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Item Type	Working Paper
Authors	Daoud, Adel;Reinsberg, Bernhard;Kentikelenis, Alexander E.;Stubbs, Thomas H.;King, Lawrence P.
DOI	10.7275/27252138
Rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Download date	2026-03-07 09:49:27
Item License	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Link to Item	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14394/40145



POLITICAL ECONOMY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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September 2018

WORKINGPAPER SERIES

Number 468

Spreading the Washington Consensus into Food and Agriculture Sectors: The Case of the International Monetary Fund

Adel Daoud^{1,2*}, Bernhard Reinsberg¹, Alexander E. Kentikelenis^{1,3,5},
Thomas H. Stubbs^{1,4}, and Lawrence P. King^{1,6}

1. Centre for Business Research, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, UK
2. Center for Population and Development Studies Harvard, Harvard University, US
3. Trinity College, University of Oxford, UK
4. School of Social Sciences, University of Waikato, New Zealand
5. Department of Sociology, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands
6. Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, US

* Corresponding author: ad836@cam.ac.uk

Abstract: The mandate and competence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) do not cover food and agriculture policies. Yet, signs indicate that IMF engages in these policies. Scholars lack a systematic empirical foundation to monitor the extent and impact of IMF's operations on these sectors. Based on a combination of machine and human coding, we present a comprehensive database on IMF's policy interventions in food and agriculture. Using new data on IMF conditionality between 1980 and 2014, we assess to what extent the IMF targets these sectors through its 'conditionalities'—policies that governments need to implement to access IMF credit. The analysis evaluates the agricultural content and ideological orientation of each condition according to whether it promotes a developmental state, a night-watchman state, or neither. The analysis identifies that about 2% of all IMF conditions (1,105 of 58,406) directly target food and agriculture issues. These conditions are available in 43% of all IMF programs (332 of 781). They affect 100 countries of all the 131 countries in which the IMF had any agreements since the 1980s. In addition, the analysis reveals that 59.2% of these conditions embody policy measures in line with a night-watchman state, 40.1% are model-neutral, and 0.7% are developmental. Within the model-neutral category, 23.9% are conditions oriented towards building state capacity; 2.7% have a poverty reduction content; and 2.9% contain pro-environmental policies. The article discusses potential mechanisms driving the IMF to intervene into agriculture and theorizes about possible effects of these conditions on people's livelihoods.

Keywords: International Monetary Fund; agriculture; Washington Consensus; development; text mining, content analysis.

JEL Code: D02, F6, L66, Q1, Q2, Q3, J43, N5, O13, P4, P5, P32, P36, I3

Author contributions. Conceived the research topic and led the research: AD. Designed the research: AD, LPK. Programed the text-mining algorithm: AD. Collected the FAO data: AD. Collected the IMF data: AEK and TS. Performed the qualitative content analysis: AD, LPK. Interpreted the results: AD, LPK. Wrote the manuscript: AD. Revised the manuscript: AD, BR, LK, AEK and THS.

1 Introduction

“Bread coupons will be abolished and the price of bread will be liberalized.” Armenia, 28-Jun-1995, (IMF, 1993a).¹

“Privatize ... or liquidate all state farms,” Albania, 14-Jul-1993, (IMF, 1993a).²

“Complete liquidation of the Bolivian Agricultural Bank...” Bolivia, 27-Jul-1988 (IMF, 1988a).³

Major events such as the global 2008 food crisis expose some of the weaknesses of the international trade system. The crisis challenged the structural capacity of the system to feed the current global population – and its potential ability to provide for 9 billion people by 2050. This system’s strained capacity and slow adaptability supplied additional energy to the policy debate on food sovereignty and the efficiency of liberalization of agriculture trade (Laroche Dupraz and Postolle, 2013). Yet, scholars lack a systematic empirical foundation that enables them to evaluate the role played by powerful international financial organizations in fueling liberalization of agricultural policies as well as the efficiency of such liberalization policies to promote agricultural growth.

This paper presents a comprehensive database on the International Monetary Fund’s conditionalities (available online as supplement files). Drawing on previous research (Kentikelenis et al., 2016), we isolated conditions related to food and agriculture using a combination of a dictionary-based text (machine) mining and qualitative (human) content

¹ EBS/95/100

² EBS/93/93

³ EBS/92/137

analysis (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). This database locates over 4,500 loan-related documents and identifies 58,406 conditions affecting 131 countries during the period 1980-2014. Rather than assuming IMF programs to deliver homogenous policy effects in agriculture, this new dataset unpacks the heterogeneity of IMF conditions across time and space. This dataset, then, enables a more nuanced and fine-grained picture of IMF operations; powering a less caricatures image of the Fund's engagement with its borrowers.

Besides measuring the IMF's role in agriculture, another key contribution of this paper is to use this data to provide stylized facts of IMF's mission creep into key affected country-cases. Our article calls for further investigation into the causes and effects of agricultural conditionalities. This can relate to, for example, public health, poverty, food riots, food price inflation, food security, transformation agrarian communities, urbanization, and land grabbing (Amanor, 2017; Bienen and Gersovitz, 1985; Bohstedt, 2016; Daoud et al., 2017; Liao et al., 2016; Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Kerr, 2017). While the state of the art of international political economy offers insights on the World Bank's involvement in food and agriculture (Ellis and Biggs, 2001; Gibbon et al., 1993), it is relatively silent on the IMF's (Bienen and Gersovitz, 1986; Walton and Seddon, 1994).

The paper contributes to the political economy of agriculture focusing on developmental states versus night-watchman state policies. Governments in several developing countries tend to protect their food and agriculture sectors from global market forces (Laroche Dupraz and Postolle, 2013). They use protectionist strategies to provide for their populations—especially in countries with looming food insecurity—and modernize their agricultural industries (Cline, 2004; Daoud, 2017; FAO, 2003; Stiglitz, 2003; WTO, 2004). Governments possess an array of policy tools to achieve these goals: setting up state-owned farms to grow the stock of food;

regulating food prices to combat inflation; establishing agriculture banks to facilitate capital investments in farming; or, imposing import and export tariffs and quotas to benefit their domestic markets. These types of policy tools belong to what is known as a ‘developmental state’ strategy (Johnson, 1982). The essence of a developmental state consists of government-led programs that seek to transform the domestic economy in such a way to produce more value-added goods and services than before. In a global perspective, the government attempts to upgrade its economy in the international division of labor toward more high-tech sectors (Chang, 2014; Saraswati et al., 2013; Woo-Cumings, 1999). The strategy revolves around using a state’s capacity to set a clear development course, rather than relying on the tides of free markets alone.

However, the developmental state literature has focus on middle- and low-income countries’ industrialization efforts, and less attention to the agricultural sector. Looney (2012) notes on Korea, Taiwan and China, that, “the developmental state literature...generally ignores the role of the state in rural development” (pp. 1-2) and that “these scholars [Amsden and Wade] and others have paid very limited attention to the rural sector in elaborating their theories of the developmental state” (pp. 30-31). This study expands this literature, covering part of this lack.

The counterimage to the developmental state is the ‘night-watchman state’ (Friedman, 1982). The night-watchman state is characterized by limited intervention into domestic markets; and state intervention is justified only on the grounds of correcting market failures, for example the underprovision of essential public goods such as national defense. Based on the view that government failure can have worse socio-economic outcomes than market failure, a set of free-market policies also known as the ‘Washington Consensus’, gained momentum in the 1980s (Williamson 1990). These policies include macroeconomic stabilization, privatization,

liberalization, and deregulation (Summers and Pritchett 1993). Among the key advocates of the Washington Consensus agenda were the Bretton Woods Institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Babb, 2013; Henisz et al., 2005; S. Nelson, 2014; Williamson, 1990). They argue that the best tool to combat poverty is by removing obstacles to economic growth (Cline, 2004; Vreeland, 2003). State-led modernization programs, subsidies, and interventions are not only costly—which low and middle-income countries rarely can afford—but also distort the market mechanism leading to inefficient allocation of resources (Summers and Pritchett, 1993).

The World Bank and the IMF occupy unique positions in the global community as they can directly affect the policy space of developing countries (Dreher, 2009). Born out of the Bretton Woods agreement, the mandate of the IMF is tailored towards monitoring and supporting governments on macroeconomic issues. Its goal is to uphold global economic stability, which includes acting as a lender of last resort to governments in fiscal crises. Via its conditional lending programs, the IMF routinely pushed for privatization, liberalization, stabilization, and deregulation (Chang, 2006; Stiglitz, 2003; Vreeland, 2003; Woods, 2006). While its mandate does not include food and agriculture issues (Plant, 2008)—contrary to the World Bank’s—these sectors have not been exempt (Berazneva and Lee, 2013; Klomp, 2014; Walton and Seddon, 1994), as the quotations above testify.

The IMF states that it will occasionally include food and agriculture reforms in its programs if it regards them as critical for achieving macroeconomic stability. As regards the usage of conditionality on food and agricultural policies, Mark Plant, former Deputy Director of the IMF’s Policy Development and Review Department, notes that “this is rare” (Plant, 2008) because the IMF lacks competence on these issues (IMF, 2008a).

Following from this political economy theory debate, this article has two research questions. First, we ask, to what extent the IMF targets food and agriculture with its conditional lending programs. An extensive targeting offer evidence for what is called *mission creep* in organization studies: spreading of organizational activities away from their original mandates (Babb and Buira, 2005; Einhorn, 2001; S. C. Nelson, 2014). Scholars suggest that when the IMF's policies move beyond its core mandate of macroeconomic issues and into new substantive areas—including domestic politics—it then challenges government's national sovereignty (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 45). Hence, this article examines the scope of *IMF Food and Agriculture Conditionality*. It investigates IMF's use of food and agricultural policy conditionality in terms of the breadth and depth of such policy conditions across both time and space (countries and regions) (Babb and Buira, 2005).

Second, we inquiry what ideological orientation does these agricultural conditions have in terms of free-market versus state-led development policies? It is well known that the IMF's policies, since the 1980s, embody the Washington Consensus agenda. However, partly motivated by the dense critique of its operations, the IMF has sought to rebrand itself (Kentikelenis et al., 2016; Rodrik, 1997). For example, referring to structural adjustment, Managing Director Christine Lagarde announced in 2009, "We don't do that any more," suggesting that the organization has changed its way of offering financial assistance to governments (IMF, 2014). This warrants an investigation into the evolution of the IMF's ideological orientation (Serra and Stiglitz, 2008; Williamson, 2003). To what extent has the IMF's ideological orientation shifted towards building state capacity, transparency, and social safety nets rather than promoting free-market policies? This quantification forms a stepping-stone to future research on the links between

worldwide agricultural developments, economic globalization, and IMF conditionality (Daoud, 2007).

We structure the paper as follows. In the next section, we describe our data and methodology (section 2). This section details how we devised a text-mining dictionary based on the terminology of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and how we used it. This section also explains how we subsequently used qualitative content analysis to evaluate the policy orientation of each condition. After that, the article outlines the empirical findings across time (1980-2014) and space (all countries in the world) (section 3). It examines the frequency, content, history, and geography of these conditions. Then, based on this evidence, we theorize about the IMF's motivation to engage in agriculture (section 4). We conclude the paper with a discussion about prospects for future research (section 5).

2 Data and methodology

Our methodology has two key components. First, we used machine coding based on a dictionary method to identify IMF conditions relating to food and agricultural issues. Second, we conducted a human qualitative coding of the content of these conditions. The purpose of the human coding was both to validate that the machine coding yielded plausible matches and to evaluate the policy content of each condition. This section explains our methodological procedure in greater detail.

