of success had been at 40%, this has increased to 97% in the post Cold War period. A closer look at the Security Council's record shows that it was more successful in resolving disputes from 1989-1993. In the period following that its rate of success appears to have declined.

The greater Security Council success in 1989-1993 reflected increased cooperation between the superpowers and a commitment to end conflicts. The US and Russia were actively involved in assisting the UN in resolving disputes. They acted as mediators in helping to end disputes in nations such as Namibia, where they had been carrying on a proxy war, and giving aid to opposing sides during the years of the Cold War. While the UN had the support of both superpowers in its efforts to end conflicts, it was able to accomplish a great deal. It was able to settle three high intensity conflicts which had been going on for many years. Out of those three conflicts in Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique, the first two came to an end only after the United States and Russia played a role in the peacemaking process. Furthermore the US and Russia made attempts not to hinder

the process of settling conflicts. This was demonstrated by a lack of vetoes in this period and also by the efforts of the superpowers to end their involvement in conflicts where they had been supporting opposing sides. Even in conflicts where the two superpowers did not take initiative, the improved political climate meant that the UN also got assistance from other intergovernmental organizations, ad hoc regional groupings or individual governments. For example, the civil war in Nicaragua came to an end with the joint efforts of the UN and the presidents of Central American countries. The Italian government worked with the UN in ending the civil war in Mozambique.

The Security Council's performance in settling disputes declined in 1994-1996. It was able to show great success in settling two conflicts: one regarding the Aouzou Strip and the other over Macedonia's name. Yet neither of these was of high intensity, nor did they involve large scale military operations. Meanwhile some high intensity conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan, which seemed to be on the verge of being resolved immediately following the end of the Cold War, continued.

Even in this period there was an absence of ideological conflict or other serious competition between the superpowers, which could have prevented them from getting involved in UN efforts. However, by this time Russia had too many domestic problems to be able to devote efforts to resolve international conflicts. It was also not in a position to contribute troops and finances to the peacekeeping operations. It now fell upon the US, the sole superpower, to make diplomatic

efforts to solve conflicts. The US did become involved in disputes such as those in Haiti or over North Korea's noncompliance with International Atomic Energy Agency, but that was only because involvement served its direct and immediate interests. Other high intensity conflicts such as East Timor where the US has chosen not to get involved are also the ones where the UN has failed to bring an end to the dispute.

The US, which now seems to be the most effective agent in settling disputes, has increasingly distanced itself from the UN and has either made independent diplomatic efforts or worked with other groups or nations. In trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, the US has worked alongside Norwegian diplomats. Meanwhile in the dispute between Russia and the Baltic states, Russia agreed to withdraw its troops from the Baltic states through US mediation.

With the lack of strong American leadership in the UN and an end of diplomatic efforts by Russia, the organization must now rely more heavily on other nations and organizations. For example, in the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi, the UN had to rely extensively on French forces to provide food and protection to the large refugee population. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the conflict seemed to be too complex and intense for the UN to handle on its own and the situation improved only after the involvement of NATO forces. In instances where the leadership and efforts from a nation or organization has ceased, as in the case of Somalia, the UN has had no choice but to end its efforts to resolve the dispute.

Since the end of the Cold War, a greater number of nations have been taking their disputes to the International Court of Justice and therefore it has become more prominent than it was during the Cold War years. In the period after 1989, the Court has examined 8 cases of political nature. So far the Court has rendered its decision in two cases, one involving maritime and frontier boundary between El Salvador and Honduras, and the other a territorial dispute between Libya and Chad. Each of these decisions was implemented by the parties involved in the dispute.

It remains to be seen whether the ICJ's decisions will be implemented more in the Post Cold War era. That can only be determined once the ICJ makes a decision in the 4 cases (the other 2 were settled out of court) of political nature which are still before it.

Following the end of the Cold War, the UN and regional organizations have worked together to resolve several disputes and this has resulted in an increase in the rate of success. A high intensity conflict such as the civil war in Nicaragua, was resolved only with the joint efforts of the UN, the OAS and the Contadora group. There is a great deal of potential for the UN and regional organizations to bring an end to conflicts as long as they develop methods and procedures to combine their resources for maximum results. Their success in the future will depend on better mutual understanding of the possibilities and limits between the UN and the regional organizations, leading to a more effective division of labor as each organization takes leadership where it can be the more

effective, and accountability of the various organizations involved in managing a conflict to the United Nations Security Council.³⁹

This study confirms the earlier observations that the UN enjoys more success in its function of dispute resolution when great powers become involved in the organization and work collectively to resolve conflicts. The increased superpower involvement strengthens the collective security mechanism and the organization becomes revitalized in its task of resolving conflicts. This was displayed in the years immediately after the end of the Cold War, when the UN's rate of success increased and more nations began to refer their disputes to the organization, as it was perceived that with great power unanimity and leadership the UN would take collective measures and be committed to resolving conflicts and addressing any threats to peace. However, as the powerful nations became reluctant to get involved in conflicts which did not affect their interest in the post 1993 period, the success of the organization has declined and it again appears that the members of the UN are developing a tolerant attitude to conflicts.

The organization works best when it has the active support of powerful nations as it is a meeting place for nations of the world to work together and take action under the guidelines of the Charter in order to settle conflicts. The world has not attained any fully supranational form of governance. Multilateral efforts still require the engagement and interest of those states with the greatest capability. What the post Cold War era shows is an additional step on the way to a

³⁹ Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements, the UN, and International Security: A Framework for Analysis," Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs, ed. Thomas G. Weiss (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1988) 26.

more fully multilateralist form of governance as John Ruggie defines it in “Multilateralism Matters”⁴⁰ - one where there is a joint decision according to general rules applied evenhandedly to all. Great power discretion has not fully disappeared, but using the UN- even the Security Council- subjects them to the eyes and comments of other states and forces the great powers to explain themselves and pushes them towards greater conformity with the charter norms.

In concluding his analysis of the UN’s performance in the Cold War years, Haas wrote that the organization’s performance would continue to decline as long as the great powers did not get involved in conflicts or exercised leadership and took action only when their direct interests were involved. This same pattern has persisted in the post Cold War period. As long as it continues, the UN’s rate of success in conflict resolution will remain lower than it was in 1990-93.

⁴⁰ John Gerald Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, ed. John Gerald Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 24.

APPENDIX

DATA TABLES

Table A.1- Ratings of Security Council's performance on the disputes referred to it between 1989-1996.

