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New Insights into Corruption: Paradoxical Effects of Approach-Orientation for Powerholders

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NEW INSIGHTS INTO CORRUPTION: PARADOXICAL EFFECTS OF
APPROACH-ORIENTATION FOR POWERHOLDERS.

A Dissertation Presented

by

MINDI S. ROCK

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Psychology Program

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ABSTRACT

NEW INSIGHTS INTO CORRUPTION: PARADOXICAL EFFECTS OF
APPROACH-ORIENTATION FOR POWERHOLDERS.

FEBRUARY 2013

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Does power lead to corruption (Kipnis, 1972), and if so, why? Here, a novel mechanism is proposed for understanding the complex relationship between power and corruption by incorporating recent work on morality (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). By bridging the power, self-regulation, and morality literatures we proposed that powerful individuals, because of their approach tendencies, are oriented more towards moral prescriptions or “shoulds” and thus focus more on moral acts and moral intentions while minimizing the importance of moral proscriptions (*neglect pathway*). We proposed an alternative path to corruption for powerholders via moral self-regard. Powerholders, because of their approach-based moral focus, would experience an automatic boost of implicit moral self-regard that would license future immorality. In three studies we found suggestive evidence that the approach tendencies of participants primed with power maximized the role of good moral acts and intentions and minimized the impact of moral transgressions, because the individual’s monitoring system focused on and valued

instances of moral successes rather than moral failures (*neglect pathway*). We did not find support for the moral self-regard pathway.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When considering the relationship between power and morality one's thoughts naturally turn to corruption. One reason for this intuitive link between power and corruption is that there are numerous examples of powerful individuals who display poor or no moral judgment, such as disgraced Governors Eliot Spitzer and Rod Blagojevich and corrupt financier, Bernard Madoff. Past research in psychology has broadly explored whether power leads to corruption (Kipnis, 1972), but a less examined question concerns specific psychological processes that underlie why powerholders may commit moral transgressions. The current research offers a theoretical framework for the relationship between power and corruption by incorporating recent work on moral regulation (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009) as a possible mechanism.

In this research we investigated potential mechanisms by which power leads to corruption. As discussed below, we do not believe power necessarily leads to corruption, but rather that power produces certain "vulnerabilities" to corruption. More specifically, we argue that power activates a type of moral regulation that influences how powerholders attend to and evaluate their good and bad behavior, which, ironically, makes them more likely to commit moral transgressions. Self-regulation research helps to explain the paradoxical process of powerholders' evaluations of moral acts, and we argue that it is their approach orientation, which promotes a focus on moral goods over immoral deeds, that deserves special attention.

To account for the considerable range of findings in the power literature, Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) proposed an integrative framework based on self-

regulation for high versus low powerholders. The authors' framework suggests that *having power* is associated with increased rewards and freedom, which promotes approach-related motivation. In contrast, *reduced power* is associated with increased threat, punishments, and constraints, and activates avoidance or inhibition-related motivation. More broadly, having power is linked to an increased focus on positive end states and activates approach tendencies, whereas reduced power is associated with an increased focus on negative end states and activates inhibition tendencies.

Recent work by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009) extended this fundamental regulatory distinction of approach versus avoidance to the moral domain. Their research examined whether individuals hold different and opposing moral goals, which reflect promoting (approaching) morality versus avoiding (inhibiting) immorality. In their model, moral prescriptions represent a distinct mode of regulation that focuses on behaviors that individuals *should* engage in to be moral, such as helping a friend, working hard, and volunteering time to a charity. Moral proscriptions represent a mode of regulation that focuses on behaviors individuals *should not* engage in to avoid immorality, such as cheating, lying, and stealing. Overall, prescriptive and proscriptive moral regulation offer insights into the fundamental difference between activating “good” behaviors versus inhibiting “bad” behaviors, and we propose that this framework sheds new light on the link between power and corruption.

In the current project we explored two paths by which the approach tendencies of powerholders may lead to corruption. The first pathway involves the under-regulation of the proscriptive system and a minimization of immoral acts and intentions. This leads to the relative neglect of immoral behavior. The second pathway features the over

regulation of the prescriptive system and involves an automatic boost in moral self-regard. Monitoring for moral “hits” such as good actions and behaviors may reward moral thoughts and intentions and lead to increased moral self-regard. This in turn may license future immorality. Ironically, in both cases, we predicted that powerholders’ approach-based moral orientation would increase the likelihood of corruption.

A corollary hypothesis to consider is the link between *lacking power* and moral regulation. Keltner et al. (2003) suggest that lacking power heightens one’s focus on negative end states that include threat, punishment and social constraints, and thus activates inhibition tendencies. Lacking power should regulate moral behavior by focusing primarily on proscriptions--what they “should not” be doing to avoid being immoral--which could lead to fewer moral transgressions. However, we believe there are additional, complex factors to be considered in understanding the impact of low power on moral or immoral outcomes. Thus the powerless may have particular concerns about injustices or special sensitivities towards others in need. In other words, we do not believe that the relationship between morality and the lack of power is a simple mirror of the relationship between morality and having power, and we believe these warrant independent explorations. The current research therefore focused on power and powerholders, self-regulatory orientations, and their possible links to corruption.

Power

What is power?

The concept of power has proven challenging for researchers to capture in a singular definition. To paraphrase Bierstedt’s (1950) insightful commentary on this issue, humans have a lay understanding of power, but when asked what it is precisely, a

definition is elusive. Some researchers consider the broadest features of power to be the ability to act upon the environment or another individual, while simultaneously remaining unconstrained by these external sources (e.g., Bugental & Lin, 2001; Cartwright, 1959; Hollander, 1985; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Guinote, 2007; Keltner, et al., 2003; Weber, 1947). Some examples of language that communicates this definition include Dahl's (1957) description of power as "the ability to compel others to do what you want them to do" and Thibaut and Kelly's (1959) "power over." Others look to the importance of influence, defining power in terms of "capacity or potential to influence, modify or control others' states" (Copeland, 1994; Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; French & Raven, 1959; Imai, 1993; Manz & Gioia, 1983; Parker & Rubenstein, 1981; Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991; Thibaut et al., 1959).

The current research focused on the social nature of power, with an eye towards individuals in power who exercise their ability to influence with the intent to gain certain outcomes. The simplest and most frequently used definition of power that conveys this meaning is "outcome control." In a given interaction the high power individual makes decisions that determine the outcomes of a target (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Copeland, 1994; Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; French et al., 1959; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Guinote, 2007; Imai, 1993; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2009; Manz et al., 1983; Overbeck & Park, 2001; Parker et al., 1981; Rusbult et al., 1991; Thibaut et al., 1959). Additionally, powerful individuals have increased access to resources (money, rewards, knowledge, prestige), which frees their thoughts and actions from ordinary restrictions (Keltner, et al., 2003). Past and present research offers examples of experiments in which power is operationalized using

outcome control, and the current research relied on this definition, as it is most relevant to this work.