Machine coding

The first substantial part of our dictionary-based machine coding consisted of developing a list (dictionary) of words and phrases relating to food and agricultural issues. We compiled this

dictionary based on the FAO's terminology.⁴ We chose the FAO as it is an external source— independent of the IMF's discourse and ours as researchers—ensuring that our dictionary guards against two types of biases (Quinn et al., 2010): misplaced and omitted terms. As the FAO is the leading global authority on food and agricultural issues, relying on our FAO dictionary ensures that we do not include misplaced or redundant terms. For example, including such terms could bias our results upwards by capturing more conditions than what the IMF articulates. Similarly, if our dictionary were to omit any terms, we would underrepresent the true level of the IMF's engagement in food and agriculture policies. Accordingly, by compiling and using our FAO dictionary, we assume that we are guarding against these biases.

[Figure 1 about here]

Figure 1 outlines how we constructed the dictionary, call it *D*. The FAO maintains 72 datasets in its area of interest:⁵ from food security to forestry. We screened these 72 datasets, identifying those that contain concrete nouns (e.g. apples, milk, sugar), and relevant abstract nouns (e.g. agriculture prices, labor force survey, population census, agriculture employment). We identified 29 datasets that contained 1,045 value labels. Table S3 in the supplementary material section lists all these 29 sources. The value labels contained in these datasets comprise our set of candidate terms for our dictionary. We further processed these terms by removing numbers, special characters, singularized and pluralized relevant terms. We manually and iteratively, by trial and error, validated the relevance of all terms against the IMF corpus. Our final dictionary

⁴ We experimented with several other sources, but found their terminology to often contain either a large amount of general terms or too specific: United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Library ([glossary](#)); European Commission, Agriculture and rural development ([glossary](#)); World Bank's general [glossary](#).

⁵ We accessed FAO's databases online by November, 2016.

distilled down to 772 unique terms, t . In a compact set notation, we write, $D = \{t_1, \dots, t_k\}$, where the index 1 through k indicates the number of validated FAO terms in the dictionary, D .

The second substantial part of our dictionary-based method consisted of preparing an all-encompassing IMF corpus database on which to apply the dictionary. While several datasets exist on IMF programs (e.g. Vreeland, 2007), only the IMF's Monitoring of Fund Arrangements database (MONA) offers disaggregated information about the content of these programs. However, MONA has been shown to be incomplete and biased (Arpac et al., 2008; IEO, 2007). Kentikelenis *et al.* (2016) sought to correct these shortcomings and created a comprehensive database of IMF conditions based on relevant archival material on the IMF's lending operations. Their data are derived from 4,500 IMF documents and include 58,406 conditions across 131 countries in total. Building on these data, we prepared a corpus of IMF conditions based only on the so-called Executive Board Specials (*EBS*), which contain the policy measures that governments need to implement under IMF programs. We exclude the parts of the EBS documents outlining the macroeconomic background motivating the need for specific conditions. Hence, by focusing on the conditions, we capture precisely which actions governments need to implement to receive IMF funding.

Figure 2 describes the process of how we prepared the IMF conditionality corpus (call it C). We used standard cleaning procedures in text mining (Jockers, 2014), by removing numbers and special characters as those do not carry qualitative meaning.⁶ The corpus was then searched for cases (conditions) that contain possibly ambiguous terminology (polysemy⁷, homonymy⁸,

⁶ We tested to lemmatize and stemming the corpus, in contrast to keep the corpus as it is. After validation we decided to rely on regular expression for the text search, as that produce the most robust results (in the sense that it gave the most conservative and valid hits regarding food and agricultural issues)

⁷ Words with related meaning.

⁸ Words with the same spelling but carrying multiple meaning depending on context.

synonymy). In particular, we looked for dubious cases such as: land,⁹ organic,¹⁰ camel,¹¹ oil,¹² among others. We manually created exclusion and inclusion lists both for the cases (conditions) and terms (words), judged on how they matched to conditions. This procedure resulted in a document-term (in our case, conditionality-word) matrix, where each type of condition, c_p , is represented as a vector of words w_{pz} . The index p captures the number of conditions in the corpus, C , and z captures the number of words in each condition.

When both the dictionary and the IMF corpus were ready, we finalized the machine-driven analysis by applying our calibrated search function, f ,

$$f(c_p) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } w_{pz} \in D \\ 0, & \text{if } w_{pz} \notin D \end{cases}$$

This function checks whether any of the words, w_{pz} , in an area of conditionality, c_p , appear in the FAO dictionary, D . If there was at least one matching word with a dictionary term, t , then that conditionality was given a value of one and filtered for further human coding. If no words matched an area of conditionality, then we declared that condition having no direct relevance to food and agricultural issues, and thus, discarded.

Human coding

Our human coding, conducted by two researchers, proceeded in three steps. Throughout the following three steps, the coders convened when any of them found a condition ambiguous to

⁹ *Land* does refer to both *arable land* but also *land-based border post* (for taxation).

¹⁰ The IMF refers to “organic law” (foundational for corporations and other organizations) or “organic budget”, but never to *organic* in an agricultural sense.

¹¹ CAMEL is a rating system developed in the U.S. banking system and used in the IMF financial language; there are no occasions where the IMF conditions policy on the animal, camel.

¹² *Oil* refers to both *edible oil* but also *oil prices*.

categorize; this happened in about 8 percent of the conditions. The coders also convened to verify the other category assignment iteratively to increase reliability of the coding procedure.

In the first step, further validated that the machine-driven procedure identified conditions about food and agriculture issues. Even after several steps of filtering at the machine-coding phase, some conditions might still be falsely considered to be about agriculture. Table 1 outlines some conditions exemplifying our key coding principles. The first example shows a typical structure of a false positive case. The machine search identified the term *land* in ‘Landsbanki’—Iceland’s oldest bank—and therefore, erroneously identified it as an agricultural policy. With this manual validation, we identified nine false positives.

In the second step, the two coders manually assigned a code to each condition and grouped these codes according to their substantive areas (e.g. price liberalization, privatization, capacity building). Motivated by the principles of grounded theory (Corbin and Strauss, 2007), we defined the number and content of the groups inductively and iteratively, with no prior categories. We formulated nine principles that guided the qualitative analysis:

1. All machine identified food and agricultural conditions shall be human coded and evaluated.
2. The analysis ignores any non-agricultural content of food and agricultural conditions.
3. The analysis also identifies conditions explicitly exempting agriculture.
4. A condition can be split into two or more sub-conditions if it refers to different actions that the government needs to take, not otherwise.

5. Only if in doubt about the content of conditionality, then we consult the original IMF program documents (i.e., *EBS*)¹³.
6. Each condition, or sub-condition, is assigned to (a) only one substantive category, and (b) only one ideological category. The substantive categories are inductively generated. We posit the following ideological categories: *Developmental state*, *night-watchman state*, and *model-neutral*. Inductively created refinements within these stipulated categories are allowed.
7. Conditions consistent with both models are coded *model-neutral*.
8. The analysis is, as far as possible, neutral in evaluating the winners and losers of introducing a particular condition.
9. Both the machine and human coding shall be reproducible, systematic, and transparent. The output of the machine and human-driven analysis consists both of a qualitative (Atlas.ti bundle file) and a quantitative dataset (an Excel file). All these data are linkable back to the original Kentikelenis et al. (2016) dataset.

All the conditions were assigned a code describing its content (*principle 1*). A majority of the conditions refers to a single policy. These conditions were therefore not split into sub-conditions (about a 1,000). Example 2, in Table 1, shows such a single case: the IMF requests the Kyrgyz government to terminate the moratorium on land sales. It is, however, not uncommon that an IMF condition targets both agricultural sectors and other areas. Following *principle 2*, see example 3, we code only the agricultural reference in a condition and ignore the rest. Example 4 displays a conditionality that refers to a single condition but with an exemption in the timber sector. The IMF tends to use these if the timing of some policy is unsuitable (e.g., domestic social disturbance). Based on *principle 3*, we set them aside in a

¹³ When referring to a conditionality, we will refer to its original Executive Board Specials, EBS. For example, most of the conditions in the Algeria 1999 program can be found in EBS/94/99.

special category called, *Exempting agricultural policy*—we found 37. Motivated by *principle 4*, example 5 and 6 demonstrate how we could split a condition into two when it referred to two distinct policy actions. Example 6 highlights a split condition case where one of the sub-conditions requires an official announcement of the government’s actions.

After we assigned substantive codes, we manually grouped these into super-categories (*principle 6*). For example, code 4 and code 6 in Table 1 both refer to the elimination of subsidies. We assigned these and similar codes to a super-category we created, called *Eliminate or reduce subsidies*. We repeated this process until all substantive codes were assigned to a super-category with similar content.

After evaluating a condition’s content (*principle 6*, again), we evaluated its ideological orientation. Based on the literature, we defined a conditionality as promoting a night-watchman state when it primarily promotes the extension of private property and competitive markets into different areas of food and agriculture (Summers and Pritchett, 1993; Williamson, 1990). This governance model regards the state’s primary function as to uphold law and security (property rights). More generally, we base our definition of the Washington Consensus and night-watchman state on Williamson’s list of ten policies (1990) where he defines what Washington (i.e. IMF, World Bank, US Treasury Department, and related parties) means by the Washington Consensus.¹⁴ We will use the term *Washington Consensus* when referring to the set of policies outlined by Williamson, not merely confined to the style of governance; accordingly, we reserve the term *night-watchman state* when specifically alluding to the role of the state, under the Washington Consensus.

¹⁴ 1. Fiscal discipline; 2. Targeted social safety nets; 3. Broad and moderate tax base; 4. Market driven interest rates; 5. Competitive exchange rates; 6. Trade liberalization; 7. Liberalization of foreign direct investment; 8. Privatization of state enterprises; 9. Deregulation of markets; 10. Protection of property rights.

We defined developmental state conditions as those that seek using a state's capacity to intervene in the economy to modernizing agricultural industries rather than relying on the power of market forces alone (Saraswati et al., 2013; Woo-Cumings, 1999). Model-neutral conditions are those that are compatible with both developmentalism and the Washington Consensus – environmental policy, anti-poverty policy, policies that strengthen state capacity, and a residual category (*principle 7*). For example, some conditions pertaining to building state capacity resonate with both a developmental and a night-watchman state. Strengthening the state's capacity to tax its citizens or to monitor property rights exemplify such policies. Our framework regards such policies as model neutral. We also generated inductively several sub-categories for the model-neutral category, which allowed us to capture further nuances in IMF conditions.

Formulated in *principle 8*, it is outside the scope of this paper to investigate the causes and effects of the introduction of these conditions (e.g. on food prices, crop production, poverty). Instead, in section four of this paper, we provide a discussion related to the potential causes driving the IMF to target agricultural sectors systematically. We aim that this will guide future research in this area.

We conducted the human coding in Atlas.ti 7.2. One major advantage of using a computer assisted qualitative coding software, is that it makes the process systematic, transparent, and reproducible fulfilling *principle 9*. The machine coding was conducted in R programming.

3 Empirical evidence of IMF Food and Agriculture Conditionality

This section evaluates the empirical evidence on the the existence of a global IMF food and agricultural conditionality in the 1980-2014 period. The section starts by counting the frequency

of such conditions; it then presents their qualitatively content, traces their evolution and lastly, shows their geographical distribution.

3.1 The frequency of conditionality

Of all the 58,406 IMF conditions, 1,105¹⁵ (2%) conditions had content matching with the FAO dictionary. These are included in 332 (43%) of the IMF's programs (of 781) and affecting 100 countries. Table S1, in the supplementary section, lists all these countries and the number of times they have been affected. The IMF sought to implement most of these policies as it only waived 36 of these.

To get a sense of whether 2% is sizable or not, we conducted two benchmarking exercises. Kentikelenis *et al.* (2016) offer the first point of comparison. Based on a qualitative content analysis, they find, for example, that IMF's largest (core) policy area, *external debt issues*, sum to 15,407 (27.8% of the total), dwarfing the share of food and agriculture conditions. Food and agriculture conditions match rather the share of typically sized policy categories: *poverty reduction policies*, contains 822 conditions (1.5 % of the total), *institutional reforms* 1,357 (2.4%), *labor issues* 1,987 (3.6%), and *state-owned enterprise privatization* 3,303 (6.0%). Nevertheless, our methodology searches through all policy areas to identify food and agriculture conditions. It captures, consequently, conditions containing a variety of issues necessarily about *food* and *agriculture* and optionally about *debt*, *institutions*, or other areas of interest for the IMF. Table S2 shows how our matches distribute across their policy areas.

