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A Knife Hidden in Roses: Development and Gender Violence in the Dominican Republic

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A KNIFE HIDDEN IN ROSES: DEVELOPMENT AND GENDER
VIOLENCE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

A Dissertation Presented

by

CRUZ CARIDAD BUENO

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Economics

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CRUZ CARIDAD BUENO

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Economics

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my grandmothers, Cruz Maria De La Cruz (born May 3, 1933) and the memory of Caridad Sepulveda de Bueno (November 13, 1911 – March 13, 1980), two Dominican women of African descent that always worked and with courage, tenacity, and hope supported their families. Without their struggle and resilience in the face of many obstacles, I would not be here. I am their namesake; from them I get my unique sense of humor, intelligence, ambition, and love of life.

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ABSTRACT

A KNIFE HIDDEN IN ROSES: DEVELOPMENT AND GENDER VIOLENCE

IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

SEPTEMBER 2013

CRUZ CARIDAD BUENO, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

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Directed by: Professor James K. Boyce

On September 30, 2012, Jonathan Torres stabbed his wife, Miguelina Martinez, fifty-two times in a beauty salon in Santiago, Dominican Republic. Ms. Martinez, 33 years-old, went to the district attorney's office eighteen times in the two weeks prior to her murder to report that because of her husband's violent threats she left her home. He killed her because she no longer wanted to be with him; the knife he used was hidden in a bouquet of roses.

This dissertation interrogates the state of development and gender violence in the Dominican Republic. The first chapter examines the implications of racial, gender, and class stratification on the economic and social opportunities of low-income women, predominantly of African descent, working in the export processing zones and as domestic workers.

The second chapter explores the correlation between women's economic, political, and social characteristics and the incidence domestic violence using data from the Demographic and Health Survey. Further, I test which model—the household bargaining model (HBM) or the male backlash model (MBM)—best explains gender

violence. I find that the HBM better predicts physical violence, while the MBM better predicts sexual violence. However, when I disaggregate asset-poor women and asset-rich women, I find that the HBM is more adept at explaining gender violence for asset-rich women and the MBM for asset-poor women

The third chapter explores the role of women's and men's endogenous preferences on the justifications of gender violence. In both the female and male specifications, there is a positive correlation between men making more decisions and the justification of gender violence. Women that support gender equity are less likely to justify gender violence; while husbands that are less gender progressive are more likely to justify gender violence.

Based on my findings, I conclude that the Dominican government's economic policies of the last thirty years are the knife hidden in the government's roses or rhetoric of human development and women's rights. To promote human development and foster women's rights, the Dominican government must embark on a new trajectory focused on human capital formation and a more equitable distribution of income, wealth, and power.

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CHAPTER 1

**STRATIFICATION ECONOMICS, BLACK LATIN AMERICAN FEMINIST
THOUGHT, AND GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF LOW-
INCOME BLACK WOMEN WORKERS**

1.1 Introduction

There is a saying in the Dominican Republic, “*ser blanco es profesion*” or “to be a white man is a profession.”¹ This euphemism, frequently said in jest but grounded in reality, highlights the common knowledge that labor markets place a premium on men with white skin, or lighter skin—regardless of education, skill, or experience—and that light-skinned or white men are at the top of the gendered and racial hierarchy. The truth of this common knowledge has been verified by the work of Dominican feminist scholars (Albert Batista 1993, Safa 1995, Valdez 2005, Curiel 2009, Curiel 2007) who have theorized and documented the fashion in which labor markets consistently segregate visibly black women workers into low-wage and low-productivity sectors.

The principal aims of this chapter are threefold. First, I provide an analysis of how Dominican ideology supports and reproduces a social hierarchy that places dark-skinned women at the bottom. Second, I demonstrate how this racial and gendered hierarchy in turn creates negative externalities that are borne by low-income black women workers. Third, I analyze women’s individual and collective responses to these negative

¹In the Spanish language, adjectives are gendered. In this case *blanco* refers to a white man, *blanca* refers to a white women.

externalities, based on fieldwork conducted with black women working in the export processing zones (EPZs)² and as domestic workers. Despite a rich literature on Dominican gendered and racial ideology, Black Latin American feminist thought (BLAFT), and the unequal burden neoliberal restructuring has placed on women workers, there is little discussion in the literature on precisely how the intersection of gender and race—rooted in the experience of colonialism and slavery—continues to stratify black women workers into the most precarious sectors of the economy, the negative outcomes they experience as a result, and how they respond to economic and social challenges at the grassroots level in the Dominican Republic. This chapter addresses this lacuna.

Neoclassical economic theory predicts that market-driven economies will erode labor market discrimination, because employers or sectors of the market that display a “taste for discrimination” will be driven out of business as discriminatory practices put firms at a disadvantage for obtaining the best and brightest workers, lowering levels of productivity (Becker 1957). In this study, I find evidence that contradicts this prediction. My ethnographic data shows that black women workers serve as a means for wealth, capital, and human capital accumulation for others (firms and the private homes that employ them), but are limited in their ability to accumulate wealth and human capital for themselves, because employers take advantage of racial, gender, and class discrimination to devalue their work contributions.

² Export processing zones are distinct geographical regions, typically near airports and seaports that facilitate the operation of domestic and transnational corporations in developing countries. The Dominican government offers many incentives for firms to locate in these regions: minimal foreign exchange controls, free repatriation of profits, rapid investment licensing procedures, income tax incentives, access to cheap credit, duty free import of raw materials and capital goods, modern facilities, and most importantly a large supply of low-wage labor.

In contrast to the neoclassical position, stratification economics advances the theory that market economies are constituted by contextual and structural factors that can severely limit the opportunities and well-being of subaltern groups (Darity et al. 2010, Darity 2005, Saunders and Darity 2003). This study finds support for stratification economics in the case of black women workers in the Dominican Republic.

BLAFT provides a rich body of on individual and collective responses to sexism, racism, and classism—that is, the structural, institutional, and contextual factors serving as mechanisms of exclusion—by women of African descent in Latin America.

Black Latin American feminists, such as Ochy Curiel, Sergia Galvan, Sueli Carneiro, Matilde Ribiero, Wendy Mateo, Lélia Gonzáles, Luiza Bairros, and Epsy Campbell Barr, have provided a critique of early Latin American feminism's failure to incorporate race, class, and sexuality into the matrix of women's subordination in Latin America. BLAFT also pushed Latin American feminist thought forward by contextualizing women's current oppression in Latin America in the history of colonialism, slavery, white femininity, racial hierarchy, power structures and heterosexist normative practices.

In the women's leadership development classes, during women's organization meetings, and in their homes, visibly Black Dominican women voiced the challenges they experienced as workers, mothers, and community members in the context of gender and racial hierarchy and the country's neoliberal economic trajectory. As I listened and learned, women's stories coalesced into reoccurring themes and challenges: inability to pursue or complete their education, rising costs for foodstuffs and transportation, limited access to information about their rights as workers and women, physical and emotional

abuse, degrading working situations, and lack of leisure time, as well as low wages. In the language of neoclassical economics these challenges can be characterized as negative externalities, or social costs of inequality, exclusion and segregation, that fell onto the women themselves as they entered in labor market relationships of exchange.

In the economics literature, a negative externality is defined as a situation in which the private costs entering into a transaction between two parties differ from the total social costs associated with the transaction. The difference is the external cost, or the negative externality, borne by third parties. In this study, I document not only the private costs the working women experienced, but also the social costs they experienced due to processes much larger than their individual transactions, arising from neoliberalism, a gendered and racial hierarchy, and an unequal distribution of income, wealth, and power. Because these external costs are borne by the women, employers will overproduce and underprice (compared to the social optimum) the product or service the women provide, which is their labor in this case study.

1.2 BLAFT and Stratification Economics: A Reprise of Dominican Racial Formations

The literature on Dominican racial formations is extensive and spans the fields of history, political science, sociology, anthropology, race, ethnic/cultural and gender studies (Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer 2001, Gregory 2007, Howard 2001, Valdez 2005, Candelario 2001, Candelario 2007, Torres-Salliant 1995, Torres-Salliant 2000, Duany 1998, Albert Batista 1993, Simmons 2012). Many scholars report an aversion to blackness (Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer 2001), up to and including strong negrophobia

and antihaitianism (Howard 2001, Gregory 2007). Others offer more ‘apologetic’ arguments, such as Torres-Salliant (1995), who maintains that since over 90 percent of the Dominican population is of mixed African ancestry, it is not convincing to speak of racial discrimination or racial marginalization, and that social hardships such as erratic electricity and water supply, high unemployment, underemployment, and below living wages are common to most Dominicans.

The Dominican Republic has a complex racial ideology that many scholars cite as distinct racial formation from other countries in the Americas in the sense that the racial category black does not exist and people of African descent do not refer to themselves as black (Inter-American Dialogue 2003). Moreover, the hegemonic elite project is to promote the country as a white Western Christian nation, and insist that “blacks” do not exist in the DR so as maintain a favorable racial climate under the guise of a racial democracy. It also is the country in the Americas with the highest levels of racial mixing (Peña, Sidanius, Sawyer 2006). However, it is also the case in Dominican Republic that the dominant wealthy elites are predominantly of European ancestry, and that people with dark skin and predominantly African features face structural barriers to obtain employment and even citizenship recognition (Howard 2001, Gregory 2007).

In her prize-winning book, *Black Behind the Ears*, scholar Ginnetta E.B. Candelario (2007) situates Dominican racial identity in the context of the Haitian Revolution and U.S. imperialism. She argues that Dominican independence from Haiti in 1844 came about under the influence of international and imperialist forces that caused the fledging nation to disassociate from Haiti—the first Black Republic and second free nation in the Americas—to escape the same fate of economic and trade sanctions in the

world arena. She writes that the currently used racial category of *indio* was adopted by Dominicans of African descent to mean that they were indigenous to the Spanish-speaking side of the island, in efforts to avoid being taken to the Creole and French-speaking side, which had much harsher and more brutal working conditions for enslaved people. The erasure of the terms “black” and “mulatto” from the Dominican Census and government-issued identity cards, and use of the terms *indio*, *indio oscuro*, and *indio claro* (indian, dark-skinned indian, and light-skinned indian) happened much later, during the Trujillo dictatorship, which lasted from 1930 to 1961.³ Candelario describes this as an elite political maneuver to construct the Dominican Republic as Catholic, Western, and white or at least more white than Haiti.

In addition to documenting the historicity of Dominican racial terms and formations, Candelario conducted fieldwork in Dominican beauty salons, where she asked participants to aesthetically rank men, women, and children from different races and with a range of hairstyles. In her study she finds that the women consistently ranked most beautiful are olive-complexioned women with long wavy hair, women who look Mediterranean or of Spanish descent. Hence, she argues that Dominican racial preference is not for whiteness—blond and blue-eyed women were not ranked the most beautiful—but for that which is Hispanic or Iberian. This preference is still, in the Dominican racial

³ Although overt legal mechanisms to socially exclude Afro-descendants in Latin America do not exist presently, state governments have promoted *emblanquecimiento*, immigration policies and incentives offered to white Europeans in order to “whiten” the population. In the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo dictatorship, which lasted from 1930 to 1961, was the first administration to overtly promote *emblanquecimiento* and *antihaitianismo*. Antihaitianismo is state-sponsored rhetoric that declares Haitians as black and inferior, “the strategic Other.” The most violent and vicious act of Trujillo administration was the massacre of twenty thousand Haitian men, women, and children living and working along the disputed Haitian-Dominican border in 1937.

imaginary, a rejection of the African cultural, economic, and social elements of Dominican culture. Participants consistently ranked visibly dark-skinned black women, especially those with “black hairstyles”, as the least attractive when ranking women. Black men and black children, especially those that did not have “black hairstyles”, however, did not receive the same penalties and low rankings given to black women.

Candelario’s findings on beauty rankings corroborate other academic research on racial and gender discrimination in the Dominican Republic. In her book, *Mujer Y Esclavitud*, Professor Celsa Albert Batiste (1993) recounts the story of two black women who were hired as news anchors on a prominent television channel to illustrate the intersection of racial and gender discrimination in the Dominican Republic. The day after the anchors presented for the first time, the television channel was flooded with viewer complaints that the anchors were “too black and ugly” to be on television. A rival television station began to call the station with the two black female anchors “*el canal de los feos*,” or the channel of ugly people.⁴ The two black female anchors were subsequently fired (Albert Batista 1993).

In her study, *Género, discriminación racial y ciudadanía: Un estudio en la escuela dominicana*, Dominican feminist scholar Claudina Valdez (2005) asked children, ages 9 to 13, to place Dominican women and men using pictures—ranging from white in the Dominican context, mulattas and mulattos with straight or straightened hair, to dark-skinned women and men with *pelo crespo*, or natural hair—into the jobs or tasks that they are most suited for. Thirty-eight percent of the children assigned white women to executive positions, while only 4.8 percent assigned black women with straightened hair,

⁴ Both of these channels had at least one black, or dark-skinned, male anchor.

and only 2.8 percent assigned black women with natural hairstyles to executive positions. Sixty-four percent of the children assigned black women to the street sweeper position, whereas only 2.8 percent assigned white women to the position of street sweeper. More children consistently assigned black women to positions such as office cleaners, domestic workers, street sweepers, informal vendors, and *friturera* (a woman who sells fried food from a street cart). Moreover, girls assigned black women to low-level positions in higher percentages than boys. Based on her findings, Valdez argues that children are socialized by official discourse and society to assume that black women lack the intellect and responsibility to have well remunerated jobs with high social standing, based solely what Alcoff (2006) calls their *visible identities*, or the markers of race, class, and gender. Valdez (2005, p.256) concludes:

Black people in the Dominican Republic are born, raised, multiply, and die in spaces where being afro-descendent is not accepted, where everything associated with being black is negatively charged, and where the dominant model is opposed to their characteristics, phenotype, social and cultural being (my translation).

Both Albert Batiste's (1993) and Valdez's (2005) work suggest that black women's visible identities adversely affect their position in labor markets, regardless of their skills and qualifications for high social standing positions. In turn, the social devaluation of black women in labor markets affects their material well-being as they are segmented into the low-paying and low-status positions that, according to the racial and gender ideology, they are adept for. Both scholars situate the current devaluation of visibly black women within the Dominican Republic's historical context of slavery and colonialism (Albert Batiste 1993, Valdez 2005).

Slavery and colonialism in the Dominican Republic as elsewhere in the Caribbean and Latin America, created conditions that exploited the reproductive capabilities of African women and their productive capabilities as market vendors and artisans. From their arrival to Santo Domingo, enslaved African women became not only caretakers of their own families, also of their slave-owner family, as well as working as producers and sellers of agricultural and artisanal goods in markets. Enslaved African women and their female descents hence were always in *la casa y en la calle*, in the house and in the street. That is to say that the private/public (or reproductive/productive) divide never applied to them as it did to white women (Curiel 2009, Albert Batiste 1993). Their role in making and selling goods for sale in markets, as well as building human capital by providing care services to both families, distinguishes enslaved black women in the Caribbean from their counterparts in the United States (Curiel 2009, Albert Batiste 1993). Although enslaved black women were able to generate small amounts of income for themselves and fund to maroons, independent settlements of escaped enslaved peoples, by secretly selling goods in the market, they were unable to generate significant wealth or acquire property, and hence unable to transfer wealth or land to their descendants.

The inability of enslaved Africans to transfer wealth, property, or land is important for understanding the current conditions of Afro descendents—particularly black women—in the Caribbean and Latin America. Stratification economics proposes the *lateral mobility hypothesis* to understand the current social status and material well-being of an immigrant population or ethnic group, in a society. The lateral mobility hypothesis holds that “the highest social status attained by the adult generation that constitutes the bulk of migrants will play a critical role in the social status achieved by

their children and grandchildren in the receiving country” (Darity, Dietrich, and Guilkey 2001, pp.439-440). If so, the low relative social standing of Afro descendents currently in Latin America can be traced, at least in part, to the inability of their ancestors to accumulate wealth, property, and land when they arrived in the Americas as an enslaved population and to restrictions that existed even after the abolition of slavery.

Intergenerational transmission effects— including the ability to transfer wealth and property across generations—on the relative social standing of different immigrant groups has been widely observed. For example, the relative success of Jewish-Americans, Japanese-Americans, Chinese-Americans, and Korean-Americans in the United States rests on many factors, such as advanced degree attainment by immigrants and above-average levels of wealth when compared to the home population (Suzuki 2002, Suzuki 1995). Darity et al. (2001) report that during the period from 1899 to 1914, 75 percent of Jewish immigrants were professionals or business owners, whereas 80 to 90 percent of Italian and Polish immigrants were farmers, laborers, and domestic servants, and conclude that this contributed to the material success of future Jewish-Americans. In sharp contrast, Afro descendents in the Americas were unable to acquire wealth and property for themselves not only during slavery but also afterwards due to legal restrictions. The counterpart of Jim Crow laws in the United States was *El Código Negro Carolina* in the case of the Dominican Republic, which codified segregation, placed restrictions on slaves’ and free blacks’ property ownership and market activity.⁵ The

⁵ The compilation of laws, which governed slaves during the colonial period, was *El Código Negro Carolino*, translated here as the “Black Caroline Codes”. The Black Caroline Codes was in response to the insurrections, slave revolts, maroon societies, and the increasing number of free blacks (Albert Batista 1993, Liriano 1992). Although most

importance of wealth and land to marginalized peoples remains evident in popular land struggles in Latin America, such as black women's struggles for land rights in Brazil and in Colombia (Perry 2013, Vergara-Figueroa 2013).

In addition to examining intergenerational transmission effects on the relative social standing of Afro descendents today, however, it is equally important to address the discriminatory practices that dominant groups set in place to maintain their power and privilege today (Darity et al. 2010, Darity 2005, Saunders and Darity 2003). In the case of the Dominican Republic, it is protocol to submit a color photo with a resume. Job advertisements specifying "*un mujer de buena apariencia*" (which is code for white women or white-looking mulatta, despite meaning literally "a good-looking woman") are still commonplace in the classifieds section of Dominican newspapers. These discriminatory labor market practices illustrate the preference for whiteness amongst Dominicans, Latin Americans, and Latinos that has been documented elsewhere in the literature (Darity et al. 2008). The structural and contextual practices that the State and

laws generally applied to all blacks, certain ones applied only to enslaved black women. Chapter 26, Laws 2 and 3, specifically detail the proper nourishment, treatment, and work conditions for enslaved black women to promote fertility and healthy pregnancies. This law served many functions. First, it sought to increase slave labor supply to ensure the economic success of the island. Second, it accomplished this by placing enslaved black women under the complete control and, ironically, care of white men and women whom ultimately gained from their loss of freedom and humanity.

The Black Caroline Codes served the economic and social interests of the ruling white elite. They also sought to enforce segregation, economic inequalities, and white supremacy. By promoting white supremacy, they fomented the social devaluation of blacks in society, creating preferences for whiteness and the ability for blacks to "whiten" by intermarrying with whites, creoles, and mestizos. This decreased the agency and ability of blacks to form coalitions built on group identity. In other words, the rising importance of national identity, the construction of Haiti as the Black Other, the ability to whiten, the inherent costs of being black, and the notions of a mythical "racial democracy" where class was more important than race, provided strong disincentives for socially-identified blacks to even self-identify as such much less form coalitions.

elite use to subordinate visibly black people are extensive and insidious, permeating the educational system, institutions, and societal norms. Hence, even when individuals manage to accumulate wealth and high levels of education, they face discrimination as the case of the black female television anchors demonstrates. As Valdez (2005) argues, all that is associated with blackness is degraded. An example of this is that the Dominican State and the Catholic Church officially decree that Afro-descendent religious practices such as Gaga, Palos, and Dominican Voodoo are demonic.

The concerted effort on the part of the State and elite, internalized and reproduced by the people, to consign black women to a relatively low social standing serves as a mechanism to extract higher economic gains from black women in labor markets. Curiel (2007) argues that both the EPZs, which generate foreign exchange and improve trade relations for the State and create wealth for domestic and foreign factory owners, and domestic work, which contributes to the high living standards and human capital formation of upper middle class and wealthy families, are modern versions of the work relations that black women experienced during the colonial period. The human rights abuses that women experience in both sectors include forced AIDS/HIV testing; sexual, physical, and psychological abuse and harassment; unsafe working conditions; pay below legal minimum wage; forced overtime; and refusal to pay legally mandated maternity, worker, healthcare and social security benefits (Bueno 2004, Safa 1995, Mollmann 2004, McClenaghan 1997, Pantaleon 2003, Dunn 1991). Despite the documentation (Sagás 2000, Albert Batista 1993, Valdez 2005, Gregory 2007, Howard 2001) of racial discrimination in labor markets, the last Dominican census to collect data on skin color or race is the census of 1960, which leads to missing statistical data on skin color or race

and employment outcomes. In the 1960 census, the person administering the survey identified the respondent as white, black, mulatto, or yellow referring to Dominicans of Asian descent. Although the recent census, ENHOGAR 2007, collects data on whether the respondent has a national identity card, the census survey does not collect data on skin color, race, or ethnicity. Currently, there are studies that discuss the importance and need for data on skin color, race, and ethnicity to document racial discrimination in labor markets and other institutions in the Dominican Republic (Oficina Nacional de Estadística 2013, Estevez 2013).

In my study, I found cases of legal and human rights abuses. My participants spoke of employers treating them with contempt, accusing them of theft, of being stupid and lazy, whilst they worked twelve hours or more per day in factories and in private homes, usually six days a week, and earning a wage that kept them and their families firmly in poverty. These strenuous, tedious, demanding and sometimes abusive working conditions illustrate Sueli Carneiro's (2005, p. 22) insight that black women "*nunca fueron tratadas como frágiles...Ayer, al servicio de frágiles señoritas y de nobles señores tarados. Hoy, empleadas de las Mujeres liberadas*" ("Black women were never treated as if they were fragile...yesterday at the service of fragile ladies and noble men. Today the workers of liberated women"). Although the women were not afforded the luxury of fragility their precarious employment conditions and the larger socioeconomic context often placed them in delicate and difficult life situations.

1.3 Leadership Program and Participants Description

1.3.1 Program Description

When I arrived in Santo Domingo, I became involved, as a participant-observer, in two distinct but simultaneously run workshops for women on leadership training, human rights and women's rights, gender discrimination, and labor law for domestic workers and export processing zones employees. These workshops run by the Centro de Estudios de Genero at INTEC (which served as my affiliation in Santo Domingo), CUDEM (a grassroots umbrella organization for women's groups), and Dominican Ministry of Labor's program Cumple y Gane.⁶ Both of these sectors—export processing zones and domestic service—provide low-incoming generating activities for women, but are vital to the Dominican economy, by producing exports and generating foreign exchange, and by providing care services and building human capital, respectively. A large percentage of women of visible African descent work in these sectors.

The leadership workshops took place on Sundays at local public schools in the area where the women lived, and ran from 1pm to 5pm. The women were not paid for their participation, but lunch, snacks, and childcare were provided for each session. In addition at the end of each class the facilitator raffled off various food items, such as a loaf of sweetbread, salami stick, cheese block, or juice.

⁶ Proyecto Cumple y Gane is a project of the Dominican Labor Department, which is a result of the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). Proyecto Cumple y Gane's purpose to provide training to workers in "precarious" sectors of the labor market in lieu of formal labor market regulations. DR-CAFTA, implemented on August 5, 2004, is a free trade agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic, and five Central American countries. (<http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta> accessed 7/7/2013).

The workshops were structured around certain themes such as neoliberalism, the sexual division of labor, the specific labor laws that applied to the women, and the history/current state of human and women's rights. Both of the instructors were both feminists (one from the academy and the other a grassroots activist), and they constantly stressed the importance of women's rights in the household and in the workplace, the right to live free from violence and exploitation at all times, the need to voice opinions, and feelings, and the importance of one's own well-being and not just the well-being of employers, children, partners, or other dependents. As a participant-observer in the workshops, I began to see that many of the women understood, in their own words, how the social construction of gender, class, and sometimes race was at the root of the common exploitation they experienced in the workplace, at home, and in the polity. In both workshops, which lasted 4 months, the women engaged in what Alvarez et al. (2003) term *dynamic projects*: they performed skits, did poster board presentations, and made individual and group presentations based on the knowledge they learned in class, from their course materials, and from their lived experiences. The main objectives were the application of workshop information to the women's lives, and the creation for a space for women to talk about experiences, feelings, and frustrations they experienced in the home, workplace, and their communities.

1.3.2 Participants

One group that I observed was a workshop for domestic workers, which was in Los Alcarrizos—a low-income and high-crime district in the capital city of Santo Domingo. The majority of the women in the group knew each other not only as neighbors

or kin, but also as members of *el grupo Mama Tingo*, the local women's organization in their neighborhood. The members of *Mama Tingo* held regular meetings, and the organization served as a contact point for NGOs and other organizations that gave the women presentations on topics such as micro-loans, candle-making and flower arrangement and connected the women to other women's organizations and feminist issues and struggles in Santo Domingo.

The domestic workers' workshop had about twenty participants each week. The women ranged in age from 18 to their 60s. The only requirement was that the participant must have worked at some point as a domestic worker. A survey conducted in class revealed that most of the women were receiving the legal minimum wage for domestic workers, which was 4,900 pesos per month (equivalent to US \$144.12 per month). One woman, Fermina was being paid below the minimum wage (4,000 pesos per month); the highest paid domestic worker receiving 6,500 pesos per month. Many of the women were living on \$2 or less per person per day when their dependants (such as elderly parents or children) were taken into account. All of the women worked 12 to 15 hour days, Monday to Friday, and Saturdays until noon, performing strenuous household labor for their employers. Assuming that they worked 176 hours per month (a low estimate), they typically received 27 pesos (88 US cents) per hour.

The other workshop was for EPZ workers. There were about ten to twelve women participants on average. It was held in San Luis, once a rural sugar-producing town. The requirement to join this group was that women had to have worked in an EPZ factory at one point in their lives. The women, ranged in age from 17 to their 50s. San Luis did not have a local women's organization, and the participants were in the midst of creating one

to address their specific needs in the community. The average daily pay in the EPZ was about 200 pesos a day (US \$5.88), but if they missed a day of work their paychecks were debited 300 pesos (US \$8.82).

1.4 Women's Responses to Private Costs & Negative Externalities

1.4.1 Precarious Employment Conditions

One module of the leadership training classes focused on labor law. The course instructor provided each participant with a labor law booklet and reviewed the specific laws that applied to the women. Throughout the duration of the course, the women identified, and denounced, many labor violations they experienced personally. In the case of domestic workers, many of the participants were unaware that it was within their rights to request a work contract, review the contract at the Ministry of Labor, and file it there for future grievances. Additionally, many were unaware that domestic workers did have a legal minimum wage, and that by law they were entitled to breaks including an hour for lunch and rest. They were also entitled to schedule their work around any academic schedules and healthcare appointments. After having taken the labor law module, the workers came back to class with stories to share about how their employers responded when they demanded their rights.

Doña Susana was a bright and lively woman in her early forties. Even though she had been working at her current job for more than three years, her employers refused to provide her with two weeks paid vacation which was long overdue (according to law,

domestic workers are entitled to two weeks paid vacation after one year of service).⁷ Doña Susana said that whenever she would speak to *la ama de casa* (lady of the house) to request her vacation, *la ama de casa* would direct her to *el jefe de la casa* (head of household, usually referring to the man of the house). In response to Doña Susana's request for her legal right *el jefe* responded, "I don't even get two weeks paid vacation. Why should I give you that, when I don't get it?"

The dialogue between Doña Susana and her employers illustrates two facets of the intersectional discrimination that black women experience in the Dominican Republic. First, her female employer completely dismissed her claim to a worker benefit she had earned and to which she was entitled by law. This is indicative of the class divide that places wealthier women in positions where they contribute to the oppression of other woman (Alvarez 2000, Curiel 2007, Curiel 2009, Carneiro 2005). Second, the male employer's response highlights how Dominicans use invoke social standing, based on race, gender, and class position, and not merit or even the law, to determine what people deserve. By his racist, sexist, and classist logic—reflecting that of society—Doña Susana was not entitled to her right to two weeks paid vacation. Because it was a benefit that wealthier man did not have, neither should she. This example is also indicative of theoretical argument underpinnings of stratification economics and the mechanism by which racial prejudice or discrimination is contextualized by group positioning. Blumer (1958) argues that the dominant racial group (in this case the employers belong to the dominant racial group and Doña Susana to the subordinate racial group) feels a sense of

⁷ In the Dominican Labor Code, Law 103-99, article 263 states "domestic workers have the right to two weeks paid vacation each time they complete one year of service" (my translation) (www.comisionadodejusticia.gob.do/phocadownload/Biblioteca_Virtual/Trabajo/Ley%20103-99,%20sobre%20Trabajo%20Domestico%20en%20Republica%20Dominicana.pdf accessed 7/7/2013).

proprietary claim to “exclusive or prior rights in many important areas of life”. By initially ignoring and dismissing her claim, her employers were reserving the right of paid vacation for others but not her based on her social positioning.

With sparkling eyes, Doña Susana, announced to the class, “*a mi jefe yo le di un clase de derechos laborales, cuando el vio mi librito de derechos laborales se les abrieron los ojos, y por fin el mes que viene voy a tener mis vacaciones!*” (“I gave my boss a class on labor rights, when he saw my little labor law book his eyes got really big, and finally next month I am going to have my vacation!”). Upon hearing Doña Susana’s story, the women engaged in high fives and lively discussion. Magda, in her early twenties, summed up the sentiments of the conversation when she said “*ya yo quiero reclamar mis derechos*” (“now I also want to reclaim my rights”). Hence, the classes served not only as a vehicle for information, empowering the women to act individually, but also as spaces of mutual reinforcement and support.

On other occasions, the workers preformed skits about their experiences working in private homes. Four women—Magalis, Jessica, Sarita, and Rossy—provided a telling and entertaining performance. Magalis played the domestic worker, Jessica was *la ama de casa*, and Sarita and Rossy were friends visiting Jessica, *la ama de casa*. Magalis put a baby—from the classroom—on her hip, and with her free hand began to wash windows (using the chalkboard as the windows). Jessica, Sarita, and Rossy were sitting in the skit’s living room (constructed with desks and chairs) at the front of the classroom. Their whole demeanors changed to embody wealthy women. They sat rather stiffly, chests puffed out, chins high, flipping their (imaginary) long hair, and laughing shallowly. Jessica directing herself to Magalis began, “*por Dios Magalis, es que tu no sabes hacer*

nada” (“for God’s sake Magalis, don’t you know how to do anything”). Then turning to her friends, she complained, “*ella llego aqui y no sabía nada...yo le tuve que enseñar todo!*” (“when she got here she didn’t know how to do anything...I had to teach her everything!”). To that Rossy responded, “*si, las trabajadoras ahora no saben trabajar ni limpiar, quieren que tu le pague sin hacer nada* (“yes, domestic workers nowadays don’t know how to work or clean, they want you to pay them for not doing anything”). Meanwhile, as Magalis continued to clean the windows, Jessica began to bellow out commands, “*Magalis el telefono esta sonado recojelo! Asegurate que la comida este lista para las doce! La planta esta dañada, calienta agua y sube las escaleras para que mi esposo tenga agua tibia para bañarse despues de sus siesta! Y todavia es la hora que no sacas la basura* (“Magalis, the phone is ringing, pick it up! Make sure that the food is ready by noon! The generator isn’t working, heat up water and carry it up the stairs so my husband has warm water to shower after his nap! And you still haven’t taken out the trash”). Magalis, baby on hip, phone nestled in her shoulder, and holding a washing rag—a domestic worker acting as a domestic worker—scrambled frantically to accomplish all these tasks. But then abruptly she stopped.