To test the effects of power, empirical research has used both explicit (e.g., narrative priming and assigned power roles) and implicit (e.g., subliminal lexical priming) tasks to manipulate one's experience of power. Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) established the use of narrative priming to explore whether simply recalling an experience of power produced the same results as being assigned a position of power. In their research, the narrative prime included three between-subjects conditions and individuals had three minutes to remember a personally relevant experience with social power. High power participants wrote about a time when they had control over someone else, low power participants wrote about a time when someone else controlled them, and participants in the control condition wrote about the previous day. The essays were then coded for how much power participants reported having. Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) found that individuals described themselves as having more power in the high power narrative prime condition compared to those in the low power narrative prime condition. The authors noted that the control condition was not coded for power, because very few individuals wrote about an experience of power.

Another effective method used to explicitly prime power involved assigning participants to specific power roles, such as boss or employee. Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) used this approach in their research as well; first participants were asked about past leadership experience and then were randomly assigned to either high or low power roles (e.g., manager or subordinate). To measure the effect of power role assignment, participants answered several questions including how much they felt they

were in charge of the task and to what extent they had power over the subordinates. As expected, their results revealed significant differences between the high and low power roles, such that individuals in the high power roles reported feeling much more control over both the task and subordinates. Both methods have been validated with a variety of participant samples (see also Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Guinote, 2007; Smith & Bargh, 2008; Smith & Trope, 2006).

In addition to explicit measures, researchers have also developed subliminal techniques to prime power, such as scrambled word, sentence-fragments completion, and scrambled-sentence tasks (see Chen, Lee-Chai & Bargh, 2001; see also Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Smith & Trope, 2006). In one example, Smith and Trope (2006) used a scrambled-sentence task that presented participants with five words from which they were to construct a grammatically correct sentence using four of the words. The researchers provided a sample sentence containing the words: *juicy, are, the, oranges, ripe*, with one possible solution being, “The oranges are ripe.” During the experiment, participants unscrambled 16 sets of words with half of the sets containing target words related to high power, low power, or control primes. Target words for the high power condition included *authority, captain, commands, controls, dominates, executive, influenced, privileged*. The low power condition included words relevant to lacking power such as *complied, janitor, obey, passive, servant, submits, subordinate, yield*. The control condition contained 16 sets of power-irrelevant words. Smith and Trope (2006) confirmed that the sentence-scramble task produced comparable power differences to the explicit power primes.

The Influence of Power

Past researchers have studied a range of psychological outcomes associated with power. Some of the known behavioral outcomes include initiating more physical contact (Henley, 1973) and speaking more (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keating, 1988).

Attention to Rewards

Elevated power increases an individual's sensitivity to rewards and opportunities (Keltner, Anderson, & Gruenfeld, 2003). According to this reasoning, powerful people should be quicker to detect opportunities for material and social rewards. This prediction is supported by Higgins's (1997) assertion that approach is facilitated by the direction of attention toward rewards and means for obtaining those rewards. Further research has revealed several correlates of behavioral approach are associated with attention to rewards, including increased dopamine (DePue, 1995).

Evidence supporting the prediction that power increases sensitivity to rewards and opportunities comes from work using Thematic Apperception Tests (TATs; Atkinson, 1964) to measure need to approach. This line of work reveals that individuals in group leadership roles (Zander & Forward, 1968), European Americans compared with African Americans (Adkins, Payne, & Ballif, 1972) and children from higher status social groups (Nygard, 1969), all demonstrate high levels of the need to approach, which detects sensitivity to rewards. Another related finding is that elevated power increases perceptions of rewards and opportunities in ambiguous interactions and acts. Work that supports this prediction comes from men who occupy positions of power and perceive sexual interest in women's ambiguous behavior (Abbey, 1982; Keltner et al., 1998).

Positive Affect

There is a growing literature on the influence of power on affect (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Clark, 1990; Collins, 1991; Kemper, 1991; Tiedens et al., 2000). Keltner et al. (2003) posited that elevated power increases the experience and expression of positive affect including discrete emotions such as desire, enthusiasm, and pride. In contrast, reduced power is predicted to cause negative emotion and anxiousness including the discrete emotions fear, shame, awe and embarrassment.

To test the relationship between power and affect, Anderson, Langner, and Keltner (2001) asked participants to report their general sense of power (e.g., “I experience power in my day to day life) and their general tendency to experience different emotions. Their work showed that power correlated with the increased experience of many positive emotions (e.g., amusement, desire, enthusiasm, happiness, and love). Other research suggests that power influences expressive behavior. Using a fraternity hierarchy, the individual’s power was defined by their position in the fraternity: active brother (high power) versus recent pledge (low power). Keltner et al. (1998) found that high power members were more likely to display smiles of pleasure than were low power members.

Additional research by Berdahl and Martorana’s (2006) manipulated power and measured the effect on expressed affect. Using Keltner et al.’s (2003) framework, Berdahl and Martorana predicted that having power would increase the experience and expression of positive emotions and that lacking power would increase the expression of negative emotions. In their study, power was primed by randomly assigning participants to power roles allegedly based on careful evaluation of a leadership questionnaire.

Following role assignment, the experimenter brought groups of three research participants into individual rooms to complete a discussion task. The leader was responsible for managing the discussion about a social issue and recording the agreed upon group opinion. Following this group interaction, both leaders and subordinates completed a post-discussion question that asked about their feelings of power and their expression of emotion during group interactions. Berdahl and Martorana found that leaders experienced more positive emotions, such as happiness and interest, compared to subordinates who reported experiencing more negative emotions such as contempt, discomfort, disgust, embarrassment, fear, guilt and shame.

Automatic Cognition

Social cognition work demonstrates that individuals with power pay less attention to others, while relying more on stereotypes (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998; Keltner & Robinson, 1996, 1997). Fiske's (1993) "power as control (PAC) model" theorizes that high power roles, such as bosses, stereotype low power roles, such as employees, for three reasons: increased cognitive load, lack of outcome dependency, and self-selection of high power roles. High power individuals may experience increased cognitive load because of their high number of responsibilities, and in order to promote efficiency high power individuals may utilize cognitive shortcuts, including stereotypes and heuristics. Second, the outcomes of high power individuals are not dependent on low power individuals, so there is less motivation to pay attention to low power individuals. Finally, high power roles may attract individuals with dominant personalities, and these individuals may be more likely to stereotype subordinates. Other research finds that powerholders pay less attention to low power targets, resulting in less individuation and

greater use of stereotypes (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Keltner & Robinson, 1996, 1997). Additionally, Gruenfeld (2005) found that when primed with power individuals use less systematic social cognition and less complex cognitive processing (cf. Guinote, 2007, on power and attentional flexibility).