Dispute	Abating conflict	Stopping hostilities	Isolating conflict	Settling conflict	Raw Score	Success
1) Panama invasion	0	0	0	0	0	None
2) Falkland Islands	1	NA	NA	1	2	Some
3) Nicaragua	1	1	1	1	4	Some
4) Namibia	1	2	0	1	4	Some
5) Lebanon	1	0	0	0	1	Some
6) Iran-Iraq war	1	1	NA	0	2	Some
7) El Salvador	1	2	1	1	5	Great
8) Cambodia	2	1	1	1	5	Great
9) Arab-Israeli	1	0	NA	0	1	Some
10) Mozambique	1	2	0	2	5	Great
11) Aouzou Strip	2	0	NA	2	4	Great
12) Rwanda, Burundi	1	0	0	1	2	Some
13) Russian Troops in Baltic	1	NA	NA	0	1	Some
14) Haiti	1	1	0	1	3	Some
15) North Korea	1	NA	NA	0	1	Some
16) Angola	1	1	0	1	3	Some
17) Greece & Macedonia	2	NA	NA	1	3	Great
18) Former Yugoslavia	1	0	1	0	2	Some
19) Guatemala	1	2	0	1	4	Some
20) Afghanistan	1	0	1	1	3	Some
21) Cyprus	1	NA	0	0	1	Some
22) Somalia	1	0	0	0	1	Some
23) East Timor	1	NA	NA	0	1	Some
24) Western Sahara	1	1	0	0	2	Some
25) Tajikistan	1	1	0	0	2	Some
26) Liberia	1	0	0	0	1	Some
27) Kashmir	0	1	NA	0	1	Some
28) Kurd homeland	1	1	NA	0	2	Some
29) Hanish islands	1	0	NA	1	2	Some
30) Nagarno-Karabakh	1	1	NA	0	2	Some

Performance in the individual cases

The 30 disputes have been on the United Nations Security Council's agenda in the post Cold War period. The cases are arranged in Table 1 based on when they were resolved. At the end of the list are those disputes which still continue.

1) In the invasion of Panama by the US, I am giving the UN a rating of 0 in the field of abating the conflict as well as in stopping the hostilities. It was thought that this invasion would have a negative impact on the peace talks that were going on in Nicaragua, but it did not affect that process. However, the UN played no role here so I am giving it no points in isolating the conflict. As the UN could take no action towards settling the conflict due to a veto by US, France and Britain in the Security Council, I am giving it a 0 in this field.

2) In the Falkland Islands dispute where Britain and Argentina continued to claim the island, even though Argentina had lost the war, I am giving the UN a score of 1 in abating the conflict as it was able to bring the two parties to negotiate and try to discuss the issue in a peaceful way. Although the two sides did not resolve their dispute, through these talks they resumed diplomatic relations for the first time in 1990 since the Falkland War. Therefore I am giving the UN a score of 1 in the field of conflict settlement.

3) In the Nicaraguan civil war, I gave the UN a score of 1 in abating the conflict as its efforts along with those of 5 Central American Presidents led to negotiations between the contras and the government. I gave it a 1 in its efforts to end hostilities as after the 1990 elections there had been renewed fighting by some rebel forces. I gave it a score of 1 in isolating the conflict because even though Honduras ended its support for the contras, the US continued to provide aid to them. Finally I gave it a score of 1 in settling the conflict as it helped to monitor elections and the demobilization of contras, but despite these measures there was still some civil strife in the nation.

4) The UN was given a score of 1 in abating the conflict in Namibia as it was able to get all the parties involved to end hostilities and start negotiations that ultimately would lead to the independence of Namibia. However, the situation in Namibia improved only with American and Soviet cooperation. The UN was able to supervise a cease fire and so I am giving it a score of 2 in this field. Diplomatic initiatives taken by the US led to the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and Cuban forces from Angola. Therefore I am giving the organization no points in isolating the conflict. Finally the UN was able to monitor the cease fire, and assist in voter registration. Due to its efforts and an end of the Cold War,

elections took place and Namibia became an independent state in 1990. Therefore I am giving the UN a score of 1 in settling the conflict.

5) I have given the UN a score of 1 in abating the conflict in Lebanon, as the UNIFIL forces have provided humanitarian assistance, prevented Israel from turning South Lebanon into Israel-occupied territory and have given Israel security from infiltration from the south of Lebanon. The UN has, however, not been able to prevent the sides from fighting and so I am giving it a 0 in the field of stopping hostilities. Also it has failed to isolate the conflict and Israel and Syria continue to be involved in the affairs of Lebanon. So I am giving the organization a score of 0 in isolating the conflict. Finally I am giving the UN a 0 in the field of settling the conflict as it seems to have played almost no role in improving the situation in Lebanon. The civil war in that nation appears to have halted due to mediation by Arab nations.

6) The UN was given a score of 1 in abating the conflict in the Iran-Iraq war as it was able to get the two parties to stop hostilities and negotiate. I gave the UN a score of 2 in the category of stopping hostilities as it made the two sides agree to a permanent cease fire. Finally the UN was given a 0 in its efforts at settling the conflict because although it had been successful in establishing a cease fire and getting the two sides to negotiate, neither of the parties was agreeing to give up its claims. This led to a situation of “no peace, no war” and the UN did not seem to be able to settle the conflict.

7) The UN received a rating of 1 in abating the civil war in El Salvador as the government and the FMLN agreed to suspend hostilities, scale down rival claims and initiate negotiations under UN auspices. However, this process was successful largely because the US and the Soviet Union backed the peace plan. The UN was given a score of 2 in stopping hostilities as both sides agreed to a cease fire. The US that had been supporting one of the sides in the civil war, ended that support through UN efforts and assisted both sides in reaching a solution. So I gave it a score of 1 in the field of conflict isolation. Finally I gave the UN a score of 1 in conflict settlement as it supervised the cease fire and the demobilization of the guerrillas and their integration in civil life with assistance from the two superpowers. The UN mediation resulted in elections in 1994 which led to an end to the civil war.

8) In the Cambodian civil war, I gave the UN a score of 2 in abating the conflict as the organization was able to bring all 4 factions and the government to agree to UN assistance with elections and rebuilding of the nation. The organization was given a rating of 1 in the field of ending hostilities as it was able to lessen the fighting between the government and some opposition groups. However, the violence continued due to the Khmer Rouge’s unwillingness to obey the cease fire. Although the third party, Vietnam, did withdraw its forces from Cambodia this was not done under UN supervision. Vietnam’s withdrawal was

mainly due to the pressure put on it by the Soviet Union and not so much by UN efforts. Therefore I am giving the UN a 1 in this field. Finally the UN was given a 1 in the category of settlement of the conflict as it was successful in holding elections and helping to create social order. However, it could not bring peace as the Khmer Rouge was still powerful and was hampering efforts that could settle the conflict.

