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THE PIGTAIL WAR:
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1894-1895

A Dissertation Presented

by

Jeffery M. Dorwart

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 1971

History

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A Dissertation

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

Throughout the nineteenth century many Americans imagined that East Asia was a land of cruel warlords, opium dens, heathen temples and masses of unwashed coolies. Now and then businessmen dreamed of vast and untapped markets, and missionaries conceived bold plans to convert Asians to Christianity. Travelling journalists found Asia a source for strange and exotic tales which perpetuated the mysteries of the East for the reading public. Asians living in the United States could do little to alter the negative stereotypes. Working long hours for meager wages, they were considered a menace to American labor. Moreover, they retained their Oriental customs, refused to cut off their pigtails and congregated in what Americans believed to be evil and filthy Chinatowns.¹

America's popular image of the Orient remained largely unchanged by the 1890's. Then in the early summer of 1894 China and Japan declared war, massing their armies in the small kingdom of Korea. Americans became intensely interested. "Whatever be the issue of the present conflict," one contemporary observed, "it is likely that Americans will know more of Chinese Asia during the next six months than they have ever cared to learn before."² They studied hastily-written books and articles on Asian history, politics, art and economics. They looked into fascinating analyses of the "Oriental mind." They searched their maps for Seoul, Chemulpo and other cities mentioned in stirring newspaper accounts of the early fighting. The New York Tribune noted in December 1894 that "in the year just closing Asia has, for the first time in a generation,

been the scene of the world's chief interest. It alone is sufficient to make 1894 an ever-memorable year."³

American interest was remarkable in view of the important domestic concerns. A terrible depression, accented by battles between strikers and soldiers, seemed likely to endure for years. Americans feared the menaces they perceived in immigration, socialism and Populism; but they were angry too over an economy monopolized by the trusts. Arguments over gold and silver money daily grew more intense, while discontented groups agitated for reforms. One Massachusetts Democrat warned President Grover Cleveland in July 1894 that these new forces threatened to undermine the two-party system and might bring about a violent revolution. "Populism, Coxeyism, and Debism are all of a piece," he explained, and they proposed to destroy the American system.⁴ These domestic crises and frustrations, according to historian Richard Hofstadter, may have been important in turning the attention of Americans to foreign affairs during the 1890's, as a welcome and exciting diversion from the complexities of trying times.⁵

Cleveland's second administration, however, could scarcely be called dramatic in its conduct of foreign policy. It had instigated minor interventions in Brazil and Nicaragua, but by 1894 it was being called "cowardly" through its contrast to the adventurous spirit of the preceding administration. Benjamin Harrison and his Secretary of State James G. Blaine had kept the American public excited over foreign affairs for several years. Harrison's war scare with Italy had hardly subsided in 1891 when the murder of two American sailors in Valparaiso threatened to lead to war with Chile. A rebellion by Americans living in Hawaii

promised for a time to result in American annexation of the islands. Yet, despite Harrison's efforts, Congress postponed passage of his annexation bill; it was still pending when Cleveland entered the White House in March 1893.

Cleveland's victory in 1892 was due partly to his long-standing reputation for honesty and morality in government. "It is better to be defeated battling for an honest principle than to win by cowardly subterfuge," he told his followers.⁶ Cleveland campaigned by criticizing the corruption and belligerency of the Republicans, promising not only financial and civil service reform, but also the return to a less aggressive and less dangerous foreign policy. Cleveland consistently assured Americans that his foreign policies would be based on "conscience, justice, peace, and neutrality," while "rejecting any share in foreign broils and ambitions upon other continents."⁷

Cleveland's choice for Secretary of State, Walter Quintin Gresham, fully concurred with the President's foreign policy objectives. An Indiana Republican, Judge Gresham had grown increasingly unhappy with the corruption in his party. In 1892, he abandoned the Republicans and supported Cleveland, realizing that in all probability he had ended his political career. When the President-elect asked him to become Secretary of State, Gresham hesitated, fearing that his appointment would be criticized as a political deal. But Cleveland assured Gresham that because of his "sturdy regard for political duty" and his "supreme sincerity and disinterestedness," he would contribute a vital service to his nation as the head of the State Department.⁸ Gresham accepted and travelled to Washington with a fervent intent to justify Cleveland's faith in him.

Though a novice in foreign affairs, Gresham applied his background and knowledge of law and domestic politics to the formulation of foreign policies. He believed that in international relations there was right and wrong, good and evil; some policies were legal, others illegal. A diplomat was best served by his unswerving allegiance to principle. In 1894 he wrote a close Indiana friend that his foreign policies would oppose expansion into the Pacific, as well as the creation of a large army and navy. Never, for instance, would Gresham condone a foreign policy which aimed to enhance the deals and intrigues of business interests. American commerce must proceed according to the workings of honest laissez-faire economics. A high tariff fostered a number of evils and must be lowered or abolished to ensure friendly relations between the United States and all other nations.⁹

The pending legislation concerning the annexation of Hawaii presented Cleveland and Gresham with their first major foreign policy decision. The President, prompted by Gresham, urged the Senate to delay action until his special commissioner, James H. Blount, could complete an investigation of the recent Hawaiian revolution. Blount discovered "improper" involvement on the part of the American minister in Honolulu, and this confirmed Gresham's suspicion that the revolution had been engineered by "immoral" American business interests in Hawaii. The Secretary of State advised Cleveland to abandon annexation and restore the legitimate government to power.¹⁰ Though restoration of the former regime failed, the President dropped the annexation treaty. Cleveland justified his decision by blaming Harrison and the Republicans for having manufactured the Hawaiian problem, thereby initiating a virulent

bipartisan debate over the direction of American foreign policy which lasted throughout Cleveland's entire second term. Influenced by the need to provide a clear contrast with Republican foreign policy as well as by their own backgrounds, Cleveland and Gresham adopted policies which, through incessant enunciation, appeared non-aggressive, anti-imperialist, straightforward and mindful of the rights of all nations.

As Sino-Japanese hostilities began in East Asia in 1894, the prospect of titanic battles between battleship fleets and huge armies was enough, in itself, to capture the interest of the American public. Had Benjamin Harrison still been President, the audience might well have expected heightened drama in the form of some American connection with the war. No such policy, however, could be expected from the current leadership; and no one was surprised when Cleveland and Gresham announced a policy of "strict neutrality."

Having understood that their government would be strictly neutral, Americans were startled in June of 1894 when they learned that United States marines and naval personnel had landed at Chemulpo, Korea, and marched some thirty miles to the capital at Seoul. A few months later the marines were in China, fully expecting to fight their way to Peking. American warships crisscrossed the Gulf of Chihli on urgent missions, while gunboats defiantly steamed on China's rivers. Americans fought in belligerent warships, sold arms to belligerent armies and accompanied those armies as observers and reporters. Cleveland's diplomats took sides in spy cases, disputes over belligerent property, matters of local politics, peace negotiations and other imbroglios forced upon them by their government's energetic conception of neutrality. Obviously there

could be no real neutrality, much less indifference toward the war. With so many Americans on the scene with so confusing an assortment of roles to fulfill, the play of circumstances alone was enough to produce undesired involvements on one side or the other.

The history of America's response to the "Pigtail War" has long been neglected. It is important because it sheds light on the question of American economic interests in Asia and because consideration of the strains of public opinion which it evoked can contribute to an understanding of general American attitudes in the 1890's. More significantly, however, it provides insight into an embarrassing and even dangerous early American involvement in Asia. These entanglements in this far distant war were unintended and unplanned, deriving from a diplomacy which prized good intentions above professional experience and ability; a tendency to act first and worry later; a method which often created commitments at some point prior to careful analysis of the issues involved.

CHAPTER I

THE KOREAN CRISIS OF 1894

Few Americans in 1894 could locate Korea on the map. They admitted that this small Asian country was one of the least known areas of the world. Knowledge of the "Hermit Kingdom" was acquired largely through the press and from columnists such as Frank George Carpenter. Carpenter, given only a year to live in 1883, survived to form his own news syndicate in 1888. An emaciated little man attired in over-sized suits and broad-brimmed hats which slipped down over his ears, he began a series of world travels, sending articles back to fifteen leading newspapers.

In 1894 Carpenter toured China, Japan and Korea, becoming the first American newspaperman to view the Korean crisis. He portrayed "queer old Corea" as a land of oriental mystery, strange almond-eyed beauties and weird tortures. Peering through his gold-rimmed glasses, Carpenter examined Korean life in great detail. He visited prisons, explaining to American readers the "common practice" of "padding," whereby a prisoner's skin was ripped from his body. He interviewed Korea's "squeezers" who made millions by taxing an already impoverished people. Carpenter travelled through the countryside and observed the potential wealth of the kingdom. He wrote in his syndicated columns that "the gold mines of Korea turn out from two to three million dollars' worth of dust and nuggets every year, and practically nothing but placer

mining is done."¹

Other American journalists, farther from the scene, discussed Korea in more general terms. They pictured "semi-savage" Koreans as being primitive as the "Thlinklits or the Quichias, or the Patagonians." Americans read that Koreans were "queer people" and that Korea, ruled by an effeminate king and a chain-smoking queen, was a "queer country." Korea--in the view of William Randolph Hearst, who was editor of the San Francisco Examiner in 1894--"is as near to an absolute nonentity as any aggregation of ten million people could possibly become without flickering out of existence. It is a colorless and feeble copy of China."²

Among the several hundred Americans in Korea in 1894 were representatives of the small trading firm of Morse & Townsend, several military and administrative advisers to the Korean king and perhaps two hundred missionaries--mostly Presbyterians and Methodists.³ The most prominent American was diplomat-missionary Horace Newton Allen. Shortly after his arrival in Korea in 1884, Allen had won the confidence of the royal family by saving the life of the Queen's nephew, who had been severely slashed by an assassin's sword. Allen soon became entangled in Korean factional struggles, assassinations and international rivalries. The weak king relied on the American's advice and in 1887 sent him to Washington to establish a Korean legation.⁴

This Presbyterian medical missionary promoted the United States as Korea's special friend. He had attempted to interest American businessmen in Korea and had received the Harrison administration's assurance that the United States would pursue an assertive policy in

that kingdom. Although criticized by the Cleveland administration for meddling in Korean politics, Allen's interpretation of American-Korean relations generally satisfied most contemporaries familiar with Asian politics. Dr. H. N. Allen, Carpenter wrote, "will go down into history as one of the greatest of our diplomats. He has done more good for Korea than any man ever connected with the United States legation."⁵

Allen based his view of Korean-American connections on the assumption that the United States had opened the "Hermit Kingdom" to foreigners. The United States had, in fact, followed Japan's path-breaking treaty of 1876 with its own Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1882, which left out mention of China's claim to Korea. When the United States sent a fully-accredited minister to Seoul in 1887, Allen assumed that his country supported Korean independence. Thus, the United States had placed itself beside Japan as the upholder (symbolically, at least, in the light of America's weak power position in Asia) of Korean independence. Furthermore, the American treaty implied opposition to China's traditional relationship with Korea, a tributary state to which China had provided protection in return for virtual control over Korean politics. It was possible, therefore, for some journalists to predict that the United States would become involved in the struggle soon to occur between China and Japan over Korea.⁶

Contact between China and Japan on the Korean peninsula was deeply rooted in the past, but the causes of the 1894 crisis resulted from several more immediate factors. The maturation and consolidation of Japan's modernization program during the 1870's and 1880's had catapulted her into direct confrontation with China and Russia in East Asia.

Many Japanese politicians favored a gradual and measured approach to power, preferring the use of diplomacy to strengthen their economic and political position in Korea and to revise their hated extra-territorial treaties with Western powers. Thus in 1884 when a Japanese-backed Korean rebellion had failed, Japan had outmaneuvered the Chinese protectors of the anti-Japanese faction through the Li-Ito Convention signed at Tientsin the following year. The Tientsin Convention not only indemnified Japan for her property and personal losses in Korea during the abortive insurrection, but indirectly acknowledged China's recognition of Japan's equal status in Korea.⁷

Then in 1891 Japanese policy in Korea faced a new threat when Russia announced it would build a trans-Siberian railway. This complicated Japan's gradualist policy and gave strength to militant opponents of gains through diplomacy. By 1894 advocates of a more vigorous program forced several dissolutions of the House of Representatives of the Imperial Japanese Diet, and some observers predicted that the violent debates could lead to revolution. Others believed only a great foreign adventure could bring the country together.⁸

The murder of a pro-Japanese Korean refugee, Kim Ok-kyun, intensified the Japanese political crisis. Kim had found refuge in Tokyo after the abortive Émuete of 1884 and had become the rallying point for Japan's designs in Korea. In late March 1894 a supposed friend lured Kim to a Japanese hotel in the foreign concession of Shanghai and murdered him. Despite ill-advised intervention by Horace Allen, a Chinese gunboat brought Kim's body back to be "hung, drawn and quartered and the head, feet and hands exposed to public view at different places."

The Chinese treated Kim's murderer as a patriotic hero and applauded attempts by Korean agents to murder another political refugee in Tokyo. Japanese police blocked the latter plot, but the damage had already been done.⁹

While the Kim affair increased Japanese hatred of China and strengthened the war party, the actual catalyst for conflict was an insurrection by the fanatical Korean nationalist sect, the Tonghak-Tang. The Tonghaks were founded in 1860 by the Korean prophet, Ch'oe Che-u, who preached a doctrine comprised of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism called the "Eastern Learning," or Tonghak. Although Ch'oe's execution several years later drove the movement underground, his disciples kept its spirit alive. In 1893 it reappeared with political and nationalistic overtones to protest the corruption and burdensome taxation perpetrated from Seoul. The revitalized Tonghak blamed foreign influence, particularly Christian and Japanese, for Korea's problems. Tonghak banners called for the reorganization of Korean society on the "principle of Confucian virtue," the elimination of the "Japanese barbarian" and the extermination of corrupt nobles and officials in Seoul.¹⁰

The Korean king ignored Tonghak petitions and in the spring of 1894 the cult rebelled, dragging most of the southern provinces into the insurrection. An American missionary in Korea wrote to a friend, "I suppose there are no less than 50,000 men in ChullaDo (a southern province) who have revolted and many of them are armed."¹¹ In May the rebels threatened the capital, and the King, pressured by the Chinese, asked China for assistance in quelling the Tonghak rebellion. Japan, citing the joint-action provision of the Tientsin Convention of 1885,

also responded by sending cavalry, artillery and infantry into Korea. Large bodies of Chinese and Japanese soldiers now faced each other in Korea and refused to withdraw. "It was the story of Tunis over again," observed W. A. P. Martin, the most prominent American scholar in China and head of Tungwen University, "when French coming to fight Kroumirs seized the Bey and declared him independent of Turkey. China was not as apathetic as the Ottoman and both parties, perceiving the real issue, pushed forward their troops as fast as their ships could carry them, their ostensible object was to annihilate the Tunghaks [sic], their real aim to settle at once and forever the question of Chinese supremacy."¹²

The beleaguered Korean king looked for foreign assistance to prevent a clash of the two Asian giants on his territory. He turned to his old friend the United States. During the early stages of the Kim and Tonghak affairs, with the exception of Allen's intervention, Americans had served merely as observers and reporters. The American ministers to Korea and Japan, respectively John M. B. Sill and Edwin Dun, with assistance from Horace Allen, had kept the State Department informed on both crises. Allen particularly hoped to use the Korean situation to open a new wedge for American influence in East Asia.

In 1894 it took six weeks or more for diplomatic dispatches to travel from Seoul by steamer across the Pacific to San Francisco and then on to Washington. Of course one could use the cable--either the southern line through Shanghai, India, Malta, Gibraltar, Lisbon and under the Atlantic to New York; or the northern line across Russia, Europe,

London and then on to New York. But this was expensive and the Department discouraged use of the cable except in emergencies. Thus, American ministers faced with crucial decisions often acted first and requested instructions later.

As the Tonghak rebellion spread in Korea, Sill urged American missionaries to leave their scattered posts in the interior and seek safety in Seoul. He called for an American gunboat to visit Chemulpo, Seoul's harbor. The American Asiatic fleet consisted of one protected cruiser, the Baltimore, then in Nagasaki, Japan; and the old Civil War gunboat, the Monocacy, considered unseaworthy by her officers and crew. The remainder of the small Asiatic squadron was guarding the seals in the Bering Sea or rusting in the Mare Island Naval Shipyard. Sill begged the Commander of the Asiatic fleet, Rear-Admiral Joseph S. Skerrett, to send the Baltimore to Chemulpo. Skerrett wrote back that these little disturbances in Korea usually burned themselves out and that the local authorities could take care of the situation. Skerrett, considered by some a "travesty in the Am^{er}ican Navy," refused to leave his wife and daughter at Nagasaki for the sake of a few missionaries in Korea.¹³

Meanwhile, other pressures were being placed on the United States government to send a warship to Korea. Allen convinced the King that the United States would be an impartial arbiter of Korea's troubles and on June 1 the Korean monarch wired his minister in Washington to request that Secretary of State Gresham send an American man-of-war to Chemulpo. Gresham asked Hilary Abner Herbert, Secretary of the Navy, "whether a vessel may conveniently be sent to that point for the protection of our

Legation and citizens of the United States residing there and to express the hope of the Department that this course may be followed if practicable."¹⁴

The final decision rested with the President. On June 2, Grover Cleveland called in Acting Secretary of the Navy William McAdoo, who told him that the Baltimore, famous for having nearly started a war with Chile under the previous administration, was only forty-eight hours away from Chemulpo. Cleveland delayed; he had promised in his campaign to tone down Harrison's foreign policies and he was already plagued by strikes, tariff revision and domestic unrest. His Hawaiian policy was still under attack and Latin American problems threatened to entangle the United States. Should he become involved in Korea as well? The President, called by his friend and biographer George F. Parker "one of the strongest advocates I have ever known of the missionary cause," knew that a number of American religious workers resided in Korea. Indeed, on that same day the New York Tribune reported that the lives of "300 to 400" Americans were in danger. Taking these factors into consideration, Cleveland decided to send the Baltimore to Chemulpo.¹⁵

As the 4,400-ton flagship steamed out of Nagasaki, the King of Korea forwarded his request for Chinese soldiers to help suppress the Tonghaks. Between 1,500 and 2,000 foreign-drilled Chinese regulars, part of powerful Chinese official Li Hung-chang's private army, were dispatched to China's alleged tributary. According to the American consul in Tientsin, site of Li's headquarters, China had promptly notified Japan, in compliance with the Convention of 1885, that it was

sending troops to assist Korea.¹⁶

The Japanese government, increasingly vilified by its political opposition at home, decided to use this Chinese action as an excuse for a concerted effort to wrest control of Korean politics away from China and to block Russian expansion into Korea. Mutsu Munemitsu, the Japanese Foreign Minister, advised Japan's minister in Washington on June 7 of his decision to deploy troops in Korea and this message was relayed to Gresham the next day.¹⁷

During this interval the Baltimore arrived in Chemulpo. For the first few days Rear-Admiral Skerrett, Minister Sill and their staffs discussed the Korean situation. Sill concluded that the rebellion had collapsed because of the "salutary moral Effect" of the warship, but he warned Skerrett that if this proved untrue he would ask for a legation guard.¹⁸ Somehow Sill's correspondence with the State Department on this subject reached the press. The New York Tribune assured its readers that it was American intervention that had calmed the rebellion. The arrival of the Baltimore and the "spreading of the stars and stripes over helpless people," the Tribune announced, had "indirectly assisted the Government by the moral effect of the ship's presence at a critical juncture."¹⁹

The rebellion, although not suppressed, was no longer the central problem in the Korean imbroglio. Instead, the rebellion's offspring, involvement of Chinese and Japanese soldiers, had become the main issue. The Japanese had occupied the road to Seoul, fortified their positions and increased their legation guard. They seemed prepared to press their opportunity. The North China Herald noted that 6,000 Japanese

troops had massed at Hiroshima and wondered: "Is insignificant Korea destined to prove the pan for the preparation of the flash of powder that is to set the world ablaze?"²⁰

A sense of foreboding emanated from the American legations in Seoul and Tokyo. Foreign Minister Mutsu tried to convince seasoned diplomat Edwin Dun in Tokyo that Japanese troops were merely protecting property and lives in Korea and would not cause trouble. Nevertheless, Dun informed Gresham on June 15 that "it is impossible to believe that so large a force is required in Korea for the protection of Japan's legation, consulates and subjects inasmuch as she already has in Korean ports ten ships of war."²¹ Sill shared Dun's concern and wondered what Japan's "ulterior purpose" could be in Korea. The American minister raised the question of granting asylum to the Korean king and claimed that Japan could not pull out of the country without "losing face." "Some irresponsible outrage committed by a Chinaman on a Japanese, or vice versa," Sill concluded, "might be the beginning of a deplorable contest on Korean ground."²²

While American diplomats debated the future of Korea, Chemulpo was fast becoming an international rendezvous. Japanese, Chinese, British, Russian, German, French and American ships steamed in and out of Seoul's anchorage. The Japanese methodically unloaded war materiel--troops, horses, mountain artillery, mortars and rice. The wide mud flats at the mouth of the Han River made unloading difficult and supplies piled up on the beach. But the efficient Japanese controlled everything and representatives of other nations could only take notes for their military reports.

The Japanese stated that they would not withdraw their soldiers until China joined Japan in a program of economic and administrative reform for Korea. Unwilling to share responsibility with the Japanese, China rejected this proposal. Gozo Tateno, the Japanese minister in Washington, told First Undersecretary Edwin F. Uhl that the "situation may become very serious."²³ The Korean crisis had reached an impasse and new initiative was needed.

The United States, first Western power to sign a treaty with Korea, made an attempt to preserve peace in Korea. Cleveland felt obligated to offer American good offices in the crisis. On July 22 Uhl cabled Sill that "in the view of the friendly interest of the United States in the welfare of Korea and its people, you are by direction of the President instructed to use every possible effort for the preservation of peaceful conditions."²⁴ Cleveland assumed sole responsibility for this message. Gresham was not in his office, leaving Uhl in charge of the Department. And, as Cleveland later told Congress, "I felt constrained at the beginning of the controversy to tender our good offices to induce an amicable arrangement of the Japanese demands for administrative reforms in Korea." The President added that he was motivated by the desire to preserve "our commercial interests" and to insure the "safety of our citizens" in Korea.²⁵ With commercial interests limited to one small firm, Cleveland's motives probably stemmed mainly from his concern for the missionaries. And his desire to "use every possible effort" in the cause of peace foreshadowed America's overly-energetic neutrality in the months ahead.

The President's policy statement soon faced a severe test. On

June 24 Sill cabled Uhl that the Korean king had solicited American intervention in asking for the removal of Japanese troops from his land. Sill, believing cooperation to be the only realistic policy in Asia, had already joined with Great Britain, Russia and France, the "Caucasian" representatives in Seoul, requesting mutual Sino-Japanese troop withdrawals. The minister also had promised the King asylum in the American legation and had convinced Skerrett to delay departure of the Baltimore.²⁶

John Mahelm Berry Sill, former principal of the Michigan State Normal School and an ordained minister, was devoted to his President and had accepted his duty as minister to Korea as a grave responsibility. He accepted Cleveland's instructions--to use every possible effort to preserve peace and protect Americans--without reservation. It mattered little to Sill that Cleveland had only a vague idea of diplomatic complexities in Korea. The Russians were plotting to strengthen their position in Korea and China; while the British, in order to maintain their trade supremacy in the Asian market, were seeking to avert war. The French and Germans were exploiting every opportunity to increase their influence in Asia, and China was casting about for allies, with unofficial Prime Minister Li Hung-chang playing one power against the next. Into this tangle of intrigue, Cleveland interjected his vague, if high-minded, principles.²⁷

Cleveland's Secretary of State was destined to entangle the United States even more deeply in Asian politics. Gresham's restraint during the Hawaiian annexation debate indicated that he would avoid American involvement in Korea. Yet, toward the end of June 1894, he

grew intensely interested in Korean affairs. On the 29th he cabled Dun in Tokyo to discover what Japan planned in Korea. At the same time the Secretary told a reporter that "the United States did not exercise any protectorate over Corea, and that the most this Government could do in any event would be to tender its offices to settle the difficulty."²⁸

During the next few days Gresham received British, Chinese and Korean requests for diplomatic intervention in the Korean problem. The Korean representative in Washington relayed a telegram from Seoul on July 5 which begged Gresham to "please ask the President of the United States to adjust the difficulty."²⁹ Gresham wavered, fearing entanglements. Then in a private discussion with the Japanese minister, Gozo Tateno, Gresham learned that Japan was willing to risk war with China over Korea.

Meeting with Tateno behind closed doors at the State Department, Gresham asked why Japan would not withdraw its soldiers from Korea. The Japanese minister gave the official answer that the troops were there to protect Japan's interests and would leave when domestic reforms were made. Disclaiming any American intent to intervene, Gresham asked if Japan would respect Korean independence. The minister replied that Japan had no designs on Korean territory. "I suppose, Mr. Minister, your Government is watching China more than Korea," Gresham inquired, "and that you are looking to war more with the former than you are with the latter?" Tateno agreed. "That is correct. Our situation at home is critical, and war with China would improve it by arousing the patriotic sentiment of our people and more strongly attaching them to the Government."³⁰

Tateno's frank admission of Japan's war plans shocked Gresham. Torn between his reluctance to involve the United States and his belief in the justice of Korea's request, the Secretary determined to do his best for the helpless kingdom. On July 7 Gresham instructed Dun to communicate the following message to the Japanese government:

The government of the United States has heard with sincere regret that although the insurrection has been suppressed and peace prevails in Korea, Japan refuses to withdraw her troops and demands that radical changes be made in the domestic administration of Korea.

This demand is more remarkable in view of the fact that China favors the simultaneous withdrawal of both the Japanese and Chinese troops. Cherishing sincere friendship for both Japan and Korea, the United States indulge the hope that Korea's independence and sovereignty will be respected. You are instructed to say to the Government at Tokyo that the President will be painfully disappointed should Japan visit upon her feeble and defenceless neighbor the horrors of an unjust war.³¹

Prompted by moral indignation, Gresham ignored a more practical means of preserving Korean independence. The United States could have cooperated with Western powers in Seoul, as it was doing in China, in the issuance of a joint note to Japan. Fearing involvement, Gresham had turned down requests for cooperation; now Tateno's revelation forced him to pursue a policy which, in its own way, could bring about entanglements.³²

Somehow the substance of Gresham's cablegram reached the press. Possibly William W. Rockhill, Third Assistant Secretary of State, who was critical of Gresham's uncertain Asian policy and who consorted with top Republican opponents of the Secretary, was responsible for the leakage. In any event, on July 18 Hearst's San Francisco Examiner reported that Gresham had made a "grave diplomatic blunder" by sending

the note to Japan. The Examiner also suggested that Gresham's friendship with the Chinese minister in Washington had improperly influenced the Secretary of State. Whitelaw Reid's New York Tribune, the leading Republican Party newspaper, attacked Gresham, calling him a "meddler" and a "willing dupe" of the Chinese minister in alienating Japan, America's friend and the most progressive country in Asia. "It is plain that if Secretary Gresham has without any provocation abruptly taken sides with Russia and China he has committed an act which can only be adequately described by saying that he has made an ass of himself in the State Department," added the Hartford Post. The little four-page Emporia, Kansas, Daily Gazette stopped attacks on the Populists long enough to claim that all of Gresham's acts were blunders and no one should be surprised that he had committed another one. ³³

More moderate press reactions were also critical of Gresham. The Philadelphia Inquirer claimed that if authentic, the dispatch was "a violation of the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, for if we do not allow other people to interfere in American affairs, we cannot expect them to allow us to interfere in theirs, where we have no direct interest." The independent Springfield Republican (Massachusetts), while admitting that the attacks on the Secretary were political, still found fault with Gresham's policy. "Our interests are not likely to suffer if Japan should gobble Korea or if Japan and China should fight to see which should have the plum." In contrast, the Boston Globe maintained that Gresham should try even harder to avert war through arbitration. ³⁴

Sensitive to press criticism and confused over the outburst against a policy he considered just, Gresham remained in his apartment at the

Arlington House and pondered the results of his note. Later, when he received news that the British consul and his wife had been molested by Japanese soldiers in Seoul and that the American minister had received a diplomatic "sneer" in reply to his protests, the Secretary passed the message on to Cleveland without comment but praised Dun for having refused to present to Japan the protests Sill had uttered in conjunction with Russia, France and Great Britain.³⁵

Despite embarrassment and confusion concerning the Korean problem, Cleveland refused to revise his earlier instructions to Sill. This strengthened the minister's resolve to use every possible effort to preserve peace, including the employment of American armed forces. This appeared out of the question with the only available force a handful of marines on board the Baltimore. Yet Sill pressed Benjamin Franklin Day, the new captain of the American warship, with the desirability of sending marines to Seoul.

Day, a career officer promoted through the ranks, opposed sending his men into the heat and disease of the Korean countryside. He not only wanted to avoid incidents but also thoroughly disliked missionaries. He wrote Sill, "In event of war between Japanese and Chinese, there would seem to be no reason for apprehending danger to Americans provided they attend to their own affairs." A Japanese attack on the royal palace in Seoul on July 22 provided Sill with another opportunity to request a legation guard. With the streets of Seoul filled with fleeing refugees, the minister asked for a contingent of fifty men. He informed Gresham that the policy of "strict neutrality" necessitated the employment of an American guard since the use of an available Japanese force would be

regarded as an unfriendly act by China.³⁶

Day acquiesced and agreed to dispatch a legation guard. Unable to locate a pilot for his steam-launches, Captain of Marines George F. Elliott elected to march his men overland the thirty-one miles to Seoul rather than risk navigating the unknown Han River to the capital. At 7 p.m. on the evening of July 23, American military personnel, each man armed with forty rounds of ammunition, began an eleven-hour march through Korean territory. A Japanese guide assisted the fifty Americans along narrow footpaths, over deep sand and through muddy rice fields. The humid night and the heavy air exhausted Elliott's men. They reached the legation without incident, however, and were joined the following day by thirty-three additional men who arrived by steam-launch.³⁷

Though Sill had his legation guard, his instructions to preserve strict neutrality brought the minister into further disagreement with Captain Day. Sill claimed that the naval officer had disregarded American neutrality when he employed a Japanese guide to bring up his troops. Even worse, the earnest diplomat informed Day, the Japanese at the head of the American column "boldly rode his horse into our Legation gate," creating the impression among the "great crowds" present that the United States favored Japan. "This act added intensity to a growing anti-American feeling," Sill concluded. Day replied bitterly, "I don't care what nationality he is," and "for his bad manners in riding his horse through the Legation gate I am in no way responsible, nor do I regard the fact that he did so a matter of political or any other consequence whatever."³⁸

Washington's instructions, hindered by delayed communications and a vague and oversimplified view of the Korean situation, were already creating problems for American representatives in Asia. The following months would bring further complications as the government sought to maintain its special conception of neutrality.

CHAPTER I I

THE UNDECLARED WAR.

Except for scattered press reports, the trouble in Korea had received little public attention in the United States during June and early July. Gresham's warning to Japan had generated some adverse publicity but this was largely conditioned by earlier anti-administration criticism of Cleveland's policies in Hawaii. The deployment of the Baltimore in Korean waters and the landing of marines on Korean territory elicited a number of comments, due to the belief that the Korean rebellion had collapsed as soon as the American warship had appeared on the scene. Yet, despite tremendous Sino-Japanese troop concentrations in Korea, few Americans actually expected a major war. For example, the New York Tribune found "neither China nor Japan anxious to fight about Corea."¹

Dispatches arriving from the American legation in Peking during the spring of 1894 provided no indication that trouble was anticipated in East Asia. The regular minister, Charles Denby, was on leave in the United States recovering from a kidney stone operation and his last dispatch from China on March 16 had assured the State Department that "the approaching summer will be quiet," since China was busy preparing birthday celebrations for the Empress Dowager.² Though his appointment by Cleveland in 1885 was a political reward, Colonel Denby had become a reliable and hard-working representative of American interests in

China. He understood the Chinese people better than most westerners and for eight years the State Department had relied heavily on this "old China hand" for information. When his friend Walter Quintin Gresham became Secretary of State in 1893, Denby's influence further increased. As Gresham wrote to his minister in England (Thomas Francis Bayard), "I wish all the States in the Union were full of such men."³

But the years had softened the minister. Secure in his post, he had permitted affairs to slide, relying more and more on his secretary, Fleming Duncan Cheshire, and on his son, Charles Jr. The senior Denby left his son in charge of the Peking legation during his absence, hoping to groom the young man as a future minister to China. The younger Denby certainly possessed the potential to serve as minister. For years this Princeton-educated scholar had studied the Chinese language and institutions. On the other hand, he was stubborn and proud, and, despite his inexperience, often refused to listen to advice from his senior colleagues. Now, as crisis approached, this "callow youth" was in charge of American interests in China and he hesitated to report on problems which might reveal his inexperience.⁴

The Korean rebellion had served to focus the attention of Washington on Asia and now the Department, worrying that young Denby was not providing full information, requested fuller reports from other diplomatic representatives in Asia. Consular agents replied that war between China and Japan, with possible European intervention, might occur at any time. On July 22 Sheridan P. Read wrote the Department from Tientsin that the Chinese Emperor was "hot for war." The consul warned that an Asian conflict would endanger American property and lives

in China and suggested that a gunboat be sent to Tientsin. The following day Consul-General Thomas R. Jernigan cabled from Shanghai that "war appears inevitable." Indeed, Jernigan observed, the Chinese threatened to close treaty ports to all shipping. Sill added that although only "unauthenticated accounts" of land engagements had reached his legation, he knew "for a fact" that large Japanese forces had marched south from Seoul to engage the Chinese. Charles Denby Jr. was the last to report that conditions in China were no longer tranquil. Suggesting that the Chinese government had been humiliated by Japan's easy occupation of Seoul, he informed Gresham that "the Emperor and conservative statesmen are eager for war."⁵

Fighting between Japan and China had already begun around Seoul. While aware of war rumors, even those Americans in the immediate vicinity were uncertain as to the extent of hostilities. Captain Day, still hoping to withdraw his men from the Korean capital, reported that the Japanese had secured control of the area; but because of the interruption of telegraphic communications he did not know of any declaration of war by either China or Japan. Meanwhile Marine Captain Elliott, closer to Chinese and Japanese troop concentrations than any other American, also groped for information. "There is a rumor that war has actually and formally been declared between Japan and China," Elliott noted on July 28, and "if this is true, our government will of course be in possession of the official information."⁶

But the government had no information, official or otherwise. The Chinese and Japanese embassies in Washington could provide nothing concrete, while the only news reaching the American government during

this interval of undeclared war came by delayed cables from American diplomatic and naval agents in Asia or from press releases originating in Shanghai and transmitted through the British-controlled cable. This problem of communications fostered uncertainty in Washington and encumbered any official American response to the crisis.

Secretary of State Gresham, still resentful over the criticism of his note to Japan, waited impatiently for news. Anxious to formulate a policy, he could not do so until he understood the nature of the Sino-Japanese confrontation. Had war been declared? If so, the United States of course would remain neutral, as it had in the Korean-Japanese affair a month earlier. But what should the American attitude be toward selling arms to the belligerents in a state of undeclared war? How long should the United States wait before offering its good offices to mediate differences? Would the hostilities threaten American interests in Asia, particularly the lives of missionaries? Should the United States send additional military forces into the area?