She dropped the washrag, put down the phone, and kept the baby on her hip. Turning to Jessica she said “*Doña Jessica, ya basta de sus insultos, yo se hacer mi trabajo, y no es posible hacer todas estas cosas a la misma vez y atender el niño...y ya es hora de yo tomar mi descanso que me toca por ley*” (“Doña Jessica, I have had enough of your insults, I know how to do my job, and it’s not possible to do everything at the same time and take care of the baby...and now it’s time for my break that I am entitled to by

law”). With that statement, Magalis turned around, and walked out of the classroom with her head high. The classroom erupted into cheers.

The skit spoke to the class divide among women. It illustrated how wealthier and less black women treated their poorer and blacker domestic workers with contempt, placed unreasonable demands on them, and characterized them as lazy and stupid—cultural tropes associated with blackness in the Dominican Republic. These cultural tropes also provide a concrete example of Blumer’s (1958) characterization of group positioning and racial prejudice. The dominant group assigns characteristics, based on definitions constructed in the public arena, to the subaltern group in abstract and precedes to assign these characteristics to individuals in the group to place them in the social hierarchy. My participant observation suggests that by defining the women workers as lazy and incompetent, employers devalued their work and the women themselves. This brilliant skit also spoke to the invisibility and alienation domestic workers experience working in private homes, and to the role of agency. In discussion afterwards, a participant named Mayra said “*ya no me dejo pisiotar por mi esposo, niños, ni jefes*” (“I don’t let my husband, kids, or employers walk all over me anymore”), which perfectly described Magalis’s dramatic finale, which put a stop to the abusive work situation and unfair treatment.

The women in the class related their own experiences of psychological abuse, insults, and the accusations that “they wanted to get paid for doing nothing.” The latter phrase, defined the strenuous and demanding work the women performed as “nothing”, was tied to the personal and social devaluation of the women themselves.

Although the workshops for the domestic workers provided the women with information, which they used in efforts to empower themselves, many of the younger women in the class spoke about the need to find better jobs and better opportunities through investing in their education, a form of human capital. The experience of the EPZ workers, however, demonstrated that even when black women attain higher levels of education, economic and social advancement is still a formidable challenge.

1.4.2 Human Capital Formation

In the group of women who worked in the EPZs, all had high school degrees, and four of the twelve were in the midst of obtaining college degrees. Jeanie, a bright twenty-year old, was a medical student at La Universidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo (UASD). Jeanie had previously worked in the EPZ, but quit because, as she explained to me, it was impossible to work the six days and on average sixty hours required of EPZ workers and go to school. Jeanie was able to quit her job because she had a cousin living and working in Sweden who was supporting her educational pursuits. Remittances from abroad are the largest generator of foreign exchange in the Dominican Republic, and contribute to a higher standard of living for many Dominicans. However, the vast majority of remittances accrue to families in the top forty percent of the country's income distribution (Dominican Republic Poverty Assessment 2006).⁸ Of all the participants, Jeanie was the only one who received support from abroad to pursue her education.

⁸ According to the *Dominican Republic Poverty Assessment 2006*, compiled by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Government of the Dominican Republic 80 % of remittances go to urban areas and 40 % to the richest families, hence remittances have a direct but modest effect on poverty reduction and have not affected poverty trends. The report states despite impressive economic growth from the period of 1997-2002, income and poverty levels the poor "saw virtually no

Gabriela, a twenty-four year old mother of two sets of twins, currently worked in the local EPZ. Gabriela had been studying accounting and only had two semesters left to finish her degree. She explained to me that she had to stop studying when she had her second set of twins, boys, because she had to support her four-year old daughters whom she left with her mother in the countryside. Her husband, Yuniol, also worked full-time in the EPZ, but two full-time incomes from the EPZ were barely enough to cover the family's expenses, including her daughters. In our conversations, I learned that Gabriela had previously worked as a bookkeeper while pursuing her studies. Transactions costs played a role in decision to quit. San Luis, once a sugar-producing town, was a rural part of Santo Domingo Este, far from her job and the university. Increases in the cost of oil, following an IMF agreement, and subsequently in the cost public transportation made it impossible for her to travel to Santo Domingo for work and pay tuition at the university. The EPZ firm, on the other hand, provided transport to and from work.

Gabriela frequently said to me, "*ay Cruz, yo tengo que salir de aqui...aqui no hay nada para mi*" ("Oh Cruz, I have to get out of here...there is nothing here for me"). Her environment—disconnected from educational and work opportunities—was thwarting her progress. Gabriela's case speaks to the spatial as well as economic marginalization that predominantly Afro descendent communities experience in the Dominican Republic. Her example, unable to secure a position as a book keeper at the local EPZ and being far from educational work opportunities highlights the way that de facto segregation (as it also exists in the United States) limits the ability of people in

improvement". The economics crisis of 2003-2004 resulted in a deterioration of real income and increase in poverty levels, where 16 % of the population became poor and 7 % fell into extreme poverty. Despite economic growth, the Gini coefficient of 0.52, has remained the same in the Dominican Republic and in 2004, 42 % of Dominicans were poor.

subaltern groups to attain employment, or better employment, and pursue other opportunities. Maroons and *ingenios*, sugar-producing towns, like San Luis are predominantly populated by Afro descendents as a legacy of slavery and colonialism. During the macroeconomic structural adjustment of the 1980s, the country's development trajectory shifted towards labor-intensive manufacturing and tourism for production for external markets to generate foreign exchange, and sugar production lost importance as an economic activity. The once vibrant sugar mill, where many women had worked as bookkeepers, closed in the 1980's, leaving many residents unemployed as a result of both direct and multiplier effects. The government's failure to invest in public education and to subsidize public transportation was coupled with deliberate policies prioritizing needs of capital in the form of "cheap labor". More generally, low-income women workers stand to benefit from activist government policies that invest in education, healthcare, transportation and food subsidies. As a result of neoliberalism these public goods, once provided by the state, increasingly became private goods to be sold in markets. This provides an example of how Afro descendants, lacking private wealth and property, are blocked from avenues to attain social mobility. Although they may be willing, in principle, to pay for goods and services that will build human capital, they are unable to do so in practice by virtue of their private economic standing and lack of socially-provisioned opportunities.

1.4.3 Racialized Gendered Expectations

When I asked Doña Inez, forty years old and the EPZ group's designated leader, what was the most abundant or lucrative job in the area, she replied without skipping a

beat, “*drogas...muchacha ven pa’ca una noche pa’ que tu vea todas las jipetas y Mercedes que vienen aqui pa’ comprar drogas*” (“Drugs...girl, come here at night so you can see all the SUVs and Mercedes-Benz lined up to buy drugs.”). Doña Inez had been a psychology student, but she too was currently unenrolled. As single mother with three children—a son in college, a pregnant fifteen-year old daughter, and a nine-year old daughter—Doña Inez explained that she had to make difficult choices, and ultimately she had to think of her children first. Doña Inez was the only member of the group working in her field of study, though she had worked previously worked in an EPZ factory. She was a social worker for COPRESIDA (the national governmental organization to treat and combat aids in the DR), distributing medication and monitoring patient adherence to prescriptions. That job was not enough to cover living expenses for her family of four, so Doña Inez also ran the local pre-K for a small fee, served as the loan collector for a microcredit program operating in the community, and was the organizer of the women’s *san* (informal savings and loans program). In addition, she was the unofficial godmother of all the children in the community, which meant that many families in the neighborhood came to her for guidance and help with their problems.

Doña Inez was a vital part of the women’s community, although her many roles and hard choices meant that many of her own desires and dreams would go unfulfilled. Doña Inez’s situation symbolized to me a distinct form of gendered expectations, or *racialized gendered expectations*, relating to the *unfragile* state of black women vis-à-vis the fragility of white women (Carneiro 2005). Doña Inez sacrificed her own dreams and work literally around the clock to provide for her family and help her neighbors. Lacking income and material resources, she had to provide her time and labor to make ends meet.

However, the participants in both workshops spoke of hardships, sacrifices, disappointments, and others' unrealistic expectations that were shaped by their intersectional identities.

Milagros, a woman in her late thirties, with beautifully toned arms from the heaving lifting required of her as a domestic worker, stood up in class one day and said *“ya se acabaron los dias que yo trabajo trece horas cuidando los niños de otra gente, concinarle a otra gente, limpiar la casa de otra gente, para llegar a mi casa a limpiar, planchar, cocinar, y acostarme con mi esposo si estoy muy cansada...y las cosas no son asi”* (“The days are done when I would come home from a twelve hour work day, cooking, cleaning, and watching other people’s children, to my own home to carry water, cook, clean, iron for my husband, and also be pressured into having relations with him husband if I am too tired”). She followed that with the statement that her children and husband needed to help her in the house. Her awareness had been changed by the workshops; realizing that the demands placed on her were unrealistic and harmful to her well-being, she stopped feeling bad about herself as a worker, mother, and partner when she could not meet them. The demands and expectations she faced resulting from her social position as a low-income black worker, mother, and wife were qualitatively and quantitatively different from the expectations and demands place on wealthier and whiter women. Precisely because wealthier and whiter women could afford to hire and displace unrealistic expectations onto domestic workers, meant that this awareness was even more important for her to safeguard her well-being.

The role of group positioning and stratification is central to the racialized gendered expectations the participants experienced. Blumer (1958) contends that the

dominant group promotes its own self-interest to establish or extend the group privileges they enjoy and wish to maintain. In this study, employers' the expectations and demands of the women workers, served to accumulate wealth for factory owners and higher living standards in private homes to maintain or improve their relative positions, by exerting the participants meet unrealistic work demands. In the domestic workers' group, some women discussed how they would stay in the employer's home past the required time in order to "finish all their work", despite not getting paid overtime because they were expected to finish certain tasks everyday. However, reproductive work or caring labor—the tasks of cleaning, cooking, and providing for others in a domestic capacity—are never truly finished. Some of the women said they were made to feel, by employers, that these tasks must be done and internalized these unrealistic expectations to the benefit of the employers. By placing unrealistic demands on the participants employers were able to extract more services from the women workers for their own benefit.

1.5 “Aqui No Hay Desarrollo”

When I asked the women what *desarollo* or development meant for them or their communities, the most frequent response I received was “*ay Cruz...aqui no hay desarrollo...aqui no ahi progreso*” (“Oh Cruz...there is no development here...there is no progress”). Beyond the leadership training program, the women in both classes attended women's organization meetings with hopes of personal development and progress. When I asked the women why a women's organization was important, and why they attended the leadership class, I elicited a variety of answers that spoke to the women's development goals. Miosotis, a 23-year-old mother and EPZ worker with one child, said

she liked going to the class and meetings because it was important for her to get out of the house, be away from her husband, and talk with the other women. In her study of women's groups in "popular", or low-income, neighborhoods, Dominican anthropologist Tahira Vargas (2005) finds that women from the popular classes frequently give the same response, that it is important to leave the home and housework, and be in a women-only space to discuss personal and community affairs. Walkiria, a young woman in the EPZ group, said that the women's group was important because the women in the community needed access to information and opportunities; she said that she knew that there were government and international programs to help women, but that they needed to be organized to participate in programs. Yamel, a senior attending high school at night and working in the EPZ during the day, said that the most important reason for a women's group was to address issues that were important to women in the community, and that the neighborhood association—dominated by men—did not care about women's issues. The women's leadership program and organizations thus served as spaces for women to share their lived experiences, determine their own agenda, and work together to access information and better opportunities. The impetus for a women's organization and the women's answers also symbolized the need for the participants to define themselves and their aspirations independent of the way in which their employers (a dominant group in relation to the women), their partners, dependents, and community defined them. Hence, the women's group served as a mechanism for the participants to define themselves and challenge what Blumer (1958) refers to as "collective image" assigned to subaltern groups by the dominant, elite, and public discourse.

Both groups held a graduation ceremony. For some women, especially those in the domestic workers' group, this was their first graduation. In the domestic workers' group, Amanda, a svelte and elegant woman in her early twenties, was the graduation speaker. Amanda first addressed the need to place demands on the State, the local government, and the neighborhood association to provide women with opportunities and resources to promote development in their communities. She also encouraged her *compañeras* to continue challenging discrimination in their homes and at work, and to demand that the State to protect their rights as workers and women. Amanda told her *compañeras*, "*nuestro bienestar y el bienestar de nuestros niños no va venir trabajando en casas de familia...tenemos que buscar otros espacios para trabajar con dignidad*" ("Our well-being and our children's well-being isn't going to come from us working in private homes...we need to find other spaces to work with dignity"). Lastly, Amanda thanked the course teachers, CEG, CUDEM, and Proyeto Cumple y Gana for funding the leadership course and her *compañeras* for participating, saying "*este curso ha sido mas important que cualquiera curso de hacer velas, carteras, o programa de microcredito porque este programa nos hay abierto las mentes con informacion y nueva posibilidades para nosotras*" ("This course has been more important than any class we had on purse or candle-making, or microcredit program, because this class has opened our minds with information and new possibilities for us"). Amanda's speech was indicative of the transformative power of knowledge and role of agency in promoting one's own well-being at the grassroots level. Indeed what is missing from some micro development programs is the information—on topics such as neoliberalism, labor laws, human rights, women's rights and an antiracist feminist critique of the sexual division of labor—that

women can use to empower themselves in addition to having income and accumulating wealth. Her statements suggest that grassroots development strategies should include women's stories, experiences, and aspirations in addition to providing opportunities for financial advancement. Lastly, Amanda's speech spoke to the myriad ways that discrimination and the group position of the participants limited their opportunities.

1.6 Conclusions

Amanda's graduation speech reflected the main tenets of BLAFT and stratification economics. As BLAFT proposes, she took women's intersectional identity as a dynamic and a political point of departure to challenge discrimination and be active in the struggle to improve the collective well-being of all Afro descendants. And as stratification economics proposes, because dominant groups seek to maintain the status quo, the State must intervene to set policies in motion to remedy the private and social costs that subaltern groups experience (Darity 2005).

As this study suggests the current status quo—absent state interventionist policies and grassroots demands on the state—relegates low-income black women to the bottom of the social hierarchy and devalues their work and contributions to the market. As a legacy of colonialism, which impeded Afro descendants from accumulating wealth and property to bequest to future generations, current Afro descendants are consistently overrepresented in lowest wealth and income quintiles. In the case of the Dominican Republic, Gabino Severino, the director of *Cumple y Gana*, described the relationship between poverty and race by saying, "*menos negros, menos pobres*": individuals and families that were less black, tended to be less poor.

The participants in the leadership program were not a part of the “*menos negros, menos pobres*” stratum of society. As a result of their “visible identities” as low-income working-class black women, they faced both private costs and negative externalities. Despite exerting their agency and using information to demand their rights in the workplace and at home, they faced resource constraints and an unequal distribution of power. They absorbed the costs of these negative externalities—low wages by design under the neoliberal political and economic project, some of the lowest levels of government spending in healthcare and education in Latin America, lack of opportunities for advancement in their communities, and racial/gender/class discrimination.⁹

Designated “*una economista de los pobres*¹⁰,” by Doña Inez during my fieldwork, I realized that although the leadership courses did not provide women with direct material gains, the information they gained from the course and from each other contributed to their well-being. However, the current racial and gender hierarchy and the neoliberal development trajectory severely limit their material well-being and opportunities. Although the DR is one of the fastest growing economies in the Caribbean, it has also seen stubbornly high levels of poverty, state level corruption, social exclusion, low levels of state investment in health and education, and very low returns to

⁹ See Appendix A for health and education spending amongst Latin America countries.

¹⁰ One day when I was talking to Doña Inez about her education, she asked me what I studied. I responded, “*economía*.” And Doña Inez said, “I thought you studied sociology.” And I responded, “*no, yo estudio economía*.” And then Doña Inez asked, “not anthropology?” I shook my head no to which she said aloud to the sky and very curiously, “*una economista de los pobres...*” (an economist for poor people), and walked away thinking. I took that to mean that when people from the “popular classes” thought about economists they thought about white men and women on the television talking about austerity, IMF agreements, rising prices, economic crisis, and the feel good rhetoric of progress, economic development, and human development that never seemed to make it to the *pobres*.

education.¹¹ On my flight back to the USA, a businessman told me that the most important things for getting a good job in the Dominican Republic were having the right connections and having light or white skin.

My participants did not have light or white skin, and many of them spoke of not having the right connections or social circles to access good jobs. The businessman's comments and the experience of the women in this study illustrate that the Dominican Republic is not promoting human development, but promoting a political and economic project that maintains a racist, sexist, and classist social hierarchy.¹² This hierarchy benefits capital, markets, and the wealthy at the expense of people's wellbeing, both material and personal. My participants' hopes—work with dignity, fair pay, vacation, leisure time with friends and family, a dwelling for themselves and the children, healthcare, and education—are the hopes of many Dominicans. If the Dominican development rhetoric is to be more than empty words, the government must begin to remedy racial and gender bias, promote pro-poor people growth strategies, and prioritize human development over the demands of capital and markets that thrive on racial, gender, and class bias.

In the chapters that follow, I address another aspect of women's oppression in the DR: gender violence. This is a reality that many of the participants in the women's group experienced, with serious and grave effects on women's well-being.

¹¹ According to statistical data from the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, in 2007 the Dominican Republic spent 2.2 % of GDP on public education and 5.7% of GDP on health expenditures. Also see Appendix A for comparisons of spending on health and education among selected Latin American and Caribbean countries. (http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp?idioma=i Accessed 5/5/2013)

¹² The Dominican Republic Poverty Assessment 2006 states, "the Dominican Republic is also an underperformer in its fiscal policies to the accumulation of human and physical capital and provide short-term income support (p. iii)." Furthermore, the assessment concludes that social assistance programs are regressive in absolute terms, "reinforcing patterns of private distribution" (p. iii).

CHAPTER 2
THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF GENDER
VIOLENCE

2.1 Introduction

Violence against women and girls is one of the most persistent human rights violations in the world (Krug et al. 2002, García-Moreno et al. 2005, Engle Merry 2006, Hindin et al. 2008). An emerging literature in development studies argues that domestic violence is an obstruction to women's well-being, human development, and economic growth (Panda and Agarwal 2005, Agarwal and Panda 2007), as well as a violation of human rights. Although this type of violence has long been studied as a residue of persistent strains of traditionalism and/or religious intolerance, it is increasingly viewed as having roots beyond its cultural determinants in the broader social, political, and economic contexts in which it occurs.

Much of the emerging literature is bifurcated between a focus on advanced industrialized nations—and on poor, agriculturally-based nations (Finnoff 2010, González-Brenes 2004, Aizer 2010, Koenig et al. 2003, Macmillian and Gartner 1999). Systematically examining women's experience in so-called intermediate societies, those that are neither rich nor poor, may yield insights into the persistence of violence against women. On the one hand, such intermediate states may have relatively developed institutions of civil society, which provide prevention and intervention services for domestic abuse victims as well as a modicum of economic development. These resources

may provide women with better exit options in cases of gender violence. On the other hand, intermediate societies may share characteristics with poor countries, such as the prevalence of low wages for women's work, relatively weak institutions of gender equity, and overt expressions of gender bias.

Among these intermediate states, Caribbean countries, including the Dominican Republic, share characteristics of both richer and poorer societies.¹³ As can be seen in Table 2.1, the Dominican Republic has a faster economic growth rate than the average of Latin American countries and middle-income developing countries and similar socio-economic development indicators. The Dominican Republic is of particular interest, since it has the highest rate of reported femicide, in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the sixth highest rate in the entire world (Esplugues et. al. 2010).¹⁴ According to the Dominican Republic Demographic and Health Survey administered in 2007, 20 to 50 percent of Dominican women have experienced physical, sexual, or emotional violence at the hands of their partner. Table 2.1 shows that in 2007, the absolute number and the rate of women killed by their partners was highest in Latin America and the Caribbean. The

¹³ During the years 2006-2011 the Dominican Republic averaged a 5.7 % economic growth rate (Abdullaev and Estevão 2013). In 2012, GDP expanded by 4.5 % (Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean, http://interwp.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_cepalstat/Perfil_nacional_economico.asp?Pais=DOM&idioma=i, accessed February 11, 2013).

¹⁴ Amnesty International's Dominican Republic Submission to the UN Human Rights Commission", states that "according to a report issued by the Spanish Center of Studies Reina Sofia in 2006 the Dominican Republic ranked first in a list of forty European and American countries for the prevalence of women killed by family members as measure by number of victims per million of women (p. 11)." See also, "Dominican Republic, Femicide Leader in the Caribbean", Dominican Today, April 20, 2010, <http://dominantoday.com/dr/local/2010/4/30/35566/Dominican-Republic-femicide-leader-in-the-Caribbean> and "Dominican Republic Has World's Sixth Highest Femicide Rate" Dominican Today, November 25, 2007, <http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/people/2007/11/25/26188/Dominican-Republic-has-worlds-sixth-highest-femicide-rate>

Dominican Republic thus provides an excellent case study for the analysis of the myriad economic, political, and social factors that give rise to violence against women.

Table 2.1: Comparative Socio-Economic Indicators 2007

	Dominican Republic	Latin America & the Caribbean	Middle Income Countries
GINI	0.56		
GDP/Capita	4,233.00	5,314.00	5,245.39
GDP Growth Rate	8.5 %	5.6 %	8.7%
Human Development Index	0.683	0.722	0.609
Poverty	44.5%	34.0%	38%
Life expectancy at birth, male	69.8	70.3	66.29
Life expectancy at birth, female	75.3	76.6	70.38
Unemployment Rate	15.6 %	7.9 %	--
Labor force participation rate, female	54.2 %	55.9%	39.5%
Labor force participation rate, male	83.9 %	83.7%	58.6%
Literacy Rate***	88.2 %	91.4 %	80.9*
Net enrollment Primary Education	86.8%	94.2%	89.0%
Net enrollment Secondary Education	60.9 %	72.8 %	60.6%

Source: World Bank Indicators 2008 and ECLAC/CEPALSTAT
http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp?idioma=i

GDP/Capita: total annual gross domestic product per capita in constant 2005 prices in dollars (dollars per inhabitant)

Poverty: percentage of population living below the poverty and extreme poverty lines, by urban and rural areas at the national level

Literacy Rate: literacy rate of people ages 15 years and over/literacy rate for middle income countries 2008 from econstats.com/wdi

Labor force participation rate, female: as % of female population 15-64

Labor force participation rate, male: as % of male population 15-64

HDI from: <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/DOM.html> and HDI in middle income countries is actual the HDI for medium HDI countries

*poverty for all middle income countries from Poverty Calculator, year 2008

Table 2.2: Femicide Rates from the Caribbean, Latin America, and Spain in 2007

	Rate	Absolute Numbers
Dominican Republic	0.94	89
Chile	0.32	53
Colombia	0.27	118
Costa Rica	0.29	13
El Salvador	0.31	19
Spain	0.11	47
Nicaragua	0.34	19
Paraguay	0.36	22
Puerto Rico	0.41	16
St. Vincent and Grenadines	3.67	4
Surinam	0.40	2
Trinidad & Tobago	0.38	5

Source: ECLAC,
http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp?idioma=i

*Women ages 15 or over killed by their intimate or former partner

Method for calculating rate:

V1= number of women killed by intimate or former partner

V2= total number of inhabitants

$$\text{Rate} = (V1*100)/V2$$

In this chapter, I examine the relationship between domestic violence and women's economic activity, political engagement, and social/demographic characteristics. Specifically, I test the extent to which two rival hypotheses account for

the incidence of domestic violence against women in the Dominican Republic: the household bargaining model (HBM) and the male backlash model (MBM).

The HBM postulates that when women have more resources, actual or potential opportunities or income-generating activities, they can bargain for better outcomes in the household and hence, they experience less violence. Therefore, when the household bargaining model is used to understand gender violence, increased economic opportunities for women are expected to be associated with a decreased likelihood of domestic violence. It follows that domestic violence is more likely to occur when women have fewer economic resources. In contrast, the MBM argues that men use violence when they feel disempowered or when they sense that the gender hierarchy is being destabilized in the household, for instance in a situation where the wife is employed while the husband is unemployed.

Using logistic regression analysis, I find support for the household bargaining model when the dependent variable is aggregate violence (both sexual and physical violence) and when the dependent variable is physical violence alone. However, in the case of women experiencing sexual violence, I find support for the male backlash model. Further, I run all specifications for asset-poor women and asset-rich women. In the regressions for asset-poor women, the male backlash model best explains asset-poor women's experience of domestic violence. The household bargaining model, however, better predicts gender violence for wealthier women.

2.1.1 Country Setting: The Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic presents a distinct social, cultural, and economic setting for testing these two theoretical perspectives. As noted above, the Dominican Republic has the sixth highest reported incidence of femicide in the world and the highest reported rate in Latin America. Not surprisingly, gender hierarchies are entrenched in the social norms, institutions, and people of the place. But the Dominican Republic also is a country of expanded economic opportunities for women. During the “Lost Decade” of the 1980s and the shift to a neoliberal growth strategy, employment opportunities for women became numerous in the key sectors of tourism and manufacturing; women flocked to the labor market to provide for their households as the male unemployment rate skyrocketed and the number of poor and near-poor households increased dramatically (Espinal 1995, Elson 1991, Deere et al. 1990). Currently, the female labor force participation rate is 44 percent.¹⁵

In addition, Dominican women are considered highly mobile, independent, and are educated at higher rates than men; they are also key economic actors as both consumers and workers (Lambert 2009).¹⁶ Since the greatest purveyor of wealth cross-generationally is inheritance, it is important to note that in the Dominican Republic (DR) inheritance is split equally among children, regardless of gender or of marital status of birth parents (Deere and Leon 2001). Nevertheless, in this relatively fluid and seemingly

¹⁵ See Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana www.bancentral.gov.do/estadisticas.asp?a=Mercado_de_Trabajo (last accessed 7/10/2012)

¹⁶ See USAID GENDER ASSESSMENT/Dominican Republic http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADQ847.pdf (last accessed 7/10/2012)

egalitarian system, men are still perceived to be the final decision makers in the household even when they are not the primary financial providers (Safa 1995). As Safa (1995) argues, the myth of the male breadwinner holds throughout the Caribbean and Latin American cultures despite the notion that women are ultimately responsible for providing for the household regardless of the male partner's economic contribution or lack of contribution.

To put it simply, it is the responsibility of the woman/girlfriend/mother/wife to put food on the table, and to maintain and provide care for the household (Chant and Craske 2003). The myth of the male breadwinner compounds women's burden of being ultimately responsible for household provisions, because it justifies and sustains the notion that working women are only supplemental wage earners, which in turn helps to suppress women's wages, hence their ability to provide for themselves and their dependents. Concurrently, there is a culture of machismo—which suggests that men feel their masculinity challenged when women disrupt the public/private divide. In addition, a culture of marianismo exists, with women socialized to believe that they—like the Virgin Mary—must endure all hardships and sacrifices to support and maintain a cohesive household (Chant and Craske 2003).

The Dominican Republic—which is one of the fastest growing economies in the Caribbean—provides an excellent case with which to test if these expanded economic opportunities in the public sphere have provided women with gains that extend to their physical well-being or if, in fact, we see what Agarwal and Panda (2007) call the “perverse effects” of development, where an expansion of economic opportunities in a gender-biased society may lead to detrimental outcomes for women. For example, Panda

and Agarwal (2005) argue that women who experience marital violence have lower levels of self-confidence and are at greater risk for injuries. Either or both of these factors may reduce a woman's earning potential, her productive capacity, her contributions to the household income, her contributions to market activity, and also her ability to help herself both as a person and as an economic actor. Scholars, activists, and analysts seek to ascertain the variables associated with domestic violence in order to provide policies that promote women's freedom from violence in the household both for instrumental reasons, reasons that promote economic development to foster economic growth, reduce healthcare costs associated with domestic violence, and avert productivity and wage loss, as well as for intrinsic reasons, reasons that promote women's wellbeing because it is right and good, and denounce gender violence and femicide as morally wrong (Krug et al. 2002, González-Brenes 2004, García-Moreno et al. 2005, Panda and Agarwal 2005, Hindin et al. 2008, Finnoff 2010, Aizer 2010).

This chapter aims to provide an analysis of violence against women and to provide possible policy prescriptions that might serve as deterrents to gender violence in the Dominican Republic. I examine to what extent male backlash—the perverse effects of development—or instead the household bargaining model accounts for the incidence of domestic violence in the Dominican Republic. In evaluating the ability of these models to explicate the processes we observe in the Dominican Republic, I examine the incidence of domestic violence against women across economic, political, and social dimensions.

The remainder of this essay proceeds in several sections. First, I more fully discuss the feminist economics household bargaining model, as well as the sociological-cultural proposition of male backlash. Second, I provide some descriptive statistics on

gender violence in the Dominican Republic, derive testable propositions from competing models, and outline the research design used to test those propositions. Third, I discuss the findings from the statistical analysis. Fourth, I discuss the research and policy implications of the findings. Finally, I summarize the main points of the essay.

2.2 Contending Perspectives on Gender Violence

The household is an important site of critical theory and research for feminist scholars. Feminist scholarship problematized the public/private divide based on the sexual division of labor and reversed the lens to study the implications of women's market participation on household dynamics. Conventional economic theory posits the household as a site of pure altruism, where the father (breadwinner) is a rational, individualistic, utility-maximizing agent in the public sphere, but a benevolent actor maximizing the well-being of the whole family in the private one, where efficiency reigns supreme as the woman dedicates herself to reproductive labor, where she maintains a "comparative advantage" (Becker 1981). Feminist scholars argue instead that the household is a site of cooperation, compromise, and discord, where relative power and available outside opportunities determine people's well-being, conflict or cooperation.

Two prominent models that focus on the economic determinants of domestic violence suggest several testable propositions regarding the factors likely to be associated with the incidence of domestic violence. In the simplified version of the household bargaining model (HBM), feminist economists argue that a woman's wellbeing in the household is not dependent on the altruism of her husband but on her own ability to bargain—based on her actual and potential outside economic opportunities and

resources—with her husband for her wellbeing in the household. According to the HBM, the more real and potential resources, education, capital, and income generating/economic opportunities the woman has, the better the exit option, and the greater her ability to leave the household if she thinks she would be better off alone than she would be as a household member.

The woman's exit option serves a twofold purpose. First, it allows her to use outside opportunities as leverage in the household to bargain with her husband for better welfare in the home. Feminist economists have shown empirically that when women have more real and potential opportunities, their outcomes generally are better: less time spent on housework, more freedom of movement, more household decision-making ability, decreased fertility rates. Second, because in this simple game both wife and husband are well aware of each other's exit options, the husband will be more willing to negotiate, compromise, and cooperate with his wife if she has the resources to leave. The more real and present that ability of the wife to take care of herself financially, the better the behavior of the husband toward his wife. Hence, a woman's exit option—if she is able to provide for herself and any dependents—serves as a deterrent to the husband's misbehavior (England 2003).