9) In the Arab-Israeli conflict I gave the UN a rating of 1 in its efforts to abate the conflict because even though it could not take action against Israel due to vetoes by the US, it still provided humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. I gave it no points for stopping hostilities as many episodes involving violence have continued to take place in that area. Finally the UN played no role in the Israel-PLO accord and subsequent treaties that were secured through American initiative. Therefore I am giving it a score of 0 in settling the conflict.

10) I have given the UN a rating of 1 in abating the conflict in Mozambique, as the organization and the government of Italy succeeded in bringing the two sides to sign the peace accords. As the cease fire lasted I gave it a score of 2 in that field. I gave the UN a 0 in isolating the conflict because it played no role in ending South African support for RENAMO, which ceased with the change in regime in South Africa. Finally I gave it a score of 2 in settling the conflict because ONUMOZ was successful in carrying out fair elections, in demobilizing the rebels and in resettling refugees.

11) In the case of the Aouzou Strip, I gave the UN a rating of 2 in abating the conflict as it send a force contributed by 6 nations to observe the withdrawal of Libyan forces from the region, following the decision made by the International Court of Justice in Chad's favor. I gave it no points for ending hostilities as a cease fire had come into effect in 1987 as a result of mediation by the OAU. The UN received a score of 2 in settling the conflict because in a period of two months the agreement was implemented and the mission was over.

12) I gave the UN a score of 1 in abating the situation in Rwanda and Burundi, because French forces under its auspices provided food, supplies and protection to thousands of Hutus. I gave it a 0 in ending hostilities because the Security Council's demands for a cease fire were not followed. The fighting ended with the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Forces. The UN received no points for isolating the conflict because neighboring countries provided support to different parties involved in the fighting. I gave the UN a score of 1 in settling the conflict as it had set up a Criminal Tribunal and UNAMIR forces are resettling refugees and monitoring human rights. However, many refugees are still in neighboring nations.

13) The Baltic States asked the UN to take action to facilitate the withdrawal of Russian troops from their territory. The Secretary General appointed a special representative who assisted the two sides in negotiations. Therefore I have given

the UN a rating of 1 in abating the conflict. The issue was finally settled with the mediation of the United States and so I have given the organization no points for settling the dispute.

14) I gave the UN a 1 in abating the conflict on Haiti because it started negotiations between the two sides and send a civil mission to monitor human rights. However the US and the OAS were also involved in the process. The organization received a rating of 1 in stopping hostilities as political violence continued in several parts of the country. The UN received no points for isolating the conflict as it allowed a US led invasion of the country under Resolution 940. The US government proceeded to make an agreement with Haiti's military leaders, which led to the return of the exiled President, without consulting the UN or the OAS. The UN assisted in settling the conflict by monitoring human rights and paving the way for elections. Therefore I have given it a score of 1 in this field.

15) I have given the UN a score of 1 in abating the tensions that arose when North Korea refused to let the IAEA examine its nuclear sites and threatened to withdraw from the NPT. Several UN members such as China were not in favor of imposing economic sanctions on North Korea so the Security Council members were urged to negotiate with North Korea. The issue was settled through bilateral talks between the US and North Korea, as a result of which the latter agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT and to permit IAEA inspections. As the UN played no role in negotiating a settlement, I have given it no points.

16) In the Angola civil war, I have given the UN a rating of 1 in abating the conflict, as the Security Council voted to place an embargo on military and petroleum products to the areas held by UNITA and also threatened to take other sanctions unless UNITA agreed to the Lusaka Protocol that ended the conflict. However, the discussion and the final peace plan were carried out through the work of US, Russia and Portugal. I gave it a rating of 1 in stopping hostilities as there had been violations of the cease fire on several occasions. The UN received no points for removing third parties from this conflict, as the withdrawal of Cuban troops in 1988, had come about due to diplomatic efforts by the United States. Through UN and US efforts, UNITA accepted the MPLA government and its leader became one of the vice-presidents of the country. Therefore I am giving the UN a score of 1 in this area.

17) In the dispute between Greece and Macedonia, I have given the UN a score of 2 in abating the conflict because it has gotten the two sides to negotiate. I gave a score of 1 to the organization in settling the conflict as it was successful in making Greece lift its economic embargo of Macedonia in 1995. Currently negotiations are going on over the issue of Greece's objection to Macedonia's name.

18) In the case of the former Yugoslavia I gave the UN a 1 in its efforts of abating the crisis as it was able to provide humanitarian assistance to the region. I gave it no points in stopping hostilities as numerous cease fires were not obeyed and the fighting ended only with the bombardment by NATO forces. Although the fighting started in Croatia it soon spread throughout the region and the UN was unable to control it. However, it did employ a force on the border of Macedonia to prevent the ethnic conflict from extending there and so I have given it a score of 1 in isolating the conflict. In the area of settling the conflict I gave it a rating of 0 as the Dayton accords that ended the conflict were a result of American diplomacy.

19) In the case of the civil war in Guatemala, I gave the UN a rating of 1 in its efforts to abate the conflict because it got the two sides to negotiate over a period of 6 years and it provided advisory service through an independent expert. After the negotiations a cease fire was accepted by both parties and therefore I have given the UN a 2 in its efforts to stopping hostilities. I gave the UN no points in isolating the conflict because the US which had been supporting the government, ended that support due to domestic pressure over human rights violations in the nation and not through any UN initiative. I gave the UN a 1 in settling the conflict as even though it assisted in deliberations and in monitoring human rights, it failed to send military observers to monitor the peace accord after China vetoed that proposal.

20) I have given the UN a rating of 1 for abating the conflict in Afghanistan as efforts by the organization led to the Geneva Accords of 1988. Under these accords, the Soviet Union was to withdraw from Afghanistan and other nations were to end their interference in the civil war in that country. I have given a score of 0 to the UN in its efforts of stopping hostilities as even after the Soviet withdrawal the war continued between the different Afghan factions. I gave the UN a rating of 1 in the category of conflict isolation as it was successful in facilitating Soviet troop withdrawal. However, the US, Pakistan and the Soviet Union continued to provide support to the government and opposition forces. I gave a score of 1 to the UN in the area of settlement of the conflict, since it was able to get the Soviet forces to withdraw but the fighting went on among the Afghan factions leading to wide scale destruction and death.