A specialized benchmark is to compare food and agriculture conditionality against the IMF's conditions on health systems (Clements et al., 2014). For that, we constructed yet another

¹⁵ 1,228 conditions counting sub-conditions.

dictionary containing the terms: *health, medic, pharma, drug, nurse, doctor, disease, vaccine, immuniz, measl, dpt, polio, hospi, care spend, care law, clinic*. This dictionary matched on 215 conditions 0.4% of the total, indicating the relative importance of food and agriculture over health issues.

Table 2 outlines the top 50 dictionary terms based on hits. Words with the stem *agric* (agricultural, agriculture, etc.) are the most frequent of the IMF's food and agriculture conditionality, with 192 hits; followed by *land* (138 hits), and *water* (106 hits). We observe that the rest of the list indicates that IMF conditionality will target a myriad of food and agricultural areas: farming, irrigation, fishery, textile, cigarette, and alcohol products. The hits displayed in the table match on non-unique conditions, implying that different terms can match on the same condition. These machine-driven results (hits) will, nevertheless, sum up to 1,105 unique conditions in the Kentikelenis *et al.* (2016) database.

[Table 2 about here]

3.2 The content and ideological orientation of conditionality

[Table 3 about here]

The qualitative content analysis shows that IMF food and agriculture conditionality vary in breadth and depth. Table 3 outlines our fourteen inductively generated policy categories and three overarching ideological models. The model-neutral category consists of four inductively generated sub-categories: *environmental, build state capacity, poverty reduction, and miscellaneous*. The fourteen policy action categories capture the substantive content of food

and agriculture conditionality that the IMF and governments have agreed to include in their adjustment programs. We proceed by presenting key overarching findings, and then outline specific results on each of the fourteen categories.

Of the 1,105 conditions, we further identified conditions that can be split into sub-conditions. As we explained in the methods section and exemplified in Table 1, we split a condition when it referred to more than one policy actions for which with the government needs to comply. This procedure generated an additional 123 conditions, leading to a total of 1,228.

Our analysis shows that the ideological orientation of the IMF's food and agriculture conditions is more nuanced than how the IMF has been portrayed in the literature (Babb, 2013; Walton and Seddon, 1994). Our results show that 59.2% (727) of the 1,228 conditions are oriented towards a Washington Consensus state model; 40.1% (493) are model-neutral; and 0.7 % (8) developmental. Within the model-neutral category, 23.9% (294) are conditions oriented towards building state capacity. Only 2.7% (33) have an explicit poverty reduction content and 2.9% (35) contain a pro-environmental policy—we discuss this finding in the discussion section.

The policy action categories tend to be tilted towards one of the ideological models. The category *establish, privatize or reduce cost of SOE (State Owned Enterprise), and liberalize sectors* is the largest category (192) overall and scores the highest on the Washington Consensus model (178). Ukraine (21), Tajikistan (19), and Mali (11) are the top three targeted countries of these market-oriented policies. As also being one of the overall highest affected countries, Ukraine is an interesting case. Between 1995 and 1999, following the breakdown of the Soviet Union, IMF conditions stipulated that the Ukrainian government have to de-monopolize and

privatize large portions of agricultural production, distribution and storage enterprises. Some of the more extensive conditions required, for example, that the government privatizes “...70 percent of shares of 9,500 medium- and large-scale enterprises and 300 grain silos...”; initiate “...bankruptcy procedures for all of the identified 170 collective farms that did not settle their debts”; or requiring that the government “....change(s) the by-laws of Bread of Ukraine, eliminating its role as a government agent dealing with issues of provision of agricultural inputs and debt collection” (IMF, 1997).¹⁶ In 1996, during the most intense period of mass privatization and social tension, the government founded *Khlib Ukrainy* (Bread of Ukraine) to protect a strategic chunk of Ukraine’s grain marketing infrastructure (e.g. harbor facilities), against the preference of the IMF (IMF, 1997, p. 25). In the end, however, the bread sector was de-monopolized, and parts of the Bread of Ukraine enterprise was privatized (Anderson and Swinnen, 2008, p. 204).

Two conditions aim to improve state capacity, and twelve are miscellaneous. The two state capacity-improving conditions refer to the IMF’s involvement in Niger in 1987. After periods of water scarcity in the country, agricultural production was severely affected, hitting people’s livelihood. In this situation, the IMF, the World Bank, and the government agreed on an action plan to establish a new state-led water company (IMF, 1986a, 1987).¹⁷

The second largest category (158), *improve trade and investment conditions* contain mostly conditions liberalizing trade (137). These measures include the usual decrees of lowering and equalizing tariffs across sectors or removing quotas in exports and imports of agricultural products. For example, Bulgaria (11) in the 1990s was the most affected by this type of market-oriented measures. The Bulgarian government turned towards the West after the fall of the

¹⁶ EBS/99/42

¹⁷ EBS/87/133 and EBS/87/226

Warsaw Pact, and the IMF was called in. This program exemplifies the highly detailed manner in which the IMF can stipulate its conditions. It wanted the government to abolish temporary import zones¹⁸ and registration requirement in “...live animals, meat, dairy products, Christmas trees, grapes, wheat, barley, maize, rice, cereal flour, sunflower seeds and oils, sugar, yeast, alcohol, brans, oil cakes, forage, tobacco, skins and hides, and wool” (IMF, 1998).¹⁹ This type of detailed advice is typical of many programs.

We identified five conditions that protected the domestic market from international competition, and which, therefore, qualify as developmental strategies. The IMF sought to introduce custom duties on coffee and cocoa (Armenia, EBS/95/100); increase export tax on timber and semi-processed logs (Cameroon, EBS/95/148); introduce surcharge on alcohol beverages and tobacco imports (Equatorial Guinea, EBS/88/220); increase port charge on rice imports (Guinea-Bissau, EBS/97/247); and introduce tariff and import duty on agricultural products (Lithuania, EBS/97/41). From the background chapters of the EBS documents, we could read that these often occurred in especially turbulent times, when the IMF and governments recognized the temporary need for protection of domestic markets against international competition.

The third largest category (135)—*improve financial information collection, study economic effect, and announce policies*—contains only model-neutral conditions. The emphasis is on building state capacity regarding collecting information to improve decision making and publically announcing policies. These measures enhance the transparency of government decisions. These types of conditions have occurred in 40 countries. In Mauritania (6), for

¹⁸ An area, e.g. a harbour, where import of goods is admitted without payment of customs, with the view to subsequently re-export the goods.

¹⁹ EBS/98/162

example, the IMF has shown concern about overfishing, where the fish industry accounted for about half of this country's economic activity. Besides the IMF issuing environmental protection conditions (discussed below), a set of conditions required that the government continuously communicate to IMF staff about the state of the fishing sector. These conditions could be about sending a quarterly table summarizing confiscations of juvenile fish (IMF, 1994a),²⁰ making sure that access rights to cephalopod and demersal fishing are being respected, or employing specialized experts to strengthen surveillance of fish exports (IMF, 1992).²¹

Poverty reduction-oriented conditions occurred four times in this third largest group. These related to the IMF's agreement with the government in Lesotho (EBS/06/66) and Nicaragua (EBS/07/66), respectively, to conduct poverty and famine relief studies in agriculture.

The fourth largest category (130), *strengthen tax and financial base*, also has a clear emphasis on building state capacity. The Pakistani government (22) is the top recipient and provides a representative example. Most conditions sought to extend and improve tax collection from the agricultural sector (EBS/93/140). In the water sector, the IMF required that the government improve its assessment and collection of water charges (EBS/88/250). The pattern is similar in the other 38 countries affected by conditions in this policy category, but there is also an emphasis on introducing and raising excise tax on alcohol and tobacco products (see for example Turkey, EBS/99/223, and Russia EBS/95/46).

Thirty-three conditions in this fourth category are about either expanding value-added tax (VAT) or removing VAT exemptions. We also assigned these to building state capacity, as they

²⁰ EBS/95/12

²¹ EBS/95/2

tend to expand the financial base of governments. However, it should be noted that some recognize these types of policies promoting the Washington Consensus, especially if the aim these actions is to level out any tax exemptions that can lead to imbalances—or favoring—between different market sectors (Swank, 2006). Our definition of model-neutral captures these types of dubious cases.

The fifth to eighth largest categories resonate mostly with the Washington Consensus. Using key words such as *establish land registry*, *commodify land*, or *primary product* (123), they require passing new laws enabling the commodification of land and to distribute certificates of already privatized farmland. Many of the former Soviet Union countries were affected by these conditions as their governments organized collective farms. In Russia, for example, the IMF required the president issuing a decree that enables all owners of private real estate assets to acquire the land on which their property was located (EBS/97/78). Fifteen conditions are about improving the state's capacity to maintain land registries. These policies included establishing land agencies, as in the cases of Rwanda (EBS/07/4) and Grenada (EBS/08/75).

The overwhelming majority of conditions in *change price regime* are geared towards liberalization. They could target the entire agricultural sector, or primary products (e.g. wheat, coffee, rice). If the government handled the domestic distribution of these goods, the IMF wanted the selling price to reflect the global market price. Some policies sought to introduce market prices, but still allowed for a gradual transition. As in the case of Tanzania, the government was authorized to keep regulated prices: “Elimination of price controls except for ‘essential items’...” (IMF, 1990).²²

²² EBS/90/13

In two instances, both occurring in Moldova (EBS/06/154 and EBS/07/75), the IMF wanted the state-owned water and energy company to set the fees, possibly enhancing state capacity. The reason for this was disruptions in the water markets. However, the IMF pointed out that the fees “...are currently so far below cost-recovery levels...” recommending—not stipulating—that the authorities raise water prices (IMF, 2006, p. 16).

The IMF issued some of the most drastic conditions to *eliminate or reduce subsidies* (98) in Armenia. Consider the following six sequential conditions and their potential outcome on vulnerable groups: “Increase the price of bread in three stages...” ; “The bread price will be adjusted further...” (IMF, 1994b).²³ And, “Pass on the full cost of bread production...”; “Bread coupons will be abolished and the price of bread will be liberalized”; and “Remove cross subsidies on drinking water for households and direct subsidies on garbage removal, district heating, and hot water” (IMF, 1995)²⁴. In Egypt, the IMF took a more creative approach. Instead of reducing subsidies to bread production directly, it required the Egyptian government to reduce “...the size of the ‘popular’ bread loaf” (IMF, 1991).²⁵

Exactly 50 conditions pertaining to the category *change the role of marketing board* (57) seek to reduce the role of stabilization funds and marketing boards, qualifying as Washington Consensus policies. These organizations are used by many developing countries as an intermediary between the domestic and world market (Woo-Cumings, 1999). Their common role, as legal cartels, is to buy primary products from farmers at a fixed price and then sell that product on the global market. In this way, the marketing board attempts to protect farmers from volatile world prices, and potential revenues would be reinvested in domestic industries.

²³ EBS/94/218

²⁴ EBS/95/100

²⁵ EBS/91/213

However, marketing boards have also been criticized for exploiting farmers by buying at a fixed low price and selling their products at a systematically higher world price, funding Western life-styles of state employees (Bates, 1981; Shivji, 1978), and thus, being a source of corruption (Daoud, 2015; Halleröd et al., 2013; Veeman, 1982). Nevertheless, it is not surprising that these entities are targeted by the IMF, as it sees them distorting both domestic and global competition. The top five affected countries are all African: Ghana (related to cocoa marketing), Burundi (coffee), Malawi (tobacco), Togo (cotton), and Senegal (rice).