For instance, in their groundbreaking study on the impact of women's property ownership on domestic violence, Panda and Agarwal (2005) find that women who own land or a house have a significantly lower odds ratio of marital violence (emotional and physical) than women who do not own any property. As a result, the authors advocate the importance of "right to housing" and "right to land" campaigns as a means of improving women's lives by providing them a viable exit option from violent husbands thereby

reducing their risk of domestic violence. The authors also find that women who reported having regular employment have a lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence. Their study relies on household surveys administered in Kerala, India, which has matrilineal property rights; it provides empirical evidence for Deere and Doss's argument that "assets improve the lives of women who own and control them" (2006, 34). In "The Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence," Aizer found that as the gender wage gap declined in California and labor demand increased in female-dominant sectors, the number of women admitted to hospitals for physical assaults decreased. This finding lends strong support to the HBM since Aizer was able to control for reporting bias and endogeneity concerns (Aizer 2010). Hence the HBM suggests the following proposition in the case of domestic violence:

Proposition 1: The more resources, and the more potential and actual income-generating opportunities a woman has, the less likely she is to experience violence in the household.

However, sociologists and anthropologists have proffered the male backlash model, which argues that as a woman's economic position or economic prospects improve relative to those of her husband, so does her likelihood of experiencing domestic violence. The causal assumption in the backlash model is that the woman's greater economic potential is viewed by the husband as challenging the masculinist norms that reinforce male dominance in the household (Engle Merry 2009). As a result, when a woman acquires greater economic potential or resources, the male partner/spouse is more likely to use force and violence to (re)assert power/control over his partner; this retribution is the "backlash" of the model (Macmillan and Gartner 1999). Finnoff finds that in post-civil war Rwanda, "women who are employed but whose husbands are not

experienced more sexual violence” (2010). Finnoff also finds that the relationship between employment and gender violence is context-dependent; regions in Rwanda that had higher levels of violence prior to the genocide also experienced greater male backlash and a higher incidence of sexual violence after the genocide.

MBM, then, illustrates what Agarwal and Panda call the unintended and perverse effects of development strategies. For example, economic restructuring and liberalization in many developing countries provide women with opportunities to work for pay, which has potential to provided women with economic autonomy. However, firmly entrenched cultural and social gender norms in an ever-changing economic context may trigger a husband to beat his wife as a way to assert power and show others that he controls his partner (Engle Merry 2009). Hence from MBM, I derive the following proposition:

Proposition 2: The greater the economic resources of a wife relative to her husband, the greater the likelihood that she will experience domestic violence from her husband.

Within the context of these two contrasting views on gender violence, the Dominican Republic provides an interesting locale to study violence against women and its economic, political, and social correlates. Dominican women are key economic actors in the labor market, accounting for over 40 percent of labor force participation. In 1997 the Dominican Republic government issued Law 24-97, in which the Dominican government, decrees that domestic violence is punishable by law; nonetheless, femicide and gender violence remain grave matters in the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican Republic as an intermediate state, with characteristics of both rich and poor countries, may also present a useful case to test if the HBM and MBM are context dependent on the relative economic position of the respondent. Despite economic

growth during the last two decades, the Dominican Republic has a high level of income inequality where the bottom or poorest quintile receives 1.3 percent of GDP, the next (poorest) receives 7.5 percent, the middle receives 12.8 percent, the next richer quintile receives 19.8 percent of income, and the top (or richest) quintile receives 58.6 percent of total income (Hammill 2005). In the case of such extreme inequality, and considering that very few shelters exist for women who experience violence, is it possible for a woman in the lowest quintile who experiences gender violence to leave the home and provide for herself and her possible dependents? It seems much more feasible for a woman in the richer or richest quintiles, with more opportunities and access to resources, to have viable exit options when confronted with a violent spouse. This contrast leads to a third proposition I test in this paper:

Proposition 3: The HBM, which highlights the role of women's outside opportunities and resources, will better predict the correlation between economic determinants and gender violence for women in the upper wealth quintiles as opposed to women in the lower wealth quintiles.

The Dominican Republic Demographic and Health Survey 2007 provides data on women's economic positions, by creating a wealth index based on household assets and placing respondents into five wealth quintiles. I use this data to assess if the HBM and the MBM are context-dependent on a women's wealth status by running regressions on a subsample of only the two bottom wealth (poorest and poorer) quintiles and then running the same regressions on the two top (richer and richest) quintiles.

2.3 Data and Method

2.3.1 Description of the Data

In order to test these propositions and assess the correlates of domestic violence, this study utilizes data from the 2007 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for the Dominican Republic. The DHS is a household-level survey administered by Macro International in many developing nations including the Dominican Republic, where it is conducted in conjunction with the Dominican government, USAID, the World Bank, and the Global Fund. It provides data on women's health, fertility, household decision-making ability, financial autonomy, employment, and their experiences with domestic violence at the hands of their partners. These data are particularly useful in evaluating the propositions from the two models not only because of the breadth of variables that they examine (e.g. economic, political, and demographic factors), but also because they allow us to tap the multiple ways that gender violence is experienced by women. On the latter point, it may be important to distinguish between physical and sexual violence, and these data allow us to make such a differentiation.

This study employs a subsample of 1,820 women—ages 15-49, currently married or cohabitating—who were randomly selected to participate in the domestic violence module of the survey administered by the DHS in 2007. Of the 1,820 respondents, 626 women are from rural areas and 1,194 are from urban areas. I only include cases that without missing data, and women who are married or partnered, including married women, women in consensual unions, or women who have partners but currently are not living with them.

Due to the sensitive nature of the issue of domestic violence, the interviewer followed specific protocols to ensure the privacy of the female respondents. First, only one woman per household was selected to participate in the domestic violence module of the survey, so as to provide a degree of anonymity vis-a-vis other household members. Second, the interviewer obtained an additional informed consent from the female respondent in order to proceed with the domestic violence module. Third, the domestic violence module was administered only in private. Where privacy could not be ensured, interviews were not held. Fourth, interviewers provided informational pamphlets on assistance for concerns with domestic violence for those women who expressed interest in receiving such information.

The domestic violence module is an addition to the DHS survey, which collects household- and individual-level data from both women and a subsample of their male partners. The majority of the questions focus on women's social and demographic characteristics such as age, employment and income status, educational attainment, social networks and support, household decision-making abilities, fertility rates, child or children's education and mortality rates, access to healthcare, and data on HIV/AIDS. The DHS domestic violence module collects data on three forms of violence against women: physical, psychological, and sexual. Using the Conflict Tactics Scale (Straus 1990), women were asked the following questions to determine experiences with physical and sexual violence in the household.

Has your (last) husband/partner ever:

- a) Pushed, shaken, or thrown something at you?
- b) Hit you?
- c) Twisted your arm or pulled your hair?
- d) Punched you with his fist or with something that could hurt you?

- e) Kicked or dragged you across the floor?
- f) Tried to strangle or burn you?
- g) Threatened or hurt you with a knife, gun, or other weapon?
- h) Used physical force to have sexual relations although you did not want to engage in sexual intercourse?
- i) Forced you to engage in sexual acts that you do not approve of?

The instances of violence were measured as discrete variables, and women were asked both if they had experienced any of these forms of violence in their lives and if they had experienced any of these forms of violence in the last twelve months. The distribution of values on economic, political, and social/demographic variables and gender violence (the dependent variable in this model) is reported in Table 2.3: Cross-Tabulations of Economic, Political, and Social Determinants of Domestic and Cohabiting Couples in the Dominican Republic 2007.

Table 2.3: Cross Tabulations of Economic, Political, and Social Determinants of Domestic Violence Married and Cohabiting Women in the Dominican Republic in 2007

(N=1820, in percentages, number of responses in parenthesis)

CHARACTERISTICS		Physical Violence	Sexual Violence
Economic Determinants	n		
<i>Respondent has money for own use</i>			
No	(956)	20.5 (196)	6.6 (63)
Yes	(864)	13.3 (115)	4.8 (41)
Employment Status			
Employed	1492	15.5 (231)	7.6 (25)
Unemployed	328	24.4 (80)	5.3 (79)
Earnings relative to partner			
Respondent makes less	1296	16.5 (214)	5.4 (70)

Respondent makes the same	215	13.9 (30)	3.7 (8)
Respondent makes more	299	22.1 (66)	8.7 (26)
<i>Women's Home Ownership</i>			
No	1032	18.0 (186)	4.5 (46)
Yes	788	15.9 (125)	7.4 (58)
<i>Women's Land Ownership</i>			
No	1608	16.9 (271)	5.5 (88)
Yes	212	18.8 (40)	7.6 (16)
<i>Wealth Quintiles</i>			
Poorest	324	25 (81)	8.9 (75)
Poorest	437	21.3 (93)	7.6 (33)
Middle	405	17.0 (69)	5.4 (22)
Richer	367	10.1 (37)	3.3 (12)
Richest	287	10.8 (31)	2.8 (8)
Political Determinants			
<i>Member of a Women's Organization</i>			
No	1715	16.9 (290)	5.9 (101)
Yes	105	21.0 (21)	2.9 (3)
<i>Member of a Political Organization</i>			
No	1779	16.9 (302)	5.7 (101)
Yes	41	21.9 (9)	7.3 (3)
Social Determinants			
<i>Education</i>			

No education	50	28.0 (14)	6.0 (3)
Primary	736	22.2 (163)	7.6 (56)
Secondary	612	15.4 (94)	5.9 (36)
Higher	422	9.5 (40)	2.1 (9)
<i>Location</i>			
Urban	1194	19.8 (124)	9.5 (59)
Rural	626	15.7 (187)	3.8 (45)
<i>Head of Household</i>			
Partner	1427	17.5 (250)	6.2 (88)
Women	393	15.5 (61)	4.1 (16)
<i>Spousal Age Difference</i>			
SPAD1	747	18.5 (198)	5.7 (61)
SPAD2	301	15.6 (47)	6.3 (19)
SPAD3	446	14.8 (66)	5.4 (24)
<i>Husband Drinks Alcohol Often</i>			
No	1675	13.5 (226)	4.0 (68)
Yes	145	58.6 (85)	24.8 (36)
<i>Women who witnessed father beating mother in childhood</i>			
No	1536	15.1 (232)	5.5 (84)
Yes	284	27.8 (79)	7.0 (20)

Although the DR DHS 2007 is a carefully constructed survey instrument administered throughout the developing world, it has limitations that are worth noting. First and foremost, the DHS does not collect data on race, ethnicity, or, what would be better yet in the Dominican context, the skin color of respondents. Although the elite and the national discourse purport that the Dominican Republic is a racial democracy, studies have shown that Afro-descendants—especially those that are visibly, or phenotypically, black—experience intense racial discrimination and prejudice in society (Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer 2001, Gregory 2007, Howard 2001, Valdez 2005). However, not only is market discrimination *racial* in the Dominican Republic, as in most cases it is also *gendered*. Dark-skinned Dominicans are overrepresented in the lower income categories and dark-skinned women of African descent and their dependents are arguably more vulnerable because of the double burden based on the gendered norm that the ultimate responsibility of women is to provide care and food to their dependents (Albert Batista 1993, Safa 1995, Valdez 2005, Gregory 2007, Howard 2001). The intersection of Dominican racist and sexist cultural norms that limit women's, especially dark-skinned women's, economic opportunities (Safa 1995, Valdez 2005).

Not only are dark-skinned Dominican women overrepresented in lower income categories, they are also overrepresented in the lowest paying and most precarious segments of the labor market, particularly the informal sector, the service sector, and the care sector (domestic workers, cooks, childcare, teachers, janitorial services). The intersectional race, class, and gender discrimination that women experience in the labor market is so institutionalized that workers must submit color photos with their resumes. Being dark skinned or visibly black in turn affects women's exit options, income

generating ability, and their ability to bargain for better outcomes in the household (Safa 1995, McClenaghan 1997, Gregory 2007, Albert Batista 1993). Because the DHS does not collect data on skin color or race in the Dominican Republic, I will not be able to examine here the ways that violence may also have a racial dimension, as has been documented in the literature (Johnson and Ferraro 2000, Rasche 1988, Kasturirangan et al. 2004, West 2004).

The second limitation is that women may be underreporting domestic violence in DHS surveys. A study by Ellsberg et al. (2003) found systematic and significant underreporting of domestic violence when they replicated and readministrated the DHS domestic violence module in two regional studies in Nicaragua. They provide several reasons for underreporting, such as the lack of preparation that interviewers need in order to administer such a difficult set of questions, and the inability of the interviewer to establish privacy and confidentiality when the interview takes place in the home of the respondent. In addition to these concerns, there may be underreporting in the DHS domestic violence because interviews ask respondents questions about domestic violence after a long list of survey questions on family planning, employment, reproductive history, health, children's welfare, nutritional and educational status. Hence, women may just answer *no* to the initial question on domestic violence to be done with the survey (Ellsberg et. al. 2003). Although these concerns cannot be corroborated for the Dominican Republic, they may lead to underreporting.

Despite these limitations, due to the prevalence of domestic violence and femicide, useful information can be gleaned from using the data in the DR DHS 2007. The DR DHS 2007 is random, representative at the national level, and collects data at

household level. In TABLE 2.3, some interesting descriptive findings emerge. First, women who are employed and have money for their own use are less likely than women who do not to experience domestic violence, both physical and sexual, as the HBM suggests. However, women who make more money than their partners experience physical and sexual abuse at rates higher than their counterparts who make the same or less than their husbands. The functional form that the literature predicts for the impact of class on domestic violence also holds; that is to say, a higher percentage of women in the lower classes report experiencing domestic violence than women in the higher economic classes. As a corollary to poverty as a form of economic violence, studies also find that the higher incidence of domestic violence in the poorer income classes than in the wealthier income classes is due to the immediate psychological and real stresses of poverty (Panda and Argawal 2005, Heise 1998). Women who are members of political organizations have a higher percentage of reporting the incidence of gender violence, both physical and sexual.

More highly educated women report less domestic violence, as do women who live in urban areas, and women whose husbands are five or more years older than they are. Women whose husbands drink alcohol often are more likely to report gender violence, as are women who witnessed their fathers beat their mothers in childhood.

2.3.2 Research Design

Table 2.4: Variables and Definitions

Variable	Type	Definition
ALLVIO	binary; dependent	Life time experience of both sexual and physical violence with current partner

SEXVIO	binary; dependent	Life-time experience sex violence with current partner
PHYVIO	binary; dependent	Life-time experience physical violence with current partner
WIFEWORKS	binary; independent	Woman has worked in the past year
WIFEMONEY	binary; independent	Woman has money for her own use
WIFEMAKESMORE	binary; independent	Woman makes more than her partner (reference category: wife makes the same or less than husband)
LAND	binary; independent	Woman owns land alone
HOME	binary; independent	Woman owns dwelling where family lives alone
POOR	binary; independent	The combined bottom 40 % of wealth quintiles
MIDDLE	binary; independent	The middle 20% of the wealth quintiles (reference category)
RICH	binary; independent	The combined top 40 % of wealth quintiles
WOMORG	binary; independent	Woman belongs to a woman's organization
POLORG	binary; independent	Woman belongs to a political organization
EDUYRS	continuous; independent	Woman's years of education
HEADHOUSE	binary; independent	Woman as head of household
URBAN	binary; independent	Urban residence
SPAD1	binary; independent	Less than 5 years age difference between partners
SPAD2	binary; independent	Man is 5 to 8 years older than wife
SPAD3	binary; independent	Man is 9 years or more older than wife
ALCOFTEN	binary; independent	Woman reports that husband drinks alcohol often
INTERGENVIO	binary; independent	Woman reports seeing father physically abuse mother
Acronyms		
HBM		Household bargaining model
MBM		Male backlash model

2.3.2.1 Dependent Variable

In the study, I use the binary variable of experiencing gender violence to ascertain the relationship between certain predictors and gender violence. I specify three models.

First, I look at the predictors of all gender violence, both sexual and physical, (ALLVIO) in the household. Second, I disaggregate ALLVIO into sexual and physical violence to examine the possible differences between these two types of violence. Sexual violence [SEXVIO] tells us whether a women has experienced any forced sexual acts, and [PHYSVIO] tells whether a women has experienced any sort of physical violence—if she has been punched, kicked, pushed, slapped, or hit with a weapon or some other instrument. Each of these variables takes the value of 1 if the event occurred, 0 otherwise.

2.3.2.2 Independent Variables: Economic, Political, and Social/Demographic Determinants

The variable WIFEWORCS takes the value 1 if the wife is working, 0 otherwise. WIFEMONEY is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the woman reports having money for her own use, 0 otherwise. WIFEMAKESMORE is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the woman respondent earns more money than her husband, 0 otherwise; this might be a salient variable with which to test the MBM, as it addresses the relative power of each partner in the couple. HOME takes the value of 1 if the wife has sole ownership of the home in which the couple resides, 0 otherwise. LAND takes the value 1 if the wife owns land alone, 0 otherwise. POOR is a variable created from the wealth quintiles (based on asset ownership) that the DHS reports; POOR consists of the two bottom quintiles. MIDDLE is the middle category of the wealth quintiles and it is omitted from the logistic analysis as the reference category. RICH is the two top quintiles in the wealth/asset distribution.

POLORG—whether a woman belongs to a political organization—takes the value 1 if the woman belongs to a political organization, 0 otherwise. WOMORG, membership in a women’s organization, takes the value of 1 if the woman is in a women’s organization, 0 otherwise. EDUYRS is education in years, the minimum being 0 years of education, the maximum 19 years. The mean years of education for the sample is 9.3. HEADHOUSE takes the value of 1 if the female respondent is the head of household, 0 otherwise. URBAN is 1 if the female respondent lives in an urban area, 0 if she lives in a rural area. SPAD1 is the spousal age difference when there is less than five years difference between the couple. SPAD2 is the spousal age difference that corresponds to couples where the husband is five to eight years older than the wife and takes the value of 1 if this is the case, 0 otherwise. SPAD3 takes the value of 1 if the husband is nine or more years older than his wife, 0 otherwise. ALCOFTEN takes the value of 1 if the wife reports that her husband drinks alcohol often, 0 otherwise. INTERGENVIO is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the female respondent saw her father beat her mother—so as to test for the intergenerational transmission of violence—0 otherwise.¹⁷

2.3.2.3 Model Specification

I estimate the models using logit regression. Logit regression is appropriate where the dependent variable is dichotomous. The logistic model takes the following form: $Pr(y=1) = \exp(\alpha + \beta x_k + \delta d_k) / (1 + \exp(\alpha + \beta x_k + \delta d_k))$; where $y = 1$ if the outcome occurs— if women respond “yes” to the indicators of gender violence in question— x is a vector of

¹⁷ See Table 2.4: Variables and Definitions for all dependent and independent variables used in regression analysis.

continuous variables, and δ is a vector of dichotomous variables. I interpret the results of the logistic model in terms of the changes in the odds. The coefficients, or odds ratios in this case, indicate that for a unit change in x_k , I expect the logit to change by β_k , holding all the other independent variables constant. I obtain the odds ratio by taking the exponential of both sides of the equation, which considers the odds of observing a positive outcome ($y=1$) versus a negative outcome ($y=0$):

$\Omega = \Pr(y=1)/\Pr(y=0) = \Pr(y=1)/1-\Pr(y=1)$. If the odds ratio of an independent variable x_k is greater than 1, by saying the odds ratio is β_k greater, holding other variables constant, this implies an increase in the probability of gender violence. Conversely, if the odds ratio is less than 1 this indicates that it is a lower probability (Long and Freese 2006). I estimate the following three specifications, which differ only in the dependent variable measuring gender violence:

$$\Pr(GV_{ALLVIO} = 1) = F(\beta_1 WIFEWORKS + \beta_2 WIFEMONEY + \beta_3 WIFEMAKESMORE + \beta_4 HOME + \beta_5 LAND + \beta_6 POOR + \beta_7 RICH + \beta_8 POLORG + \beta_9 WOMORG + \beta_{10} EDUYRS + \beta_{11} HEADHOUSE + \beta_{12} URBAN + \beta_{13} SPAD2 + \beta_{14} SPAD3 + \beta_{15} ALOFTEN + \beta_{16} INTERGENVIO)$$

$$\Pr(GV_{SEXVIO} = 1) = F(\beta_1 WIFEWORKS + \beta_2 WIFEMONEY + \beta_3 WIFEMAKESMORE + \beta_4 HOME + \beta_5 LAND + \beta_6 POOR + \beta_7 RICH + \beta_8 POLORG + \beta_9 WOMORG + \beta_{10} EDUYRS + \beta_{11} HEADHOUSE + \beta_{12} URBAN + \beta_{13} SPAD2 + \beta_{14} SPAD3 + \beta_{15} ALOFTEN + \beta_{16} INTERGENVIO)$$

$$\Pr(GV_{PHYSVIO} = 1) = F(\beta_1 WIFEWORKS + \beta_2 WIFEMONEY + \beta_3 WIFEMAKESMORE + \beta_4 HOME + \beta_5 LAND + \beta_6 POOR + \beta_7 RICH + \beta_8 POLORG + \beta_9 WOMORG + \beta_{10} EDUYRS + \beta_{11} HEADHOUSE + \beta_{12} URBAN + \beta_{13} SPAD2 + \beta_{14} SPAD3 + \beta_{15} ALOFTEN + \beta_{16} INTERGENVIO)$$

2.3.3 Propositions from Contending Models

In assessing the correlates of gender violence in the Dominican Republic, and testing which model—HBM or the MBM—best accounts for gender violence, I advance the following propositions which situate the competing models within the context of economic, political and social variables.

The HBM predicts that any potential or actual outside economic opportunities and resources improve the woman's wellbeing in the household. Hence, the HBM suggests that any economic resources and income-generating activity will translate into a lower odds ratio of women experiencing less domestic violence. Additionally, social/demographic factors such as increased years of education, living in an urban area where there are more work opportunities, or if the respondent is the household head this should also translate into better outcomes as these strengthen a woman's bargaining position; I call this the narrow version of the HBM. I also envision women's participation in the political realm as an extension of outside opportunities and resources, which in turn would strengthen her bargaining position; hence in this augmented version of the HBM, women's participation in political organizations and in women's organizations also results in a lower odds ratio of experiencing gender violence.

In the narrow version of the MBM, it is the relative income positions of the couple that matter. Hence a situation where the wife makes more money than her husband would imply that the wife is at a higher odds ratio of experiencing violence. I can also extend the MBM—that is, a broader version of the MBM—to economic variables that strengthen a woman's exit options or make her a political actor in the

public sphere; in this case, it follows variables that provide women resources and participation in politics will elicit higher odds of violence from the husband.

I turn now to an analysis of multivariate logistic results to ascertain the signs and statistical significance of the economic, political, social determinants and assess which of the two models best describes gender violence in the household in which contexts in the Dominican Republic.

2.4 Analysis of Multivariate Results¹⁸

2.4.1 Model of Aggregate Domestic Violence

In the model of aggregate violence (ALLVIO), including both sexual and/or physical violence, the HBM does the better job of describing domestic violence in the Dominican Republic. Two salient independent variables—when the wife has money for her own use, and education in years— are associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing gender violence in the household, and both are statistically significant ($p < .05$).¹⁹ There is limited support for the MBM as well; in terms of economic variables, when the wife makes more money than her husband, she has a higher odds ratio of experiencing violence in the household than women who make the same amount or less than their husbands, a result that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. There is

¹⁸ For correlation matrices and tests of correlation significance see Appendix B. For discussion of significant correlations, likelihood ratio tests of nested versus full models, and justification of model validity see Appendix C.

¹⁹ $P < .01$ means that the variable odds ratio is significant at the 1% level, $p < .05$ denotes that the odds ratio is significant at the 5% level, and $p < .10$ significant at the 10 % level.

additional support for the broader version of the MBM: women who belong to a political organization have a higher odds ratio of experiencing gender violence than women who do not belong to political organizations ($p < .10$). Several demographic variables are also significant. I find that women who are nine or more years younger than their husbands are at a lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence in the household than women who do not have that age differential ($p < .01$). Also I find that women whose husbands drink alcohol often and women who witnessed their fathers beat their mothers are at a higher odds ratio of experiencing gender violence than women whose husbands do not drink often and women who did see gender violence in the household respectively ($p < .01$).

Table 2.5: Logistic Regression of Factors Associated with Gender Violence
(robust standard errors in parenthesis)

	Physical Violence	Sexual Violence	Physical and Sexual Violence
<i>Independent Variables</i>	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
<i>Economic Variables</i>			
Wife works	.73* (.12)	.83 (.21)	.74* (.12)
Wife money for own use	.71** (.11)	.88 (.20)	.69** (.10)
Wife makes more \$ than husband	1.54** (.28)	1.64* (.42)	1.54** (.47)
Wife owns dwelling where couple lives	.77* (.11)	1.46* (.31)	.82 (.11)
Wife owns land	1.22 (.26)	1.39 (.44)	1.27 (.26)
Poor	1.19 (.22)	1.19 (.33)	1.15 (.21)
Rich	.76 (.15)	.74 (.25)	.74 (.15)
<i>Political Variables</i>			
Belongs to women's organization	1.30 (.36)	.36 (.28)	1.14 (.30)

Belongs to a political organization	2.01* (.76)	2.03 (1.60)	2.92*** (1.04)
<i>Social/Demographic Variables</i>			
Education in years	.95** (.02)	.98 (.02)	.95** (.02)
Female headed household	.83 (.14)	.68 (.21)	.86 (.14)
Urban	.87 (.13)	.44*** (.10)	.77* (.11)
Husband 5-8 yrs older than wife	.79 (.15)	1.07 (.31)	.82 (.15)
Husband is 9 yrs older than wife	.73** (.13)	.89 (.24)	.81 (.14)
Husband drinks alcohol often	8.72*** (1.70)	7.44*** (1.85)	8.80 (1.72)***
Women saw father beat mother	2.31*** (.37)	1.28 (.35)	2.30*** (.37)
<i>Constant</i>			
	0.37*** (.11)	.07*** (.03)	.40*** (.18)
N	1820	1818	1820
McFaddens R ²	0.1402	0.1381	0.1403

2.4.2 Model of Sexual Violence

When I disaggregate gender violence to examine specifically sexual violence, I find somewhat different results. Again, women who make more money than their husbands are at a higher odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence than women who make the same amount of money or less than their husbands. Recall that, according to the MBM, when husbands feel relatively disempowered in some measure vis-à-vis their wives, the male's response is to impose his "authority" over the woman by using his physical power in the form of violence. In the case of sexual violence, the only statistically significant economic variable—women who make more money than husband ($p < .10$)—supports the MBM.

However, I also find support for the HBM in the political and social/demographic variables: belonging to a women's organization ($p < 0.01$), increasing education in years ($p < 0.05$), and being a female head of household ($p < .10$) lower the odds ratio of experiencing violence. Additionally, women who live in urban areas ($p < .05$) are at a lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence than women who live in rural areas. This finding about the influence of geographical location is consistent with the HBM, in so far as women in urban areas have more potential outside work and educational opportunities, which strengthens their bargaining power and provides more potential exit options. In the results for sexual violence (SEXVIO), I find that as for aggregate violence (ALLVIO), women whose husbands often drink alcohol are at a higher odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence ($p < .01$).

2.4.3 Model of Physical Violence

In the model with physical violence as the dependent variable, there is stronger support for the HBM. When women have money for their own use, they are at a lower odds ratio of experiencing violence in the household than their counterparts who do not have money for their own use ($p < 0.05$). Additional support for the HBM is provided by the variable education in years, with each additional year of schooling lowering the odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence ($p < .05$). Despite the stronger support for the HBM, there is also support, albeit statistically weaker, for the MBM in the categories of economic and political variables; when the wife makes more money than her husband, she has a higher odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence ($p < .10$), and when she is a member of a political organization, she also faces a higher odds ratio of experiencing

domestic violence ($p < .10$). In the specification of physical violence (PHYSVIO), greater spousal age differences, the male partner being five to eight years older than the respondent (SPAD2) ($p < .10$), and the male partner being nine years older (SPAD3) ($p < .01$), put women at a lower odds ratio of experiencing physical violence. Once again, women whose husbands drink often ($p < .01$) and who witnessed gender violence in their own homes as children ($p < .01$) have a higher odds ratio of experiencing gender violence.

2.5 Class Dimension of Gender Violence

In previous specifications, I control for economic class through the use of the wealth variables. In all three specifications the functional form I expect for class and gender violence holds. That is to say, there is a higher odds ratio of poor women experiencing gender violence, while there is a lower odds ratio of rich women experiencing domestic violence both with respect to middle asset category, the reference group. However, neither class status is statistically significant in the three models in which all women are analyzed together. In this section I discuss the results that emerge when I run each of the three previous models separately for women in the asset-poor category and then for women in the asset-rich category.

2.5.1 Asset-Poor Women and Gender Violence in the Household

In regression analysis for asset-poor women ($N=761$), I find that the MBM best explains gender violence both at the aggregate level and also when gender violence is disaggregated into physical violence and sexual violence.

Table 2.6: Logistic Regression of Factors Associated with Domestic Violence for Asset-Poor Women
(robust standard errors in parenthesis)

	Physical Violence	Sexual Violence	Physical and Sexual Violence
<i>Independent Variables</i>	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratios
<i>Economic Variables</i>			
Wife works	.40*** (.12)	1.02 (.56)	.44*** (.13)
Wife money for own use	.69 (.20)	.52 (.21)	.130 (.19)
Wife makes more \$ than husband	2.47** (.94)	3.135** (1.60)	2.49** (.92)
Wife owns dwelling where couple lives	.84 (.25)	1.01 (.35)	.88 (.26)
Wife owns land	.54 (.25)	1.73 (.96)	.73 (.33)
<i>Political Variables</i>			
Belongs to women's organization	.45 (.27)	.33 (.27)	.38 (.23)
Belongs to a political organization	8.04*** (4.94)	.733 (1.01)	10.40*** (6.22)
<i>Social/Demographic Variables</i>			
Education in years	.78 (.22)	1.00 (.06)	.98 (.03)
Female headed household	.61 (.22)	.4168 .2776	.640 .22879
Urban	.78 (.21)	.47* (.19)	.71 (.19)
Husband 5-8 yrs older than wife	.86 (.34)	.90 (.45)	.87 (.33)
Husband is 9 yrs older than wife	.62 (.21)	.83 (.50)	.65 (.21)
Husband drinks alcohol often	11.61*** (4.66)	6.10*** (2.56)	11.02*** (4.46)
Women saw father beat mother	2.92*** (1.07)	1.481 (.91)	2.75*** (1.00)
N	761	760	761
McFaddens R ²	0.1377	0.1100	0.1269

*p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

In the aggregate violence (ALLVIO) specification for poor women, both the wife making more money than the husband ($p < .05$) and the wife being a member of a political organization ($p < .01$) increase the odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence in the household; both of these variables speak to the way that women's outside opportunities—especially in the case where the husband is relatively disempowered—and women's participation in the public sphere may place poor women in precarious situations within the household. In the case of a poor woman who is the main breadwinner in the household, it is important to note how the larger economic context, characterized by sporadic and insecure employment for both women and men, high levels of unemployment, and large informal sector may be contributing to the “perverse consequences” of development including detrimental outcomes for women.