21) I gave the UN a 1 in abating the conflict in Cyprus as the Secretary General was able to get the leaders of the Greek and Turkish sides to have discussions in 1988. The UN's efforts in isolating the conflict were given a 0 as Turkey and Greece continued to support the rival factions on Cyprus. The UN was given a 0 in settling the conflict because the issue has been on its agenda for more than 30 years but neither of the sides seem to want a permanent peace and the dispute between them continues.

22) I gave the UN a score of 1 in abating the food shortages in Somalia amidst heavy clan warfare. The UN was able to provide humanitarian assistance that

prevented a famine. I gave it a rating of 0 in stopping hostilities as none of the cease fires held for long and there was a great deal of fighting. I gave it a score of 0 in isolating the conflict because it permitted US forces to intervene in the country under resolution 794. The US forces that had come under “Operation Restore Hope” took military initiatives without consulting the UN officials. The UN was given a rating of 0 in conflict settlement as it could not bring about national reconciliation and the country remained in a state of chaos.

23) I gave the UN a score of 1 in abating the conflict in East Timor as it got Portugal and Indonesia to discuss the conflict in 1989. However, there was no follow up to that and a visit by the Portuguese administration to East Timor on a fact finding mission was canceled in 1991. So I have given the UN a rating of 0 in settling the conflict as there has been no change in that situation.

24) I gave the UN a score of 1 in abating the Western Sahara conflict as it was able to get the POLISARIO and the Moroccan King to start a dialogue and agree to a referendum. The UN was given a rating of 1 in the field of stopping hostilities because due to its efforts the two sides accepted a temporary cease fire. The UN was unsuccessful in isolating the conflict and therefore was given a score of 0. Algeria did cease supporting the POLISARIO but that was due to its rapprochement with Morocco. The UN was given a 0 in resolving the conflict as the referendum never took place and the POLISARIO eventually backed out of the negotiations.

25) I am giving a score of 1 to the UN’s efforts in abating the civil war in Tajikistan. The UN was successful in bringing the two sides to start negotiations and lessen hostilities. The UN sent forces to monitor the cease fire, but there have been many violations of the cease fire and so I am giving the organization a 1 in the field of stopping hostilities. The UN has been unsuccessful in preventing countries like Afghanistan and Iran from supporting the Islamic rebels and so I am giving it a rating of 0 in isolating the conflict. The conflict continues as the violence persists and the sides do not seem willing to come to an agreement. So I am giving the UN a 0 in settling the conflict.

26) The UN was given a score of 1 in abating the Liberian civil war, because its special envoy assisted the ECOWAS group in starting the negotiations between the various factions. I gave the UN a score of 0 in ending the hostilities as the cease fires were followed rarely. The UN received a score of 0 in isolating the conflict as the ECOWAS nations interfered in the civil war in Liberia while the UN supported their actions. Although plans were made for a transitional government and subsequent elections these never materialized as fighting spread throughout the nation and so the UN received a score of 0 in settling the conflict.

27) In the case of Kashmir, the UN has had no effect in abating the conflict and tensions have increased between India and Pakistan in recent years. So I have

given it a score of 0 in this field. The cease fire has been broken on several occasions and so I have given the UN a 1 in its efforts to end hostilities. Finally no settlement seems to be near and India has stopped cooperating with the UN since 1972 and has restricted the organization's activities. So I have given the UN a 0 in settling the conflict.

28) In the situation where the Kurds have demanded a homeland, the UN gave support to the US operation "Provide Comfort" to give the Kurds a safe haven. So I have given it a score of 1 in this area. I have given the UN a 1 in its efforts to stop hostilities, because even though the Kurds are safe from Iraq, they have been attacked by Turkey and there is infighting amongst them. I have given it no points to the UN in determining a permanent homeland for the Kurds as Turkey is opposed to a Kurd region in Northern Iraq.

29) I have given the UN a score of 1 in abating the conflict over the Hanish islands as the Secretary General offered his good offices to Eritrea and Yemen and urged France to mediate. After a round of fighting over the Greater Hanish islands, the two sides agreed to a cease fire amongst themselves and exchanged prisoners of war. The UN did not play a role in ending hostilities, so I have given it no points. The two nations agreed to settle the issue peacefully and submit it to the International Court of Justice, as a result of mediation by France, Egypt, Ethiopia and the UN. So I am giving the organization a score of 1 in settling the conflict.

30) I have given a score of 1 to the UN in abating the conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh as it has assisted the OSCE in starting negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and has provided humanitarian assistance. The UN has received a 1 in ending hostilities as a fragile cease fire has been in effect since 1994. I gave the organization a 0 in settling the conflict as no agreement appears to be forthcoming.

Table A.2- Outcome of disputes not referred to the UN between 1989-1996.

Dispute	Parties	Outcome
Sudan civil war	Sudan, Iran, Uganda Ethiopia, Eritrea	unresolved
Sri Lanka civil war	Sri Lanka, India	unresolved
Dispute over 3 islands	Iran, UAE	unresolved
Dispute over Sabah	Malaysia, Philippines	unresolved
Senegal/ Mauritania border	Senegal, Mauritania	petered out
Treatment of Turks in Bulgaria	Turkey, Bulgaria	petered out
Fishing in Barents Sea	Russia, Iceland, Norway	unresolved
Sprately islands	China, Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei	unresolved
Walvis Bay	Namibia, South Africa	resolved by negotiations
Sudan/ Egypt border	Sudan, Egypt	unresolved
Ecuador/ Peru border	Ecuador, Peru	resolved by mediation
Russia/ Latvia border	Russia, Latvia	unresolved
Russia/ Estonia border	Russia, Estonia	unresolved
Latvia/ Lithuania maritime border	Latvia, Lithuania	unresolved
Siachen Glacier	India, Pakistan	unresolved
Kurile island	Russia, Japan	unresolved
Senkaku Island	China, Japan, Taiwan	unresolved
Ukraine/ Romania border	Ukraine, Romania	resolved by negotiations
Treatment of Hungarians in Slovakia	Hungary, Slovakia	unresolved
Black Sea Fleet	Ukraine, Russia	unresolved
Ukraine's nuclear weapons	Ukraine, Russia	resolved by mediation
Nepalese refugees	Nepal, Bhutan	petered out
Treatment of Turks in Greece	Turkey, Greece	unresolved
Greece extending its territory in Aegean	Greece, Turkey	unresolved
Ganges river water	Bangladesh, India	resolved by mediation
Qatar/ Saudi border	Qatar, Saudi Arabia	unresolved
Yemen/ Saudi border	Yemen, Saudi Arabia	unresolved
Treatment of Greeks in Albania	Greece, Albania	petered out
Thailand/ Vietnam maritime boundaries	Thailand, Vietnam	unresolved
Sipadan and Ligitan islands	Malaysia, Indonesia	unresolved
Batu Puteh island	Malaysia, Singapore	unresolved
Ethnic Russians in Baltic	Russia, Baltic states	unresolved

Table A.3- Variables of disputes referred to the UN between 1989-1996.