It is, therefore, unexpected to find that on seven occasions the IMF sought to strengthen the role of marketing boards. For example, in the Dominican Republic the IMF issued a condition to establish a joint venture between the government and Dominica Agro Industries Ltd (which previously bought a government-owned agro-processing plant) to market fresh grapefruits and other citrus fruits (IMF, 1986b, p. 42). The reason for this joint venture was depressed citrus production and export conditions. In Burundi, the IMF acknowledged that "...the Government is concerned with improving the marketing of coffee..." via its Burundi Coffee Company (IMF, 1988b, p. 10).²⁶ In agreement with the IMF, and the World Bank, the government managed to restore financing of 1 billion in Burundian franc to marketing coffee globally.

The previous eight policy action categories that we have described cover 81.7% of IMF food and agricultural conditionality. They describe the bulk of the IMF's interest in these sectors, and six of eight categories are dominated by market-oriented policies. The remaining four of the six categories exhibit a model-neutral orientation, and two promote a Washington consensus agenda.

²⁶ EBS/88/76

The ninth to eleventh largest categories have a model-neutral substance. All conditions in *strengthen agricultural ministry* (55) build state capacity. In Cambodia (8) for instance, one of the most affected country in this category, the IMF sought to establish a “...forestry crime monitoring unit...” which was required to report quarterly and publicly to the Council of Ministers (IMF, 1999).²⁷ The process of transforming the Cambodian economy from planned to market-driven had put pressure on its largest resource: forestry. This pressure came mainly from an increasing activity in illegal logging activities outside of the official concessions (IMF, 1999, pp. 9–10). In a similar spirit, the majority of the IMF’s conditions in this category seek to empower ministries by requiring new laws to be passed or new agencies established. The main purpose, exemplified by Cambodian case, is to enhance these ministries monitoring capabilities for both collecting tax and countering economic crime (IMF, 1999).

Support and train agricultural actors (52) target mainly farmers and small companies. We classified three as developmental. One of these was about Somalian farmers’ citrus production (EBS/87/122). The IMF and the government agreed to modernize the agricultural sector, and the citrus industry was chosen as a pilot project. That industry had been plagued by bad harvest due to drought, and now, with proper training and new technology the parties were hoping to increase production. The IMF’s new agriculture development strategy for Sao Tome and Principe is another example (EBS/00/58). The government agreed to consolidate the gains achieved in the late 1990s in fiscal and exchange rate stabilization and move towards economic diversification. Beyond strengthening tourism, it was decided to modernize the agricultural sector and to promote new exporting routes with neighboring countries (IMF, 2000, p. 21).

²⁷ EBS/99/188

Still, these types of conditions are exceptions. Thirty-five conditions have an environmental orientation, of which twenty-one targeted Mauritania's fishing sector. Motivated by a worry of overexploitation of fish, the IMF and the Mauritanian government agreed to various policies: from specific actions such as banning "...fishing nets with a mesh size under 70 millimeters"; to more general actions as establishing "...license for industrial fishing" and issuing "territorial fee for artisanal fishing" (IMF, 1993b).²⁸ As these conditions are geared towards protecting a national resource rather than developing the economy towards producing higher-value-added goods, we categorize them as environmental instead of developmental.

Repay arrears, or recover loans from debtor (37) have no clear ideological direction, and thus we categorize nearly all as miscellaneous in model-neutral. These conditions are mainly about actors, for example, domestic companies, settling their debt to the government; or, the government paying back to creditors. The aim is to balance the government budget by settling old contracts.

The twelfth category, *establish, capitalize, privatize, liquidate or restructure agricultural banks or ministries* (33), promotes Washington Consensus policies and tends to reduce state capacity. The IMF has been observed to target national agricultural development banks (Seibel, 2000). We find that 73 percent of these conditions (24) privatize, liquidate, or downsize these agriculture banks. Fourteen countries are affected: Vietnam (3), Romania (3), Tajikistan (3), Bolivia (2), Lithuania (2), to mention the top-five countries.

Interestingly, the IMF appears to have acted against this trend in four conditions and sought to strengthen or establish new agricultural state-led organizations. Haiti accounts for two of these

²⁸ EBS/93/208

state capacity building conditions. The IMF recognized the need for a Haitian public investment program, which focused on rural development projects in irrigation and road building. It requested, therefore, the establishment of a new state-led agricultural credit bank (EBS/87/233). However, at a closer look, it turns out that this new bank was created as a more streamlined version of two existing organizations that was closed down by the IMF earlier: Bureau of Credit Agricole and the Banque Nationale de Developpement Agricole et Industriel (IMF, 1986c, p. 39).

The thirteenth largest category, *support poverty reduction efforts* (28), can both fit a developmental and a Washington Consensus agenda, which is why we assigned it as a model-neutral strategy. When issuing a poverty reduction condition, the IMF tends to do that in conjunction with a price regime changing. Moldova is a typical case. The IMF set out in a condition that the Moldovan government “...increase of tariffs for heat and water...” in line with a reasonable cost-recovery level, but with “...an increase in compensation to poor households” to cushion the effect on them (IMF, 2006).²⁹ This type of anti-poverty measures could also happen in conjunction with when the government, as in Nicaragua (EBS/03/73), was ordered to raise the VAT, but was granted to keep some exemptions on essential goods. It should be noted, nonetheless, that in the vast majority of conditions related to liberalizing food and agricultural prices, no additional poverty reduction efforts were put in place.

The last category is about *reducing government expenditure* (20), consistent with Washington Consensus policies. All these conditions sought to limit government spending in various ways, ranging from extensive measures such as laying off 4,000 workers in agricultural companies to simpler ones such as canceling Christmas bonuses (both happened in Romania, EBS/03/137).

²⁹ EBS/06/154

Having discussed the content of IMF food and agricultural conditionality, we now turn to consider its historical trajectory.

3.3 The evolution of conditionality

[Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here]

Figure 3 shows the historical trend of the frequency of IMF food and agriculture conditionality by ideological model. In 1980, the total frequency of all these conditions was relatively small, with a sharp rise by the mid-1980s, reflecting the rapid expansion of IMF programs in general, with a peak by the end-1990s. This peak also marked the height of criticism of IMF policies. By then, the IMF sought to ‘streamline’ its conditionality policy (Babb and Buira, 2005), promising that its conditionality will be kept to a minimum (IMF, 2001, 2009a). By the turn of the millennium, we find that the number of conditions dropped sharply. This decline can partly be explained by the phasing out of structural performance criteria (IMF, 2009b), and partly by the end of programs of some large agricultural economies (e.g. Ukraine) or agrarian-based societies (e.g. Mauritania). Figure S1 in the supplements section shows the trends by country. The period between 2000 and 2014 entails a comparably stable number of food and agriculture conditions of about 15 per year. Additionally, we note that the number of conditions between the first decade of IMF lending activities (1980 and 1990) is 167, and the number of conditions the last decade (2004 and 2014) is 155. Still, during the last few years, the trend is declining, and it is possible that these conditions will eventually phase out.

Figure 4 shows the yearly proportions of the key ideological models in IMF food and agricultural policy conditionality. The proportion of Washington Consensus conditions peaked in 1996/97, with about 80% of the conditions having this ideological orientation. After the 2008 global financial crisis, this proportion had shrunk down to less than 25%. Conditions oriented towards state capacity building have been steadily rising since the 1990s, from about 12.5% in the mid-1990s to about 50% in 2010. The graph also shows a small rise of poverty reduction conditions: hovering just above 0% in 1980, to below 5% in 2005, with a minor burst to 12% around the global financial crisis, and finally, fizzling out by the year 2014.

In the appendix, we scrutinize further the type of conditions in the food and agricultural sector. First, since IMF food and agricultural policy measures mostly require changes to the structure of the agricultural sector and the institutions that govern it, these measures are predominantly “structural conditions” (Figure S2). Second, most of the IMF food and agricultural policy conditions are binding. Binding conditions make up about half (597) of all food and agriculture conditions—see Figure S3. These conditions consist of prior actions, structural benchmarks, and quantitative benchmarks (see e.g. Copelovitch, 2010). Prior action conditions are usually issued when the IMF is in doubt on whether the country in question will implement the program consistently. These conditions make up about 36 % of all food and agriculture conditions. The IMF considers these conditions crucial for the continuation of a program, and it will hold off access to further finance until they are implemented.

3.4 The geography of conditionality

[Figure 5 about here]

Geographically, food and agriculture conditionality has been introduced in 100 countries of the 131 that had an arrangement with the IMF. Figure 5 maps the geographical trend, showing that a majority of all African countries—where food insecurity is largest—were affected by many of these conditions. The West African region, with Mauritania in the lead, followed by Senegal (41 conditions), Ghana (39), and Mali (30), rank among the top-five. These countries depend largely on agriculture, with respect to both domestic production and international trade.

Another hotspot affected by this type of conditionality is Eastern Europe, specifically countries of the former Soviet Union: Ukraine (58 conditions), Albania (37), Tajikistan (36), Kyrgyz Republic (25), Georgia (24), Moldova (24), Armenia (20), Bulgaria (20), and Azerbaijan (18). Most of these countries were the agricultural powerhouses of the Soviet Union. Ukraine, for example, was one of the main suppliers of agricultural products (Osborne and Trueblood, 2002), and today is one of the world's largest agricultural exporter. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of these countries—including Russia (12)—went through radical privatization programs (Hamm et al., 2012) under the supervision of the IMF (King, 2001; King and Sznajder, 2006). Not surprisingly, their large-scale privatizations and liberalizations included their agricultural sectors.

Latin America has been largely spared of IMF food and agriculture conditionality. This is puzzling as this region underwent intense IMF adjustments under the 1980s and 1990s (Remmer, 2002). For example, regional powers of Latin America—Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Brazil—have substantial agricultural industries but with no or minimal agricultural conditions (Albertus et al., 2016; Gwynne and Cristobal, 2014). This is an interesting contrast to Eastern Europe, which we discuss in the next section.

4 Theorizing IMF food and agricultural conditionality

The article presented stylized facts of IMF's interventions in food and agriculture, an area in which the IMF lacks the mandate and expertise to operate (Plant, 2008). The qualitative analysis has shown that many of these conditions envisage radical structural change of agricultural sectors and rural social structures. In this section, partly based on our empirical material and partly on previous research, we turn to theorizing about the causes of these interventions.

We consider three key mechanisms that drive the IMF spreading its activities into food and agriculture. The first mechanism relies on the IMF's stipulated reason for why it would target agriculture: subjecting governments' budgets to fiscal discipline (IMF, 2008a, 2013; Plant, 2008). Agricultural subsidies are the chief target. As the former Deputy Director of the IMF's Policy Development and Review Department, Plant, articulates the point:

In general, the IMF does not provide policy advice on agriculture, or any productive sector (that's the preserve of the World Bank and other donors).

However, sometimes in a Fund-supported program, country authorities will include sector-specific reforms, including in agriculture, if it is critical for macroeconomic stability. For example, when subsidies to the agriculture sector are straining the government's budget. But this is rare. Over the past five years, just 35 out of 2,640 lending conditions in Fund-supported programs related to agriculture (Plant, 2008).

Indeed, subsidies can be expensive for governments to maintain (Lensink, 1996). Still, policymakers see them as a vital political-economic tool. One of the strongest reasons for implementing them, besides combating poverty, is maintaining national self-sufficiency in

agriculture—a crucial asset in times of war. For example, in Pakistan subsidies on food, fuel, and electricity accounted for 2.5% of GDP in 2008 (IMF, 2008b); irrigation subsidies in India—Pakistan’s mortal enemy—were somewhere in the vicinity of US\$ 579 million per year from 2004 to 2008 (Palanisami et al., 2011); the European Union subsidizes agricultural production by €59 billion per year, partly driven by its Second World War experience; similarly, the United States has long been subsidizing farming, which has produced a massive yearly cereal surplus that has been used, among other things, for foreign interest purposes, including food aid (Nunn and Qian, 2014; Prasad, 2012). As these costs can occupy a considerable portion of a government's expenses, the IMF will target these subsidies (Brune et al., 2004; Toye, 1994)—as we, for example, showed to happen in Pakistan.