Badly in need of guidance for his Asian policies, Gresham telegraphed Charles Denby, then convalescing from his recent operation at the Cadillac Hotel in Detroit. The Secretary urged Colonel Denby to return to Peking. Aware of his old friend's pride and confidence in his son, Gresham assured the senior Denby that: "Your son will doubtless look after our interests in China about as well as you could," but the President had "indicated that he thought it would be well if you were there." Both Gresham and Cleveland hoped to avoid embarrassments and preferred that their trusted adviser return to coordinate the American diplomatic efforts in Asia.⁷

Though determined to remain neutral in the Sino-Japanese crisis, Washington could not legally prevent the sale of war material to either China or Japan until war had been declared. In fact, both China and Japan were using the period of undeclared war to purchase arms, ammunition and supplies in the United States and in Europe. Chinese representatives could be sold anything, so long as it was lethal, and New England arms manufacturers reportedly did a brisk business. In their indiscriminate orders, pigtailed buyers seemed unaware that the bullets had to fit the gun. "Most of the modern equipment of the Chinese army was made in New England," one Boston newspaper erroneously assumed, "and guns and cartridges can be landed in China or Japan more quickly from New York than from any country in Europe." Steamers in San Francisco, as well as on the East coast, tried to beat the declaration of war by hastily loading war supplies from the United States to be shipped to Asia.⁸

The state of undeclared war created other problems for the United States government. The traditional dictum of freedom of the seas in time of peace was challenged when Gresham learned that the Japanese were searching all vessels arriving in Korean ports. Before the Secretary could study this issue, he received a telegram from Charles Denby Jr. clarifying earlier reports that both China and Japan had requested American good offices for the protection of their subjects and archives in the other's country. Several days later this request was confirmed by Yang Yu,["] the Chinese minister in Washington, when he informed the State Department that:

For the protection of the lives and property of the Chinese

subjects in Japan the Chinese Government begs the United States Government to allow that the United States Legation and the Consulates at Japan may protect the Chinese in the said country during the absence of the Representatives of the Chinese Government at the time of war, if there be any.⁹

The formulation of an Asian policy was complicated by the constant reminder that the United States possessed only two ships in Asian waters, the Baltimore and the Monocacy. Pressure mounted to send additional warships. The New Orleans Picayune, calling the currently nebulous hostilities the "war in the Far West," considered Asia to be an extension of the United States and American gunboats to be forts on the new frontier. "The United States has many citizens resident in China and Japan whose lives and property are likely to be imperiled by the war," warned the Picayune. "Prompt steps should therefore be taken to have sufficient forces of warships at the scene of the fighting as speedily as possible." Other newspapers predicted that anti-foreign riots, which were certain to occur throughout China as a result of the fighting, would require the presence of American gunboats to restore order.¹⁰

Rumors persisted that two women missionaries had already been attacked in south China. Both Gresham and Cleveland, according to speculation in the press, considered any attack upon a woman as an especially heinous act. "A woman in trouble," Mrs. Gresham remembered, and "my husband would certainly side with her against the power, greed and lust of man." Americans now wondered whether the "cowardly" administration would stand back and allow Christian women to be slaughtered by the heathen Chinese.¹¹

Gresham's first action was not to defend Americans in Asia but to

protect Chinese and Japanese interests. On July 26 he sent cipher telegrams to Charles Denby Jr. and Edwin Dun, instructing each to "act as custodian" and "afford friendly offices for the protection of Chinese and Japanese subjects in Japan and in China; either directly or through Consuls acting under your instructions but you will not represent China and Japan diplomatically."¹² Although writing his friend Yang Yu that he "took pleasure in instructing" the ministers to afford mutual protection, Gresham's instructions raised some difficult questions. Wouldn't the American role place the United States in an untenable position when the first conflict of interests occurred? Would not the first incident, whether in China or Japan, force the abandonment of strict neutrality? Gresham overlooked such questions and furthermore his instructions assumed that a state of war existed between China and Japan when in fact it did not. Even the Secretary acknowledged this when he asked Dun on July 29, "Has Japan declared war, or commenced war?"¹³

While the State Department groped for a policy appropriate to an undeclared war, the Asian crisis generated an increased number of news stories and ever larger headlines in the United States. Detailed maps of Korea, China and Japan accompanied lead articles, helping "many people brush up their rusty knowledge of Asiatic geography." Illustrations of Chemulpo harbor and belligerent warships supplemented the maps. Prints of Li Hung-chang, strangely resembling an emaciated Grover Cleveland; and the Emperor of Japan, with his medals, epaulettes and European-styled

uniform, appeared on the pages of American newspapers. Cartoons, which included ape-like representations of Chinese and Japanese soldiers pulling each other's long, braided pigtails, reflected a popular view of the combatants.¹⁴

By the last week of July articles and editorials were investigating what the San Francisco Examiner called "the true inwardness of the Korean trouble." The Examiner concluded that "the fundamental causes are the crowding of Western ways upon the Orient through Japan, and the resentment of change by that ancient, austere and dignified despotism, China." The pro-Japanese New Orleans Picayune claimed that China's opposition to a Japanese modernization program prevented progress in Korea and caused the current trouble between the two countries. The New York Times, while wary of Japanese ambitions in Asia, told its readers that "there is reason to suppose that Japan is a better friend of the Koreans than China, and that, on the whole, there would be less interference with their home affairs under a virtual Japanese protectorate." The New York Herald, continuing a notion developed during the Korean affair, argued that "the time has come for Japan to show herself worthy of her civilization and of her ambitions She is in Korea today for the benefit of the whole world, and her retirement therefrom would be tantamount to allowing the Hermit Kingdom to sink back to Chinese barbarism."¹⁵

Convinced of public fascination for the Asian crisis, newspapers discussed it with unconcealed anticipation. In a view typical of the West Coast, where excitement over Chinese immigration was especially intense, the San Francisco Examiner predicted that the United States

would support vibrant, exciting Japan in a war with China since "she is the most progressive among the Oriental nations, while China is a lethargic mass of repellent barbarism." The approaching war shared space with the Pullman strike and Eugene V. Debs in the pages of several midwestern dailies. The Chicago Tribune, for example, argued that an Asian catastrophe would lead to the consumption of more grain and wheat, thus establishing "dollar wheat" in the Midwest. The Chicago Inter-Ocean believed that war in Asia would stimulate the American carrying trade, while providing higher wages and more work for troubled American labor. But the paper concluded that war, which would probably involve Europe, would also greatly impoverish the world and ultimately hurt the United States.¹⁶

A number of Eastern newspapers agreed that hostilities were imminent and eagerly analyzed the military forces of the two countries. The Atlanta Constitution claimed that "American sympathies are doubtless with the island; the Japanese are a bright, progressive people--the Americans, so called, of Asia." In the northeast the Boston Globe prominently displayed the columns of war correspondent Frank G. Carpenter and urged its readers to pay attention to events in Asia because bloodthirsty China, the enemy of progress, would "not hesitate to adopt anything that might be invented" in the way of horrible weapons. China "could bring a gigantic army into the field" with her teeming population, the Globe predicted, and "Europe may some day be overrun by a great Chinese inundation."¹⁷

The rising interest in Asia also prompted cultural analyses of the combatants. The meaning of the Chinese and Japanese civilizations,

discussed in the context of the Western world and America's relation to East Asia, was debated at length. The rhetoric of race consciousness and Social Darwinism, so popular in the world of the late nineteenth century, appeared in a number of articles. "The Japanese are the real Chinese," one writer enigmatically claimed in July 1894. "They represent the best elements of the Mongol race" . . . and "are close rivals of the best of the Caucasians." Another observer argued that "the Chinese and the Anglo-Saxon are thoroughly antagonistic." Lafcadio Hearn, an American writer and teacher who had adopted Japan as his own country, suggested that Japan had undergone a process of "Occidentalization" without upsetting its Oriental "race brain."¹⁸

In their popular image as the "Yankees of the Orient," the Japanese grew steadily taller and paler. Feminist Helen H. Gardener noted that the United States naturalized "hundreds of low and worthless from European countries," who were not as "white" as the Japanese. Indeed Japan had adopted Western technology, education and representative government and, as one source acknowledged, studied Napoleon, American history and the English language. Consequently few Americans disagreed with the New York Tribune when it claimed that Japan should be "ranked with America and the nations of Western Europe, rather than with Asiatic countries."¹⁹

Equating Japan with American ideals of civilization and progress, social reformers and intellectuals emphasized Japan's struggle for justice in the family of nations. Japan, they argued, had passed the tests of Western civilization and was entitled to take an equal place beside other advanced nations. "This little oasis of progress in the

Far East," announced Benjamin Orange Flower, reformist editor of the Arena, had "shown a willingness . . . to adopt whatever the Western civilization could offer which was higher, better or more helpful than that which they possessed." Therefore, Flower concluded, the United States was morally obligated to revise its unequal treaties with Japan signed in Japan's "pre-civilized" stage in 1858. Flower compared Japan's struggle for treaty revision with the ante-bellum abolitionist crusade against slavery, and he proclaimed that treaty revision would permit the enlightened and progressive political groups to triumph, thus fulfilling Japan's natural evolutionary progress to higher civilization.²⁰

Efforts by Japanese-Americans supplemented this favorable view. Everywhere one looked, Japanese-Americans seemed to display that strident style of patriotism and pride which the American people could understand. Young Japanese throughout the United States raised brigades "armed with American rifles" and a fervent intent to return to Asia and fight the Chinese. Japanese fund-raising campaigns prospered, with \$10,000 collected in San Francisco alone. The Japanese community in Boston, though composed of students too poor to contribute to the war fund, displayed "appropriate" patriotic zeal and confidence that Japan would win the war. Japanese in New York City also were admirably confident as they mocked and laughed at the clumsy Chinese. In some parts of the country Americans and Japanese cooperated in a boycott of Chinese laundries.²¹

For every article praising Japan there were two condemning China, usually portrayed as despotic, corrupt, unprogressive and on the verge

of revolution. Although some admitted that the Chinese people had a rich cultural history, most writers in 1894 accepted correspondent Julian Ralph's view of the Chinese as the Negroes and Hebrews of the Orient. Drawing on a fanciful version of black Americans as "Sambos," Ralph similarly described the Chinese. "One sang an endless comic song . . . and all laughed as long as they were awake, when they were not wrestling or frolicking, or bandying repartee with the happy folk on passing vessels and on the shore."²²

Ralph's observations were reinforced by press reports of Chinese-Americans huddled in their filthy Chinatowns, praying to their "Joss gods," burning incense and singing strange "Mongolian chants" to the beat of "tomtoms." Unlike the Japanese, Chinese-Americans seemed ignorant of the trouble in Asia, and if they had heard reports about it they expressed a startling and hardly admirable indifference to the fate of their country. Further, the backward Chinese seemed determined to resist progress, proved by the closing of their country to Western education and commerce. Americans hoped that a Japanese victory would force China to accept the modern world and to learn from it.²³

The anti-Chinese Boston Globe proved that it could be impartial in its disdain for oriental nations. Its editor argued that a fight between Japan and China over Korea would be a "war over nothing," particularly since Japan had no right to interfere in Korea. "Japan's best claim to superior civilization," the Boston paper concluded, "would be to have minded her own business." Prompted mainly by a fear that potentially-dangerous China would be aroused by war, the Globe's criticism of Japan was lost in the pro-Japanese sentiment that swept

the United States during the last days of the undeclared war.²⁴

During the latter part of July the press devoted extensive coverage to the relative military strength of China and Japan. On paper the Chinese army appeared awesome, for every province had its own large army. Western observers late in July watched a mile-long column of dog-trotting Chinese infantry moving north toward Korea. Rivers were filled with soldier-laden boats. One American reported that "a Chinese army in motion can be likened to nothing more truly than a flight of locusts," ravaging everything in its way. According to Frank G. Carpenter, whose interest in the exotic never ceased, Chinese soldiers ate black dog's flesh and ground tiger bones to make them bloodthirsty and brave.²⁵

Americans marvelled at China's vast size and resources. They assumed that China's population of 400,000,000 people would overrun the 40,000,000 Japanese. "In the matter of brute strength," China had a tremendous advantage over the Japanese, the Springfield Republican commented. The New York Times predicted that if the Chinese proved determined to defeat Japan they could concentrate "immensely superior resources of numbers and money" against their smaller enemy. Furthermore, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle concluded, "China has all the advantages which result from a direct land connection with Korea." Japan, most agreed, would be a decided underdog, and this factor alone created considerable sympathy for the Japanese side.²⁶

In actuality, the diversity and immensity of China would prove

one of the major weaknesses of the Chinese war effort. Each province was jealous of its own army and often refused to send troops to help the Peking government fight what many considered its own private war against Japan. Without a standardized system of armament, Chinese soldiers often lacked proper cartridges for their rifles, if indeed they had been furnished with rifles. Many of the Chinese warriors marching north carried bows and arrows and gaily decorated lances. Chinese conscripts were inadequately clothed and fed, their officers pocketing payrolls and privately selling army provisions. Most of the officers had purchased commissions and the entire military system suffered from a traditional kickback system called the "squeeze." The corruption which permeated the entire fabric of Chinese administration, Julian Ralph observed, made the Chinese military as corrupt as the "Tammany plan."²⁷

The Japanese army, in comparison, was a model of efficiency. In 1879 General Ulysses S. Grant, on a visit to Asia, had predicted that the Japanese army was so well trained and armed that 10,000 of them could march against all odds back and forth across China.²⁸ Westerners praised the uniform system of conscription and carefully-organized active and reserve units. With European-style uniforms and armed with Japanese-made, repeating Murata rifles, soldiers reflected the training and discipline of their Western instructors. Japanese officers--having memorized the most modern textbooks on tactics and command, possessing Western artillery and supported by an excellent supply system and hospital corps--impatiently awaited the test of battle conditions.²⁹

In a generation which avidly studied the works of Captain

Alfred Thayer Mahan, debated the merits of a big-battleship navy, armor plate thicknesses and gun-bore sizes, Americans paid particular attention to analyses of the Asian navies. Both countries owned a number of foreign-built, armored warships. China was represented by two former German battleships and assorted smaller vessels, while Japan had a number of new, British-built cruisers and torpedo boats. Americans especially looked forward to the comparative performances of several Annapolis graduates, including one rear-admiral in the Japanese navy.³⁰

The public did not have to wait long for the first naval engagement. On July 23 the 1350-ton transport Kowshing loaded the last of her contingent of Chinese troops bound for Korea. The Kowshing belonged to the Indo-China Steamship Navigation Company, controlled by the British firm of Jardine, Matheson and Company. Since war had not been declared, China sent troop transports to Korea under foreign flags, in this case the British flag. The Kowshing, along with several other troopships and a gunboat escort, left the Taku forts on the Gulf of Chihli on July 23. Aboard were 1,200 Chinese regulars, several foreign advisers and a dozen pieces of field artillery. On the evening of the 25th, in sight of the islands off the Korean coast, the Kowshing encountered three Japanese armored cruisers, and, soon afterwards, three more men-of-war, one of which fired two warning shots and ordered the transport to stop.

Japanese officers boarded the Kowshing and commanded the British captain to follow the Japanese man-of-war. The Chinese soldiers on board, however, threatened to kill the captain and crew if he followed

these instructions. The British officer refused to obey, and the Japanese officers returned to their own vessel, which then fired a torpedo and opened up with all her heavy guns. The Kowshing exploded and sank stern first about forty miles from Chemulpo. When the Chinese and their European advisers and crew abandoned ship, the Japanese warship moved among the survivors and sprayed them with machine gun fire. Several dozen Chinese and a few Europeans, including German mercenary Constantin von Hanneken, escaped to tell the story of the Kowshing affair.³¹

Although the initial American response to the sinking was one of shock at the terrible slaughter, most commentators did not blame the Japanese. "Hairsplitting aside," argued the New York Tribune, "the Kowshing was a Chinese ship engaged in actual warfare against Japan, and the Japanese ship had as good right to fire on it as the Kearsarge had to fire on the Alabama." Furthermore, when the Japanese minister to England explained that Japanese warships did not know that the Kowshing was an English vessel, the Boston Globe quipped, "she certainly didn't have a particularly English name."³²

A defense of the Japanese by an eminent British international legal expert, Thomas Erskine Holland, reinforced the tendency to side with the Japanese. Holland, the Philadelphia Record reported, had declared Japan innocent of violating international law when it destroyed the Kowshing. According to the Record, Holland had argued that the transport comprised part of a "hostile expedition" directed against Japan during a period of actual, even if undeclared, warfare. "Having released the neutrals who were saved from the sinking ship," the

Record explained, "the Japanese have fulfilled every obligation imposed upon them by international law."³³

The Springfield Republican reminded Americans that the western nations had perpetrated far worse crimes on the open seas. The Republican cited the British attack on the United States warship Chesapeake in 1807 as a prime example, concluding that "nothing Japan has done could equal that in outrageous violation of international law."³⁴

The Japanese paid careful attention to official statements and press treatments of their country in the United States. They were pleased by most of what they had observed, but coverage of the Kowshing affair made them uneasy and convinced Japanese policymakers that a concerted propaganda effort would be needed to maintain American sympathy for Japan. The Japanese Secret Service fund already had paid American writers, including Edward Howard House, editor of the Tokyo Times, to publish material favorable to Japan.³⁵ But a surprise attack prior to a legal declaration of war necessitated a much larger informational effort.

The Japanese minister in Washington, explaining Japanese policy to the American press on July 27, said that Japan was not led by "fire-eaters" or "foolish people" but by careful statesmen. Playing on fears of radicalism in the United States, the minister argued that "it would be just as fair to judge Japan's attitude at the present time by listening only to Japan's jingoes, as it would be to form an estimate

of American statesmen from the examples afforded by Gen. Coxey and Mr. Debs."³⁶ Several days later the Japanese government released a lengthy statement explaining that Japan was well within her treaty rights in acting in Korea. Meanwhile Japanese consular agents interviewed by the press stressed the theme of a progressive Japan reforming backward and uncivilized Korea.³⁷

The most extensive use of propaganda in the United States did not occur until the arrival of the new Japanese minister, Shinchiro Kurino, the following month, but during the period of undeclared war the Japanese were testing their techniques and trying to create a favorable initial impression of Japan before making a formal declaration of war. In this they seem to have succeeded, aided all the while by preconceived notions already held by Americans concerning China and Japan. As the Chancellor of the Japanese consulate in New York City declared:

We are grateful to the American papers for what they say about us and for the great moral weight of the public opinion of this country, which seems to have been thrown almost entirely on the side of Japan; and whatever be the outcome of the struggle it will only strengthen the bonds between the great Republic of the Far West and her "Yankee brother," as you call Japan, of the Orient.³⁸

The sinking of the Kowshing provided the first concrete evidence of fighting in Asia, even though reports of the action remained sketchy and confused. It was generally believed that the attack would clarify the situation. Charles Denby Jr. informed Gresham that it would mean an "immediate" declaration of war between China and Japan.³⁹ The weeks of uncertainty appeared to be over.

The period of undeclared war had established an initial American response to the Sino-Japanese War. Officially it was one of strict neutrality. That the administration's conception of a neutral's role was active, rather than passive, could be seen in a number of statements and decisions, the most important of which was acceptance of the "good offices" responsibility. The response of press opinion, however, was anything but neutral. The belligerents had been pre-judged, the stereotypes created and the right and wrong decided. Japanese propaganda merely reinforced an established condition.

CHAPTER III

UNEASY NEUTRALITY

China and Japan declared war on August 1, 1894. Under international law a state of war required American neutrality if the administration was convinced that each belligerent had "just" cause for war. Consequently the two oriental powers endeavored to justify their policies to the United States government. Japanese officials, trained in the subtleties of western diplomacy, assured Washington that their nation would fight China "consistently with the law of nations." Naval Attaché Naoki Miyaoka explained to Gresham on August 1 that China had forced Japan into the declaration of war by refusing to cooperate with her in instituting a reform program for backward and anarchic Korea. Stressing Japan's moral role in the crisis, he informed the Secretary that China's request for Anglo-American mediation was a "ruse" to strengthen its military forces in Korea.¹

China countered with a view of its own. Though Chinese spokesmen in the United States remained silent, fearing punishment from Peking if they said the wrong thing, the Chinese Foreign Office (Tsungli Yamen) released a detailed statement of its Korean policy to Charles Denby Jr. At the same time, a former Chinese minister to the United States, Chang Yen-hoon, outlined China's defense in a letter to his old friend, Thomas Francis Bayard, now the American minister to England. These documents insisted that China could not, under the

customs and laws of its tributary relation to Korea, enter a program of internal reform with Japan. Chang noted that when Bayard had been Secretary of State, he had acknowledged Korea's tributary status in 1887. Chang argued further that Japan had invaded Korea while China had been invited in to suppress the Tonghak rebels. His concluding argument appealed to American moral sensitivities by suggesting that Japan's unprovoked and savage attack on the Kowshing during a time of peace constituted a flagrant violation of international law.²

The declarations of war failed to clarify the Asian situation in the United States. Communications, unreliable at best, broke down completely. The Chinese delayed cable messages concerning the war and American telegraph companies (Western Union, the Anglo-American Telegraph Company, Direct U.S. Cable Company, Commercial Cable Company and the Great Northern Company) temporarily suspended their Asian service. For news, the United States depended largely on delayed dispatches delivered by steamer or on unreliable reports emanating from London.³

The Cleveland administration insisted that, with the declaration of war, it would even "more strictly observe the neutrality laws." Yet neutrality laws were complex, imprecise and out of date. In August 1894 the only published restrictions on American citizens were based upon a law made in 1860 prohibiting enlistment in the armies of belligerents to make war against countries friendly to the United States (both Japan and China were considered friendly by the State Department) or to fit out armed vessels for belligerent service. Nothing, however, prevented belligerents from buying arms in the United States and

shipping them in their own vessels.⁴

American speculators, businessmen and expansionists threatened to undermine the image of a friendly and impartial United States. Claiming that the United States was locked in a struggle for "possession of the world" with China and Japan, Hawaiian annexationists urged American businessmen to take advantage of the Sino-Japanese War by adopting the "untiring zeal and splendid commercial talent" of the Jews to achieve economic ascendancy in Asia.⁵ Predicting that the present crisis would entangle Europe as well as Asia in a costly and bloody war, other imperialists demanded that the United States repeal its neutrality laws and allow Americans to take belligerent ships under the American flag. William Randolph Hearst's San Francisco Examiner implored California munitions and shipbuilding firms to exploit the war. Hearst's newspaper advised the Union Iron Works to build fast torpedo boats and cruisers for Japan, circumventing the neutrality laws of the "law-abiding Administration" by contracting warships for Samoa and then, once they were at sea, selling them to Japan.⁶

Some expansionist businessmen, though less sanguine than Hearst, anticipated that the war would open East Asia to American capital. Expressing revived interest in the Asian market, American manufacturers urged the State Department to inform them of new trade opportunities in China, Japan and Korea.⁷ At the same time, New York's Commercial and Financial Chronicle predicted that this "real eastern war" would stimulate American trade with Korea and China. A leading Virginia manufacturing spokesman, the Richmond State, doubted that the present war would greatly benefit American export trade but concluded that

"if Russia should interfere and England should resent to the point of hostilities, the hard times in the United States would quickly disappear." Focusing on the current controversy over silver and gold money in the United States, the New York Tribune added that at least the war would raise the price of silver and "not only help both our own Treasury and that of the Indian Government to unload part of the enormous quantity of silver bullion which they have accumulated, but may also render it possible to work at a profit our silver mines in the West that are now idle."⁸

Labor spokesmen speculated that, while the war might increase employment in the world's arsenals, it eventually would cause increased public debt, taxation and human suffering. "No one can tell whose toes may be tramped on before it ends," the United Mine Worker's Journal commented.⁹ The Journal of the Knights of Labor hoped that the Sino-Japanese War would reveal European governments as "awful cowards," prompting their people to rise against them.¹⁰

American labor spokesmen who commented on the war in 1894 generally agreed that all wars exploited the workingman and caused widespread suffering; yet they often proved themselves vulnerable to the rhetoric of expansionists--that this particular war would benefit the United States by creating jobs, higher wages, an end to unemployment and depression and a world-wide demand for American products. Furthermore, as the Knights of Labor publication noted, the Asian war might eliminate competition from cheap oriental labor because "all the patriotic Japs and Chinaman /sic/" would "go there now and be killed for glory and relief of America."¹¹

Others criticized assumptions that the war would materially benefit the United States. The Staunton Weekly News (Virginia) editorialized that the Asian war helped only war profiteers and actually hindered the world's economy by dislocating commerce, destroying property and creating hardships in Asia which would detrimentally affect the United States. The Boston Globe claimed that the United States had a duty to stop the war because it had contributed to the hostilities through its "reckless" sale of arms to Japanese and Chinese, who were no more than "children." The American Peace Society demanded that the government prevent American weapons from reaching Asia.¹²

Meanwhile, the entrepreneurs were busy. Ships loaded with flour, beans, pork, beef, fruit and leather goods destined for the hostile armies departed from San Francisco. The steamer Rio de Janeiro sailed with 200 tons of pig lead consigned to Japan. The Armour Packing Company in Kansas City negotiated with the belligerents for the sale of 500,000 pounds of canned corn beef, while the Anker Bouillon Capsule Manufacturing Company of Jersey City signed a contract with Japanese officials to supply the army with one million capsules of beef. At the same time Hartley & Graham, the New York agents of the Remington gun works, reportedly sold several million rounds of ammunition to the Japanese government. The New York brokerage firm of Charles R. Flint & Co. allegedly negotiated Japanese purchase of the Chilean cruiser Esmeralda, while Cramps Shipbuilding of Philadelphia considered latest offers for a cruiser, the Minneapolis, which had been destined for the United States Navy. American marine insurance companies raised their rates on "war risk" goods and carried on a "brisk business." Tea and

rice merchants in New York and Chicago prospered. As one businessman noted, "all lines of trade report an increased business, which is attributed to the Oriental War."¹³

Expecting American enforcement of neutrality laws and a Japanese blockade of the China coast, California gun-runners outfitted swift merchantmen designed to slip by patrolling cruisers. An American purchased the coastal steamers Smith and Cass to shuttle munitions from mainland China to Formosa. Applications from assorted military men, adventurers and cranks flooded the Japanese legation in Washington--so many, in fact, that the legation released a circular explaining that no volunteers would be needed by the Japanese military organization. Undeterred, ex-Confederate soldiers vied with their Union counterparts to offer service to Japan. In Cleveland, Ohio, several members of the local National Guard formed a "Japanese Loyal Legion" and received seventy signatures when they circulated an enlistment form for service in the Japanese army. In California a "mysterious white man," allegedly carrying the credentials of an official Japanese War Department recruiter, promoted an elite regiment, equipped with the latest repeating rifles, clothed in their own special uniforms and enticed by prospects of looting various mandarins' palaces. The San Francisco Examiner revealed the recruiter to be a famous "frontiersman," Captain Dick Falconsberg.¹⁴

On the East Coast, coke striker Valentine Nowacki of Pennsylvania offered to enlist five thousand of his impoverished and unemployed fellows as soldiers for Japan. When a cashier of the Second National Bank of Altoona, Pennsylvania, absconded with the bank's money and fled

to Japan, a New York newspaper commented on his "intention of helping out the island people financially in their present crisis."¹⁵

Among breaches of neutrality by individuals, the most sensational case originated with the scheme of a New England inventor to build an "infernal machine" for China. The late Victorian imagination thrived on tales of sinister devices and awful engines of destruction. It was an age in which M. Eugene Turpin's "engine of war" thrilled Paris, General Clarke's secret "electrical fish-shaped torpedo" amazed Americans and rumors of deadly balloon plots caused Londoners to shudder. John Wilde, a Providence, Rhode Island, chemist and nautical inventor, had concocted a mysterious weapon which he claimed would destroy entire fleets without the loss of a single attacking ship. Ignored by the United States Navy, the fifty-two-year-old Wilde brooded in his dark waterfront laboratory and planned to show the world the power of his "terrible secret."¹⁶

Wilde interested George Howie (alias George Cameron)--former demolitions expert aboard the dynamite cruiser Nictheroy during the Brazilian civil war and presently a torpedo tester for the Hotchkiss Ordnance Company--in his ideas. When news of possible Sino-Japanese hostilities in Korea reached Providence in early July of 1894, Wilde wrote the Japanese minister to Washington, Gozo Tateno, offering his invention to Japan. Wilde assured Tateno that he possessed "secret information which if known by your Government would enable them to destroy the whole Chinese fleet and enable them to capture any forts or water battery without the loss of a man or a ship." The Japanese government apparently was not interested in Wilde's plans.¹⁷

The inventor turned next for help to the senior Rhode Island senator, Nelson W. Aldrich. On August 27 Aldrich requested that the Chinese minister listen to Wilde who "desires to confer with you in regard to some matter which he will present."¹⁸ Chang Fang Mo, Yang Yu's secretary and first interpreter, interviewed Wilde and Howie. Mo, who called himself C. F. Moore in the United States, wore a wig to hide his pigtail and passed in many circles as an American. As Fleming Duncan Cheshire, the interpreter for the American legation in Peking wrote to Rockhill, "the chap in the Chinese Legation who styles himself C. F. Moore must be an ass; he is no more styled Moore in Chinese than I am, but anything will pass in the states so let him call himself Moore or any other d--d name he pleases."¹⁹ Moore expressed interest but wanted to check with former Secretary of State John Watson Foster before accepting Wilde's plan. On September 5, Foster inquired of the Brazilian Minister Salvador Mendonca whether Wilde or Howie actually had been involved in the Brazilian civil war. Mendonca assured him that an American had been employed by Brazil but had never tested his terrible weapon.²⁰

On September 13 Moore accepted Wilde's proposal and agreed to finance his trip to China. Unfortunately he could not raise enough money for the fare. Wilde urged him to try harder, promising that "if I get there before the war is over through your endeavors, it will mean Rank, Honor and Wealth for you."²¹ Moore replied unhappily that even the Chinese minister doubted the utility of the scheme and would not assist Wilde. The inventor wrote back: "They laugh at you do they . . . ? Well, I will try my best to raise the money and if I can we will go to

China . . . we will destroy the Japanese fleet . . . carry the war to Japan . . . then we will see if your Minister will laugh We will show him, and not only him, but the whole world, that it is no laughing matter."²²

Somehow either Moore or Wilde raised the necessary funds for passage to China. On October 16, accompanied by Howie, they left San Francisco bound for Tientsin on the steamer Gaelic. They strongly suspected that Japanese agents were shadowing them and that Howie's indiscreet boasts of an ominous "machine-de-guerre" had been overheard by a fellow passenger, the Japanese consul-general to Mexico. Therefore, upon arrival in Yokohama on November 2, the trio clandestinely slipped their ship and boarded the French steamer Sydney, moored at the same wharf. The ruse was not successful. When the Sydney stopped at Kobe, Japanese marines boarded the ship and arrested the three. The Japanese claimed that a contract, complete with terms of sale as well as an ironclad guarantee to destroy the Japanese fleet, was found in Moore's pocket. A copy of this evidence, forwarded to the American minister in Tokyo by the Japanese Foreign Office, indicated that the Chinese had agreed to pay Wilde one million dollars in gold and a percentage of every ship they destroyed in exchange for revealing his plan.²³

Publicly termed another Mason and Slidell case by the New York Times, the so-called "Sydney affair" threatened to involve the United States in a controversy with Japan. Would the United States demand return of the prisoners? Gresham refused to entangle the government, instructing Dun only to "insist that he (Wilde) shall receive proper treatment" as a prisoner of war.²⁴ The Japanese politely reciprocated by releasing

Wilde and Howie on their promise not to take up arms against Japan and to stay away from China. Moore was hustled away to a Japanese prison. Though Howie and Wilde later broke their pledge and helped the Chinese plant mines at Weihaiwei, leading to Howie's recapture, a potentially serious issue over neutrality had been avoided.²⁵

The United States government tried to prevent incidents such as the Wilde Case. Federal officers hunted the elusive Dick Falconsberg in California, while the consul-general at Shanghai refused to let the Cass and Smith carry arms to Formosa under the American flag. The government also planned legal action against the Colt Arms Factory of Hartford, Connecticut, at the request of the Japanese minister who objected to the sale of ten million small-bore rifle cartridges to China. It was necessary too for the State Department to pointedly refuse to encourage a relief project sponsored by the Christian Herald to feed starving Koreans for fear that the food would fall into the hands of one or another of the invading armies and therefore lead to a neutrality violation.²⁶

Determined that individual Americans must not in any way endanger the neutral policy of their government, Gresham sent cautionary instructions to diplomatic posts throughout Asia. In his note to Dun on August 30, the Secretary ordered the minister to "issue all manner of writs to prevent the citizens of the United States from enlisting in the military or naval service of either of the said countries to make war upon any foreign power with whom the United States are at peace."

Concerning this particular threat to neutrality, Gresham could act most decisively. He told Dun to "carry out this power by a resort to such force belonging to the United States as may at the time be within reach."²⁷

Compared to the need to restrain American individuals, Japanese and Chinese threats to American neutral rights, especially freedom of the seas, offered the administration a more complex problem. Although European powers had sometimes successfully challenged the American interpretation of neutral rights, Asian defiance of these venerated doctrines was a different matter, creating consternation and even anger in the State Department. Japan had labored quietly for treaty revision during the past few years, but now China threatened to upset the system of Western treaties by closing the treaty ports of Amoy, Canton, Ningpo, Chinkiang, Foochow, Shanghai, Hankow and Tientsin. China warned that it would blockade harbors, remove buoys and channel markers and shut down the coastal lighthouses. Chinese officials allowed it to be known that they were considering the searching of ships and the seizure of suspected contraband cargoes. On their part, the Japanese seemed prepared to blockade China's treaty ports and already had planted submarine torpedoes at entrances to their own harbors. Noting the growing danger to foreign commerce and reporting that pirates now attacked merchant vessels at will (since Chinese cruisers, fearing Japanese attack, refused to venture into the open sea), British members of the Chinese customs service later admitted that "things seemed bleak in August."²⁸

Great Britain, in fact, had asked the United States to cooperate with Britain, Italy and Germany to preserve the neutrality of the treaty

ports by the use of naval force. Sir Julian Pauncefote, the British minister in Washington, discussed the possibility of American co-operation in several private meetings with Gresham.²⁹ The resulting dilemma (one interpretation of neutrality at odds with another) drew a characteristic response. Guided by the large, overall principle he had helped establish in regard to the war the Secretary of State assured reporters that the United States would never participate in armed intervention in Asia and would maintain "strict impartiality" toward China, Japan and Korea.³⁰

Once again confidential State Department business was leaked to newspapers. Ironically, Gresham was attacked as another "Machiavelli" or "Talleyrand," for having covered up allegedly sinister and deceitful meetings with Pauncefote. One paper claimed that Gresham had never inspired public confidence in the good faith of the State Department. Another accused the Cleveland administration of making entangling alliances with European powers to keep the treaty ports open, thus betraying the basic dicta of the Founding Fathers as well as the Monroe Doctrine.³¹

On August 10, Chinese authorities at Shanghai announced that American merchant vessels would be searched. Charles Denby Jr. at once inquired whether the United States would "concede" to this demand. Consulting his legation's volumes on international law, the younger Denby granted that China might have the right to examine American merchant ships "in the territorial waters of China," but doubted that it could exercise this right on the high seas. He informed Gresham that no Oriental power had ever been permitted to search a public vessel of the

United States and urged that this right should not now be admitted.³²

Gresham hoped that he would never have to make the sort of decision suggested by the acting minister in Peking. He advised young Denby on August 15 that if China searched American merchant vessels on the high seas, "you will immediately report the fact for instructions, but you are not expected to encourage the assertion of that right." Where United States Navy vessels were concerned, Gresham could speak more firmly. While belligerents might be permitted to ascertain the neutral character of American ships, "the search of men-of-war can not be permitted," nor could the movement of American ships be revealed to the Chinese. The Secretary of State forwarded an optimistic circular to all diplomatic and naval personnel in Asia: "As neither China nor Japan has made known an intention to exercise the belligerent right of visitation and search on the high seas, it is hoped that neutral commerce may escape the inconvenience and obstruction which the exercise of that right must necessarily entail."³³

Possessing few large warships capable of long-range operations, the United States could not resist violations of American neutrality. Advocates of a larger navy asserted that China's actions should stimulate Congressional appropriations for additions to the fleet "beyond a few torpedo boats, which while excellent in their way are of no service on foreign stations." Noting that "we have sent several tubs into South American waters, but they never accomplished anything," others remarked that the current Asian situation offered the opportunity to display the American navy. The Atlanta Constitution echoed the views of "big navy" people when it commented:

We now have the best navy that we have had in a generation, and it is time to make our power felt in foreign waters. Our cruisers and battleships are needed in the ports of China, and any delay in the matter may cost us the lives of many American missionaries. We need a more vigorous foreign policy. The British should be kicked out of Central America, checked in Venezuela, and in China and Japan our naval supremacy should be made manifest at once.

Give old glory a chance again!³⁴

The Springfield Republican cautioned against this latest outburst by naval enthusiasts: "They say they are needed there to protect American interests, but wouldn't they in reality be likely to get us into more trouble than they could avert? Luckily we haven't a large fleet to spare just now for purely spectacular purposes."³⁵

Nevertheless, events in Asia were persuading Gresham that a larger fleet might be necessary to preserve American neutrality. The Japanese navy bombarded the Chinese military base at Weihaiwei on August 10, accelerating rumors of an imminent attack somewhere on the China coast. The Chinese sank rock-filled junks in Tientsin harbor, constructed a wooden barrier across the Peiho channel and removed navigation lights from the approaches to the Taku forts. Expecting invasion, thousands of refugees filled roads to the interior. Panic dominated even the Manchu government, and bandit armies roamed the countryside, attacking Chinese and foreigners without fear of reprisals.³⁶

Americans viewed China's self-defense measures with disdain. Some feared maritime incidents or resented inconveniences caused American steamers loaded with case oil or tea. It was increasingly apparent, however, that the greatest danger to Americans lay in the

chaos that would probably result from an attack. American diplomatic agents in Peking and Tientsin warned the State Department that a Japanese attack would turn the Chinese against all foreigners. Lawless Chinese infantry already had insulted American missionaries and the younger Denby anticipated mob violence. "Much anxiety is felt among the foreigners at Tientsin for their own safety," the acting minister related. "If the Japanese land and defeat the Chinese, the routed soldiers will, it is feared, attack the settlement."³⁷ Consul Sheridan Read advised: "Should the Chinese soldiers be defeated on their own soil it is understood that they will scour the country, committing outrages of every sort, and it is apparent that the slender thread which sustains the obedience of the masses to the Viceroy, would in that event be snapped and pandemonium would reign supreme."³⁸

American missionaries expected to be the primary targets of Chinese reaction to a Japanese attack. In 1894, missionaries-- principally Presbyterians, Methodists and members of the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions--constituted the largest single group of Americans in Asia. Scattered throughout Japan, China and Korea, little bands of missionaries established chapels, schools and hospitals, often accumulating substantial personal property as well-- including \$50,000 worth in the area of Seoul.³⁹ The majority of missionaries labored long hours, learned the native language and lived with the people. They had to cope with the diseases which had decimated countless missionary families in Asia throughout the nineteenth century, as well as the distrust and hostility of the people and officials. Anti-missionary riots had plagued China in particular, and missionaries

often faced death at the hands of anti-foreign mobs.

Church organizations in the United States apprehended that American missionaries confronted even graver dangers now that war had been declared between China and Japan. The Atlanta Constitution reported that an American Presbyterian church recently had been razed by an anti-missionary mob, and Southern Methodist Bishop Alpheus W. Wilson warned that "there is much reason to fear for the safety of the missionaries both men and women, now stationed in China and Corea." At the same time the New York Tribune published a letter from Hankow, China, claiming that the outbreak of hostilities had "revived all the native fanaticism of the Chinese" and that the Chinese were insulting foreigners and threatening violence.⁴⁰

Meeting in Nashville, Tennessee, in early August, the executive committee of foreign missions for the Southern Presbyterian Church stated that the United States government should take all necessary steps for the protection of their fifty missionaries in China. Resolved to present its case in person, the committee dispatched the Reverend Dr. J. W. Bachman to a Washington conference with Gresham and the Japanese chargé d'affaires. Leaders of the Board of Missions of the Northern Presbyterian Church in New York followed Bachman to Washington and arranged their own meeting with the Secretary of State. Concurrently the Board of the Southern Methodist mission sent a list of their people in China to the State Department. The Department in fact received numerous letters from missionary groups and individuals having friends and relatives in Asian missions.⁴¹

Gresham assured inquirers that American missionaries faced no

immediate danger and would be protected. Yet privately he expressed doubt that "effective protection" could be afforded "by the agents of this Government on the scene of hostilities." Despite a popular claim that "if our Missionaries are killed and no apologies and reparations made, this government will do some bombarding on its own account," Gresham perceived that the United States could do nothing at this juncture to help the missionaries.⁴²

The brutal assault on and murder of a Scotch Presbyterian missionary James Wylie by Manchu soldiers on August 10 intensified American concern. The Chinese government promptly issued an Imperial proclamation designed to protect the missionaries. But Li Hung-chang cautioned that this edict, which officials extensively circulated, would be ineffective if the missionaries agitated for foreign gunboats, legation guards or if they publicly commented on the war, because such actions would intensify anti-foreign hatred.⁴³ Nevertheless, believing that the war would profoundly affect their work, American missionaries refused to remain silent. Rev. Charles A. Stanley, an American Board missionary at Tientsin, claimed that Wylie's murder placed his brethren in great danger. "It is a time of uncertainty, anxiety, of danger in some localities," Stanley wrote, "and we can only fall back on our sure Refuge--the Lord reigneth, in thee is our trust." But he quickly added, "we have three gunboats now--British, French, German--and may have two more, U.S. and Russian." Stanley urged Read to request a gunboat, despite Li Hung-chang's warning. Meanwhile, another missionary announced, "It is rumored we are to have more gunboats here; I hope it is true," because only the Baltimore and the Monocacy, that "old-

fashioned side-wheeler" which looked like a "New York ferry boat,"
afforded protection.⁴⁴

The mission stations in North China reported the movement of huge armies, and as the fighting spread they feared reprisals from villagers who looked upon the missionaries as part of a vast foreign kingdom arrayed against China. Believing that the war provided evidence of God's work to open China to Christianity, the missionaries openly commented on China's corruption and weakness. Rev. Willis C. Noble, an American medical missionary at Paotingfu, near Peking, predicted that the war will have a "decided and lasting benefit to the country" by breaking up "the intense conservatism of the Gov^{er}nm^{en}t" and people and the hatred and suspicion of all that is foreign." Some missionaries publicly prayed for China's defeat while others hinted that the United States government should prepare to support the missionary crusade after the collapse of Chinese conservatism.⁴⁵

Reports of the missionaries' plight combined with rumors of American intervention on their behalf helped stimulate the public's appetite for war news. Yet there was little reliable information available during early August, and newspapers filled column after column with editorial analysis. They warned that this was not a "remote" Asian war. Americans could not disregard it because "European interests were so involved in Asia that a war in the Orient may precipitate a European war, and this would so upset the equilibrium of nations that its effects would be plainly felt even on this side of

the Atlantic."⁴⁶

Few doubted that European powers would intervene in the war, and not a few editorials anticipated that such interference would save brave and skillful little Japan (which most Americans hoped would "lick China into a cocked hat") from being swarmed under by three or four million Chinese. Even reports from American military experts that the "homogeneous and warlike" Japanese were "much superior to their Chinese cousins" failed to dissuade some American newspapers from playing on fears of China's ultimate triumph. "It is hard to believe that 40,000,000 people can lick 400,000,000," the Atlanta Constitution observed, and "the chances are that the Chinese will overrun Japan unless the European powers interfere." The Newark Advertiser explained, "It will shortly develop that China can command advantageous positions and execute frightful slaughter, once her multitudinous army spreads out on the land field."⁴⁷

Other Americans commented on China's vast resources. Dr. L. W. Luscher of Kansas City, a former surgeon in the Chinese navy, told interviewers that "China can afford to wage war for years, and from the millions of her people can pour troops into Korea as a child would pour sand in a rat hole . . . without missing them from the densely populated districts." The Springfield Republican asserted that "the Japanese cannot hope to whip China by killing off all her inhabitants, for, according to a statistician, if 1000 Chinese should be killed every day it would require 1500 years to finish them." The Knights of Labor maintained that "owing to the immense resources of China it is thought she will pour her hordes into Korea and overwhelm Japanese

troops."⁴⁸

More optimistic Americans placed their faith in the ultimate triumph of Japan, which represented the values of western civilization. The Philadelphia Press predicted that progressive Japan would make "short work" of China. The former commander of the cruiser Baltimore, Captain W. R. Bridgman, confidently believed that unless China undertook war preparations on a "gigantic scale," Japan's splendid army and navy would whip her. In this war theory there was no place for hopes that European powers might intervene. As the Louisville Courier-Journal supposed, Japan's fighting ability "promises hot work for his pig-tailed enemies," as long as "some of the big European bullies" abstained from involvement. The progressive view also challenged the argument that China's masses would inundate Japan. "If the Japs continue to improve in marksmanship," the Richmond State quipped, "it is not known whether China's 400,000,000 will suffice to keep up the target supply or not."⁴⁹

Typical American views of China as corrupt and decadent did not usually include Li Hung-chang, unofficial prime minister and commander-in-chief of China's northern defenses. Li had emerged as one of the most powerful Chinese leaders in late nineteenth century China. He had placed family and friends in key government posts while building up his own private army and navy as Governor of Chihli Province. Yet Li remained loyal to the Manchu dynasty and used his power to protect the throne as well as his own interests. Popularized by Grant's visit to China in 1872 and by former American minister to China John Russell Young's laudatory articles, Li Hung-chang became the only Chinese leader recognizable to the American public. "Li Hung Chang is a man of

liberal views, measured by the conservative Chinese standard," Sheridan Read observed, and he "is regarded as distinctly pro-foreign."⁵⁰

During August 1894 Americans were calling Li the Gladstone or Bismarck of China, the greatest of his race and the only leader willing to adopt western technology and education. Li appeared to be the one man capable of uniting China in a war effort against Japan, since Li, like Bismarck, was thought to possess the ability to mold diverse groups of provinces and cities into a national entity. But when Li's enemies urged the Emperor to deprive him of his "Yellow Jacket and Peacock Feather," signs of Imperial favor and confidence, (ostensibly for permitting Japan's seizure of Seoul and the defeat of Chinese troops), there were many Americans who noted that China would seal its own fate by turning its back on a man with Western attitudes.⁵¹

Stories dealing with Chinese-Americans continued to confirm earlier opinions that the Chinese lacked patriotism and the incentive to fight. Most Chinese interviewed in American cities appeared uninformed or indifferent about the Sino-Japanese conflict. When asked what the war meant to Atlanta's Chinese population, Sam Sing, an "intelligent Atlanta Chinaman," allegedly told the Constitution, "no makee diffence, Mellican Chinaman allee samee washee, makee monee, no go war, Empler China say come fight muchee, me no go tall, stay in Lanta, workee, washee, no, me no go war." This type of coverage, repeated in Boston, New York City, Chicago and San Francisco helped form the image of a people sadly deficient in national pride, a flaw which would drag China down to defeat. As the Boston Globe reported, Chinamen in Boston's Chinatown would "remain here to wash, play fan tan, and make money"

during the war. Residents of New York City's Chinatown, the Tribune stated with amusement, were content with "Low Flung," a new god meant to insure Chinese victory, which had been erected atop a building at the corner of Mott and Pell Streets.⁵²

On the other hand, when interviewed about their opinions of the war, local Japanese were admirably patriotic and well-informed. They founded a Japanese Patriotic League in Brooklyn to read dispatches, discuss the war and collect contributions for Japan's war effort. They established similar groups in Chicago, San Francisco, Tacoma, Boston, New Haven, Baltimore and Atlantic City. Japanese residents of Portland, Oregon, organized a Mutual Protective Association which pledged absolute loyalty to Japan. Always willing to discuss the war with Americans, the Japanese in the United States stressed Japan's progress, democracy and reforming zeal and they predicted that by adopting American technology they could conquer barbaric, un-Christian China.⁵³

One American who disputed simplistic views of the war was Ambrose Biercé, political pundit, journalist and later author of the Devil's Dictionary. Bierce contended that few Americans had endeavored to understand the causes of the war, much less the Japanese and Chinese peoples. "All that we knew or cared to know was that our Chinatowns were filthy--almost as filthy as the East side of New York, that the Chinese workingman in America is a heathen and works for low wages" and "that the Japanese make pretty bric-a-brac--which we may buy from Chinese tradesmen." He suggested that Americans study Japan and China before passing judgment on the combatants.⁵⁴

Partly to gather more accurate news but primarily to increase sales with sensational stories, major publishers debated sending special correspondents, at great cost, to the war zones. Harper's Weekly and Harper's Magazine hired Julian Ralph, already planning a trip to China and already equipped with uncomplimentary views of Asia. Ralph wrote Secretary of War Daniel S. Lamont that he needed letters of introduction "so that I may see some water fighting in the course of the grotesque war that is going on in Korea . . . perhaps a letter from you, stating that I am your friend, and of repute in 'my own countree' might be very valuable." Ralph suggested that Lamont keep the whole thing quiet "as I am keeping it dark so as not to excite the other publishers into sending men to share my 'glory' with me." Lamont complied with Ralph's request, also enclosing letters from Gresham and Assistant Secretary of Navy William McAdoo. "Well, if I ain't fixed for my trip nobody ever was," Ralph joked, and he hoped that reports from "cross-eyed and quaint" China might "advertise his wares."⁵⁵

Richard Harding Davis, just starting his career as journalist and author, also expressed interest in following the Japanese army for the purpose of writing a history of the war. He urged Lamont to write a letter to the Japanese Secretary of War, "saying that I am all sorts of a fine person and one who he should at once attach to the staff of some general in the field if he wants his side, the Japanese side, of the war written up with grace and accuracy combined." Davis even phoned Mrs. Cleveland to thank her husband for procuring credentials. "Will you say farewell for me to the President and thank him for his fine Cabinet, three of whom came through with letters which made it possible

for me to go." Somehow Davis' plans fell through, but a number of other special correspondents would follow Ralph and play important roles in shaping American reactions.⁵⁶

While strident pro-Japanese publicity continued to threaten American neutrality, the Cleveland administration searched for a war policy which might preserve neutrality while protecting American interests. Any effort along such lines would remain unilateral. The President, responding in part to growing criticism of British intervention in Latin America, was determined not to alter his country's non-entangling alliances tradition. He turned down all British requests for cooperation in Asia and ordered the strengthening of the Asiatic squadron. Responding to missionary pleas for a gunboat at Tientsin, the administration ordered Secretary of the Navy Hilary Abner Herbert to send the first available war vessel to that port as a "precautionary measure." The Navy Department also prepared to supplement the Baltimore and the Monocacy with gunboats from the Bering Sea patrol.⁵⁷

The captains of the gunboats Concord and Petrel coaled and equipped their steam whale boats with mounts for gatling guns, while stowing below a number of Lee Magazine Rifles and Colt revolvers. Fully expecting land duty on the Asian continent, the crews of the ships steaming toward China drilled daily as infantry. Meanwhile the Secretary of the Navy ordered Captain George W. Coffin of the second-class cruiser Charleston to complete repairs at Mare Island and sail immediately. This 3730-ton protected cruiser, along with the two

gunboats, would join the Baltimore and Monocacy in the war zone. ⁵⁸

Herbert assigned command of the reinforced Asiatic squadron to Admiral Charles C. Carpenter, a "bull of a man" with a thick wavy beard and mustache. Carpenter had commanded the USS Hartford in 1884 when he had suffered the first in a series of nervous breakdowns which would eventually lead to his suicide in a Massachusetts sanitarium several years after the Sino-Japanese War. In August of 1894, at any rate, Carpenter was considered capable of commanding a fleet in a critical area. ⁵⁹

At the same time Gresham prodded the elder Denby--still resting at his home in Evansville, Indiana--to "go to Peking without delay." Noting that a steamer would leave San Francisco for China on August 28, Gresham strongly suggested that the minister ought to be on board. "Naturally enough we fear that the war between China and Japan may embarrass us," the Secretary admitted, and the President strongly agreed that the current crisis required the presence of the senior Denby in Peking. ⁶⁰

Denby's experience was considered essential to the maintenance of strict neutrality, already subject to a variety of stresses and strains. The press continued to promote sympathy for the Japanese. Faulty communications invited misinterpretations of instructions. Neutrality violations by both Americans and Asians caused constant consternation, and missionary groups clamored for protection. Could the United States remain indifferent to neutrality violations, threats to missionaries and acts of atrocity? Not in the legalistic view of Gresham and Cleveland, who felt that neutrality must be strictly enforced, by

means which included the strengthening of the Asiatic fleet. Having accepted a neutral policy, the government could ignore none of the responsibilities suggested by that policy. One of these responsibilities, to be fulfilled regardless of the consequences, was the function of "good offices."