Dispute	Intensity	Spread	Extent of Warfare
Invasion of Panama	Moderate	bilateral	military
Falkland Islands	Low	bilateral	none
Nicaragua civil war	High	regional	military
Namibia	High	regional	skirmishes
Lebanon	High	regional	military
Iran-Iraq war	High	bilateral	military
El Salvador civil war	High	bilateral	military
Cambodia civil war	High	regional	military
Arab-Israeli	High	regional	skirmishes
Mozambique civil war	High	bilateral	military
Aouzou Strip	Moderate	bilateral	skirmishes
Rwanda, Burundi	High	regional	military
Russian troops in Baltic	Low	regional	none
Haiti	Moderate	regional	skirmishes
North Korea and NPT	Low	global	none
Angola civil war	High	global	military
Greece and Macedonia	Low	bilateral	none
Former Yugoslavia	High	regional	military
Guatemala civil war	High	bilateral	military
Afghanistan Civil war	High	global	military
Cyprus	Moderate	regional	skirmishes
Somalia	High	global	limited military
East Timor	High	bilateral	military
Western Sahara	High	regional	military
Tajikstan	High	regional	military
Liberia civil war	High	regional	military
Kashmir	Moderate	bilateral	skirmishes
Kurd homeland	High	global	skirmishes
Hanish Islands	Low	bilateral	military
Nagarno-Karabagh	High	bilateral	military

Dispute : Parties

Power of Parties⁴¹

Invasion of Panama: US, Panama	Superpower vs. smallest power
Falkland Islands: Britain, Argentina	Large power vs. middle power
Nicaragua: US, Nicaraguan factions	Superpower vs. smallest power
Namibia: South Africa, Namibia	Middle power vs. smallest power
Lebanon: Israel, Syria, Lebanese factions	Middle power vs. smaller power
Iran-Iraq war: Iran, Iraq	Middle power vs. smaller power
El Salvador: US, El Salvador factions	Superpower vs. smallest power
Cambodia: Vietnam, Cambodian factions	Smaller power vs. smallest power
Arab-Israel: Israel, Arab states, PLO	Middle power vs. middle power
Mozambique: South Africa, Mozambique factions	Middle power vs. smallest power
Aouzou Strip: Libya, Chad	Smaller power vs. smallest power
War b/w Hutus and Tutsis: Burundi, Rwanda	Smallest power vs. smallest power
Russian troops in Baltic: Russia, Baltic states	Large power vs. smaller power
Haiti: US, Haiti	Superpower vs. smallest power
North Korea and NPT: US, North Korea	Superpower vs. smaller power
Angola: US, USSR, Cuba, South Africa Angolan factions	Superpower vs. superpower
Macedonia's name: Greece, Macedonia	Middle power vs. smallest power
Former Yugoslavia: Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia	Smaller power vs. smaller power
Guatemala: US, Guatemalan factions	Superpower vs. smallest power
Afghanistan: US, USSR, Pakistan, Afghan factions	Superpower vs. superpower
Cyprus: Turkey, Greece, Cyprus	Middle power vs. middle power
Somalia: US, Somalian factions	Superpower vs. smallest power
East Timor: Indonesia, Portugal, East Timor factions	Middle power vs. middle power
Western Sahara: Morocco, Algeria, Polisario	Smallest power vs. smaller power
Tajikstan: Russia, Afghanistan, Tajik factions	Large power vs. smaller power
Liberia: Liberian factions, Nigeria and other members of the ECOWAS group	Smallest power vs. middle power
Kashmir: India, Pakistan	Large power vs. smaller power
Kurds: US, Britain, France, Iraq, Turkey	Superpower vs. smaller power
Hanish Islands: Eritrea, Yemen	Smallest power vs. smallest power
Nagarno-Karabagh: Armenia, Azerbaijan	Smaller power vs. smaller power

⁴¹ In disputes involving more than two parties I have coded the most powerful party on each side as Haas has done in his study. I have used the same five factors (GNP, GNP per capita, Population, Nuclear Capability and Prestige) as Cox and Jacobson to determine the power of the each country. I have, however, updated the figures used by them for GNP, GNP per capita and Population, as their analysis used figures from 1965 and these numbers have increased a great deal since then.

Table A.4- Variables of disputes not referred to the UN between 1989-1996.

Dispute	Intensity	Spread	Extent of Warfare
Sudan Civil War	High	regional	military
Sri Lanka Civil War	High	bilateral	military
Iran and UAE over 3 islands	Low	bilateral	none
Malaysia and Philippines over Sabah	Low	bilateral	none
Senegal/ Mauritania border	Moderate	bilateral	skirmishes
Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria	Low	bilateral	none
Fishing Rights in Barents Sea	Low	regional	none
Spratly islands	Moderate	regional	skirmishes
Walvis Bay	Low	bilateral	none
Sudan/ Egypt border	Moderate	bilateral	skirmishes
Ecuador/ Peru border	Moderate	bilateral	military
Russia/ Latvia border	Low	bilateral	none
Russia/ Estonia border	Low	bilateral	none
Latvia/ Lithuania maritime border	Low	bilateral	none
Siachin Glacier	Moderate	bilateral	military
Kurile Island	Low	bilateral	none
Senkaku Island	Low	bilateral	none
Ukraine/ Romania border	Low	bilateral	none
Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia	Low	bilateral	none
Black Sea Fleet	Low	bilateral	none
Ukraine's Nuclear weapons	Low	bilateral	none
Nepalese refugees	Low	bilateral	none
Ethnic Turks in Greece	Low	bilateral	skirmishes
Greece extending territory in Aegean	Low	bilateral	none
Ganges River water	Low	bilateral	none
Qatar/ Saudi border	Low	bilateral	skirmishes
Yemen/ Saudi border	Moderate	bilateral	skirmishes
Ethnic Greeks in Albania	Low	bilateral	skirmishes
Thailand/ Vietnam maritime boundary	Low	bilateral	none
Malaysia and Indonesia over Sipadan and Ligitan	Low	bilateral	none
Malaysia and Singapore over Batu Puteh island	Low	bilateral	none
Ethnic Russians in Baltic	Low	regional	none