In addition to the strong support for the MBM as an explanation for asset-poor women's experience of gender violence, there is also some support for the HBM. When an asset-poor woman works, she is at a lower odds ratio of experiencing violence than asset-poor women who does not work, signaling the importance of employment for women's well-being. Both social/demographic variables husband drinks alcohol often ($p < .01$) and witnessing gender violence growing up ($p < .01$) put asset-poor women at a higher odds ratio of experiencing violence.

In the sexual violence (SEXVIO) specification for asset-poor women, the only significant economic predictor is when the wife makes more than her male partner (WIFEMAKESMORE) ($p < .05$); when asset-poor women make more money than their husbands, they are at a higher odds ratio of experiencing sexual violence than asset-poor women who make the same or less than their partners. However, living in an urban area

($p < 0.10$) puts asset-poor women at a lower odds ratio of experiencing sexual violence than asset-poor women in rural areas, which supports the HBM in so far as living in urban areas presents women with more potential work, education, and outside opportunities.

In the physical violence (PHYSVIO) specification for asset poor women, there is broader support for the MBM. Both when the respondent makes more than her male partner (WIFEMAKESMORE) ($p < .05$) and when the respondent belongs to a political organization (POLITICALORG) ($p < .01$) are associated with a higher odds ratio of experiencing violence in the household. In this specification, there is also support for the HBM in that the variable WIFEWORKS ($p < .01$), is associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence.

2.5.2 Asset-Rich Women and Gender Violence in the Household

When the same specifications were estimated for women in the asset-rich category, the HBM best explained both the aggregate (ALLVIO) and physical violence (PHYSVIO) results; whereas the MBM best explained significant variables in the sexual violence (SEXVIO) results.

Table 2.7: Logistic Regression of Factors Associated with Domestic Violence for Asset-Rich Women
(robust standard errors in parenthesis)

	Physical Violence	Sexual Violence	Physical and Sexual Violence
<i>Independent Variables</i>	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratios
<i>Economic Variables</i>			
Wife works	2.41 (1.44)	2.75 (2.35)	1.96 (1.08)
	.35**	.59	.35**

Wife money for own use	(.16)	(.43)	(.16)
	1.21	.78	1.23
Wife makes more \$ than husband	(.70)	(.63)	(.63)
Wife owns dwelling where couple lives	.74	1.11	.78
	(.17)	(.38)	(.17)
Wife owns land	1.83**	2.51**	1.80**
	(.55)	(1.06)	(0.53)
<i>Political Variables</i>			
		OMMITTED PREDICTS FAILURE PER.	
Belongs to women's organization	2.33**		1.88
	(1.20)		(1.02)
Belongs to a political organization	2.99	14.66**	8.38**
	(3.33)	(18.28)	(7.29)
<i>Social/Demographic Variables</i>			
	.91*	.83***	.90**
Education in years	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Female headed household	1.22	.39	1.27
	(.51)	(.29)	(.52)
Urban	.83	.42	.77
	(.37)	(.27)	(.33)
Husband 5-8 yrs older than wife	.70	.42	.69
	(.38)	(.36)	(.38)
Husband is 9 yrs older than wife	.28**	.17	.32
	.14	(.15)	(.16)
Husband drinks alcohol often	5.01*	2.22	4.96**
	(3.06)	(2.21)	(3.08)
Women saw father beat mother	3.26**	.99	3.51***
	(1.55)	(.74)	(1.66)
N	654	621	654
McFaddens R ²	0.1294	0.1546	0.1390

*p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

In the aggregate violence (ALLVIO) specification for rich women, the only significant economic variable, when the wife has money for her own use (WIFEMONEY) (p<.05) is associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence; that is to say, women who have money, the most liquid financial asset, at their command have a lower odds ratio of experiencing gender violence than women who do not have money for their own use. Here it is important to note that when asset-rich

women have liquid assets, these assets may serve as an exit option and a deterrent to violence in the home; in contrast, this variable was not significant in any of the specifications of asset-poor women. This contrast suggests that exit options must be substantial to be viable. Asset-rich women who have money at their disposal are likely to have more of it than asset-poor women and hence more chance to support themselves and their dependents should they decide to exit the marriage. Additionally, belonging to a political organization (POLORG) and more years of education (EDUYRS) are also associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence in the household (both at $p < .05$ level), providing further support for the HBM.

In the sexual violence (SEXVIO) specification for asset-rich women, on the other hand, there is more support for the MBM; both women who own land (OWNSLAND) ($p < .10$) and women who belong to a political organization (POLORG) ($p < .05$) are associated with a higher odds ratio of experiencing violence. Only one of the social variables provides support for the HBM: continuous years of education (EDUYRS) is associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing gender violence for asset-rich women ($p < .01$).

Turning to the physical violence (PHYSVIO) specification, both variables when the wife has money for own use (WIFEMONEY) ($p < .05$) and continuous years of education (EDUYRS) ($p < .10$) are associated with a lower odds ratio of gender violence for asset-rich women, supporting the HBM, while, membership in a women's organization (WOMORG) is associated with a higher odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence ($p < .10$).

2.6 Policy Prescriptions & Conclusions

2.6.1 Discussion of Predicted Probabilities and Policy Implications

By calculating and reporting predicted probabilities of gender violence, I am able to assess the effects of significant variables in the models (Long and Freese 2006). TABLES 2.8 and 2.9 present predicted probabilities of gender violence for asset-poor and asset-rich women, respectively based on significant variables from TABLES 2.6 and 2.7.

Table 2.8: Probability of ALLVIO for Asset-Poor* women with mean EDUYRS= 7.1

	Urban [95% CI]	Rural [95% CI]
Unemployed Women	.27 [.14, .40]	.34 [.19, .49]
Women who make money than their husbands	.29 [.09, .49]	.36 [.15, .58]
Members of Political Organizations	.63 [.32, .94]	.70 [.43, .98]
Partner drinks alcohol often	.64 [.42, .86]	.72 [.53, .90]
Women who witnessed father beat mother	.31 [.14, .48]	.39 [.22, .55]

*all other variables held at their mode

In logistic regressions for asset-poor women—where the MBM best accounted for spousal abuse among the asset poor— being employed (WIFEWORKS) was associated with a lower odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence; hence, for asset-poor women employment may serve as an important means to reduce their probability of experiencing gender violence. I find that for an unemployed asset-poor woman living in an urban area, with the mean 7.1 years of education, the predicted probability of experiencing domestic violence is 27 percent, with the 95 percent confidence interval lying between .14 and .40. However employed women living in urban areas have fifteen percent predicted

probability of experiencing gender violence, which is lower than their unemployed counterpart. The predicted probability of rural unemployed asset-poor women experiencing gender violence is 34 percent with a 95 % confidence interval of between .19 and .49. In contrast, employed women in rural areas have an eighteen percent predicted probability of experiencing gender violence. These predicted probabilities point to the need for viable employment opportunities for women in the asset-poor category, especially in rural areas. Employment—especially employment that pays a living wage—serves not only the intrinsic purpose of providing a woman with income, but also the purposes of providing a potential exit option (if it is enough money for her to support herself and her dependents), increasing her level of self-esteem, and the social purposes of allowing a woman to provide for her dependents and to contribute to market activity.

If, however, the woman earns more money than her husband, her predicted probability of experiencing domestic violence goes up. Women in urban areas who make more money than their husbands have a 29 percent predicted probability of experiencing domestic violence; women in urban areas that earn the same or less than their husbands have a lower predicted probability of fifteen percent. Women in rural areas who make more money than their husbands have a 36 percent predicted probability of experiencing the domestic violence; whereas their counterparts who earn the same or less have an eighteen percent predicted probability of experiencing domestic violence.

This outcome, in which women are at a higher predicted probability of experiencing gender violence when they make more money than their husbands, leading to relative male disempowerment, is indicative of what Panda and Agarwal (2005) call the “perverse effects of development.” Women’s movement from the home to the work

place and the polity has challenged gender norms, but at the same time the myth of the male breadwinner and traditional gender ideology persist. The resulting tensions may not only perpetuate the foundations and normalization of gender violence but even exacerbate them. For instance, if the wife assumes the role of primary breadwinner—particularly if she is in the asset-poor category—instead of improving her well-being, unequivocally, her status may lead to her husband using violence to assert himself. This male breadwinner myth serves also to justify paying women inferior, supplemental wages in the labor market, an ideological support for labor market discrimination which in turn is detrimental to women’s wellbeing and economic autonomy. In the context of the Dominican Republic’s high unemployment rate, and its shift from a state-led Keynesian development strategy to a more market-oriented growth strategy (which decreased men’s employment opportunities as government officials and in public works), its falling real wages, and its precarious, unstable job market, it is important for the government to pursue a job creation strategy that benefits both men and women (Deere et al 1990).

Similarly, the MBM receives support in the case of asset-poor women who are members of political organizations. In urban areas, women who are members of political organizations have 63 percent predicted probability of experiencing domestic violence, whereas women not involved in political organizations have a lower predicted probability of fifteen percent.²⁰ In rural areas women who are politically active have an alarmingly high predicted probability of 70 percent; women who are not members of a political organization have fifteen percent chance of experiencing domestic violence. In the case

²⁰ In this dataset a total of 41 women report belonging to a political organization. Of the 41 women in political organizations, 16 are in the asset-poor category, 13 are in the middle asset category, and 12 are in the asset-rich category.

of women's political activism, there is the possibility of reverse causality. It could be that husbands want to punish their wives for challenging politics as male only space, thereby asserting to themselves and others that they are still in control of their wives. Or it could be that women who experience gender violence become politicized as they come to understand their experience as both a personal and a political issue. Whatever the relative importance of these two causal pathways, there is a significant correlation between female political activism and gender violence.

The political culture in the Dominican Republic helps to perpetuate violence against women. Abortion is still illegal; it is almost impossible for an asset-poor woman in the Dominican Republic to get access to a safe and affordable abortion. When women in the Dominican Republic report gender violence to the police, they are routinely told to “give your husband time to calm down” and are advised to go a family member's home. Prominent politicians and political pundits broadcast racist, homophobic, and sexist rhetoric. All this reinforces the gender violence, but women are inserting themselves into the political conversation—political organizations, the government, and in grassroots feminist movements—to reshape politics and advocate for themselves in the Dominican Republic. The associated increase in the risk of domestic violence is symptomatic of the challenge they confront.

The group of women in the asset-poor category who have the highest predicted probability of experiencing domestic violence—64 percent in urban areas and 72 percent in rural areas—are women who report that their husbands drink often. Conversely, women whose partners do not drink have a lower predicted probability of experiencing violence: fourteen percent in urban areas and seventeen percent in rural areas. A way to

alleviate this situation might be national and grassroots-level social and educational awareness programs that denounce alcohol abuse as detrimental not only to one’s health but also to the mental and physical well-being of others, with the link between alcohol abuse and gender violence given particular attention.

In urban areas women, who have witnessed gender violence in their homes as children have a predicted probability of 31 percent of experiencing violence themselves but those in urban areas who have not witnessed domestic violence have a lower predicted probability of fifteen percent. In rural areas the predicted probability of gender violence when a woman witnessed abuse in the childhood home is 39 percent, similarly in this case rural women who did not see domestic violence growing up have a lower predicted probability of eighteen percent. These percentages point to the need for social policy that seeks to disrupt the intergenerational transmission of gender violence, as well as for economic policy that disrupts the violence of poverty. Social policies are needed to breakdown the normalcy of men using violence against women, to confront the pervasive underlying notion in masculinist thought and cultures of machismo that women are objects to be controlled.

Table 2.9 presents the predicted probabilities of women in the asset-rich category experiencing domestic violence. These are lower than the corresponding probabilities for women in the asset-poor category.

Table 2.9: Probability for Asset-Rich* in Urban Areas with mean EDUYRS= 11.8

	Urban [95% CI]	Rural [95% CI]
Woman has no money for own use	.14 [.02, 0.26]	.18 [.02, 0.34]
Members of Political Organizations	.31 [.02, .65]	.38 [-.03, 0.8]

Partner drinks alcohol often	.22 [-.04, .48]	.27 [0.06, .60]
Women who witnessed father beat mother	.16 [.02, .31]	.21 [.02, 0.40]

*all other variables held at their mode

These lower predicted probabilities speak to two different issues documented in the literature. One is the possible systematic underreporting of violence of women in the upper economic classes, due to the shame and stigma associated with spousal abuse, and to the notion that gender violence does not happen in the homes of the wealthy and educated. Second, they highlight the way in which the violence of poverty is intertwined with gender violence, and add to the case for economic equality/justice as a way to reduce violence against women. The women with the highest predicted probabilities in the asset-rich category—women who are members of political organizations and women whose husbands drink often—share these risk factors with the asset-poor. This significant conjunction speaks to the way that gender violence cuts across class lines, and suggests that similar social and educational policies would benefit all women, regardless of class. It is also important to note that for asset-rich women, having money for their own use is associated with a lower odds ratio of gender violence; asset-rich women in urban who have money for their own use have a five percent predicted probability of experiencing domestic violence and those in rural areas have a seven percent predicted probability. Whereas asset-rich women with no money for their own use have a higher predicted probability of spousal abuse: fourteen percent in urban areas and eighteen percent in rural areas. Here, campaigns, interventions, and banks, such as El Banco de La Mujer Dominicana, can play a role in educating women and providing them with incentives to save money that is for their own use. The higher predicted probabilities of asset-rich

women who do not have money for their own use lends support to the HBM; asset-rich women need to have economic autonomy to have an exit option or to deter spousal abuse.

2.6.2 Conclusions and Further Research

In this chapter, I have tested which theoretical perspective—HBM or MBM—provides the most accurate description of how gender violence and women’s participation in the economic sphere intersect in Dominican Republic. I also explored the association of various other economic, social, and political determinants with women’s experience of domestic violence. My results—from the three aggregated models (TABLE 2.5) — suggest that in the Dominican Republic the HBM is better able to explain physical violence, but the MBM is more predictive of women being sexually assaulted by their partners.

Table 2.10: Summary of Significant Variables’ Support for Contending Models

	Physical Violence	Sexual Violence	Aggregate Violence
WIFEWORCS			
WIFEMONEY	HBM		HBM
WIFEMAKESMORE	MBM	MBM	MBM
OWNSLAND			
WOMENORG		HBM	
POLTICALORG	MBM		MBM
EDUYRS	HBM	HBM	HBM
HEADHOUSE		HBM	
URBAN		HBM	
BEST MODEL	HBM	MBM	HBM

Table 2.11: Summary of Significant Variables’ Support for Asset-Poor Women Specifications

	Physical Violence	Sexual Violence	Aggregate Violence
WIFEWORCS	HBM		HBM
WIFEMONEY			
WIFEMAKESMORE	MBM	MBM	MBM

OWNSLAND		MBM	
WOMENORG			
POLITICALORG	MBM		MBM
EDUYRS			
HEADHOUSE			
URBAN		HBM	
BEST MODEL	MBM	MBM	MBM

Table 2.12: Summary of Significant Variables' Support for Asset-Rich Women Specifications

	Physical Violence	Sexual Violence	Aggregate Violence
WIFEWORKS			
WIFEMONEY	HBM		HBM
WIFEMAKESMORE			
OWNSLAND	MBM	MBM	MBM
WOMENORG	MBM		
POLITICALORG		MBM	MBM
EDUYRS	HBM	HBM	HBM
HEADHOUSE			
URBAN			
BEST MODEL	HBM	MBM	HBM

When I disaggregate between low-income and upper-income women, I find an important socioeconomic element of gender violence. For asset-poor women in the sample, the relationship between the economic, political, and social/demographic variables provide more support for the MBM; that is to say, asset-poor women may be more vulnerable to their husbands' using violence in response to their wives' participation in the market. For asset-rich women in this sample, the HBM holds more firmly; when asset-rich women have economic resources at their command, they tend to experience less violence in the household.²¹

²¹ The DHS collects data at the household and individual level for respondents. Asset wealth data--assessed by household items, type of house, and other items owned—

The evidence from both subsamples points to the conclusion that if we are to reduce women's chances of experiencing violence in the household, women must have viable exit options. They must have jobs that pay a living wage. The current average wage for women, is roughly 87 percent of male's wages, despite higher female than male levels of educational attainment (Lambert 2007).²² Compounding the damage caused by the gender wage gap, women's unemployment rate is consistently higher than that of men. In 2007, 67 percent of women were unemployed, twice the unemployment level of men (Lambert 2007). Additionally, women are more likely to be employed in the informal sector, which tends to include the lowest-paying, most labor-intensive work, work that does not offer benefits, pension, healthcare, or job security (Lambert 2007, Safa 1995). These larger, macroeconomic structural issues severely limit women's, particularly asset-poor women's, exit options from violent relationships. Apart from these structural economic issues, the results of this study show that gender norms may be learned and reproduced. Women who saw gender violence in the home as children are more likely to experience gender violence as adults. Policy makers and feminist organizations must continue to tackle gendered beliefs and institutions to eradicate

however, is at the household level and in this study partners who live in the same home are designated the same wealth asset status.

²² According to a report by the Dominican National Statistical Office (Oficina Nacional de Estadística) entitled, "Situación laboral de las mujeres en la República Dominicana", the median monthly wage for women in 2010 was \$305 USD and \$361 USD for men (p. 78). In 2010, the monthly average food basket for a family of four (termed la canasta básica) in the Dominican Republic was \$668.57 USD. La canasta básica not include average housing, transportation, educational, or health-related expenses (Banco Central de la República Dominicana 2011, http://www.bancentral.gov.do/notas_del_bc.asp?a=bc2011-02-02, accessed 9/13/2013). A household with two people earning the median wage, therefore, is unable to cover the basic nutrition necessities for a family of four.

gender violence. In addition, social and education policies are necessary to enhance awareness of the implications of alcohol abuse for violence in the home.

What emerges from this study, then, are some insights into the way in which both the HBM and the MBM are operating in a mid-level income, developing nation where women are highly mobile, independent, and challenging the very gender norms that perpetuate violence against them. The finding that both of these contending models prove relevant to women's experience of domestic violence in the Dominican Republic suggests that economic factors interact with gender norms. Both are at play when there is gender violence in the household. To eradicate domestic violence, therefore, new policies must use both economic strategies (such as providing both men and women with remunerative employment) and cultural strategies that challenge the male bias inherent in institutions, markets, and cultural norms. This dual strategy is already at the heart of the feminist movement in the Dominican Republic.

In the majority of the models, excessive alcohol drinking by husbands and the intergenerational transmission of violence are associated with a higher odds ratio of experiencing domestic violence in the household. Interestingly, feminist studies written during the Dominican financial crisis in 1980's reported that at the height of the crisis—when unemployment rates among men dramatically increased—the majority of women's concerns as reported by women to NGOs involved the heightened level of sexual and physical violence they were experiencing (Sikoska 2000).

These results suggest that policies and campaigns that provide both men and women with viable economic opportunities, together with policies and campaigns that challenge gender norms and hierarchy could have the effect of lowering the incidence of

gender violence in the household in the Dominican Republic. Implementing such economic policy would likely be difficult at this time as the Dominican government pursues a neoliberal, market-oriented growth strategy, which thus far has led to economic growth accompanied by increasing income inequality. Many academic and grassroots feminists argue that Law 24-97, the law that makes domestic violence illegal, is not enforced by the current government and that women's right to safety in their homes is therefore violated.

The finding that the rival hypotheses, MBM and HBM, are both relevant to the Dominican Republic, each one offering a more congruent explanation for a differing type of violence—physical, sexual, and aggregate gender violence—or a differing socioeconomic class—asset poor or asset rich—suggests several avenues for further research on the factors, preferences, economic constraints, and cultural values that underlay gender violence and in turn affect women's well-being in the Dominican Republic. Economists have provided critiques of the assumption of exogenous preferences in people's decision-making and behavior (Bowles 1998, McCrate 1988). These critiques can be applied to the study of gender violence. The impact of both economic variables and gender norms on domestic violence in the Dominican Republic then poses the question, what is the role of endogenous preferences in this case? The following and last chapter of this dissertation further examines the relationship between the justifications for gender violence and women's and men's gendered beliefs and endogenous preferences.

CHAPTER 3
GENDERED BELIEFS, ENDOGENOUS PREFERENCES, AND GENDER
VIOLENCE

3.1 Introduction

On September 30, 2012, Jonathan Minaya Torres stabbed his wife, Miguelina Altagracia Martinez, fifty-two times in a beauty salon in Santiago, Dominican Republic in front of one of their children and other members of the community. Miguelina Martinez went to the district attorney's office eighteen times in the two weeks prior to her murder to report that because of her husband's violent threats she left had her home and feared for her life. He killed her because she no longer wanted to be with him; the knife he used to stab her was hidden in a bouquet of roses. As Jonathan Minaya left the beauty salon, news of his heinous crime spread through the neighborhood. A mob of men caught and proceeded to beat him. Local police saved Jonthan Minaya's life and escorted him to the nearest hospital for treatment of head trauma and broken bones. The irony of this situation—a local state institution saving the life of the violent former partner of Ms. Martinez, but failing to help her protect herself—provides insight into the gendered logic and norms that operate in the country.

Ms. Martinez's avoidable and tragic murder is but one example of the state of gender violence in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic has a Ministry of Gender Affairs, and the country is party to the Convention to End All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Law 24-97 criminalizes gender violence in

the household. Law 88-03, enacted in 2003, established shelters and halfway houses for women fleeing violent partners. The country has local mechanisms such as police stations (in some cases with all women officers) and district public prosecutors, all with the intention of helping women to protect themselves against violence. In addition to these official institutions, grassroots feminist organizations and various sectors of civil society are active in the struggle to bring awareness and an end to gender violence. Despite the public outcry against gender violence, despite the laws, and despite the institutions, gender violence remains a grave issue in the Dominican Republic. According to the General Attorney's office, 1383 women were killed between the years of 2005 and 2011, over fifty percent of them by their intimate partners (Amnesty International 2012).

The case of Ms. Martinez is not unusual. Women are turned away from local police stations. Local prosecutors and judges, who operate on the basis of gender norms and gender hierarchies rooted in the underlying cultural tropes of machismos and marianismo, dismiss domestic violence cases.²³ Moreover many officials privately fail to recognize the severity of gender violence in the Dominican Republic.²⁴ According to Roxanna Reyes, the Prosecutor for Women's Affairs and Deputy Attorney General in the Dominican Republic, because of this underlying gender bias among judges, although 62,000 women reported experiencing some sort of sexual or physical violence in 2011, only four percent of these cases went to trial.²⁵

²³ See chapter 2 of this dissertation for a discussion of machismo and marianismo

²⁴ <http://womennewsnetwork.net/2012/07/19/dominican-republic-domestic-violence/2/> accessed Mar 28, 2013

²⁵ <http://womennewsnetwork.net/2012/07/19/dominican-republic-domestic-violence/> accessed Mar 28, 2013

Studies (Rani et al. 2004, Uthman et al. 2009, Nayak et al. 2003) situated in developing countries find that there is a positive relationship between the incidence of gender violence and the phenomena of placing the blame for gender violence on women, not the perpetrators. In the DR, the high rate of reported femicide, the inability of laws and institutions to help women protect themselves against gender violence, and the prevailing gender norms that promote the myth of male superiority and normalized violence as a way to control and discipline women all raise the question, what are the gendered beliefs and endogenous preferences that contribute to these conditions and may even cause both men and women alike to blame the victim?

The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) administers a standard set of questions to both male and female respondents regarding the status of women. In this chapter, I assess views on gender violence in the household, by analyzing respondents' answers to the questions of whether intimate partner violence is "justified" in any of following situations:²⁶

1. if she goes out without telling him
2. if she argues with him
3. if she burns the food
4. if she neglects the children
5. if she refuses to have sex with him

Questions 1, 2, and 5 specifically address respondents views on the control husband's may exercise over his partner, and questions 3 and 4 refer to a women's

²⁶ "Justification for wife beating " is the exact term used by the DHS administered in developing countries. In this study, I use the phrase *justification for intimate partner violence* in place of "justification for wife beating."

fulfillment of her gender-ascribed domestic responsibilities of cooking and taking care of children (Yount and Li 2009).

For the 3,200 women who participated in the gender violence module of the DR DHS 2007, I find discrepancies between women’s and men’s views on whether gender violence can be justified in the household and the actual incidence of reported intimate partner violence among married and cohabitating couples. As can be seen in TABLE 3.2 (and using TABLE 3.1 as a key), over 90 % of women who reported experiencing emotional, physical, and sexual violence had husbands who did not agree with any of the five motives for gender violence that featured in the survey. Similarly among the women themselves (over 90%) did not agree with any of the motives for gender violence.

Table 3.1: Key for Dependent Variables and Tables 3.2 and 3.3

Variable	Definition
WGV = 0	Female respondent does not agree with any of the five justifications intimate partner violence
WGV = 1	Female respondent agrees with at least one of the five justifications intimate partner violence
MGV = 0	Male respondent does not agree with any of the five justifications intimate partner violence
MGV = 1	Male respondent agrees with at least one of the five justifications intimate partner violence

Table 3.2: The Incidence of Gender Violence and Individual Responses to Justifications for Intimate Partner Violence

	(MGV=0)	(MGV=1)		(WGV=0)	(WGV=1)
Women experiencing the following forms of gender violence					
<i>Emotional Violence</i> (N=810)	92.5 (749)	7.5 (61)		92.6 (750)	7.4 (60)
<i>Less Severe Physical Violence</i> (N=478)	90.6 (433)	9.4 (45)		90.4 (432)	9.6 (46)

<i>More Severe Physical Violence (N=160)</i>	91.3 (146)	8.8 (14)		91.9 (147)	8.1 (13)
<i>Sexual Violence (N=143)</i>	92.3 (132)	7.7 (11)		92.3 (132)	7.7 (11)

Table 3.3: The Incidence of Gender Violence and Responses to Justifications of Intimate Partner Violence at the Household Level

	Emotional Violence	Less Severe Physical Violence	More Severe Physical Violence	Sexual Violence
	N=810	N=478	N=160	N=143
WGV=0 MGV=0	86.2 (698)	82.0 (392)	84.4 (135)	85.3 (122)
WGV=0 MGV=1	6.4 (52)	8.4 (40)	7.5 (12)	7.0 (10)
WGV=1 MGV=0	6.3 (51)	8.6 (41)	6.9 (11)	7.0 (10)
WGV=1 MGV=1	1.1 (9)	1.1 (11)	1.3 (2)	0.7 (1)

These responses suggest that men and women both understand that gender violence is not acceptable but men still use gender violence against women in the household. In more than 80% of the households experiencing gender violence both partners indicate that they found gender violence unacceptable (see TABLE 3.3). These data seem to suggest that women’s rights, human rights, religious and political campaigns in the Dominican Republic have convinced most people that gender violence is not justifiable in principle, but that in practice male partners still commit acts of gender violence in the household based on the gender norms including the myth of the male breadwinner, gender hierarchy, and hyper masculinity. It is also possible that other

factors may be motivating gender violence in the Dominican Republic, and hence that surveys may need to provide more context-specific questions to elicit better information.

The principal aims of this chapter are to 1) assess the correlates among men and women's justifications for gender violence and socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, and 2) provide an analysis of partnered men's and women's underlying gendered attitudes, gendered beliefs, and behaviors that are associated with the justification of gender violence using the DHS 2007 Couples Recode survey. To my knowledge no prior work has explored men's and women's gendered beliefs and endogenous preferences regarding the justification of intimate partner violence in married couples in the DR.

3.2 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

Endogenous preferences, according to Bowles (1998, p. 78), “are reasons for behavior, that is, attributes of individuals that (along with their beliefs and capacities) account for the actions they take in a given situation.” Central to the concept of endogenous preferences is that laws, norms, and social/market institutions influence and shaped human behavior and beliefs. Of utmost importance to this study is the institution of marriage. Although marriage is a legal contractual agreement, sanctioned and governed by the church and state (and in some instances both), the noncontractual aspects (the day-to-day interactions of spouses) of marriage are governed by prevailing gender norms and power relations among men and women in society. Bowles defines norms as conventions that people adhere to, that are in their own interest as long as others are doing the same. Norms are influenced by institutional structure—the “population level

laws, informal rules, and conventions that give durable structure to social interaction” so men’s behavior, including gender violence, is context-dependent and reflects preferences (Bowles 1998).

McCrate (1988) argues that both men and women invest heavily in their gender identities, because there are significant gains to behaving in the manner that is assigned to one’s biological sex, and losses are incurred when one deviates from ascribed gender roles. I argue here that men’s preference is to maintain a gender hierarchy that places men at the top and subordinates women, because this is the structure that benefits them and is seemingly in their best interest. Their actions and beliefs are geared toward maintaining and reproducing this hierarchy (Bowles 1998, McCrate 1988). Women, however, may also accept and reproduce gender norms because there are significant costs to challenging the norm of male superiority and transgressing gender identity lines. Indeed, some studies find that more women justify intimate partner violence than men (Rani et al. 2004, Uthman et al. 2009). The myriad actions and beliefs of men and women contribute to the glaring gender inequalities that constitute Dominican society.

I use the following variables to assess men’s endogenous preferences: men’s household decision-making ability index, an index of men’s reactions to partner’s refusal of sex, men’s belief that married women should be allowed to work outside of the household, and attributes such as education, marital status, occupational status, and age. Similarly, I use the following variables to assess women’s endogenous preferences and justifications for intimate partner violence: women’s household decision-making ability index, women’s views on gender equality, women’s ability to refuse sex, women’s age, women’s educational attainment, and occupational status.

Gender norms in a society provide the social context for understanding the incidence of gender violence, power relations between men and woman, and the underlying beliefs that govern these relationships (Krug et al. 2002). Women's and men's responses to justifications for intimate partner violence may highlight the myriad ways that both men and women internalize gender bias, and the normalization of gender violence against women placing some women in a precarious situation in her home, in the community, and in the workplace.²⁷

For example, Heise et al. (1999) find that in Latin America, anywhere from 8% to 32% of women and men report that intimate partner violence is justified if the husband thinks his wife is being unfaithful. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a study of attitudes towards intimate partner violence among male and female nurses found that most respondents believed the incidence gender violence was a normal occurrence among married couples (Kim and Motsei 2002). Data thus suggest that in developing countries there is a normalization of intimate partner violence. Studies that aim to provide an analysis of women's and men's attitudes towards gender violence do so with the intent of finding the salient variables associated with the justifications for intimate partner violence (Hindin 2003, Lawoko 2006, Lawoko 2008, Yount 2005, Yount and Li 2009, Yount and Carrera 2006, Uthman et al. 2009, Fawole et al. 2005, Khawaja et al. 2008, Rani et al. 2004, Oyediran and Isugo-Abanihe 2005). Structural factors, such as place of residence, wealth,

²⁷As stated in the introduction the DHS administers a standard set of questions to both male and female respondents regarding the status of women. To assess the "justifications for wife beating", interviewers asked respondents if wife beating is justified in any of following situations: 1) if she goes out without telling him 2) if she argues with him 3) if she burns the food 4) if she neglects the children 5) if she refuses to have sex with him.