Disinhibition Effects

Interestingly, recent work reveals that across different social contexts power is often associated with socially inappropriate and disinhibited behavior. Work by Keltner and Ward (1998) focused on how priming power affects socially appropriate behavior (e.g., eating). Participants were brought into a lab and told to discuss several contentious social issues. One participant was randomly assigned to the high power role that required him or her to assign points to two other participants based on their contributions to written policy recommendations. Partway through the study the experimenter returned with a plate of five cookies. Given that each group consisted of three participants each person could take a single cookie. Of interest was which individual would consume a second cookie. Consistent with their predictions, Keltner and Ward (1998) reported that participants assigned to the high power role were more likely to take a second cookie. Along with consuming more cookies, coded video interactions revealed that high power participants were also more likely to chew with their mouths open and have crumbs on their face and table.

Work in support of disinhibited behavior includes Gonzaga and Keltner's (2001) investigation of the behavioral influence of power in sexual contexts. In their experiment, participants were coded for exhibiting two categories of behavior in a face-

to-face interaction: disinhibition and flirtatiousness. Typical behaviors included provocative eye contact, touches, forward leans, coy glances, and neck presentations. Consistent with their predictions, powerful individuals were more disinhibited and flirtatious compared to those without power. There were no significant sex differences, suggesting that high power men and women demonstrated similar disinhibited behavior. Likewise, Henley (1973) found that touch privilege is correlated with status, such that high power is associated with increased attempts to initiate physical contact.

Another theme of socially inappropriate outcomes includes violations of politeness norms. DePaulo and Friedman (1998) found that high power individuals were more likely to talk, interrupt, and speak out of turn in an organizational context. Drawing from a survey of approximately 750 employees, participants reported that rude and disrespectful behaviors were three times as likely to come from individuals higher up in the company. Further, Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, and Keating (1988) reported that in a discussion task, individuals randomly assigned to high power roles spoke twice as much as those assigned to low power roles.

Taken together, past research in the power literature demonstrates important downstream effects of power on affect, behavior and cognition. Power is associated with attention to rewards, positive affect, cognitive automaticity, and disinhibited behavior. In the following section we review theory and research by Keltner and his colleagues (2003) that integrates these findings into a unified framework.

Power as Approach

Self-Regulation

A fundamental distinction in psychology concerns the difference between approach and avoidance. This distinction is central to motivation theory and research and has been successfully applied to many areas within psychology, from personality (Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Emmons, 1996; Markus & Nurius, 1996) to neuroscience (e.g., Gray, 1982, 1990; Sutton & Davidson, 1997). A substantial body of research provides abundant evidence for the distinction between approaching positive outcomes versus avoiding negative outcomes.

Carver and Scheier (1998) proposed that behavior is guided by two opposing orientations: an approach orientation that is focused on achieving desired goals and an avoidance orientation that is aimed at avoiding anti-goals. Work in neuroscience has identified independent motivational systems based on the response to signals of reward and punishment; in particular, a distinction has been made between a behavioral activation system (BAS) and a behavioral inhibition system (BIS] (e.g., Gray, 1982, 1990; Sutton & Davidson, 1997), and Carver and his colleagues (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Carver & White, 1994) present the BIS and BAS as the two fundamental components of self-regulation. Though represented in various forms, the underlying characteristic of each distinction is essentially the same: an approach motivation is sensitive to positive outcomes and involves moving towards, activating and promoting, whereas an avoidance motivation is sensitive to negative outcomes and involves restraining and inhibiting.

In sum, approach and avoidance regulation differ in focus and action tendency. Approach tendencies are sensitive to positive end states and involve activation. Inhibition tendencies are sensitive to negative end states and involve restraint.

Power as Approach Regulation

An important assumption of the current research is based on Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson's (2003) proposition that "power – influences the relative balance of the tendencies to approach and inhibit" (p. 268). Their theory suggests that power involves reward-rich environments and freedom from constraints that trigger positive affect, automatic cognition, disinhibited behavior, and is related to general increased approach tendencies and decreased inhibition tendencies

In their work examining the action tendencies of powerholders, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) found that in ambiguous situations powerholders were more likely to take action, a reflection of approach tendencies. To test the action tendencies of powerholders, the researchers created a clever blackjack scenario, which challenged players to get as close to 21 without going over. The experimental design included priming power by placing participants in a structural position of power as either the manager or a subordinate. Participants assigned to the manager position were led to believe that they would evaluate and direct the subordinates on a Lego building task. After the explanation of the power roles, but before the Lego task, participants completed the blackjack scenario. Participants were dealt a hand of cards totaling 16 that required asking for an additional card to get closer to 21 or staying with the original hand. Of interest was whether the priming influenced the individual's strategy to "hit," taking action to get closer to 21, or "stay." In line with their predictions, Galinsky et al. (2003)

found that the high power group of managers “hit” significantly more than the low power group. This lends support to the claim that power increases the tendency to take action. In a replication of the influence of power on action tendencies, the authors found that high power participants were twice as likely to take physical action against an annoying stimulus (e.g., turn off a fan blowing in their face) compared to those primed with low power.

Further evidence of the influence of power on action tendencies comes from Anderson and Galinsky’s (2006) investigation of risk estimates. Participants were divided into two groups based on the amount of power they had in their relationships. Then they were asked to estimate the chances that certain events, both positive and negative, would occur in their lives. Participants primed with power estimated lower numbers of fatalities from the causes of death than people primed with low power. The study suggests that when people have power, they are not only more optimistic about risks inherent in their own life, but also about risks in the world in general.

Importantly, having power is not only about increasing one’s approach tendencies, but also about decreasing inhibition tendencies. Disinhibition involves acting on one’s own desires in a social context without considering the effects of one’s actions. In motivational terms, Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) argue that disinhibition is a byproduct of approach tendencies in which the balance of motivation shifts towards failure to inhibit behaviors. They note that those with power are more likely to go after what they want (i.e., approach rewards), and in doing so they are less likely to attend to others and to act in socially inappropriate ways.