Dispute : Parties

Sudan Civil War: Iran, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda
Sri Lanka Civil War: India, Sri Lankan factions
Iran and UAE over 3 islands: Iran, UAE
Sabah: Malaysia, Philippines
Senegal/ Mauritania border: Senegal, Mauritania
Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Turkey, Bulgaria
Fishing Rights in Barents Sea: Russia, Norway, Iceland
Spratly islands: China, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei, Philippines
Walvis Bay: South Africa, Namibia
Sudan/ Egypt border: Egypt, Sudan
Ecuador/ Peru border: Ecuador, Peru
Russia/ Latvia border: Russia, Latvia
Russia/ Estonia border: Russia, Estonia
Latvia/ Lithuania maritime border: Latvia, Lithuania
Siachin Glacier: India, Pakistan
Kurile Islands: Russia, Japan
Senkaku Island: China, Japan, Taiwan
Ukraine/ Romania border: Ukraine, Romania
Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia: Hungary, Slovakia
Black Sea Fleet: Russia, Ukraine
Ukraine's Nuclear Weapons: Russia, Ukraine
Nepalese refugees: Nepal, Bhutan
Ethnic Turks in Greece: Turkey, Greece
Aegean islands/ continental shelf: Greece, Turkey
Ganges River water: India, Bangladesh
Qatar/ Saudi border: Saudi Arabia, Qatar
Yemen/ Saudi border: Saudi Arabia, Yemen
Ethnic Greeks in Albania: Greece, Albania
Gulf of Thailand: Thailand, Vietnam
Sipadan and Ligitan islands: Malaysia, Indonesia
Batu Puteh island: Malaysia, Singapore
Ethnic Russians in Baltic: Russia, Baltic states

Power of Parties

Middle power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. smaller power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Smallest power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smaller power

Large power vs. smaller power

Middle power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. smaller power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smaller power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. large power
Large power vs. large power
Middle power vs. smaller power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. middle power
Large power vs. middle power
Smallest power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. middle power
Middle power vs. middle power
Large power vs. smaller power
Middle power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. smallest power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Smaller power vs. middle power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smaller powers

Table A.5- Ratings of Security Council's performance on the disputes referred to it between 1985-1988.

Dispute	Abating conflict	Stopping hostilities	Isolating conflict	Settling conflict	Raw Score	Success
Raids on neighboring states by South Africa	0	0	NA	0	0	None
Greenpeace Ship	1	NA	NA	1	2	Some
US intervening in Nicaragua	0	0	NA	0	0	None
Israeli raid on Tunisia	0	NA	NA	0	0	None
US raid on Libya	0	NA	NA	0	0	None

Performance in the individual cases

In the disputes involving raids by South African forces in Lesotho and Botswana in 1985, the Security Council condemned the acts and said that South Africa should pay compensation for damages. However, South Africa refused to pay any compensation and justified the raids as being necessary for destroying bases of the African National Congress in its neighboring nations. In the case of South African raids in Botswana, Zaire and Zambia, in 1987, a draft resolution proposing that selective sanctions should be placed against South Africa to prevent it from sending its forces into these nations again was considered, but was vetoed by the United States and Britain. South African forces continued to attack these nations, so I have given no points to the UN in abating the conflict, putting an end to the skirmishes or settling the matter.

In the dispute between France and New Zealand over the Greenpeace ship I gave the UN a rating of 1 in abating the conflict because the Secretary General brought about an agreement between the two nations regarding the punishment given to the French secret service agents responsible for sinking the ship. However the dispute continued when the agents were released from their confinement by the French government before the agreed term was over. New Zealand demanded a return of the two agents and this matter was finally resolved by a three man international tribunal which refused New Zealand's demands for return of the agents but condemned the actions of the French government. Therefore I have given the UN a rating of 1 in settling the dispute.

In the dispute between the US and Nicaragua, the Security Council was convened on many occasions by Nicaragua. But the US vetoed and blocked any actions. In the General Assembly resolution 42/18 was adopted calling for US compliance with the ICJ's judgment in the case brought against it by Nicaragua and resolution 42/176 was adopted which asked the US to lift its trade embargo against Nicaragua. However the US refused to comply with the ICJ's judgment and continued to intervene in Nicaragua. So I have given no points to the UN in abating or settling the conflict. I have given the UN no points in ending hostilities between the two nations because the US continued to supply aid to the contras and to the government of Honduras to continue the civil war in Nicaragua.

In the case of the Israeli raid on Tunisia, the Security Council condemned the bombing as an act of aggression but refrained from imposing sanctions. Security Council resolution 573 said that Tunisia had the right to appropriate reparations. Some nations suggested that a penalty should be placed on Israel to make it pay compensation to Tunisia, but this issue was never taken up in the Security Council. Meanwhile Israel rejected the Security Council's resolution

saying that it had carried out the raid in Tunisia as it was a base for the PLO. Israel also refused to pay any compensation. Therefore I have given the UN no points for abating or settling the conflict.

In the dispute over the bombing of Libya by the US, a resolution condemning the attack in the Security Council was vetoed by the United States, France and Britain. The General Assembly condemned the attack in resolution 41/38 and said that Libya should get compensation from the US. However, Libya received no compensation so I am giving the UN no points for abating or settling the conflict.

Table A.6- Outcome of disputes between 1985-1988 not referred to the UN.

Dispute	Parties	Outcome
Persecution of ethnic Hungarians	Romania, Hungary	petered out
Siachen Glacier	India, Pakistan	unresolved
Dispute over logging rights	Laos, Thailand	petered out
Spratly islands	Vietnam, China	unresolved
Hutu revolt	Burundi, Rwanda	petered out
Sudan Civil War	Sudanese factions, Ethiopia	unresolved
Dispute over 3 villages	Laos, Thailand	petered out
Persecution of ethnic Turks	Turkey, Bulgaria	petered out
Expulsion of Tunisian workers	Libya, Tunisia	resolved by negotiations
Use of Costa Rican territory by contras	Nicaragua, Costa Rica	resolved by negotiations
Aid provided to contras	Nicaragua, Honduras	resolved by negotiations
Missiles fired at Italian island	Libya, Italy	petered out
Fasht-al-Dibal island	Bahrain, Qatar	petered out
Taba enclave	Egypt, Israel	resolved by negotiations
Persecution of ethnic Albanians	Yugoslavia, Albania	petered out
Sri Lanka Civil War	Sri Lanka, India	unresolved
Kenya/ Uganda border	Kenya, Uganda	petered out
South Yemen/ Oman border	South Yemen, Oman	petered out
Vietnamese troop incursions	Vietnam, Thailand	petered out
Oil rights in Aegean	Greece, Turkey	unresolved

Table A.7- Variables of disputes between 1985-1988 referred to the UN.