GDP per capita and gender equality have been found to affect women's and men's attitudes towards intimate partner violence. Several studies (Hindin 2003, Oyediran and Isugo-Abanihe 2005, García-Moreno et al. 2005, Yount 2005, Yount and Li 2009) find that poor, rural women are more likely to agree with justifications for intimate partner violence than richer women living in urban areas. In her study of women's attitudes towards intimate partner violence in Zimbabwe, Hindin (2003) finds that women living in rural areas have a higher odds ratio of agreeing with any five justifications for intimate partner violence than women living in urban areas, and that there is a negative relationship (an odds ratio less than 1) between household wealth and women agreeing with any of the justifications for intimate partner violence. In their study of 17 Sub-Saharan countries, Uthman et al. (2009) also find that increased wealth and urbanization are associated with lower odds ratios for justifying gender violence among both men and women.

These empirical findings lend support to Kabeer's (1999, p.149) argument that poor women, because of their socioeconomic context, tend to be more exposed to violence, as well as less likely to escape from a potentially violent partner because of lack of sufficient resources (see also chapter 2). Uthman et. al (2010) find that higher levels of GDP per capita and greater equality among men and women (measured by the Gender Development Index) are associated with smaller gender gaps in finding gender violence against wives acceptable.

Studies have also found that demographic variables—age, education, occupational status, and media exposure—are also salient to understanding women's and men's attitudes towards justifying intimate partner violence (Rani et al. 2004, Fawole et al.

2005, Khawaja et al. 2008). For example in a study of pooled DHS data from seven African countries—Benin, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe—older women and men are less likely to think that intimate partner violence is acceptable (Rani et al. 2004). In this same study, authors found that having secondary or higher education and higher levels of wealth for women were the most significant and consistent predictors of non-acceptance of intimate partner violence among the seven African countries (Rani et al. 2004). Among women and men in a Palestinian refugee camp, younger unemployed men were more likely to agree with justifications for intimate partner violence, whereas among women only a previous experience with gender violence is positively associated with agreeing to justifications for intimate partner violence (Khawaja et al. 2008).

In Zimbabwe, women who worked in professional, clerical, or sales capacity had lower odds ratios of justifying intimate partner violence than women in manual, domestic, or agriculture employment. In a study of attitudes towards intimate partner violence among civil servants in Ibadan, Nigeria, younger people tended to accept more justifications for intimate partner violence than older respondents: 71.4 % of respondents under the age of 36 agreed that a husband was justified in beating his wife if she “does not do what she is told”, while only 28.6 % of respondents older than 36 responded the same way; in addition, both female and male respondents with more education among civil servants in Nigeria had a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence (Fawole et al. 2005). In a study of domestic violence in Egypt, Yount and Li (2009) find that women who marry at older ages have a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner

violence than women who marry young, possibly because women who get married at older ages tend to have more education and choose their spouse.

In addition to the role of structural and demographic factors women's and men's justifications for intimate partner violence, gendered norms, gendered beliefs, and gendered practices impact people's views on domestic violence (García-Moreno 2002). For example, Pallito and O'Campo (2004) find that living in municipalities with high rates of patriarchal control increased women's odds on an unintended pregnancy by over three times, compared to women who lived in places with low rates of patriarchal control; similarly, they found that in municipalities with high rates of intimate partner violence women had a higher odds ratio of unintended pregnancy.

In the Dominican Republic, as is documented in chapter 2, women who earn more money than their spouses have a higher odds ratio of experiencing sexual violence than women who earn the same amount or less than their husbands. Studies elsewhere have found that women are at an increase risk of violence when husbands are unemployed and wives are employed (Roldan 1988, Hindin and Adair 2002). These findings provide empirical support for Jewkes's (2002) argument that women are at increased risk of gender violence if they are relatively empowered vis-à-vis men in a society that places men at the top of gender hierarchy and/or if men have conservative beliefs about women and women's role in society. In addition to income and employment status, relative decision-making ability in the household also impacts people's views on gender violence. In the Philippines, for example, in households that reported joint decision making between partners, women reported lower levels of gender violence, whereas in

households where either spouse (female or male) reported making more decisions, women were at an increased risk of gender violence (Hindin and Adair 2002).

In Zimbabwe, women were more likely to justify intimate partner violence if male partners made more decisions in the household than did the female respondent (Hindin 2003). However, the same study also finds that women who report more decision-making power in the household believed intimate partner violence to be justified if the wife argues with the husband, refuses to have sex, and/or neglects the children. In addition to relative power in the household, studies show find that women who report low levels of individual autonomy are more likely to agree with justifications for intimate partner violence (Lawoko 2006, González-Brenes 2004). In a study of men's attitudes towards intimate partner violence in Zambia and Kenya, Lawoko (2008) finds that men who believed that decisions in the household should be made equally by women and men also have a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than men who believed husbands alone should have the final say in household decision making. In addition to gendered beliefs and practices, it is important to look at both women's and men's support for gender equality to understand the incidence and acceptance of gender violence in the household. In a study of currently partnered Palestinian couples living in refugee camps, male partners who were unsupportive of women's autonomy had 3.54 higher odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than male partners who reported being supportive of women's rights (Khawaja et al. 2008).

Understanding the relationship between intimate partner violence and structural factors, demographic variables, and gender values, beliefs, and practices may provide insight to social context that produces and reproduces violence against women. It is

especially important to understand these complex relationships, as findings show that in many developing countries women tended to agree with justifications for intimate partner violence in higher percentages than men (Rani et al. 2004, Uthman et al. 2009).²⁸ In a cross-national study of the United States, India, Japan and Kuwait, Nayak et al. (2003) found that participants in the non-US sample were more likely to blame the female partner for incidences of gender violence, although in all samples male partners were likely to blame the female partner for gender violence. Studies find that women who are more accepting of gender violence are at a higher risk of being abused by their partners (Lawoko 2006, Lawoko 2008, Faramarzi et al. 2005).

3.3 Data

3.3.1 Description of the Data Set

This study seeks to understand the determinants of women's and men's acceptance of gender violence against women in the Dominican Republic, to provide policy prescriptions that will promote women's wellbeing, and challenge the gender bias and discrimination that reinforce violence against women. The data used in this study come from the Demographic and Health Survey administered in the Dominican Republic in 2007 (DR DHS 2007). The DHS—funded by USAID, Macro International, and host country governments—is administered in countries in the developing world and focuses

²⁸ Studies (Smith 1980, Bryant and Spencer 2003, Locke and Richman 1999, Saunders et al. 1987) find that men tend to blame the female victim more often than women. Perez et al. (2006) find the same result—men blaming the abused women more than women—in Spain.

on collecting qualitative and quantitative data in the areas of population, health, fertility, nutrition, and AIDS/HIV. In addition to standard social and demographic data, the DHS has begun in recent years to collect data on the incidence of gender violence and on women’s and men’s attitudes towards gender violence and gender equity. The DHS collects data primarily from women respondents, but it also includes interviews of a subsample of women respondents’ male partners. Data from the subsample of women respondents and their partners—the Couple’s Recode—provides information on the couple’s asset wealth status, occupations, education, household characteristics, as well as both the husbands’ and wives’ views on gender violence, gender equity, and gender hierarchy.

Table 3.4: Women’s and Men’s Characteristics from the 2007 DR DHS
Percentages provided (with frequency in parenthesis).

	Women (N=7780)	Men (N=7780)
Characteristics		
Age		
Mean Age in years	33.2 (std. dev. 8.5)	38.6 (std. dev. 9.5)
Age Group 1: 15-24	18.4 (1,432)	6.6 (511)
Age Group 2: 25-34	37.1 (2,878)	29.6 (2,298)
Age Group 3: 35-44	33.2 (2577)	34.8 (2,699)
Age Group 4: 45-59	11.3 (879)	24.5 (1,904)
Age Group 5: 55-59 (men only)		4.6 (354)
Education		
Mean years of Education	7.8 (std dev. 4.60)	7.2 (std. dev. 4.57)
No Education	6.1 (474)	6.4 (500)
Primary Education	49.5 (3,841)	54.7 (4,295)

Secondary Education	29.7 (2,309)	27.5 (2,136)
Higher Education	14.7 (1,142)	11.4 (882)
Labor Market Sector		
Not working	51.6 (4003)	0.4 (27)
Professional	10.2 (788)	12.9 (1008)
Self-employed Agricultural	2.0 (156)	26.0 (2,015)
Manual Labor (skilled & unskilled)	10.0 (788)	44.2 (3,436)
Clerical	4.8 (374)	2.6 (198)
Sales & Services	14.0 (1088)	13.8 (1,074)
Domestic	7.4 (573)	.1 (8)

Table 3.5: Married or Cohabiting Couple's Characteristics from the 2007 DR DHS
Percentages provided (with frequency in parenthesis)

	Couples (N=7870)
Wealth Class	
Poor	53.5 (4,154)
Middle	19.9 (1,542)
Rich	26.7 (2,070)
Residence Type	
Rural	46.1 (3,584)
Urban	53.9 (4,196)
Head of Household	
Women	14.5 (1,127)
Men	85.5 (6,639)
Percentage of Couples with Children Living at Home	
Daughters at home	66.2 (5,141)

Sons at home	70.8 (5,500)	
Marital Status	Women	Men
Consensual union	76.5 (5,938)	76.7 (5,960)
Married	23.5 (1,828)	23.3 (1,806)
Marital Duration	Women	Men
9 years or less	29.9 (2,325)	32.9 (2,557)
10 – 19 years	39.4 (3,063)	36.0 (2,796)
20 – 29 years	25.6 (1,990)	24.1 (1,872)
30 years or more	5.0 (388)	7.0 (541)
Percentage of Those Accessing Media Once a Week or More	Women	Men
Newspaper	39.3 (3,054)	41.6 (3,232)
Radio	75.3 (5,846)	85.2 (6,616)
TV	85.4 (6,630)	87.5 (6,796)

The sample used in this study comprises 7,766 couples (that is to say 7,766 women and 7,766 men). On average, the men tend to be older than their wives; the mean age for women is 33.2 and for men it's 38.7. Representative of trends in educational attainment in the Dominican Republic, where women are surpassing men in years of education, we see that the mean years of education for women is 7.8 for women and 7.2 for men. In this sample, almost 52 percent of Dominican women reported that they were currently unemployed, whereas only 0.2 percent of men were reported as unemployed (as reported by their female partners). The largest sector of employment for women in this subsample is service & sales, followed by manual labor and the professional/management/technical sector (both a little over ten percent). Roughly seven

percent of women are in the domestic service category. Women in clerical positions are 4.8 percent of the sample, and self-employed agricultural workers are a little over two percent of the sample. Over 44 percent of men in this sample are employed as manual laborers; followed by 26 percent of men who are self-employed agricultural workers. Over thirteen percent of men in the sample work in the sales and services sector and another thirteen percent are in the professional sector.

Almost 54 percent of the couples live in urban areas; while a little over 46 percent live in rural areas. In this survey 85.5 percent of men are reported as heads of households, whereas 14.5 percent of women are reported as heads of households. The DHS does not collect data on income or expenditures, but it does collect data on assets, appliances, and housing material/quality, and these are used to create a wealth index using principal components analysis, on the basis of which it classifies households into wealth quintiles: poorest, poorer, middle, richer, and richest. For the purposes of this study, poorest and poor are combined to create the asset-poor category; richer and richest are combined to create the asset-rich category. The middle asset category, remains the same, and is 20.0 percent of the sample. Sixty-six percent of households have daughters living at home, and just over 70 percent have sons in the household. In terms of marital duration, between 29 percent of women and 32 percent of men have been married nine years or less, 35 percent of the couples have been married between ten and nineteen years, and roughly 27 percent have been married 20 to 29 years. Both male and female respondents in this subsample are exposed to media news and coverage, with the vast majority of women and men watching television once or more times a week.

The descriptive data on household-decision making, gender equity, gender hierarchy, and justifications for intimate partner violence provide insights into Dominican gender norms. The DHS collects data on household-decision making ability and behavior among both men and women, by asking who (husband, wife, or the couple jointly) has the “final say” in certain household decisions. In some cases, the answers given by a couple are different. For instance, on deciding how many children to have, nineteen percent of women responded that they decide alone, but only ten percent of husbands responded that their wives decide alone. In three of the “final say” questions—large household purchases, deciding what to do with partner’s earnings, and number of children to have—women tended to respond that decisions were made as joint decisions in more egalitarian fashion, whereas husbands tended to respond themselves making more decisions than women reported.

Table 3.6: Summary of Women’s and Men’s Responses to Justifications for Intimate Partner Violence

Percentage of respondents that agree with the statement (with frequency in percentages).

	All Women (N=7766)	All Men (N=7766)
Wife beating is justified if:		
Wife goes out without telling him	1.6 (126)	2.9 (224)
Wife neglects the children	4.2 (328)	3.4 (266)
Wife argues with husband	0.9 (67)	1.4 (108)
Wife refuses to have sex with husband	0.7 (52)	.9 (68)
Wife burns the food	1.3 (101)	1.2 (93)
Women agreeing to at least one justification for intimate partner violence	5.4 (422)	n/a
Men agreeing to at least one justification for intimate partner violence	n/a	5.3 (412)

Table 3.7: Summary of Women’s Justification of Intimate Partner Violence by Wealth-Asset Class

Percentage of respondents that agree with the statement (with frequency in percentages)

	Asset Poor (N=4154)	Middle (N=1542)	Asset Rich (N=2070)
Wife beating is justified if:			
Wife goes out without telling him	2.6 (106)	0.8 (12)	0.4 (8)
Wife neglects the children	5.5 (230)	3.6 (56)	2.0 (42)
Wife argues with husband	1.4 (58)	0.3 (5)	0.2 (4)
Wife refuses to have sex with husband	1.0 (42)	0.4 (6)	0.2 (4)
Wife burns the food	1.8 (75)	1.0 (15)	0.5 (11)
WGV	7.2 (301)	4.5 (70)	2.5 (51)

Table 3.8: Summary of Men’s Justification of Intimate Partner Violence by Wealth-Asset Class

Percentage of respondents that agree with the statement (with frequency in percentages)

	Asset Poor (N=4154)	Middle (N=1542)	Asset Rich N=2070
Wife beating is justified if:			
Wife goes out without telling him	3.9 (160)	2.4 (37)	1.3 (27)
Wife neglects the children	4.7 (195)	2.9 (45)	1.3 (26)
Wife argues with husband	2.1 (85)	0.8 (13)	0.5 (10)
Wife refuses to have sex with husband	1.3 (52)	0.6 (9)	0.3 (6)
Wife burns the food	1.7 (71)	0.7 (11)	0.5 (11)
Men agreeing with at least one justification	7.2 (301)	4.2 (65)	2.2 (46)

The survey presents the five quotidian scenarios cited above to both the husband and wife and asks them to agree or disagree that intimate partner violence is justified. The

justification for intimate partner violence to which the most women (4.2 percent) and men (3.4 percent) agreed is that intimate partner violence is justified if the wife neglects the children. It is interesting to note that a somewhat larger percentage of women agreed with the statement than men, which speaks to the ways that women internalize responsibility for child care. Similarly, 1.3 percent of women and 1.2 percent of men agreed to the justification for gender violence when the wife burns the food. Overall, 5.4 percent of women agreed with at least one of the five scenarios presented for intimate partner violence, whereas 5.3 percent of men agreed with at least one statement. In addition we see from TABLES 3.7 and 3.8 that those in the asset-poor category agreed with all five statements in larger percentages than those in the middle and rich-asset categories.

Table 3.9: Summary of Men’s Attitudes towards Violent Reactions to Partner’s refusal of Sex

Percentage of respondents that agree with the statement (with frequency in percentages)

	Asset Poor	Asset Middle	Asset Rich	All Men
	(N=4154)	(N=1542)	(N=2070)	(N=7766)
A husband has the right to do the following if his wife refuses to have sex with him:				
Get angry <i>(percentage answering yes)</i>	22.7 (941)	22.1 (340)	18.6 (384)	21.4 (1,665)
Refuse financial support <i>(percentage answering yes)</i>	4.7 (194)	2.7 (42)	1.9 (39)	3.5 (275)
Use Force <i>(percentage answering yes)</i>	.9 (38)	0.3 (5)	0.5 (11)	0.7 (54)

Table 3.9 provides men’s responses to three different potential reactions to wives’ refusal of sex: get angry, refuse financial support, or use force to obtain sex. Over 21 percent of men answer that husbands have a right to get angry when their wives refuse

sex; 3.5 percent say husbands have a right to withhold financial support when a wife refuses sex, and less than one percent agreed that husbands have a right to use force.

Table 3.10: Summary of Women’s Responses to Gendered Statements
Percentage of respondents that agree with the statement (with frequency in percentages)

	Asset Poor (N=4154)	Asset Middle (N=1542)	Asset Rich (N=2070)	Aggregate Women’s Reponses (N=7766)
Family decisions should be made by men	39.7 (1,651)	29.2 (450)	19.2 (398)	32.2 (2,499)
Husband should not help with chores	4.0 (164)	2.9 (44)	1.8 (37)	3.2 (245)
Married women should not be allowed to work	25.2 (1,048)	23.2 (357)	22.9 (473)	24.2 (1,878)
The wife does not have the right to express her opinion	7.8 (324)	4.0 (61)	2.8 (58)	5.7 (443)
A wife should tolerate beatings to keep the family together	2.8 (116)	0.9 (14)	1.4 (29)	2.1 (159)
It is better to educate a son than a daughter	12.9 (534)	11.7 (181)	8.2 (170)	11.4 (885)

Women in the survey are presented with five statements that support gender inequality and asked to agree or disagree. Over 32 percent of women agree that men should make family decisions. Close to four percent agree that husbands should not help with chores. Twenty-four percent agree that married women should not work. Close to six percent agree that the wife does not have the right to express her opinion. Roughly eleven percent agree that it is better to educate a son than a daughter. However, only two percent agreed that a wife should tolerate beatings to keep the family together; this is the statement that had the least approval by women. As is visible in the data, class

differences exist, with women in the asset-poor category agreeing in larger percentages than those in both middle and asset-rich categories, and the women in the rich-asset category agreeing the least with these statements.

Table 3.11: Women’s and Men’s Responses to Household Decision Making
Percentages provided (with frequency in parenthesis)

	Women (N=7766)	Men (N=7766)
Final say on the following situations:		
Large household purchases		
woman	11.4 (886)	8.5 (657)
man	24.9 (1,908)	30.8 (2,395)
joint decision	63.7 (4,945)	60.7 (4,714)
Visits to family & friends		
woman	28.4 (2,203)	7.2 (558)
man	12.6 (978)	30.9 (2,397)
joint decision	59.0 (4,585)	62.0 (4,811)
Deciding what to do with partner’s earnings		
woman	8.8 (685)	44.1 (3,425)
man	22.1 (1,716)	12.7 (987)
joint	67.9 (5,273)	43.2 (3,425)
Number of children		
woman	19.2 (1,497)	10.3 (797)
man	6.8 (528)	19.0 (1,477)
joint	74.0 (5,755)	70.7 (5,492)

Lastly, I turn to women’s and men’s responses on house decision-making ability.

The majority of couples report joint decision making for large household purchases, visits

to family and friends, how partner’s earning is spent, and number of children to have. In the case of large household purchases, 24.9 percent women and 30.8 percent men report that the male partner has the final say. Twenty-two percent of women report their partners have the final say over their earnings, and 30.9 percent of men say that they alone decide visits to family and friends.

3.3.2 Description of the Variables

Table 3.12: Variables Dictionary

WOMEN’S VARIABLES	TYPE	DEFINITION
DEPENDENT		
WGV	Binary	Equals 1 if women answer yes to at least one motive intimate partner violence; 0 otherwise
INDEPENDENT		
<i>EDUCATION</i>		
WNOEDUC	Binary	1 if a woman has no formal education; 0 otherwise
WPRIM	Binary	1 if the woman attended primary school; 0 otherwise
WSEC	Binary	1 if the woman attended high school; 0 otherwise
WHIGHER	Binary	1 if the woman attended college; 0 otherwise
WEDUYRS	Continuous	Years of education
<i>AGE</i>		
AGEW1	Binary	1 if woman is 15 to 24; 0 otherwise
AGEW2	Binary	1 if woman is 25-34; 0 otherwise
AGEW3	Binary	1 if woman is 35-44; 0 otherwise
AGEW4	Binary	1 if woman is 45-54; 0 otherwise
AGEW5	Binary	1 if woman is 55-59; 0 otherwise
AGEYRSW	Continuous	Age in years
<i>OCCUPATION</i>		
MPROF	Binary	1 if woman is in a professional, technical, or management position; 0 otherwise

WMANUAL	Binary	1 if woman is a manual worker; 0 otherwise
WAGRICUL	Binary	1 if woman is in agricultural; 0 otherwise
WSERVICES	Binary	1 if woman is in sales or services; 0 otherwise
WCLERICAL	Binary	1 if woman is in clerical position; 0 otherwise
WDOM	Binary	1 if woman is a domestic worker; 0 otherwise
WNOWORK	Binary	1 if woman is unemployed; 0 otherwise
<i>MARITAL</i> as reported by women		
WMARITALSTAT	Binary	1 if couple is legally married; 0 if it's a consensual union
WMARITAL1	Binary	1 if couple is married 9 yrs or less; 0 otherwise
WMARITAL2	Binary	1 if couple married 10-19 yrs; 0 otherwise
WMARITAL3	Binary	1 if couple married 20-29 yrs; 0 otherwise
WMARITAL4	Binary	1 if couple married 30 yrs or more; 0 otherwise
<i>MEDIA USAGE</i>		
WTV	Binary	1 if woman watches TV 1 or more times a week; 0 otherwise
WRADIO	Binary	1 if woman listens to the radio 1 or more times a week; 0 otherwise
WNEWS	Binary	1 if woman reads a newspaper 1 or more times a week; 0 otherwise
<i>INDICES</i>		
WHHDM	Continuous	Index measuring woman's household decision making ability
GENDEREQ	Continuous	Index measuring woman's views on gender equity
MEN'S VARIABLES	TYPE	DEFINITION
DEPENDENT		
MGV	Binary	Equals 1 if men answer yes to at least one motive intimate partner violence; 0 otherwise
INDEPENDENT		
<i>EDUCATION</i>		
MNOEDUC	Binary	1 if a man has no formal education; 0 otherwise
MPRIM	Binary	1 if the man attended primary school; 0 otherwise
MSEC	Binary	1 if the man attended high school; 0 otherwise

MHIGHER	Binary	1 if the man attended college; 0 otherwise
MEDUYRS	Continuous	Years of education
<i>AGE</i>		
AGEM1	Binary	1 if man is 15 to 24; 0 otherwise
AGEM2	Binary	1 if man is 25-34; 0 otherwise
AGEM3	Binary	1 if man is 35-44; 0 otherwise
AGEM4	Binary	1 if man is 45-54; 0 otherwise
AGEM5	Binary	1 if man is 55-59; 0 otherwise
AGEYRSMEN	Continuous	Age in years
<i>OCCUPATION</i>		
MPROF	Binary	1 if man is in a professional, technical, or management position; 0 otherwise
MMANUAL	Binary	1 if man is a manual worker; 0 otherwise
MAGRICUL	Binary	1 if man is in agricultural; 0 otherwise
MSERVICES	Binary	1 if man is in sales or services; 0 otherwise
MCLERICAL	Binary	1 if man is in clerical position; 0 otherwise
MDOM	Binary	1 if man is a domestic worker; 0 otherwise
MNOWORK	Binary	1 if man is unemployed; 0 otherwise
<i>MARITAL as reported by men</i>		
MMARITALSTAT	Binary	1 if couple is legally married; 0 if it's a consensual union
MMARITAL1	Binary	1 if couple is married 9 yrs or less; 0 otherwise
MMARITAL2	Binary	1 if couple married 10-19 yrs; 0 otherwise
MMARITAL3	Binary	1 if couple married 20-29 yrs; 0 otherwise
MMARITAL4	Binary	1 if couple married 30 yrs or more; 0 otherwise
<i>MEDIA USAGE</i>		
MTV	Binary	1 if man watches TV 1 or more times a week; 0 otherwise
MRADIO	Binary	1 if man listens to the radio 1 or more times a week; 0 otherwise
MNEWS	Binary	1 if man reads a newspaper 1 or more times a week; 0 otherwise
<i>INDICES</i>		
MHADM	Continuous	Index measuring man's household decision making ability

MREFSEX	Continuous	Index measuring man's violent responses to partners refusal of sex
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS	TYPE	DEFINITION
SOCIAL/DEMOGRAPHIC		
URBAN	Binary	1 if household in an urban area;0 otherwise
HEAD	Binary	1if the head of household is the male partner; 0 otherwise
SONS	Binary	1 if there is at least one son in the home; 0 otherwise
DAUGHTERS	Binary	1 if there is at least one daughter in the home; 0 otherwise
<i>WEALTH CATERGORIES</i>		
POOR	Binary	1 if the household is in the poor or poorest wealth asset category; 0 otherwise
MIDDLE	Binary	1 if the household is in the middle asset category; 0 otherwise
RICH	Binary	1 if the household is in the rich or richest asset category; 0 otherwise
WEALTH	Continuous	Asset wealth index

3.3.2.1 Men's variables

The dependent variable in men's specification, *MGV*, is binary variable that takes the value one if men answer yes to at least one motive for intimate partner violence; zero otherwise. The independent variables measure the characteristics, attitudes, and behavior of men. The education variables in the male specification are a series of dummies that measure the highest level of educational attainment: *MNOEDU* takes the value one if a man has no formal education; zero otherwise. *MPRIM* takes the value one if the man attended primary school, zero otherwise. The value of *MSEC* is one if the man attended high school, zero otherwise. Lastly, *MHIGHER* takes the value one if the man attended an institution of higher learning; zero otherwise. Similarly, the age variables are also a

series of dummies: *AGEM1* takes the value 1 if men are between the ages of fifteen to twenty-four; zero otherwise. *AGEM2*, consists of men 25 to 34 and takes a value of 1 for this age group; zero otherwise. *AGEM3* takes the value one if men are between the ages of 35 to 44; zero otherwise. *AGEM4* takes the value one for men between the ages of 45 and 54; zero otherwise. The final age dummy is *AGEM5*, which takes the value of 1 for men 55 to 59 years old.

To control for occupational level (which is reported by the husband's partners in this survey) there are seven occupation dummies: *MPROF* takes the value one if the man in the professional, technical, or management position (zero otherwise); *MMANUAL* takes the value one if a man is employed as a skilled or unskilled manual worker (zero otherwise); *MAGRICUL* is coded as one if the man is a self-employed agricultural worker (zero otherwise); *MSERVICES* takes the value one if men work in the sales or service sector (zero otherwise); *MCLERICAL* is coded as one if the man works in a clerical position (zero otherwise). *MDOM* takes the value one if men work in a domestic capacity (zero otherwise). Finally *MNOWORK* is coded 1 for men who are not employed; zero otherwise.

MMARITALSTAT is coded as one if the couple is married and zero if they are in a consensual union. To control for marital duration there are four dummies: *MMARITAL1* is coded as 1 when husbands reported being married for nine years or less (zero otherwise); *MMARITAL2* takes the value one if the husband reports that he has been married for ten to nineteen years (zero otherwise); *MMARITAL3* is coded as one if men reported being married 20 to 29 years (zero otherwise); *MMARITAL4* takes the value one if husbands report that they have been married to their partner for 30 years or more.

Since the implementation of Law 24-97, which makes domestic violence illegal, the media has been widely used to bring awareness to domestic violence as a problem, in an effort to dissuade men from using gender violence against their partners. However, despite these campaigns, there is a considerable amount of media that promotes gender hierarchy and reinforces the idea that women are supplemental income earners. Hence, I control for the role of the media by the use of three dummies: *MTV* takes the value one if a man watches television once or more times a week on average, zero if he watches less than once or never at all; *MRADIO* is coded as 1 if he listens to the radio at least once or more times a week, zero if he listens less than once or never; *MNEWS* takes the value one if the man reads a newspaper or magazine once or more times in the week, zero if he reads less than once or never at all.

Two variables in the men's specification were created using principal component analysis (PCA). The first index, *MHHDM*, is an index composed of responses to the following questions: (1) who has the final say on large household purchases? (2) who has the final say on visits to family members, friends, or relatives? (3) who has the final say on what to do with your wife's earned income? (4) who has the final say on having another child? If the man responded that he had the final say the response was coded 3; if he responded him and his wife equally then the response was coded 2; if he responded the wife alone then the response was coded 1. So the higher the index, the more household decision-making ability the husband has, and the lower the index the more decision-making ability the wife has. The second variable created using PCA is *MREFSEX*, based on the following questions: (1) if your wife refuses to have sex with you, you have the right to get angry? (2) if your wife refuses to have sex with you, you have the right to

refuse financial support? (3) if your wife refuses sex with you, you have the right to use force to have sex with her? Each male response yes was coded as a one, and no was coded as zero. Hence, the higher the index, the more likely a husband would react violently when his wife refused sex.

3.3.2.2 Social/Demographic Variables

The social/demographic variables are the same in both the men's specification and the women's specification, since these refer to the couples' sharing a household. The *URBAN* variable controls for type of place of residence, and takes the value one if the couple lives in an urban area; zero otherwise. *HEAD* takes the value one if the husband is the head of household; zero otherwise. *POOR*—created by combining the bottom two wealth quintiles poorest and poorer—takes the value one if respondent is in the poorest or poorer quintiles. *MIDDLE* takes the value one if the respondents are in the middle wealth quintile; zero otherwise. *RICH*, takes the value one if the respondents are in the two top wealth quintiles—richer and richest—zero otherwise. In the disaggregated samples—where I analyze asset-poor and asset-rich households separately—I include the wealth index, *WEALTH*, to examine the relationship between relative wealth and justifications for intimate partner violence. To account for the presence of children in the household there are two dummy variables: *SONS*, which takes the value 1 if there is at least one son in the house (zero otherwise), and *DAUGHTERS*, which is coded as one if there is at least one daughter in the household (zero otherwise).