To illustrate disinhibited behavior in everyday life, Gruenfeld (Rigoglioso, 2003) provides an anecdote of a famous magazine publisher's behavior:

“He had in his office a small refrigerator within arm's reach of his desk. As far as I could tell, there were only two things in there: a bottle of vodka and a bag of raw onions. While we were meeting, he would reach over, open the door, drink vodka straight out of the bottle, and eat onions. [...] He seemed to think it was perfectly appropriate to do this in a meeting.” (Rigoglioso, 2006)

The relationship between power and disinhibition provides an important connective thread to understanding how power may lead individuals to engage in immoral acts. As illustrated in Keltner and Ward's experiment, powerholders were less concerned with social consequences and were uninhibited in their actions. We propose that disinhibition may play a role in powerholders' tendencies to commit immoral or corrupt acts without incurring damage to their moral self-image. It is powerholders' approach orientation that focuses the individual on rewarding moral actions (i.e., prescriptions) without concentrating on inhibiting immoral behavior (i.e., proscriptions). In this way, the balance of motivational tendencies shifts towards increased approach tendencies and decreased inhibition tendencies and may ultimately promote overlooking immoral behavior.

The current research built upon past work that associated power with increased approach and decreased inhibition tendencies (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003). The next section will review literature concerning the proposed mechanism, moral regulation, for the current set of studies.

Power and Morality

As mentioned in the opening section of this paper, intuitively there seems to be a direct connection between power and corruption, and this was the thesis of Kipnis's

(1972) seminal research. Kipnis questioned whether having power would produce significant behavioral changes in the powerholder, with a particular focus on corrupt consequences. To empirically test this question, Kipnis designed a business simulation in which all participants, who were Temple University business students, were assigned to supervise a group of teenagers in a separate building. Kipnis showed that participants who were given control over resources (e.g., pay increase or deductions) made more attempts to influence the subordinates than those who did not control resources. The managers subsequently undervalued the subordinates' performance, attributed the subordinates' efforts to their own control rather than subordinates' motivations, and sought increased distance from the subordinates.

Other researchers have also sought to understand whether power necessarily leads to negative outcomes. Some of the findings suggest that powerful individuals are more likely to distribute rewards to favor their own powerful group (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001) and to attend to information that confirms their expectations (Copeland, 1994). As discussed in an earlier section, Fiske's (1993) "power as control (PAC) model" proposed that high power roles stereotype low power roles, which "justify the system of inequality." (p.182).

However, findings on the topic of power leading to negative consequences are not consistent, and several researchers find that under certain conditions powerful individuals exhibit superior individuation and less reliance on stereotyping (Overbeck & Park, 2001; Ric, 1997; Louche, 1982) and also do not display in-group favoritism in reward distribution (Ng, 1982). Although power does not necessarily lead to corruption and

behavioral transgressions, we nevertheless believe it may make such outcomes more likely.

Morality

Thus far we have presented past empirical links between power and self-regulation with specific evidence highlighting the relationship between power and approach tendencies. Self-regulation provides a parsimonious explanation of multiple psychological outcomes associated with power, but does not completely explain the relationship between power and corruption. Corruption is broadly defined as immoral behavior and includes such actions as lying, cheating, and stealing. Therefore, the current analysis integrates research on self-regulation and morality as a way to understand how power may lead to corruption and, specifically, moral transgressions. Recent research by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009; also see Janoff-Bulman, 2011; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010, Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010) focused on distinguishing between dual moral obligations of “not harming others” versus “helping others,” which they suggest reflect separate systems of motivation and self-regulation. The current analysis proposes that moral regulation, focusing on good acts or avoiding bad acts, offers an alternative way to understand the relationship between power and corruption. Our aim is to test powerholders’ evaluation of moral and immoral acts, and whether their sensitivity to the two systems of moral regulation predict differential judgments of and engagement in corrupt behaviors.

Two Systems of Moral Regulation: Prescriptive versus Proscriptive

As a set of rules that facilitate group living, morality acts as a compass, helping individuals navigate social situations by offering guidelines as to “how we should or

should not behave in order to be valued members of society” (De Waal, 1996, p.10).

Moral judgments are based on beliefs about what is right and wrong, and moral behavior characterizes a person as good or bad (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). As discussed earlier, central to motivation theory and research is the distinction between approaching positive outcomes versus avoiding negative outcomes. In the moral realm, approach and avoidance regulatory strategies parallel the two primary motives underlying parental responsibility: providing children with the means to survive and protecting them from harm (Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006; also see Bowlby, 1969; Higgins, 1997). In a group context, approach-avoidance motivation functions by regulating group behavior: advancing (i.e., approaching) desirable behaviors to promote group well-being and inhibiting (i.e., avoiding) dangerous, undesirable behaviors.

Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009) propose that past work provides suggestive evidence for two systems of morality based on motivation and self-regulation, and in a series of seven studies they provide evidence for these two systems. One moral system, labeled “prescriptive morality,” is based on activation motivation and focuses on what we *should do*. The other moral system, labeled “proscriptive morality,” is based on inhibition motivation and focuses on what we *should not do*. Further, prescriptive morality involves activation and specifically engaging in moral actions. Proscriptive morality, in contrast, involves inhibition and specifically restraining from immoral behaviors. (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Following from these separate motivational bases, prescriptive and proscriptive morality involve different behaviors. Prescriptive morality entails behaviors that promote well-being and includes acts of

charity and assistance. Proscriptive morality entails inhibiting harmful actions and restraining behaviors that may violate group norms, such as cheating, lying and stealing. Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009) profile the differences between prescriptive and proscriptive morality in terms of linguistic representation, priming sensitivity, judgments of personal preference, and moral crediting and disapproval. Overall, prescriptive morality, a focus on “shoulds,” is represented more abstractly and involves inclusivity to maximize success by engaging in moral acts; proscriptive morality, a focus on “should nots,” is represented in more concrete language, to minimize potential failures by engaging in immoral acts. Prescriptive morality is regarded as more discretionary and less obligatory; given that the costs of engaging in immoral acts are considerably higher, proscriptive morality is perceived as mandatory. Judgments about engaging in moral and immoral behavior are also viewed very differently. Prescriptive moral primes resulted in less disapproval for immoral behavior and more credit for moral behavior. In contrast, proscriptive moral prime resulted in stronger disapproval of immoral acts and less credit for morality.

Overall, prescriptive and proscriptive moral regulation offer insights into the fundamental difference between activating “good” behaviors versus inhibiting “bad” behaviors, and we propose that this framework sheds new light on the link between power and corruption.