Dispute	Intensity	Spread	Extent of warfare
South African raids	Low	regional	skirmishes
Greenpeace ship	Low	bilateral	none
US intervention in Nicaragua	Moderate	regional	none
Israeli raid on Tunisia	Moderate	bilateral	skirmish
US raid on Libya	Moderate	bilateral	skirmish

Dispute: Parties

Power of Parties

South African Raids: South Africa, Botswana,
Zaire, Zambia, Lesotho

Middle power vs. smallest power

Greenpeace ship: France, New Zealand

Large power vs. smaller power

US intervention in Nicaragua: US, Nicaragua

Superpower vs. smallest power

Israeli raid over Tunisia: Israel, Tunisia

Middle power vs. smallest power

US raid on Libya: US, Libya

Superpower vs. smaller power

Table A.8- Variables of disputes between 1985-1988 not referred to the UN.

Dispute	Intensity	Spread	Extent of warfare
Sudan civil war	High	bilateral	military
Laos and Thailand over 3 villages	Low	bilateral	skirmishes
Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria	Low	bilateral	none
Libya's expulsion of Tunisian workers	Low	bilateral	none
Costa Rican territory used by contras	Moderate	regional	skirmishes
Honduras aiding contras	Moderate	regional	skirmishes
Missiles fired at Italian island	Low	bilateral	skirmish
Fasht-al-Dibal island	Low	bilateral	skirmish
Taba enclave	Low	bilateral	none
Ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia	Low	bilateral	none
Sri Lanka civil war	High	bilateral	military
Kenya/ Uganda border	Low	bilateral	skirmishes
Vietnamese troops incursion	Low	bilateral	skirmishes
Oil rights in Aegean	Low	bilateral	none
Ethnic Hungarians in Yugoslavia	Low	bilateral	none
Siachen Glacier	Moderate	bilateral	military
Logging rights in Laos	Low	bilateral	skirmishes
Spratly islands	Moderate	regional	skirmishes
Hutu revolt	Moderate	bilateral	military

Dispute: Parties	Power of parties
Sudan civil war: Sudanese factions, Ethiopia	Smallest power vs. smallest power
Laos and Thailand over 3 villages: Thailand, Laos	Smaller power vs. smallest power
Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Turkey, Bulgaria	Middle power vs. smaller power
Expulsion of Tunisian workers: Libya, Tunisia	Smaller power vs. smallest power
Costa Rican territory used by rebels: Costa Rica, Nicaragua	Smallest power vs. smallest power
Honduras aiding contras: Nicaragua, Honduras	Smallest power vs. smallest power
Missiles fired at Italian island: Libya, Italy	Smaller power vs. large power
Fasht-al-Dibal island: Bahrain, Qatar	Smaller power vs. smallest power
Taba enclave: Egypt, Israel	Middle power vs. middle power
Ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia: Yugoslavia, Albania	Smaller power vs. smallest power
Sri Lanka civil war: India, Sri Lankan factions	Large power vs. smallest power
Kenya/ Uganda border: Kenya, Uganda	Smallest power vs. smallest power
Vietnamese troops incursion in Thailand: Vietnam, Thailand	Smaller power vs. smaller power
Oil rights in Aegean: Greece, Turkey	Middle power vs. middle power
Ethnic Hungarians in Romania: Hungary, Romania	Smaller power vs. smaller power
Siachen Glacier: India, Pakistan	Large power vs. smaller power
Logging rights in Laos: Thailand, Laos	Smaller power vs. smallest power
Spratly islands: China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei, Philippines	Large power vs. smaller powers
Hutu revolt: Rwanda, Burundi	Smallest power vs. smallest power

Table A.9- Ratings of regional organizations' performance on the disputes referred to them between 1989-1996.

Organization of American States						
Dispute	Abating conflict	Stopping hostilities	Isolating conflict	Settling conflict	Raw Score	Success
Nicaragua	1	1	1	1	4	Some
Haiti	1	1	NA	1	3	Some
Organization of African Unity						
Mauritania and Senegal	2	0	NA	2	4	Great
Aouzou Strip	0	2	NA	0	2	Some
Western Sahara	1	1	0	0	2	Some
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0	None
Nigeria and Cameroon	0	0	NA	0	0	None
Arab League						
Lebanon	1	1	0	1	3	Some
Kuwait invasion	0	0	0	0	0	None
Iran and UAE	0	NA	NA	0	0	None

Performance in the individual cases

Organization of American States

In the case of the Nicaragua civil war, I have given the OAS a score of 1 in abating the conflict because it worked with the UN and 5 Central American Presidents to bring about an agreement between the contra rebels and the government which resulted in a cease fire and elections in 1990. I gave the organization a score of 1 in stopping hostilities because even after the elections there was some fighting by rebel groups. I gave the OAS a rating of 1 in isolating the conflict because even as Honduras stopped supporting the contras, the US still provided aid to them. I gave the OAS a score of 1 in settling the conflict because it assisted the UN in observing the election process and in dismantling the Nicaraguan resistance force, but even after these efforts, there was some civil strife in the country.

I have given a score of 1 to the OAS in abating the conflict in Haiti because it send an observer mission to the nation to look at human rights and to facilitate distribution of humanitarian assistance. However the negotiations between the two sides were carried out by a UN-OAS special envoy and also by the US. The organization received 1 point for ending hostilities as political violence continued in parts of the country. The OAS and the UN worked together in the UN-OAS International Civilian Mission to ensure deployment of observers and to monitor human rights before the elections. So I have given it a score of 1 in settling the conflict.

Organization of African Unity

In the ethnic violence between Mauritania and Senegal, which was triggered by a border incident over grazing rights, I have given the OAU a score of 2 in abating the conflict, as the OAU inter-African Commission and the Secretary General mediated the dispute between the two nations. Riots between Arab Mauritians and black Senegalese began with the looting of Mauritanian shops in Senegal and quickly spread to both countries. The strife ended when Mauritania and Senegal called in their armies and put a curfew on their capitals, Dakar and Nouakchott. I have given the OAU no points in stopping hostilities as it did not play a role in ending the skirmishes. I have given it 2 point in settling the conflict because the organization was successful in mediating the dispute and the two countries restored relations in 1992.

In the dispute over the Aouzou strip I have given the OAU no points for abating the conflict as its effort to mobilize a 6 nation African peacekeeping force ended in failure. It did, however, get Libya and Chad to agree to a cease fire in

1987 so I have given it 2 points for stopping hostilities. Later Chad and Libya took their dispute before the ICJ so I have given the OAU no points in settling the conflict.