Nonetheless, this cannot be the only explanation, given that only 8% of the food and agriculture conditions targeted subsidies. Indeed, subsidies only rank seventh in the list of the above-identified policy categories. Even if we included two additional policy categories that usually are important for macroeconomic stability in favor to this explanation, we would be left with a significant portion of unaccounted conditionality. *Reduce government expenditure* category adds 1.6%, and *strengthen tax and financial base* gives another 11%, which all together, with the category *removing subsidies*, would only account for 20% of all the conditions. Accordingly, there has to be other, stronger driving forces, motivating the IMF’s interest in agriculture beyond fiscal discipline.

A second possible mechanism as to why the IMF scrutinizes food and agriculture sectors follows from its ‘mission creep’ into the development scene (Babb and Buirra, 2005). As past studies have shown (Dreher, 2009; Vreeland, 2003), after the dissolution of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF struggled to redefine its role and identity and gradually became a development-

oriented organization (Vetterlein and Moschella, 2014). As many of the low and middle-income countries that turn to the IMF are agrarian economies, the IMF will necessarily face issues in food and agricultural sectors, and thus, be tempted to intervene (Walton and Seddon, 1994).

For example, Ukraine, the second highest global recipient of such conditions, was one of the agricultural power-houses of the former Soviet Union; the other top recipients, Senegal, Ghana, Albania, and Pakistan, all have large agricultural economies, with a significant portion of the population living in rural areas. Encounters with these types of countries increase the IMF's likelihood to engage in food and agriculture conditionality. At a closer look, however, this pattern is not consistent.

It turns out that the IMF's treatment of major agricultural economies do not consistently explain its interest in food and agriculture—as we noted in Latin America. Our findings show that major economies with both sizable agricultural industries and extensive IMF programs had no or only a few agricultural conditions. Take, for instance, Argentina, which had 265 general IMF conditions but zero in agriculture. Chile had 68 versus 0; Brazil had 185 versus 1; Mexico had 105 versus 0. It is difficult to determine the exact causes of these patterns without conducting an in-depth study of how these countries are different from others that received food and agriculture conditionality. One should recall, however, that Latin America was the IMF's first major testing ground for its adjustment programs.

It is likely, then, that in the early 1980s, the IMF focused on controlling inflation, balance of payments, and external debt, rather than agricultural regulations. Stiglitz also emphasizes, “If land reform ... regulations were underemphasized by the IMF and the Washington Consensus, in many places inflation was overemphasized” (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 81). Subsequently, when the

IMF deemed its programs successful, backed implicitly by economists like Milton Friedman hailing the Chilean case as an “economic miracle”, it exported these programs to the rest of the world (Ostry et al., 2016). The IMF’s free market doctrine expanded to other sectors, including food and agriculture (Walton and Seddon, 1994). This matches with the rise of these types of conditions between the mid-1980s and the early 2000s, as outlined in Figure 3. These arguments would explain why the IMF abstained from targeting agriculture in Latin America.

Accordingly, the third mechanism we propose derives from the IMF’s pursuit of Washington Consensus policies. Our empirical finding in Figure 4 shows that during the period 1985 and 2000, the proportion of Washington Consensus conditions was about 75%. The IMF considered more *laissez-faire*, or less government intervention in the economy—regardless of sector—better for creating economic prosperity (Centeno and Cohen, 2012). The IMF’s free market orientation is well-established in the literature (Chorev and Babb, 2009; De Vogli, 2011; Mueller, 2011; Rowden, 2009; Schrecker and Bamba, 2015). We find that its overall activities partly—not completely—resonate with its operations in agriculture as well (IMF, 2008c).

Recall, Williamson’s list of ten policies (1990).³⁰ If we compare this list with our inductively identified fourteen policy categories in Table 3, then we discover a reasonable fit. At least five of his ten policy categories can be mapped onto our inductively produced categories. Removal of subsidies account for 8% of all the IMF food and agriculture conditionalities. Add Williamson’s trade liberalization (which maps to our *Improve trade and investment conditions*), his tax reforms (our *Strengthen tax and financial base*), secure property rights (our *Establish*

³⁰ 1. Fiscal discipline; 2. Targeted social safety nets; 3. Broad and moderate tax base; 4. Market driven interest rates; 5. Competitive exchange rates; 6. Trade liberalization; 7. Liberalization of foreign direct investment; 8. Privatization of state enterprises; 9. Deregulation of markets; 10. Protection of property rights.

land registry and commodify land), privatization (our *Establish and privatize SEO*) and we account for about 60% of our findings.

One puzzle remains. How can the IMF both favor free-market policies and still articulate a considerable set of policies that do not necessarily promote free markets? This is manifested in our findings in two ways. First, as only 59% of the agricultural conditionalities promote Washington Consensus policies, about 40% are model neutral and 1% developmental. Second, the IMF's proportion of Washington Consensus conditions has been declining ever since the end of the 1990s from a peak of 80% to a bottom of 25% in 2014 (see Figure 4). These patterns reflect the IMF's movement toward an *augmented* Washington Consensus (Rodrik, 2001). In particular, after the extensive critique of the IMF's operations in Latin America and disappointing results in the former Soviet Union, the IMF sought to refashion itself (Rodrik, 2001). To create and optimize the institutional underpinnings of market economies, it argued, policymakers have to, for example, invest in mechanisms promoting corporate governance, anti-corruption, and targeted poverty reduction. Institutions would have to preferably be installed before mass privatization programs are launched, or at least in conjunction with them. Our findings echo with the re-orientation of conditionality since the mid-1990s. The proportion of state capacity-building conditions has been rising since the mid-1990s. Additionally, as shown in Table 3, improving financial information collection and announcing policies is the third largest policy category of food and agriculture conditionality. Hence, our findings are consistent with the IMF's attempt to refashion itself and adapt its policy actions according to an augmented Washington Consensus.

However, the IMF apparently neglects poverty reduction efforts. We find that merely 2.7% of the conditions across policy categories have such an orientation—as disadvantaged groups

largely rely on agriculture for their livelihood, we expected that more has been done. The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF raises a similar concern. It argues that although the IMF's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) are concerned with alleviating poverty and building social safety nets, the IMF still lacks clear strategies in agriculture (IEO and IEG, 2004). In Cambodia, for example, about 70 percent of the population relies on agriculture as their primary source of income, but the Fund's PRSP provides no medium or long-term strategies in these matters; the IEO presents similar criticism in the case of Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Tajikistan.

In summary, the IMF's explanation of why it targets food and agriculture (fiscal discipline) can, at most, account for one fifth of our findings. The two stronger explanations are IMF's mission creep into the developmental business and (augmented) Washington Consensus values.

5 Conclusions

This article provides a comprehensive database on *IMF Food and Agriculture Conditionality*, facilitating agricultural policy evaluations. The article provides two versions of this database, one for qualitative analysis (Atlas.ti file of the actual text) and the other for quantitative (Excel sheet of agricultural policy counts). Based on this database, the article outlines stylized facts of IMF's policy interventions in food and agricultural issues. Drawing on a combination of machine and human-driven content analyses, our analysis shows that IMF's claim, that its policies "... only occasionally target food and agro..." (Plant, 2008), does not match with its practice. In summary, these conditions are available in 332 (43%) of all (781) IMF programs and affect 100 countries of the 131 that have ever had an IMF program between the 1980-2014 period. Our qualitative analysis shows that food and agriculture conditionality cuts through all kinds of policy areas. It encompasses privatization of state-owned farms, liberalization of

agricultural trade, and deregulation of agricultural sectors. Our evaluation of the ideological orientation of these policies shows that 59.2% of the conditions promote a night-watchman state; 0.7% (8) developmental; and 40.1% are model neutral, capable of promoting both models. Of the model neutral, 23.9% conditions aim building state capacity; 2.7% seeks to combat poverty; 2.9% protects the environment. This evidence qualifies as mission creep: a systematic expansion of the IMF's activities into new policy areas.

We highlight three limitations of our study before discussing some policy implications. First, our study has restricted itself to analyzing the discrepancy between the IMF's mission statement and its policy practice through conditionality. However, one could ask, what other channels of influence has the IMF used to reform agricultural sectors? What role has the negotiating government in requesting agricultural conditions, maybe biased towards domestic vested interests? Research has shown that governments can use the IMF as a scapegoat to implement unpopular policies (Vreeland, 2007). Additionally, from our study, we know that the IMF waived 36 conditions and it explicitly avoided targeting food and agricultural policies in 37 conditions, but we still know little about the implementation process of the remaining conditions. How closely did the implementation follow the original agreements? How many were aborted, and for what reasons?

Second, our analysis has not quantified the relative importance of each condition, beyond organizing them in policy categories. Some conditions bring less intrusive policies compared to others: for instances, a condition about announcing a policy is fundamentally different from actually privatizing agricultural production. The former makes policies more transparent and maybe aid in combating corruption; the latter changes the fundamental structure of the economy. Even within the same policy area, care has to be taken about weighing the magnitude

of impact. For example, a condition stipulating that a particular state-owned agricultural company has to be privatized carries a different weight compared to a condition privatizing 4,000 farms. One needs to consider, among other things, the size of these companies, production capacity, and their market structure (e.g. monopolistic or not).

Third, one possible objection to the account presented in this paper is that the IMF works closely together with its sister organization, the World Bank (IMF, 2016). So, although the IMF lacks the expertise to engage in agricultural business, it will use the skills of the Bank to avoid missteps. This could be the case. However, although the Bank is occasionally mentioned in the EBS documents, we find only 24 conditions that directly involve the Bank. This indicates a meager amount of formal coordination. Moreover, in the case of Tajikistan, which was a pilot case for an *enhanced Bank-Fund collaboration* in 1998, the IMF's IEO finds a well-functioning collaboration between the two organizations, but that it could be improved: "In general, staff have tried—not always successfully—to coordinate their work programs." (IEO and IEG, 2004, p. 47). Even if we assume that the IMF indirectly consults with the World Bank on each of the food and agriculture conditions it has issued in the 332 programs, the question of the IMF's mandate remains because arguably its role is not to reform food and agricultural sectors.

Our findings advance the research area in several ways. First, our article calls for further investigation of the IMF's interventions in food and agriculture and beyond. We note that our analysis shows that the IMF's conditionality in agriculture exhibits a more nuanced ideological orientation compared to what the literature finds when evaluating its programs (Chwieroth, 2007). The study of Kentikelenis *et al.* (2016) is an exception, which also focuses on conditionality. Although their analysis does not use the same quantifying methodology and its focuses on social protection and labor issues, there are some interesting tangent points. They

find that much of the policy advice that the IMF gives countries today is still the same advice it gave them during the 1990s—despite what the IMF management is publicizing. Our study shows that 80% of the food and agricultural conditions reflected Washington Consensus ideology in 1996/97. However, contrary to the Kentikelenis *et al.* account, we find a decreasing trend ever since, shrinking just below 25% after the 2008 financial crisis. One explanation for this difference could be that the IMF takes a specific ideological position when it comes to food and agriculture issues. Another explanation could be that, at a closer look using our methodology, the IMF displays this type of ideological mixture in other areas as well. Future research could undertake comparable research by combining machine-human coding to analyze IMF interventions in other productive sectors such as, energy, mining, or construction.

We considered three key forces driving the IMF to target food and agricultural sectors: fiscal discipline, Washington Consensus ideology (and its augmented version), and mission creep. We have not evaluated the developmental or social impact of these policies, nor provided a causal analysis of their determinants. With the accompanying dataset—provided as a supplementary file—future research can explore these matters in greater depth. Our aspiration is to fuel research about the relationship between IMF policies and agricultural issues (e.g. urbanization, land grab, development, poverty reduction). The data set contains disaggregated measures of conditions with their content and ideological orientation; it isolates IMF food and agriculture conditionality from other types of IMF conditionality (Kentikelenis *et al.*, 2016); it has global span, which enables comparative research; and it covers 25 years, thus allowing for time-series analyses.