Power and Moral Regulation

Following from past research that separately links power and morality with self-regulation, the current perspective proposed that the joint effect of power and morality may provide new insights into why and how power leads to corruption. Power, which involves activation and approach tendencies (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003),

should focus individuals on prescriptive morality, involving good behaviors and intentions one should engage in to promote morality (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Shepp, 2009). Paradoxically, high power individuals, because of their approach-based prescriptive moral orientation, may be predisposed to focus primarily on good moral actions, while overlooking damaging immoral behaviors. In the following sections we will put forth two pathways by which high power, because of a focus on prescriptions, may lead to corruption.

Two Paths to Corruption for Powerholders

A critical feature of self-regulation is the role of monitoring to determine whether one is successfully reaching a goal—successfully approaching a positive outcome in the case of approach motivation and successfully avoiding a negative outcome in the case of avoidance motivation (Carver & Scheier, 1998). As pointed out by Janoff-Bulman (2009), the most effective and efficient monitoring involves feature-positive monitoring (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Newman, Wolff, & Hearst, 1980), which focuses on the presence of evidence rather than its absence (e.g., Coats, Janoff-Bulman, & Alpert, 1996). In the case of prescriptive morality, feature-positive monitoring focuses on instances of morality—good deeds and positive intentions; these are the “hits” of this approach-based regulatory system. In the case of proscriptive morality, feature-positive monitoring focuses on instances of immorality, which are the “hits” of this avoidance-based regulatory system.

We suggest that one way power may paradoxically lead to corruption is based on the information of “what counts most” (i.e. prescriptions) when determining morality. We label this route of power to corruption the *neglect pathway*, and it is characterized by the

under-regulation of the proscriptive moral system (see Figure 1). Power via approach maximizes the importance of good deeds and intentions that matter to morality, and simultaneously minimizes the importance of bad deeds and temptations that contribute to immorality. This is a processes aided and abetted by the feature-positive monitoring processes associated with prescriptive morality and, presumably, power.

Neglect Pathway

Specifically, power should elicit approach-based, prescriptive moral regulation that monitors for good deeds and actions. Moreover, power should minimize one's focus on immoral behavior such as stealing, lying and cheating, because these actions don't fit into the category of actions that define and promote one's morality. They are less relevant to one's own moral self-evaluation. Here there is over-reliance on a single moral regulatory system—prescriptive morality, and this results in under-regulation of immoral acts and a failure to inhibit behavioral transgressions. Put more concretely, consider a businessperson who simultaneously donates money to a charity and embezzles company money for personal gain. Theoretically, power should shift the businessperson's attention to actions that promote prescriptive morality (such as donating to charity), because power elicits approach-based, moral regulation. At the same time, the businessperson fails to inhibit immoral behavior (e.g., embezzling), because his/her prescriptive moral focus minimizes the import of these immoral acts, and thus "allows" the person to paradoxically engage in corruption. Interestingly, the neglect pathway may help us better understand the link between power and disinhibition (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), because approach tendencies of powerholders contribute to their failure to inhibit socially inappropriate behavior.

High Moral Self-Regard

An alternative route for powerful individuals to engage in corruption is through a pathway that is characterized by the belief that they have earned the right to behave immorally based on over-regulation of the prescriptive moral system (see Figure 1). That is, powerholders, focused particularly on their positive moral thoughts and deeds, reward their positive acts and good intentions with moral credits, which ironically licenses future immorality. Their monitoring system over-represents good thoughts and actions, for these are the focus of the regulatory search.

In a series of experiments, Monin and Miller (2001) make the counterintuitive discovery that expressing morally correct judgments leads individuals to behave less morally on a subsequent task. In their experiment, Monin and Miller (2001) had participants make hiring decisions in which the strongest applicant was either a White applicant from an all White applicant pool or an African American applicant from a mixed race applicant pool. In the latter condition, White participants were given the opportunity to make a moral, anti-prejudiced hiring decision and Monin and Miller were interested in whether this moral decision would license the individual to be less moral on a follow-up task. Consistent with their predictions, Monin and Miller (2001) reported that participants who made moral decisions in the first task, made less moral decisions in the follow up task by recommending a less qualified White applicant for a job in a racist police department. Monin and Miller (2001) point out that by establishing anti-racist credentials in the first task these participants gave themselves moral permission to discriminate on the follow-up task. Interestingly, the researchers ruled out self-presentation concerns by rerunning the study as two ostensibly unrelated tasks conducted

by different experimenters. This suggests that individuals keep internal track of their moral actions to ensure a balanced moral self-image. This work demonstrates the ironic finding that behaving morally one time allows individuals to be less moral later.

Additional support comes from recent research by Mazar and Zhong (2010) who found that individuals who previously demonstrated pro-environmentally conscious behaviors (i.e., buying green products) were subsequently more likely to engage in less moral behaviors (i.e., cheat on an online game).

Our second predicted pathway for how power leads to corruption is labeled *high moral self-regard*. Similar to the *neglect pathway*, this path begins with a focus on good moral deeds and intentions, but unlike the neglect pathway, this focus produces a boost in moral self-regard that licenses future immorality. Specifically, high power should elicit approach-based, prescriptive moral regulation that focuses on good deeds and intentions. This focus on moral thoughts and actions should produce a boost in moral self-regard; each monitoring “hit” is evidence of one’s morality (as opposed to outcomes in the proscriptive system, in which each “hit” is evidence of one’s immorality). As Monin and Miller (2001) show, this boost in moral self-regard licenses future immoral behavior. Although actual moral acts are likely to be particularly valuable, it seems that positive intentions alone—thoughts in the absence of deeds—can provide moral credit for those with a strong prescriptive orientation like powerholders. Research on self-other biases by Pronin and Kugler (2007) found that individuals overvalue thoughts and may ignore behavior when engaged in self-evaluations, validating their “good” selves with good intentions. For example, recall the businessperson (as described above) planning to donate to a group of charities. High power focuses attention primarily on this good

intention to donate to charities and as a consequence s/he experiences a boost in moral self-regard. This heightened moral self-regard may then ironically produce more immoral behavior in the future, and thus the original good moral intention licenses future corruption.

Current Studies

In the following three studies we explored the role of moral regulation as a possible exploratory mechanism for the relationship between power and corruption. Specifically, we proposed that powerholders' approach orientation would activate prescriptive moral regulation, which is sensitive to positive moral thoughts and actions, and by minimizing a focus on proscriptive regulation and increasing moral self-regard, may result in moral transgressions by failing to inhibit immoral (proscriptive) behaviors. The following studies tested the two routes to moral transgression, both based in over-regulation of the prescriptive system. The *neglect pathway* involves the under-regulation of the proscriptive system and consists of a minimization of immoral acts and intentions. The *high moral self-regard* pathway involves an approach-based boost in moral self-regard that licenses future immoral behavior. Ironically, in both cases, powerholders' approach-based moral regulation may increase the likelihood of corruption, but the two routes represent independent paths from power to corruption.