3.3.2.3 Women's variables

WGV is the binary dependent variable in the women's specification. It takes the value one if women respond yes to at least one motive for intimate partner violence, zero otherwise. Education again is measured using dummy variables: *WNOEDU* takes the value one if the woman has no formal education (zero otherwise); *WPRIM* is coded as one if the woman attended primary school (zero otherwise); *WSEC* is one if woman attended high school (zero otherwise); *WHIGHER* takes the value one if the woman attended an institution of higher education (zero otherwise). Because the DHS only surveys women between the ages of 15-54, there are only four age groups for women. *AGEW1* takes the value one if the woman is between the ages of fifteen to twenty-four (zero otherwise); *AGEW2* is coded as one if a woman is between the ages of 25 to 34 (zero otherwise); *AGEW3* takes the value one if a woman is between the ages of 35 and 44 (zero otherwise); lastly *AGEW4* is coded one if a woman is between the ages of 45 and 54 (zero otherwise). There are seven occupational dummies for women respondents: *WNOWORK* is one for women who reported currently not working (zero otherwise); *WPROF* is coded as one for women who are in professional, technical, or management positions, zero otherwise; women who are self-employed agricultural workers in the *WAGRICUL* category and coded one (zero otherwise); *WDOM* is coded one for women who are domestic workers, zero otherwise; *WMANUAL* is one for women who reported being unskilled or skilled manual workers, zero otherwise; lastly, *WCLERICAL* is one for women who are employed in the clerical field, zero otherwise. *WSERVICES* is coded 1 for women in the service and sales sector, zero otherwise.

Couples in this survey frequently reported having different marital status and/or different years of marital duration. Hence, the same variables were created for marital status and marital duration, but in this case based on the female respondent's answers: hence *WMARITALSTAT*, *WMARITAL1*, *WMARITAL2*, *WMARITAL3*, and *WMARITAL4* are defined based on the same criteria as men's responses. Similarly, *WNEWSPAPER*, *WRADIO*, *WTV* are dummy variables taking the value one if women access the specific form of media at least once or more a week, zero otherwise.

There are two variables in the women's specification created using PCA. The first index, *WHHDM*, measures women's household decision-making ability. It is based on the following questions: (1) who has the final say on large household purchases? (2) who has the final say on visits to family members, friends, or relatives? (3) who has the final say on what to do with your wife's earned income? (4) who has the final say on having another child? In this case woman could respond four ways: (a) that their husband made the decision alone, or someone else made the decision, which was coded as 3, (b) the decision was made jointly by the female respondent and her husband, which was coded as 2, or (c) the female respondent made the decision alone, coded as 1. So in this specification, the lower the index the more household decision-making ability the wife has. The second index created, *GENDEREQ*, measures women's belief in gender equity. The following statements, in which she responded agree or disagree, were used to create the *GENDEREQ* index: (1) family decisions should be made by the man, (2) men should not help with household chores, (3) married woman should not work, (4) a wife does not have the right to express her opinions, (5) a wife should tolerate beatings to keep her family together, and (6) it is better to educate a son than a daughter. The answer was

coded one when women agreed with the statement, zero if the women disagreed. Thus, the higher the index, the more supportive a women is of gender hierarchy based on male dominance; the lower the index, the more the woman supports equity between men and women.

I now turn to logistic regression analysis to ascertain the relationship between these characteristics, beliefs and behaviors and agreement with at least one justification for intimate partner violence in the Dominican Republic.

3.4 Methods

3.4.1 Logistic Regression Analysis using odds ratios

The logistic model takes the following form:

$$\Pr (y=1) = \exp (\alpha + \beta x_k + \delta d_k) / (1 + \exp (\alpha + \beta x_k + \delta d_k))$$

where $y = 1$ if the outcome occurs—in our case if the individual responds yes to at least one justification for intimate partner violence ; x_k is a vector of continuous variables; δ_k is a vector of dichotomous variables. For the logistic model, the probability of MGV or WGV (respectively the outcome variables in the men's and women's specifications) is the cumulative density function of the random error term ε evaluated at the given values of the independent variables: $\Pr (y=1|x) = F (x\beta)$.

I interpret the effect of the logistic model in terms of the changes in the odds. The log odds are a linear combination of the x_k 's and β_k s. The coefficients, or odds ratios in this case, indicate that for a unit change in x_k , a vector of independent variables, I expect the logit to change by β_k , holding all the other independent variables constant. I obtain

the odds ratio by taking the exponential of both sides of the equation, which measures the odds of observing a positive outcome ($y=1$) versus a negative outcome ($y=0$):

$$\Omega = \Pr(y=1)/\Pr(y=0) = \Pr(y=1)/1-\Pr(y=1).$$

3.4.2 Principal component analysis (PCA)

I use PCA to create the following indices: MGV and MREFSEX for the men's specification, WGV and GENDEREQ for the women's specification. PCA is a method for creating a single variable from a set of variables, one that circumvents the issue of arbitrarily assigning weights to create an index. Methodologically, PCA identifies patterns in data by re-expressing the set of variables (each a basis vector) as a linear combination of the data; this linear combination of the data is an extraction of the most meaningful data from the variables and the most important vector (Shlens 2003; Filmer and Pritchett 2001). Basically, PCA extracts the most important information from the set of variables by using orthogonal linear combinations of the data; the first principal component of the variables is the linear combination that contains the most information.

I estimate the following equations in this chapter:

$$\Pr(\text{MGV} = 1) = F(\text{MNOEDUC}\delta_1 + \text{MPRIM}\delta_2 + \text{MHIGER}\delta_3 + \text{AGEM1}\delta_4 + \text{AGEM3}\delta_5 + \text{AGEM4}\delta_6 + \text{MNOWORK}\delta_7 + \text{MPROF}\delta_8 + \text{MAGRICUL}\delta_9 + \text{MMANUAL}\delta_{10} + \text{POOR}\delta_{11} + \text{RICH}\delta_{12} + \text{URBAN}\delta_{13} + \text{HEAD}\delta_{14} + \text{SONS}\delta_{15} + \text{DAUGHTER}\delta_{16} + \text{MMARITALSTAT}\delta_{17} + \text{MMARITAL1}\delta_{18} + \text{MMARITAL3}\delta_{19} + \text{MMARITAL4}\delta_{20} + \text{MNEWS}\delta_{21} + \text{MRADIO}\delta_{22} + \text{MTV}\delta_{23} + \text{MHHDMB}\delta_{24} + \text{MREFSEX}\delta_{25})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr (WGV =1) =F (WNOEDUC\delta_1 + WSEC\delta_2 + WHIGER\delta_3 + AGEW1\delta_4 + \\ AGEW3\delta_5 + AGEW4\delta_6 + WNOWORK\delta_7 + WPROF\delta_8+ WAGRICUL\delta_9+ \\ WMANUAL\delta_{10} + WSERVICES\delta_{11} + WDOM\delta_{12} + POOR\delta_{13} + RICH\delta_{14} + URBAN\delta_{15} + \\ HEAD\delta_{16} + SONS\delta_{17} + DAUGHTER\delta_{18} + WMARITALSTAT\delta_{19} + WMARITAL1\delta_{20} + \\ WMARITAL3\delta_{21} + WMARITAL4\delta_{22} + WNEWS\delta_{23} + WRADIO\delta_{24} + WTV\delta_{25} + \\ WHHDM\beta_{26} + GENDEREQ \beta_{27}) \end{aligned}$$

3.5 Results²⁹

3.5.1 Women's Specification

Table 3.13: Odds Ratios for the Correlates of Women's Justification of Intimate Partner Violence

(robust standard errors reported; ***1%, **5% *10 % Level significance)

	All Women (N=7766)	Asset Poor- Women (N=4154)	Asset Rich- Women (N=2070)
Education (rc: primary education)			
No education	.99 (.26)	1.05 (.20)	1.10 (1.23)
Secondary education	.61** (.12)	.58** (.11)	0.83 (.30)
Higher education	1.33 (.58)	.50 (.23)	1.19 (.56)
Age (rc: Ages 25-34)			
Age group 1: 15-24	1.32 (.40)	1.27 (.27)	1.96 (1.01)

²⁹ For correlation matrices and correlation significance at the 5% level see appendix D. For discussion of correlations and model test statistics see appendix E.

Age group 3: 35-44	.87 (.20)	.95 (.21)	.71 (.31)
Age group 4: 45-54	.69 (.25)	.83 (.30)	.14** (.14)
Occupation (rc for women: clerical & agriculture for asset-rich women)			
Not working	2.24* (1.05)	1.15 (.55)	2.26 (1.71)
Professional, Management, Technical	1.57 (.96)	1.30 (.86)	1.21 (1.04)
Service & Sales	2.94 (1.40)	1.28 (.65)	3.08 (2.42)
Domestic	2.41* (1.23)	1.26 (.64)	1.90 (2.41)
Skilled and Unskilled Manual	2.91** (1.42)	1.73 (.87)	3.71 (3.10)
Self-employed Agriculture	3.87** (2.17)	1.66 (.90)	
Wealth Asset Class (rc: Asset Middle)			
Asset Poor	1.34 (.27)		
Asset Rich	.93 (.25)		
Wealth Index		.78* (.11)	1.01 (.32)
	All Women (N=7870)	Asset-Poor Women (N=4154)	Asset-Rich Women (N=2070)
Social/Demographic			
Urban	1.05 (.16)	1.00 (.14)	.82 (.28)
Head of household	.94 (.18)	.98 (.17)	.89 (.32)
Marital status (married=1, consensual union=0)	.42*** (.11)	.70 (.17)	.68 (.23)
Marital duration (rc: Marital duration 10-19 years)			

Marital duration 1:0-9 years	.94 (.28)	1.17 (.25)	.71 (.33)
Marital duration 3: 20-29 years	1.09 (.26)	.95 (.22)	1.40 (.64)
Marital Duration 4: 30 years and above	.93 (.38)	1.29 (.51)	2.20 (2.90)
Sons living at home	.80 (.12)	.73** (.10)	.89 (.30)
Daughters living at home	1.01 (.15)	.80* (.09)	1.23 (.41)
Newspaper	.68** (.12)	1.01 (.16)	.57* (.18)
Radio	.83 (.15)	1.05 (.14)	.86 (.33)
Television	.88 (.17)	.90 (.13)	1.68 (1.74)
Household Decision Making and Gender Attitudes			
Household Decision Making Index (men=3, couple=2, wife=1)	1.15** (.07)	1.16*** (.06)	.88 (.11)
Questions for Women			
Women's opinions on Gender Issues Index (1=agree with gender bias in favor of men, 0= disagree)	1.38*** (.06)	1.35*** (.05)	1.30** (.15)
McFadden's R2	0.0872	0.063	0.0710

Tables 3.13 and 3.14 report odds ratios for women and men, respectively. There are fewer statistically significant variables in the women's specifications than in the men's specifications. First I turn to the analysis of statistically significant variables in the women's specification. For the education dummies, WSEC is associated with a 0.61 lower odds ratio than the reference category WPRIM ($p < 0.05$) for the pooled women's specification. Similarly, women in the asset-poor category with a secondary education have a lower odds ratio of agreeing to at least one motive of gender than women in the

asset-poor category with only a primary education ($p < 0.05$). This finding supports the argument that for women in general, and asset-poor women in particular, education is a means to challenging gender violence and internalizing gendered norms that condone violence (Rani et al. 2004). Several of the occupation categories are statistically significant and positively related to the justification of intimate partner violence for women. Women who are self-employed agricultural workers ($p < 0.05$), domestic workers ($p < 0.10$), manual workers ($p < 0.05$), and women who are not working outside of the home ($p < 0.05$) have a higher odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than the reference category, which is women in the clerical field. None of the occupational dummies are statistically significant in the disaggregated specifications, however.

In the asset-rich sample, women who were between the ages of 45 to 54 had a lower odds ratio of agreeing to the justifications for intimate partner violence than women between the ages of 25 and 34, consistent with findings that older women and men are less likely to agree with justifications for intimate partner violence (Rani et al. 2004, Fawole et al. 2005, Yount and Li 2009, Khawaja et al. 2008).

In their study of seventeen sub-Saharan countries, Uthman et al (2009) find that increased wealth is associated with a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence. I find that only in the asset-poor specification do relatively less asset-poor women have lower odds ratio for the justification for intimate partner violence than women who are more asset-poor ($p < 0.10$); as with the asset-poor men's specification, discussed below, I see that relative deprivation amongst the respondents in the asset-poor category may be an important factor for understanding the relationship between poverty and the justification of intimate partner violence.

Marital status—significant only for asset-poor women—is associated with a .42 lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence in the pooled sample, which suggests that women who are married by the church, the state, or both, have a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence as opposed to women cohabitating or in consensual unions ($p < .01$). In the specification consisting of asset-poor women only, both sons ($p < 0.05$) and daughters ($p < 0.10$) living at home are associated with a lower odds ratio of asset-poor women agreeing to at least one justification for gender violence, compared to those that do not have children living at home (see also Oldenburg 1992, Mahalingam et al. 2007, Bunch 1997, Khosla et al 2005, Caprioli et al. 2009, Engle Merry 2009, Bhat 1998).

In the pooled specification, women who read the newspaper once or more a week on average have a 0.68 lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than women who do not read the newspaper at all ($p < 0.05$), and women in the asset-rich category who read the newspaper also have a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence. Lastly, the results show that in the pooled sample, both *WHHINDEX* and *WGENDEREQ* are statistically significant: women's decision-making ability in the household and their notions of gender equity matter for women's justification of intimate partner violence. Women with less decision-making ability in the household (higher index score) have a 1.15 higher odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than women who report making more decisions in the household ($p < 0.01$). This finding persists in the asset-poor subsample, but not in the asset-rich subsample. In the pooled sample, women who are less gender progressive, as measured *WGENDEREQ* score, have a 1.38 higher odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than women who are more

gender progressive as indicated by the score ($p < 0.01$). This result holds for both asset-rich ($p < 0.05$) and asset-poor women ($p < 0.01$). This result is consistent with other studies (Hindin 2003, Hindin and Adair 2002, González-Brenes 2004, Lawoko 2006) that find that less decision-making ability in the household is associated with a higher odds ratio of justification for intimate partner violence and/or a higher incidence of gender violence against women.

3.5.2 Men's Specifications

Table 3.14: Odds Ratios for the Correlates of Male Partners Justification of Intimate Partner Violence

(robust standard errors reported; ***1%, **5% *10 % Level significance)

	All Men (N=7766)	Asset-Poor Men (N=4152)	Asset-Rich Men (N=2070)
Education (rc men: secondary education)			
No education	1.34 (.43)	1.70* (.48)	.78 (1.4)
Primary Education	1.40* (.29)	1.69*** (.32)	1.60 (.57)
Higher education	.43* (.21)	0.17* (.17)	.42 (.27)
Age (rc: Men 25-34 & 55-59)			
Age group 1: 15-24	1.73** (.46)	1.34 (.28)	.81 (.55)
Age group 3: 35-44	.86 (.17)	.80 (.14)	.83 (.35)
Age group 4: 45-54	.75 (.20)	.77 (18)	.54 (.32)
Occupation (rc: services/sales, clerical and not working for Asset-Rich sample)			

Not working	2.82 (2.32)	2.83 (2.38)	
Professional, Management, Technical	.70 (.26)	.87 (.36)	.24* (.19)
Self-employed Agriculture	1.67** (.40)	.92 (.20)	1.47 (.95)
Skilled and Unskilled Manual	1.14 (.24)	.73 (.15)	1.32 (.51)
Wealth Asset Class (rc: Asset Middle)			
Asset Poor	.86 (.17)		
Asset Rich	.42*** (.13)		
Wealth Index for Class Sub-samples		.73** (.11)	1.08 (.38)
	All Men (N=7766)	Asset-Poor Men (N=4152)	Asset-Rich Men (N=2070)
Social/Demographic			
Urban	1.40** (.23)	1.70*** (.24)	1.27 (.54)
Head of household (husband=1, wife=0)	.86 (.18)	.94 (.17)	.86 (.34)
Marital status (married=1, consensual union=0)	.97 (.29)	.62* (.16)	.52 (.21)
Marital duration (rc: Marital duration 2: 10-19 years)			
Marital duration 1:0-9 years	1.42* (.28)	1.25 (.22)	2.73** (1.18)
Marital duration 3: 20-29 years	.81 (.20)	.82 (.18)	1.1 (.59)
Marital Duration 4: 30 years and above	.62 (.22)	.72 (.22)	1.01 (.87)
Sons living at home	.70** (.11)	.76** (.10)	.91 (.32)
Daughters living at home	.86 (.14)	.89 (.12)	1.03 (.36)
Newspaper	.78 (.147)	1.16 (.18)	.96 (.32)
Radio	1.45* (.31)	1.10 (.19)	2.80 (1.91)
Television	.55*** (.11)	.76* (.12)	.30* (.21)

Household Decision Making and Gender Attitudes			
Household Decision Making Index (men=3, couple=2, wife=1)	1.16** (.08)	1.23*** (.06)	.87 (.13)
Husband's responses to sex refusal from wife Index	1.50*** (.07)	1.50*** (.05)	1.48*** (.11)
Husband's support for women's economic autonomy (yes=1, no=0)	.89 (.14)	.83 (.12)	1.10 (.36)
McFadden's R ²	0.1530	0.1410	.1958

In the men's specifications, there are several statistically significant variables that shed light on the correlates of the husband's propensity to accept a justification for intimate partner violence. In terms of education dummies, *MHIGHER* is associated with a .43 lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence. This is consistent with literature from elsewhere (Rani et al. 2004, Fawole et al. 2005, Khawaja et al. 2008) that shows lower levels of reported gender violence among the highly educated. When I disaggregate the sample into asset-poor and asset-rich men, all of the education dummies are significant for asset-poor men, but none are significant for asset-rich men. Asset-poor men with no education have a 1.70 higher odds ratio than asset-poor men with a secondary education of agreeing with at least one motive for intimate partner violence ($p < 0.10$). Asset-poor men with a primary education have 1.69 higher odds ratio than asset-poor men with a secondary education of agreeing with one of the motives for intimate partner violence ($p < 0.05$). However, asset-poor men with higher education have a lower odds ratio (.17) of agreeing with intimate partner than men with a secondary degree ($p < 0.10$).

I find that men between the ages of fifteen to twenty-four have a 1.73 higher odds ratio of agreeing to at least one of the motives for intimate partner violence compared to

the reference category, men ages 25 to 34 ($p < 0.05$). Many studies (Rani et al. 2004, Fawole et al. 2005, Yount and Li 2009, Khawaja et al. 2008) have also found that younger people—both women and men—are more likely to agree with justifications for intimate partner violence, whereas older women and men are less tolerant of intimate partner violence.

Men who are self-employed in the agricultural sector have a 1.67 higher odds ratio of justifying domestic violence than men in the reference groups, clerical field and service/sales sector ($p < 0.05$). Although none of the occupational variables are significant for men in the asset-poor category, asset-rich men in the professional or technical positions have a .24 lower odds ratio of agreeing to least one of the justifications for intimate partner violence ($p < 0.10$). In the general specification for all men, I find that men in the asset-rich category have a .42 lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence when compared to the middle asset group ($p < 0.01$); this is consistent with Uthman et al.'s (2009) findings that increased wealth with associated with less tolerance for gender violence across seventeen sub-Saharan African countries. In the samples disaggregated according to wealth, I use a continuous wealth index to test if relative wealth within the asset category is significant in men's views on intimate partner violence. Relative wealth is significant in the asset-poor category; relatively less poor men in the asset-poor category are less likely to agree with the justifications for intimate partner violence ($p < 0.05$).

However, in this data set I find that men living in an urban setting (*URBAN*) have a 1.40 higher odds ratio for justifying intimate partner violence than men living in rural areas ($p < 0.05$). This appears to be inconsistent with the data showing that rural areas tend

to be associated with higher levels of domestic violence, including data cited in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. Note, however, that this expresses the effect of urban versus rural location controlling for all other variables such as wealth and education. The higher levels of violence found in simple rural-urban comparisons appear to be an attribute to these other variables, rather than to location per se. Asset-poor men in urban areas also have a 1.70 higher odds of justifying intimate partner violence than asset-poor men in rural areas ($p < .01$).

Although marital status is not significant in the all-men's specification, in the disaggregated sample it is statistically significant for men in the asset-poor category. Asset-poor men who reported being married to their partners have a .62 lower odds ratio of agreeing to the justifications of intimate partner violence than asset-poor men in a consensual union ($p < .10$). Men who report being married for nine years or less have a 1.42 higher odds ratio of justifying domestic violence than men who reported being married ten to nineteen years ($p < 0.10$).

Consistent with previous findings (Oldenburg 1992, Mahalingam 2007, Bunch 1997, Khosla et al 2005, Caprioli et al. 2009, Engle Merry 2009, Bhat 1998) I find a protective effect, when there are sons in the household: the variable *SONS* is associated with a .70 lower odds ratio of husbands justifying intimate partner violence than households without sons ($p < 0.05$), an effect that is strongest among and asset-poor men. The presence of daughters has a weaker effect.

With respect to the media variables, only *MTV* is statistically significant. Men who watch television—once or more a week on average—have a .57 lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than those who watch less than once a week or not at

all ($p < 0.01$). Both asset-poor and asset-rich men who watch television once or more a week also have lower odds ratios of justifying gender violence in the household.

Both indices created using PCA—*MHHDM* and *MREFSEX*—are significant, and both are positively related with men justifying intimate partner violence. Men who report more decision-making power in the household, and hence a higher score for *MHHDM*, have a 1.15 higher odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than men who have a lower decision-making score ($p < 0.05$). Asset-poor men who report making more decisions in the household likewise have a higher odds ratio of justifying gender violence than those who make less decisions ($p < 0.05$). Similarly, the *MREFSEX* index that provides a score for men's belief that emotional, financial, or physically violent behavior is valid response to wife's refusal of intimate relations, shows that men with a higher index (condoning violent responses to wife's refusal of sex) have a higher odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence than those who do not condone violent responses to wife's refusal of sex, in all three specifications ($p < 0.01$). This is consistent with findings that men's gendered attitudes and biases against women are positively correlated with both the incidence of gender violence in the household and agreeing with the justifications for intimate partner violence (García-Moreno 2002, Hindin 2003, Lawoko 2006, González-Brenes 2004, Khawaja et al 2008).

The differences between the men's specification and the women's specification (in terms of significant variables) highlight the ways that different variables may matter for men's and women's perceptions and beliefs about gender equity and the use of violence to maintain gender hierarchy in society, and it also points to the need to target men and women in different ways to promote gender equity in society. For example, in

the all-men's specification primary and higher education, urban residence asset-wealth class, marital duration, and media usage were significant variables, but not in the all-women's specification. However, in the majority of the women's specifications and in the the majority of the men's specifications gendered beliefs and behaviors proved statistically significant predictors for the justification of intimate partner violence.

3.5 Policy Implications and Conclusions

Despite having one of the highest rates of femicide in the world and in the Caribbean/Latin American region, the percentage of Dominican women and men agreeing to at least one instance where intimate partner violence is justified is relatively low when compared to other developing nations.³⁰ Moreover, the vast majority of women who experienced intimate partner violence came from households where neither party agreed with any of the "justifications for wife-beating". This creates a conundrum for understanding gender violence and endogenous preferences in the Dominican Republic. First, it may be the case that although men use gender violence as a way to maintain gender hierarchy, both men and women know it is not socially acceptable to justify gender violence. Second, it may also be the case that the justifications provided do not accurately capture the motives for gender violence against women in the Dominican Republic.

³⁰ For example, in this study less than 6 % of women and 6% of men agreed to least one justification for "wife-beating". Other studies, also using data from the DHS in other developing countries, find that the percentage of women and men agreeing with at least one of the justifications ranges from 8% to 91% (Heise et al. 1999, Rani et al. 2004, Uthman et al. 2009, Kim and Motsei 2002, Hindin 2003).

Despite institutions created to help women protect themselves from gender violence, deep-rooted gendered norms and conventions that govern people's behavior and attitudes have limited the ability of laws and institutions to promote women's well-being. Respondent's attributes and ideology are significantly correlated with both men's and women's justification of gender violence against women. Based on this study, I propose several policies that could promote women's well-being and development in the Dominican Republic.

First, the government must invest more heavily in education, in general and in particular education that disrupts gender norms that are detrimental to freedom from gender violence. In both the women's and men's specifications, more education is associated with a lower odds ratio of justifying intimate partner violence. In both the pooled women's sample and for women in the asset-poor category, having at least a primary education made women less likely to agree to agree with any statement that justified intimate partner violence. For men, having higher education was associated with a lower odds ratio of justifying violence. The Dominican Republic has one of the lowest levels of spending on public education in Latin America but my results suggest that investing in public education at the primary and secondary level and providing low-income students with access to higher education, is a long-term solution to the eradication of gender violence.

In the short run feminist, political, and international campaigns can direct gender violence awareness programs and interventions to women and men in under-resourced areas, drawing the link between gender bias ideology and gender violence. Gender violence awareness programs and interventions should be directed to both young men and

young women, in particular, both of whom were more likely to agree with at least justification than their older counterparts.

The results suggest that wealth and relative wealth also matter for people's beliefs about gender violence. First, men in the asset-rich category are less likely to justify intimate partner violence. Second, in regressions for both women and men in the asset-poor categories, I find that the relatively more asset-poor respondents (or the poorest) are more likely to agree with at least with one of the justifications for intimate partner violence. In addition to targeting gender violence campaigns to underserved and under-resourced communities, findings on wealth and relative wealth lend support to arguments for a more equitable distribution of income as a means to curtail violence against women. To create a more equitable distribution of wealth, workers in vulnerable employment (informal sector employment) and others must earn a living wage. Although there has been economic growth in the last 20 years, there has also been increasing inequality (Hammill 2005, World Bank et al. 2006). Hence the government must devise methods to promote economic growth that benefit the lower quintiles of the wealth and income distribution.

I also find that the type of marriage matters for women, and that marital duration matters for men. Women in consensual unions were more likely to agree with at least one justification for intimate partner violence, suggesting that for women the type of marriage contract matters. The vast majority of couples (over 76%) in this sample reported being in consensual unions. Hence it seems important to target gender violence campaigns to this demographic, and to challenge the potential stigma associated with consensual unions. Additionally, in the pooled men's sample I find that men in the earlier years of

marriage are also more likely to justify gender violence than men in longer marriages. Some scholars explain this as a learning curve for husbands, whereby they learn over time that communication and compromise can lead to better outcomes in the household than using violence against their partners.

In terms of household structure, homes without children should be targeted for gender awareness campaigns, as both women and men in childless homes are more likely to agree with gender violence against women. The results also point to the importance of the media; in the pooled sample and wealth-disaggregated samples, men who watched television at least once a week were less likely to agree with the justifications for intimate partner violence. This suggests that gender violence awareness campaigns and news shows, which have recently highlighted violent crimes against women, might be making an impact on men's views on gender violence.

Lastly, and most importantly, the indices that measure household decision-making ability and gendered beliefs point to a crucial link in understanding gender violence. Both women and men who engage in heterosexist gendered practices—such as men making more decisions in the household—are more likely to agree with gender violence against women. I measured gendered beliefs by creating an index that measured men's approval of aggressive responses to women's refusal of sex with her husband, which proxies men's belief that are entitled to control over their partner's body. Men with a higher index number were more likely to justify intimate partner violence. Similarly, women who agreed with gender bias statements that placed men at the top of the gender hierarchy and women at the bottom were also more likely to agree with at least one justification for intimate partner violence.

The statistically significant correlations between women's and men's gendered beliefs and the acceptance of gender violence against women suggests that the struggle against gender violence should challenge gender norms and ideology that reinforce and maintain gender hierarchy more generally. It is these gender norms and gendered behaviors that serve as a basis for the acceptance of gender violence. Hence to challenge intimate partner violence, the message that women are in control of their bodies and their lives in the household and beyond is paramount. The widespread belief that woman should not work outside of the household severely limits their freedom and independence in a market economy (where income is based on employment). Despite the facts that Dominican women are educated at higher rates than men and are a large part of the labor force, in the Dominican society's collective imagination women are relegated to the household. This lends strong support to Helen Safa's (1995) argument that the myth of the male breadwinner continues to undermine women's autonomy, even when they are at the primary income earners.

Women's household decision-making ability has been linked to positive outcomes in the household and to desirable social/demographic outcomes. In this study it also linked to women being less likely to think intimate partner violence is acceptable. In households where men make more decisions, both men and women are more likely to find intimate partner violence acceptable. In other words, my results suggest that gendered practices, such male partners making household decisions, are implicated and correlated with the justification of intimate partner violence. These findings also suggest that efforts to shift people's beliefs about gender hierarchy should be pursued widely, for

example by inclusion in Civic Education and Moral/Ethics classes which are standard courses in both public and private schools at all levels in the Dominican Republic.

The conundrum of a relatively high rate of femicide in the DR, despite relatively low percentages of people agreeing with the justifications of intimate partner violence and reporting gender violence, also suggests a need to examine of the construction of the DHS questions and their applicability in different contexts. It may be the case in the Dominican context, where women are highly mobile and it is publicly not acceptable to espouse violence against women, different questions are needed to better understand gender violence in the household. For example, statements such as: “wife beating is justified if a wife has sexual relations with another man”, “wife beating is justified if a woman refuses to return with her husband in the case of a prior separation”, “wife beating is justified if a woman refuses her husband sex for a prolonged period of time”, “wife beating is justified if a wife leaves her husband for another man”, would be more culturally-context and relevant to the Dominican Republic.

Although development based on a neoliberal market strategy has increased GDP in the Dominican Republic, it has not been translated into women and men challenging gender roles and ideology. Better and more country-specific data, based on fieldwork, focus groups, and empirical data are necessary to address gender violence against women in the Dominican Republic. Future research should focus on how social, political, and economic policies can change people’s preferences so as to promote more gender equitable and sustainable development practices that disrupt the norms that reproduce gender violence.