We conclude with a discussion of policy implications. Motivated by our findings and the IMF's acknowledgment of its lack of expertise in agriculture, it might be reasonable to suggest that

the IMF either does not issue any food or agriculture policies until its mandate explicitly admits such interventions and that it builds functional competence to do so; or, the IMF should pass all agricultural conditions through a joint approval system with the World Bank, the FAO, and the World Food Program (WFP). The last option resonates with the 17th Sustainable Development Goal: to revitalize the global partnership among governments and international organizations. If the circumstances demand that the IMF has to engage in food and agricultural business, then it would perhaps benefit from a deeper collaboration with the FAO and the WFP,³¹ beyond its partnership with the Bank. This type of close cooperation has occurred, and certainly could again (e.g. the IMF's Food Financing Facility). Even if it did not live up to the expectations of the global community (Kirkpatrick, 1985), it shows that collaboration is a real possibility.

³¹ The World Food Council was a predecessor of the FAO and WFP, and it was suspended in 1993.

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Figures




Figure 1: Constructing the food and agriculture dictionary

Notes: We constructed the FAO dictionary as a measurement instrument to identify food and agriculture conditions in the IMF Conditionality corpus. This figure describes the workflow of producing this dictionary.




Figure 2: Preparation of the IMF corpus.

Notes: This figure describes the authors' workflow of preparing the IMF corpus for machine coding.




Figure 3: The overall historical trend of IMF food and agriculture conditionality, 1980-2014.

Notes: Authors' calculations based on the data.




Figure 4: The yearly proportion of conditions' ideological orientation (3-year averages).

Notes: Authors' calculations based on the data.




Figure 5: Geographical distribution of the total number of IMF conditions in food and agriculture, 1985-2014.

Notes: Authors' calculations based on the data.

Tables

Table 1: Human coding examples and special cases

Coding	Example of	Source
1. • A capital injection into New ^{false positive} <i>Landsbanki</i> , using tradable government bonds issued on market terms, to raise the capital adequacy ratio to at least 12 percent.	Discarded condition, as it is not about agriculture	Letter of Intent, April 7 2010, Iceland
2. • ^{code0 = commodify land} Eliminate moratorium on land sales.	Single condition.	EBS/00/182, Kyrgyz Republic
3. • ^{code1 = liquidate bank} Complete liquidation of the Bolivian Agricultural Bank, the Bolivian Mining Bank, and the National Mining Exploration Fund.	Single condition, focus on agriculture, ignore the rest.	EBS/92/137, Bolivia
4. • ^{ignore} Abolish all export bans and quotas for agricultural products, ^{code2 = abolish bans/quotas} except for timber.	Single condition with an exception.	EBS/97/69, Armenia
5. • ^{code3 = except agriculture} Elimination of all remaining subsidies on bread and milk ^{code4 = eliminate subsidies in food} and ^{code5 = liberalize prices} the full liberalization of the prices of subsidized consumer.	Split condition.	EBS/94/111, Moldova
6. • ^{code6 = eliminate subsidies in rice} Elimination of all subsidies related to rice marketing ^{code6 = announce policy} and an official announcement of this action.	Split condition, of which one announces the action.	EBS/99/120, Mauritania

Table 2: Top-50 terms

term	hits
1 agric	192
2 land	138
3 water	106
4 cotton	65
5 fish	53
6 cocoa	49
7 coffee	49
8 crop	49
9 farm	46
10 bread	42

11 food	41
12 rice	41
13 sugar	41
14 grain	37
15 tobacco	37
16 forest	36
17 alcohol	29
18 wheat	29
19 flour	28
20 cigarette	27
21 fertili	22
22 maize	15
23 milk	15
24 land use	14
25 alcoholic	12
26 groundnut	12
27 textile	12
28 vegetable	12
29 cereal	11
30 crops	11
31 timber	11
32 animal	10

33 beverage	10
34 beer	8
35 beverages	8
36 edible	8
37 meat	8
38 seed	8
39 dairy	7
40 demersal	7
41 irrigat	7
42 logging	7
43 vegetable oil	7
44 wine	7
45 wood	7
46 cooking	6
47 drinks	6
48 fruit	6
49 hides	6
50 logs	6

Table 3: The content and ideological orientation of IMF food and agriculture conditionality

Policy Actions	In %	In cum. %	Freq.	Ideological Model					
				Developmental	Model Neutral			Washington Consensus	
					Environmental	Miscellaneous	Build State Capacity		Poverty reduction
1. Establish, privatize, or reduce cost of SEO, and liberalize sectors	15.6%	15.6%	192	0	0	12	2	0	178
2. Improve trade and investment conditions	12.9%	28.5%	158	5	0	16	0	0	137
3. Improve financial info collection, study economic effect, and announce policies	11.0%	39.5%	135	0	0	46	85	4	0
4. Strengthen tax and financial base	10.6%	50.1%	130	0	0	4	124	0	2
5. Establish land registry, commodify land, or primary product	10.0%	60.1%	123	0	0	4	15	0	104
6. Change price regime	9.0%	69.1%	110	0	0	0	2	0	108
7. Eliminate or reduce subsidies	8.0%	77.0%	98	0	0	1	0	0	97
8. Change the role of marketing board	4.6%	81.7%	57	0	0	0	7	0	50
9. Strengthen agricultural ministry	4.5%	86.2%	55	0	0	0	55	0	0
10. Support and train agricultural actors	4.2%	90.4%	52	3	35	6	0	1	7
11. Repay arrears, or recover loans from debtor	3.0%	93.4%	37	0	0	36	0	0	1
12. Establish, capitalize, privatize, liquidate or restructure agricultural banks or ministries	2.7%	96.1%	33	0	0	6	4	0	23
13. Support poverty reduction efforts	2.3%	98.4%	28	0	0	0	0	28	0
14. Reduce government expenditure	1.6%	100.0%	20	0	0	0	0	0	20
TOTAL			1228	8	35	131	294	33	727
In %				0.7%	2.9%	10.7%	23.9%	2.7%	59.2%

Supplementary material

Supplementary figures and tables

Figures




Figure S1: Country profile of the historical trend of IMF food and agriculture conditionality, 1980-2014




Figure S2: The evolution of structural and quantitative conditions in food and agriculture.




Figure S3: The evolution of the proportion of hard conditions (excluding waived).

Tables

Table S1: Countries affected by IMF Food and Agriculture Conditionality

Rank	Country	Total number of conditions
1	Mauritania	69
2	Ukraine	58
3	Senegal	41
4	Ghana	39
5	Albania	37
6	Pakistan	37
7	Tajikistan	36
8	Mali	30
9	Kyrgyz Republic	25
10	Burundi	24
11	Georgia	24
12	Moldova	24
13	Armenia	20
14	Bulgaria	20
15	Tanzania	19
16	Azerbaijan	18
17	Cote d'Ivoire	18

18	Malawi	18
19	Cambodia	17
20	Guyana	17
21	Sri Lanka	17
22	Central African Republic	15
23	Haiti	15
24	Uganda	15
25	Gabon	14
26	Kazakhstan	14
27	Romania	14
28	Burkina Faso	13
29	Equatorial Guinea	13
30	Jordan	13
31	Nicaragua	13
32	Sierra Leone	13
33	Bangladesh	12
34	Indonesia	12
35	Russian Federation	12
36	Yemen	11
37	Lesotho	10
38	Niger	10
39	Belarus	9
40	Benin	9
41	Cameroon	9
42	Chad	9

43	Lithuania	9
44	Mongolia	9
45	Mozambique	9
46	Zimbabwe	9
47	Congo, Rep.	8
48	Egypt	8
49	Sao Tome and Principe	8
50	St. Kitts and Nevis	8
51	Dominica	7
52	Guinea	7
53	Guinea-Bissau	7
54	Honduras	7
55	Rwanda	7
56	Togo	7
57	Algeria	6
58	Lao PDR	6
59	Latvia	6
60	Madagascar	6
61	Nepal	6
62	Peru	6
63	Vietnam	6
64	Bosnia and Herzegovina	5
65	Kenya	5
66	Sudan	5
67	Uzbekistan	5

68	Congo, Dem. Rep.	4
69	Estonia	4
70	Gambia	4
71	India	4
72	Papua New Guinea	4
73	Bolivia	3
74	Ethiopia	3
75	Serbia	3
76	Somalia	3
77	Turkey	3
78	Zambia	3
79	Cape Verde	2
80	Djibouti	2
81	Ecuador	2
82	El Salvador	2
83	Greece	2
84	Iceland	2
85	Jamaica	2
86	Panama	2
87	Afghanistan	1
88	Brazil	1
89	Costa Rica	1
90	Dominican Republic	1
91	Grenada	1
92	Guatemala	1

93	Hungary	1
94	Liberia	1
95	Macedonia, FYR	1
96	Philippines	1
97	Seychelles	1
98	Slovak Republic	1
99	Solomon Islands	1
100	Tunisia	1

Table S2: Food and agriculture conditionality per policy area

Policy area	Frequency
External sector (trade and exchange system)	126
SOE privatization	118
Land and environment	147
Social policy (restrictive or neutral)	107
Revenues and tax issues	144
SOE reform and pricing	270
Fiscal issues	52
Redistributive policies	4
Institutional reforms	55
Financial sector, monetary policy, and Central Bank issues	66
Residual category	7

Notes: These policy categories follow the definitions provided in (Kentikelenis et al., 2016).

FAO databases used in the construction of the dictionary

Table S3: Food and Agriculture database sources

	Definition	Source (accessed, November 2016)
FAO - Production		
Crops	Crop statistics are recorded for 173 products, covering the following categories: Crops Primary, Fibre Crops Primary, Cereals, Coarse Grain, Citrus Fruit, Fruit, Jute & Jute-like Fibres, Oilcakes Equivalent, Oil crops Primary, Pulses, Roots and Tubers, Treenuts and Vegetables and Melons	http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/QC
Crops processed	The dataset covers the following commodities: Beer of barley; Cotton lint; Cottonseed; Margarine, short; Molasses; Oil, coconut (copra); Oil, cottonseed; Oil, groundnut; Oil,	http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/QD

	linseed; Oil, maize; Oil, olive, virgin; Oil, palm; Oil, palm kernel; Oil, rapeseed; Oil, safflower; Oil, sesame; Oil, soybean; Oil, sunflower; Palm kernels; Sugar Raw Centrifugal; Wine.	
Livestock Primary	The dataset contains the following commodities and commodity aggregates thereof : Animals live n.e.s.; Asses; Beehives; Buffaloes; Camelids, other; Camels; Cattle; Chickens; Ducks; Geese and guinea fowls; Goats; Horses; Mules; Pigeons, other birds; Pigs; Rabbits and hares; Rodents, other; Sheep; Turkeys	http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/QA
Livestock Processed	NA [FAO give no metadata]	http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/QP
Production Indices	The dataset includes data on gross and net production indices for various food and agriculture aggregates expressed in both totals and per capita.	http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/QI
Value of Agricultural Production	The data set includes data on gross and net production values, in	http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/QV

	constant international USD, and gross production values, in constant and current USD and Local Currency Units, for various food and agriculture commodities and aggregates thereof, expressed in both total value and value per capita.	
FAO - Inputs		
Fertilizers	The dataset contains data on Production, Trade, Non fertilizer Use and Consumption for the 3 main fertilizer categories (Nitrogen, Phosphate and Potash) in terms of nutrients from 2002 onwards. Data are expressed in metric tons of nutrients. Country and country aggregate data are available.	http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/RF
Fertilizers archive	The dataset contains data on Production, Trade and Consumption for single fertilizers, Nitrogen, Phosphate and Potash totals, Fertilizer Totals) in terms of nutrients from 1961 to 2002. Data are expressed in metric tons of	http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/RA