CHAPTER IV
THE ORDEAL OF GOOD OFFICES

When the United States agreed to extend its good offices to China and Japan in order to protect the subjects and property of each in the country of the other, the Cleveland administration believed that this was required by any honest and responsible policy of neutrality. Cleveland and Gresham envisaged good offices as a moral duty to be offered by an impartial friend of two warring countries. Yet complications arising from this well-meaning policy soon created unforeseen problems.

In 1894 the term "good offices," as defined by most international legal experts, signified the offer of "unofficial" and "impartial" advice by a third party to two disputants, sometimes as a first step toward mediation but more commonly as a means of maintaining useful communications into and out of nations at war. The United States, while traditionally advocating the peaceful settlement of international disputes, had offered its good offices sparingly during the nineteenth century, limiting them primarily to disputes among Latin American countries. Yet, the American treaty with Korea of May 22, 1882, specified that "if other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings." In such a case, much more was implied

than a narrow and technical diplomatic function.¹

Despite opposition to the implementation of the Korean treaty, Gresham had established a precedent by using good offices in an attempt to alleviate the tensions between Japan and China on the Korean peninsula. Shortly afterward, the State Department began to consider yet another extension of the good offices concept. Should this function now include the protection of Japanese property and subjects in China and the same for China in Japan? During the last week of June 1894, the Japanese government had requested Dun to inquire whether the United States would "use its good offices to protect Japanese archives and subjects in China."² Gresham cabled Dun that if the Japanese government withdrew its minister from Peking and requested American good offices, "the request would receive the President's friendly consideration, but it would not be granted without the assent of China."³

During preliminary discussions American officials voiced little concern over the idea that the meaning of good offices might be extended to protect belligerent interests. Such an interpretation would go beyond the role of impartial intermediary, suggesting instead possible instances of intervention, even if accomplished under the broad intent of impartiality. International law recognized that the term could be "somewhat elastic" but its definition had never really included the use of good offices to protect property and persons of warring powers. Yet, Charles Denby Jr. assured the State Department that international law provided for expansion of the service and Washington failed to question this concept.⁴

Preparing for expected Sino-Japanese hostilities in late July,

the State Department instructed American agents in China and Japan to represent unofficially and upon request belligerent interests in their respective countries. Confused by these instructions, consular representatives requested further definition of their duties under good offices. Young Denby distributed a circular to consuls on July 31 in which he explained that American diplomatic representatives in Asia would protect Japanese in case of war without diplomatically representing Japan. The acting minister added that the consuls might become custodians of Japanese consulates and archives but could not fly the American flag over Japanese property nor act as Japanese consular agents. The State Department failed to help young Denby clarify these instructions, only adding to the puzzlement by noting that the "raising the flag of the United States over buildings owned or occupied in China by the Japanese Government would be perfectly proper and according to precedent."⁵

The Japanese chargé d'affaires and his entire legation staff vacated Peking on August 1 leaving the Americans in charge of Japan's interests in China. Informing the Tsungli Yamen of the American responsibility, young Denby requested the Chinese Foreign Office to issue "stringent orders" to local authorities designed to protect Japanese subjects travelling from the interior to the treaty ports.⁶

Good offices, almost from their inception, contributed to misunderstanding and tension between American diplomatic representatives and the Chinese. On August 2 Consul Sheridan P. Read, in accordance with his instructions, escorted the Japanese consul's wife and children through hostile and shouting Chinese mobs to a waiting British steamer

then coaling at a wharf in Tientsin. Later Chinese soldiers and ruffians boarded the ship, hunting down and forcibly removing every Japanese passenger, including women and children. Read at once intervened, demanding that Li Hung-chang reprimand the soldiers and permit the Japanese to return to Japan. Li complied, apologizing profusely, but the incident reinforced Chinese assumptions that the Americans were somehow allied with Japan.⁷

Meanwhile Consul-General Thomas R. Jernigan at Shanghai announced that the Department's instructions "so disquieted Americans that I was pressed to communicate with you (Uhl) . . . submitting that the course of the United States towards China and Japan be absolutely neutral in the interest of American interests in both countries." Jernigan further indicated that good offices might be construed as favorable to Japan and "would tend to transfer to American residents in China the intense animosity of the Chinese for Japanese and especially endanger the lives of American missionaries in the interior of this Empire."⁸

Although generally less critical than the Chinese situation, good offices in Japan also caused difficulty. N. W. McIvor, the American consul-general at Kanagawa, reported that when some Chinese were stoned by a Japanese mob, he assumed protection of some five hundred persons making their way to the docks to board the China-bound Oceanic.⁹ The Chinese in Japan complicated matters by insisting that the Americans now held diplomatic as well as legal jurisdiction over them, which of course the State Department denied. Good offices clouded the line where American authority ended and Japanese jurisdiction began. The Japanese resented Chinese claims that only the United States had authority over

their subjects in Japan, announcing by Imperial Ordinance that "Chinese subjects in Japan shall be wholly subject to the jurisdiction of the Japanese courts."¹⁰ McIvor assured Japan that the United States "had not sided with anybody," but acted as "a friend of good order and civilization" in Asia, which mollified Japanese officials.¹¹

Up to this point the Cleveland administration had suffered only minor embarrassments from its broad application of good offices. It was not prepared, however, for the question of Japanese spies in China. For years the Japanese intelligence services had infiltrated China with agents disguised as students, merchants and even religious men. They supplied the Japanese army with detailed maps of the countryside and sketches and descriptions of major fortifications and arsenals. The Chinese obtained some knowledge of this network and with the declaration of war announced severe punishment for any Japanese captured as a military spy. The Chinese suspected almost every Japanese, and this, combined with American assumption of the protection of Japanese in China, led to a volatile situation. Charles Denby Jr. tried to avoid a confrontation by urging the Chinese "to proceed with moderation and to be influenced rather by motives of humanity than by bitterness toward Japan" and to deport rather than execute suspected spies.¹²

With the outbreak of hostilities, Japanese citizens in China flocked to the treaty ports in preparation for their flight to Japan. At Shanghai Jernigan promised members of the Japanese community that they would be safe under his protection if they remained in China. The

first test of Jernigan's promise occurred on August 10 when two Japanese students accused of spying sought protection in the American consulate under the auspices of good offices. Shanghai sweltered in an extraordinary heat wave which had kept the mercury at over one hundred degrees for more than a week. The heat bothered Jernigan but not nearly as much as the need to implement a policy, the pitfalls of which he had already recognized. Although the consul-general wanted to avoid involvement, he refused to hand the Japanese over to Chinese authorities.¹³

The Chinese Foreign Office instructed its minister in Washington to protest Jernigan's decision. Yang Yu["] informed Gresham that China demanded the immediate surrender of the two Japanese in Jernigan's possession. Taken completely by surprise, the Secretary of State cabled young Denby to "report immediately and fully" on the Chinese complaint. Gresham added that legally "our legation and consulates in China are not authorized to hold Japanese accused of crime against the demand of Chinese authorities."¹⁴

In reply the acting minister defended Jernigan, explaining that the two Japanese wearing Chinese clothes had been arrested by the French consul in the French concession in the International Settlement. The Japanese had requested asylum in the American compound under the good offices provisions until the case could be investigated. Jernigan had granted this fully in line with his interpretation of the State Department's instructions to protect all Japanese in China. Doubting the rights of China in the case, Charles Denby Jr. advised Gresham that important principles were involved and that the Secretary should not

act precipitately.¹⁵ The spy case enmeshed Gresham in the controversy between the western interpretation of treaty rights (extraterritoriality) and China's legal claims. Moreover, when Jernigan and the younger Denby asserted that surrender of the two alleged spies, whom they claimed to be only poor students, meant terrible torture and decapitation of "innocent victims" by the barbaric Chinese, Gresham confronted a moral as well as a legal dilemma.

Meanwhile Chinese minister Yang Yu¹⁶ reminded Gresham that, despite their interview of August 18, American representatives had not surrendered the spies to the proper authorities. Lacking information, the Secretary deferred action until he received further word from China. He castigated young Denby for having failed to dispatch a full report of the case to Washington.

The acting minister waited until August 26 to cable Gresham that the Japanese had been arrested in the foreign settlement and therefore must be tried by foreign consuls, in this case the American consul acting for Japan. Stressing that Jernigan had called the alleged spies "mere school-boys, peacefully and openly living at Shanghai," Charles Denby Jr. requested instructions for the consul-general to try the case in a mixed court of both foreigners and Chinese officials.¹⁷ The same day young Denby further defied the State Department in a case involving another accused spy at Ningpo. John Fowler, American consul at Ningpo and a close Boston friend of leading anti-administration spokesman Henry Cabot Lodge, had complained to the acting minister that the Chinese had seized a Japanese priest and without evidence had sentenced him to death for spying. Fowler denounced the Chinese action, asking the Peking legation

for instructions. Charles Denby Jr. replied: "Gresham's orders positive . . . consuls cannot protect Japanese accused of crime . . . you may use friendly offices to secure trial; if refused no alternative." He then added his own corollary to Gresham's instructions, stating that if a Japanese accused of crime desired refuge, the American legation in Peking considered it "lawful" to retain him until the Chinese presented reasonable proof of guilt.¹⁸

Learning of the younger Denby's insubordination, the Secretary of State tried to spell out a view of good offices acceptable to the United States government.

You and Consul General at Shanghai seem to misapprehend nature of protection authorized. Lending good offices does not invest Japanese with extraterritoriality nor should legation or consulates be made asylum for Japanese who violate local laws or commit belligerent acts. Protection to be exercised unofficially and consistently with neutrality. Consul General should not have received two Japanese and is not authorized to hold them. Your suggestion that our Consuls act as arbitrators not entertained.¹⁹

Pressured by the Chinese, agitated by recalcitrant subalterns and compromised by his own instructions, Gresham relied on his legal preparation rather than his inadequate diplomatic background. He forwarded another communication to the acting minister insisting that "you need to be instructed as to the nature of your duties" in regard to the care of Japanese subjects under good offices. The Secretary stressed the unofficial aspect of good offices, explaining that it was unconstitutional for an American diplomatic representative to act officially for the subjects of another nation. Furthermore, Gresham reminded young Denby that since the Japanese could not be considered citizens of the United States, they were not subject to the laws of that country.

Finally, the Secretary asserted that it was inconsistent with the laws of neutrality to show special favor, such as Jernigan's action comprised, for either side. In closing the former Indiana judge assured Colonel Denby's son that precedents for the use of good offices existed, citing as examples the American offer to Mexico in 1867, in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and for years on behalf of Swiss Republic's citizens in China.²⁰

Abstract legal principles did not interest the stubborn acting minister as much as the humanitarian question of two Japanese who, he was firmly convinced, were not spies. He begged Gresham to delay this "unconditional surrender to the Chinese Government" until his father arrived back in Peking. Gresham replied curtly, "My instructions 29th clear."²¹ Realizing that he could resist no longer, Charles Denby Jr. instructed Jernigan on September 1 to turn the two students over to Chinese authorities. He expended his anger by sending to Gresham an elaborate and condescending explanation of western law in China.

The former Princeton scholar stated that the foreign concession in Shanghai contained a multiple legal code and that "mixed courts" with a Chinese magistrate and a foreign assessor tried criminal cases in the international community. He hinted that Gresham's action threatened to undermine the treaty system and set a dangerous precedent for the future viability of western extraterritoriality in China.²² Jernigan undermined this interpretation, however, when he admitted that the foreign community, and not his conception of American legal obligations, had forced him to ask for a mixed court.²³

While the Shanghai affair was consuming most of the State

Department energy, good offices were causing trouble for Americans in other parts of China. On September 3, Jacob T. Child, the American consul at Hankow, reported that his marshal had resorted to force while protecting Japanese in that treaty port. Child had ordered his officer to escort a Japanese businessman to a steamer bound for Shanghai; however, when a mob of about two thousand Chinese blocked the path, the Americans had used a "display of rifles" to ensure his passage. The Chinese accused Child of acting "as an accessory [sic] to the escape of a spy," calling the American "dishonorable."²⁴

Several days later at Tientsin, Consul Read became involved in the controversy over the capture of an alleged Japanese spy named Ishikawa Yoichi. Read had suspected Ishikawa of clandestine activity even before the declaration of war and advised the Japanese to take him to Japan when they abandoned Tientsin. Certain that Ishikawa had departed, Read had assured Li Hung-chang that Tientsin harbored no undesirable Japanese. Much to the consul's embarrassment, Ishikawa Yoichi was captured in September as he emerged from the home of the chief secretary of the Director of the Ordnance Department of Chinese customs. Though Read believed that Ishikawa was a spy, the Japanese claimed that he was not and fully expected Read to use good offices to obtain his release. Read had hardly begun to protest when the Chinese decapitated Ishikawa, thus freeing at least one American official from the good offices dilemma.²⁵

Meanwhile, Third Assistant Secretary William W. Rockhill, absent from Washington when Gresham ordered the surrender of the two Japanese students, returned in early September and unsuccessfully attempted to

convince the Secretary to view the case "realistically" rather than on purely "abstract" legal grounds.²⁶ At about the same time the press began to comment on the spy case. Newspapers deplored Gresham's action, claiming that the spies had already been beheaded. For example, the New Orleans Picayune called Gresham's instruction "a cowardly act," noting that "the pledge of the United States to protect Japanese subjects in China is a mockery, and should be at once withdrawn, so that Japan may be able to secure the good offices of some other power."²⁷

Public discussion of the spy case added to Thomas Jernigan's dejection. He felt betrayed and tormented. As a friend of Assistant Secretary Rockhill wrote from China, the consul-general had "the Japanese spies on the brain & can talk of nothing else; & not with much dignity he inspires or writes himself articles belauding his own actions and belittling that of the State Dept."²⁸ On September 21 Jernigan presented the Department with a lengthy manuscript justifying his actions. He explained that, while never acting officially, he had retained the Japanese because of the "then excited state of the Chinese mind" which would have "meant death to the young men within twenty four hours." Jernigan repeated his assertion that the foreign community in the international settlement at Shanghai had requested that the consul-general hold a trial by mixed court. He added that the Department's action threatened American lives in a similar situation if the United States ever waged war on China. Then commenting on Yang Yu's influence on the Secretary of State, Jernigan noted that "mistakes may have been made . . . but the suspicious nature of the Chinese mind may well be properly rebuked when attempting to offer its attributes as the standard

by which to judge an officer of the United States." Closing his brief, Jernigan summarized:

Viewed from a legal standpoint, the case presented no difficulty, but I had been instructed to protect Japanese interests and here was a case that appeared, not to law, but to humanity. I was not asked to intervene legally, officially, but as a man having the confidence of both China and Japan, and desirous of being just to both and at least humane to the imperilled subjects of the one whose interest I had been published as being the representative at this port.²⁹

Jernigan implied that the State Department misunderstood conditions in China. He became convinced that Gresham's instructions not only condemned the Japanese to death and endangered other Japanese in China, but also destroyed the consul-general's dignity and effectiveness as a representative of the United States.

The Chinese minister in Washington, meanwhile, assured Gresham that his Government would not punish the students until Colonel Denby returned to his ministerial post in Peking. He visited Gresham several times, insisting that "reports in the American papers to the effect that the two alleged spies had been beheaded by the Chinese Government were untrue." Even Jernigan admitted this. In a cablegram of October 9, sent to "belie newspaper reports" about the death of the two spies, Jernigan intimated that the two were alive and well. On October 22, however, Jernigan reported that the two accused students had been tortured and decapitated in conformity with Chinese law.³⁰

The controversy had subsided by the end of November, when Harper's Weekly correspondent Julian Ralph resurrected it. Looking for sensational copy, Ralph interviewed the tormented Thomas Jernigan. Exaggerating many of the consul-general's comments, Ralph hurried an

article to Harper's claiming that the Japanese spies had been "tortured with horrible ingenuity and devilishness, every day with a new brutality, for seven days," implying that American helplessness in Asia had condemned them to this horrible death. He alleged further, embellishing on Jernigan's suspicions, that the "oily rogue" of a Chinese minister in Washington had blinded the Secretary of State to reality and made him believe that the Japanese would be treated humanely.³¹

Reprinted throughout the United States, Ralph's article ignored all evidence to the contrary in claiming that Gresham himself had acted to condemn the two students to a most barbaric and brutal death. Ralph even asserted that the United States Senate had decided to investigate Gresham's conduct of the affair "solely upon my written word." Yet, on the very day that Ralph's revelations appeared, Theodore Roosevelt suggested to Henry Cabot Lodge that he ought to demand all the official correspondence concerning the spy case for a Senate investigation. Roosevelt told Lodge on December 1, "It seems to me that this brutal stupidity and cowardice of Gresham in the matter of the surrender of the two Japanese calls for the most decided and prompt action If possible I wish he could be impeached." Roosevelt's wrath was based upon his idea that Gresham had failed a test of manliness but for Lodge it was a political opportunity to castigate the Cleveland administration and increase his own stature in the Republican Party.³²

On December 3, Lodge requested that the Senate be shown the correspondence relative to the delivery of the two Japanese "if not incompatible with the public interest."³³ Gresham resisted pressure

to turn the documents over. He urged John T. Morgan of Alabama, the administration's spokesman on the Foreign Relations Committee, to bring a Republican member of the committee (Gresham suggested Senator John Sherman of Ohio) to his office to read the correspondence in private and then report back to the Committee. Gresham warned Morgan, considered by some an unwilling defender of Cleveland's policy, that:

Publication at this time of the correspondence might be harmful. The Chinese Minister tells me that he is daily expecting his copy of the treaty between China and the United States for exchange of ratifications, and the treaty between this government and Japan was only sent to the Senate yesterday. There are some things in the correspondence the publication of which might irritate China, perhaps offend her.³⁴

The Secretary of State penned an identical letter to Senator Sherman and evidently convinced the two lawmakers that they should try to curb Lodge's Senate criticism of the administration.

The question of releasing the spy case documents was debated on December 5th. Sherman suggested that the whole matter be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations rather than dumped on the Senate. This afforded Lodge an opportunity to criticize the State Department. The Massachusetts Senator implied that the failure to protect the two Japanese "is an act of the greatest possible discredit to the humanity of the United States and to the humanity of all civilized men." Citing Ralph's article as his evidence, Lodge assumed that the Japanese, relying on American good offices, were turned over to "the most hideous torture that it is possible to conceive." The Senator stated that "an explanation is due to the American people for such an incident."³⁵

Like Sherman, Senator Morgan also asked that the affair be sent

to the Foreign Relations Committee since "war is flagrant between Japan and China, and the least interference on the part of the Senate of the United States which might be considered as favoring the one side or the other of those belligerents would be an unfortunate circumstance at this particular time." Pressed to explain why he thought the resolution should go to the committee, Morgan defended the administration. He contended that imputations of guilt against the President, the Secretary of State or American diplomatic agents in China ought to be most carefully considered before being publicly debated on the floor of Congress.

Lodge insisted that his resolution had simply called for the facts of the case and he could not understand why it would influence American relations with China and Japan. Then the Republican Senator revealed a deeper motive for wanting to bring the issue before the Senate:

We have done a good deal of unproductive, if not mischievous, meddling in that war already, beginning by warning Japan from interfering with Korea, when the war was between China and Japan and not between Japan and Korea. From that time on we have been meddling in one way or another, and I think Mr. President, that it seems an extraordinary objection to make now to an inquiry as to facts to be told that we may render our relations uncomfortable with either China or Japan I propose this inquiry because I think on the facts as stated to the people of the United States we are put in an attitude which is simply humiliating and disgraceful. If it be true that we gave up these men to torture and to death without a single inquiry after we had an understanding with the Chinese Government that we should give safe conduct to just such citizens in order to get them out of that country, then a heavy burden of misdoing rests on somebody.³⁶

Despite Lodge's pleas, Sherman's motion to defer the question to the committee passed and the Senate recessed for the holidays.

During this interval Gresham wrote to the senior Denby, who at last had arrived in Peking: "The whole correspondence will go to Congress when it assembles after the holidays and some of your son's despatches may and doubtless will be seized upon by the Republicans in their effort to damage the State Department." He complained that all of this trouble could have been averted had Jernigan acted promptly on his instructions. In closing Gresham told Denby, "I do not expect any real trouble to come from the matter, however, and hope you will not let it annoy you."³⁷

Even so, the spy case continued to annoy Gresham, weakening his health and increasing his irascibility. The Secretary turned on Yang Yu["] for what he believed was the Chinese minister's betrayal of trust in having promised that the Chinese would wait for Denby's return before punishing the two Japanese. Gresham wrote Yang, "I regret to say that there is reason to believe that the men were executed before the return of Colonel Denby to Peking, and therefore, in derogation of the voluntary promise which you assured me your Government had made." The Chinese minister replied that his government had never promised anything but only to take the matter under consideration and that Gresham had misunderstood the conversation. "It was established by proof that the two students had furnished information to their Government by means of ciphers in which seventy six telegraphic messages in all were sent by them, giving reports of the movement of troops and of military matters." Hence, Yang concluded, the Chinese government could not wait for the American minister's return to dispense justice. Gresham pressed the issue in further correspondence but Yang Yu["]

refused to debate it, assuring Gresham that their differences were merely a regrettable misunderstanding.³⁸

Incensed by the epithet that "the blood of these tortured and murdered Japs is on his head," as well as by Ralph's accusations, Gresham tried to win a more favorable press. He compiled an unsigned defense for the New York Evening Post, and that paper's editor agreed that, while the execution of the two Japanese was unfortunate, "it seems that the outcry lately raised against Secretary Gresham for not preventing it is as disproportionate to the occasion as it is groundless and sensational." The Providence Journal also defended Gresham, explaining that while "it may be regrettable that we cannot prevent such crimes," even "Japan admitted [that] it is not within our legal rights to do so."³⁹

The controversy raged through January 1895. Public disclosure of the documents, combined with Gresham's own testimony before the Senate on January 16, convinced papers such as the New York World that the Secretary of State had "made a blunder which seems to be almost a crime . . . his surrender of the two Japanese students to be tortured and put to death by the Chinese at Shanghai appears to have been wholly unjustified." The World maintained that even Charles Denby believed that the Japanese "boys" were "probably guiltless," raising serious doubts as to whether Gresham had any evidence that they were spies. The New York Tribune merely wondered: "Is Gresham in his right mind?"⁴⁰

Ironically, Denby himself in a confidential dispatch sent to Gresham on December 31 (though not received by the State Department until March 1) supplied evidence that at least one of the two victims

had been part of an elaborate spy network in China. Denby gathered information about the training and procedure of Japanese espionage agents and noted that at one time there were as many as thirty spies in Shanghai alone. "I have it on the best authority," the minister said, "that one of the alleged Japanese spies who was arrested at Shanghai, and over whose fate so many tears have been shed, was one of these detailed officers." Denby disclosed that every village in the projected war zone had been infiltrated by Japanese agents disguised as storekeepers, monks, laborers, merchants and students. "This information, I think you will agree with me, tends greatly to show that a vast amount of undeserved sympathy has been wasted on Japanese spies, both in our own country and in this." Even Jernigan admitted that one of the Japanese students was a spy. He told Assistant Secretary Uhl that, had he been allowed to try the case, he would "probably have committed one and liberated the other."⁴¹

While these revelations eased some minds, they could not affect the central problems raised by the case. The State Department had created a broad general policy without first giving thought to its practical implementation. Forced to send precise directions to its agents in Asia, it learned too late that this task was impossible. The United States continued to employ its good offices to register Japanese in China and Chinese citizens in Japan, to urge the belligerents not to attack enemy merchant ships and lighthouse tenders and eventually to open channels of communication for peace negotiations. None of

these functions, however, embarrassed the United States so much as promises based upon the vague assumption that good offices meant protection of subjects of one country residing in enemy territory.⁴²

Prompted by a sense of principle, the administration had made a kind of promise which could have one of two results; to keep the promise would certainly destroy American neutrality and might even lead to dangerous involvement, while not to keep it would result in humiliation. The administration endured the latter, a burden which weighed most heavily upon the shoulders of the Secretary of State. His friends considered it an important cause for the rapid deterioration of his health, leading to the Secretary's death in the spring of 1895.⁴³

CHAPTER V

THE BATTLES AT PING YANG AND YALU

After reports of the Kowshing affair in late July, Americans had anticipated early news of pitched battles between huge armies interspersed with reports of colossal naval engagements. Instead they received rumors of minor skirmishes between Chinese and Japanese foragers. China and Japan had utilized the first month of the war to strengthen their positions in Korea. The Chinese had built massive earthworks around the northern garrison town of Ping Yang, while at Chemulpo squadrons of Japanese transports unloaded troops and supplies. Minister Sill and his legation secretary, Horace Allen, both agreed that conditions in Korea were unusually calm.¹

Lacking exciting news, Americans continued to speculate upon the scope of coming battles, the terrible barbarities which were certain to result, Chinese court rivalries and other oriental intrigues. On one day China was said to have purchased the Chilean navy, while on the next the Asian rivals were described as discussing an armistice. The smallest event, so long as it was concrete, received inordinate attention. An example occurred on September 14, when the State Department decided to send Lieutenant Michael J. O'Brien of Boston, an instructor of military art at Fort Leavenworth Infantry and Cavalry School, to travel with the Japanese army. The Richmond State predicted: "If our army officer, attached to the staff of the Japanese general,

should be taken prisoner, the Chinese government would behead him first and apologize to the United States government later."²

American observers in Asia believed that the month of silence suggested preparations for a major battle somewhere in northern Korea. Admiral Charles C. Carpenter, studying the steady debarkation of Japanese infantry, cavalry and artillery at Chemulpo, related to Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert that a battle appeared imminent. Concurrently, Allen ascertained that as many as 108,000 Chinese troops were now facing two Japanese army corps of perhaps 70,000 men at the city of Ping Yang.³

The ancient walled stronghold of Ping Yang dominated the road through northern Korea to Manchuria. During August the Chinese reinforced the massive walls with loopholed and moated earthworks, garrisoned by picked soldiers reportedly armed with American Winchester rifles and supported by Krupp and Gatling guns. The six Chinese generals flying their banners at Ping Yang were confident that their lines of infantry, artillery and select Manchurian cavalry, brandishing fifteen foot lances, would check the invading "dwarf-men" (wo-jen) from Japan. Chinese officers cavorted with Ping Yang's supple dancing girls, while their soldiers broke into Korean homes and made themselves comfortable with the city's wives and daughters.⁴

Japanese General Oshima, at the head of a column of highly-trained infantry, watched Chinese revelry from the surrounding hills. Taking advantage of the situation, Oshima's soldiers attacked the southern outer forts and after heavy fighting drove out the Chinese defenders. Three additional Japanese units joined Oshima's force and

systematically began to assault Ping Yang in bayonet charges covered by devastating rifle and artillery fire. At first the Manchu army inflicted heavy casualties with the repeating rifles, but soon the Japanese learned to hug the ground and let the Chinese fire furiously and ineffectively until they ran out of ammunition. Then Oshima's men charged, and often the defenders threw down their empty rifles and fled into the countryside. The only American correspondent at Ping Yang, dapper James Creelman of the New York World, reported the intensity of the battle:

Blood, blood everywhere--on the walls, in the rippling river, on the green hillsides, in the flowering valleys. Blood trickling over gravestones, blood dashed against the walls of the ancient temples, blood on the rocks, blood on the roof-tops--everywhere the cold gleam of steel in the swirling cannon mist and sheeted flame 5

The reporter also noted the torrential rains which inundated the battlefield during most of the twenty-two hour contest for Ping Yang and turned the fields into a quagmire of mud and mangled men and horses. The Japanese repulsed suicidal charges by the Manchurian cavalry, then penetrated the inner defenses of the city. The Chinese garrison retreated, allegedly cutting off the heads and hands of dead and wounded Japanese as they retired. The Japanese victory at Ping Yang was complete and Chinese armies fled from Korea.

The first news of the battle reached the United States through dispatches transmitted to London from Shanghai and Tientsin and then sent on to New York. The dispatch of September 15 announced that China had turned back the Japanese attack at Ping Yang. This was refuted the next day by a report from the Central News Agency in Tokyo, claiming

that the Japanese had gained the victory. The Atlanta Constitution, for one, accepted the Japanese version, noting that "Jackson's defeat of the British at New Orleans fell far short of this showing." By September 18 American newspapers were in general agreement that the Chinese had been "utterly routed" at Ping Yang. Inaccurate initial accounts of the battle were blamed on the Reuters news service which "foists" news cooked in London legations off on the American press. Newspapers began to rely upon the United Press Service which provided Central News Agency dispatches from Tokyo, thus assuring a pro-Japanese press treatment.⁶

America's major newspapers--including the Atlanta Constitution, Baltimore American, Boston Herald, New York Tribune, New York World, Philadelphia Inquirer, Brooklyn Standard Union, San Francisco Examiner and others--praised Japan's great victory. "Ping Yang was not a matter of luck," the Boston Herald explained, "but the result of scientific preparation and calculation . . . inspired with an intelligence equal to that exhibited by many European governments." After surveying the week's press treatment of Ping Yang, Public Opinion magazine concluded that Japan "has won for herself what has heretofore been persistently denied her, a degree of admiration and respect that insure her hereafter an equal place among the civilized powers of the world." The Army and Navy Register, while praising Japan's "superior strategy," warned that China might quickly replenish her losses and that this Japanese victory could merely prolong the war and force China to resist change.⁷

Some Americans questioned the facile tendency to equate military prowess with superior civilization. Reporting that after the victory

"the atmosphere /in Japan/ is electric with spirit of war . . . the army is mad with enthusiasm . . . the Government is drunk with egotism," James Creelman suggested that Ping Yang augured a spirit of unhealthy militarism in Asia and hinted that Japan would one day become a threat to the Western powers. The Boston Globe noted that "having shown her power as a scientific murderer, Japan has earned the right to be counted among the civilized nations of the world." Dwight W. Learned, an American missionary in Kyoto, who observed closely Ping Yang's influence on Japan, commented: "These victories naturally stimulate Japanese self-confidence and the feeling seems to be rapidly growing that it is Japan's mission to lead all Asia, and after regenerating China to stimulate aid to India for independence." Despite these prophetic warnings, the memory of Ping Yang faded as news of another monumental battle reached the United States.⁸

While the battle for Ping Yang raged, units of the Chinese and Japanese navies gathered in the Yellow Sea. In July and August both the specialized and general press in America had commented on the naval strength of the two combatants, predicting that a Sino-Japanese war might be the testing ground for modern warships. Noting that Annapolis had graduated two Japanese naval officers each year since 1872 and that "the Japanese officers are faithful students of Captain Mahan, the American naval historian," a number of observers viewed the Japanese navy as an American protege and waited for the titanic encounter that would prove its superiority. As Captain Benjamin Franklin Day of the

Baltimore stated, "the Annapolis men among them (the Japanese navy) are the smartest sailors and have the most important commands." The coming test between the navies of China and Japan would be the "greatest naval war" since the American Civil War. The predicted encounter would also provide technical information. "The navies of China and Japan contain specimens of about all the various types of ships which have been evolved in the last generation and a great deal of light will doubtless be thrown upon their relative utility."⁹

The Japanese fleet cruising near Ping Yang in early September 1894 included a "flying squadron" of British-built cruisers Yoshino, Takachiho, Naniwa and Akitsushima, already battle-tested in the brief encounter with Chinese warships and transports on July 25. The 4150-ton steel cruiser Yoshino, reputed to be the fastest ship in the world when tested in 1893, was armed with an assortment of quick-firing guns and five fixed torpedo tubes. The other three cruisers all displaced over 3,000 tons and, although not capable of the Yoshino's twenty-three knots, could maintain a steady eighteen or nineteen knots under full steam. These unarmored steel cruisers shared basically the same light-calibre, quick-firing attributes of the Yoshino and together they comprised a tough and mobile group designed to intercept and destroy convoys.