The following studies used three different methodologies to test whether powerholders' approach orientation would activate prescriptive moral regulation that paradoxically leads to immoral behavior. Study 1 focused on establishing that power produces approach-based moral regulation and, specifically, valuing prescriptions while simultaneously minimizing proscriptions. To test this relationship, we primed participants

with power and then measured their preference for prescriptive and proscriptive items using self-report survey measures. Study 2 assessed whether priming power produces an automatic approach-based boost of moral self-regard as measured by the Moral Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT), a new implicit measure developed by our lab. Study 2 used the power manipulation and morality measures from Study 1. Study 3 built upon the prior two studies' findings by testing the relationship between power and prescriptive moral regulation using actual behavioral measures of helping and cheating. After being primed with power, participants were asked to complete a behavioral activity of helping and cheating (counterbalanced). Study 3 allowed us to examine whether power is associated with specific patterns of helping and cheating, particularly greater levels of prescriptive morality and proscriptive immorality. The design allowed us to explore whether helping (or cheating) at Time 1 differentially influenced cheating (or helping) at Time 2 for those with and without power. Further, this design allowed us to examine whether helping (or cheating) at Time 1 differentially influenced scores on the Moral Go/No-go Association Task. Taken together, the three studies produced a meaningful investigation of the relationship between power, approach-based moral regulation, and corruptive consequences.

Specific hypotheses that were tested in the following studies are:

- 1.) Power leads to approach-based moral regulation (i.e., focus on prescriptions).
- 2.) Power promotes the overvaluing of moral (prescriptive) behaviors, while simultaneously minimizing (i.e., undervaluing) immoral (proscriptive) behaviors (*neglect pathway*).

3.) Power (via prescriptive moral regulation) produces an automatic boost in moral self-regard that licenses future immoral behaviors (*high moral self-regard pathway*).

Hypotheses 2 and 3 represent the two possible self-regulatory routes from power to corruption. In the research that follows, either, both, or neither of these two hypotheses could be supported.

CHAPTER 2

STUDY 1: POWER PROMOTES A FOCUS ON APPROACH-BASED MORALITY

Study 1 focused on establishing the association between power and prescriptive moral regulation using explicit measures of moral judgment. Using two different self-report measures, we explored the relationship between power and the extent to which participants believed people should or should not engage in moral and immoral behaviors. The two moral judgment measures differed in meaningful ways: the first measure of moral dilemmas mixed moral and immoral behaviors in each scenario and asked participants to evaluate them together; this is a new measure developed for this research. The second measure separated out moral and immoral behaviors to produce a relative preference for prescriptive versus proscriptive moral regulation; this is a measure of prescriptive-proscriptive morality developed and used in previous research (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009; Sheik & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). We believed it was particularly important to include the former measure of morality because it provides a realistic context for moral decision-making – that is, a trade-off between moral and immoral behaviors in a single situation.

In Study 1 we hypothesized that powerholders' approach-based moral regulation should produce overvaluing of moral prescriptions (“shoulds”) compared to moral proscriptions (“should nots”) across both moral judgment measures. Specifically, we expected that powerholders' approval of prescriptive behaviors would be higher and their disapproval of immoral behavior would be lower compared to participants in low power and control groups. Thus, we aimed to show that power is associated with the overvaluing of prescriptions and the minimization (i.e., devaluing) of proscriptions.

Method

Participants

Participants were 186 (131 women, 53 men and 2 unspecified) undergraduates from the Psychology Department subject pool who received experimental credit for their participation.

Materials

Power Prime. Participants were primed with type of power (high or low) using an autobiographical task (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). For three minutes participants wrote about a time that they had (or did not have) power over another individual. A control group was also included; these participants were asked to describe what they did the previous day.

Moral Dilemma Measure. Participants evaluated a series of moral dilemmas involving immoral actions that produced moral outcomes (e.g., receive van for charitable organization by providing a receipt for twice the real value to the car dealer who donated the van). Participants were asked to imagine themselves as the target person in each moral scenario and to consider how they would act. For example:

As a manager, you are approached by an employee to sponsor a charity event that will provide food and clothing for a local women's shelter. You have already sponsored the maximum number of events allowed by your company, but you are still interested in finding a way to sponsor the event, so you consider using money from your department's cash account. Although it violates company rules, you consider taking money from your department's cash account to sponsor the charity event.

Participants rated 10 moral dilemmas using scales tailored to the individual dilemmas (see Appendix 1 for full materials). Using the example above, participants answered the following questions: "Do you sponsor the charity event with money from the

department's cash account?" (responses were given as "yes" or "no") followed by "Do you feel you should/should not use money from the department's cash account...?" "Do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to use the department's money...?" and "What is the likelihood that you would use the department's cash...?" Using separate 9-point scales, participants reported their moral attitude (1= "very strongly should not" to 9 = "very strongly should"); acceptability judgment (1="completely unacceptable" to 9 = "completely acceptable"); and likelihood judgment (1 = "not at all likely" to 9 = "extremely likely"). The reliabilities for the 10-item scales of moral attitude, acceptability and likelihood judgments were .681, .681, and .660.

Moralisms Scale (Janoff-Bulman, 2009). This 20-item measure consisted of 10 prescriptive (PreM) and 10 proscriptive (ProM) items. Each item described a scenario in which the target person is deciding whether or not to engage in a particular behavior. For prescriptive items, these are behaviors the person presumably should engage in to be considered moral, whereas for proscriptive items, these are behaviors the person presumably should not engage in to be considered moral.

Prescriptive items represented behaviors involving benevolence or industriousness, and included volunteering two hours for a local food drive, working especially long and hard to meet a deadline for one's job, going out to find one's own place after staying with a friend for many weeks in her small apartment, and giving money to a homeless person on the street. The latter scenario, for example, was written as follows: "Mary walks by a homeless man on the street, and he asks if she can spare some change. There's a local shelter that costs \$2.00 a night that Mary knows about. Mary could just walk past the homeless man, but considers giving him the \$2.00 instead."