In the case of Western Sahara, the UN secretary general was a joint mediator with the president of the OAU between Morocco and POLISARIO. Through their efforts Morocco recognized POLISARIO and agreed to a cease fire and a referendum, so I have given the OAU a score of 1 in abating the conflict and 1 point for stopping hostilities. The OAU played no role in isolating the conflict because Algeria ended its support to POLISARIO after it restored diplomatic relations with Morocco. Finally I have given the OAU no points in settling the conflict as the referendum never took place and POLISARIO backed out of the agreement.

In the Somalian civil war the OAU had been making efforts since 1991 to bring peace among the warring factions. It send envoys to Somalia and contacted leaders of all the factions and later organized a meeting in Ethiopia which was attended by leaders of 26 factions, including the 2 main ones of Aideed and Ali Mahdi. The organization worked with the UN in 1992 to call for a cease fire. However, its efforts have had no impact on the conflict and none of the cease fires have held, so I am giving it no points for abating the conflict or stopping hostilities. I am also giving it no points for isolating the conflict as US forces intervened in the civil war. I have given it a score of 0 in settling the conflict as its efforts did not lead to any accord between the factions and it was later marginalized when the UN and the US became more involved in this conflict.

In the dispute over the Bakassi peninsula, the President of Togo acted as a mediator on behalf of the OAU at the organization's summit in Tunis in 1994. Through his efforts, Nigeria and Cameroon agreed to set up a joint commission to find ways to solve the problem in a peaceful way. However, later Cameroon backed out and the commission was never established, so I have given the OAU no points for abating the conflict. In 1996, after renewed fighting between the two nations, the OAU mediator was successful in getting the foreign ministers of both countries to accept the Kara agreement which called for a cease fire. Even then, fighting and skirmishes continued, so I have given it a score of 0 in stopping hostilities. Finally I have given the OAU no points for settling the conflict because Cameroon has taken the issue before the ICJ and Nigeria has accepted that the ICJ has jurisdiction over the case.

Arab League

In the case of the civil war in Lebanon, I have given the Arab League a score of 1 in abating the conflict because its Tripartite Commission was successful in getting Syria and some of the factions to negotiate under the Taif Agreement. I gave the Arab League 1 point for stopping hostilities as a number of militias have

stopping fighting, but the conflict with Israeli forces continue. I have given it no points for isolating the conflict as Israel and Syria are involved in Lebanon. I have given the organization 1 point for settling the dispute as due to its efforts, the central government has extended its power and restored order to most of Lebanon.

I have given the Arab League no points in abating the crisis following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces as the organization split into two factions. One side called for imposing economic sanctions on Iraq and providing troops for an Arab defensive force in Saudi Arabia, while the other supported Iraq. As a result it could take no collective security action. It was unable to stop the hostilities so I have given it 0 points in this field. It was also unable to prevent a multinational force led by the US to enter into the conflict so I have given it a score of 0 in isolating the conflict. I gave the Arab League a score of 0 in settling the conflict since it ended with the defeat of Iraq and the organization played no role in this process.

In the conflict over three islands between Iran and United Arab Emirates, the Arab League called on Iran to have serious negotiations with UAE to end the dispute. It also supported UAE in its efforts to take the issue before the ICJ, but Iran refused to negotiate and rejected taking the case before the ICJ. So I have given the Arab League no points for abating the conflict or settling it.

Table A.10- Ratings of regional organizations' performance on the disputes referred to them between 1985-1988.

Organization of American States						
Dispute	Abating conflict	Stopping hostilities	Isolating conflict	Settling conflict	Raw Score	Success
Honduras aiding contras	1	1	1	1	4	Some
Organization of African Unity						
Mali and Burkina Faso over Agacher	1	1	NA	0	2	Some
Kenya/ Uganda border	1	0	NA	1	2	Some
Arab League						
Tunisia and Libya over expulsion of workers	0	NA	NA	0	0	None

Performance in the individual cases

Organization of American States

In the case of Honduras aiding the contra rebels against Nicaragua, I have given the OAS a score of 1 in abating the conflict, as it worked with the UN and 5 Central American Presidents to bring about a regional agreement. The agreement banned the use of the territory of any nation to attack another, and called for an end to military aid to insurgents and urged withdrawal of foreign military forces. I gave the organization a 1 in stopping hostilities as even after this agreement was signed, there was some sporadic violence along the border. I gave the OAS a score of 1 in isolating the conflict, because due to its efforts and that of the UN and the Contadora group, Honduras stopped providing aid to the contras, even as the US continued to do so. I gave the OAS a rating of 1 in settling the conflict because due to the efforts of all the groups involved in the peace process, Honduras ended its support to the contras, and Nicaragua agreed to withdraw its troops from both nations' common border and end its invasions into Honduras in search of contra forces.

Organization of African Unity

In the conflict between Mali and Burkina Faso over the Agacher Strip, I have given the OAU a score of 1 in abating the dispute because its secretary general worked with the presidents of Togo, Niger, Libya and Nigeria to mediate between the two nations in order to bring about a cease-fire. I have given the OAU a rating of 1 in stopping hostilities as due to its efforts and that of the Presidents of the other nations, the two nations agreed to a cease-fire. Neutral observers from the nations formed a military observer's team and went to the area to monitor the pact. I have given the OAU no points for settling the conflict because the matter was settled by the ICJ, and its decision was accepted by both sides.

In the dispute between Uganda and Kenya over their border, I have given the OAU a score of 1 in abating the conflict, as its secretary general and the president of Tanzania organized a summit between the presidents of the two nations so that they could find a peaceful solution to their border conflict. I have given no points to the OAU in stopping hostilities as the skirmishes between the security forces along the border ended with the closure of the frontier between the two nations. I have given the OAU a rating of 1 in settling the conflict as due to the mediation of its secretary general and the President of Tanzania, the two countries reopened their border after talks at the summit.

Arab League

In the dispute between Tunisia and Libya, I have given the Arab League no points for abating the conflict, since mediation by it failed to prevent the expulsion of Tunisian workers from Libya. In retaliation Tunisia expelled Libyan diplomats. Libya protested this move to the Arab League which failed to bring any improvement in the situation. The two nations severed relations in 1985. They restored relations in 1987, after Libya agreed to compensate the expelled workers and to remove troops from its border with Tunisia. The Arab League played no role in settling this conflict so I have given it no points in resolving this dispute.

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