On September 17 a larger Japanese squadron under Vice-Admiral Ito, an imposing figure with his heavy epaulettes and sabre-scarred face, joined the "flying squadron" at Haiyang Island near the mouth of the Yalu River. Ito's group contained the Matsushima, Itsukushima, Hashidate, Chiyoda, Fuso, Hiyei, Akagi and Saikyo. The first three

were coastal defense ships built by the French between 1889-1891. Slower than the cruisers but each displacing 4,277 tons, armed with thirty-two ton Canet guns in open-topped barbettes with twelve-inch armor plate and further equipped with a large number of small, quick-firing guns, the Matsushima, Itsukushima and Hashidate provided the backbone of the fleet. They were reinforced by the armored 2450-ton British-built cruiser Chiyoda and the ancient, bark-rigged Fuso, a former British iron-armored corvette. The obsolete armored cruiser Hiyei, the dispatch gunboat Akagi and the cumbersome, armed merchant ship Saikyo brought up the rear.¹⁰

Early on the morning of the 17th the Japanese fleet spotted the smoke of a large group of ships approaching from the east. This was the Chinese Peiyang squadron under the command of Admiral Ting Ju-ch'ang, a former Anhwei army general. The Chinese fleet boasted two 7430-ton German-built battleships, the Chen Yuan and the Ting Yuan, reputed to be more powerful than the Maine or Texas of the United States Navy. A fourteen-inch armor belt and four twelve-inch Krupp cannons protected the Yuan sister ships. Ten German and British-constructed cruisers accompanied the battleships. The Lai-Yuan, Ping-Yuan and the Ching-Yuan all displaced over 2,800 tons and, though slower than their Japanese opponents, carried heavier armor. Assorted vessels supported the battleships and armored cruisers--including the two Armstrong ram cruisers, Ch'ao Yung and Yang Wei, the 2300-ton unarmored cruisers Chih-Yuan and Ching Yuan, the gunboat Kuang Chia, the torpedo cruiser Kuang Ping and the 2355-ton steel cruiser Chi-Yuan. China possessed a number of other steel warships in the southern-based Nanyang, Fukien

and Kwantung squadrons, but the lack of central command, combined with provincial jealousy, had prevented their concentration in northern waters. Nevertheless the Chinese squadron which steamed toward the Korean coast appeared more than the equal of the Japanese fleet. Aboard were several foreign advisers, including an American Annapolis-trained naval mercenary, Philo Norton McGiffin, to offset the Japanese Annapolis graduates.¹¹

The fleets closed, the smaller Chinese warships strung out line abreast on either side of the two battleships, forming a loose wedge. This formation offered the battleships maximum firepower but greatly reduced their maneuverability. Western advisers later claimed that this formation had been ordered by the cowardly captain of the Ting Yuan to protect his own ship in the center. The Japanese sprinted forward in single-file formation or line ahead, the four cruisers of the "flying squadron" suddenly veering off and attacking the Chinese flank while the main squadron crossed in front of, then around, the Chinese formation. The Kwang-Ping and the Ping-Yuan slipped away either to divert part of the Japanese fleet or, as some later claimed, in cowardly retreat.¹²

The Japanese concentrated on the main group, singling out the slower, weaker vessels for destruction, sinking the Ch'ao Yung and Yang Wei before attacking the battleships. The engagement fragmented into smaller group battles, the Chinese also first attacking the weakest Japanese ships. The Ting Yuan poured heavy fire into the Miyei, then turned on the Saikyo, destroying the latter's steering gear and starting a fire. The Lai-Yuan led the attack on the small Akagi,

ripping away masts and riddling its funnel. Somehow the damaged Japanese vessels slipped away, and suddenly the Chinese battleships found themselves between two lines of Japanese cruisers. For six hours the opposing groups exchanged fire, hurling projectiles at each other until the Chen Yuan alone had sustained over four hundred hits. McGiffin, adviser on that battleship, reported that the Japanese "rapid firing cannon" of four, five and six-inches pumped shot after shot into the Chinese vessels and "riddled the Chinese Superstructures with them; disabling unprotected guns, and driving their crews away, besides setting on fire boats and all /the/ wood work in unprotected parts of the ship." Japanese shells, however, could not penetrate the fourteen-inch armor belt of the battleships, and as dusk settled around the smoke-obscured battle area the Japanese withdrew, fearing that Chinese torpedo boats lurking on the fringes of the conflict would move in and attack their cruisers.¹³

The Japanese had sunk the weak cruisers Ch'ao Yung, Yang Wei, Chih-Yuan and King Yuan without the loss of a single vessel. German mercenary Constantin von Hanneken, in charge of guns on the Ting Yuan, later blamed corrupt officials and inferior technicians for having supplied the battleships with armor-piercing shells instead of the more effective bursting ammunition. "It's as clear as daylight that if the Chinese had had the right thing in their big guns, they would have punished the Japs very severely, and perhaps won the battle."¹⁴ The remnants of the demoralized Chinese fleet limped into Port Arthur for repairs. The main fleet still existed, but Japan now effectively controlled the sea routes to China and northern Korea without which she

could not have carried on land operations during the next few months.¹⁵

The State Department learned by ciphered telegram on September 19 that a naval battle had occurred off the mouth of the Yalu River. Charles Denby Jr. informed Gresham that the Chinese had lost at least five vessels and the Japanese three. Commander Robert E. Impey of the gunboat Monocacy, then at Tientsin, repeated Denby's report, giving the names of the Chinese ships believed lost. At the same time the Japanese legation in Seoul first insisted that Japan had destroyed eleven Chinese warships, then later lowered the estimate to seven while noting that the Matsushima, Hiyei and Akagi had suffered "some damage." By September 21, cables transmitted from Tokyo had convinced the American government that Japan had not lost a single ship at Yalu.¹⁶

News of the "great naval battle" excited American naval experts and newspapermen who proceeded to study the effects of naval gunnery on steel plate. As the anti-war Nation complained, "they rather exclaim with a sort of bastard scientific enthusiasm, 'By Jove' old Krupp was right after all!" But the popular press and specialized journals ignored E. L. Godkin's criticism and filled their columns with analyses of the Yalu battle. For example, the Scientific American called the battle "the most important naval engagement since the advent of iron and steel in shipbuilding." As the Engineering News stated, "Tests of guns and armor on a government proving ground are well enough; but this cannot compare with the tests of an actual battle" such as Yalu.¹⁷

Newspapers echoed this theme. The New Orleans Picayune predicted

that Yalu would be "carefully studied" as "the first practical test in actual warfare of many of the modern appliances for naval defense." Stating that Yalu proved cruisers and small fast gunboats could defeat heavily-armored large battleships, the New York Tribune believed that the lesson of "Japan's Trafalgar" was "too obvious to need further emphasis." At the same time the Springfield Republican editorialized that Yalu "enjoys the distinction of being the first sea fight of any magnitude, under modern conditions of steam, high-power/ed/ guns and heavy armor . . . and on this account alone it must possess considerable historical importance, whatever it's /sic/ political results may be."¹⁸

The popularity of the naval battle prompted several Americans supposedly serving on Chinese warships to capitalize on the publicity. Raymond H. Hornbrook, claiming to have been an engineer on the ill-fated Yang Wei, sold his stories of the action for five dollars a column to the San Francisco Chronicle and the New York Sun. According to Hornbrook (or at least as the San Francisco Examiner asserted, an "inebriated reporter" who doctored Hornbrook's stories), the Yang Wei had not really been sunk but had single-handedly held off the entire Japanese fleet and, once it had run out of ammunition, had escaped the swift Japanese cruisers. The record speed of the Chinese warship, Hornbrook claimed, had been achieved by adding "a fresh bottle of gin" to each stoker. The Examiner, a rival of the Chronicle, accused that paper of "Hornbrooking" the public. The Chronicle had "manufactured" the stories and "humbugged" its readers with "a cheap outlay."¹⁹ In fact, the Examiner doubted that Hornbrook ever had served on the Yang Wei

and subsequent investigations confirmed the suspicion.

Yalu also made a short-term hero out of the American adviser on the Chen Yuan, Philo Norton McGiffin. No one doubted McGiffin's presence at Yalu. He had served as a naval instructor for Li Hung-chang since 1885 and when the Sino-Japanese War broke out had volunteered for sea duty. During the battle, McGiffin suffered a concussion, partial loss of sight and lacerations--and he had pictures to prove it. The New Orleans Picayune claimed that this "plucky ex-American naval officer" was really a hero, with a Japanese reward on his head for \$5000. The Century Magazine published his story and Richard Harding Davis later included him in his collection of great war heroes. For a time, McGiffin lectured on naval strategy and was cited by experts as an authority on the subject of modern naval warfare. But when William Ferdinand Tyler, a British adviser at the Yalu battle, revealed that McGiffin, "queer before the fight," had contracted a "curious case of partial brain affection" after the battle, becoming a "Yalu-maniac" and telegraphing his exploits around the world, the public lost interest in the hero. McGiffin later shot himself with his own service revolver in a New York hospital.²⁰

Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan made far better material for hero worship. Reporters rushed to Gravesend, England, where the Captain was holding court aboard the cruiser Chicago. Here the world-renowned naval expert explained the meaning of Yalu. The Chinese fleet, he said, had suffered from its duty to protect the troop convoys and consequently operated too close to shore, enabling the Japanese to cut down its maneuverability. "It was a big engagement for modern vessels but I

see nothing yet to lead me to suppose that the engagement will point to the reconstruction or remodeling of war vessels."²¹ Commenting privately on the Yalu battle to his friend in the Royal Engineers, Major Sir George Clarke, Mahan said that the Sino-Japanese naval display reinforced his own theories that modern warfare could not be conducted without a "fleet superior" to a "fleet in being."²² For Americans, Mahan was the greatest naval expert and since Japan had won they concluded that the Japanese had followed Mahan's teachings. "Looking on the tactics and the results as a whole, they are flattering to Americans, for the Japanese are pupils of Captain Mahan and the Chinese are not" ²³

Secretary of the Navy Hilary A. Herbert scrutinized battle details more diligently than did Mahan and most of the others. Herbert, ex-Confederate war hero and ardent expansionist, hoped to use the "lessons" of Yalu to stimulate interest in Congress and in the public for increased naval appropriations. Though his critics asserted that he "did not know the difference between a man-of-war and a wash-tub," Herbert actually had studied naval problems as chairman of the Senate committee for naval appropriations and always had been sensitive to the criticism that the American navy was second-rate. ²⁴

Herbert was collecting a scrapbook of news clippings concerning naval action during the Sino-Japanese War. Despite popular acclaim for the swift cruisers supposedly victorious at Yalu, the Secretary paid particular attention to one clipping from the New York World of September 28th. "The two Chinese battleships proved to be formidable war machines," the World had noted. "They stood the battering of

heavy, quick-firing guns admirably . . . their upper structures were severely damaged, but no shot penetrated to any vital part." Other naval officers supported this pro-battleship view. At the New York meeting of naval architects and constructors held in November, Rear-Admiral Richard W. Meade, Jr. specified that "there was nothing connected with the Yalu fight which disproves the hitherto generally accepted theory of the superiority of the battle-ship as a fighting vessel." Meade called for construction of more large battleships for the United States Navy.²⁵

Herbert received a copy of a private letter written by Philo McGiffin to a friend at the Norfolk Hydrographic Office (Virginia) on November 13 which stressed the need for battleships. McGiffin, at this time still regarded as an authority, wrote that he preferred "battle-ships [ironclads]" by all means for fighting." He stressed the efficiency of rapid-firing guns and observed that all woodwork should be removed from warships because of the extreme fire hazard. McGiffin concluded that Chinese "official corruption and inefficiency," as well as Japanese strategy and tenacity, had accounted for their victory, not the superiority of cruisers over battleships.²⁶

On December 12 Herbert received another letter, this one a lengthy discussion of Yalu from the New York City police commissioner, Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt revealed to the Secretary of the Navy that he had obtained a detailed description of the battle and damage to ships from a friend whom he preferred not to name (actually Speck von Sternburg, military attaché in the German Legation at Peking). Slipping over to Port Arthur, Roosevelt's friend had examined the Chinese fleet

immediately after the battle and reported that "they had received the most terrific hammering, and if it had not been for their excellent iron-clads, which did most of the fighting, under control of foreigners, not a ship would have returned." The letter concluded that "the most powerful cruisers cannot successfully fight ironclads."²⁷

Roosevelt's letter prompted Herbert to write an article about Yalu, "The Fight off the Yalu River," which appeared in the November edition of the North American Review. Critical of suggestions in the American press that future wars would be fought by swift, unarmored cruisers rather than heavy battleships, the Secretary asked: "Is there anything in the recent naval developments to justify the conclusion that the days of the battle-ship are ended?" After surveying the Yalu battle, Herbert surmised that "certainly there is nothing in these facts to induce the conclusion towards which so many writers seem to have been straining, that instead of battle-ships we should rely on cruisers as fighting-vessels." In fact, Herbert suggested, battleships should be improved and equipped with better armor. Consequently he urged Congress to authorize the construction of additional battleships, as well as torpedo boats and to replace older guns on existing ships with rapid-fire six-inch batteries. In closing Herbert warned Americans that the Yalu battle carried a lesson "our country must heed. Unless either China or Japan is to be wiped off the map as an independent nation, the United States are to have west of them two nations each steadily increasing its naval power, while our trade relations with both are rapidly becoming more intricate and more complicated."²⁸

Cleveland and Gresham had often suffered severe criticism for

their uncertain Asian policies, but Herbert's aggressive analysis of Yalu drew one of the most virulent attacks made on a government official during the course of the war. E. L. Godkin's Nation disparaged Herbert's article, claiming that the "erstwhile inoffensive Congressman" had undergone a "metamorphosis" into a "bloodthirsty bully of the sea." The Nation charged:

In the last North American Review he has an article on the lessons of the Yalu seafight, in which there is not a word of sympathy for victims or survivors, not a line in deprecation of our own country ever being drawn into war, but only and everywhere anxiety about making our battleships bigger and more deadly. Is it any wonder that when the head of the department takes such a tone, a subordinate should draw a fancy picture of a "hell of death and destruction," and print it in a popular magazine as the kind of thing naval officers think about, day and night?²⁹

Yalu, in fact, accelerated the administration's desire to strengthen its navy in Asian waters. While Gresham and Cleveland had wanted a larger fleet to protect American neutrality, Herbert sought more ships to study naval warfare and gather information firsthand. The Secretary of the Navy pushed for additions to the Asiatic fleet while sending detailed instructions to Admiral C. C. Carpenter concerning Navy Department policy and strategy during the war. Herbert cabled the commander-in-chief of the American Asiatic squadron on September 24th that the Navy Department desired the stationing of permanent warships at Newchwang and at Chingkiang. "It is the wish of this Department that a ship shall be kept at each of the ports mentioned and that the vessels of your squadron shall be so distributed that every protection

may be given to American citizens and particularly to the missionaries."³⁰ The Secretary ordered Carpenter to cooperate with other naval powers to protect foreigners at the treaty ports. Then he reminded the Admiral that one of his primary missions was to gather information, especially "careful reports desired on ships injured in action." Herbert vested Carpenter with all necessary powers to send intelligence officers to the enemy fleets as well as permission to sail as close as possible to sites of hostilities. The Department, Herbert added, would try to assist by sending additional ships, four of which--the Yorktown, Charleston, Machias and Detroit--were already slated to join the Asiatic squadron. "The arrival of these vessels will place you in command of a large squadron, from which the Department expects energetic and efficient work."³¹

Ping Yang and Yalu further excited public interest in the Sino-Japanese conflict. While the two battles fulfilled the expectations of technical observers, and while Yalu reinforced the arguments of battleship advocates, the engagements were even more useful to sensational journalists. Japan's overwhelming victories fulfilled the heroic role forecast for her. She had applied western technology and a particularly American style of strategy in her initial triumphs. Washington's policy of strict neutrality must have seemed unbelievable to those who observed the highly-partisan enthusiasm of the American public in its discussion of Japan's successes.

CHAPTER VI

BARBARISM VERSUS CIVILIZATION

Japan's victories at Ping Yang and Yalu crystallized earlier pro-Japanese sentiment in the United States even if this mood threw into question the country's self-defined role as impartial arbiter in Asia. Vicarious pride was provided by the obvious superiority of Japanese technological and military development. Commentators appeared comfortable in their assumptions that western civilization had triumphed on the Korean battlefields. "It can hardly be said that the news was a surprise, for all the advantages of an advanced and progressive civilization were on the side of the smaller power," the Commercial Chronicle commented, "and is it not fair to add that seldom has any nation, in a war not purely patriotic or for self-preservation, been more entitled to the world's sympathy and encouragement?" The only way that Americans could ever sympathize with China, the New Orleans Picayune added, would be if the Chinese removed their "troublesome pigtailed." "If they want to lick the Japs, they must let down their back hair, have it cut, and wade into war without a hitch."¹

In the weeks after Yalu discussion of the war, both at the popular and scholarly levels, focused on an evaluation of Asian cultures in the context of American conceptions of historical development, progress and Social Darwinism. China and Japan provided a laboratory for the testing of attitudes concerning the meaning of civilization.

Americans explained the fact that 40 million people were defeating 400 million by contrasting the fundamental characteristics of China and Japan. "China, in fact, cannot be regarded as a nation in the same sense as are the nations of the West," senior China diplomat Charles Denby explained, "because of its provincial diversity and lack of national awareness."² The regrettable deficiencies in nationalism and patriotism, asserted military historian and Harvard lecturer Theodore Ayrault Dodge, stemmed from China's organic evolution. According to Dodge, "the body of China was not homogeneously sentient;-- as if the nervous system of the mass was so subdivided that a lesion to one part did not reach the nervous center of the whole structure." China's bulk alone could not win a war against organized and unified Japan, Dodge noted, any more than the "Persian hosts" could defeat the Greeks.³

The theme of Chinese venality also pervaded American analyses of the war. Official corruption hindered an effective and concerted war effort. Treacherous officials, particularly the Empress Dowager's chief eunuch, Li Lien-ying, reportedly siphoned off funds allocated for prosecution of the war; while indifferent Chinese citizens turned their backs on their country's struggle. "Piles of shells made of mud have been exhibited as the real article," Denby informed Gresham. "Provisions have proved worthless, high priced guns useless, regimental lists of men have been fictitious; commanding officers have embezzled military funds; men have gone without pay." Chinese warships even passed inspection armed with huge cannon balls of black-painted clay. Forced coolie labor cut wood for harbor defense booms as contractors

charged the government for regular wage labor.⁴

Social Darwinists in the United States explained China's lack of national awareness, as well as its inherent corruption, in terms of the biological "inertness" of the Mongol race. The Chinese were not exactly a diseased race, Theodore Dodge declared; indeed many Chinese lads were rugged men "who would be marked down for football-players in any American college." But even if he looked robust, the "Chinaman is filthy in mind, body, and estate." The lethargic and slovenly Chinaman could best serve the world, according to this theory, as a "mere human animal" because his "nervous structure is less fine than the Aryan's." Paradoxically, these sub-human traits were sometimes spoken of as military assets. The Chinese could "endure unblenched the pain of a surgical operation which would seriously compromise the reactionary power of most white men." Theodore Roosevelt, then police commissioner in New York City, shared this evaluation of Chinese racial attributes. He received sketches of Chinese infantry, clearly resembling monkeys with long pigtails, from his friend in Peking, Speck von Sternburg. The latter, noting that Roosevelt's police force had tested its revolvers on corpses to measure the effects of gunshot wounds, explained that he had examined pistol wounds of Chinese who had walked 320 miles over the Liaotung Peninsula and had survived. "What fighting material you could make out of those chaps!" the German official told Roosevelt. The future President fully concurred.⁵

Lucius H. Foote, the first American Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Korea, added his own interpretation of the Chinese condition. A "cumbersome bureaucracy" motivated by "personal

aggrandizement" dominated China's "densely ignorant" population, breeding an atmosphere of distrust and national apathy. China, Foote stated, "has always been an enigma among nations, exclusive, anomalous and grotesque, she seems to be a petrified relic of the past."⁶

A discussion of China's "overplus of superstition" supplemented the Social Darwinian analysis of the Chinese stereotype. Chinese soldiers were portrayed in the United States as evincing "more faith in their war god and their green dragon than . . . in powder and lead" and they reportedly carried umbrellas, fans and ceremonial chickens into battle instead of modern rifles. Chinese villagers, many Americans believed, refused to dig wells for sanitary conditions in their towns because they feared that holes would sink the land. At the same time, journals such as the Catholic World proved "beyond dispute" that infanticide and other horrible practices existed on a large scale in China.⁷

The Chinese were barbarous as well as backward. Commenting on China's offer of rewards for Japanese heads, the Brooklyn Standard Union asserted, "a people that can be guilty of such revolting acts deserves no sympathy from civilized nations." Moreover, surrounded by "effeminate luxuries" as well as an "army of from eight to ten thousand eunuchs," the Chinese emperor appeared too dissipated to lead his nation against anyone; yet at the same time, Americans believed he was capable of "savage depravity," forcing his subjects, as well as foreign dignitaries, to seek interviews by crawling "like reptiles to the foot of the throne." Many probably agreed with Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, that while the American people held

"no antipathy" toward Chinese because of their nationality, they were nevertheless "a people which have allowed civilization to pass them untouched and uninfluenced, a people who allow themselves to be barbarously tyrannized over in their own country."⁸

Discussion of China's internal imperfections was enough to stigmatize her wartime image, yet her influence on the rest of Asia became the subject of even greater condemnation. Durham White Stevens (the American secretary employed by the Japanese embassy in Washington, yet claiming to be an impartial observer) insisted that China threatened to destroy "the genius of enterprise and progress" in East Asia. Corruption and insurrections in Korea, he apprised, resulted from China's imposition of its repressive "system" on the helpless kingdom.

In all of Korea's domestic dissensions the hand of China can be traced. Her influence is secret, but none the less patent. She shirks responsibility to other nations, but hesitates at no means--cajolery, bribery, menace--to dominate Korea. Whatever object her policy may have, its plain result has been to paralyze progress, and to leave the country weak and defenceless, a ready victim of foreign aggression.⁹

Howard Martin, a former secretary in the American legation in Peking, supported Steven's argument. Americans had a special interest in the outcome of the war in Korea, Martin suggested, because they had helped open the country to western contact. Therefore, the United States should oppose China's repressive presence in Korea since a Chinese victory would mean "the forcing back of the Koreans to Oriental sluggishness, superstition, ignorance, and anti-foreign sentiment and methods." The Korean war, Martin concluded, pitted Japanese "Progress"

against Chinese "Extermination."¹⁰

Seeking dramatic contrasts, Americans developed the theme of a progressive and modernized Japan opening Asia to commerce and Christianity. According to this concept, the Japanese, though admittedly a part of the Mongol race, had adapted gracefully to the modern world, assimilating western civilization and adopting western technology. The Japanese supposedly exemplified Christian virtue by their "honest helpfulness, unending amiability, loyalty to the powers that be, filial piety in its highest expression, law-abiding steadiness, and keen sense of honor." The Japanese had learned to respect law even more than the Anglo-Saxons, and were, as Lucius H. Foote insisted, "their equals in courage and tenacity." As for the reported superior physical qualities of the individual Chinaman, a typical view was enunciated by the expatriate American editor of the Kobe Chronicle, Lafcadio Hearn, who predicted that as Japan progressed, the "Japanese Physique" would also grow larger, thus eventually offsetting the only Chinese advantage in a comparison of the two peoples. Even more flattering to Japan was the more widely-held idea that, despite their diminutive size, the Japanese already possessed superior courage and "exceptional power of endurance," producing an "infantry able to march to the end of the world."¹¹

Though somewhat more restrained due to the policy of neutrality, even officials of the United States government discovered means of praising Japan. The President found quite laudable Japan's desire for "more liberal intercourse, complete autonomy in her domestic affairs, and full equality in the family of nations." Grover Cleveland told Congress in December of 1894 that "the Japanese Empire of today is no

longer the Japan of the past and our relations with this progressive nation should not be less broad and liberal than those with other powers." Secretary of State Gresham also sympathized with Japan. He admitted to Edwin Dun that he had always considered Japan the "most civilized country in Asia." Though he would uphold American neutrality in the present war, Gresham revealed his personal views of the conflict to Senator John Morgan of Alabama. "Japan has stepped out into the light of a better day and she regards the United States as her best friend." He hinted that the United States must preserve this friendship. Meanwhile, the administration's agent in Nagasaki, W. H. Abercrombie, assured Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Uhl that "history furnishes no example of such wonderful and rapid progress" than the advancement of Japan since Commodore Perry opened it to western progress.¹²

A short step from unqualified praise of the Japanese was their correlation with Americans. As the New York Tribune editorialized, "the Japanese have for years called themselves 'the Yankees of the Orient,' and their style of fighting rather goes to support their claim to the title . . . their warfare against China is going ahead in an immensely practical businesslike way, and the results of it are peculiarly American in character." Rumors that Japan's royal prince was searching for a wife prompted suggestions that, if he could not find a match with some European princess, an American woman would make an admirable Empress of Japan. "While the Japanese are dark skinned there is no race prejudice against them in other countries," the Atlanta Constitution remarked, "and they are cordially received in circles where a Chinaman or an East Indian would be barred."¹³

Japan's "excellent and praiseworthy" conduct of the war up to this point had done nothing to detract from her reputation in the United States. "The Japanese here are under perfect control," American missionary George Heber Jones revealed from his post at Chemulpo, "for over two months we have had them about us by the thousands, but I have not seen a drunken soldier at any time." This evoked particular comment since American legation guards in Seoul allegedly remained perpetually drunk, carousing and pestering Koreans. Japanese commanders also inspired favorable opinions. Field Marshal Count Arimoto Yamagata "is a soldier, like Moltke," the New York Herald reported; stable, brilliant and capable of controlling Japan's fiery younger officers. On the other hand, Americans scorned China's lack of capable military leadership. Even the old hero Li Hung-chang had fallen into disrepute. "The much lauded Li Hung Chang is one of the biggest boodlers in existence," charged American Board missionary William Scott Ament. Denby wrote Gresham that "the reputation of Li Hung Chang has been shown to be based on pretence He is responsible for this war."¹⁴

Called China's greatest statesman not many months earlier, Li had become an object of ridicule in the American press. The Boston Globe claimed that Li had outlived his usefulness to China and had been overestimated by the world in the first place. While Americans extolled the virtues of Japanese leaders and soldiers, Li furnished the subject of several popular ditties:

Li Hung Chang he belly sick,
 Alle samee he get lick;
 Chinese makee muchee racket,

Li Hung lost he yelle jacket.

Li Hung he get licked again
On the sea by monkey men;
Alle samee chillee weather,
Li Hung lose he peacock feather.

Next time Li Hung he get lick,
Better watch out belly quick;
There'll be a pretty how-dy do,
And Chang will lose his pigtail, too!

At the same time the New Orleans Picayune pictured its daily "frog" weather forecaster as Li Hung-chang, complete with fan and opium pipe, followed by poetry alluding to Li's disgrace and China's defeats:

I am a Frog Brownie and Heathen Chinee,
And I've hopped all the way from my home o'er the sea.
For the worst of your weather is naught to compare
With the cyclones the Jap pigs are stirring up there.
They've ruined our vessels and slaughtered our troops,
And cannot be scared by our humbugs and whoops.
They gobble our money, and frighten our crones,
And I fear they will steal all our ancestors' bones.¹⁵

Exponents of the barbarism versus civilization theories contended that the United States should not be neutral in this Asian contest because the war was a Japanese crusade introducing Asia to the modern world, particularly to American ideas and technology. William Elliot Griffis--former missionary to Japan, teacher, author of the Mikado's Empire, and considered one of America's foremost experts on Japan--proclaimed that the Sino-Japanese War "is one chapter in that eternal struggle of progress which has been written with graves of Absolutism, Divine Right, Slavery, the Holy Roman Empire, Patriarchal Barbarism, the Inquisition, Theocracy, etc., in the long perspective of its past triumphs." Japan fought for stability and the preservation of peace

in the Orient, Griffis asserted, and the war would open Korea and China to western civilization. "Let us hope that true Americanism and the work of our nation will be that of the Great Pacific Power," the missionary stated.¹⁶

Another Asian expert told readers of the Overland Monthly that Japan should be permitted to reorganize Asia "under the new order of things" without interference from outside powers. Japan promised to cultivate "liberal" elements in Asia and to set Korea on the path to "culture in its true sense." Others discovered the "hand of God" in Japan's victories over China in Korea, breaking down the walls of Chinese resistance to Christianity and civilization. Students of the war delighted in the prospect of China's ultimate collapse. They suggested that the Chinese, unfit to have a government of their own, would benefit from Japanese domination and reforms. Some seriously doubted whether China should even be preserved in its present shape, although they hesitated to advocate the partition of China by the European "beasts of prey." Especially dangerous were the "Russian Bear and the British Lion" who hungered "to dismember the crippled and helpless Chinese Empire."¹⁷

Rumors persisted in the United States that China stood on the brink of rebellion. As early as the middle of September, Consul Sheridan P. Read reported power struggles between Li and the powerful Dowager Empress on one side and the Emperor and his clique on the other for control of China's government. "I pass on these facts as serving to throw light upon future events, it being not altogether precipitate to forecast the downfall of the present dynasty, or at least serious

internal disruptions."¹⁸ Meanwhile, Chinese-Americans had organized an anti-Manchu Society called the Gee-Hing and allegedly conspired to overthrow the Chinese Emperor. Reports that the Society's leaders had held a secret meeting in the basement of an Omaha, Nebraska, laundry stimulated speculation concerning plots by enlightened, Americanized Chinese.¹⁹

Though most commentators expected China's eventual defeat and collapse, they did not predict a partition of China. Charles Denby Jr. admitted the "remote contingency of dissolution of the empire." But he doubted that China would completely collapse and believed the war would benefit that nation by forcing it to enter "the path of western civilization." China's humiliation, others agreed, would prompt reform and the request for western assistance. W. W. Rockhill hoped China would recognize the need for a "national system of defense" and a complete financial reorganization. Lafcadio Hearn accepted China's defeat as part of the cyclical tradition of Chinese history in which periods of corruption and disaster preceded periods of reform. "It is not impossible that after such a humiliation, China might immediately set to work developing and expanding all her latent and now useless power--building railroads, forming armies of really efficient troops, purifying her offices, employing and empowering the best foreign teachers that money could engage."²⁰

Critics of Japan, much fewer in number than the pro-Japanese Americans, also threatened the policy of strict neutrality by advocating

that the United States halt Japanese aggression. They warned against Japan's ambitions in Asia and indicated that the United States should strengthen its position in the Pacific at the very least and possibly work to block Japanese expansion as a last resort. They believed that strict neutrality would lead to a dangerous Japanese-American competition in post-war Asia. Critics also objected to a policy which seemed to insure a Japanese victory since it would lead, as they claimed, not to peace and stability in Asia, but to militarism and intense rivalries. A Japanese victory might even prove a vehicle for the development of China's latent power. China's humiliation, one American army officer warned, actually posed a threat to the United States. "If China ever gets into the way of thirsting for American gore, they will promptly attack American ships, and American coast." Therefore, as the Pacific Commercial Advertiser suggested, "every shotted gun, fired in this war, is a signal gun to the United States, of the coming events," since it would wake Chinese militarism from its centuries of sleep.²¹

Events on the battlefield also inspired American warnings of Japanese ambitions. For example, Augustine Heard, former minister to Korea, deplored the pro-Japanese bias, noting that Japan's adoption of western learning had blinded Americans to the menace of Japan the conqueror. As a Boston merchant interested in American investment in Asia, Heard insinuated that Japan's desire for commercial ascendancy lay behind its façade of reform rhetoric and should be "a fair subject for criticism" in the United States. Japan, Heard complained, aimed at a total monopoly of Korean transportation, fishing industry and gold mines, hence closing this lucrative field to foreign investment. "Her

present attitude toward Korea, irresistibly reminds one of the wolf and the lamb in the fable."²²

Heard disagreed with those who claimed China had stirred up the Tonghak insurrection in Korea. He accused the Japanese of "manufacturing excitement" as "a pretext to interfere by force in Korea," perhaps even fostering and fomenting the whole rebellion themselves. China had an honorable and "voluntary" vassal relationship with Korea and felt duty-bound to assist Korea in putting down the rebellion. Korea traditionally adopted Chinese culture and respected Chinese ideas and institutions while despising the aggressive and assertive Japanese. The country needed reform, Heard admitted, yet Japan, the object of "undue partiality" in the United States, desired only conquest. "If Korea falls into the hands of Japan, God help her!"²³

The American Peace Society supported Heard's view. While admitting that Japan was progressive, the Boston-based organization noted that its progress had not been "accompanied by a corresponding moral and religious development." It had marched to civilization "through seas of blood" and should be considered the aggressor in Korea. Yet the pacifist group qualified its condemnation of Japan, blaming primarily the western "Christian" powers for having supplied the Asians with modern weapons of destruction. "It is England and the United States and France and Germany and Italy that have taught them the arts of modern warfare, and the example of some of these nations has led them to believe that national strength and glory can be acquired in no other way than by building up huge armaments and slaughtering multitudes of one's neighbors."²⁴

For a very different reason Rev. Robert Stuart MacArthur, the militant pastor of the Calvary Church of New York City, warned Americans of Japan's progress. In a sermon delivered in October of 1894, MacArthur explained that "the United States is humbled in the presence of this Japanese victory" particularly since "we could not have placed in Eastern waters during the time since this war began a naval force at all adequate to contend with that of Japan." Reviewing this sermon, the Pacific Commercial Advertiser ascertained that the war would greatly influence American attitudes toward Asia in the future.

For the first time, the American people, are earnestly looking westward. They may not, for a while yet, fully take in the drift of events, but it is something for us, that they must look at the Asiatics, in a new light, and, very soon, must deal with them on a new basis, that is, the military and naval basis. It means for us, the occupation of Pearl Harbor, and a strong policy, in the Pacific.

The New Orleans Picayune echoed these fears, contending that the Pacific Ocean would henceforth be dominated by "purely Asiatic" military and naval power. This voice of Gulf Coast shipping interests wondered what the United States planned to do about Japan's growing challenge. The Picayune suggested not only military preparation and closer commercial ties but also construction of an interoceanic canal.

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Additional criticism of Japan emanated from American missionaries in Japan who were intimately acquainted with Japanese attitudes and from Asian scholar and diplomat W. W. Rockhill. The latter, while predicting that "a good thrashing" of China would be "the only tonic which seems to suit that queer country," feared Japanese victories.

"The Lord only knows where they will stop," Rockhill wrote to a friend in China. "The Japanese are going to occupy Korea, for the same reason and in the same way as the British did Egypt."²⁶ The missionaries, perhaps mindful that they were losing their prestige and positions to aggressive Japanese Christians, took a similar view. The Rev. Dwight Learned observed from Kyoto that Japan believed it had humbled a power that England and France feared to attack and had accepted "a heaven given mission to lead this part of the world if not all Asia." The "common people" behaved rudely toward Americans in Kyoto, Learned said, and this reminded him of the fate Americans would face if they ever tried to dominate Japan.²⁷

Americans often discussed the impact of the war on trade with East Asia within the context of the barbarism versus civilization theme. "When this cruel war in China is over," the Boston Globe argued, "the United States are bound to realize the larger share of the new and enlarged commerce with the east that can but be the result of China's severe shaking up. We have as yet seen hardly the dawning of the immense commerce with China that is in store for us in the future." The Globe was joined by various business spokesmen who claimed that the war revealed the "wonderful progress of Japanese manufacturing" which would force open new Asian markets to the eventual benefit of such American products as cotton. Decrying American "commercial serfdom to England" which forced the South to sell raw cotton to Asia through "the great English metropolis," southern cotton interests renewed

pressure for the construction of a Nicaraguan Canal. They predicted that some day "the commercial men of the world may be surprised to see fleets of vessels carrying American cotton through the canal via Hawaii to the Japanese factories."²⁸

American consular agents asserted that China's expected collapse promised to create "enlarged business relations between the United States and China." Consul-General Thomas Jernigan remarked that the people in Shanghai assumed that Japan's victories would force China to undertake an extensive system of internal improvement. The United States should strengthen its navy in Asiatic waters and be prepared to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by a Japanese victory. Suggesting American intervention in post-war China, Consul Sheridan Read expanded upon Jernigan's advice:

It will be my aim that America whose hands are clean as regards China, shall secure her fair share of the orders to be placed, and shall come forward as the best country from which to draw men and material. It is in our country that modern civilization is at its best, as it is untinged with the ideas of ancient Europe and Asia.

In closing, Read claimed that American trade in the East would "never assume its correct proportions until a canal has been cut through the Isthmus of Panama."²⁹

Less optimistic commentators believed that Japan's success portended not lucrative Asian markets for American commerce but severe competition from Japan. Japan possessed advanced machinery, inventive genius and cheap labor, they observed, and could undersell western traders not only domestically but in world markets. Careful students of Asian affairs reasoned that Japan's drive into Korea was a step

toward economic domination of East Asia. Japan's vigorous search for markets would block American projects and investments. Rockhill warned that the war would probably hinder American penetration of the China market and would certainly lead to severe Japanese competition.

"Japan is bound to become a great manufacturing country and will cut us, and Great Britain and Germany also . . . out of the Chinese market, or at least we will only supply Japan with raw materials which it will put in manufactured shape on the Chinese market."³⁰

Debates on the war also influenced American attitudes toward treaty revisions with China and Japan. The question of treaty relations with China in 1894 still centered on immigration. Aided by widespread anti-Chinese prejudices, exclusionists worked diligently for complete restriction of Chinese immigration and the registration or deportation of Chinese already in the United States. The war increased such sentiment, for there were fears that Japanese victories might drive the defeated Chinese to seek refuge in the United States. We don't want "these dirty folk" on California's shores, exclusionists stated. They demanded that immigration laws protect the United States from having "the Chinese empire dumped on us."³¹

Both China and the United States were pushing for a formal treaty outlining restrictions and rights concerning Chinese-Americans. In March of 1894 Gresham and Yang Yu^u had signed a convention which was ratified by the Senate in August and signed by Cleveland. The Gresham-Yang Treaty prohibited further immigration to the United States for a

period of ten years and clarified some of the questions left vague in an early treaty signed in 1880. The 1894 treaty was more restrictive than the original Sino-American Immigration Treaty of November 17, 1880, in which Article I had provided that the United States government might "regulate, limit, or suspend" Chinese immigration "but may not absolutely prohibit it." Article I of the new treaty, however, prescribed that the immigration of Chinese laborers "shall be absolutely prohibited." In September the Gresham-Yang Treaty arrived in China for ratification and Gresham worried about war-induced public utterances against China, as well as pro-Japanese sentiments, believing these detrimental to Chinese acceptance of the pact. China, however, was in no position to argue. She signed a treaty that was clearly an affront to her.³²

While the Secretary of State discussed treaty relations with China, both Japanese Minister Gozo Tateno and his successor Shinchiro Kurino belabored the State Department with requests for a new treaty of their own with the United States. Japan, unlike China, insisted upon the removal of all vestiges of the early unequal treaties between the two countries, such as extraterritorial jurisdiction. Speaking often of current sympathy for Japan in the United States and of Japanese military successes, Kurino became bolder and pushed harder for treaty revision. Whitelaw Reid observed that the Japanese "are feeling a little more like taking a strong tone with Mr. Gresham." Indeed, Japan had already succeeded in winning revision of extra-territoriality from Great Britain and now urged the United States to follow the British example.³³

Pressure on Gresham to revise the treaty with Japan also emanated

from Republican critics of the Secretary's foreign policies. Incensed at British leadership in treaty revision with Japan when the United States had supposedly become the foremost defender of Japanese rights and equality, critics attacked Gresham. They claimed that British Minister Sir Julian Pauncefote had "duped" the sluggish mind of the Secretary by promising him that Great Britain would not negotiate a treaty with Japan until the United States had concluded a similar pact. "It is exceedingly unfortunate that the State Department in this crisis in the Orient should be placed in the embarrassing position" of ignoring Japan's requests for treaty revision while Japan's erstwhile critic Great Britain had already concluded a friendly pact.³⁴

Pushed by Kurino and sensitive to criticism, Gresham proceeded to negotiate a new treaty which eliminated American consular jurisdiction over the affairs of its citizens in Japan and enumerated certain export duties between the two nations. The New York Herald declared that Japan considered this abolition of extraterritorial rights more important than all her victories against China. "Japan has made such progress in civilization during the past two decades that her national pride revolts at a continuation of such authority which is only demanded in our treaty negotiations with semi-barbarous nations [such as China]." Finally on November 23, 1894, Kurino and Gresham signed the new treaty fulfilling Japanese demands. "The acceptance of this treaty by the Senate will be a great compliment to the progress and civilization of Japan," one editorial averred; "it will be tantamount to a recognition that the little island empire of the Far East has earned by its progressiveness and enlightenment a right to be ranked among the most

civilized nations."³⁵

No one could misinterpret the meaning of the two treaties of 1894. One offered a humiliating slap to China and the other a bow to Japanese prestige. Gresham believed that he had concluded fair and impartial treaties with both powers, yet the treaties themselves indicated otherwise.

The building of Japan's reputation in the United States during the war was due in part to natural preferences in an era which prized progress, efficiency and the competitive spirit--and in part to the concerted efforts of Japanese propaganda. Initially the Japanese had prohibited American war correspondents to accompany their armies and had been caught tampering with and censoring the mail of American naval personnel sent from Japan to the United States. But with the arrival of Shinchiro Kurino as the new Japanese minister to the United States at the end of August 1894, Japan began to coordinate and cultivate a program designed to win American approval. American reporters were allowed to travel with Japanese units while Kurino improved the Japanese profile in the United States. "I have seen a good deal of the Jap Minister, Kurino, who is a good fellow--very civilized--an ex-graduate of Harvard and a great exploiter of the press," a British diplomat residing in Washington during 1894 observed. "He is 'up to all the latest American tricks.'"³⁶

The new Japanese minister countered Yang Yu's close ties with the Gresham family by cultivating friendly contacts of his own with the

American Secretary of State. "Mr. Kurino told my son and myself," Mrs. Gresham later recalled, "that during the Chinese-Japanese War he met Mr. Gresham almost daily, and received from him information as to what was going on in the diplomatic world." Both the Chinese and Japanese ministers arranged dinner parties for Gresham and sent the family trinkets and mementos of friendship. Kurino offset Yang Yu's warnings of Japan's "sinister designs" on Korea with his own assurances to the Secretary of State that Japan only wished to reform that corrupt and anarchic little country.³⁷

The Harvard-trained Japanese minister supervised journalistic exploitation of the war, even contributing his own article on the "Oriental War" in the North American Review. A Forum article of October 1894, inspired by Kurino, concluded that Japan should be viewed as an American-styled republican government in Asia. Concurrently, the Arena vigorously defended Japan with a wide spectrum of those arguments employed by Japanese propagandists. In November the Arena published an article by the Japanese scholar Kuma Oishi which traced the causes of the "War in the East." He argued that China's resistance to "social and political innovation" in Korea lay at the root of the conflict. Kuma testified further that Chinese-backed Tonghak rebels, who were fanatics intent on blocking the influence of Western civilization, had forced Japan to intervene to preserve law and order. Japan since 1868 "has been steadily pursuing a determined and upright policy toward Corea," the object being to recognize her independence and to secure her autonomy. The Japanese propagandist designed this approach especially for American audiences because the

United States and Japan, he pointed out, had shared first honors in recognizing Korean independence by treaty. China's policy of clandestine and greedy machinations had left Korea "destitute and defenceless," which in turn invited foreign aggression and threatened Japan's security.³⁸

Another approach designed to appeal to Americans pointed to the "gradual encroachment and increasing supremacy in Asia of the European powers." This was the "most momentous cause of this war." In order to resist European invasion, Japanese propagandists argued, China and Japan must "duly recognize the law of the survival of the fittest" and attain the "highest possible degree of civilization in the shortest possible length of time, using the word civilization here in its widest sense, so as to include the development of material resources, of military strength, of intellectual and moral qualities of the people." China, unfortunately, had not understood these demands of history. "Stupid and haughty," she had resisted the natural development of nations, thus threatening the peace and stability of Asia. China had refused to cooperate with Japan in a reform program for Korea and Japan had been forced to accept the challenge alone not for territorial gain, but because of a "moral obligation" to Korean civilization.³⁹

Japanese writers also flattered Americans and identified Japan with standard American ideals. Japan represented the "light of civilization and an unbroken era of tranquillity and prosperity," while upholding "the cause of liberty, of civilization and of humanity" and defending all "lovers of justice and freedom."