APPENDIX A

EDUCATION AND HEALTH EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES IN 2007

	Education	Health
Dominican Republic	2.2	5.4
Argentina	4.9	8.4
Brazil	5.1	4.7
Chile	3.2	6.9
Colombia	4.1	7.2
Costa Rica	4.7	8.4
Ecuador	3.1	7.0
El Salvador	3.0	6.2
Guatemala	4.8	7.0
Paraguay	4.0	6.1
Peru	2.5	5.1
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	3.6	5.8

(Data compiled from the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPALSTAT)

APPENDIX B

CHAPTER 2 CORRELATION MATRICES AND TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE

Table B.1: Physical Violence Specification

(N=1820, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	phyvio	wife works	wife money	wife makesmore	owns dwelling	land	rich	poor	women org	political org	eduyrs	head house	urban	spad2	spad3	aloften	intergenvio
phyvio	1																
wifeworks	-.09*	1															
wifemoney	-.09*	0.19*	1														
wifemakesmore	.06*	.02	.04	1													
ownsdwelling	-.03	0.06*	-.06	.08*	1												
land	.01	-.02	.03	.02	0.09*	1											
rich	-.13*	0.14*	.22	-.01	.00	.07*	1										
poor	.13*	-.16*	-.23*	-.03	0.01	-.03	-.63*	1									
womenorg	.02	.01	-.02	.01	.11*	.08*	-.03	.02	1								
politicalorg	.02	-.01	-.06*	.01	.05*	-.01	-.01	-.01	.07*	1							
eduyrs	-.14*	.13*	.22*	.05*	-.08*	.02	.41*	-.40*	.02	.01	1						
headhouse	-.02	-.06	0.2	.00	-.07*	-.04	.07*	-.07*	-.03	.03	.03	1					
urban	-.05*	.04	.07	.00	-.17*	-.03	.26*	-.32*	-.11	-.01	.15*	0.04	1				
spad2	-.02	.01	-.01	.01	.05*	.03	-.01	-.02	-.01	.02	-.01	-.05*	.03	1			
spad3	-.03	.00	.02	-.05*	.00	.03	.01	.05*	.00	-.03	-.04	.01	-.06*	-.25*	1		
aloften	.34*	-.04	-.03	.03	-.02	.00	-.09*	.08*	-.03	-.04	-.11*	.01	-.01	.00	0.01	1	
intergenvio	0.12*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-.02	.00	-0.00	.00	-.01	-.00	.00	.01	-.01	.00	-.03	.02	1

Table B.2: Sexual Violence Specification

(N=1820, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	sexvio	wife works	wife money	wife makesmore	owns dwelling	land	rich	poor	women org	political org	eduyrs	head house	urban	spad2	spad3	aloften	intergenvio
sexvio	1																
wifeworks	-.04	1															
wifemoney	-.04	.19*	1														
wifemakesmore	.06*	.02	.04	1													
ownsdwelling	.06*	.06*	-.06*	.08*	1												
land	.01	-.02	.03	.02	.09*	1											
rich	-.09*	.14*	.22*	-.01	.00	.07*	1										

poor	.09*	-.17*	-.23*	-.02	.01	-.02	-.6	1									
womenorg	-.03	.01	-.02	.01	.11*	.08*	-0.03	.02	1								
politicalorg	.01	-.01	.06*	.01	.05*	-.01	-0.01	-.01	.07*	1							
edyurs	-.08*	.13*	.22*	.05*	-.08*	.01	.42*	-.40*	.02	0.01	1						
headhouse	-.04	-.07*	.02	.00	-.07*	-.04	.07*	-.07	-.03	.03	.03	1					
urban	-.11*	.03	.07*	-0.0005	-.017*	-0.03	.26*	-.32*	-.11*	-.01	.15*	.04	1				
spad2	.01	.02	-.02	.01	.05*	.03	-.01	-.02	-.01	.02	-.01	-.05*	.03	1			
spad3	-.01	.00	.02	-.05*	.00	.02	.01	.05*	.00	-.02	-.04	.01	-.06*	-.25*	1		
aloften	.24*	-.04	-.03	.03	-.02	-.002	-.09	.08*	-.02	-.04	-.11*	.01	-.01	.00	0.01	1	
intergenvio	.03	-0.01	-0.01	-.002	-.02	.00	-.0002	.00	-.01	-.004	.00	.01	-.01	.00	-0.03	0.02	1

Table B.3: Aggregate Violence Specification
(N=1820, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	allvio	wife works	wife money	wife makesmore	owns dwelling	land	rich	poor	women org	political org	edyurs	head house	urban	spad2	spad3	aloften	intergenvio
allvio	1																
wifeworks	-.09*	1															
wifemoney	-.1*	.19*	1														
wifemakesmore	.06*	.02	.04	1													
ownsdwelling	-.01	.06*	-.06*	.08	1												
land	.02	-.02	.03	.02	.09	1											
rich	-.14	.14*	.22*	-.01	.00	.07*	1										
poor	.13*	-.16*	-.23*	-.03	.01	-.03	-.63*	1									
womenorg	.01	.01	-.02	.01	.11*	.08*	-0.03	.02	1								
politicalorg	.04	-.01	.06*	.01	.05*	-.01	-.01	-.01	.08*	1							
edyurs	-.14*	.13*	.22*	.05*	-.07*	.01	0.42*	-.40*	.02	.01	1						
headhouse	-.02	-.02	-.06*	.02	.00	-.07*	.02	-.07*	-.03	.03	.03	1					
urban	-.07*	.04	.07*	-0.0005	-.17*	-.03	.26*	-.32*	-.11*	-.01	.15*	.04	1				
spad2	-.02	.02	-.02	.00	.05*	.03	-.01	-.02	-.01	.02	-.01	-.05	.03	1			
spad3	-.02	.00	.02	-.05*	.00	.03	.01	.05*	.00	-.02	-.04	.01	-.06*	-.25*	1		
aloften	.32*	-.04	-.03	.03	-.01	-.002	-.09*	.08*	-.03	-.04	-.11*	.01	-.01	.00	.01	1	
intergenvio	.12*	-.01	-.01	-.002	-.02	.00	-.0002	.00	-.01	-.004	.00	.01	-.01	.00	-.03	.02	1

Table B.4: Asset-Poor Physical Violence Specification
(N= 761, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	phyvio	wife works	wife money	wife makesmore	owns dwelling	land	women org	political org	edyurs	head house	urban	spad2	spad3	aloften	intergenvio
phyvio	1														
wifeworks	-.13*	1													

wifemoney	-.04	.20*	1												
wifemakesmore	.10*	-.01	.03	1											
ownsdwelling	-.04	.05	-.06	.00	1										
land	-.04	.01	.05	-.01	.08*	1									
womenorg	-.03	.06	.04	.02	.11*	.10*	1								
politicalorg	.05	.00	.03	.04	.07*	.03	.08*	1							
edyurs	-.07	.03	.14*	.02	-.11*	-.02	.07*	.00	1						
headhouse	-.02	-.10*	.01	-.003	-.08*	-.03	-.05	.03	.04	1					
urban	.02	-.06	-.03	.05	-.18*	-.06	-.13*	.01	-.0006	.03	1				
spad2	-.04	.06	-.03	-.03	.03	.01	-.04	.04	-.03	-.04	.08*	1			
spad3	-.04	.04	.02	-.04	-.01	.05	-.04	-.05	-.03	-.03	-.08*	-.26*	1		
aloften	.33*	-.04	.01	.02	-.001	-.03	-.04	-.05	-.08*	.00	.06	.01	-.02	1	
intergenvio	.13*	-.05	-.03	-.04	-.07	-.03	.05	-.01	.03	-.02	.02	.03	-.05	.03	1

Table B.5: Asset-Poor Sexual Violence Specification
(N=761, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	sexvio	wife works	wife money	wife makesmore	owns dwelling	land	women org	political org	edyurs	head house	urban	spad2	spad3	aloften	intergenvio
sexvio	1														
wifeworks	-.01	1													
wifemoney	-.03	.20*	1												
wifemakesmore	.05	-.01	.03	1											
ownsdwelling	.05	.05	-.06	.00	1										
land	.01	.01	.05	-.01	.08*	1									
womenorg	-.02	.06	.04	.02	.12*	.10*	1								
politicalorg	-.01	.00	.03	.04	.08*	.03	.08*	1							
edyurs	-.0001	.03	.14*	.02	-.11*	-.02	.08*	.00	1						
headhouse	-.04	.10*	.01	-.003	-.08*	-.03	-.05	.03	.04	1					
urban	-.08	.06	-.03	.05	-.18*	-.06	-.13*	.00	-.001	.03	1				
spad2	.00	.06	-.03	-.03	.03	.01	-.04	.04	-.03	-.04	.08*	1			
spad3	-.02	.04	.02	-.04	-.01	.05	-.04	-.05	-.03	-.03	-.08*	-.26*	1		
aloften	.24*	-.04	.01	.02	-.001	-.03	-.04	-.05	-.08*	.00	.06	.01	-.03	1	
intergenvio	.02	-.05	-.03	-.04	-.07	-.03	.05	-.01	.03	-.02	.02	.03	-.05	.03	1

Table B.6: Asset-Poor Aggregate Violence Specification
(N=761, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	allvio	wife works	wife money	wife makesmore	owns dwelling	land	women org	political org	edyurs	head house	urban	spad2	spad3	aloften	intergenvio
--	--------	------------	------------	----------------	---------------	------	-----------	---------------	--------	------------	-------	-------	-------	---------	-------------

allvio	1															
wifeworks	-.11*	1														
wifemoney	-.04	.20*	1													
wifemakesmore	.11*	-.01	.03	1												
ownsdwelling	-.02	.05	-.06	.00	1											
land	-.03	.01	.05	-.01	.08*	1										
womenorg	-.03	.06	.04	.03	.11*	.10*	1									
politicalorg	.07	.00	.03	.04	-.07*	.04	.08*	1								
eduys	-.06	.03	.14*	.03	-.11*	-.02	.07*	.00	1							
headhouse	-.02	-.10*	.01	-.003	-.08*	-.03	-.05	.02	.04	1						
urban	-.00	-.06	-.03	.05	-.01	-.06	-.13*	.01	-.0006	.03	1					
spad2	-.03	.06	-.03	-.03	-.03	.01	-.04	.04	-.03	-.04	.08*	1				
spad3	-.02	.04	.02	-.04	-0.01	.05	-.04	-.04	-.03	-.03	-.08*		1			
aloften	.33*	-.04	.01	.02	-0.001	-.03	-.04	-.05	-.08*	.00	.06	.01	-.02	1		
intergenvio	.12*	-.05	-.03	-.04	-.07	-.03	.05	-.01	.03	-.02	.02	.03	-.05	.03	1	

Table B.7: Asset-Rich Physical Violence Specification
(N=654, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	phyvio	wife works	wife money	wife makesmore	owns dwelling	land	women org	political org	eduys	head house	urban	spad2	spad3	aloften	intergenvio
phyvio	1														
wifeworks	.02	1													
wifemoney	-.11*	.13*	1												
wifemakesmore	.03	.05	.00	1											
ownsdwelling	-.02	.06	-.05	.11*	1										
land	.10*	-.03	-.01	.03	.09*	1									
womenorg	.04	-.03	-.07	.02	.14*	.03	1								
politicalorg	.02	-.02	.06	-.002	.07	-.02	.12*	1							
eduys	-.09*	.13*	.12*	.12*	-.02	.00	-.01	.01	1						
headhouse	.02	-.06	.03	.03	-.06	-.06	-.02	.02	-.001	1					
urban	-.08*	-.01	.02	-.02	-.12*	-.07	-.10*	-.07*	.04	.02	1				
spad2	.01	-.01	-.001	-.02	.01	.06	.02	-.002	.03	.00	-.004	1			
spad3	-.01	-.03	.05	-.08	.01	-.002	.05	0.02	-.05	.04	.04	-.25*	1		
aloften	.25*	.01	-.02	.06	-.02	.03	.02	-.03	-.03	.00	-.03	.00	.04	1	
intergenvio	.13*	.07	-.01	-.002	-.01	.01	-.04	-.03	.02	.06	-.03	.01	-.03	.02	1

Table B.8: Asset-Rich Sexual Violence Specification
(N=653, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	sexvio	wife works	wife money	wife makesmore	owns dwelling	land	women org	political org	eduysrs	head house	urban	spad2	spad3	aloften	intergenvio
sexvio	1														
wifeworks	.03	1													
wifemoney	-.02	.13*	1												
wifemakesmore	.04	.05	.00	1											
ownsdwelling	.08	.06	-.05	.11*	1										
land	.01	-.03	-.01	.03	.09*	1									
womenorg	-.04	-.03	-.07	.02	.14*	.03	1								
politicalorg	.10*	-.01	.07	-.002	.07	-.02	.12*	1							
eduysrs	-.10*	.13*	.12*	.12*	-.02	.00	-.01	.01	1						
headhouse	-.02	-.06	.03	.03	-.06	-.06	-.02	.02	-.001	1					
urban	-.10*	-.01	.02	-.02	-.12*	-.07	-.10*	-.08*	-.04	.02	1				
spad2	-.01	-.005	-.002	-.02	.01	.06	.02	-.003	.03	.00	-.004	1			
spad3	-.04	-.03	.05	-.08	.01	-.002	.05	.02	-.05	.04	.04	-.25*	1		
aloften	.13*	.01	-.02	.06	-.02	.03	.02	-.03	-.03	.00	-.03	.00	.03	1	
intergenvio	.02	.07	-.01	-.002	-.01	.01	-.04	-.03	.02	.06	-.03	.01	-.03	.02	1

Table B.9: Asset-Rich Aggregate Violence Specification
(N=654, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	allvio	wife works	wife money	wife makesmore	owns dwelling	land	women org	political org	eduysrs	head house	urban	spad2	spad3	aloften	intergenvio
allvio	1														
wifeworks	.01	1													
wifemoney	-.10*	.13*	1												
wifemakesmore	.02	.05	.00	1											
ownsdwelling	-.01	.06	-.05	.11*	1										
land	.09*	-.03	-.01	.03	.09*	1									
womenorg	.03	-.03	-.07	.02	.14*	.03	1								
politicalorg	.09*	-.02	.07	-.002	.07	-.02	.12*	1							
eduysrs	-.11*	.13*	.12*	.12*	-.02	.00	-.01	.01	1						
headhouse	.02	-.06	.03	-.03	-.07	-.06	-.02	.02	-.001	1					
urban	-.08*	-.01	.02	-.02	-.12*	-.07	-.10*	-.08*	.04	.02	1				
spad2	.01	-.01	-.002	-.02	.01	.06	.02	-.003	.03	.00	-.004	1			
spad3	-.01	-.03	.05	-.08	.01	-.002	.05	.02	-.05	.04	.03	-.25*	1		
aloften	.25*	.01	-.02	.06	-.02	.03	.02	-.03	-.03	.00	-.03	.00	.04	1	
intergenvio	.13*	.07	-.01	-.002	-.01	-.01	-.04	-.03	.02	.05	-.03	.01	-.03	.02	1

APPENDIX C

DISCUSSION OF SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS AND RESULTS OF STEPWISE REGRESSIONS (LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS)

C1. Discussion of Correlations³¹

In the (PHYVIO) specification, where the dependent variable is the incidence of physical violence, with the complete sample (N=1820) all three variables that provide insight into women's economic autonomy—the woman works (WIFWORKS), the woman has money for her own use (WIFEMONEY), and the woman makes more money than her husband (WIFEMAKESMORE) have significant correlation coefficients at the 5% level with incidence of physical violence.³² $\text{Corr (WIFWORKS, PHYVIO) = -.09*}$, lending support to the HBM, as does $\text{corr (WIFEMONEY, PHYVIO) = -.09*}$. However, the $\text{corr (WIFEMAKESMORE, PHYVIO) = .06*}$, this positive relationship between the woman making more money and the incidence of experiencing gender violence supports the MBM. Of utmost importance to the robustness and validity of regression results is the possible correlation between these three independent economic variables.³³ However, the only significant correlation between WIFEMONEY, WIFWORKS, and WIFEMAKESMORE is $\text{corr (WIFEMONEY, WIFWORKS) = .19*}$, denoting a positive relationship between a woman working and having money for her own use. Both independent variables husband's frequent alcohol consumption (ALOFTEN) and the

³¹ See appendix B for correlation matrices and significance at the 5% level

³² * for correlations denotes significance at the 5% level

³³ In order to provide tests of robustness, I later present tests of the full model (all three variables included) and various nested models to support the chosen model specification and support results.

woman witnessing her father physically harm her mother (INTERGENVIO) have positive and significant relationships with the incidence of gender violence, however education in years and physical violence have a negative corr (EDUYRS, PHYVIO) = -.14*. The class variables rich and poor are also significantly correlated with physical violence, corr (POOR, PHYVIO) = .13* and corr (RICH, PHYVIO) = -.13*, lending support to the hypothesis that class is related with the incidence of gender violence.

In the (SEXVIO) specification, where the dependent variable is the incidence of forced sex or sexual acts, with the complete sample (N=1820) the only variable of economic independence that is significantly correlated with sexual is when the woman makes more money than her husband, corr(WIFEMAKESMORE, SEXVIO)=.06*, lending support to the MBM. In the sexual violence specification, the woman working and having money for her own use are also positively correlated, corr (WIFEWORKS, WIFEMONEY)=.19*. Similar to the physical violence specification, corr (POOR, SEXVIO) = .09* and corr (RICH, SEXVIO) = -.09*, which provides an empirical basis for later regressions which use only asset-poor woman (N= 761) and then the same regressions for asset-rich woman (N= 654).

In the (ALLVIO) specification, where the dependent variable is the incidence of physical and/or forced sex or sexual acts, with the complete sample (N=1820) all three variables of economic independence are significantly related to the incidence of aggregate violence. Both WIFEWORKS and WIFEMONEY are negatively correlated with ALLVIO, corr (WIFEWORKS, ALLVIO)= -.09* and corr (WIFEMONEY, ALLVIO)= -.1*, both lending support to HBM. However, corr (WIFEMAKESMORE, ALLVIO) = .06*, lending support to the MBM. As in the previous specifications, I find

a positive and significant correlation between WIFEMONEY and WIFEWORKS, corr (WIFEMONEY, WIFEWORKS) = .19*.

In sub-sample of two bottom asset quintiles (POOR), N=761, corr (WIFEWORKS, PHYVIO)=-.13* and corr (WIFEMAKESMORE, PHYVIO) =.1*, the former supporting the HBM and the latter the MBM. The only other variables that are significantly and positively related to physical violence for asset-poor women is husband's frequent alcohol consumption (ALOFTEN) and witnessing domestic violence as a child (INTERGENVIO), corr (ALOFTEN, PHYVIO) =.33* and corr (INTERGENVIO, PHYVIO) =.13*. WIFEWORKS and WIFEMONEY are also positively correlated in this sub-sample, corr (WIFEWORKS, WIFEMONEY) = .20*. For asset-poor women and the incidence of sexual violence (SEXVIO), only ALOFTEN is significantly correlated with sexvio, corr (ALOFTEN, SEXVIO)= .24*. For the variables of women's economic autonomy in the SEXVIO specification, corr (WIFEWORKS, WIFEMONEY) = .20*. Lastly, for asset-poor women and the incidence of aggregate violence (ALLVIO), corr (WIFEWORKS, PHYVIO)=-.11* and corr (WIFEMAKESMORE, PHYVIO) =.11*, and corr (WIFEWORKS, WIFEMONEY) = .20*.

In the sub-sample of the two top quintiles (RICH), in physical violence specification where N=654, the only women's economic autonomy variable that is significant is wife has money for own use (WIFEMONEY), corr (WIFEMONEY, PHYVIO) = -.11*. As in previous tests of correlation, corr (WIFEMONEY, WIFEWORKS) = .13*, denoting a positive relationship between working for income and women having money for their own use. Unlike the POOR sub-sample, both education

in years (EDUYRS) and urban residence (URBAN) are negatively and significantly correlated to the incidence of physical violence, suggesting that there are differences between the asset-poor and asset-rich subsamples and the incidence of domestic violence. In specification where the dependent variable is the incidence of sexual violence (SEXVIO), none of the variables of women's economic independence are significantly correlated with SEXVIO, however $\text{corr}(\text{WIFEMONEY}, \text{WIFEWORKS}) = .13^*$. Urban residence and education in years are negatively correlated with the incidence of sexual violence, $\text{corr}(\text{URBAN}, \text{SEXVIO}) = -.10^*$ and $\text{corr}(\text{EDUYRS}, \text{SEXVIO}) = -.10^*$, providing support to the HBM, as both urban residence and more years of formal schooling should improve a woman's bargaining power in the household. Lastly, for the asset-rich sub-sample, only WIFEWORKS is significantly correlated with aggregate violence (ALLVIO), $\text{corr}(\text{WIFEMONEY}, \text{ALLVIO}) = -.10^*$. Additionally, two variables of economic autonomy are correlated; $\text{corr}(\text{WIFEMONEY}, \text{WIFEWORKS}) = .13^*$. The reoccurring positively and statistically significant correlation between a woman working and having money for her own use may pose estimation concerns, mainly the robustness and validity of results. In the following section, I address these concerns using stepwise regressions and likelihood-ratio tests to provide support for the models as specified in my analysis.

C2. Discussion of Full Model (regressions as specified in results provided) versus Nested Models

Full Model of Physical Violence:

$$\Pr (DV_{\text{PHYSVIO}} = 1) = F(\beta_1 \text{WIFEWORKS} + \beta_2 \text{WIFEMONEY} + \beta_3 \text{WIFEMAKESMORE} + \beta_4 \text{HOME} + \beta_5 \text{LAND} + \beta_6 \text{POOR} + \beta_7 \text{RICH} + \beta_8 \text{POLORG} + \beta_9 \text{WOMORG} + \beta_{10} \text{EDUYRS} + \beta_{11} \text{HEADHOUSE} + \beta_{12} \text{URBAN} + \beta_{13} \text{SPAD2} + \beta_{14} \text{SPAD3} + \beta_{15} \text{ALOFTEN} + \beta_{16} \text{INTERGENVIO})$$

Nested Model 1 of Physical Violence:

Ho: $\beta_2 \text{WIFEMONEY} = \beta_3 \text{WIFEMAKESMORE} = 0$

Ha: $\beta_2 \text{WIFEMONEY}$ and $\beta_3 \text{WIFEMAKESMORE}$ do not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 11.04

Prob>chi2 = 0.0040

At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that $\beta_2 \text{WIFEMONEY}$ and $\beta_3 \text{WIFEMAKESMORE}$ are equal to zero, and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 1.

Nested Model 2 of Physical Violence:

$$H_0: \beta_1 \text{WIFEWORKS} = \beta_3 \text{WIFEMAKESMORE} = 0$$

$$H_a: \beta_1 \text{WIFEWORKS} \text{ and } \beta_3 \text{WIFEMAKESMORE} \text{ do not equal } 0$$

$$\text{LR chi2 (2) = 9.41}$$

$$\text{Prob}>\text{chi2} = 0.0090$$

At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that β_1 WIFEWORKS and β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE are equal to zero, and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 2.

Nested Model 3 of Physical Violence:

$$H_0: \beta_1 \text{WIFEWORKS} = \beta_2 \text{WIFEMONEY} = 0$$

$$H_a: \beta_1 \text{WIFEWORKS} \text{ and } \beta_2 \text{WIFEMONEY} \text{ do not equal } 0$$

$$\text{LR chi2 (2) = 10.61}$$

$$\text{Prob}>\text{chi2} = 0.0050$$

At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that β_1 WIFEWORKS and β_2 WIFEMONEY are equal to zero, and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 3.

Nested Model 4 of Physical Violence:

Ho: β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0

Ha: β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE does not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 6.02

Prob>chi2 = 0.0141

At the 5% level, I reject the null hypothesis that β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE is equal to zero, and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 4.

Nested Model 5 of Physical Violence:

Ho: β_2 WIFEMONEY = 0

Ha: β_2 WIFEMONEY does not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 5.54

Prob>chi2 = 0.0186

At the 5% level, I reject the null hypothesis that β_2 WIFEMONEY is equal to zero, and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 5.

Nested Model 6 of Physical Violence:

Ho: $\beta_1 \text{ WIFEWORKS} = 0$

Ha: $\beta_1 \text{ WIFEWORKS}$ does not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 5.54

Prob>chi2 = 0.0186

At the 10% level, I reject the null hypothesis that $\beta_1 \text{ WIFEWORKS}$ is equal to zero, and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 5. By rejecting at the 10% level I avoid the mistake of a Type II error, that is, failing to reject the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is in fact false.

Justification of Validity for Physical Violence Full Model

Using likelihood-ratio tests, I find that when the dependent variable is physical violence including all three variables of women's economic independence provides a better model specification. Additionally in all of the nested models, all three variables of women's economic independence remained statistically significant, despite the omission of variables and combination tested.

Full Model of Sexual Violence

$$\Pr (DV_{\text{SEXVIO}} = 1) = F(\beta_1 \text{ WIFEWORKS} + \beta_2 \text{ WIFEMONEY} + \beta_3 \text{ WIFEMAKESMORE} + \beta_4 \text{ HOME} + \beta_5 \text{ LAND} + \beta_6 \text{ POOR} + \beta_7 \text{ RICH} + \beta_8 \text{ POLORG} + \beta_9 \text{ WOMORG} + \beta_{10} \text{ EDUYRS} +$$

β_{11} HEADHOUSE + β_{12} URBAN + β_{13} SPAD2 + β_{14} SPAD3 + β_{15} ALOFTEN + β_{16} INTERGENVIO)

Nested Model 1 of Sexual Violence:

Ho: β_2 WIFEMONEY = β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0

Ha: β_2 WIFEMONEY and β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 3.88

Prob>chi2 = 0.1435

In this nested model, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that β_2 WIFEMONEY = β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0. However, it is the case in the results for the sexual violence specification that the only economic variable that is significant is β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE. Additionally, in this specification with only β_1 WIFEWORKS, the results indicate that β_1 WIFEWORKS is insignificant, which is the same result as the full model.

Nested Model 2 of Sexual Violence:

Ho: β_1 WIFEWORKS = β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0

Ha: β_1 WIFEWORKS and β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 4.17

Prob>chi2 = 0.1243

In this nested model, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that $\beta_1 \text{WIFEWORKS} = \beta_3 \text{WIFEMAKESMORE} = 0$. In nested model 2 of sexual violence, $\beta_2 \text{WIFEMONEY}$ remains insignificant as it does in the full model of sexual violence.

Nested Model 3 of Sexual Violence:

Ho: $\beta_1 \text{WIFEWORKS} = \beta_2 \text{WIFEMONEY} = 0$

Ha: $\beta_1 \text{WIFEWORKS}$ and $\beta_2 \text{WIFEMONEY}$ do not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 0.93

Prob>chi2 = 0.6274

In this nested model, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that $\beta_1 \text{WIFEWORKS} = \beta_2 \text{WIFEMONEY} = 0$. In nested model 3 of sexual violence, $\beta_3 \text{WIFEMAKESMORE}$ remains significant as it does in the full model of sexual violence.

Nested Model 4 of Sexual Violence:

Ho: $\beta_3 \text{WIFEMAKESMORE} = 0$

Ha: $\beta_3 \text{WIFEMAKESMORE}$ does not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 3.62

Prob>chi2 = 0.0570

At the 10% level, I reject the null hypothesis that β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE is equal to zero, and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 4. By rejecting at the 10% level I avoid the mistake of a Type II error, that is, failing to reject the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is in fact false. β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE is the only variable of economic autonomy that is significant in the sexual violence specification, and in nest model β_1 WIFEWORKS and β_2 WIFEMONEY remain insignificant, corroborating the results of the full model.

Nested Model 5 of Sexual Violence:

Ho: β_2 WIFEMONEY = 0

Ha: β_2 WIFEMONEY does not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 0.31

Prob>chi2 = 0.5802

I fail to reject the null hypothesis that β_2 WIFEMONEY equals zero. In this nested model however, β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE remains significant and β_1 WIFEWORKS remains insignificant, corroborating the results of the full model.

Nested Model 6 of Sexual Violence:

Ho: β_1 WIFEWORKS = 0

Ha: β_1 WIFEWORKS does not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 0.49

Prob>chi2 = 0.4843

I fail to reject the null hypothesis that β_1 WIFEWORKS equal zero. In this nested model however, β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE remains significant and β_2 WIFEMONEY remains insignificant, corroborating the results of the full model.

Justification of Validity for Sexual Violence Full Model

In estimation I use the full model for several reasons. First and foremost, though I only rejected one of the null hypothesis (nested model 4) and failed to reject the rest using the likelihood-ratio tests, the nested models confirmed the results of the full model for sexual violence—mainly that β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE is statistically significant and different from zero, providing support for the MBM. Moreover the nested models, as stepwise regressions, demonstrate that the three economic autonomy variables are not providing confounding results as results in the nested model remain consistent with the full model. Lastly, I include all three economic variables in order to obtain results that can speak to the hypothesis I am testing and since results are consistent across the distinct models tested, the full model for sexual violence remains robust and a better specification.

Full Model of Aggregate Violence

$$\Pr (DV_{ALLVIO} = 1) = F(\beta_1 WIFEWORKS + \beta_2 WIFEMONEY + \beta_3 WIFEMAKESMORE + \beta_4 HOME + \beta_5 LAND + \beta_6 POOR + \beta_7 RICH + \beta_8 POLORG + \beta_9 WOMORG + \beta_{10} EDUYRS +$$

β_{11} HEADHOUSE + β_{12} URBAN + β_{13} SPAD2 + β_{14} SPAD3 + β_{15} ALOFTEN +
 β_{16} INTERGENVIO)

Nested Model 1 of Aggregate Violence:

Ho: β_2 WIFEMONEY = β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0

Ha: β_2 WIFEMONEY and β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 12.45

Prob>chi2 = 0.0020

At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that β_2 WIFEMONEY and
 β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE are equal to zero, in favor of the alternative hypothesis
that β_2 WIFEMONEY and β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0 and the full model
provides a better specification than nested model 1.

Nested Model 2 of Aggregate Violence:

Ho: β_1 WIFEWORCS = β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0

Ha: β_1 WIFEWORCS and β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 9.51

Prob>chi2 = 0.0086

At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that β_1 WIFEWORCS and

β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE are equal to zero, in favor of the alternative hypothesis that β_1 WIFEWORKS and β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE do not equal 0 and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 2.

Nested Model 3 of Aggregate Violence:

Ho: β_1 WIFEWORKS = β_2 WIFEMONEY = 0

Ha: β_1 WIFEWORKS and β_2 WIFEMONEY do not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 11.71

Prob>chi2 = 0.0029

At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that β_1 WIFEWORKS and β_2 WIFEMONEY are equal to zero in favor of the alternative hypothesis that β_1 WIFEWORKS and β_2 WIFEMONEY do not equal 0 and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 3.

Nested Model 4 of Aggregate Violence:

Ho: β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE = 0

Ha: β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE does not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 6.31

Prob>chi2 = 0.0120

At the 5% level, I reject the null hypothesis that β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE equals zero in favor of the alternative hypothesis that β_3 WIFEMAKESMORE does not equal 0. The full model provides a better specification than nested model number 4 of aggregate violence.

Nested Model 5 of Aggregate Violence:

Ho: β_2 WIFEMONEY = 0

Ha: β_2 WIFEMONEY does not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 6.71

Prob>chi2 = 0.0096

At the 1% level, I reject the null hypothesis that β_2 WIFEMONEY is equal to zero in favor of the alternative hypothesis that β_2 WIFEMONEY does not equal 0 and the full model provides a better specification than nested model 5.

Nested Model 6 of Aggregate Violence:

Ho: β_1 WIFEWORKS = 0

Ha: β_1 WIFEWORKS does not equal 0

LR chi2 (2) = 3.26

Prob>chi2 = 0.0708

At the 10% level, to avoid a Type II error, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that $\beta_1 \text{ WIFEWORKS} = 0$ in favor of the alternative hypothesis that $\beta_1 \text{ WIFEWORKS}$ does not equal 0.

Justification of Validity for Aggregate Violence Full Model

Using the likelihood-ratio tests, the full model of aggregate violence as specified provides a better specification than the six nested models tested. Furthermore all of the nested models corroborated the results of the full model used to provide analysis.