Proscriptive scenarios represented behaviors involving personal temptations or behaviors that indicate a desire or willingness to disregard social norms. Scale items were informed by the work of Haidt (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and Shweder (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) in broadening the traditional focus of morality (also see Krebs, 2008). Examples included “excessive” gambling, wearing a skimpy dress to a funeral, painting a house bright pink and purple in a modest, well-kept neighborhood, and going into greater debt to purchase an expensive TV. The debt scenario, for example, was written as follows: “Sarah is getting more and more into debt with her credit card. She recently bought lots of expensive new clothes and costly furniture for her apartment. She could start saving her money but instead is thinking of buying a very expensive hi-definition TV and going into greater debt.” This instance is intended to draw on moral motives associated with restraint from temptation and self-indulgence.

In each case, participants were presented with a target person who is considering a particular behavior (a “good” behavior in the case of prescriptive, and a “bad” behavior in the case of proscriptive) and was asked to rate the extent to which they viewed the decision to be a matter of personal preference (1 = “not at all a matter of personal preference” and 9 = “completely a matter of personal preference”) and the extent to which they believed the person in the scenario should or should not perform the behavior (1 = “feel very strongly he/she should not” to 9 = “feel very strongly he/she should”). The reliabilities for PreM and ProM personal preference ratings were .85 and .82, and for the PreM and ProM moral weight ratings they were .76 and .77.

Moral Esteem Scale. This 8-item scale was an adaptation of the Rosenberg (1962) Self-Esteem measure. Sample items included: “I feel that I am a person of moral self worth, at least on an equal plane with others” “All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a moral failure, ” “When it comes to morality, on the whole I am satisfied with myself.” Participants rated the extent to which they disagree/agree with each item (1 = “very strongly disagree” to 7 = “very strongly agree”). The reliability for Moral Esteem was .91.

Procedure

Participants took part in an online study that consisted of three priming conditions: high power, low power, or control followed by the Moral Dilemmas Scale, Moralisms Scale, and standard demographics. After completing the study, participants were thanked for their involvement and given a debriefing document that explained the research goals.

Results and Discussion

As predicted, high power participants, compared to low power and control, indicated greater acceptance of immoral behaviors that lead to moral outcomes; means were 4.10 versus 3.51 and 3.55, respectively, $F(2, 185) = 5.571, p < .005$. As shown in Figure 2, high power participants’ greater acceptance of moral dilemmas provides suggestive evidence that high power leads to a focus on prescriptions by overvaluing prescriptive moral ends and undervaluing proscriptive immoral means. Interestingly, differences were not found on the other Moral Dilemma subscales, which were likely less direct measures of moral judgments. For example, the should/should not scale may have reflected societal rather than personal views while the likelihood scale may have reflected

recognition of other factors that contribute to these decisions. The yes/no item was probably too crude to capture moral judgments accurately.¹ Moral self-esteem did not differ by group and will not be discussed in further analyses.

We also tested for condition effects on the Moralisms Scale. We hypothesized that high power participants, compared to low power and control, would have higher scores for prescriptive morality and lower scores for proscriptive morality. Means were computed for the 10 prescriptive (PreM) and 10 proscriptive (ProM) preference and moral weight items. ProM scores were subtracted from 10 so that higher scores indicated stronger proscriptive orientation.

Mean scores for PreM and ProM personal preference and moral weight scores did not differ by power condition (see Table 1 for means). Therefore, we did not find direct confirmation for the prediction that compared to low power and control groups, high power participants would have higher prescriptive and lower proscriptive scores on the Moralisms Scale. However, a closer look at the correlations between PreM and ProM moral weight scores provided some preliminary evidence for hypothesis-supporting differences based on power. Interestingly, PreM and ProM moral weight scores were uncorrelated for high power ($r = .052, n.s.$), strongly positively correlated for low power participants ($r = .372, p < .001$) and marginally positively correlated for control ($r = .206, n.s.$). These divergent correlations shed light on how power may change the relationship between these two systems of morality. For low power individuals, and to some extent for control participants as well, prescriptive and proscriptive morality were interrelated;

¹The Moral Dilemma acceptability subscale was much stronger alone than combined with the should/should not, likelihood and yes/no measures, so it will be the sole measure used for the remainder of the paper.

the desire to engage in moral behavior was associated with the desire to avoid engaging in immoral behavior. In contrast, high power individuals seemed to treat prescriptive and proscriptive morality as fairly independent systems; attitudes about moral behaviors did not necessarily predict their attitudes towards immoral behaviors. Importantly, the separable nature of prescriptive and proscriptive morality for high power participants may help explain why immoral behaviors are viewed as acceptable when they lead to moral outcomes.

As illustrated in Table 2, correlations between PreM and ProM scores and acceptability judgments also differed by power condition. For high power participants, PreM scores were positively associated with acceptance of moral dilemmas, but ProM scores were negatively associated with these dilemmas. For low power participants both PreM and ProM scores were negatively associated with acceptance of moral dilemmas. Similarly, PreM and ProM scores were negatively associated with acceptance of moral dilemmas for the control group. We conducted Fischer z-tests to examine if the correlations for PreM and ProM scores and acceptability judgments were significantly different by power conditions. The correlation for PreM scores and acceptability judgments were significantly different for high and low power ($z = 3.31, p < .001$) as well as high power and control ($z = 1.77, p = .038$). The correlations for ProM and acceptability judgments were marginally different for high and low power ($z = -1.14, p = .079$), but not statistically different for high power and control. These results provide additional evidence that priming power may influence how individuals differentially emphasize the two systems of morality (prescriptive and proscriptive) when making moral judgments.

Given the previous results, we examined the joint effect of power and individual scores of prescriptive morality to predict acceptance of immoral behavior. We hypothesized that the combined effect of high power and prescriptive morality would be associated with greater acceptance of immoral behavior. Hierarchical moderated multiple regression was used to predict acceptance of moral dilemma items. In Step 1 the dummy coded variables for power condition and prescriptive morality scores were entered. In Step 2 the interaction terms for prescriptive morality by power condition were added. The control condition was treated as the reference group. The addition of the interaction terms at Step 2 indicated that the relationship between acceptance scores and prescriptive morality varied across the power conditions, $\Delta R^2 = .06$, $F(2,180) = 6.22$, $p = .002$. As shown in Figure 3, individuals primed with high power, who also scored relatively high on prescriptive morality, were more accepting of immoral behaviors compared to low power and control conditions.