If this struggle of progress against stagnation, of the

right against the wrong, during its course, proves to some extent, detrimental to the commercial interest of the West; if it justly recalls to the minds of the lovers of peace, the vivid pictures of all the horrors and evils attendant upon fire and courage, the enormous advantages which will probably be derived after the close of the war must not be forgotten.

Japanese scholar Julius Kumpei Matumoto, in his introduction to Trumbull White's popular history of the Sino-Japanese War, told the American reader that Japan was the "true standard-bearer of civilization and progress in the far east. Her mission is to enlighten the millions of slumbering souls in the Celestial Kingdom, darkened for generations." He urged Americans to recognize and accept Japan as a powerful and "living force" in the world.⁴⁰

The American intellectual climate was congenial to Japanese arguments and the propaganda reinforced these views. "The Japanese have learned the lesson of lying gracefully & persistently," the American missionary William Scott Ament wrote in October 1894. "The Chinese have no writers to present their cause before the world & the Japs have had their own way, and well they have used it."⁴¹

CHAPTER VII
THE PORT ARTHUR MASSACRE

Pro-Japanese enthusiasm had reached its height by the end of November 1894. So far Japan had done little to harm such feeling. The Kowshing affair was regarded as a regrettable mistake, hardly remembered amidst the glories and virtues of the Japanese cause.

As the winter snows deepened in northern China, the Japanese methodically and irresistibly pushed onward, scattering the remnants of enemy armies before them. During the weeks after its victory at Ping Yang, the Japanese First Army had consolidated its position and then advanced north where, during the latter part of October, it had crossed the Yalu River and invaded Manchuria. Chinese forces retreated toward Manchuria's ancient capital at Mukden, laying waste to the land. By December 13, Japanese soldiers had occupied the Chinese stronghold at Haicheng. But with the overextension of Japan's supply lines, Chinese resistance grew more stubborn; and with the onset of cold weather and heavy snows, the First Army entrenched at Haicheng.¹

American knowledge of Japan's Manchurian campaign had originated from delayed and speculative dispatches forwarded by commanders of the American naval vessels stationed at Chemulpo. On October 9, Commander Caspar Frederick Goodrich of the gunboat Concord reported "the Chinese, are thought to be mostly, if not all, over the frontier (the Yalu River)." Yet, he admitted that his intelligence reports were not up to

the highest standards of the Navy Department, but were based primarily on sketchy information from Japanese sources. Several days later Goodrich cabled his commanding officer, Admiral Charles C. Carpenter, then in Nagasaki, that the Japanese supposedly had already advanced on Mukden, Port Arthur, Weihaiwei, and perhaps even Peking and Formosa. Reliable information concerning Korean military operations failed to arrive at the State Department until October 27, three days after the Japanese actually crossed the Yalu River. In a dispatch to Gresham, Charles Denby Jr. verified the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and added that Chinese leadership in Peking seemed suddenly aware of China's plight.²

While Count Aritomo Yamagata's First Army advanced into Manchuria, the Japanese Second Army, under the "fat, good-natured" Field Marshal Iwao Oyama, prepared to open another front against China. Japanese strategists believed that as long as the modern naval base at Port Arthur guarded the Strait of Chihli and sheltered a Chinese fleet, Japanese supply lines in Manchuria would never be completely secure. Port Arthur, situated at the extremity of the Liaotung Peninsula, presented the Japanese with their most formidable enemy fortification. Designed by German engineers, including Colonel von Hanneken of Kowshing fame, the walls of the forts guarding the dry docks, shipyards and repair shops extended in some places as much as three hundred feet out of the sea. The forts contained a deadly array of heavy naval rifles, particularly forty and fifty-ton Krupp guns and rifled mortars. Even the Japanese high command considered attack from the sea impossible. Thus it drew up a bold plan to land an army above the port, march it

around behind the forts, and besiege them from the land side.³

Advance units of Oyama's Second Army landed on the Liaotung Peninsula some eighty miles northeast of Port Arthur on October 23, 1894. By November 4, the entire army, aided by willing Manchurian peasants, had established a secure beachhead on the peninsula. Two days later the Japanese had overrun Kinchow, just thirty miles north-east of Port Arthur, and shortly thereafter had captured the Talienwan forts with little effort. "Our army occupied Talienwan at the afternoon of the 8th instant," Kurino revealed to Gresham on November 14, adding that a complete chart of Chinese torpedo mine defenses at Port Arthur had also been seized.⁴

American press reports speculated, as early as November 10, that the Japanese were "pushing the pigtailed" out of Port Arthur. However, Japan did not attack until November 21 when it launched a three-pronged assault on the fortifications. According to correspondent James Creelman, "cold, stoical, Asiatic" General Yamaji, "who [had] deliberately plucked out his own eye at school to show his comrades that he was not a coward," coordinated the Japanese advance. Chinese resistance, with few exceptions, collapsed as Japanese infantry attacked under the cover of their mountain artillery. The Chinese abandoned Port Arthur, leaving the dock yards and equipment intact.⁵

As they approached the walls of the last fortification, Japanese soldiers discovered the mutilated heads of their captured comrades hanging by strings from the main gate of the fort. This sight, combined with Chinese mutilation of a Japanese scouting party at Talienwan and the savagery of some of the fighting before the final assault, incensed

the victorious army. Bent on revenge and finding all the combatants gone, Japanese soldiers and their baggage coolies turned viciously on the civilian inhabitants of Port Arthur. The Japanese "killed everything they saw," American eyewitness James Creelman of the New York World reported, "unarmed men, kneeling in the streets and begging for life, were shot, bayoneted, or beheaded . . . the town was sacked from end to end, and the inhabitants were butchered in their own homes." Another eyewitness, Anglo-American gunrunner James Allan, claimed that "the dead lay thickly in nearly every street in the quarters we traversed, where of every age, sex, and condition, they had been promiscuously butchered by the hundred."⁶

News of Port Arthur's capture reached the United States almost immediately, Colonel Denby cabling Gresham on November 24. Reports of the massacre, however, remained rumors in the United States for several weeks. In fact, the initial response to Port Arthur reflected recent American approval of Japan's civilizing mission. The New York Tribune, for example, editorialized that: "Out of the darkness of the Far East a light shines and it is the light of civilization evolved from conditions of native progress." A London dispatch arriving in New York on November 29th, which alluded to atrocities perpetrated by both sides on the Liaotung Peninsula, received little publicity. Another London source on December 8 reported that during the night after the capture of Port Arthur Japanese army laborers had entered the town and slaughtered Chinese civilians in their homes. Yet it was not until James Creelman's eyewitness account of the massacre arrived in New York on December 11 that the atrocities at Port Arthur became a national sensation.⁷

James Creelman, immaculately dressed and groomed even in Manchuria, was determined to win journalistic fame, a goal in part inspired by earlier frustrations experienced while on the staff of James Gordon Bennett's New York Herald. Bennett's policies had prevented Creelman's signature from appearing on his articles, and the ambitious reporter, chafing under this restriction, had left Bennett's staff in 1890. By 1893 he had become manager of the British edition of Cosmopolitan Magazine and the next year he accepted an assignment as special correspondent for the New York World to cover the Sino-Japanese War. Creelman, it was said, would go anywhere and do anything for a news scoop. At Ping Yang he pitched his tent among rotting corpses to cover the battle. In order to catch Oyama's forces before Port Arthur, Creelman rode a Japanese military pony all night, arriving at the Japanese camp on the verge of collapse yet thankful that he had not missed the opening shots. Several times Creelman narrowly escaped capture by Chinese soldiers because he insisted on getting as close to the action as possible.⁸

Everywhere Creelman worked he stirred up controversy. As the American minister in Seoul reported to Gresham, the writer tended to "over-dramatize" and in the case of his interview with the Korean king "doubtless put into the king's mouth what he thought he wished to say."⁹ Creelman had praised Japan in his early articles from Asia. He wrote after Ping Yang (where atrocities had occurred) that Japanese soldiers were "brave and humane," and in early September he cabled the opinion that the "patriotism of Japan must command the admiration of the world." Then for about a month Creelman failed to communicate with the World.

The newspaper became concerned for his safety, meanwhile filling the news void by hiring E. H. House of Tokyo to send dispatches concerning the war to New York. The World cabled House, instructing him to investigate rumors that a foreign correspondent had been killed in the war zone.¹⁰

During this time Creelman was aboard a Japanese troopship bound for his biggest story. His first sensational letter describing the Port Arthur massacre appeared in the New York World on December 11. For the next month the World fully exploited the story, elaborating on the slaughter and mutilation of men, women and children in the streets of Port Arthur. According to Creelman and the New York World, Japanese officers did nothing to stop the slaughter of non-combatants, while Japanese soldiers laughed as their comrades hunted down every living thing in the city--even the personnel in the town's only hospital. "Just below me was a hospital flying the Red Cross flag," Creelman wrote, "but the Japanese fired upon the unarmed men who came out of the doorway." After three days of butchery and the slaughter of "at least two thousand helpless people," Creelman noted that only Chinese coolies needed to bury their countrymen survived the massacre.¹¹

The World, editorially wondering how the Japanese government would defend this "lapse into barbarism," instructed House to elicit an official explanation. House reported that the Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu had in effect verified Creelman's story when he admitted that some excesses may have occurred on the part of Japanese soldiers at Port Arthur. Yet when the American minister, Edwin Dun, interviewed Mutsu several days later, the Japanese official called

Creelman's account "a gross exaggeration of the truth, sensational in the extreme and tending to work great injury and injustice to Japan in the eyes of the civilized world." Mutsu admitted, however, that Japanese troops, "maddened by the atrocities committed upon their comrades who had fallen into the hands of the Chinese," may have killed more Chinese than necessary for a military victory.¹²

Visiting other eyewitnesses, Dun attempted to reconstruct the Port Arthur story for the State Department. He learned from the French military attaché in Tokyo, Viscount de Labry, who had entered Port Arthur with the first wave of Japanese soldiers, that Creelman's letter over-dramatized the effects of Japanese attacks with bayonet and sword. At the same time Lieutenant O'Brien, the American military attaché in Tokyo who was also present at Port Arthur, admitted that there were needless deaths but not enough to be called a massacre. The American commander of a Japanese transport, George W. Conner, maintained that Japanese action never approached the horrors reported by Creelman. Dun concluded in his report to Gresham: "It is clear that the slaughter of Chinese soldiers at Port Arthur cannot be justified by any rules governing the usages of modern civilized warfare . . . but that the account sent to 'The World' by Mr. Creelman is sensational in the extreme and a gross exaggeration of what occurred."¹³

There were attempts to discount Creelman's observations at Port Arthur. Led by the strongly pro-Japanese New York Tribune, a bitter rival of the World, war commentators criticized Creelman's exploitation of the incident. "These stories bore upon their face the brand of reckless sensationalism," the Tribune argued, and Japanese "so-called

excesses, while regrettable, were excusable" because of Chinese barbarism in mutilating Japanese captives. Free-lance correspondent Frank G. Carpenter observed that when Japanese troops entered Port Arthur they found that "archways of Japanese heads, with the noses and ears missing, had been built over the streets." Carpenter doubted whether highly-trained and disciplined American soldiers would act any differently under similar circumstances. "After all, war is war," Colonel E. F. Gregory of the United States Army observed, pointing out that no one had objected to the atrocities committed during the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War or the War between Turkey and Russia. "To say that the Japanese have relapsed to barbarism, or have come down to the savage level of their foes, is an absurd misstatement."¹⁴

The Port Arthur debate prompted an examination of past American barbarity. "Have all memories faded of the manner in which American soldiers avenged the massacre of the garrison of the Alamo by Santa Anna?" the Philadelphia Record inquired. American defenders of the Japanese reminded that "in recent times our own troops have done precisely what the Japanese soldiers at Port Arthur did." They discussed in detail the massacre of Indian men, women and children near Wounded Knee Creek on the Pine Ridge Reservation by units of the Seventh Cavalry avenging General Custer's death. Just as the Seventh Cavalry had responded to memories of their comrades slaughtered by barbaric Indians, the Japanese, according to this argument, had sought retribution "of the almost justifiable sort" in punishing the barbaric excesses of their uncivilized, savage enemy.¹⁵

Nevertheless, Greelman's articles caused new doubts. Newspapers which only just days before had extolled the virtues of Japanese progress and civilization now castigated the "other Asian barbarian." The Kansas City Journal noted that "the barbarities perpetrated by the civilized Japanese at Port Arthur are just as revolting as if they had been committed by the uncivilized Chinese." The influence of Christian teaching and western morality appeared to these critics "only a thin varnish, scratch it, and the barbarian is revealed." Americans suggested that if Japanese cruelty and slaughter continued, the civilized nations of the West would be forced to intervene "in the interest of humanity." American Board missionary Franklin M. Chapin indicated to Judson Smith in Boston that American sympathies should be with the helpless Chinese. "The time must come when the proud little nation will be punished for the slaughter of a defenceless people."¹⁶

Revelation of the Port Arthur massacre threatened to undo the carefully woven fabric of Japanese propaganda and pro-Japanese sentiment. Almost overnight Japan's claim as the torchbearer of civilization and moderation in Asia became suspect. "Scratch a 'Jap' and you have a savage notwithstanding his pretensions to civilization." The Japanese were "mere children" when it came to the historical development of mankind. They had civilized too rapidly, imitating the façade of civilization but not the moral commitments. "Civilization cannot be put on like a cloak, and Japan may, after all, never grow up to it." A letter to the editor of the New York World signed "White Man" warned: "any one who would place absolute trust in those sly little figures, almond eyes and catlike 'politeness' without a much longer course of

probation than Japan has yet endured would be very foolish." Always eager arbiters of moral issues, American commentators in Boston, New York, Cincinnati, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Washington D.C., Fort Worth and San Francisco agreed that Port Arthur constituted an ineradicable stain upon Japan's "vaunted progress and civilization."¹⁷

The New York World, having discovered that its Port Arthur stories had increased circulation, continued to exploit the massacre. "No other American newspaper had a correspondent on the scene," the World boasted. Other papers sneered at the exposé, then suffered through Mutsu's confessions, British war artist Frederic Villiers' confirmations, editorials in the London Times and London Standard and other verifications of Creelman's story. As the World proclaimed, Creelman had now become the world's foremost journalist. The New York daily expanded on its coup by printing sketches by Villiers which showed piles of mutilated Chinese corpses in the streets of Port Arthur, as well as a poignant drawing of a puppy curled up beside the body of his fallen Chinese master. Pulitzer's paper, the first of the so-called "yellow journals," accused Japan of trying to bribe Creelman with preferential treatment if he would keep the Port Arthur affair quiet, at least until after the ratification of a new Japanese-American treaty. The American public soon tired of the atrocity story, however, and the World turned to new fields of excitement and recalled Creelman at Japan's request.¹⁸

Several factors, including news of operations at Weihaiwei, tempered American criticism of Japanese behavior at Port Arthur. Across the Chihli

Strait from Port Arthur lay the fortifications and naval station of Weihaiwei. In some respects Wei was a replica of Port Arthur--heavily fortified by western engineers, armed with modern weaponry and equipped with dockyards, repair stations and auxiliary services. This port remained the only obstacle to Japanese control of the Gulf of Chihli and the Yellow Sea, for the Chinese fleet had sought refuge at Wei after the fall of Port Arthur. The Japanese command outlined a plan similar to its earlier campaign across the Gulf. This time it proposed the landing of an army on the Shantung Peninsula behind the fortifications and an attack from the rear.

On January 10, a little more than a month after Port Arthur, a Japanese army landed thirty-seven miles below Weihaiwei. The command of this expedition rested with Port Arthur hero Count Iwao Oyama and included many of the same officers and units involved in the previous operation. Oyama's Third Army moved in two columns up the Shantung Peninsula toward Wei's outer forts, while the Japanese navy shelled coastal positions and bottled up the Chinese fleet. For two weeks the Japanese advanced, storming Chinese earthworks and positions as they moved. At times Chinese resistance proved stubborn, particularly at the Motienling fort, and Japanese casualties were unusually heavy--much heavier than they had been around Port Arthur.

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The main forts, island forts and Chinese warships concentrated heavy fire on Japanese forces, preventing penetration of the inner defenses. In response, the Japanese employed small torpedo boats in night raids to cripple some of the Chinese fleet. By February 7th most of the Chinese resistance had collapsed and several days later,

Admiral Ting, commander of the Chinese fleet at Wei, offered to surrender the ships, forts and arms, provided that the Japanese would spare the lives of his crews, soldiers and foreign advisers.²⁰

In contrast to the Port Arthur capture, the Japanese displayed restraint at Weihaiwei. Chinese prisoners were released with two day's supply of food. The Japanese provided a steamer to carry the body of Admiral Ting, who had committed suicide, as well as his surviving staff and advisers back to Tientsin. American observers, permitted immediate access to the battle area, found no evidence of Japanese atrocities, although the intensity of the fighting had surpassed that of Port Arthur. Perhaps influenced by the presence of foreign advisers throughout the Weihaiwei defense system, as well as by the observation of foreign warships--including the American cruiser Charleston, accorded special favor by the Japanese--the victors took precautions against a repeat of the Port Arthur massacre.²¹

Increasing attention paid Japan's military medicine and Red Cross activity also helped diminish criticism of Port Arthur. Reading of Japan's modern hospital system and humane treatment of wounded Chinese prisoners, Americans could believe that this, "rather than the action of a body of men in the heat of battle, where death threatens them on every hand," displayed the "true spirit of any nation." The Journal of the American Medical Association proclaimed that the Japanese had demonstrated the best in medical treatment, the newest antiseptics and the latest training, and concluded: "truly the Japanese is a wonderful

man." Despite Japan's aberration at Port Arthur, the Springfield Republican pointed out, "nothing more emphatically shows the vast progress of Japan out of the barbarism of the Asian nations" than her adoption and employment of the Red Cross Society in the war with China. The fact that the Japanese Red Cross Society had sent six physicians and twelve nurses with each troop transport bound for Korea and China was widely noted. Rev. J. H. DeForest wrote in the Missionary Herald that the employment of the Red Cross Society "has helped to give Japan power to wage war on a higher plane of humanitarian spirit than has ever been reached before, even in Christian nations."²²

On the other hand the Chinese rejected the help of the Red Cross and refused to form a Society of their own. They left their wounded to freeze and starve on the battlefield, and they mutilated and murdered Japanese wounded. As Rev. Charles A. Stanley noted from Tientsin, "The Chinese are making no hospital or ambulance arrangements." Other Americans regretted China's lack of an organized medical department. Chinese officers of rank and wealth employed their own personal doctors but soldiers received no aid. Allegedly, the Chinese even failed to bury their dead.²³

Chinese officials refused to guarantee protection for Red Cross nurses who requested transportation to the front to aid wounded Chinese soldiers. "We don't want to save any wounded Chinese," the Governor of Tientsin informed one Red Cross worker. Even worse, the American Medical Association revealed that Chinese fired on ambulances, killed attendants and attacked surgeons wearing the Geneva cross, a symbol of Christian humanity and compassion. It was recalled that early efforts

by westerners to form a Chinese Red Cross Society had met with repeated failure. Under pressure from the Western community, Li Hung-chang placed the steamer Toonan at the disposal of an Independent Red Cross Society at Tientsin to bring back wounded Chinese from around Port Arthur. Four American medical missionaries accompanied four British doctors on the trip. When the Toonan was refused permission to carry the wounded to hospitals at Tientsin, the mercy ship returned empty-handed. This appeared to be further evidence of China's barbarism.²⁴

Hoping to improve American military medicine and treatment of wounded, the American government expressed interest in Japan's modern techniques. Gresham requested copies of pamphlets issued by the Medical Division of the Japanese Department of War. The United States War Department asked Dun to ship items of equipment from the Japanese Army Medical Corps for study in Washington, D.C. At the same time, the Navy Department dispatched navy surgeon C. U. Gravatt of the Charleston to visit field hospitals at Port Arthur.²⁵

Gravatt's investigation reinforced the image of a humane and modern Japanese medical corps. He discovered immaculate hospital facilities, as well as typhoid fever patients treated with the latest technique--"hydro-chloric acid." He observed highly-trained nurses busily bandaging wounds (of both Japanese and Chinese personnel) with bags of "mercuric gauze," and feeding the wounded fresh food. Everything was carefully organized, Gravatt reported, from the dressing stations at the front down to the main field hospitals at command headquarters. The navy surgeon paid particular attention to sanitary measures instituted by Japanese military officials upon entering a captured

Chinese town, such as employing Chinese labor to clean the filthy streets and houses. "Closets have been constructed at many of the corners," Gravatt explained, "and Chinamen are fined when detected in committing nuisances."²⁶

The New York World's exposure of the brutality at Port Arthur had threatened to destroy an American impression of the Japanese as the "Yankees of the Orient." One American newspaper, however, could not reverse the current of public attitudes. Americans reminded themselves that they had committed similar atrocities during the formative stages of their own civilization and Japan's example only seemed to reinforce the similarity of two national experiences. The World's impact diminished as reports of Japanese humanitarianism at Weihaiwei reached the United States, and respect for Japan actually increased through the attention given its medical technology and Red Cross Society. The press theme of "barbarism versus civilization" had been altered little, if at all, by the end of the year.

But the fighting grew heavier and moved toward the major cities. In the weeks ahead, a new concern--for the lives of Americans rather than Asians--began to affect the American response to the Sino-Japanese War.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN EAST ASIA

The capture of the mammoth fortifications at Port Arthur and Weihaiwei, combined with the Japanese offensive in Manchuria, threw thousands of Chinese soldiers into disorganized retreat. Cutting swaths of pillage and destruction, bands of defeated troops terrorized the Chinese population as well as the foreign communities of northern China. Chinese soldiery had become "a lawless mob, without discipline," missionary Franklin M. Chapin observed from his station at Linching. "They collected in bodies especially at night, and attacked the villages, and even towns, looted and murdered," Speck von Sternburg advised Teddy Roosevelt. "The poor traveller, who came across them, was stripped and left naked at the roadside in the terrible cold" ¹

Foreign residents throughout the north daily expected to fall "victim to the rage of the bigoted pagans of the celestial empire" who were believed ready to attack mission stations and settlements. Alluding to the earlier murder of James Wylie, a Scotch Presbyterian missionary, medical missionary Willis C. Noble reported from Paoingfu that anti-foreign rabble had almost created "another Wylie affair" at his station when they tormented and threatened violence to the Christian community. Even the missionaries at the treaty ports would not be safe, asserted the Rev. R. O. Hayden, unless they could

find refuge aboard foreign gunboats.²

Foreigners in China, from the outset of hostilities, had urged the western powers to send more naval protection to China's treaty ports. Grover Cleveland, always sympathetic to American missionary requests, had been among the first to respond to such pressures by ordering the strengthening of the Asiatic squadron. The President told Congress that the war had "rendered it necessary or expedient to dispatch eight vessels to those waters." Secretary of State Gresham, influenced by the "great number of communications" from American missionaries in Asia and their friends in the United States, advised Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert to send "some small ships, able to run up the rivers" for the protection of Americans in the interior.³

By the end of August, American naval reinforcements began to arrive on the Asiatic station, joining the Monocacy and the Baltimore. The first on the scene, gunboats Petrel and Concord, were soon joined by the Charleston, the Yorktown and later by the Detroit and the Machias. The additions to his fleet increased Admiral C. C. Carpenter's ability to respond to requests for gunboats, yet he realized that even the larger fleet would provide insufficient strength to guard all of the scattered American missionary groups. To derive maximum effectiveness from his fleet, Carpenter devised a two-fold strategy. First, he deployed several vessels at what the Navy Department considered key points and used the rest to maintain a continual patrol, visiting potential trouble spots to "show the flag." Second, Carpenter worked toward an agreement with the other naval commanders to cooperate in deploying their ships for the protection of all foreigners. The

Admiral particularly desired the cooperation of the nineteen-ship British Asiatic Squadron. He communicated regularly with Vice-Admiral E. R. Fremantle, commander-in-chief of the British naval forces in China. Carpenter revealed where each American ship would be stationed in order to facilitate British protection of Americans in areas where the United States Navy was absent. In a private conversation with Fremantle on November 4th, Carpenter learned that the British would cooperate. Fremantle, however, cautioned that the entire arrangement must remain informal and he carefully stated that the British agreement constituted only a general expression of cooperation to protect each other's subjects. Several days later the American commander reached a similar understanding with Admiral Dupuis of the French China fleet. German gunboat commanders also indicated that they would protect American citizens in China if absolutely necessary.⁴

Carpenter's first concern was to free the Baltimore from its guard duty on the Korean station. American naval forces, as well as a legation guard, had been stationed in Korea since July. But with the imposition of Japanese military law Carpenter believed that Americans in Korea needed little protection. Nevertheless, Minister Sill insisted that his guard be maintained, even though its members were often drunk and did little more than stand watch at the legation gates. Hopefully, Sill arranged for the construction of winter barracks for the marines who were still quartered in leaky tents around the compound's courtyard. Confiding to Carpenter that "in the present condition of communications I cannot wait for instruction," Sill cabled, "I have taken it for granted that the Navy Department will supply stoves and fuel . . . and

fit it up with bunks and blankets." The Admiral complied but also reduced the guard. When the gunboat Concord arrived the latter part of September, Carpenter replaced the Baltimore's guard with a smaller contingent from the gunboat and assured a worried Sill that the flagship would be close at hand if needed.⁵

After another month of calm in Korea, Carpenter inquired whether Sill still considered a legation guard essential. The minister replied that, while the Chinese no longer threatened Seoul, "the whole kingdom [had] never been in a more complete state of anarchy and confusion." Although he was undoubtedly concerned for the lives of the eighty Americans in Seoul, Sill also had become interested in maintaining an American military presence in Korea as a post-war wedge for a larger American role in that country. Evidently influenced by advice from legation secretary and missionary Horace Allen, Sill closed his letter to Carpenter indicating that the United States should retain its guard for the present because both Russia and Great Britain had left their guards--and not because Americans confronted immediate danger.⁶ At the same time, the minister dashed off a cable to a skeptical Gresham to tell him that troops should remain because rumors of assassinations and plots continued unabated. Again in December Sill informed his chief that Japanese reforms had been largely unsuccessful and had left the kingdom in disorder. He also reminded the State Department of Korea's commercial potential, noting, "It is expected that Japanese influences will soon open and develop the rich gold and coal mines of the country."⁷

Sill perpetuated the image of near anarchy in Seoul as a basis for the continued presence of American soldiers in Korea. He bombarded

all listeners with tales of unrest and disorder. When the Charleston replaced the Concord as the watch ship at Chemulpo, the minister revealed to its captain, George W. Coffin, that the factional struggle in Seoul had become more and more bitter and might forecast an insurrection. Sill continued to insist on a guard even after foreign forces had been withdrawn. "In this city American citizens outnumber all other caucassian [sic] nationalities combined and these are largely women and children," he informed Gresham. "My responsibilities are greater than those of any European Representative, hence I cannot consent to follow blindly any example of withdrawal of guards that any of them may set."⁸

Despite Sill's pleas for retention of the guard, American marines had become somewhat of an embarrassment, though they provided the only excitement experienced in Seoul's otherwise secure American community. The first incident occurred when a drunken marine allegedly entered the house of a Korean Christian, frightening the woman and seizing "a perfectly useless article of clothing." Mistakenly assuming that the woman was in the clothing when the trooper grasped it, a female American missionary reported the outrage to the Navy Department.⁹ No sooner had the furor quieted when word of another incident reached the desk of Acting Secretary of the Navy William McAdoo, who ordered "a searching investigation" of American military conduct in Korea. McAdoo had received a letter from a friend of Rose Ely Moore, another American missionary in Korea. "We have to blush for our American soldiers and some of the officers from the Baltimore," Mrs. Moore had reportedly written. "They get beastly drunk and carouse about the streets in a most disgraceful manner, frightening and surprising the Japs and

Koreans." The letter alleged that the soldiers "were so drunk they probably would have not been of any use" had the Tonghaks attacked the city or the legation.¹⁰

In response to McAdoo's order, Carpenter called for statements from the officers of the Baltimore and also requested Sill's cooperation in the investigation. The officers denied any knowledge of excessive drunkenness. Assistant Surgeon Lewis Morris asserted that "some of the men, at times, were under the influence of liquor but were promptly punished by the officer in command." Concurrently, paymaster's clerk James Schon assured his superiors that he possessed no knowledge of the affair. Sill discovered the identity of the letter writer, who admitted that she had based her report upon rumors. "My husband's Korean teacher said he saw soldiers drunk and carousing in the streets, and Dr. O. R. Anison told me he had seen a soldier in a shop dead drunk, 'Beastly drunk'," Mrs. Moore said when questioned. "I did hear that the officers got drunk at the club, and had to be brought home, but I cannot recall who my informant was." Sill was relieved. Intent upon retaining his guard, he assured Carpenter that the legation had no information to sustain the charges made in Mrs. Moore's letter.¹¹

Ben Franklin Day, captain of the Baltimore, concluded that the accusations had exaggerated the misbehavior of his officers and men. "It would have been surprising, and not in accordance with the usual experience with landing parties had there not been some drunkenness amongst them as they were supplied with money monthly . . . and there was plenty of liquor for sale of the most potent kind." Day admitted confidentially to navy veteran Carpenter, "Men who do not get drunk are

not plentiful in the Navy and Marine Corps." Concurring with Day's conclusions, the Admiral urged the Navy Department to drop the case.¹²

With the Korean station secure under Japanese occupation, the Gulf of Chihli patrol assumed the primary attention of the American Asiatic squadron. Since the Gulf was bordered by the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur to the north, Weihaiwei and Chefoo at the tip of the Shantung Peninsula to the south and Tientsin and the Taku Forts to the west, patrols cruised near the areas of current Sino-Japanese hostilities. The Charleston and Yorktown were mainly responsible for patrolling the open Gulf, while throughout the winter the Petrel remained stuck in a mud dock at Newchwang on the mouth of the Liao River. Although he occasionally joined the patrol, Carpenter preferred to maintain his flagship Baltimore at Nagasaki as a communications center rather than toss about on the rough winter seas of the Gulf. When the Yorktown arrived at Yokohama on December 7, Carpenter immediately assigned her captain, Commander William Mayhew Folger, to the arduous Chihli station.¹³

By late December the Yorktown had established Chefoo as its watch station, where ice, gales and blinding snowstorms made operations at sea almost impossible. Nevertheless, Folger responded to every missionary's plea for help, keeping his crew drilled in landing and rescue operations. On January 18, three Japanese warships, ignoring a white flag raised by missionaries, shelled the port city of Tungchow, west of Chefoo. Folger investigated, communicating with the American missionary leader. The Rev. Calvin Mateer requested that Folger inform

the Japanese of the missionaries' presence in the city. Folger replied that the Japanese had a right to fire on Tungchow. "A state of war exists, and, legally all foreigners that remain in the country do so at their own risk." Several days later the missionaries decided to leave and Folger sailed up from Chefoo in a heavy snowstorm to rescue them. He picked up sixteen women and children, but "six men and three ladies . . . all Americans," Folger cabled Herbert, insisted upon staying "to protect their property, and to aid the Chinese, their pupils and converts, with their counsel."¹⁴

The Americans still at Tungchow made another effort to enlist the United States Navy as an intermediary between themselves and the Japanese command, offering to surrender the city if it would mean less bloodshed. Admiral Carpenter considered such action "inadvisable and dangerous," even if the missionaries approached the Japanese directly and did not involve the Navy. As to any intervention on Carpenter's part, the idea was absurd. "I am not authorized by the United States Government to act as a mediator for the belligerent Japanese and Chinese, and cannot, in consequence, be a party to forwarding an unauthorized communication from an American citizen offering to use his best efforts to have a city of one country surrender to the forces of another."¹⁵

No sooner had the Tungchow matter quieted when the Admiral received a telegram from a Baptist group stranded somewhere near San San Saddle on the Shantung Peninsula. Without charts to guide him, Captain Coffin of the Charleston, dispatched by Carpenter on the rescue mission, attempted to locate the missionaries. At last successful in

his search, Coffin rammed his cruiser through foot-thick ice in the San San Channel until he reached a point three miles from land. He then used the ship's steam-launch, towing a whale boat, to traverse a narrow ice-free channel to shore, where he rescued fourteen American, British and Swedish missionaries and their families. Upon returning to the Charleston, the party found the cruiser frozen in the ice, and, as Coffin later reported to Carpenter, only "by ramming the ice and going astern and then ahead with full speed," was the ship able to break itself free.¹⁶

At the same time the Yorktown arrived at Ichowfu on the southeast coast of the Shantung Peninsula to keep an appointment with some beleaguered missionaries. But the group had failed to reach the point of rescue due to heavy snow, bad roads and the Chinese seizure of all means of transportation. Folger received a note from another missionary ashore pleading "please do not go off without them." For two days the captain maintained position, even when a violent storm threatened to drive his ship onto the rocks. He departed only after receiving word that one of the missionaries, Miss Anna Larson, had contracted pneumonia on a mountain road and the others refused to leave her. "We believe therefore that God has something further for us to do here," the message to Folger related, "and that he will take care of us."¹⁷

Folger, Coffin and Carpenter became increasingly impatient with the missionaries. The Admiral communicated that "as a class they are thoroughly helpless and irresponsible as far as taking precautions are concerned and by their lack of unanimity of action would defeat the best laid plans for their rescue." In January Carpenter had ordered a

fifteen-man guard for the American consulate at Chefoo and urged missionaries to go into the city "as it will be impossible to afford protection to those that insist upon remaining in the outlying dwellings." He repeatedly explained that his marines would not be sent to protect the missionaries "individually and collectively" in their own homes. Yet they refused to seek refuge in Chefoo. Exasperated, the admiral expressed his dismay in a lengthy cable to Secretary of the Navy Herbert:

The missionaries appear to have no conception of a state of war, as long as the danger appears to them remote they disregard all advice, preferring to remain to care for their worldly possessions, rather than to prepare for possible contingencies. When it becomes almost too late, and they find themselves confronted with dangerous conditions, they appeal with pitiful energy for assistance, and start aimlessly for the coast hoping for aid and succor. To them the presence of ice along the shore and the absence of soundings on the chart mean nothing, as long as they reach the seaboard at any time they apparently think their responsibility ended.¹⁸

The missionaries continued to trouble the Navy with unneutral requests. Mateer at Tungchow urged Carpenter to forward a letter to the Japanese general in command of the forces nearest his city. He disclosed that eight Americans, who "have no connection whatever with the Chinese Government or with the defense of the city," would "exert ourselves to have it surrendered by a flag of truce" if the Chinese proved unable to defend it. Carpenter of course refused. At the same time some missionaries just to the south of Chefoo requested help. After stopping at a number of villages along the shore in a thick fog, Folger finally located and rescued a number of missionary families. After several hectic months of rescue work, the Navy recorded a decrease in requests for aid and by the end of March conditions seemed tranquil

on the Chihli station.¹⁹

While the Yorktown, Charleston and Baltimore steamed through the seas on their patrols, the tiny Petrel sailed up the Liao River to the north. Carpenter had assigned this gunboat to protect missionaries at Newchwang. Opened to foreign commerce in 1860, this port on the Gulf of Liaotung had become an important trading nexus for the Liao River plain. As the Petrel churned up the brown waters of the Liao and approached the city, only the tile roofs of a few temples and the white tower of the Chinese Imperial Customs building appeared over the high mudbanks bordering the river. The gunboat passed reed beds in stagnant water infested with mosquito larvae and hundreds of trading junks heavy with produce from the interior. To this city of mud, mosquitoes and fat cockroaches, the foreign missionaries had fled, escaping the Chinese armies who swarmed through the neighboring countryside on their way to the war zone. The Petrel had been sent to protect them.²⁰

Unaware that the Navy Department had revoked orders to proceed to Newchwang, Lieutenant-Commander William Hensley Emory forced the twelve-foot-draft Petrel into an eleven-foot mud dock next to a smaller British gunboat, the Firebrand. Inextricably mired in the mud, the Petrel would remain until spring rains could provide sufficient flotation for removal. The crews of the two gunboats, preparing for an extended duty station, constructed mud barricades around their ships and mounted gatling guns at key positions. Emory arranged accommodations for the

foreign community if it was forced to seek asylum aboard his gunboat. He drilled his crew daily with bayonets, revolvers and gatling guns, warning them all the while to avoid trouble in the port town, particularly since the streets swarmed with Chinese soldiery.

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In view of the Petrel's immobility, it was fortunate that nothing occurred to prompt the fulfillment of her mission, which was to aid the escape of Americans from Newchwang. There was only one minor incident between a member of the crew and a Chinese mob, and no foreigners requested assistance, except for the Rev. John McIntyre, who borrowed some Colt revolvers. Even so, Emory's ship was valuable as a listening post. Closer to the actual battlefield than any other vessel, the Petrel's intelligence people not only relied on Chinese informers but could themselves count the troops and equipment passing through Newchwang. During January and early February of 1895, Chinese units marched north and not much later, drubbed again by the Japanese, swarmed back along the same roads. Emory carefully recorded all movements and kept the Department informed of war news. On March 6 the Japanese occupied the city and General Michitsura Nodzu of the First Army called on Emory to assure him that order would be maintained. With the spring floods, the Petrel floated free of its mud dock and left for Shanghai.

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While the Petrel was wintering in the north, the Concord assumed responsibility for the protection of American interests in the Yangtze River region. Anti-Manchu signs accompanied by anti-foreign placards had appeared at the treaty port of Chinkiang at the mouth of the river, prompting the American community there to request a gunboat. The

Concord steamed as far as Wuhu on the Yangtze, exercising, according to her commander, "a restraining and wholesome effect" on this part of the river. Commanding officer Caspar F. Goodrich also made arrangements with the captain of the German gunboat Iltis for cooperation in the event of anti-foreign activity at Chinkiang. Both vessels would land armed parties and gatling guns to close off the western settlement and the Customs Residence.²³

In addition to his contingency plan with the Iltis, Goodrich cooperated freely with the British along the Yangtze. In December 1894 he received a request from British Consul W. R. Carles to assist the Municipal Police at Chinkiang in clearing Chinese gun sampans away from the landing pontoon of Jardine, Matheson & Company. Two boatloads of armed Americans went ashore. Goodrich justified this intervention under his general mandate to preserve order and protect property. Yet, the Concord's action in behalf of a British commercial house was of little aid to the State Department's continuing attempts to convince China that the United States was neutral. Shortly after the favor to Carles, the British consul at Wuhu requested a gunboat to settle some reported unrest. Goodrich hurried to the spot, where he found everything quiet. "My trip to Wuhu is justified," Goodrich informed Carpenter, "in the confidence it has brought to the foreign community, which includes a number of American missionaries."²⁴

In January 1895 Commander Joseph Edgar Craig replaced Caspar Goodrich as captain of the Concord and was soon pursuing the same energetic tactics as had his predecessor. Upon learning that the Taotai (Governor) at Ningpo had refused permission for foreign men-of-war

to visit his city and that the American missionaries in the treaty port feared attack, Craig secretly arranged a plan with Consul-General Jernigan at Shanghai to force his way into the harbor. "I believe that the situation demands that the flag of the United States be shown on board a man-of-war at Ningpo," Craig asserted. Without waiting for orders from Carpenter, he steamed into Ningpo despite vehement Chinese protests. The Concord's visit passed without incident and Craig received the thanks of American Consul Fowler for strengthening his hand in dealing with Chinese authorities.²⁵

The Concord proceeded to Chinkiang where officers went ashore to hunt game. Instead they accidentally shot and slightly wounded a Chinese boy. During the race back to the ship a Chinese mob managed to seize one of the Americans. News of the incident reached the American press which, for a time, threatened to exaggerate the affair. As one editorialist raved: "Great fears are felt for the safety of the entire party, as the Chinese are wrought up to an extreme pitch of resentment." Long before the first editorial, the incident had been amicably and quickly settled by "the payment of twenty Mexican dollars" to the boy's father and treatment of the superficial wound by the Concord's surgeon. Jernigan, worried over the "graphic account" of the Chinkiang shooting in American newspapers, took pains to announce that no one had been seriously hurt and no one should be blamed for the affair, since even the President himself could not have resisted hunting in Chinkiang, were he in China. "Probably he is a better marksman," Jernigan joked, "than some of our naval officers appear to be."²⁶

The Concord remained at Chinkiang without further incident, suffering only from its own poor deck caulking which admitted a dangerous amount of water during the torrential spring rains. The gunboat's patrol on the Yangtze had been an abrasive one, but fortunately, matters here were not so sensitive as in the main war theater farther to the north.