	<p>nutrients. Country and country aggregate data are available. It also contains data on Prices paid by farmers expressed in local currencies (as a consequence no country aggregates are available) for single fertilizer products.</p>	
Fertilizers - Trade Value	<p>The dataset contains data on Import and Export Value (expressed in 1000US\$) for a selected list of fertilizers, see below, from 1961 onwards. Country and country aggregate data are available. The fertilizers covered are: Nitrogenous fertilizers; Phosphate fertilizers; Potash fertilizers; Fertilizers Manufactured, nes; Fertilizers, Organic; Natural Phosphates; Natural Potassic Salts; Natural Sodium Nitrate</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/RV</p>
Pesticides (use)	<p>The pesticides use database refers to the use of major pesticide groups (Insecticides, Herbicides, Fungicides, Plant growth regulators and Rodenticides) and relevant</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/RP</p>

	<p>chemical families when available.</p> <p>Data refers to quantities of pesticides used in or sold to the agricultural sector for crops and seeds and are expressed in tonnes of active ingredients. However, due to some country reporting practices, the data may be reported by: use or imports in formulated product; sales; distribution or imports for use in the agricultural sector in active ingredients. In these cases it is specified in the country notes. Information on quantities applied to single crops is not available.</p>	
Pesticides (trade)	<p>The pesticides trade database reports on values expressed in 1000 US\$ of import and export for a range of products as defined by the Harmonised Coding System (HS2012) code 3808. It covers total pesticides and relevant break-down: insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, disinfectants as well as anti-sprouting products and plant-growth</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/RT</p>

	<p>regulators. Starting in the year 2007 it has been introduced a new variable to cover the trade of certain hazardous pesticides that are subject to the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure. This variable, “Hazardous pesticides”, relates to the HS code 3808.50 and covers mixtures preparations containing the substance subject to PIC procedure. The pesticides trade dataset also includes the pure substances that are subject to the PIC procedure; these are reported starting in the year 2007 for import/export quantity (NetWeight (kg)) and value (1000 US\$).</p> <p>Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in International Trade: The Convention was initiated by FAO and UNEP in 1989 and entered into force on 24 February 2004. The</p>	
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	<p>Convention establishes a legally binding obligation to enable countries to decide which potentially hazardous chemicals they want to import /export and to exclude those they cannot manage safely. Please see the correspondence table of the pure substances in Pesticides (trade) http://faostat3.fao.org/faostat-gateway/go/to/download/RT/*/E).</p> <p>In 2011, import value relating to the aggregated variable "Pesticides" is available for 202 countries and the relevant regional, continental and world totals according to country classification of United Nations M-49 list. On the other hand, regional, continental and world totals are not calculated for the remaining variables due to incomplete country coverage.</p>	
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Land	<p>Data on agricultural land-use are valuable for conducting studies on a various perspectives concerning agricultural production, food security and for deriving cropping intensity among others uses. Indicators derived from the land-use categories can also elucidate the environmental sustainability of countries' agricultural practices. FAOSTAT Land-use statistics contain a wide range of information on variables that are significant for: understanding the structure of a country's agricultural sector; making economic plans and policies for food security; deriving environmental indicators, including those related to investment in agriculture and data on gross crop area and net crop area which are useful for policy formulation and monitoring. Land-use Inputs sub-domain covers: Country area (including area under inland water</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/RL</p>
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	<p>bodies), Land area (excluding area under inland water bodies), Agricultural area, Arable land and Permanent crops, Arable land, Permanent crops, Permanent meadows and pastures, Forest area, Inland water, Other land and Area equipped for irrigation. Data are available from 1961 onwards for more than 200 countries and areas. Detailed data for sub-categories are also available (starting year 2001): Temporary crops, Temporary meadows and pastures, Fallow land (temporary: less than 5 years), Permanent meadows and pastures cultivated and naturally growing as well as Organic land (starting year 2004)and Area of arable land and permanent crops under protective cover (starting year 2007). Global Forest Resource Assessment 2010 (FRA 2010) is the main source of forest area data in FAOSTAT. Data were provided by countries for years</p>	
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	1990, 2000, 2005 and 2010. Data for intermediate years were estimated for FAO using linear interpolation and tabulation.	
Employment Indicators	Excluded (too broad)	Excluded (too broad), http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/GN
FAO – Agriculture emissions		
Enteric Fermentation	Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from enteric fermentation consist of methane gas produced in digestive systems of ruminants and to a lesser extent of non-ruminants. The FAOSTAT emissions database is computed following Tier 1 IPCC 2006 Guidelines for National GHG Inventories vol. 4, ch. 10 and 11 (http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol4.html). GHG emissions are provided	http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/GE

	<p>by country, regions and special groups, with global coverage, relative to the period 1961-present (with annual updates) and with projections for 2030 and 2050, expressed both as Gg CH₄ and Gg CO₂eq, by livestock species (asses, buffaloes, camels, cattle (dairy and non-dairy), goats, horses, llamas, mules, sheep, swine (breeding and market)) and by species aggregates (all animals, camels and llamas, cattle, mules and asses, sheep and goats, swine). Implied emission factor for CH₄ and activity data are also provided.</p>	
Crop Residues	<p>Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from crop residues consist of direct and indirect nitrous oxide (N₂O) emissions from nitrogen (N) in crop residues and forage/pasture renewal left on agricultural fields by farmers. Specifically, N₂O is produced by microbial processes of nitrification and de-nitrification taking place on</p>	

	<p>the deposition site (direct emissions), and after volatilization/re-deposition and leaching processes (indirect emissions). The FAOSTAT emissions database is computed following Tier 1 IPCC 2006 Guidelines for National GHG Inventories, Vol. 4, Ch. 2 and 11. (http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol4.html). GHG emissions are provided as direct, indirect and total by country, regions and special groups, with global coverage, relative to the period 1961-present (with annual updates) and with projections for 2030 and 2050, expressed as Gg N₂O and Gg CO₂eq, by crop and N content in residues.</p>	
Energy use	Excluded (too broad)	Excluded (too broad), http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/GN
FAO – Trade		

Crops and livestock products	<p>The detailed food and agriculture trade data collected, processed and disseminated by FAO according to the standard International Merchandise Trade Statistics Methodology, is mainly provided by the national authorities and other international organizations. The trade database includes the following variables: export quantity, export value and export unit value, import quantity, import value and import unit value. The trade database includes all food and agriculture products imported/exported annually by all the countries in the world.</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/TP</p>
Live animals	<p>The detailed food and agriculture trade data collected, processed and disseminated by FAO according to the standard International Merchandise Trade Statistics Methodology, is mainly provided by the national authorities and other international organizations. The</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/TA</p>

	<p>trade database includes the following variables: export quantity, export value and export unit value, import quantity, import value and import unit value. The trade database includes all food and agriculture products imported/exported annually by all the countries in the world.</p>	
Detailed trade matrix	<p>The detailed food and agriculture trade data collected, processed and disseminated by FAO according to the standard International Merchandise Trade Statistics Methodology, is mainly provided by the national authorities and other international organizations. The trade database includes the following variables: export quantity, export value and export unit value, import quantity, import value and import unit value. The trade database includes all food and agriculture products</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/TM</p>

	imported/exported annually by all the countries in the world	
FAO – Food Balance		
Food Balance Sheets	<p>Food Balance Sheet presents a comprehensive picture of the pattern of a country's food supply during a specified reference period. The food balance sheet shows for each food item - i.e. each primary commodity and a number of processed commodities potentially available for human consumption - the sources of supply and its utilization. The total quantity of foodstuffs produced in a country added to the total quantity imported and adjusted to any change in stocks that may have occurred since the beginning of the reference period gives the supply available during that period. On the utilization side a distinction is made between the quantities exported, fed to livestock, used for seed, put to manufacture for food</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/FBS</p>

	<p>use and non-food uses, losses during storage and transportation, and food supplies available for human consumption. The per caput supply of each such food item available for human consumption is then obtained by dividing the respective quantity by the related data on the population actually partaking of it. Data on per caput food supplies are expressed in terms of quantity and - by applying appropriate food composition factors for all primary and processed products - also in terms of caloric value and protein and fat content.</p>	
<p>Commodity Balances - Crops Primary Equivalent</p>	<p>Commodity balances show balances of food and agricultural commodities in a standardized form. The scope of standardization is to present these data in a less detailed form for a selected number of commodities without causing any significant loss of the basic variables monitoring the</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/BC</p>

	<p>agricultural sector. The selected commodities include the equivalents of their derived products falling in the same commodity group, but exclude the equivalents of by-products and derived commodities, which through processing, change their nature and become part of different commodity groups. A number of commodity/item aggregates have been included to offer synthetic information. Some of these are included with the aim of simplifying the extraction of all component commodities. Data shown in the item aggregates represent the sum of the component commodities as presented in this domain (standardized form). Commodity coverage: The commodity list in this domain has been generally confined to primary commodities - except for sugar, oils and fats and beverages. Whenever possible trade in</p>	
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	<p>processed commodities is expressed in the originating primary commodity equivalent. Rice is expressed in milled equivalent.</p>	
<p>Commodity Balances - Livestock and Fish Primary Equivalent</p>	<p>Food supply data is some of the most important data in FAOSTAT. In fact, this data is for the basis for estimation of global and national undernourishment assessment, when it is combined with parameters and other data sets. This data has been the foundation of food balance sheets ever since they were first constructed. The data is accessed by both business and governments for economic analysis and policy setting, as well as being used by the academic community</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/BL</p>
<p>Food Supply - Crops Primary Equivalent</p>	<p>Food supply data is some of the most important data in FAOSTAT. In fact, this data is for the basis for estimation of global and national undernourishment assessment, when it is combined with parameters and other data sets. This</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/CC</p>

	<p>data has been the foundation of food balance sheets ever since they were first constructed. The data is accessed by both business and governments for economic analysis and policy setting, as well as being used by the academic community.</p>	
<p>Food Supply - Livestock and Fish Primary Equivalent</p>	<p>Food supply data is some of the most important data in FAOSTAT. In fact, this data is for the basis for estimation of global and national undernourishment assessment, when it is combined with parameters and other data sets. This data has been the foundation of food balance sheets ever since they were first constructed. The data is accessed by both business and governments for economic analysis and policy setting, as well as being used by the academic community</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/CL</p>
FAO – Investment		
Machinery	NA	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/RM</p>

FAO – Land Use Emissions		
Land Use Total	Land Use Total contains all GHG emissions and removals produced in the different Land Use sub-domains, representing the three IPCC Land Use categories: cropland, forest land, and grassland, collectively called emissions/removals from the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) sector. FOLU emissions consist of CO ₂ (carbon dioxide), CH ₄ (methane) and N ₂ O (nitrous oxide) associated with land management activities. CO ₂ emissions/removals are derived from estimated net carbon stock changes in above and below-ground biomass pools of forest land, including forest land converted to other land uses. CH ₄ and N ₂ O, and additional CO ₂ emissions are estimated for fires and drainage of organic soils. The FAOSTAT	http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/GL

	<p>emissions database is computed following Tier 1 IPCC 2006 Guidelines for National GHG Inventories (http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/index.html). GHG emissions are provided as by country, regions and special groups, with global coverage, relative to the period 1990-present (with annual updates), expressed as Gg CO₂eq from CH₄ and N₂O, net emissions/removals as GG CO₂ and Gg CO₂eq, by underlying land use emission sub-domain and by aggregate (land use total).</p>	
FAO- Forestry		
Forestry Production and Trade	<p>The database contains data on the production and trade in roundwood and primary wood and paper products for all countries and territories in the world. The main types of primary forest products included in are: roundwood,</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/FO</p>