APPENDIX D

CHAPTER 3 CORRELATION MATRICES AND TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE

Table D.1: Women’s Specification On The Justifications Of Intimate Partner Violence
(N=7766, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	wgv	wnoedu	wsec	whigher	agew1	agew3	agew4	wagricul	wmanual	wprof	wservices	wdom	wnowork	poor	rich	urban	head
wgv	1																
wnoedu	.04*	1															
wsec	-.06*	-.06*	1														
whigher	-.06*	-.06*	-.17*	1													
agew1	.05*	.05*	-.10*	-.08	1												
agew3	-.02*	-.02*	-.06*	.03*	-.33*	1											
agew4	-.01	-.01	.04*	-.04*	-.17*	-.025*	1										
wagricul	.04*	.04*	.06*	-.06*	.03*	.01	1										
wmanual	.02	.02	.10*	-.09*	-.06*	.04*	.02	-.05*	1								
wprof	-.05*	-.05*	.00	.48*	-.12*	.11*	.04*	-.05*	-.11*	1							
wservices	-.01	-.01	-.08*	-.05*	-.08*	.02	.03*	-.06*	-.13*	-.13*	1						
wdom	.01	.01	-.03*	-.09*	-.02	.03*	-.01	-.04*	.09*	-.09*	-.11*	1					
wnowork	.02	.02	.03*	-.20*	.17*	-.12*	-.03	-.15*	-.34*	-.35*	-.41*	-.29*	1				
poor	.08*	.09*	.05*	-.29*	.13*	-.09*	-.06*	.12*	-.0001	-.24*	-.09*	.11*	.16*	1			
rich	-.08*	-.08*	.17*	.32*	-.11*	.09*	.06*	-.08*	-.04*	.26*	.04*	-.12*	-.12*	-.65*	1		
urban	-.05*	-.04	-.13*	.16*	-.03*	.02	-.01	-.11*	.03*	.12*	.05*	-.01	-.12*	-.38*	.31*	1	
head	-.01	-.01	-.09*	.02*	-.09*	.04	.01	.02	.00	.03*	-.03*	-.05*	.03*	.03*	-.03*	-.02	1
wmaritalstat	-.07*	-.07*	.01	.32*	-.18*	.14*	.10*	-.04*	-.03*	.30*	-.001	-.08*	-.13*	-.30*	.33*	.12*	.07*
wmarital1	.03*	.03	-.08*	.08*	.67*	-.41*	-.23*	-.05*	-.07*	-.04*	-.08	-.06*	.14*	.05*	-.03*	.02	-.09*
wmarital3	-.01	-.01	-.08*	-.09*	-.28*	.48*	.24*	.04*	.06*	.03*	.02	.03*	-.08*	-.03*	.02*	-.02*	.03*
wmarital4	-0.0002	.09*	-.11*	-.08*	-.11*	-.11*	.56*	.02	.00	-.03*	.03*	.01	.00	.03*	-.03*	-.04*	-.004
sons	-.03*	.02	-.01	.01	-.12*	.08*	-.06*	.02*	-.006	.02	-.02*	-.02	.02	.00	.00	.01	.06*
daughters	-.02	.01	-.01	.01	-.08*	.08*	-.12*	.00	.03*	-.003	-.01	-.01	.01	-.01	.03*	.01	.04
wnewspaper	-.05*	-.19*	.15*	.24*	-.04*	.00	-.03*	-.07*	-.03*	.20*	.03*	-.04*	-.12*	-.25*	.15*	.00	.00
wradio	-.01	-.09*	.05*	.06	-.04*	.01	-.01	-.02	.01	.06*	.02*	-.02	-.06*	-.15*	.13*	.05*	-.02
wtv	-.06*	-.20*	.13*	.10*	-.05*	.00	-.002	.15*	.03*	.08*	.04*	-.01	-.07*	-.28*	.20*	.18*	-.02
whhdm	.05*	.04*	-.01	-.07*	.07*	-.05*	-.03*	.02	-.02	-.09*	-.04*	-.04*	.13*	-.06*	-.06*	-.09*	.05*
gendereq	.14*	.11*	-.07	-.16*	.06*	-.03*	-.01	.08*	-.001	-.12*	-.01	.02*	.07*	.16*	-.15*	-.09*	.02

	wmaritalstat	wmarital1	wmarital3	wmarital4	sons	daughters	wnewspaper	wradio	wtv	whhdm	gendereq
wmaritalstat	1										

wmarital1	-.09*	1															
wmarital3	.08*	-.38*	1														
wmarital4	.00	-.15*	-.13*	1													
sons	.05	-.12*	-.002	-.07*	1												
daughters	.05	-.08*	-.03*	-.12*	-.08*	1											
wnewspaper	.17*	.02	-.05*	-.06*	-.006	.01	1										
wradio	.05*	-.03*	.00	-.02*	-.02	.01	.17*	1									
wtv	.08*	-0.01	-.02	-.05*	-.02	.11	.17*	.23*	1								
whhdm	-.03*	.06*	-.04	-.03*	-.001	.00	-.06*	-.04*	-.06*	1							
gendereq	-.11*	.01	.00	.01	.01	-.03*	-.10*	-.04*	-.11*	.09*	1						

Table D.2: Asset-Poor Women’s Specification On The Justifications Of Intimate Partner Violence
(N=4154, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	wgv	wnoedu	wsec	whigher	agew1	agew3	agew4	wagricul	wmanual	wprof	wservices	wdom	wnowork	wealth	urban	head
wgv	1															
wnoedu	.03*	1														
wsec	-.06*	-.17*	1													
whigher	-.04	-.08*	-.12*	1												
agew1	.05*	-.10*	.12*	-.02	1											
agew3	-.02	.07*	-.09*	-.02	-.35*	1										
agew4	-.01	.09*	-.11*	-.05*	-.18*	-.21*	1									
wagricul	.04*	.08*	-.08*	-.04*	-.07*	.05*	.02	1								
wmanual	.02	-.01	-.01	-.02	-.07*	.07*	.01	-.06*	1							
wprof	-.03	-.06*	.06*	.30*	-.06*	.07	-.01	-.04*	-.06	1						
wservices	-.01	-.03*	.04*	-.01	-.07*	.01	.04*	-.07*	-.12*	-.07*	1					
wdom	.00	.01	-.05*	-.04*	-.05*	.04*	.00	-.07*	-.11*	-.07*	-.12*	1				
wnowork	-.06*	.03	-.01	-.08*	.16*	-.11*	.02	-.23*	-.40*	-.22*	-.43*	-.41*	1			
wealth	-.01	-.15*	.18*	.11*	-.07*	.02	.02	-.11*	.07*	.07*	.09*	.01	-.11*	1		
urban	-.004	-.04*	.08*	.04*	.03*	-.03	-.04*	-.09*	.05*	.02	.05*	.06*	-.07*	.26*	1	
head	-.04*	.00	-.01	.01	-.07*	.02	.01	.02	.00	.02	-.02	-.06*	.06*	.00	-.01	1
wmaritalstat	.04	-.04	.03	.17*	.03	.07*	-.06*	-.02	.01	.14*	.02	-.05*	-.04*	.09*	-.002	.06*
wmarital1	.04*	-.12*	.19*	.08*	-.07*	.42*	-.22*	-.08*	-.09*	-.04*	-.07*	-.06*	.15*	-.04*	.04*	-.08*
wmarital3	-.02	.10*	-.14*	-.08*	-.11*	.60*	.18*	.07*	.07*	.02	.04*	.04*	-.11*	.01	-.04*	.01
wmarital4	.01	.10*	-.11*	-.05	.73*	-.07*	.62*	.02	-.01	-.02	.02	.01	-.002	.01	-.03	-.01
sons	-.04*	.03*	-.02	.11	-.31*	.06*	-.10*	.03	-.001	.04*	-.02	-.02	.01	-.02	.01	.07*
daughters	-.02	.03*	-.03*	-.005	-.13*	.05*	-.12*	.01	.04*	-.01	-.02	-.02	.01	-.03*	.002	.02
wnewspaper	-.03	-.20*	.19*	.15*	-.12*	-.02	-.06*	-.06*	.01	.11*	.04*	.01	-.08*	.14*	.06*	-.01
wradio	-.01	-.08*	.03*	.02	-.07*	-.01	-.01	-.005	.03*	.02	.03	.00	-.05*	.10*	.00	-.01
wtv	-.04*	-.18*	.12*	.04*	-.001	-.03	-.02	-.14*	.05*	.02	.05*	.03*	-.05*	.28*	.12*	-.03
whhdm	.07*	.04*	-.03	-.03*	-.02	-.04*	.04*	.01	.04*	-.05*	-.07*	-.07*	.13*	-.08*	-.06*	.05*
gendereq	.15*	.11*	-.09*	-.12*	.03	.01	-.03	.08*	-.001	-.09*	-.02	-.01	.03	-.12*	-.03	.01

	wmaritalstat	wmarital1	wmarital3	wmarital4	sons	daughters	wnewspaper	wradio	wtv	whhdm	gendereq
wmaritalstat	1										
wmarital1	-.08*	1									
wmarital3	.04*	-.40*	1								
wmarital4	.05*	-.17*	-.13*	1							
sons	.05*	-.12*	-.001	-.09*	1						
daughters	.02	-.09*	-.04*	-.12*	-.04*	1					
wnewspaper	.08*	-.04*	-.05*	-.05*	.00	-.01	1				
wradio	.01	-.02	.00	-.02	-.02	-.01	.12*	1			
wtv	-.01	.00	-.02	-.05*	.02	-.001	.13*	.22*	1		
whhdm	.00	.05*	-.05*	-.05*	.02	.01	-.05*	-.04*	-.06*	1	
gendereq	-.04*	.01	-.003	.00	.02	-.01	-.06*	-.02	-.09*	.10*	1

Table D.3: Asset-Rich Women’s Specification On The Justifications Of Intimate Partner Violence
(N=2068, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	wgv	wnoedu	wsec	whigher	agew1	agew3	agew4	wagricul	wmanual	wprof	wservices	wdom	wnowork	wealth	urban	head
wgv	1															
wnoedu	.02	1														
wsec	-.001	-.08*	1													
whigher	-.03	-.07*	-.60*	1												
agew1	.04*	.00	.12*	-.08*	1											
agew3	-.003	.05*	-.06*	.02	-.29*	1										
agew4	-.05*	.00	-.08*	-.07*	-.14*	-.34*	1									
wagricul	-.005	-.002	.00	-.02	.04	-.02	.03	1								
wmanual	.03	.05*	.03	-.15*	-.02	-.005	.04*	-.01	1							
wprof	-.05*	-.05*	-.22*	.48*	-.12*	.11*	.05*	-.02	-.16*	1						
wservices	.03	.00	.06*	-.12*	-.10*	.02	.01	-.01	-.13*	-.24*	1					
wdom	-.002	-.01	-.02	-.09*	-.01	.04	-.004	-.004	-.04*	-.08*	-.07*	1				
wnowork	.02	.03	.13*	-.27*	.17*	-.11*	-.03	-.03	-.25*	-.46*	-.37*	-.12*	1			
wealth	-.02	-.04*	-.03	.19*	-.05*	.04	.07*	.03	-.09*	-.17*	-.01	-.08*	-.12*	1		
urban	-.01	-.02	-.06*	.07*	.01	-.02	.01	-.02	.02	.05*	-.03	-.02	-.08*	-.08*	1	
head	-.02	-.01	-.06*	.05*	-.18*	.09*	.03	.01	.03	.06*	-.06*	-.02	-.03	.03	-.04	1
wmaritalstat	-.05*	-.05*	-.10*	.28*	-.21*	.17*	.12*	.00	-.06*	.27*	-.06*	-.05*	-.14*	.23*	-.01	.14*
wmarital1	-.01	-.03	.06*	.12*	.54*	-.41*	-.24*	.01	-.07*	-.03	-.11*	-.05*	.12*	-.01	.03	-.13*
wmarital3	-.01	.07*	-.06*	-.12*	-.22*	.30*	.35*	-.02	.05*	.03	.04	-.001	-.03	.02	-.04	.09*
wmarital4	-.02	.01	-.08*	-.11*	-.07*	-.14*	.45*	.07*	.03	-.03	.04	.00	.00	.00	-.005	-.02
sons	-.01	-.03	.01	.01	-.13*	.08*	-.01	.02	.02	.01	-.02	.01	.01	.01	-.002	.04

daughters	.01	-.003	-.01	.01	-.08*	.11*	-.10*	-.05*	.02	-.01	.02	.04	.01	.02	-.01	.04*
wnewspaper	-.05*	-.10*	-.02	.18*	.01	-.02	-.03	-.01	-.09*	.15*	-.01	-.02	-.10*	.09*	.03	.01
wradio	-.02	-.02	.00	-.001	-.01	.00	-.03	-.03	-.02	-.0003	.03	.00	-.01	.02	-.01	-.03
wtv	.01	-.01	.02	.01	.02	.00	-.05*	-.09*	-.02	-.02	-.02	.00	.05*	-.03	-.004	-.02
whhdm	-.01	.01	.05*	-.10*	.07*	-.02	-.03	.04	.04	-.10*	-.04	.03	.11*	.00	-.09*	.10*
gendereq	.06*	-.01	.04	-.13*	.06*	-.03	.01	-.0003	.02	-.10*	.01	.00	.09*	-.06*	-.02	-.005

	wmaritalstat	wmarital1	wmarital3	wmarital4	sons	daughters	wnewspaper	wradio	wtv	whhdm	gendereq
wmaritalstat	1										
wmarital1	-.12*	1									
wmarital3	.11*	-.38*	1								
wmarital4	-.005	-.012*	-.012*	1							
sons	.08*	-.15*	-.004	-.04	1						
daughters	.07*	-.07*	-.04	-.09*	-.15*	1					
wnewspaper	.07*	.02	-.07*	-.04	-.02	.04	1				
wradio	-.01	-.004	-.02	-.02	-.02	.03	.16*	1			
wtv	-.01	.02	-.04	-.04	.02	.04	.09*	.17*	1		
whhdm	-.02	.04*	-.04	-.01	-.01	.01	-.04	-.0001	-.01	1	
gendereq	-.08*	.01	.02	.00	-.003	-.03	-.06	-.03	-.01	.04	1

Table D.4: All Men Specification On The Justifications Of Intimate Partner Violence
(N=7766, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	mgv	mnoedu	mprim	mhigher	agem1	agem3	agem4	mnowork	mprof	magricul	mmanual	poor	rich	urban	head
mgv	1														
mnoedu	.02	1													
mprim	.06*	-.28*	1												
mhigher	-.07*	-.09*	-.40*	1											
agem1	.07	-.03*	-.04*	-.05*	1										
agem3	-.03*	-.01	-.03*	.02	-.19*	1									
agem4	-.04*	.06*	.06*	.01	-.15*	-.41*	1								
mnowork	.00	.00	-.04	.02	.03*	-.01	-.003	1							
mprof	-.07*	-.08*	-.28*	.45*	-.03*	.01	.05*	-.02*	1						
magricul	.05*	.21*	.19*	-.17*	-.02*	-.04*	.09*	-.03*	-.23*	1					
mmanual	.00	-.08*	.08*	-.16*	.03*	.02	-.09*	-.05*	-.34*	-.52*	1				
poor	.09*	.16*	.27*	-.27*	.09*	-.06*	-.04*	.01	-.27*	.35*	-.04*	1			
rich	-.08*	-.13*	-.27*	.32*	-.07	.06*	.06*	.02*	.32*	-.27*	-.04*	-.65*	1		
urban	-.02	-.10*	-.17*	.17*	-.01	.04*	-.03*	.01	.15*	-.36*	.17*	-.38*	.31*	1	
head	-.02	-.01	.04*	.01	-.14*	.05*	.06*	-.04	.02	.03*	-.05*	.03*	-.03*	-.02	1

mmaritalstat	-.08*	-.08*	-.16*	.28*	-.11*	.04*	.13*	.00	.25*	-.12*	-.09*	-.30*	.33*	.12*	.08*
mmarital1	.07*	-.05*	-.10*	.04*	.38*	-.26*	-.35*	.01	-.01	-.07*	.05*	.07*	-.06*	.01	-.13*
mmarital3	-.05*	.06*	.07*	-.04*	-.15*	-.01	.46*	.01	.01	.07*	-.04*	-.05*	.05*	-.02	.08*
mmarital4	-.02	.03*	.10*	-.05*	-.07*	-.19*	.22*	-.01	-.02	.10*	-.07*	.03*	-.03*	-.05*	.04*
sons	-.02*	.01	.02	-.003	-.11*	.08*	.02	-.005	-.002	.02*	-.02	.00	.00	.01	.06*
daughters	-.02	-.001	.00	.02*	-.07*	.11*	-.03*	.00	.02	.01	.00	-.01	.03*	.01	.04*
mnewspaper	-.04*	-.21*	-.24*	.25*	-.01	.03*	-.03*	.02	.23*	.27*	.01	-.29*	.26*	.22*	-.001
mradio	-.01	-.09*	-.05*	.06*	.02	.01	-.03*	-.01	.06*	-.09*	.03*	-.10*	.08*	.05*	-.01
mtv	-.07*	-.17*	-.11*	.11*	-.01	.01	-.02	.02*	.10*	-.26*	.12*	-.25*	.17*	.19*	-.01
mhhdm	.08*	.03*	.10*	-.11*	.03*	-.02	-.03*	-.001	-.09*	.08*	-.004	.13*	-.12*	-.08*	.01
mrefsex	.28*	.00	.05*	-.06*	.04*	-.02	-.003	-.002	-.07*	.04*	.01	.06*	-.05*	-.04*	-.001
acceptablework	-.04*	-.02	-.11*	.14*	-.05*	.04*	.03*	.02	.11*	-.04*	-.05*	-.12*	.14*	.06*	.00

	mmaritalstat	mmarital1	mmarital3	mmarital4	sons	daughters	mnewspaper	mradio	mtv	mhhdm	mrefsex	acceptablework
mmaritalstat	1											
mmarital1	-.11*	1										
mmarital3	.09*	-.39*	1									
mmarital4	.01	-.19*	-.15*	1								
sons	.05*	-.12*	.04*	-.03*	1							
daughters	.05*	-.07*	-.01	-.04*	-.08*	1						
mnewspaper	.15*	.02	-.04*	-.06*	-.02	-.001	1					
mradio	.03*	.02	-.01	-.05*	-.01	-.01	.18*	1				
mtv	.08*	.02	-.005	-.06*	-.02	.00	.21*	.25*	1			
mhhdm	-.09*	.03*	-.00	-.0003	-.0003	-.003	-.10*	-.04*	-.09*	1		
mrefsex	-.05*	.02*	-.01	.00	.01	-.01	-.02	-.02	-.05*	.08*	1	
acceptablework	.10*	-.02*	.03*	-.01	.01	-.003	.04*	.01	.04*	-.08*	-.02*	1

Table D.5: Asset-Poor Men Specification On The Justifications Of Intimate Partner Violence
(N=4154, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	mgv	mnoedu	mprim	mhigher	agem1	agem3	agem4	mnowork	mprof	magricul	mmanual	wealth	urban	head
mgv	1													
mnoedu	.01	1												
mprim	.04*	-.48*	1											
mhigher	-.05*	-.06*	-.27*	1										
agem1	.07*	-.06*	-.07*	.01	1									
agem3	-.03*	-.0002	.00	-.02	-.21*	1								
agem4	-.04*	.07*	.07*	-.03	-.17*	-.37*	1							
mnowork	-.04*	.01	-.05*	.01	.01	-.01	-.01	1						

mprof	-.02	-.03*	-.17*	.28*	.01	.03	-.02	-.01	1					
magricul	.02	.18*	.09*	-.10*	-.08*	-.01	.13*	-.05*	-.18*	1				
mmanual	-.01	-.12*	.02	-.06*	.06*	-.003	-.09*	-.05*	-.18*	-.07*	1			
wealth	-.06*	-.13*	-.09*	.12*	-.05*	.03*	-.003	.01	.10*	-.31*	.20*	1		
urban	.03*	-.05*	-.06*	.04*	.04*	.02	-.07*	.02	.04*	-.32*	.26*	.26*	1	
head	-.02	-.02	.05*	-.01	-.12*	.05*	.06*	-.05*	.02	.03*	-.03*	.00	-.01	1
mmaritalstat	-.05*	-.03	-.03	.09*	-.08*	.02	.10*	.01	.05*	.01	-.04*	.09*	-.01	.07*
mmarital1	.07*	-.07*	-.11*	.06*	.41*	-.29*	-.36*	.02	-.01	-.11*	.07*	-.05*	.03	-.13*
mmarital3	-.04*	.08*	.03*	-.03*	-.16*	.04*	.44*	-.01	.01	.10*	-.08*	-.01	-.04*	-.06*
mmarital4	-.02	.03	.08*	-.04*	-.09*	-.19*	.25*	.00	-.02	.10*	-.09*	.00	.01	.04*
sons	-.03*	.02	.03	.02	-.14*	.09*	.02	-.02	-.01	.04*	-.03	-.02	.00	.07*
daughters	-.02	.01	.02	-.004	-.07*	.10*	-.03*	.01	-.004	.03*	-.01	-.03	.13*	.02
mnewspaper	-.004	-.20*	-.13*	.15*	.05*	-.00	-.06*	.03*	.13*	-.23*	.09*	.16*	.03*	-.002
mradio	-.03	-.10*	-.01	.04*	.04*	.00	-.03*	.00	.02	-.08*	.05*	.07*	.15*	-.02
mtv	-.05*	-.15*	-.05	.07*	.01	-.01	-.04*	.03	.07*	-.23*	.17*	.27*	-.03*	-.02
mhhdm	.09*	.01	.04*	-.06*	.02	-.02	-.01	-.01	-.02	.04*	-.03*	-.08*	-.01	-.004
mrefsex	.30*	-.01	.03*	-.03	.04*	-.02	.01	-.005	-.02	.02	-.01	-.04*	-.01	-.005
acceptablework	-.02	.00	-.05*	-.06*	-.03	.04*	.02	.01	.04*	.01	-.03	-.01	.00	-.02

	mmaritalstat	mmarital1	mmarital3	mmarital4	sons	daughters	mnewspaper	mradio	mtv	mhhdm	mrefsex	acceptablework
mmaritalstat	1											
mmarital1	-.11*	1										
mmarital3	.07*	-.40*	1									
mmarital4	.05*	-.21*	-.15*	1								
sons	.05*	-.14*	.05*	-.02	1							
daughters	.02	-.07*	-.01	-.05*	-.04*	1						
mnewspaper	.02	.05*	-.05*	-.06*	-.03*	-.03*	1					
mradio	.01	.04*	-.02	-.05*	.02	-.03	.15*	1				
mtv	.01	.04*	-.02	-.06*	-.02	.00	.17*	.25*	1			
mhhdm	-.03*	.03*	.01	-.01	.00	-.01	-.06*	-.02	-.07*	1		
mrefsex	-.02	.02	.00	.01	.00	-.03*	-.004	-.01	-.04*	.06*	1	
acceptablework	.03	-.02	.02	.00	.02	-.01	-.02	-.004	-.01	-.05*	-.001	1

Table D.6: Asset-Rich Men Specification On The Justifications Of Intimate Partner Violence
(N=2070, * denotes correlation significance at the 5% level)

	mgv	mnoedu	mprim	mhigher	agem1	agem3	agem4	mprof	magricul	mmanual	wealth	urban	head
mgv	1												
mnoedu	.02	1											

mprim	.05*	-.07*	1										
mhigher	-.07*	-.06*	-.43*	1									
agem1	.02	-.02	-.05*	-.06*	1								
agem3	-.03	.01	-.06*	.01	-.16*	1							
agem4	-.04	.04	.11*	.01	-.12*	-.51*	1						
mprof	-.09	-.05*	-.28*	.44*	-.02	-.02	.08*	1					
magricul	.03	-.05*	.12*	-.09*	.00	-.05*	.06*	-.17*	1				
mmanual	.07*	.02	.19*	-.29*	-.01	.03	-.06*	-.55*	-.21*	1			
wealth	-.03*	-.06*	-.17*	.21*	-.05	.03	.04	.20*	-.02	-.16*	1		
urban	.01	-.01	-.06*	.08*	-.01	.01	-.03	.08*	-.11*	.01	.11*	1	
head	-.04*	-.05*	.01	.03	-.21*	.07*	.08*	.05*	-.003	-.05*	.03*	-.04	1
mmaritalstat	.08*	-.05*	-.12*	.25*	-.12*	.04	.15*	.24*	-.03	-.15*	.23*	-.01	.12*
mmarital1	.08*	-.05*	-.14*	.07*	.31*	-.18*	-.35*	.03	-.08*	-.004	-.04*	.02	-.15*
mmarital3	-.03*	.03	.13*	-.07*	-.12*	-.12*	.47*	-.004	.08*	.00	.02	-.05	.10*
mmarital4	-.01	.06*	.10*	-.06*	-.05*	-.19*	.19*	-.02	.10*	-.02	-.001	.00	.03
sons	-.01	-.04	.03	-.02	-.05*	.09*	.01	.01	.00	-.01	.01	-.002	.04*
daughters	.00	-.03	-.02	.04*	-.06*	.12*	-.02	.04*	-.03	.02	.02	-.01	.04*
mnewspaper	-.03	-.12*	-.22*	.23*	-.04	.02	-.03	.19*	-.10*	-.13*	.10*	.10*	.01
mradio	.01	-.04*	.05*	.06*	-.02	.01	-.04	.05*	-.04	-.04	.05*	.01	.01
mtv	-.05*	-.07	-.04	.03	-.01	-.01	.03	.01	-.01	-.001	.06*	-.02	.04*
mhhdm	-.002	-.002	.10*	-.10*	.04	.03	-.04	.09*	.00	.05*	-.07*	-.03	.03
mrefsex	.25*	.05*	.05*	-.07*	.01	-.01	-.001	-.11*	.04	.08	-.03	-.01	-.02
acceptablework	-.01*	-.01	-.12*	.15*	-.06*	.03	.02	.11*	.01	-.07	.10*	.03	.06*

	mmaritalstat	mmarital1	mmarital3	mmarital4	sons	daughters	mnewspaper	mradio	mtv	mhhdm	mrefsex	acceptablework
mmaritalstat	1											
mmarital1	-.11*	1										
mmarital3	.11*	-.39*	1									
mmarital4	-.03	-.15*	-.15*	1								
sons	.08*	-.10*	.06*	-.05*	1							
daughters	.07*	-.07*	-.02	-.01	-.15*	1						
mnewspaper	.08*	.00	-.04	-.02	.02	.03*	1					
mradio	-.02	.02	-.01	-.04	-.003	-.01	.17*	1				
mtv	-.02	.00	.00	-.01	-.02	-.01	.12*		1			
mhhdm	-.08*	.01	-.002	.02	-.001	-.01	-.06*	-.05	-.03	1		
mrefsex	-.06*	.04	-.03	.01	.02	.02	.00	-.04*	-.06*	.06*	1	
acceptablework	.09*	-.002	.03	-.03	.01	-.02	.05*	-.01	.06*	-.09*	-.06*	1

APPENDIX E

DISCUSSION OF CORRELATIONS AND MODEL TEST STATISTICS

Discussion of Correlations³⁴

In the pooled specification of women's justification of intimate partner violence (WGV), N=7766, correlations emerge that provide preliminary insight into the role of gendered beliefs, endogenous preferences, and the justification of gender violence at the household level. A woman's household decision-making ability index score (a higher score for women means less household decision-making ability) is positively and significantly correlated with woman agreeing to at least one of the justifications for intimate partner violence, with $\text{corr}(\text{WHHDM}, \text{WGV}) = .05^*$. Similarly, women who agree with more traditional gender roles (as measured by the index GENDEREQ) are also more likely to agree with at least one justification for intimate partner violence; $\text{corr}(\text{GENDEREQ}, \text{WGV}) = .14^*$. In this pooled sample women between the ages of 15 to 24 (AGEW1) there is a positive correlation with agreeing to at least one justification, $\text{corr}(\text{AGEW1}, \text{WGV}) = .05^*$, while women between the ages of 35-44 (AGEW3) have a negative correlation with agreeing to at least one justification, $(\text{AGEW3}, \text{WGV}) = -.02^*$ suggesting that younger women may adopted more traditional gender roles and adhere to gender hierarchy than older women.

In the pooled sample women in the asset-poor category (POOR) are positively and significantly correlated with agreeing to at least one justification, $\text{corr}(\text{POOR},$

³⁴ See appendix C for correlation matrices and significance at the 5% level

WGV)=-.08*. However women in the asset-rich category (RICH), have a negative correlation with agreeing to at least one of the justifications, with $\text{corr}(\text{RICH}, \text{WGV}) = -.08^*$. The respective correlations of POOR and RICH to the dependent variable WGV suggest that disaggregating the pooled specification into class sub-samples may provide further information and in this chapter I estimate the specification of women's justification of intimate partner violence first on a sub-sample of only women in the asset-poor category and then on a sub-sample of those in the asset-rich category. In the specification of women in the asset-poor category (N= 4154), both women's household decision-making index score (WHHDM) and adhering to more traditional gender roles (GENDEREQ) are positively and significantly correlated with WGV, respectively $\text{corr}(\text{WHHDM}, \text{WGV}) = .07^*$ and $\text{corr}(\text{GENDEREQ}, \text{WGV}) = .15^*$. Whereas, for women in the asset-rich category (N=2068), only GENDEREQ is positively and significantly correlated with WGV, $\text{corr}(\text{GENDEREQ}, \text{WGV}) = .06^*$, but lower than the same variables correlation coefficient for women in the asset-poor category.

In the specification of pooled sample of men's justification of intimate partner violence, N=7766, correlation coefficients suggest that men's gendered beliefs and attitudes also matter for the justification of intimate partner violence (MGV). The variable that measures men's household decision-making ability (the index score MHHDM) is positively and significantly correlated with MGV, $\text{corr}(\text{MHHDM}, \text{MGV}) = .08^*$. Men who agree with using violence or withholding money from their partners should they refuse sex (measured by the index score MREFSEX) have a positive and significant correlation coefficient with MGV, $\text{corr}(\text{MREFSEX}, \text{MGV}) = .28^*$. However, the variable ACCEPTABLEWORK, men agreeing that it is acceptable for women to

work outside the home, is negatively correlated with agreeing to at least one justification for intimate partner violence with a corr (ACCEPTABLEWORK, MGVS) = -.04*. As in the pooled women's specification, for men corr (POOR, MGVS) = .09* and corr (RICH, MGVS) = -.08*. I disaggregate the pooled sample into two categories: asset-poor (N=5154) and asset-rich (N=2070). In the sub-sample of asset-poor men, corr (MHHDM, MGVS) = .09* and corr (MREFSEX, MGVS) = .30*, whereas for asset-rich men MHHDM is not significantly correlated with MGVS and corr (MREFSEX, MGVS) = .25*, a lower correlation coefficient than that of asset-poor men.

Discussion of Model Test Statistics using McFadden's R²

The model test statistic presented in Tables 3.13 and 3.14 is McFadden's R², also known as the pseudo-R², which is characterized by the following equation:

$$R^2 = 1 - \frac{\ln \hat{L}(M_{Full})}{\ln \hat{L}(M_{Intercept})}$$

M_{Full} is the model with the predictors, so in this case the numerator of the ratio represents the estimated log likelihood of the model as specified with predictors. The denominator, M_{Intercept} is the estimated log likelihood of the model of the model without predictors. The ratio of these provides the level of improvement of the full model over the model with only an intercept. Because McFadden's R² use the ratio of estimated log

likelihood of the full model over the model without predictors, a small ratio denotes that the full model is a much better fit.³⁵

³⁵ FAQ: What are pseudo R-squareds? UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group from www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/Psuedo_RSquareds.htm (accessed August 3, 2013)

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