The Tientsin station, protected by the decrepit, unseaworthy Monocacy, became the center of American governmental concern. Early in the war reports had circulated that Tientsin and Peking would be attacked by Japanese forces. "Pekin is Panic Striken," the New York Herald's European edition announced in late September 1894. American Board missionary William Scott Ament wrote from Peking that foreigners fear "Pandemonium" may break loose among the "unsavory elements" of the city at any time. The British evacuated their women and children and American missionaries met with Charles Denby Jr. who urged them to follow the British. News that Great Britain would employ Sepoy troops to protect the lives of foreigners from brigandage, murder and outrage hardly soothed the fears of Americans in Tientsin. Unable to decide whether the Chinese mob or the Sepoy troops posed the greater danger in China, one American commented that England's Sepoys were "no better than the Hessians and the red savages who were turned loose upon us in the revolution."²⁷

Under pressure from the foreign community, the Chinese government placed huge posters on mission compound walls making it a crime

punishable by death to harass foreign residents in the city. Young Denby, in a press release, assured Americans that reports of danger in Peking had been greatly exaggerated. The acting minister told of his concern over false dispatches. "Whatever their object, whether to justify foreign interference, or to serve other purposes," he cabled Gresham, "they will cause groundless anxiety in Europe and America." Peking remained quiet and fears of riots decreased.²⁸

The bogey of anti-foreign violence reappeared shortly after the return of the senior Denby to his ministerial post. On October 31 he wrote to Gresham of his concern for the lives of the sixty Americans in Peking if the Japanese marched on the capital. "I do not wish to abandon my post, therefore I have written to Rear Admiral Carpenter," suggesting that the crew of the Monocacy at Tientsin be increased by fifty men and that the officer commanding be instructed to send them to Peking "upon my request." Carpenter envisaged a recurrence of the Korean problem and objected to sending reinforcements to the old gunboat. He argued that the drafty and cramped quarters aboard the Monocacy could not adequately support the existing crew, never mind fifty additional men. Further suggesting that fifty men would be insufficient to force their way inland to Peking, the Admiral testified that the International Force at Tientsin would be able to meet all emergencies and refused to approve Denby's request. Even Gresham quietly prompted Denby to advise the missionaries to seek asylum at the nearest treaty port where naval officers on the Asiatic station could protect them. At the same time Denby's interpreter, F. D. Cheshire, privately assured Third Secretary Rockhill that "everything is quiet here in spite of

the news at home to the contrary--there is no danger."²⁹

Yet Denby persevered. In a dispatch to Gresham, he bypassed Carpenter and requested the strengthening of the Monocacy's crew. Denby succeeded in winning Gresham's approval, who in turn convinced Secretary of the Navy Herbert. When the Baltimore arrived in Nagasaki on November 29, Carpenter found orders directing the assignment of the additional force to the Monocacy. Reluctantly, Carpenter steamed to Chefoo, where three officers and forty-two marines boarded a British steamer bound for Tientsin. The steamer arrived off the Taku Bar and waited for earlier vessels to transfer passengers to landing lighters. Facing a severe shortage of rations and the possibility of river freeze, the commander of the marine guard, Captain George Elliott, decided to land his troops without permission and shuttle them to Tientsin by rail. "I was well aware I had no right to land an armed force without permission in a foreign country, but it was impossible for me to get this permit within necessary time, so I embarked the men and baggage on a tug," Elliott later recalled. He marched his men through a "motley crowd" of coolies and soldiers, instructing the American marines to apply "vicious blows with the butts of their pieces" in order to reach the train. After an hour-and-a-half ride to Tientsin on an open car in freezing winds, the contingent enjoyed the relative warmth of the leaky Monocacy. They purchased long sheepskin coats, fur caps and gloves and settled down to await marching orders for Peking.³⁰

An Imperial Edict had forbidden the passage and entry of foreign soldiers into Peking, but Admiral Carpenter had instructed the commander of the Monocacy to use his own discretion as to the advisability of

sending men there. The Admiral reminded the commander of agreements with foreign naval representatives which might make it necessary to send an allied force to Peking and stressed Herbert's order to avoid offense, "if possible," to either the Japanese or the Chinese.

Carpenter added his own warning. "Although arms and ammunition will be provided, it is not expected that any occasion will arise for their use, and recourse to arms shall take place in an extreme emergency only such as self defense, or the defense of the Legation against attack by an irresponsible mob."³¹

Even after the capitulation of Port Arthur and Denby's request for reinforcements at Tientsin, Peking remained relatively calm. Ament, writing from the capital in December, noted that the Imperial Rescript and the patrols of Manchu bannermen at Christian chapels had proved effective in curbing anti-foreign outbreaks. "The people are so overawed by these multiplied indications of care for us on the part of the authorities that they hardly lift their eyes to a foreigner as he goes along the street for fear they will be immediately decapitated." Denby advised the missionaries to remain in Peking if they felt secure and appeared to believe that the Monocacy's reinforcements would not be needed after all. Then, without consulting other foreign representatives, the Russian minister called his marines to Peking.³²

Denby cabled that he might act soon. Herbert opposed sending the troops, but the Cleveland administration had authorized the dispatch of a guard if China failed to protect foreigners or if the "other Powers send marines to Peking." The action of other western nations assumed a central role in Denby's ruminations. "If the other nations

bring their marines hither and we bring none, and anarchy supervenes, and mob violence breaks out, and my own people who are more numerous than any, perhaps all others, are left without protection, I should feel that I have not done my full duty."³³

Gresham began to doubt the wisdom of sending troops to Peking. Yang Yu["] voiced his government's opposition to the dispatch of American soldiers through Chinese territory. Requesting that Gresham not insist on sending troops, the Chinese minister assured the Secretary of State that the Chinese government would protect the American legation and the "presence of foreign troops as you request would aggravate the situation." Gresham promised Yang that the United States would not insist upon sending troops "unless the other Representatives make similar requests of the Chinese Government." Meanwhile Denby stepped up the pressure from Peking. He cabled news of his meeting with the foreign diplomatic representatives in which all insisted on the right to convey armed guards into the Chinese Imperial capital. "It is likely that Russia, France, and Italy will bring troops," Denby warned. "England has now fifteen here and will bring more."³⁴

President Cleveland, regarding American marines in China as a violation of neutrality, shared Gresham's reservations. The latter cabled Denby on January 1: "President thinks Carpenter's opposition to sending marines reasonable and expects that in no event will you insist upon marines, unless other legations do." Once again the final decision seemed to revolve around the actions of western powers rather than the Chinese. At the same time, Carpenter suggested an alternative to the transportation of a marine guard to Peking, inquiring whether

the American community might not seek the safety of heavily-guarded Tientsin.³⁵

In February 1895, reports of disturbances and mutinies by Chinese soldiers increased. Consul Read called missionaries of the American Board and the Methodist Episcopal church to the refuge of Tientsin. In conjunction with Commander Robert E. Impey of the Monocacy, he cabled Denby requesting one hundred more men from the American force at Chefoo. Impey ordered Captain Elliott to visit Peking and make arrangements for the housing of his marines in the abandoned Dutch legation. Meanwhile, Denby informed Admiral Carpenter on February 21 that he would request the fifty marines "in pursuance of the cooperation policy which prevails in the East." Aware that Denby was finally prepared to call for American armed intervention, the Secretary of State sent a last warning. Legally the United States had no right to bring up troops, Gresham cabled on February 28th. "I do not find in any of the treaties with China provisions authorizing the protection of the legations by foreign troops, but if other powers bring up marines you are authorized to do the same."³⁶

After months of tension and false expectations, mob disorders failed to materialize and Denby never made the final request. By early May the Monocacy's reinforcements had returned to the Baltimore. Circumstance allowed the United States to avoid yet another situation which could easily have compromised the policy of neutrality. The American government had been extremely sensitive to the perils, whether real or imagined, faced by missionaries in East Asia. Troops had been landed in Korea, a sizeable fleet had been engaged in protective duties,

the administration had permitted the deployment of troops in China and had almost consented to marching these troops to Peking against the wishes of the Chinese government. Once again State Department instructions derived more from principle than from comprehension of existing conditions. Typically vague and sometimes self-contradictory, such instructions virtually invited American diplomatic and naval representatives in East Asia to interpret them loosely or even disobey them.

Early 1895 brought peace feelers, providing the United States with yet additional tasks to undertake in its role as a conscientious and energetic neutral.

CHAPTER IX

THE AMERICAN ROLE IN PEACE PRELIMINARIES

From the beginning of hostilities in Korea, European nations had pressured the United States to join them in multilateral intervention between China and Japan. As early as July 1894 Cleveland had indicated that the United States would not participate in such an arrangement. Yet rumors persisted that the United States would serve in a mediatory capacity, or would at least offer unilateral arbitration. In fact, some Americans desired early mediation of the conflict. In September 1894 the American Review of Reviews insisted that the United States had a duty to end the war on her own terms. "We believe that any solution of existing Asiatic difficulties that the United States should declare to be just and right would be promptly accepted by Russia and England, as well as by the Asiatic powers themselves." American pacifists agreed, suggesting immediate mediation. The American Peace Society even alluded to American participation in an international police force which would guarantee the independence and reform of the Korean government. Leading pacifist Belva Lockwood was not so patriotic about peacemaking. She believed that the American branch of the International Peace Bureau, for which she worked as secretary, should submit a plan of arbitration to the Pope or some other European leader, rather than to President Cleveland.¹

Reports of possible American partnership in a multilateral

intervention increased in early October. A New York Herald reporter hastened to Assistant Secretary of State Uhl's home on the evening of October 5 determined to discover whether the United States contemplated involvement in Asian politics. Uhl insisted that the State Department had never received an official request for cooperation in a program of joint intervention, but he refused to comment further on the subject. Pushed to discuss what the United States might do in the event such a request should be received, another "official source" revealed that the United States would follow the traditional policy of "absolute non-intervention in the East" and would not cooperate with any power to effect a settlement of the war "except from a humanitarian point of view." Possible limitations on humanitarian action were not discussed.²

On the following day Uhl received a formal note from Mr. W. E. Goshen of the British Embassy inquiring whether the United States would participate in a projected joint intervention. Uhl sent the note to President Cleveland, then vacationing at Buzzards Bay. For almost a week the State Department waited for the President's reply. Remarking that the British expected a prompt answer, Gresham cabled his chief on October 12: "Shall I say in reply to Goshen's note copy of which was sent you that while the President earnestly desires that China and Japan shall speedily agree upon terms of peace alike honorable to both nations and not humiliating to Korea he cannot join England Germany Russia and France in an intervention as requested?" Leaving the policy statement completely up to the Secretary, Cleveland replied, "That is exactly what I was going to suggest in reply to Mr. Goshen . . . it is exactly

right." The President returned to the New England woods for more hunting, and further pleadings from Goshen--assuring that any intervention would be limited to diplomatic action at a suitable time--were ignored by the State Department.³

Pressure for American mediation came next from China. On October 23 young Denby had learned that the Chinese Foreign Office would concede Korean independence and pay a war indemnity to Japan, although at this point China had not yet requested American mediation. Later the Tsungli Yamen called for the employment of American good offices under the first article of the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin. This article provided for good offices to bring about an amicable arrangement of a dispute between China and another nation, acting "oppressively or unjustly toward China." The senior Denby, now in Peking, immediately warned Gresham that this would be a violation of American neutrality, since under this arrangement the United States would in effect be recognizing Japan as the aggressor and China as the innocent victim. Furthermore, since China had requested similar mediation from other powers, acceptance would entangle the United States in a multilateral understanding designed to protect China.⁴

Yang Yu, using his friendship with Gresham to good advantage, had already convinced the Secretary of State to extend an offer of American good offices for mediation to China. Gresham cabled Denby and instructed him to make such an offer. China's request and Gresham's instructions to Denby each formulated without the knowledge of the other, arrived at their respective destinations coincidentally, reinforcing China's opinion that the United States had accepted the role of mediator under

the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin. Explaining that Denby's cable, forwarding China's request and warning against its acceptance, had arrived after the American offer of mediation, Gresham asserted that "China's similar request addressed to the great European Powers may somewhat embarrass the President's freedom of action." President Cleveland would serve as an impartial arbiter only if China and Japan accepted the United States as the sole mediatory agent. As Gresham announced, "He will gladly aid them by conference at this capital, or in any other practicable way." Washington further complicated the situation when Cleveland hinted that he might cooperate with other powers "simply in determining amount of indemnity if Japan's consent obtained," thus opening the door to possible American involvement in the post-war settlement.⁵

Gresham realized that he must attempt to clarify the American position. "It was not until China through her minister here, had repeatedly requested it, that the President expressed his willingness to act as peacemaker," the Secretary assured Denby. At the same time he explained American policy to the Japanese minister in Washington, Shinchiro Kurino. The offer of mediation had been made not because America was opposed to the war but because continued warfare might force European intervention. Motivated by "sentiments of friendship toward Japan" and not by the desire to hinder Japanese military progress, Gresham suggested that Japan express its willingness to initiate peace talks which would prevent outside interference. Therefore, Japan as well as China was allowed to understand that American mediation efforts would aid its own interests.⁶

News of the American offer reached the press about a week after it had arrived in Peking and Tokyo. The usually-critical New York Tribune, believing that American mediation would benefit Japan, supported the latest American move. This policy differed from the Cleveland administration's "earlier diplomatic fiasco" (warning Japan to preserve Korean integrity) which the Tribune said had been designed to "dazzle the public and distract attention from the State Department's other lamentable and disastrous ventures" in Hawaii. Pro-mediation spokesmen argued over whether to support the American policy because "it would materially advance this country's growing commercial interests" in Asia or because the United States should mediate "without personal interests or prejudice to warp her decision." Others believed that the United States could at the same time, be both commercially-oriented and impartial. Selfish interests could not hurt the nation's role as an "ideal mediator," since neither Japan or China would be favored in future Asian trade. "The one possible objection to the acceptance of its friendly offices is the remembrance of Mr. Gresham's scandalous indiscretion at the beginning of the war," the Tribune concluded. Unaware of Gresham's assurances to Kurino and resorting to earlier form, the Republican newspaper asserted that "Japan might well hesitate to submit her case to the judgement of a Government whose foreign policy was in such hands as his."⁷

In line with existing patterns of public opinion, most opponents of American mediation assumed that American efforts would be more beneficial to China than Japan. They wondered why the United States had manifested such a sudden interest in what they called entangling

alliances and suggested that Yang had manipulated the American Secretary of State. These critics asserted that the war had progressed nicely for "the friends of progress and Christian civilization" and should be allowed to take its natural course. By trying to stop the war, the United States allegedly played England's game, on grounds that British commercial supremacy was being threatened by continued warfare.⁸ These analysts ignored well-publicized fears that continued warfare might lead to European intervention against Japan.

While Americans debated possible mediation efforts, Japan remained silent. Not until November 15 could Dun report that the Imperial Cabinet had decided to discuss the proposal. On the next day the Japanese "politely" refused to accept American mediation. Gresham learned that while Japan appreciated the kind offer it could not achieve "the just and reasonable results of the war" unless China directly approached Japan on the subject of peace negotiations. In other words, China must humble herself. Japan indicated that it would accept the Chinese proposals if they were transmitted through the American legation in Peking. Gresham, accompanied by Secretary of Treasury John G. Carlisle, drove out to Cleveland's suburban Georgetown retreat, Woodley, and presented Japan's reply to the President.⁹

Public response to Japan's rejection coincided with earlier attitudes toward American mediation. Generally, those who had favored it accepted the rebuff with little more than a hint of criticism. "There is nothing offensive to the United States in this deliberate refusal to take advantage of the good offices of a benevolent peacemaker." After all, American diplomats could still function as messengers, if

not formal mediators, between the two belligerents. The San Francisco Examiner predicted that even this limited role would project the United States into the center of the peace negotiations and enormously increase its prestige in Asia. The Louisville Courier-Journal maintained that the United States would now benefit from its treaty role without assuming the "thankless office of mediator." Other newspapers praised the administration's humanitarianism. "The spectacle of the United States as the friend of all peoples, referred to without question as an unprejudiced mediator in the quarrels of nations, is one of which Americans should be proud," extolled the Philadelphia Ledger. "We not only keep the peace ourselves, but we are trusted peacemakers in all parts of the world."¹⁰

Critics of American mediation cited the Japanese rejection as evidence of more bungling. "The Administration has received another humiliation at the hands of Japan," the Indianapolis Journal remarked. The Detroit News claimed the government deserved the "snub" because of its inept diplomacy. Detractors contended that American mediation had been refused since it would interfere with Japan's civilizing crusade in Asia. "China is such a stumbling block in the way of commercial progress in the East that it will be a good thing for Japan to thoroughly shake up the Celestials and cure them of their unprogressiveness and exclusiveness by a practical demonstration of the advantages of civilized and enlightened methods." The war was "none of our business" and Gresham's offer constituted "an officious piece of meddling."¹¹

The most virulent anti-administration attack came from the New York Press, a Republican opponent of Cleveland. The Press accused

the British of using Americans to preserve their trading supremacy in Asia which was based on the infamous Indian opium trade. The United States by offering mediation had become the "tool of England in the East" in supporting a decadent and detestable Manchu dynasty. "For the sake of the national honor and the American name, it is to be hoped that this blunder will prove the last: that Messrs. Cleveland and Gresham will cease to act as flunkeys to Lord Rosebery, and that the President of the United States will conclude to adopt a foreign policy that will no longer bring shame upon the country and confusion upon himself."¹²

Despite the Japanese rejection, they had helped pave the way for American participation in any peace preliminaries between themselves and China. In the good offices agreements both Asian countries had accepted American diplomatic representatives as messengers to keep lines of communications open between them. No European nation played such a role. Minister Dun in Tokyo, Consul-General Abercrombie in Nagasaki, Consul Read in Tientsin and Minister Denby in Peking served as the only means of official communication between the belligerents. Denby particularly relished this opportunity to influence the future course of Chinese history, as well as the American presence in Asia. Denby told his friend Gresham that China appeared on the brink of a profound and historic transformation and indicated that he wanted the United States to be in on the shaping of a new China. Believing that only he could assist China in its negotiations with Japan according to

accepted standards of western diplomacy, Denby suggested that the Tsungli Yamen invest him in writing with the power to communicate China's overtures of peace to Japan.¹³

But before Denby could assume the role he desired, Li Hung-chang attempted to deal directly with Japan. The Viceroy, without the knowledge of the Chinese Foreign Office, dispatched his private agent, Customs Commissioner G. Detring, a German, to Japan with a personal letter to Prime Minister Viscount Ito Hirobumi. The Japanese government refused even to receive Detring, stating that he was not properly accredited by the Chinese government to discuss peace and would not be recognized in any capacity. Kurino informed the American press that Japan's rejection of Detring stemmed, not from Japan's desire to prolong war, but from its attempt to insure the success of any peace negotiations by forcing China to send a fully-accredited envoy. Shortly thereafter Detring left Japan without meeting Ito. Denby took personal advantage of Detring's failure, telling Gresham, "When I undertook to negotiate on the part of China to bring about peace the Chinese Government immediately recalled Mr. Detring."¹⁴

At the moment Denby's role was important enough even without his exaggerations. Japan's treatment of Detring implied that it would talk with China only through the American legation in Peking. This left Denby in the key position to transmit and receive all peace proposals. Furthermore, the Chinese relied on the American minister to interpret Japanese diplomatic maneuvering, as well as to help the Yamen formulate appropriate responses. Although he never acted as an official mediator, Denby served as a key adviser for the Chinese Foreign

Office on "non-substantive matters" during preliminary negotiations with Japan. In fact he found it difficult, at times, to convince the Tsungli Yamen that he could not act as a mediator and conduct all the negotiations for China. "They even asserted that their Minister at Washington had wired that the President had consented that I should act for them as commissioner to make peace," Denby revealed to the Secretary of State in December of 1894.¹⁵

While insisting the Chinese Foreign Office understand that his good offices role could not include mediation, Denby continued as an intimate adviser for the Chinese in the peace preliminaries. On November 27, when Dun cabled Japan's terms for opening peace talks to Denby, the minister showed the cable to the Yamen and advised China either to decline Japan's terms or to appoint a fully-accredited Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for the purpose of negotiation. China procrastinated, requesting Denby to cable Japan that China would not designate a representative until the Japanese government indicated exactly what the two countries were to discuss. Denby forwarded this message but pressed China to accept Japanese terms.¹⁶

Having received another cable from Dun on December 2, Denby visited the Yamen and after a lengthy debate advised China to follow Japan's directions and designate a peace envoy. "I pointed out that the war would now go on at the expense of China, and while I wished to leave the Yamen perfectly free to carry on war or make peace still it was my duty, as they consulted me as an adviser, to say that unless they hoped to gain great successes in the future it would be better to make

peace." Denby, apparently concerned about overstepping his role as a neutral representative extending good offices to a belligerent, took pains to defend his advice to Gresham. "Understanding that my Government favors peace my effort has been to bring about that result, but I am always confronted with the assertion of the excessive friendliness of the United States, and with a piteous and helpless reliance which makes me an adviser when in truth I am only an intermediary between the two Governments." Whether he realized it or not, Denby's advice was anything but impartial. The Japanese would have been grateful had they known how diligently Denby was working to promote Chinese surrender to their harsh terms.¹⁷

China, apparently prepared to follow Denby's advice, agreed to appoint a minister with full power to negotiate peace. After rejecting China's offer to hold the talks in Shanghai, Tokyo stated that it would appoint its plenipotentiary only after China's peace ambassador arrived in Japan and presented his credentials. These arrangements humiliated the Chinese, who had never negotiated with foreigners outside of China. Denby told his advisees to surrender to this demand. He patiently explained that international law required a defeated nation to accept the site of negotiations from the victor, and he assured the Yamen that its plenipotentiaries would be safe in Japan. Apparently convinced, the Chinese Foreign Office appointed two peace commissioners on December 20th. But China could also play the subtle game of saving face. The two officials, chosen expressly for the purpose of affronting Japan, were minor officials and one of them, Shao Yu-lien, previously had ordered prizes for Japanese heads while Governor of Formosa.

Nevertheless, as Dun cabled, Japan feared European intervention, desired peace and would meet the Chinese plenipotentiaries at Hiroshima.¹⁸

Although Denby considered the Japanese terms "schocking [sic]," he expressed relief that China had finally decided to negotiate peace. "I have, alone, done the troublesome and difficult work of inducing China to sue for peace, . . . jealousy, distrust, ill feeling in and out of the Yamen had to be overcome." Believing his good offices duties finished, Denby assured Gresham on December 29th that "I have done all I can to bring the two nations together and now it is up to them."¹⁹

During this interval another prominent American, former Secretary of State John Watson Foster, became involved in the Sino-Japanese peace preliminaries. Foster had visited China the previous year, where Li Hung-chang had taken him on a tour of the Kaiping mines and railroad. Foster, hoping that China's resources could be exploited by American capital, had become enmeshed in several schemes to introduce American investment into China. He was involved with James Harrison Wilson, Delaware entrepreneur and promoter of enterprises in China, and his name had also been linked with the "infernal machine" plots early in the war. Now, in December of 1894, Foster appeared at the State Department and informed Gresham that China had requested his assistance in the peace talks.²⁰

Foster requested that the State Department assign a clerk to

accompany him to Asia. Gresham refused. The Secretary of State believed Foster's interest in the peace negotiations was purely financial. Besides, Foster was a Republican who had contributed to the expansionist activity during the last months of the Harrison administration. The Secretary wrote Thomas Francis Bayard, the American minister to England, that Foster and a Mr. Holcombe of New York City had raised a large loan for China in the United States. "You can readily see that if Foster is not already a very rich man his prospects for becoming a millionaire are flattering." Several days later Gresham suggested the same to Denby, writing that "Foster's trip will not injure him financially." The New York World reinforced Judge Gresham's suspicions when it revealed Foster's complicity in raising a China loan with George Flint and Chester Holcombe of New York. Foster vigorously denied all allegations, then departed for China.²¹

Whatever Foster's motives, Gresham carefully divorced the State Department from his mission. The Secretary hastened to assure Kurino and the Japanese government that Foster's intention to help the Chinese had originated "entirely without the sanction of the United States Gov't." The following week, in response to a Senate inquiry, administration spokesman Senator Morgan of Alabama asserted that General Foster "has no connection in the world with any official act, or recognizance even, of the United States Government." Gresham was determined not to open new avenues for anti-administration attacks by an unneutral act--especially an unneutral act in behalf of China. The Secretary also resented the former public servant's alleged financial machinations and opposed the mission on moral as well as

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diplomatic grounds.

Denby, meanwhile, continued as unofficial adviser and intermediary. He forwarded China's request for the names of Japan's plenipotentiaries and inquired as to the exact spot for their landing. Realizing that everything he had done had worked out in Japan's favor, he informed Dun that Japan's treatment of China was embarrassing him. Dun answered that Foreign Minister Mutsu regretted that he could not relieve Denby's embarrassment. At this point, Denby further expanded the authority vested in him under good offices. Sending a message directly to Mutsu, he advised Japan to treat China more gently. Furthermore, he pressed Washington for increased American influence in determining the outcome of peace talks. "It would be advisable for the Department to consider whether supervision should be had of the treaty making process, and whether good results might follow friendly suggestions made in the interest of the treaty powers." He argued that the proven impartiality and friendship of the United States permitted it to act in a supervisory role, if it so decided, without arousing the animosity of either belligerent. Denby advocated American assistance in shaping the settlement "for the benefit of humanity." He added that he was not presenting a case for either side but was only seeking to increase American influence in order to gain post-war commercial benefits derived from the "most favored nations clause." He did not mention Japan's earlier rejection of a "supervisory role" for the United States. ²³

Denby had prepared a draft of credentials for the Chinese peace envoys, and he assured Dun and Gresham that he had included the words "plenipotentiaries with full powers." Supposedly equipped with these

credentials, the Chinese negotiators left Shanghai on January 26th aboard a French mail steamer and arrived in Kobe, Japan, on the 30th. Foster, already in Japan, met the Chinese envoys at the dock and examined their credentials. As he later recorded in his memoirs, the letters were "not in the usual form among nations" and he expected the Japanese to refuse them. Ito and Mutsu, after unleashing a propaganda tirade against Chinese duplicity, refused the "defective and unsatisfactory" credentials. The Chinese party, accompanied by Foster, returned to China. As one American editorial suggested, "even the ornate whiskers of our own John W. Foster couldn't persuade the Japanese authorities to accept the credentials of those envoys from China."²⁴

Denby, almost as embarrassed as the Chinese, reacted too quickly. He insisted that he had prepared standard diplomatic credentials but that the Chinese had substituted their own letter for his, striking out any reference to "full powers" for signing a peace treaty. The minister angrily castigated the Yamen for revising his work. "I demanded that any new letters of credence prepared by the Yamen should be submitted to me before transmission and they agreed to this demand." Then Denby heard reports that the Japanese victory at Weihaiwei, combined with the passage of a bill by the Japanese Diet for "whatever amount of appropriations may be necessary for the purpose of military expenditure," had been the real cause of the Japanese refusal. This eased Denby's own embarrassment as well as his anger toward the Yamen. Yet, in demanding that China show him everything before sending it to Japan, Denby had assumed the authority of a mediator.²⁵

Gresham immediately recognized the minister's assumption of new powers. He warned: "While acting as intermediary do nothing that will even appear to compromise in any degree this government's position of impartial neutrality between China and Japan." Gradually Denby had assumed an increased role in influencing China's peace preliminaries. He had opened the door for American participation in the post-war settlement but Gresham and Cleveland refused to enter. Now, under pressure from Washington, Denby attempted to make amends. Calling his contribution to China simply "an unofficial act of kindness," he told Gresham that he had done nothing to compromise American neutrality. Yet he said that he would "severely heed the admonition." Gresham assured his friend that his efforts had not been "inconsistent with our attitudes of impartial neutrality."²⁶

At last China surrendered to Japanese demands and Denby's advice by appointing Li Hung-chang, all his honors restored, as the sole plenipotentiary with full powers to treat for peace. At the same time, the Yamen begged Denby to urge the President of the United States to request an armistice. "I told them that our position of strict neutrality forbade such action and that their request could not be granted, but they begged me so strenuously to send a telegram that I agreed to do so." Once again Dun warned Denby that the Japanese would not accept Li's mission unless he had full powers to recognize the complete independence of Korea, the cession of territory, an agreement for the regulation of trade and any further demands Japan might make. The Japanese government instructed Dun to make certain China understood these conditions and was prepared to comply with them before dispatching

any more emissaries. Japan assumed this tough position, German military attaché Speck von Sternburg wrote Theodore Roosevelt from Peking, because the Japanese public was in a mood to accept only one of two alternatives, "some extraordinary bargain" or the capture of Peking.²⁷

Wily Li Hung-chang delayed answering Japan, hoping in the meantime to involve some western powers in the peace negotiations, thereby substituting complexities for the frightening clarity of the Japanese demands. He visited Denby on February 21 and requested American assistance in persuading Japan to discuss an armistice. Li urged the American minister to use his influence with Japan "to befriend" China. Denby replied "flatly and firmly that my Government would in no wise intervene in the war, nor interfere in any way between the two nations" and if Li really desired peace he should immediately accept Japan's terms. The able Chinese diplomat received more favorable responses from certain European representatives, particularly the French and Russian ministers in Peking and thus laid the groundwork for the later tripartite intervention. When Denby reported Li's machination to Washington, he indicated that the Viceroy had received no assurances from the Europeans.²⁸

If Li had wrung any commitments from other powers, he certainly did not tell Denby. Yet he persistently requested American aid. Denby, in contrast to his earlier attitude, just as vehemently refused to compromise American neutrality. He drew the elder statesman aside "as an old friend" and expressed his views "unofficially and personally." Denby intimated that European intervention would only lead to the

dismemberment of China and that China should cooperate instead with Japan as a fellow oriental power. He held out the prospect of China, Japan and the United States cooperating to build a progressive, modern and enlightened post-war East Asia without European interference. This great end could be accomplished only if China agreed to surrender to Japan.²⁹

Noting that Li would include the Americans Foster, Pethick and Dennison as legal advisers in his party, Denby wondered whether the United States might still benefit from this service. Throughout his dealings the minister had kept in mind the prospect of increased American investment in China. Now, as he prepared to travel to Japan, Li stopped once more to see Denby. The minister suggested that Li should achieve the power to reform China's railroads, mining enterprises, banks and other resources, leaving the guidance of such a program "in the hands of English speaking people." In frankness Denby admitted that neither he nor his government could officially arrange for Americans to participate in these reforms, but he hoped that he was sowing seeds for future events.³⁰

Accompanied by over 150 officials and attendants, travelling in two steamers, Li expected to impress the Japanese with the size and splendor of his retinue. An American missionary in Japan commented, "If he had taken his grip in hand and set out alone in a canoe, he would have made quite as strong an impression, as the Japanese are not likely to be overawed by anything a Chinaman can now get up in the way of display, and he would have more money left toward paying the indemnity that Japan will exact." In any event, on March 20, 1895, Li and his

troupe arrived at Shimonoseki, the site selected by the Japanese for the conference which would open on the following day.³¹

Though American interest in foreign policy had for some weeks been distracted by troubles with the British in Nicaragua and in Venezuela, news of the impending peace conference drew public attention back to Asia. The New York World competed with rivals to scoop the conference, assigning former Tokyo Times editor Edward Howard House to cover the great event. The World praised House for his cable on the peace preliminaries which made the daily "a day ahead of everybody." Other newspapers discussed the preliminary terms, focusing on several major issues--China's apparent peace "trickery," Japan's terms and motives and the disquieting interest of the European powers in the peace negotiations. Though critical of China's alleged duplicity in delaying the negotiations, press comment in the United States seemed far more concerned with the possibility of European intervention. Many believed that Russia, portrayed as the villain of the East, would cause the most trouble. If Russia blocked Japan's legitimate aims, the New York Tribune threatened, Japan "would have the moral sympathy of the world, and perhaps the physical aid of some rival of the Czar." Then, on March 26, Americans read that Li Hung-chang had been shot.³²

C H A P T E R X

JAPANESE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP

On March 24, 1895, Li Hung-chang was being carried in his open sedan chair along the narrow streets of Shimonoseki. A young Japanese fanatic, dressed as a laboring man, rushed from the crowd and fired a pistol point blank at the face of the Chinese Viceroy. The bullet entered just below Li's left eye and lodged deeply in his cheek bone. The elder statesman was rushed to his residence where foreign surgeons examined him. One surgeon expressed grave concern for the Viceroy's life and observers, expecting the worst, awaited further news. Gresham informed Yang Yu["] that the President of the United States "has heard with profound regret of this most deplorable occurrence and earnestly hopes that the distinguished sufferer may speedily recover from the effects of his wound." American newspapers, at last sympathizing with Li, carried the story under prominent headlines.¹

Several days earlier, when Li Hung-chang and his peace commission had arrived at Shimonoseki, the Japanese had imposed tight security precautions around Chinese quarters and along the route to the conferences. Yet thousands of curious Japanese jammed the roadside in hope of seeing the enemy leader. For several days the Chinese travelled back and forth without incident. On the first day the Japanese accepted the Viceroy's credentials, yet rejected his request for an immediate armistice. Viscount Ito and Foreign Minister Nutsu, the

Japanese peace plenipotentiaries, indicated they might consider an armistice if China first agreed to surrender Shanhaikwan, the Taku Forts, Tientsin and all war munitions, as well as paying the expenses of the peace negotiations. The Yamen asked Denby's opinion of the armistice terms and the American minister offered some "unofficial advice." He, in effect, urged China's complete surrender. "I said this was severe but if they thought China could not defend these places they should accept." This time, perhaps at last disenchanted with American impartiality, the Chinese government ignored Denby's advice. It resisted Japan's demands and ordered Li to refuse the armistice terms which would have rendered Peking utterly defenseless. Li Hung-chang was returning from this third session, where he had rejected the armistice proposals, when the attempt on his life was made.²

Colonel Foster, Li's chief legal adviser, arrived at the wounded envoy's apartment as the surgeons probed for the embedded bullet. Li grasped the American's hand and asked him to return in the evening. That evening a much-strengthened Viceroy held a private conversation with Foster. He told the former Secretary of State that Denby had assured him that there "would not be the slightest danger" of assassination in Japan. Li had lost confidence in Denby and perhaps in the American government. Now he began to rely more heavily on Foster, thus practically ending official American good offices. Foster remained constantly beside the Viceroy, calming his anger at Japan for the attack. He claimed later that his presence and advice had prevented the perpetration of "some grave indiscretion" by the Chinese peace commission.

In fact he promised Li that the attack "would turn out for the benefit of China, as Japan would be less exacting in its terms."³

Foster asserted that Li's wound "was the most effective shedding of blood on the Chinese side during the entire war, as it brought to him the sympathy of the whole world, and made the Japanese plenipotentiaries more considerate of him, if not less exacting in the terms of peace." There was some agreement. One American missionary in Japan feared that "a defeat in a great battle would have been preferable" to this blow to Japan's prestige and bargaining position. Others echoed the belief that the assassination attempt would have a profound effect on the peace negotiations. "This is an almost unheard of event in the history of modern peace conclaves," the Journal of the Knights of Labor reflected. One American newspaper suggested that Li would take advantage of the incident to win more favorable terms from the Japanese. "He will probably be able to secure better terms than would have been possible prior to the attack made upon him" Some even suggested that Li would break off negotiations if the Japanese failed to grant a suitable concession to China as a result of this grievous act.⁴

The Japanese government declared an unconditional armistice on March 30, 1895. This armistice, lasting until April 20, 1895, met China's initial terms for a continuation of the peace talks and probably would not have been granted except for the embarrassment caused by the attempt on Li's life. Yet the cessation of hostilities occurred only in the northern war zone since the armistice ignored military activities which continued around Formosa. In fact, the Japanese pressed forward

in Formosa and the island eventually fell after a short-lived declaration of independence and pleas for French and British protection. As one American observer noted, "It is now generally believed that Japan will demand the possession of Formosa as part of the war indemnity; but, anticipating probable objections by foreign powers, the Japanese authorities no doubt thought it wiser to capture the island in advance, so as to have the advantage which actual possession always gives."⁵

The assassination attempt also propelled Li's two American legal advisers into the main current of peace negotiations. When Li Ching-fong, Li Hung-chang's son, was appointed an additional peace plenipotentiary to assist his wounded father, the young man's tutor and intimate adviser Charles Pethick accompanied the new envoy in his conversations with the Japanese. According to Foster, this "cultivated and intelligent American . . . proved a valuable member of the Peace Embassy" since the younger Li heavily relied on his guidance. In addition, Viceroy Li, directing peace negotiations from his bed, now employed Foster almost exclusively as his representative.⁶

John Watson Foster, seasoned diplomat and expert on international law, Li later recalled, was "a great national friend" of China. "I do not hesitate to say that but for Foster the case might have gone more heavily against us, though he was by no means one-sided in his--on several points in the dispute actually taking the view of the Japanese." Foster apparently had a certain amount of influence with both China and Japan, although he may have magnified it himself. American missionaries claimed that when the former Secretary of State had arrived in Japan

several months earlier, he had been influential enough to persuade the Japanese government to curb anti-missionary writing by patriotic Japanese intellectuals. In any event, with Li confined to his bed and the armistice opening up the peace talks, Foster acted as Li Hung-chang's spokesman.⁷

On April 1, the Japanese submitted their terms--the independence of Korea, the cession of the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula and of Formosa, an indemnity of three hundred million taels and important trade concessions. When these terms reached Li's bedside, he was despondent. But Foster assured the Viceroy that the terms were not final. "I insisted to him that the case was by no means hopeless, that a good answer could be made to several of the demands, and that I believed we could force the Japanese, out of their own sense of justice and their regard for the good opinion of the Chinese nation, to make important modifications." Back in Peking the Yamen asked Denby's opinion of the terms. But the minister, realizing that he had lost the Yamen's confidence, refused to comment on them, even unofficially, despite hints that England or Russia might intervene to prevent the imposition of these terms.⁸

Foster examined the treaty stipulations and suggested answers for each. According to Foster, the Viceroy accepted these as the basis for all further Chinese responses to Japanese demands. The Foster memorandum stated that Japan, contrary to accepted practices of international law, demanded territory it had never actually occupied. Furthermore, Foster documented the irresponsibility of Japan's indemnity claims and commercial demands, indicating that excessive burdens on the

Chinese government would create instability in Asia dangerous even to Japan. Li's adviser believed his memorandum influenced the final Japanese decisions to relinquish some territory, as well as to revise the indemnity and commerce claims--although it is more probable that later pressure of European intervention played the key role in bringing modification of the Japanese treaty terms.⁹

The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed April 17, 1895. Edwin Dun--unlike Denby, Read or Jernigan--usually had avoided the long, editorial type of dispatch, but this time he warned:

Thus has ended one of the most remarkable wars of the nineteenth century. It came upon the world as a surprise and its results have startled and bewildered all but the very few who have closely observed and studied the conditions existing in the East. With the signing of the treaty of peace at Shimonoseki the first chapter only of the history of the era in the East begun with war has been closed. The changed conditions to ensue will be far reaching, not only upon China and Japan, but upon the entire world as well.¹⁰

The details of the treaty reached Washington on April 25th. Despite Foster's previous hopes, the treaty met all of Japan's earlier demands--the independence of Korea; the cession of territory on the Liaotung Peninsula; the surrender of Formosa and the Pescadores; an indemnity of two hundred million taels (Mutsu had always considered the indemnity negotiable), payable fifty million in six months and a like amount every twelve months thereafter at five percent interest annually; and the opening of treaty ports to foreign manufacturing and the importation of foreign machinery. Denby noted that Japan had already ratified the treaty and now awaited China's final response. Perhaps concerned that his earlier advices had contributed to China's acceptance

of a punitive and severe treaty, Denby sent a brooding dispatch to Gresham. He believed that the treaty terms were extremely harsh and China was very unlucky, adding that Li's weakened condition prevented his resistance for better terms and that the armistice, contrary to popular belief, actually helped Japan capture Formosa. "The cession of territory is appalling," and it "makes Japan a continental power." This bothered the minister mainly because Japanese "aggrandizement" on the continent might upset the status quo and provide the European powers with an excuse for intervention in Asia.¹¹

While Denby revealed his forebodings to Gresham, the European powers were already planning to intervene. German Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Max von Brandt, a former minister to China who had continued to communicate with Li Hung-chang; and Count Cassini, the Russian minister in Peking, coordinated efforts to create a multi-lateral European response to Japanese seizure of continental territory. Though rebuffed by Great Britain, von Brandt and Cassini gained the cooperation of France in a tripartite understanding designed to check Japanese ambitions on the Asian continent. On April 17, immediately after the signature of the peace treaty, Russia requested the support of Berlin and Paris in a "friendly demarche," advising Japan to refrain from occupying any mainland territory. Ministers of the three powers delivered their advice "verbally and confidentially" to the Japanese Foreign Office on April 23, insisting that Japanese occupation of the Liaotung Peninsula rendered the independence of Korea "illusory," and

would "constantly disturb the peace of the East." The Russian representative hinted that if Japan refused the three might use their sea power to isolate the Japanese armies in China.¹²

The tripartite intervention evoked little surprise in the United States. Throughout the war, Americans had predicted European intervention. In fact, along with discussions of China's barbarism and Japan's civilization, European intervention had persisted as one of the more popular themes concerning the war in the United States. "Will Europe Try to Save China?" a Springfield Republican leader inquired in December of 1894, and there had been attempts to learn the answer by studying the European press. For example, the European edition of the New York Herald published comments from Europe alluding to possible intervention. One of these, from the English Morning Post, explained that it was "impossible to allow Japan to dictate terms to China without consulting the European powers," because "for the sake of the world's peace . . . Russia, Germany, France and Great Britain must intervene."¹³