	<p>sawnwood, wood-based panels, pulp, and paper and paperboard. These products are detailed further. The definitions are available. The database contains details of the following topics: - Roundwood removals (production) by type of wood and assortment - Production and trade in roundwood, woodfuel and other basic products - Industrial roundwood by assortment and species - Sawnwood, panels and other primary products - Pulp and paper & paperboard. More detailed information on wood products, including definitions, can be found at</p> <p>http://www.fao.org/forestry/statistics/80572/en/</p>	
FAO – Prices		
Producer Prices - Annual	<p>This sub-domain contains data on Agriculture Producer Prices. These are prices received by farmers for primary crops, live animals and</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/PP</p>

	<p>livestock primary products as collected at the point of initial sale (prices paid at the farm-gate). Annual data are provided from 1991 for over 160 countries and about 200 commodities.</p>	
<p>Producer Prices - Monthly</p>	<p>This sub-domain contains data on Agriculture Producer Prices (APP). These are prices received by farmers for primary crops, live animals and livestock primary products as collected at the point of initial sale (prices paid at the farm-gate). Monthly data are provided from January 2010 to December of the previous year for over 60 countries and about 200 commodities.</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/PP</p>
<p>Producer Prices - Archive</p>	<p>This sub-domain contains data on Agriculture Producer Prices and Producer Price Indices collected no later than 1996. These are prices received by farmers for primary crops, live animals weight and livestock primary products as collected at the point of initial sale</p>	<p>http://faostat.fao.org/beta/en/#data/PA</p>

	(prices paid at the farm-gate). Data are provided for over 97 countries and for some 200 commodities.	
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The FAO dictionary

The FAO dictionary we constructed contains the following 772 terms:

"abaca, acidified milk, agave fibres, agric, agricultural area, agricultural machinery, agricultural tractors, alcohol, alcoholic, alcoholic beverages, aldrin, alfalfa meal, alliaceous vegetables, almonds, almonds shelled, amalgams, amides, ammonia, ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrate solutions, ammonium phosphat, ammonium phosphate, ammonium sulphate, ammonium sulphatenitrate, anhydrous, animal, animal fats, animal products, animal vegetable oil, animals, animals live, anise, anticoagulants, apples, apricots, aquatic animals, aquatic mammals, aquatic plants, aquatic products, arabl, arable land, area equipped for irrigation, areca nuts, artichokes, asparagus, aubergines, avocados, bacon, badian, balers, bambara beans, banana, bananas, barley, basic slag, bastfibres, beans, beef, beehives, beer, beer of barley, beer of sorghum, beeswax, beet pulp, benzimidazoles, berries, berries nes, beverage, beverages, binapacryl, bipiridils, bird, birds, bleached sulphate pulp, bleached sulphite pulp, blueberries, body oil, boiled, boneless, bovine, bovine meat, brans, brassicas, brazil nuts, bread, breakfast, breeding, broad beans, broccoli, buckwheat, buffalo, buffalo milk, buffaloes, bulgur, burning biomass, butter, butter of karite nuts, buttermilk, butteroil of cow milk, cabbages, caff, cake, calcium ammonium nitrate, calcium cyanamide, calcium nitrate, calve, camel milk, camelids, canary seed, cane tops, canned, canned meat, captafol, carbamates, carbamates herbicides, carbamates insecticides, cardamoms, carded, carobs, carrots, case materials, cashew nuts, cashewapple, cassava, cassava dried, castor beans, castor oil seed, cattle, cauliflowers, cephalopod,

cephalopods, cereal, cereal preparations, cereals, cheese, cheese of goat mlk, chemical wood pulp, cheroots, cherries, chestnut, chestnuts, chick peas, chicken, chickens, chicory, chicory roots, chillies, chips, chlordane, chlordimeform, chlorinated hydrocarbons, chlorobenzilate, chocolate products, cider, cigarette, cigarettes, cigars, cinnamon, citronella, citrus, citrus fruit, clementines, clover, cloves, coarse, coated papers, cocoa, cocoa beans, coconut, coconut oil, coconuts, cocoons, cocoyam, coffee, combed, combine harvesters, complex fert, complex fertilizer, concent superphosphate, concentrated or not, cooked, cooking, cooking oil, copra, copra cake, coriander, corn, cotton, cotton lint, cotton linter, cotton waste, cottonseed, cottonseed cake, cottonseed oil, country area, cow milk, cow peas, cranberries, cream, cream fresh, crop, cropland, crops, crude materials, crustaceans, cucumbers, curd, curdled, currants, cyanide generators, dairy, dairy machinery, ddt, dehydrated, demersal, demersal fish, desiccated, dextrose, diammonium phosphate, diazines, diazoles, dieldrin, dinitroanilines, dinoseb, dinoseb acetate, dinoseb salts, disinfectants, dissolving wood pulp, distillation, distilled alcoholic, dithiocarbamates, dnoc, doughs, dregs from brewing, drinks, dry buttermilk, dry salted, duck, ducks, edible, edible ice, edible oil, eggplants, eggs, eggs in the shell, essential goods, essential items, essential product, esters, ethylene dibromide, ethylene dichloride, farm, fats, fats of animal, fatty acids, fatty substance residues, feed, feed minerals, feed supplements, feeding stuff, fennel, fermented, fermented rice, fertili, fertilizers, fertilizers manufactured, fibre crops, fibre crops nes, fibre furnish, fibre pulp, fibreboard, figs, figs dried, fish, fish meal, fixed vegetable oils, flax fibre, flax fibre raw, flax tow waste, flour, fluoroacetamide, fodder, folding boxboard, fonio, food, food excl fish, food prep, food preparations, food wastes, forage, forage products, forest, forest land, forest products, freshwater fish, fructose, fruit, fruits, fungicides, game meat, garlic, geese, ghee, gherkins, ginger, ginning, glucose, gluten, goat, goat meat, goat milk, goats, goose, gooseberries, gourds, grain, grape, grapefruit, grapes, graphic papers, grasses, grassland, greasy, ground rock phosphate, groundnut, groundnut cake,

groundnut oil, groundnuts, guavas, guinea fowl, guinea fowls, gums, gums natural, hair waste, ham, hard fibres, hardboard, harvester, hazardous pesticides, hazelnuts, hch, hemp tow waste, hempseed, hen eggs, heptachlor, herbicides, hexachlorobenzene, hides, homogenized preparations, honey, hops, horse, horse beans, horses, husks, hypercalcaemics, ice cream, industrial roundwood, infant food, inland water, insecticides, insulating board, irrigat, juice, jute, kapok, kapok fibre, kapok fruit, kapokseed in shell, kapokseed shelled, karite nuts, kiwi fruit, kola nuts, kolanuts, lactose, land, land area, land use, lard, leeks, legumes, leguminous, leguminous vegetables, lemon, lemons, lentils, lettuce, limes, linseed, live animals, liver, liver chicken, liver duck, liver geese, liver oil, livestock, llamas, logging, logs, lucerne, lumber, lupins, macaroni, maize, maize germ oil, malt, malt extract, mandarines, mandarins, mangoes, mangosteens, manila fibre, manure spreaders, maple sugar, margarine, marine fish, maté, mate extracts, meal, meat, meat bovine fresh, meat indigenous, meat meal, meat of swine, meat poultry fresh, meat preparations, meat prepared pres, meat sheep fresh, mechanical wood pulp, melons, melonseed, methamidophos, milk, milk condensed, milk dry, milk fresh, milking, milking machines, millet, mineral oils, miscellaneous food, mixed grain, mixes, molasses, molluscs, monoammonium phosphate, monocrotophos, morpholines, mule, mules, mushrooms, mustard, mustard cake, mustard oil, mustard seed, mustardseed, mutton, narcotics, natural phosphates, natural potassic salts, natural rubber, natural sodium nitrate, naturally regenerated forest, nectarines, nitrogen, nitrogenous fert, nitrogenous fertilizers, non alcoholic, nutmeg, nuts, oats, oats rolled, of buffalo milk, offals, offals edibl fresh, ofland, oil palm fruit, oilcrops, oilcrops oil, oilseed cake, oilseed cake meal, oilseed cakes, oilseeds, okra, olive, olive oil, olive residues, olives, olives preserved, onions, orange, oranges, organo, ovine meat, oxirane, paddy, palm, palm fruit, palm kernel, palm kernels, palm oil, palmkernel cake, palmkernel oil, papayas, paperboard, papers packaging, parathion, particle board, particles, pastry, pastures, peaches, peanut butter, pearled, pears, peas, pedestrian controlled tractors, peeled, pelagic, pelagic fish,

pellets, pentachlorophenol, pepper, peppermint, peppers, permanent crops, permanent meadows, persimmons, pestic, pesticides, pet food, phenoxy hormone products, phosphamidon, phosphate fertil, phosphate fertilizers, phosphate rock, phosphates compounds, phosphoric acid, phosphorus compounds, pig, pig sausages, pigeon peas, pigeons, pigmeat, pigs, pimento, pineapple, pineapples, pineapples canned, pistachios, plant growth regulators, plantains, plantation, planted forest, ploughs, plum, plums, plums dried, plywood, pome, pomelos, popcorn, poppy, poppy seed, pork, potash, potash fertilizers, potassium chloride, potassium nitrate, potassium sulphate, potato offals, potatoes, poultry, poultry birds, poultry meat, powder, products of natural constituents, pulp for paper, pulp of fruit, pulpwood, pulses, pumpkins, pyrethroids, pyrethrum, quinces, quinoa, rabbit, rabbits, raisins, ramie, rapeseed, raspberries, recovered fibre pulp, recovered paper, rice, rice –, rice bran, ricebran oil, roasted, rodenticides, rodents, root or tuber harvesting machines, roots, roundwood, rubber, rubber natural dry, rye, safflower, safflower seed, salt, salts of pentachlorophenol, satsumas, sawlogs, sawnwood, seafood, seed, seed cotton, seed treatm fungicides, seed treatm insecticides, seedcotton, seeders, sesame, sesame seed, sesameseed cake, sesameseed oil, shallots, sheep, sheep milk, silage, silk, silk raw, single superphosphate, sisal, skimmed condensed, skimmed cow, skimmed cow milk, skimmed dried, skimmed evaporated, skins, sloes, sodas, sodium nitrate, soil machinery, sorghum, sour cherries, soy, soya curd, soya paste, soya sauce, soyabean cake, soyabean oil, soyabeans, soybean, soybeans, spices, spinach, squash, starch, starchy roots, stillingia oil, stimulants, stone fruit, straw husks, strawberries, string beans, substitutes containing coffee, sugar, sugar beet, sugar cane, sugar confectionery, sugar crops, sugar raw centrifugal, sugar refined, sulfonyl ureas, sunflower, sunflower seed, sunflowerseed cake, sunflowerseed oil, superphosphate, sweet corn frozen, sweet corn prep or preserved, sweet potatoes, sweeteners, swine, syrup, syrups, tallow, tallowtree seed, tangerines, taro , tea , textile, textile fibres, threshers, timber, tobacco, tobacco products, tomato, tomatoes, treenuts, triazines, triazoles,

triazoles diazoles, tributyltin compounds, triticale, tropical fresh, truffles, tuber dry equiv, tubers, tung nuts, turkeys, turnips, turnips for fodder, unbleached sulphate pulp, unbleached sulphite pulp, uncoated mechanical, uncoated woodfree, uracil, urea, urea derivates, vanilla, veal sausages, vegetable, vegetable oil, vegetable oils, vegetable origin, vegetable products, vegetable tallow, vegetables, vegetables fresh, vegetables in vinegar, vegetal products, veneer logs, veneer sheets, vermouths, vetches, virgin, vitamins, wafers, walnuts, waste, water, watermelons, waters, waxes vegetable, weat, wet salted, wheat, whey, whole condensed, whole cow milk, whole dried, whole evaporated, whole fresh buffalo, whole fresh camel, whole fresh cow, whole fresh goat, whole fresh sheep, wine, wood, wood charcoal, wood fuel, wood fuel trd, wood pellets, wood pulp, wood pulp exc mechanical, wood residues, wool, wrapping papers, yams, yautia, yoghurt"