The American press concentrated its resentment on Russia, often said to be coveting an ice-free port in Korea as a terminus for her great Siberian railroad. "Russia is the one power that wants the earth," and having got a vast area of it, she must also have the sea." The Russians seemed to have been responsible for the entire Korean crisis, "egging on" Japan and deftly mixing in peninsular politics. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle warned that Russia "has got a foothold on Korean soil. The time will come when she will claim it all; and whether Korea retains her independence or comes under Chinese rule, Russia's claim will be conceded."¹⁴

Despite current American opposition to British policies in Venezuela and Nicaragua, Russia rather than England continued to be the main object of American criticism. In March, Denby wrote Gresham to keep his eye on Russia as the power most likely to disturb the future peace in the East. He indicated that Great Britain and now Japan, as satisfied countries in Asia, would cooperate with the United States to preserve the status quo in that area. Sill also warned the State Department of Russian ambitions. He revealed that the King of Korea believed Russia would assist him in ousting the Japanese conquerors from his territory.¹⁵

Reports reached the United States that Russia had strengthened its navy in Japanese waters and would block Japan's fulfillment of her treaty gains. In addition, Russia had instigated the "curious new triple alliance" of Germany, France and Russia, formed to deprive Japan of its "legitimate" gains. After Japan had completed the "noble" work of defeating barbaric China, the New York Tribune surmised, "these three great, chivalric, Christian Powers come prowling around the scene of strife licking their hungry chops, and whining and snarling for a few mouthfuls of prey." Russian behavior toward Japan was "something not only outrageously unjust but so unparalleled in the history of all the past that one wonders not so much that the other nations look on in silence as that such Powers as Germany and France should abet such gross selfishness," the Commercial and Financial Chronicle added. It was only because "they each want an opportunity to steal some of the territory of China without just cause," the Chronicle continued, that Europeans would intervene. Japan had won the victory without outside assistance

and was entitled to the fruits of its triumph. Japan had not exacted more than its fair share of the spoils of war and had "kept well within bounds of international law and practice."¹⁶

Some editorials suggested that while Japan was justified in taking the Liaotung Peninsula to preserve the "integrity of Korea," it was also blocking Russia's quest for a warm water port on the Pacific. The Indianapolis News admitted that Russia, as an Asian power, had "some reasonable ground for her proposed interference." The New Orleans Picayune warned Russia, however, that Japan would be much harder to discipline than Turkey had been in 1876. The Staunton Weekly News promised that many Americans would sympathize with Japan if it fought Russia, because, "of the two, Japan is the more civilized, the more progressive, the more modern in her form of government . . . and, we make bold to say, the more Christianized." It would be a "world-wide misfortune" if Russia blocked the natural development of Japanese power and progress. "There is, in fact, no good reason why Japan should not be allowed to make such terms with China as she deems proper, without interference, and the people of the United States will rejoice to see the Japanese come off victorious in the diplomatic fencing now in progress with the continental powers of Europe."¹⁷

Rumors persisted that the United States might extend more than sympathy to Japan by cooperating with a possible Sino-Japanese defensive and offensive alliance constructed to resist "aggressions on the part of Europe." As the New Orleans Picayune predicted, "An alliance which would combine the military capacity and progressiveness of Japan with the vast resources of China would present a very formidable barrier

to the ambitions of Europe, and would make Japanese domination in the Orient complete and paramount." With the tripartite intervention, some speculated that England and even the United States might join with Japan in alliance systems to balance Russia, Germany and France in the Far East. The London correspondent of the New York Times reported that England and the United States may have an understanding to support Japan in its current crisis with the European powers, although he revealed "it is impossible to hint at the sources of this information." The Springfield Republican asked, "Have we a finger in the pie?" and added that the United States should not become entangled even as "a silent partner in the alliance." But the Picayune insisted that, while the United States must avoid entangling alliances, it should realize that a policy of isolation might be obsolete. Our interests in the East were greater than those of any other country, according to this argument, and appeared identical to those of Great Britain and Japan.¹⁸

Some disagreed that the United States should cooperate with Japan and Great Britain and instead advocated the exploitation of Japan's involvement with the tripartite powers to the advantage of the United States. This view was based on speculations that a victorious Japan would now covet the Hawaiian islands, the annexation of which the Cleveland administration had rejected. The Providence Journal noted that the Japanese had the largest male population on the islands and that during the war these Japanese had daily drilled as militia. "With the Chinese war ended, the Mikado and his advisers may well turn their attention more seriously to other fields of conquest," and at the

present time the United States would be no match for Japanese expansion into the Pacific. Concurrently, the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette predicted that Japan would soon "swoop down on the islands . . . and place them in subjection to what is called the light of Asia." The Springfield Republican revealed that it would be easy for a force of one thousand Japanese regulars to combine with the indigenous Japanese population of 20,000 and seize the island republic for Japan. Thus, the United States should use Japan's problems with Europe to secure assurances from Japan that it will leave Hawaii alone. "If we had an Administration thoroughly American," the New York Tribune concluded, and "if there were at Washington a statesman of sufficient breadth and earnest patriotism to care for American interest in every emergency, there can be no doubt that important advantages could be secured at this juncture which Japan would most readily concede."¹⁹

Americans in Asia also discussed the tripartite intervention and its impact on Oriental politics. Consul-General Jernigan indicated that the foreign community in China was obsessed by the possibility of a world war over the peace terms. "It is evident that Japan intends to dispute the ascendancy of European nations for the commerce of Asia and that European nations will not yield without a struggle, it may be a struggle of force." Jernigan observed that Russia would forcibly oppose the cession of any part of Manchuria, "having in view that less is to be apprehended from the Chinese as neighbors than from the more warlike and restless Japanese." He predicted that Great Britain then might oppose Russian policy by force, while France, Germany and perhaps Spain, might suddenly discover the acquisition of Chinese bases

essential to their national interests. "A great problem now confronts Europe and Asia," the consul-general warned the State Department. "Its solution may be in blood, or the agency of higher civilization may be invoked to solve it in the interest of peace."²⁰

Meanwhile, both Lafcadio Hearn in Japan and Sheridan P. Read in Chefoo observed the deployment of Russian ships. "The heavy Russian battleships were stripped for fighting," Hearn recorded. Consul Read, arriving in Chefoo shortly before the ratification conference, watched the crews of Russian warships camouflage their ironclads. He counted nine men-of-war, three torpedo boats and a merchantman loaded with munitions assembled in the harbor directly in front of the Japanese waterfront residences. "Russia's movements are being keenly watched as it is thought likely by all that she will declare war against Japan in the event that Japan refuses to comply with Russia's demands for a modification of certain terms in the Treaty of Peace."²¹

On the other hand, Peking legation secretary F. D. Cheshire believed that Russian action was "merely a bluff" and that the idea of French and German participation was ridiculous. But American Board missionary William Scott Ament hoped Russia would fight Japan. He believed that the tripartite intervention quite righteously had rescued China from Japanese domination. Japan should not complain "if the privilege of a highway robber is denied her." Horace N. Allen, noting that the Japanese were controlling everything in Korea and remembering his days of influence with the Korean king, expressed excitement at the prospect of observing "the chip knocked off the shoulder of the cheeky little Jap" Allen's friend in the State Department,

William W. Rockhill, agreed. "Like you I dislike to see the Japs so belauded for a parade campaign," a friend wrote Rockhill. "Perhaps their vanity, which is stupendous will drag them on to complications with a European power--I don't care what one--and if it does I shall rejoice."²²

The tripartite intervention delighted the Chinese. Denby reported on May 1st that China had requested a delay in ratification of the peace treaty for at least another ten days to permit the three powers to discuss the issues with Japan. Denby in Peking and Jernigan in Shanghai both reported that China hoped for European armed intervention to prevent the imposition of Japan's terms. "This action makes continuation of war probable," Denby informed Gresham.²³

In the meantime, John W. Foster had learned that the Russian minister, Count Cassini, supported by French and German representatives in Peking, had exerted his influence in the Imperial Court to prevent the Emperor's ratification of the treaty. Foster, on the other hand, urged Li Hung-chang to journey to the capital and defend the treaty before the Imperial Cabinet. But Li insisted that his many enemies were too strong in Peking and begged the American to undertake the mission himself. After some hesitation, the former Secretary of State agreed and left for the Chinese Imperial city.²⁴

Once in Peking, Foster accepted advice from the Viceroy's agents and discarded Li's interpreter in favor of an interpreter "cheerfully" supplied by Denby and the American legation. Also, he made his

headquarters in the American compound. Therefore, when he travelled to his interview with the Cabinet (the "ten most influential men of the Empire"), his mission appeared to be officially sanctioned by the United States rather than by Li Hung-chang. Supported now by Denby, who had changed his mind several times on the subject of treaty terms, Foster argued for ratification in front of the Cabinet, reminding China's mandarins that the treaty was no longer Li's but the Emperor's, because Li had been sent under Imperial rescript. The Emperor's advisers listened carefully and may have been influenced by Foster's arguments since they urged their monarch to sign the treaty.²⁵

Japanese policy also contributed to China's decision. Cognizant that continued Chinese procrastination would strengthen the tripartite position, Japan refused the request for a ten day delay in ratifications. On May 4 Denby recorded that Japan demanded immediate compliance with the treaty terms. Several days later Dun reported that Japan "knew of no reason to delay ratification." Japan could take this hard line with China because it had reached an understanding with the tripartite powers. Still insisting on undelayed exchange of ratifications of the original treaty, Japan indicated that it would "immediately afterwards renounce definitive possession of all the Liaotung Peninsula, with the exception of Port Arthur and Taliénwan, provided the indemnity was increased to compensate Japan for territory relinquished."²⁶

American Board missionary Devello Sheffield praised Japan's "self-restraint" in not forcing warfare on Asia by defying tripartite suggestions. Thomas Jernigan described the relief in Asia over Japan's submission: "It is the opinion of the more thoughtful and circumspect

here that Japan made the better bargain in accepting the additional indemnity, and leaving European nations the disputants over the Manchurian territory." Equipped with Japan's assurance and increasingly divided over the purpose of the three power arrangement, the ministers of Russia, France and Germany instructed China to exchange ratifications of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. This China did at Chefoo on May 8, 1895, thus bringing to an end nine months of war.²⁷

No other western power had been as intimately involved in peace preliminaries and in the final treaty as had the United States. American diplomatic representatives, empowered by their government to offer good offices, had served as intermediaries rather than mediators. Nevertheless, diplomats on the scene had enlarged upon their "messenger" role by acting as advisers. Apparently considering a strong Japan in Asia preferable to a feared European partition of China, Americans had taken Japan's side in the negotiations by consistently advising China to hasten the negotiations and to surrender to Japan's terms.

American support for Japanese treaty demands capped months of general admiration for Japan. Throughout the war the American press had praised Japan's progress, patriotism, industry, efficiency and spirit of aggressive competitiveness. At the same time, somehow, the Japanese had seemed to represent democracy, Christianity and humanitarianism in Asia. They were "just like Americans" and the true "Yankees of the Orient." Japanese propagandists had of course contributed to the partisan enthusiasm, an easy task under the circumstances.

China's wartime stereotype, on the other hand, had been repulsive. Reinforced by Social Darwinian rhetoric and sensational journalism, Americans criticized these backward, un-American people. The Chinese lacked patriotism, humanity and the drive for material progress. They were lazy, heathenish and unintelligent. Though awesome in sheer numbers, they could not stand up and fight a much smaller opponent. China represented superstition, stagnation, barbarism, evil and filth. Thus, a majority of Americans had felt that a victory for Japan would be a victory for all mankind.

Yet, the American government insisted that the United States remain strictly neutral in the Asian war and that Americans display an appropriate impartiality. Cleveland and Gresham believed that neutrality carried with it moral duties and responsibilities to foreign nationals, American missionaries and the combatants themselves. "Good offices" meant more than a diplomatic technicality; it was a solemn responsibility that had to be worked at diligently. The more responsibilities it undertook, the more vulnerable the United States became to the play of circumstances. The atrocity of a local warlord, the execution of a Japanese prisoner or any incident which could strain rules too strictly applied, all threatened to enmesh the United States in foreign complications. Ironically, the more intensely neutrality was applied, the more it compromised itself.

Diplomats in the field often believed that policies based upon principle did not meet the needs of Asian complexities. Washington's formulas, sometimes too rigid and sometimes too vague, made practical implementation a virtual impossibility. Yet, when ministers, consuls

and naval personnel acted on their own the results were usually further perversions of their government's neutral policy. Confusion and unplanned partisanship were damaging to American prestige and hurt the government's desire to increase its influence in East Asia. If Denby and others promoted Japanese interests in order to open Chinese markets for American commerce or to strengthen the American position in Asia, these hopes too proved illusory. The "mysterious East" had fully retained its mystery insofar as American diplomacy was concerned.

Unintentionally American policies during the Sino-Japanese War had obtained one valuable, if temporary, benefit--the gratitude of Japan. It was most satisfying to read statements such as that voiced by a Japanese translator at the Chefoo conference which praised the American response to the war. "American friendship to us has been consistent ever since its commencement, and our appreciation for same is daily increasing." The Emperor of Japan also sent his official thanks to Grover Cleveland for American policies during the war which had "served to draw still closer the bonds of friendship and good neighborhood which happily united our two countries." Reading such statements, Americans could well believe that their response to the Sino-Japanese War had been an important contribution to justice and progress in East Asia.

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

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² W. E. Griffis, "The Literary Phase of the Eastern War," The Literary World, XXV (August 25, 1894), 265; also see Margherita Arlin Hamm, "The Mongol Triad: Japan, Korea and China," Overland Monthly, XXV, 2nd series (February, 1895), 130.

³ New York Tribune, Dec. 31, 1894.

⁴ Horatio King to Grover Cleveland, July 23, 1894, Grover Cleveland Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Cleveland MSS).

⁵ Richard Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," in America in Crisis, ed. by Daniel Aaron (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), pp. 173-178.

⁶ Quoted in Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1966), p. 439.

⁷ George F. Parker, ed., The Writings and Speeches of Grover Cleveland (New York: Cassell Publishing Company, 1892), p. 35.

⁸ Montgomery Schuyler, "Walter Quintin Gresham," in The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, ed. by Samuel Flagg Bemis, VIII (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 267.

⁹ Walter Q. Gresham to Hon. John Overmeyer, July 25, 1894, Letterbook, Walter Quintin Gresham Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Gresham MSS).

¹⁰ Gresham's influence on Cleveland's Hawaiian policy in "Typescript of Walter Q. Gresham Mem. for Mr. Parker by L. T. Michener," Louis Theodore Michener Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

CHAPTER I. THE KOREAN CRISIS OF 1894

¹ Frank G. Carpenter, "Queer Old Corea," Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 5, 1894; "Crime in Corea," ibid., Sept. 5, 1895; "Corea's Squeezer," ibid., Sept. 2, 1894; gold mines discussed in Public Opinion, XVII (August 16, 1894), 468.

² Semi-savage Korea in Pacific Commercial Advertiser, July 17, 1894; New York Tribune, July 2, 1894 and Boston Globe, July 23, 1894; Hearst in San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 29, 1894. See also James Morton Callahan, American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East, 1784-1900, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol. XIX (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1901), pp. 112-113.

³ The one American firm was owned by James R. Morse of New York and W. D. Townsend of Boston, according to Carpenter in the Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 2, 1894.

⁴ For Allen's role see Fred Harvey Harrington, God, Mammon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1895-1905 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1944), pp. 141-156, 211-221; Marilyn Blatt Young, The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 14-18; J. Spencer Palmer, ed., Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, Vol. II (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), p. 1.

⁵ Harrington, Allen, pp. 126-139; Carpenter's view of Allen in Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 2, 1894.

⁶ The Japanese and American treaties with Korea are discussed in C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); also Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York: Macmillan, 1922), pp. 450ff.

⁷ The gradualist interpretation is presented in Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), pp. 232-235. For the argument that China's recognition of Japan's equal rights in Korea was a grave diplomatic blunder, making the Sino-Japanese War inevitable, see W. A. P. Martin, A Cycle of Cathay, or China, South and North with Personal Reminiscences (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 2nd ed., 1897),

p. 402. For the Tientsin Convention see Seiji G. Hishida, The International Position of Japan as a Great Power, Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. XXIV (New York: Columbia University Press, 1905, pp. 167-169; Arthur Judson Brown, The Mastery of the Far East (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919), pp. 120ff.

⁸ Reports of Japanese domestic problems in Dun to Gresham, Jan. 4, 1894, Feb. 19, 1894 and May 24, 1894, all in Despatches from United States Ministers to Japan, Vol. 66, Record Group 59, Department of State, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Japan, Despatches, NA, RG 59). For an evaluation of Japanese democracy in 1894, see George N. Curzon, Problems of the Far East: Japan-Korea-China (London: Longmans, Green, 1894), pp. 33-37.

⁹ Kim's murder in Dun to Gresham, April 20, 1894, Japan, Despatches, 66, NA, RG 59; North China Herald, LII, March 30, 1894, pp. 470, 488; also see Gozo Tateno to Gresham, April 5, 1894, Notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department of State, Vol. 5, NA, RG 59 (hereafter cited as Notes from Japan); Denby Jr. to Gresham, Sept. 27, 1894, Despatches from United States Ministers to China, Vol. 96, NA, RG 59 (hereafter China, Despatches). Allen tried to get the U.S. consul-general in Shanghai to hold Kim's murderer and was reprimanded by the State Department, Uhl to Sill, May 31, 1894, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Korea, Vol. 1, NA, RG 59 (hereafter cited as Korea, Instructions); also Harrington, Allen, pp. 254-255; Palmer, Korean Documents, II, pp. 323-325.

¹⁰ For a discussion of the Tonghaks see Kim, Korea, pp. 75-77; Palmer, Korean Documents, II, pp. 307-309. Tonghak motto in Nagao Ariga, "Diplomacy," in Japan by the Japanese: A Survey by Its Highest Authorities, ed. by Alfred Stead (London: William Heinemann, 1904), p. 203.

¹¹ H. B. Hulbert to Gilmore, April 29, 1894, William Elliot Griffis Collection, Rutgers University Library (hereafter cited as Griffis MSS).

¹² Martin, Cycle of Cathay, p. 403.

¹³ Sill to Gresham, June 1, 1894, Dispatches from United States Ministers to Korea, Vol. 11, NA, RG 59 (hereafter cited as Korea, Dispatches); view of Skerrett in Horace Allen to William W. Rockhill, July 3, 1894, William W. Rockhill Collection, Houghton Library, by permission of the Harvard College Library (hereafter cited as Rockhill MSS).

¹⁴ Ye Lung Loo to Gresham, June 1, 1894, Area 10 File, Record Group 45, Navy Department, National Archives (hereafter cited as Area 10 File, NA, RG 45).

¹⁵ Conversations with McAdoo and danger to missionaries in New York Tribune, June 2, 1894; Cleveland's view of missionaries in George F. Parker, Recollections of Grover Cleveland (New York: The Century Co., 1909), p. 384.

¹⁶ Read to Uhl, June 7, 1894, Despatches from United States Consuls in Tientsin, 1868-1906, Vol. 4, NA, RG 59 (hereafter cited as Consul, Tientsin); also Denby Jr. to Gresham, June 8, 1894, China, Despatches, NA, RG 59.

¹⁷ Tateno to Gresham, June 8, 1894 and Mutsu to Tateno, June 7, 1894, Notes from Japan, 5, NA, RG 59. For a study of Mutsu's policy motives see Lillian Ota Dotson, "The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95: A Study in Asian Power Politics" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1951), pp. 17-21.

¹⁸ Skerrett to Herbert, June 8, 1894 and copy of a letter Sill to Skerrett, June 8, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

¹⁹ New York Tribune, June 15, 1894.

²⁰ North China Herald, LII, June 15, 1894, p. 926.

²¹ Dun to Gresham, June 15, 1894, Japan, Despatches, 66, NA, RG 59.

²² Sill to Gresham, June 18, 1894, Korea, Dispatches, 11, NA, RG 59.

²³ Tateno to Uhl, June 23, 1894, Notes from Japan, 5, NA, RG 59.

²⁴ Uhl to Sill, June 22, 1894, Korea, Instructions, 1, NA, RG 59.

²⁵ U. S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894-5, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1895), p. ix (hereafter cited as FRUS).

²⁶ Copy of joint note in Sill to Gresham, June 25, 1894, Korea, Dispatches, 11, NA, RG 59 (the word "Caucasian" was edited out of the printed document in FRUS); Sill to Skerrett, June 25, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

²⁷ One of the more perceptive American observers of international politics in Asia during 1894-1895 was Consul Sheridan P. Read at Tientsin, see Read to Uhl, June 26 and 30, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59.

²⁸ Gresham to Dun, June 29, 1894, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Japan, Vol. 4, NA, RG 59 (hereafter cited as Japan, Instructions); New York Times, June 30, 1894.

29

Korean Minister to Gresham, July 5, 1894, Notes from the Korean Legation in the United States to the Department of State, Vol. 1, NA, RG 59 (hereafter cited as Notes from Korea); China's request in Read to Uhl, July 7, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, NA, RG 59.

30

Tateno's secretary kept complete notes of this conversation typescript of Tateno-Gresham talks, July 7, 1894, Notes from Japan, 5, NA, RG 59.

31

Gresham to Dun, July 7, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59; also forwarded to American ministers in Korea and China, Gresham to Sill, July 9, 1894, Korea, Instructions, 1, NA, RG 59 and Gresham to Denby Jr., July 9, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59.

32

For the argument that the American refusal to cooperate with Great Britain in Korea made war likely, see Philip Joseph, Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1894-1900 (London: George, Allen & Unwin, 1928), p. 71.

33

San Francisco Examiner, July 18, 1894; New York Tribune, July 19, 1894; Hartford Post, July 20, 1894; Emporia Gazette, July 19, 1894.

34

Philadelphia Inquirer quoted in New York Tribune, July 20, 1894; Springfield Republican, July 20, 1894; Boston Globe, July 20, 1894.

35

Sill to Dun, July 19, 1894 and Sill to Gresham, July 24, 1894, Korea, Dispatches, 11, NA, RG 59; copy of note filed under date of July 17, 1894, Cleveland MSS.

36

Sill to Day, July 23, 1894 and Day to Sill, July 20, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; strict neutrality in Sill to Gresham, July 24 and 26, 1894, Korea, Dispatches, 11, NA, RG 59.

37

G. F. Elliott, "Marines in Seoul, Korea," Annual Report of the Secretary of the U. S. Navy, 1895 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1895), pp. 523-529. Also see Deck Log Book of the USS Baltimore, Record Group 24, Navy Department, National Archives; Day to Sill, July 24, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

38

Sill to Day, August 1, 1894 and Day to Sill, Aug. 3, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

CHAPTER II. THE UNDECLARED WAR

¹ New York Tribune, July 15, 1894.

² Denby to Gresham, Mar. 16, 1894, China, Despatches, 94, NA, RG 59.

³ Gresham to Bayard, July 22, 1894, Letterbook, Gresham MSS. Biographical material on Denby in Richmond State, Aug. 9, 1894; Charles Denby, China and Her People: Being the Observations, Reminiscences, and Conclusions of an American Diplomat, Vol. I (Boston: L. C. Page & Company, 1906, reprinted by Ch'eng-wen Publishing Company of Taipei, 1968), p. ix; John William Cassey, "The Mission of Charles Denby and International Rivalries in the Far East, 1885-1908 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1959).

⁴ For criticism of Denby Jr. see Cheshire to Rockhill, June 16, 1894 and Nov. 14, 1894, Rockhill MSS; also Gresham to D. Howard, Nov. 26, 1894, Letterbook, Gresham MSS; callow youth in Springfield Republican, Sept. 6, 1894.

⁵ Read to Uhl, July 22, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59; Jernigan to Uhl, July 23, 1894, Consul, Shanghai, 42, NA, RG 59; Sill to Gresham, July 26, 1894, Korea, Dispatches, 11, NA, RG 59; Denby Jr. to Gresham, July 27, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

⁶ Sill to Day, July 28, 1894, Day to Herbert, July 28, 1894 and Elliott to Day, July 28, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

⁷ Denby to Gresham, July 31, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59; Gresham to Denby, Aug. 3, 1894, Letterbook, Gresham MSS. See also New York Tribune, July 3, Aug. 1 and 2, 1894; Atlanta Constitution, July 31, 1894.

⁸ Purchase of arms in New Haven reported in Chicago Tribune, July 27, 1894; purchased in Hartford in Springfield Republican, July 27, 1894; New England arms sales in Boston Globe, July 31, 1894; war supplies in San Francisco in Atlanta Constitution, July 31, 1894.

⁹ Yang Yu to Gresham, July 30, 1894, Notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department of State, Vol. 3, NA, RG 59 (hereafter cited as Notes from China). Violations of freedom of the seas in Denby Jr. to Gresham, July 24, 1894, Tsungli Yamen to Denby Jr., July 28, 1894 and Denby Jr. to Gresham, July 30, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59. The protection of belligerents under good offices examined in detail in Chapter IV.

¹⁰ New Orleans Picayune, July 31, 1894; anti-missionary threats in Boston Globe, July 31, 1894; see also Read to Uhl, July 28, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59.

¹¹ Missionary women in Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 1, 1894; Gresham's view of women in Matilda Gresham, Life of Walter Quintin Gresham, 1832-1895, Vol. II (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1919), p. 741; Cleveland's view in Parker, ed., Writings, p. 355.

¹² Gresham to Denby Jr., July 26, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; also Gresham to Dun, July 26, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59.

¹³ Gresham to Yang Yü, July 31, 1894, Notes to Foreign Legations in the United States from the Department of State, 1834-1906: China, Vol. 1, NA, RG 59 (hereafter cited as Notes to China); Gresham to Denby, Aug. 3, 1894, Letterbook, Gresham MSS; also Gresham to Dun, July 29, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59.

¹⁴ Geography in Boston Globe, July 27 and 28, 1894; for examples of illustrations and cartoons see Chicago Tribune, July 26 and 29, 1894; Atlanta Constitution, July 29, 1894.

¹⁵ San Francisco Examiner, July 29, 1894; New Orleans Picayune, July 28, 1894; New York Times, July 28, 1894; New York Herald quoted in Public Opinion, XVII (August 2, 1894), 417.

¹⁶ San Francisco Examiner, July 22 and 24, 1894; Chicago Tribune, July 24 and 26, 1894; Chicago Inter-Ocean, July 24, 1894; also see midwestern view reported in Boston Globe, July 26, 1894.

¹⁷ Atlanta Constitution, July 24 and 26, 1894; Boston Globe, July 25, 27 and 29, 1894; New York Tribune, July 25, 1894.

¹⁸ New York Tribune, July 29, 1894; St. Paul Pioneer Press quoted in Public Opinion, XVII (August 2, 1894), 417; Lafcadio Hearn, Kokoro: Hints and Echoes of Japanese Inner Life (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1899), p. 9.

¹⁹ Helen H. Gardener, "Japan: Our Little Neighbor in the East," Arena, XI (January, 1895), 178; New York Tribune, July 29, 1894.

²⁰ B. O. Flower, "Justice for Japan," Arena, X (July, 1894), 225-236.

²¹ Brigades and \$10,000 in San Francisco Examiner, July 26, 1894; Atlanta Constitution, July 27, 1894; and New York Tribune, July 27, 1894; Japanese in Boston in Boston Globe, July 27, 1894; in New York see New York Tribune, July 25, 1894; anti-Chinese agitation in San Francisco Examiner, July 29, 1894.

²² Julian Ralph, Alone in China and Other Stories (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1897), pp. 19-20.

²³ Atlanta Constitution, July 28, 1894; New Orleans Picayune, June 28, 1894; Chicago Tribune, July 23, 1894.

²⁴ Boston Globe, July 21, 1894.

²⁵ Julian Ralph, The Making of a Journalist (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1903), p. 102; Frank G. Carpenter, "The Army of China," Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 26, 1894.

²⁶ Springfield Republican, July 30, 1894; New York Times, Aug. 1, 1894; Commercial and Financial Chronicle, LIX (August 4, 1894), 173; similar predictions in Brown, Mastery, p. 122.

²⁷ Ralph, Alone, p. 22. Other observations in Denby, China, II, p. 15; and Brown, Mastery, p. 123.

²⁸ Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 1887, p. 725 quoted from John W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1903), p. 342.

²⁹ Discussion of Japanese army in Atlanta Constitution, July 29, 1894.

³⁰ For armor plate and projectiles discussion see Power to Gen. Flager, Chief of Ordnance, Aug. 29, 1894, Daniel S. Lamont Papers, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as Lamont MSS). A full view of the navies and individual ships can be found in Chapter V; for Annapolis graduates see New York Tribune, Aug. 3, 1894.

³¹ Reports of the sinking of the Kowshing were taken from an eyewitness account by German mercenary Constantin von Hanneken, who was on board the transport when it was attacked, Sill to Gresham, Aug. 3, 1894, Korea, Dispatches, 11; Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 13, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

³² New York Tribune, Aug. 1, 1894; Boston Globe, Aug. 2, 1894; other headlines in Atlanta Constitution, July 29 and 31, 1894; Staunton Weekly News, Aug. 2, 1894; Boston Journal quoted in New York Tribune, Aug. 2, 1894; government intelligence in Denby Jr. to Gresham, July 28, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

³³ Philadelphia Record quoted in Public Opinion, XVII (Aug. 16, 1894), 468.

³⁴ Springfield Republican, Aug. 2, 1894.

³⁵ Hearn to Chamberlain, June 8, 1894, Lafcadio Hearn Collection, Clifton Waller Barrett Library, University of Virginia Library (hereafter cited as Hearn MSS).

³⁶ Chicago Tribune, July 28, 1894.

³⁷ Japan's lengthy statement in Atlanta Constitution, July 29, 1894; Japanese consular comment in Chicago Tribune, July 30, 1894; New York Tribune, Aug. 1 and 3, 1894.

³⁸ New York Tribune, Aug. 5, 1894.

³⁹ Denby Jr. to Gresham, July 28, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

CHAPTER III. UNEASY NEUTRALITY

¹ Miyaoka to Gresham, Aug. 1, 2 and 4, 1894, Notes from Japan, 5, NA, RG 59; for a translation of the Japanese declaration of war see Stead, ed., Japan by the Japanese, p. 10.

² China's official justification in Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 4, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59; Chang Yen Hoon to Bayard, Aug. 12, 1894, Thomas Francis Bayard Papers, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as Bayard MSS).

³ List of cable companies found in New York Tribune, Aug. 1, 1894; for conditions of communications in Asia see Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 28, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59; London dispatches discussed in Philadelphia Times quoted in New York Tribune, Aug. 4, 1894.

⁴ Study of American neutrality laws in John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. VII (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), pp. 859-1109; contemporary views of neutrality in Boston Globe, Aug. 1, 1894; New York Tribune, Aug. 7, 1894.

⁵ Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Aug. 20, 1894.

⁶ San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 4, 1894.

⁷ For example see McIvor to Uhl, Aug. 13, 1894, Consul, Kanagawa, NA, RG 59.

⁸ Commercial and Financial Chronicle, LIX (Aug. 6, 1894); Richmond State, Aug. 7, 1894; New York Tribune, Sept. 6, 1894.

- ⁹ United Mine Workers' Journal, Aug. 2, 1894.
- ¹⁰ Journal of the Knights of Labor, Aug. 9, 1894.
- ¹¹ Ibid., Aug. 2, 1894.
- ¹² Staunton Weekly News, Aug. 9, 1894; Boston Globe, Aug. 13, 1894; Advocate of Peace, LVI (September, 1894), p. 206.
- ¹³ Goods departing San Francisco in San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 6 and 9, 1894; pig lead in Springfield Republican, Oct. 6, 1894; New York Herald, Oct. 6, 1894; Armour in New York Tribune, Aug. 3, 1894; Hartley in New York Tribune, Aug. 5, 1894; Esmeralda and Minneapolis in New York Tribune, Dec. 2 and 21, 1894; marine insurance in New York Tribune, Aug. 28, 1894.
- ¹⁴ Gunrunners in James Allan, Under the Dragon Flag: My Experiences in the Chino-Japanese War (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1898); Smith and Cass case in Morse to Hart, Aug. 6, 1894 and Oct. 26, 1894, Morse Collection, Houghton Library, by permission of Harvard College Library (hereafter cited as Morse MSS); Denby Jr. to Gresham, Sept. 8, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59; Japanese circular in New York Tribune, Sept. 24, 1894; Japanese Loyal Legion in Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 6, 1894; New York Tribune, Aug. 3, 4 and 6, 1894; Richmond State, Aug. 6, 1894; elite regiment in San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 16 and 17, 1894.
- ¹⁵ Nowacki in San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 8, 1894; Altoona banker in New York Tribune, Aug. 27, 1894.
- ¹⁶ For Turpin see Chicago Tribune, July 8, 1894; for Clarke see Atlanta Constitution, Oct. 6, 1894. Wilde's infernal machine consisted of chemical-filled containers sown by torpedo boats around an enemy fleet allegedly creating smoke or explosions, called "tidal-wave power" by Howie, Dun to Gresham, Dec. 7, 1894, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59.
- ¹⁷ Wilde to Tateno, July 3, 1894 enclosure in Dun to Gresham, Dec. 7, 1894, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59.
- ¹⁸ Aldrich to Chinese Minister, Aug. 27, 1894, ibid.
- ¹⁹ Cheshire to Rockhill, June 16, 1894, Rockhill MSS.
- ²⁰ Foster to Moore, Sept. 5, 1894, Brazilian Minister to Foster, Sept. 5, 1894, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59. There was some confusion whether Howie or Wilde or both were involved in the Brazilian Civil War. Months later Mrs. Foster adamantly denied that her husband knew anything about the plot or had ever heard of John Wilde, New York Tribune, Mar. 8, 1894.

²¹ Moore to Wilde, Sept. 13, 1894 and Wilde to Moore, Sept. 17, 1894, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59.

²² Wilde to Moore, Sept. 20, 1894, ibid.

²³ "Letter of Guarantee" and "Terms of Sale of Secret," ibid.
The letters, at times, fit too neatly together and appear as though the Japanese framed Wilde and Howie. Yet, Japan tried to maintain American friendship and almost immediately freed the two westerners. Thus it seemed unlikely that Japan would go to such great lengths to stir up controversy.

²⁴ New York Times, Nov. 9, 1894; Gresham to Dun, Nov. 8, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59; also for impact of Sydney affair in Japan see Atkinson to Barton, Nov. 5, 1894, American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions Collection, Japan Mission, Vol. 15, Houghton Library, by permission of the Harvard College Library (hereafter cited as Japan Mission, ABCFM).

²⁵ Gresham to Dun, Dec. 20, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59. Read reported that they were procuring turpentine, gasoline and explosives at Tientsin to be sent to Weihaiwei, Read to Uhl, Feb. 9, 1895, Consul, Tientsin, 5, NA, RG 59; Howie's capture reported in Carpenter to Herbert, Feb. 19, 1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

²⁶ Colt arms violation reported in San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 9, 1894; Korean relief project in New York Tribune, Aug. 14 and 18, 1894.

²⁷ Gresham to Dun, Aug. 30, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59.

²⁸ Merrill to Hart, Aug. 25, 1894, Merrill Transcript, Vol. III, pp. 34-35, Morse MSS.

²⁹ Pauncefote to Gresham, Aug. 7, 1894, Gresham MSS.

³⁰ New York Tribune, Aug. 5, 1894.

³¹ For example San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 22, 1894; New York Tribune, Aug. 6 and 15, 1894; New Orleans Picayune, Aug. 5, 1894.

³² Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 10, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59; Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 10, 1894, Denby Jr. to Jernigan, Aug. 9, 1894 and Jernigan to Denby Jr., Aug. 1, 1894, all in Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

³³ Gresham to Denby Jr., Aug. 15, 1894, Sept. 17, 1894 and Sept. 28, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59.

³⁴ Lack of naval resources in New Orleans Picayune, Aug. 8, 1894; Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 20, 1894.

³⁵ Springfield Republican, Aug. 10, 1894.

³⁶ Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 13, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

³⁷ Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 13, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 18, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

³⁸ Read to Uhl, Aug. 15, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

³⁹ Chicago Inter-Ocean, July 31, 1894.

⁴⁰ Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 1, 1894; New York Tribune, Aug. 2, 1894.

⁴¹ Meeting reported in Chicago Inter-Ocean, Aug. 2, 1894; Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 5, 1894; New York Tribune, Aug. 5 and 8, 1894; inquiries concerning safety of Rev. H. G. Underwood in Sill to Gresham, Sept. 26, 1894, Korea, Despatches, 11, NA, RG 59.

⁴² Gresham to Dun, Aug. 15, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59; bombarding in Staunton Weekly News, Aug. 30, 1894.

⁴³ Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 24, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59; also see Dugald Christie, Thirty Years in the Manchu Capital in and Around Moukden in Peace and War (New York: McBride, Nast, 1914), 87-89; New York Tribune, Aug. 25, 1894.

⁴⁴ Stanley to Daniels, Aug. 28, 1894, North China Mission, 21, ABCFM; Duryea Diary, Aug. 17, 1894, Grinnan Papers, University of Virginia Library (hereafter cited as Grinnan MSS).

⁴⁵ Noble to Smith, Aug. 21, 1894, North China Mission, 21, ABCFM; similar views found in Sheffield to Smith, Aug. 21, 1894, Vol. 21, Report of the P'ang Chuang Station, 1894-5, Vol. 15, Report of the Kalgan Station, 1894-5, Vol. 2, and Report of the Linching Station, Mar. 31, 1895, Vol. 15, all in North China Mission, ABCFM.

⁴⁶ Boston Globe, Aug. 1, 1894; also Chicago Inter-Ocean, July 29, 1894.

⁴⁷ Chicago Tribune, Aug. 1, 1894; Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 1, 1894; Newark Advertiser quoted in New York Tribune, Aug. 4, 1894; also see Boston Globe, Aug. 1, 1894.

⁴⁸ Luscher in New York Tribune, Aug. 2, 1894; Springfield Republican, Aug. 2, 1894; Journal of the Knights of Labor, Aug. 9, 1894.

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Philadelphia Press quoted in New York Tribune, Aug. 2, 1894; Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 8, 1894; Louisville Courier-Journal quoted in New York Tribune, Aug. 4, 1894; Richmond State, Aug. 15, 1894.

50

John Russell Young, "Li Hung Chang: A Character Sketch of the Premier of China," Review of Reviews, X (October, 1894), 386-395; also John Russell Young, Men and Memories, Personal Reminiscences (New York and London: F. Tennyson Neely, 1901), pp. 303-325; Read's evaluation of Li in Read to Uhl, Feb. 16, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59. Also see Stanley Spector, Li Hung-Chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth Century Regionalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), p. ix.

51

View of Li as Bismarck in New York Tribune, Aug. 6, 1894 and Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 4, 1894; as Gladstone in Boston Globe, Aug. 3, 1894; as most able man in China see Pittsburg Chronicle-Telegraph in New York Tribune, Aug. 6, 1894; malevolent Li in Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 10, 1894; as modernizer in New York Tribune, Aug. 15, 1894; as westernizer in Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Sept. 6, 1894; also Spector, Li Hung-Chang, p. 262.

52

Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 27, 1894; Boston Globe, Aug. 2, 1894; New York Tribune, Aug. 14, 1894; see also San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 30, 1894.

53

For example see San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 2 and 12, 1894; New York Tribune, Aug. 12, 1894.

54

Ambrose Bierce, "Prattle," San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 19, 1894.

55

Ralph to Lamont, Aug. 4 and 10, 1894, Lamont MSS.

56

Davis to Lamont, Aug. 22, 1894 and Davis to Mrs. Cleveland, Sept. 5(?), 1894, Cleveland MSS.

57

Gresham to Herbert, Aug. 21, 1894, Day to Carpenter, Aug. 29, 1894, Carpenter to Commander of the Concord, Aug. 1, 1894, all in Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; New York Tribune, Aug. 15, 1894.

58

Deck Log Books of the Steamer Petrel, Aug. 1, 1894 to Feb. 7, 1895, Steamer Concord, April 2, 1894 to Oct. 11, 1894, and USS Charleston, July 1, 1894 to Dec. 31, 1894, all in NA, RG 24.

59

Carpenter's biography in Boston Globe, April 3, 1899; New York Times, April 3, 1899.

60

Gresham to Denby, Aug. 21, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; Gresham to Denby, Aug. 25, 1894, Letterbook, Gresham MSS; Denby to Gresham, Aug. 21, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

CHAPTER IV. THE ORDEAL OF GOOD OFFICES

¹ Moore, International Law, VII, pp. 7-8.

² Dun to Gresham, June 29, 1894 and also June 30, 1894, Japan, Despatches, 66, NA, RG 59.

³ Gresham to Dun, June 30, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59.

⁴ Tsungli Yamen to Denby Jr., July 28, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

⁵ Uhl to Denby Jr., Sept. 14, 1894, countermanded Gresham to Denby, Dec. 20, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; young Denby's circular in Denby Jr. to U.S. Consular Officials in China, July 31, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

⁶ Komura to Denby Jr., Aug. 1, 1894 and Denby Jr. to Tsungli Yamen, Aug. 1, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

⁷ Read to Uhl, Aug. 2, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59; Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 14, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59. The so-called Chung King affair (after the name of the steamer) reported in Lynchburg Daily Advance, Nov. 8, 1894.

⁸ Jernigan to Uhl, Aug. 4, 1894, Consul, Shanghai, 42, NA, RG 59.

⁹ Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853-1895, II (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932, reprinted by Peter Smith, 1963), p. 474 inaccurately stated that "The Department files do not record a single instance in which the American officials had to intervene to protect Chinese subjects."

¹⁰ Gresham to Denby Jr., Sept. 18, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59.

¹¹ McIvor to Uhl, Aug. 6, 1894, Consul, Kanagawa, 20, NA, RG 59.

¹² Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 8, 1894, Tsungli Yamen to Denby Jr., Aug. 6, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

¹³ Jernigan to Uhl, Aug. 21, 1894, Consul, Shanghai, 42, NA, RG 59.

¹⁴ Tsungli Yamen to Chinese Minister (translation), Aug. 18,

1894, Notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department of State, Vol. 3, NA, RG 59 (hereafter cited as Notes from China); Gresham to Denby Jr., Aug. 18, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59.

¹⁵ Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 21, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

¹⁶ Yang Yu to Gresham, Aug. 22, 1894, Notes from China, 3, NA, RG 59; Gresham to Denby Jr., Aug. 23, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; also Gresham to Yang Yu, Aug. 25, 1894, Notes to Foreign Legations in the United States from the Department of State, 1834-1906: China, Vol. 1, NA, RG 59 (hereafter cited as Notes to China).

¹⁷ Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 26, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

¹⁸ Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 27, 1894, ibid.

¹⁹ Gresham to Denby Jr., Aug. 29, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; also Gresham to Dun, Aug. 29, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Denby Jr. to Gresham, Aug. 31, 1894, Gresham to Denby Jr., Aug. 31, 1894, China, Despatches, 95, NA, RG 59.

²² Denby Jr. to Gresham, Sept. 1, 1894, ibid.

²³ Jernigan to Uhl, Sept. 3, 1894, Consul, Shanghai, 42, NA, RG 59.

²⁴ Child to Uhl, Sept. 3, 1894, Consul, Hankow, 7, NA, RG 59; Jernigan to Uhl, Sept. 21, 1894, Consul, Shanghai, 42, NA, RG 59.

²⁵ Denby Jr. to Gresham, Sept. 5, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59.

²⁶ Rockhill to Hippisley, Oct. 30, 1894, Rockhill MSS.

²⁷ New Orleans Picayune, Sept. 7, 1894; also Staunton Weekly News, Sept. 6, 1894; New York Tribune, Sept. 5, 1894.

²⁸ Hippisley to Rockhill, Jan. 26, 1895, Rockhill MSS.

²⁹ Jernigan to Uhl, Sept. 21, 1894 and Oct. 22, 1894, Consul, Shanghai, 42, NA, RG 59.

³⁰ Gresham to Denby Jr., Oct. 20 and 30, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; Jernigan to Uhl, Oct. 9, 1894, also Oct. 22, 1894 and Nov. 2, 1894, Consul, Shanghai, 42, NA, RG 59.

³¹ Ralph, Journalist, pp. 129-130.

³² Henry Cabot Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, Vol. I (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), p. 140; see also George E. Paulsen, "Secretary Gresham, Senator Lodge, and American Good Offices in China, 1894," Pacific Historical Review, XXXVI (May, 1967), 123-142; Ralph, Journalist, p. 130; North China Herald, LIV, Feb. 22, 1895, p. 279.

³³ Congressional Record, 53 Cong., 3 sess., XXVII, Dec. 5, 1894, p. 39.

³⁴ Gresham to Morgan, Dec. 6, 1894 and Gresham to Sherman, Dec. 6, 1894, Gresham MSS.

³⁵ Congressional Record, 53 Cong., 3 sess., XXVII, Dec. 5, 1894, p. 39.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 41.

³⁷ Gresham to Denby, Dec. 26, 1894, Letterbook, Gresham MSS.

³⁸ Gresham to Yang Yu, Nov. 30, 1894 and Dec. 27, 1894, Notes to China, 1, NA, RG 59; Yang Yu to Gresham, Dec. 6, 1894 and Dec. 31, 1894, Notes from China, 3, NA, RG 59.

³⁹ Clipping from New York Evening Post, Dec. 3, 1894 signed "Justice to Gresham" with inked corrections presumably by Gresham, Letterbook, Gresham MSS; also "Secretary Gresham's Surrender of Japanese Refugees," Literary Digest, X (Dec. 8, 1894), 151-152.

⁴⁰ New York World, Jan. 17, 1894; New York Tribune, Dec. 11, 1894.

⁴¹ Denby to Gresham, Dec. 31, 1894, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59; Jernigan to Uhl, Jan. 23, 1895, Consul, Shanghai, 42, NA, RG 59.

⁴² Uhl to Denby Jr., Oct. 12, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; McIvor to Uhl, Nov. 28, 1894, Consul, Kanagawa, 21, NA, RG 59; also Gresham to Denby Jr., Oct. 20 and 31, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59.

⁴³ Russell to Gresham, Jan. 6, 1895, Gresham MSS. These attacks continued long after the spy affair, see Cushman K. Davis, "Two Years of Democratic Diplomacy," North American Review, CLX (March, 1895), 270-284.

CHAPTER V. THE BATTLES AT PING YANG AND YALU

¹ Allen to Rockhill, Sept. 14, 1894, Rockhill MSS; Carpenter to Sill, Sept. 3, 1894 and Sill to Carpenter, Sept. 4, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

² Barbaric war in Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Sept. 6, 1894; Chilean navy in New York Tribune, Sept. 8, 1894; O'Brien in Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 14, 1894 and New York Tribune, Sept. 14, 1894; armistice rumors in Staunton Weekly News, Sept. 13, 1894; Richmond State, Sept. 10, 1894.

³ Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 15, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Allen to Rockhill, Sept. 14, 1894, Rockhill MSS.

⁴ James Creelman, On the Great Highway (Boston: Lothrop, 1901), pp. 32-54.

⁵ Japanese rifle strategy in New York World, Sept. 28, 1894; intensity of fighting in Creelman, Highway, p. 45; see also Brown, Mastery, p. 124.

⁶ First dispatches in New York Tribune, Sept. 15 and 16, 1894; Jackson's defeat in Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 16, 1894; rout and Reuters in New York Tribune, Sept. 18 and 19, 1894.

⁷ Boston Herald in New York Tribune, Sept. 19, 1894; Public Opinion, XVII, Sept. 27, 1894, p. 620; Army and Navy Register quoted in ibid.

⁸ Creelman's column in New York World, Sept. 28, 1894; scientific murder in Boston Globe, Sept. 20, 1894; Learned to Barton, Sept. 17, 1894, Japan Mission, 22, ABCFM. Also see similar views in Staunton Weekly News, Sept. 27, 1894.

⁹ Students of Mahan in Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 18, 1894; Annapolis graduates in Boston Advertiser, Sept. 26, 1894; battle a testing ground in New York Times, July 4, 1894 and Boston Globe, Aug. 4, 1894; Captain Day in New York Herald, Sept. 28, 1894; various kinds of ships in Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Aug. 14, 1894.

¹⁰ See Jukichi Inouye, "The Naval Battle of Haiyang," in The Japan-China War (Yokohama: Kelly & Walsh, Limited, n.d.), pp. 1-22; also Fred T. Jane, ed., All the World's Fighting Ships (Boston: Little, Brown, 1899), pp. 190-196; John L. Rawlinson, China's Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 260-261.

¹¹Inouye, Japan-China War, p. 23; Rawlinson, China's Struggle, pp. 247-258; divided fleet in George M. Beckman, The Modernization of China and Japan (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 172.

¹²Map of battle in Rear Admiral S. S. Robison and Mary L. Robison, A History of Naval Tactics from 1530 to 1930: The Evolution of Tactical Maxims (Annapolis: The United States Naval Institute, 1942), p. 739; also Inouye, Japan-China War, pp. 24-25.

¹³McGiffin to Lieutenant Dumby(?) at the U.S. Navy Branch Hydrographic Office, Norfolk, Va., Nov. 13, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Philo Norton McGiffin, "The Battle of the Yalu: Personal Recollections by the Commander of the Chinese Ironclad Chen Yuen," Century Magazine, L, new series XXVIII (August, 1895), 585-604 and favorable response to this article in A. T. Mahan, "Lessons from the Yalu Fight," ibid., 629-632; also Richard Harding Davis, "Philo Norton McGiffin," in Real Soldiers of Fortune (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919), p. 141. See Inouye, Japan-China War, pp. 1-25; Rawlinson, China's Struggle, pp. 168-195; also Vice-Admiral G. A. Ballard, The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan (London: John Murray, 1921), pp. 145-153.

¹⁴Sternburg to Roosevelt, Feb. 19, 1895, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as Roosevelt MSS).

¹⁵Denby Jr. to Gresham, Oct. 10, 1894 and Oct. 15, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59.

¹⁶Denby Jr. to Gresham, Sept. 19, 1894, ibid.; Impey to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 19, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Sill to Gresham, Sept. 20 and 21, 1894, Korea, Despatches, 11, NA, RG 59.

¹⁷"Naval Vivisection," Nation, LIX (Nov. 8, 1894), 336; "Repairing Chinese War Ships," Scientific American, LXXII (Jan. 26, 1895), 57; "The Lessons of the Battle of Yalu," Scientific American, LXXIII (Aug. 31, 1895), 130; Engineering News and American Railway Journal, XXXII (Oct. 18, 1894), 320.

¹⁸New Orleans Picayune, Sept. 23, 1894; New York Tribune, Sept. 21, 1894 and Springfield Republican, Sept. 22, 1894.

¹⁹San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 9 and 10, 1894.

²⁰Notes on the Life of Philo Norton McGiffin, 1860-1897, compiled by Richard Harding Davis, Davis Collection in the Clifton Waller Barrett Library, University of Virginia Library; also Davis, Real Soldiers, pp. 120-144; plucky hero in New Orleans Picayune, May 12, 1895; McGiffin, "Yalu," p. 585; also Denby to Gresham, Jan. 31, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59; McGiffin portrayed as Yalu-maniac in William Ferdinand Tyler, Pulling Strings in China (London: Constable, 1929), pp. 57-58.

²¹ New York Tribune, Sept. 24, 1894.

²² Mahan to Clarke, Sept. 30, 1894, Mahan Special Correspondence, Alfred Thayer Mahan Papers, Library of Congress (hereafter Mahan MSS).

²³ For example see clipping from Boston Advertiser, n.d. in Herbert Scrapbook, 1893-4, Hilary Herbert Papers, University of North Carolina Library (hereafter cited as Herbert MSS); The Congregationalist, n.d., clipping from Griffis MSS.

²⁴ Evidence of expansionist sentiment in clipping from Marine Journal, July 7, 1894, Scrapbook, 1893-4, Herbert MSS; wash-tub in Parker, Recollections, p. 396.

²⁵ Clipping from New York World, Sept. 28, 1894, Scrapbook, 1893-4, Herbert MSS; need for more battleships in New Orleans Picayune, Nov. 12, 1894. For the allegation that the Sino-Japanese War convinced Americans to build fast cruisers rather than battleships, see William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 374.

²⁶ McGiffin to Lieutenant Dumby(?), forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 13, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; also Mahan, "Lessons from the Yalu Fight," Century Magazine, L (August, 1895), 629-632.

²⁷ Roosevelt to Herbert, Dec. 12, 1894, Herbert MSS.

²⁸ See Herbert's note following letter, Roosevelt to Herbert, Dec. 12, 1894, Herbert MSS; Hilary A. Herbert, "The Fight off the Yalu River," North American Review, CLIX (November, 1894), 513-528; Herbert's article was reprinted in Tokyo by the Japanese Imperial Navy, Miyaoka to Herbert, Jan. 27, 1895, Herbert MSS.

²⁹ "Naval Vivisection," Nation, LIX (Nov. 8, 1894), 336-337.

³⁰ Herbert to Carpenter, Sept. 24, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

³¹ Ibid. Later Herbert claimed he had used the Sino-Japanese War as an excuse to strengthen the Asiatic fleet in order to watch the Spanish navy in the Pacific, see "Grandfather Talks About his Life Under Two Flags," Herbert MSS.

CHAPTER VI. BARBARISM VERSUS CIVILIZATION

¹ Commercial and Financial Chronicle, LIX (Sept. 22, 1894),

496; New Orleans Picayune, Nov. 30, 1894.

²Charles Denby, China, II, p. 17.

³Theodore Ayrault Dodge, "The Eastern War, and After: A Military Study," Forum, XVIII (Nov., 1894), 320.

⁴Li Lien-ying in J. O. P. Bland and E. Backhouse, China Under the Empress Dowager (London: William Heinemann, 1910), pp. 98-99; Denby's observations on corruption in Denby to Gresham, Nov. 16, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59; mud cannon balls in New York Tribune, Oct. 29, 1894; coolie forced labor in Merrill to Hart, Nov. 5, 1894, Merrill Transcript, Morse MSS.

⁵Dodge, "Eastern War," p. 315; Sternburg to Roosevelt, July 30, 1895, Roosevelt MSS. See also McClellan, "American Image," pp. 118, 135.

⁶Lucius H. Foote, "The War in the Orient," Overland Monthly, XXIV, 2nd series (November, 1894), 524-528.

⁷Overplus of superstition in Richmond State, Oct. 13, 1894; green dragons in Atlanta Constitution, Nov. 2, 1894; war gods in New York Tribune, Nov. 17, 1894; sinking wells in Brown, Mastery, p. 507; "Is Infanticide Practised in China?" Catholic World, LX (March, 1895), 781.

⁸Brooklyn Standard-Union quoted in Richmond State, Oct. 4, 1894; effeminate luxuries in Staunton Weekly News, Nov. 8, 1894; eunuchs in New York Herald, Oct. 2, 1894; savage depravity in New York Tribune, Sept. 28, 1894; kowtowing in New York World, Sept. 28, 1894; Compers on China in American Federationist, I (January, 1895), 261.

⁹Augustine Heard, Durham W. Stevens and Howard Martin, "China and Japan in Korea," North American Review, CLIX (September, 1894), 310, 312.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 316.

¹¹Christian virtues in Dodge, "Eastern War," 315-316, 319; Foote, "War in Orient," 524; Lafcadio Hearn, Editorials from the Kobe Chronicle, ed. by Makoto Sangu (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1960), pp. 31-34.

¹²Cleveland in FRUS, 1894-5, Vol. I, p. xi; Gresham to Dun, July 16, 1894, Gresham MSS; Gresham to Morgan, Jan. 10, 1895, Gresham MSS; Abercrombie to Uhl, Feb. 23, 1895, Consul, Nagasaki, 6, NA, RG 59.

¹³New York Tribune, Sept. 28, 1894; Atlanta Constitution, Jan. 7, 1894; see also Richmond State, Nov. 28, 1894.

¹⁴ Jones in New York Tribune, Sept. 22, 1894; Yamagata in New York Herald, Sept. 26, 1894; views of Li in Denby to Gresham, Nov. 16, 1894; China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59; Ament to Smith, Dec. 17, 1894, North China Mission, 17, ABCFM; for plots surrounding Li see Read to Uhl, Nov. 14, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59.

¹⁵ Boston Globe, Sept. 8, 1894; ditty on Li in New York Evening Sun quoted in Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Nov. 1, 1894; "frog" in New Orleans Picayune, Oct. 8, 1894.

¹⁶ William Elliott Griffis, "American Relations with the Far East," New England Magazine, IX, new series (Nov., 1894), 272; also see Missionary Review of the World, XVIII (Feb., 1895), 137.

¹⁷ New order in Foote, "War in Orient," 527; hand of God in Richmond State, Nov. 28, 1894; and Atlanta Constitution, Nov. 24, 1894; China worth preserving in Financial and Commercial Chronicle, LIX (Nov. 10, 1894), 816; beasts of prey and Russian Bear in New Orleans Picayune, Nov. 15, 1894, and New York Herald, Oct. 3, 1894.

¹⁸ Brink of rebellion in New York Tribune, Oct. 5, 1894; Read to Uhl, Sept. 17, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59.

¹⁹ Gee Hing in New York Tribune, Oct. 5, and Nov. 23, 1894; Nebraska meeting in Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Sept. 10, 1894.

²⁰ Denby Jr. to Gresham, Oct. 3, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59; Rockhill to Hippisley, Oct. 30, 1894, Rockhill MSS; Hearn, Kobe Chronicle, Oct. 15, 1894, p. 17; also Missionary Review of the World, VIII (January, 1895), 29-30.

²¹ War scare in San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 14, 1894; Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 1, 1894.

²² Heard, Stevens and Martin, "China and Japan," 300-301; James Creelman, special New York World correspondent visiting Korea in October 1894, also noted mining and railroad concessions. He asked: "Will Japan take them all?" New York World, Nov. 28, 1894.

²³ Heard, Stevens and Martin, ibid., 305, 308.

²⁴ "The War in Corea," Advocate of Peace, LVI (September, 1894), 204.

²⁵ MacArthur's sermon and comments on it in Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 19, 1894; New Orleans Picayune, Nov. 12, 1894.

²⁶ Rockhill to Hippisley, Oct. 30, 1894, Rockhill MSS.

²⁷ Barton to Learned, Nov. 24, 1894, Japan Mission, 22, ABCFM. Similar views in Pettee to Barton, Oct. 6, 1894, Vol. 14; Greene to

Barton, Oct. 4, 1894, Vol. 20, although some, such as Rev. John L. Atkinson in Kobe, dreamed that the Japanese victory would pull Japan away from Oriental culture and Chinese learning, turning it instead toward the adoption of strictly western education, Atkinson to Barton, Nov. 5, 1894, Vol. 15, all in Japan Mission, ABCFM.

²⁸ Future commerce with China in Boston Globe, Jan. 5, 1894; new markets for the South in Atlanta Constitution, Nov. 27, 1894; Japan and American cotton in Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 18, 1894; also American cotton in Japan in New Orleans Picayune, Dec. 7, 1894; war stimulated cotton trade in New Orleans Picayune, Nov. 23, 1894; view that war would entangle Great Britain and help U.S. trade in New York Herald, Oct. 3, 1894.

²⁹ Jernigan to Uhl, Oct. 9, 1894, Consul, Shanghai, 42, NA, RG 59; Read to Uhl, Nov. 14, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59.

³⁰ Though advocating American trade with Japan, this article also warned of Japanese competition, New Orleans Picayune, Oct. 26, 1894; Rockhill to Hippisley, Oct. 30, 1894, Rockhill MSS.

³¹ Anti-Chinese prejudice surveyed in Miller, Unwelcome Immigrant; fear of dirty folk in Dodge, "Eastern War," 322; empire dumped on us in Richmond State, Oct. 31, 1894.

³² Paul Hibbert Clyde, United States Policy Toward China: Diplomatic and Public Documents, 1839-1939 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1940), pp. 140-158; FRUS, 1894, p. 177; also see George E. Paulsen, "The Gresham-Yang Treaty," Pacific Historical Review, XXXVI (August, 1968), 281-97.

³³ For example see Tateno to Gresham, Mar. 22, 1894, July 19, 1894, Kurino to Gresham, Sept. 18, 1894. Comment on Kurino's attitude in Reid to Mills, Oct. 18, 1894, Whitelaw Reid Papers, Library of Congress. For the view that Japan would no longer request but now demand treaty revision and back up its demand with force, see Abercrombie to Uhl, Feb. 23, 1895, Consul, Nagasaki, 6, NA, RG 59.

³⁴ British minister's dupe in New York Tribune, Sept. 22, 1894; treaties with Japan discussed in New York Tribune, Sept. 19, 1894.

³⁵ New York Herald, Sept. 26, 1894; acceptance of treaty in New Orleans Picayune, Dec. 10, 1894.

³⁶ Japanese treatment of war correspondents discussed in Miss Mary Holbrock to Barton, Sept. 17, 1894, Japan Mission, 21, ABCFM; opening American mail in New York Herald, Oct. 6, 1894; Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 25, 1894; view of Kurino in Stephen Gwynn, ed., The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, II (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1929), p. 164.

³⁷ Matilda Gresham, Walter Quintin Gresham, II, p. 789; dinners and trinkets in Boston Globe, Nov. 21, 1895; Kurino's propaganda in Yang Yu to Gresham, Sept. 22, 1894, Notes from China, 3, NA, RG 59; also see New York Tribune, Oct. 21, 1894.

³⁸ Shinchiro Kurino, "The Oriental War," North American Review, CLIX (November, 1894), 529-536; Michitaro Hisa, "The Significance of the Japan-China War," Forum, XVIII (October, 1894), 216-227; Kuma Oishi, "The Causes Which Led to the War in the East," Arena, X (Nov., 1894), 726-727; see also Midori Komatz, "Japan: Its Present and Future," Arena, XII (March, 1895), 1-9.

³⁹ Oishi, "Causes," 721-735.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 728, 734-735. For the influence of this kind of propaganda see Herbert Scrapbook, 1893-4, Herbert MSS; New York Tribune, Sept. 24, 1894; "The Japanese Press on the War," Literary Digest, IX (Sept. 8, 1894), 564-5; Trumbull White, The War in the East, Japan, China, and Corea (Philadelphia, 1895), p. 13.

⁴¹ Ament to Griffis(?), Oct. 23, 1894, Griffis MSS.

CHAPTER VII. THE PORT ARTHUR MASSACRE

¹ See U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, General Information Series, XIV, "Preliminary Notes on the Japan-China War," in Notes on the Year's Naval Progress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1895), pp. 215-234; U.S. Adjutant General's Office, Military Information Division, 11, series 3, Notes on the War Between China and Japan (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1896), pp. 19-21.

² Goodrich to Carpenter, Oct. 9 and 17, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Denby Jr. to Gresham, Oct. 27, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59.

³ Description of Port Arthur in James Creelman, On the Great Highway: The Wanderings and Adventures of a Special Correspondent (Boston: Lothrop Publishing Company, 1901), pp. 80-81; and in Allan, Dragon Flag, pp. 38-42. See also Notes on the War, p. 17; Carpenter to Herbert, Nov. 29, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

⁴ Kurino to Gresham, Nov. 14, 1894, Notes from Japan, 5, NA, RG 59.

⁵ Predictions that Port Arthur had collapsed as early as Nov. 10 in Lynchburg Daily Advance, Boston Globe, Boston Journal, Chicago

Times, Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, New York Herald, New York Tribune; Yamaji sketch in Creelman, Highway, pp. 94-95.

⁶Mutilations cited in Allan, Dragon Flag, pp. 66-67; Creelman, Highway, p. 109; see also Carpenter to Herbert, Nov. 29, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Notes on the War, pp. 19-21; Inouye, "On the Regent's Sword: Kinchow, Port Arthur, and Talienwan," in the Japan-China War, pp. 1-12.

⁷Denby to Gresham, Nov. 24, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59; New York Tribune, Nov. 24 and 25, 1894; London dispatches in New York Tribune, Nov. 29 and 30, 1894; New York World, Nov. 30, 1894 and Dec. 9 and 11, 1894.

⁸See Creelman, Highway, pp. 80-114.

⁹Creelman's article from New York World which alluded to Korean king's "pitiful appeal" for U.S. aid, discussed in Sill to Gresham, Feb. 20, 1895, Korea, Despatches, 11, NA, RG 59; Gresham defended Creelman in Gresham to Sill, April 1, 1895, Korea, Instructions, 1, NA, RG 59.

¹⁰Hippisley to Rockhill, Jan. 26, 1895, Rockhill MSS; New York World, Sept. 25 and 28, 1894; inquiries in World to House, Nov. 23, 1894 and in Col. Yamanouchi to House, Dec. 1, 1894, Clemens-House Collection, University of Virginia Library (hereafter cited as House MSS).

¹¹New York World, Dec. 11, 20, 23 and 24, 1894.

¹²World to House, Dec. 13, 1894, House MSS; New York World, Dec. 17 and 18, 1894; Dun to Gresham, Dec. 20, 1894, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59.

¹³Dun to Gresham, Dec. 20, 1894 and Jan. 7, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59.

¹⁴New York Tribune, Dec. 20, 1894; Carpenter in Atlanta Constitution, Jan. 6, 1895; Gregory in New York World, Dec. 22, 1894; the North China Herald questioned Creelman's reporting, stating: "A certain class of journals, notably American dailies, revel in gore, and one at least of the few properly accredited 'specials' at the front appears to have been making the most of his opportunities at Port Arthur, and dilated upon some of the common-place characteristics of the battlefield to an unsavory extent," North China Herald, LIV (Jan. 4, 1895), p. 5.

¹⁵Philadelphia Record in "The Massacre at Port Arthur," Public Opinion, XVII (Dec. 27, 1894), 939-940

¹⁶Kansas City Journal quoted in Staunton Weekly News, Dec. 20,

1894; Port Arthur massacre, Atlanta Constitution, Dec. 14, 1894; Chapin to Smith, Jan. 18, 1895, North China Mission, 18, ABCFM.

¹⁷ Scratch a Jap in New York World, Dec. 23, 1894; thin veneer of civilization in Atlanta Constitution, Dec. 14, 1894; White Man in New York World, Dec. 21, 1894. Similar views in New Orleans Picayune, Dec. 16, 1894; "The Massacre at Port Arthur," Public Opinion, XVII (Dec. 27, 1894), 939-940; Lynchburg Daily Advance, Jan. 8, 1895; also Sioux City Tribune, Binghamton Republican, Philadelphia Call, Philadelphia Times, St. Louis Post-Despatch, Washington Star, Fort Worth Gazette in New York World, Dec. 22, 1894; Boston Post, York Gazette (Pa.), Minneapolis Journal, Cincinnati Commercial Gazette in New York World, Dec. 27, 1894.

¹⁸ New York World, Jan. 9, 1895; also Jan. 12 and 20, 1895; Feb. 11, 1895; Frederic Villiers, "The Truth About Port Arthur," North American Review, CLX (March, 1895), 325-330.

¹⁹ Dun to Gresham, Jan. 17, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; Inouye, "The Fall of Weihaiwei," in Japan-China War, pp. 1-26; "Notes on the Japan-China War," pp. 21-23; for the report of the landing of 25,000 Japanese troops near Wei, see New York Tribune, Jan. 21, 1895.

²⁰ Dun to Gresham, Feb. 15, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; Inouye, "Fall of Wei," pp. 11-26; Copy of telegram from Oyama reporting capture of Wei, Feb. 6, 1895; Notes from Japan, 5, NA, RG 59; Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 7, 1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Denby to Gresham, Feb. 8, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59.

²¹ Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 13, 1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Dun to Gresham, Feb. 15, and 27, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; Deck Log Book of the USS Charleston, Feb. 17-22, 1895, NA, RG 24; list of foreigners found on Weihaiwei and a copy of the terms of capitulation of Wei forwarded by Captain Coffin of the Charleston, Feb. 22, 1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

²² Japanese humanity in New York Tribune, Dec. 7, 1894; Red Cross activity in Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 15, 1894 and Mar. 11, 1895; Journal of the American Medical Association, XXIII (July-Dec., 1894), 995; Springfield Republican, Dec. 17, 1894; nurses and physicians in Missionary Review of the World, XVIII (May, 1895), 399; Japan fights war on higher plane of civilization in Rev. J. H. DeForest, "The Political Preparation for Christ in the Far East," Missionary Herald, XCI (June, 1895), 232. Also see Nagao Ariga, The Red Cross Society of Japan (St. Louis: Universal Exposition, 1904), pp. 5-6.

²³ Stanley to Bostwick, July 31, 1894, North China Mission, 27, ABCFM; lack of medical service and Chinese brutality in New York Tribune, Sept. 17, 1894; Christie, Thirty Years, pp. 99-104; Martin,

Cycle, p. 405; mutilation of Japanese wounded in A. B. de Guerville, "The Red Cross in the Far East," Munsey's Magazine, XIV (October, 1895), 48.

²⁴View of Governor of Tientsin in Read to Uhl, Nov. 22, 1894 and Dec. 3, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59; Chinese firing on Red Cross in Journal of the American Medical Association, XXIII (July-Dec., 1894), 520; Toonan project in Uhl to Denby, Dec. 29, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; Denby to Gresham, Nov. 24, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59; also see Staunton Weekly News, Nov. 22, 1894.

²⁵Gresham's requests in Uhl to Dun, May 16, 1895, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59; War Department's requests in Dun to Gresham to Lamont, Feb. 28, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; also see Colonel Dallas Bache, "Synopsis of a Report on the Medico-Military Arrangements of the Japanese Army in the Field, 1894-1895," Proceedings Sixth Annual Meeting Military Surgeons (May, 1896), 159-183; W. F. Arnold, "Notes on Gunshot Wounds in Cases of Chinese Soldiers," Annual Report of the Surgeon-General, U.S. Navy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1895), pp. 190-194.

²⁶Gravatt to Herbert, Mar. 30, 1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; also C. U. Gravatt, "Method of Caring for Wounded in Field and Hospital of Chinese and Japanese Armies," Proceedings Sixth Annual Meeting Surgeons (May, 1896), 137-143.

CHAPTER VIII. THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN EAST ASIA

¹Chapin to Smith, Sept., 18, 1894, North China Mission, 18, ABCFM; Sternburg to Roosevelt, Feb. 19, 1895, Roosevelt MSS.

²Bigoted pagans in San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 1, 1894; fear of unrest in New York Herald, Oct. 3, 1894; plundering and brigandage reported in New York Tribune, Nov. 7, 1894; apprehensions and fears in New Orleans Picayune, Dec. 28, 1894; breakup of missionary work predicted in Advocate of Peace, LVI (Sept. 1, 1894), 206; Noble to Smith, Jan. 11, 1895, North China Mission, 20, ABCFM; similar views in Ewing to Smith, Jan. 21, 1895, North China Mission, 18, ABCFM; Hayden in New York Herald, Oct. 6, 1894.

³Cleveland in FRUS, 1894-5, I, p. xxvii; great number of communications cited in New York Herald, Oct. 3, 1894; river patrol boats in Gresham to Cleveland, Oct. 2, 1894, Cleveland MSS.

⁴Herbert directs cooperation cited in William Reynolds Braisted.

The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), p. 16; Carpenter to Fremantle, Nov. 7, 1894, Carpenter to Herbert, Nov. 10, 1894, Commander-in-Chief of Centurion (Fremantle) to Carpenter, Nov. 14, 1894, Pauncefote to Gresham, Dec. 14, 1894, all in Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; public announcement of naval cooperation in New York Herald, Oct. 5, 1894.

⁵ Sill to Carpenter, Sept. 17, 1894, Carpenter to Sill, Sept. 18, 1894, Carpenter to Sill, Sept. 25, 1894, all in Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

⁶ Carpenter to Sill, Oct. 25, 1894, Sill to Carpenter, Oct. 26, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

⁷ Sill to Gresham, Nov. 2 and Dec. 4, 1894, Korea, Dispatches, 11, NA, RG 59; Sill to Uhl, Jan. 17, 1895, Consul, Seoul, 1, NA, RG 59.

⁸ Sill to Coffin, Dec. 4, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Sill to Folger, Mar. 13, 1895, Sill to Gresham, Mar. 16, 1895, Korea, Dispatches, 11, NA, RG 59.

⁹ Elliott to Commanding Officer of Baltimore, Dec. 4, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

¹⁰ McAdoo to Carpenter, Nov. 19, 1894, ibid.

¹¹ Day to Hayward, Macfarland, Newell, Schon, Morris in Carpenter to Sill, Jan. 11, 1894, Morris to Day, Jan. 12, 1895, Schon to Day, Jan. 17, 1895, Statement of Rose Ely Moore signed by Horace N. Allen enclosed in Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Jan. 23, 1894, Sill to Carpenter, Jan. 14, 1895, all in Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

¹² Day to Carpenter, Jan. 12, 1895, forwarded to Secretary of the Navy, Jan. 23, 1895, ibid.

¹³ Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Oct. 19 and 21, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Log Books of the Charleston, July 1, 1894-Dec. 31, 1894 and Baltimore, Sept. 13, 1894-Mar. 28, 1895, NA, RG 24.

¹⁴ Log Book of the Yorktown, July 1, 1894-Dec. 31, 1894, NA, RG 24; Tungchow incident in Folger to Secretary of the Navy, Jan. 22, 1895, Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Jan. 29, 1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; see also New York Tribune, Jan. 8, 1895; Denby to Gresham, Jan. 21, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59; North China Herald, LIV (Feb. 1, 1895), 156.

¹⁵ Donnelly to Carpenter, Feb. 2, 1895 and Carpenter to Donnelly, Feb. 3, 1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

¹⁶ Donnelly to Carpenter, Feb. 6, 1895 and Coffin to Carpenter, Feb. 8, 1895, ibid.

¹⁷ Rev. Charles A. Killie to Commander American Warship, Feb. 10, 1895 and Killie to Commanding Officer Rescue Vessel, Feb. 12, 1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

¹⁸ Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 13, 1895, Carpenter to U.S. consular agents, Jan. 26, 1895, Folger to Carpenter, Feb. 5, 1895, Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 13, 1895, all in ibid.

¹⁹ Mateer to Donnelly and Mateer to Oyama in Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 13, 1895, Folger to Carpenter, Feb. 21, 1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Log Book of Yorktown, Feb. 19, 1895, NA, RG 24; Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Mar. 13, 1895, Donnelly to Coffin, Mar. 18, 1895, Griffin to Carpenter, Mar. 22, 1895, Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Mar. 23, 1895, all in Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

²⁰ Newchwang in Isabella L. Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbours: A Narrative of Travel with an Account of the Recent Vicissitudes and Present Condition of the Country, Vol. I (London: John Murray, 1898), pp. 216, 224-225.

²¹ Carpenter to Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 29, 1894, Emory to Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 21, 1894, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45; Log Book of the Steamer Petrel, Aug. 1, 1894-Feb. 7, 1895, NA, RG 24.

²² Dun to Gresham, Mar. 9, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; Emory to Carpenter, Mar. 27, 1895, Area 10 File, NA, RG 45.

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¹ Review of Reviews, X (September, 1894), 251; American Peace Society in Advocate of Peace, LVI (September, 1894), 206 and (November, 1894), 257; Belva Lockwood in San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 20, 1894 and Richmond State, Oct. 4, 1894.

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⁶ Warning acknowledged in Kurino to Gresham, Nov. 10, 1894, Notes from Japan, 5, NA, RG 59; Denby issued a similar warning to China, Denby to Gresham, Nov. 16, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59; see also New York Tribune, Nov. 11, 1894.

⁷ New York Tribune, Nov. 13, 1894 and Boston Globe, Nov. 15, 1894; similar views in Literary Digest, X (Nov. 24, 1894), 96-97.

⁸ Sudden interest in New Orleans Picayune, Nov. 15, 1894; progress and civilization in Atlanta Constitution, Nov. 19, 1894; British supremacy in New York Sun quoted in Literary Digest, X (Nov. 24, 1894), 96-97.

⁹ Dun's note of November 15 confirmed in Gresham to Dun, Dec. 22, 1894, Japan, Instructions, 4, NA, RG 59; Mutsu to Kurino to Gresham, Nov. 17, 1894, Notes from Japan, 5, NA, RG 59; Gresham to Yang Yu, Nov. 20, 1894, Notes to China, 1, NA, RG 59; trip to Woodley in New York Tribune, Nov. 22, 1894.

¹⁰ Nothing offensive in New York Tribune, Nov. 22, 1894; San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 24, 1894; Louisville Courier-Journal, Chicago Record, Philadelphia Ledger and New York Times quoted in Public Opinion, XVII (Nov. 29, 1894), 839; Literary Digest, X (Dec. 1, 1894), 125-126.

¹¹ Indianapolis Journal and Detroit News quoted in Public Opinion, XVII (Nov. 29, 1894), 839; stumbling block in New Orleans Picayune, Nov. 20, 1894; officious meddling in Atlanta Constitution, Nov. 22, 1894; similar views expressed in Syracuse Post, New York Herald,

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¹² New York Press quoted in Literary Digest, X (Dec. 1, 1894), 125; a condemnation of these "base partisan attacks" in Springfield Republican, Dec. 8, 1894.

¹³ Denby to Gresham, Nov. 16 and 22, 1894, China, Despatches, 96, NA, RG 59.

¹⁴ Detring to Read to Uhl, Nov. 26, 1894, Consul, Tientsin, 4, NA, RG 59; also New York Tribune, Nov. 28 and 30, 1894; Springfield Republican, Dec. 9, 1894; Dun to Gresham, Dec. 7, 1894, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; Denby to Gresham, Jan. 14, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59.

¹⁵ Denby in "non-substantive" role in Young, Rhetoric of Empire, pp. 31-32, 241; Denby to Gresham, Dec. 1, 1894, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59.

¹⁶ Denby's advice to Yamen in Denby to Gresham, Nov. 30, 1894, Dec. 1, 1894, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59; Denby to Gresham, Dec. 5, 1894, Cleveland MSS; Gresham to Denby, Dec. 2, 1894, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; Dun to Gresham, Dec. 7, 1894, Dun to Denby, Dec. 18, 1894, Dun to Gresham, Dec. 20, 1894, all in Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59.

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²⁴ Denby to Gresham, Jan. 23, 1895, enclosure Denby to Yamen, Jan. 23, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59; Uhl to Denby, Jan. 25, 1895, China, Instructions, 5, NA, RG 59; Foster's view of Chinese credentials in Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs, II, p. 114; Japanese rejection in Dun to Gresham, Feb. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; Denby to Gresham, Feb. 5, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59; Dun to Gresham, Feb. 15, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; Abercrombie to Uhl, Feb. 23, 1895, Consul, Nagasaki, 6, NA, RG 59; Foster's whiskers in Boston Globe, Feb. 5, 1895.

²⁵ Denby to Gresham, Feb. 4, 1895, China Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59; also see Dun to Gresham, Feb. 5, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; Denby to Gresham, Feb. 14, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59.

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²⁸ Denby to Gresham, Feb. 23 and 26, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59.

²⁹ Denby to Gresham, Feb. 26, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59. Denby's advice to Li appeared less "wholesome and far-sighted advice" and a "breath of fresh air" in the face of selfish exchanges between the European chancelleries, as interpreted by Treat, U.S. and Japan, II, p. 526, than the minister's desire to maintain American influence in China.

³⁰ Denby to Gresham, Mar. 5, 1895, China, Despatches, 97, NA, RG 59.

³¹ Read to Uhl, Mar. 12, 1895, Consul, Tientsin, 5, NA, RG 59; Staunton Weekly News, Mar. 21, 1894.

³² World to House, Mar. 15, 1895; R. H. Lyman to House, Mar. 16, 1895, House MSS; New York Tribune, Mar. 8, 1895; similar views found in Commercial and Financial Chronicle, LIX (Dec. 22, 1894), 1081-1082; Boston Globe, Jan. 22, 1895; New York Tribune, Jan. 31, 1895; New Orleans Picayune, Mar. 21, 1895; "A Dangerous Undertaking," Advocate of Peace, LVI (December, 1894), 284.

CHAPTER X. JAPANESE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP

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² Denby to Gresham, Mar. 23, 1895, China, Despatches, 98, NA, RG 59.

³ Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs, pp. 129-133.

⁴ Ibid., p. 134; missionary view in Gordon to Barton, Mar. 23, 1895, Japan, Mission, 20, ABCFM; Journal of the Knights of Labor, Mar. 28, 1895, p. 1; better terms in New Orleans Picayune, Mar. 25, 1895; break negotiations unless concessions, predicted in Dun to Gresham, Mar. 25 and 28, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59.

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⁶ Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs, II, p. 137.

⁷ Li on Foster in Francis William Mannix, ed., Memoirs of Li

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⁸Terms cited in Dun to Gresham, April 14, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; Foster's advice in Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs, II, p. 137; Yamen asked Denby's advice in Denby to Gresham, April 4, 1895, China, Despatches, 98, NA, RG 59; see also New York Tribune, April 11, 1895; Dun to Gresham, April 12, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59.

⁹Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs, II, p. 138.

¹⁰Dun to Gresham, April 16 and 18, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59.

¹¹Details sent in Denby to Gresham, April 25, 1895, China, Despatches, 98, NA, RG 59; complete text of treaty sent in Dun to Gresham, May 18, 1895, Japan, Despatches, 68, NA, RG 59; "Documentary History of the Peace Negotiations between China and Japan, March-April 1895" (Tientsin: The Tientsin Press, 1895), pp. 1-29 in Read to Uhl, June 13, 1895, Consul, Tientsin, 5, NA, RG 59; Denby's views on treaty in Denby to Gresham, April 29, 1895, China, Despatches, 98, NA, RG 59.

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²⁰ Jernigan to Uhl, May 2 and 11, 1895, Consul, Shanghai, 42, NA, RG 59.

²¹ Hearn, Kokoro, p. 96; Read to Uhl, May 9, 1895 and Jernigan to Uhl, May 9, 1895, Consul, Tientsin, 5, NA, RG 59.

²² Cheshire to Rockhill, May 7, 1895, Rockhill MSS; Ament to Smith, May 11, 1895, North China Mission, 17, ABCFM; Allen to Rockhill, May 2, 1895 and Campbell to Rockhill, Mar. 2, 1895, Rockhill MSS; see also Everts Boutell Greene, A New-Englander in Japan: Daniel Crosby Greene (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1927), p. 248.

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²⁵ Ibid.

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²⁸ Satoh to Griffis, (?), 1895, Griffis MSS; Mutsuhito to Cleveland, June 18, 1895, Notes from Japan, 5, NA, RG 59.

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