Overall, the findings of Study 1 provide suggestive evidence for the neglect pathway as tested by the first and second hypotheses. We found power led to approach-based moral regulation and promoted the overvaluing of moral (prescriptive) behaviors while simultaneously minimizing immoral (proscriptive) behaviors. Using the Moral Dilemma Measure, we assessed participants' tolerance of short term immorality (proscriptions) to achieve long term moral outcomes (prescriptions). Consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2, high powerholders reported greater acceptance of moral dilemmas suggesting that high power activated a type of moral regulation that prioritized prescriptions and deprioritized proscriptions.

Additional support for the neglect pathway came from the Moralism Scale, which provided a relative preference for PreM versus ProM. We predicted high power participants would be higher on PreM and lower on ProM, but did not find this main effect. However, correlations between the two systems of morality and the moral dilemma measure revealed interesting patterns. For only high power PreM and ProM scores were uncorrelated, which we believe reflects the separable nature of morality for powerholders that may help explain why they engage in both altruistic and corrupt behaviors without costs to their moral-esteem. Further, for high power participants acceptance of moral dilemmas was associated with PreM not ProM, suggesting that for powerholders it was how they felt about prescriptive morality, not proscriptive morality that mattered in judging the dilemmas. Similarly, the interaction between power and PreM in predicting acceptability of moral dilemmas revealed that high power participants with relatively high PreM scores were most accepting of moral dilemmas. When having power is paired with a dispositional prescriptive focus, it produces overvaluing of prescriptions and minimization of proscriptions; a prescriptive focus for those without high power does not result in a similar acceptance of proscriptive immorality for the sake of prescriptive moral outcomes.

CHAPTER III

STUDY 2: POWER AND MORAL SELF-REGARD

Study 2 was designed to examine if priming power automatically shifts participants' moral self-regard and whether this shift influences explicit moral judgments. Of particular interest was whether high power individuals experienced enhanced moral self-regard that in turn produced over-regulation of prescriptive morality and decreased concern for proscriptive moral violations (i.e., moral self-regard pathway). In Study 2 it was important to use an implicit measure of moral esteem like the Moral Go/No-go Association Task, because people prefer to view themselves as moral, which results in high explicit moral esteem scores. We found no differences on explicit moral esteem in Study 1; therefore in Study 2 we included both implicit and explicit measures of moral esteem.

Method

Study 2 attempted to explore the relationship between power and shifts in moral self-regard in order to determine whether high moral self-regard could help account for the greater acceptance of immoral actions (for moral outcomes) by high power individuals, as found in Study 1. We manipulated power (high, low, and control) using the same procedure described in Study 1. Following the prime, participants completed an implicit measure of moral esteem, the Moral Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT), as well as the Moral Dilemmas and Moralisms Scale used in Study 1.

Participants

Participants were 141 (114 women, 26 men and 1 unspecified) undergraduates from the Psychology Department subject pool who received experimental credit for their participation.

Materials

Moral Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT). The original Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001) was designed to assess an implicit attitude or belief by measuring the strength of association between a target category and two poles of a given attribute dimension. The MGNAT was developed by our morality lab and is an adaptation of the GNAT designed to assess an individual's implicit moral self-regard. The advantage of using the MGNAT, as opposed to other implicit measures (e.g., a measure based on the Implicit Association Task), is that it allowed us to collect separate associations for prescriptive and proscriptive bases of moral self-regard. In the MGNAT the target dimensions included "self" (I, me, myself, my, mine) and "other" (they, them, their, him, her) with the attribute poles set to "moral" (honest, help, fair, care, generous) and "immoral" (lie, cheat, steal, unfaithful, selfish). In this task, participants were exposed to all four types of stimuli: self, other, moral, and immoral. After several practice trials that familiarized participants with each type (12 practice trials for each type of stimulus), they completed four critical blocks of 60 trials each. In one block participants were asked to give a "go" response if the word presented fit the "moral" or "me" categories, and ignore all other types of words. Similarly, participants were presented with trials me-immoral, other-moral, and other-immoral (counterbalanced), and were instructed to ignore all other words except for the specified

target words. A key to this task is that exposure times to these trials were very rapid (a matter of milliseconds), and thus errors were very common (and not only counted on by researchers, but used in the scoring of the task). The MGNAT allowed us to measure the ease of association (measured in number of errors, with fewer errors indicating greater association) when “moral” versus “immoral” words were associated with “self” versus “other.”

Moral Dilemma Measure. Using the same measure from Study 1, participants evaluated 10 moral dilemmas involving immoral actions that produced moral outcomes (e.g., receive donated van for charitable organization by providing a receipt for twice the real value of the donated van to car dealer). Participants were asked to imagine themselves as the target person in each moral scenario and to consider how they would act. The reliabilities for the 10-item subscales of moral attitude, acceptability and likelihood judgments were .617, .707, and .587, respectively.

Moralisms Scale (Janoff-Bulman, 2009). Using the same measure from Study 1, participants evaluated 10 prescriptive (PreM) and 10 proscriptive (ProM) items. The reliabilities for PreM and ProM personal preference ratings were .795 and .781, and for the PreM and ProM moral weight ratings they were .642 and .653.

Moral Esteem Scale. Using the same scale from Study 1, participants responded to the adapted Rosenberg (1962) Self-Esteem measure that included 8 items measuring moral esteem. The reliability for Moral Esteem was .869.²

²We did not find any group differences on explicit moral esteem nor were explicit and implicit moral esteem correlated (i.e., d' prime scores of MGNAT). Correlations between explicit moral esteem and d' prime scores were: self-moral ($r = .084, n.s.$), self-immoral ($r = -.152, n.s.$), other-moral ($r = -.053, n.s.$), other-immoral ($r = -.039, n.s.$),

Procedure

Participants took part in a computer-based laboratory study that consisted of three priming conditions, followed by an implicit measure of moral esteem and two explicit moral judgment measures. Power was manipulated using the same narrative priming task (Galinsky et al., 2003) described in Study 1 and was directly followed by the Moral Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT). The MGNAT included four 60-trial blocks of word associations. Afterward, participants completed the Moral Dilemmas and Moralisms Scale and standard demographics from Study 1. Participants were thanked for their involvement in the study and given a debriefing document that explained the research goals.

Results and Discussion

To test the moral self-regard pathway, we predicted that power would produce higher implicit moral regard that would be reflected in greater accuracy in response to stimulus words associating “me” and “moral” than when responding to all other pairings including: me-immoral, other-moral and other-immoral. We also expected that for high power, moral regard would be related to support of prescriptions and greater acceptance of proscriptions on the Moral Dilemma measure. We believed moral esteem would mediate the relationship between power and moral judgments, and planned to test for this mediation.

As seen in Figure 4, we replicated the effect from Study 1 that high power participants, compared to low power and control, were more accepting of immoral behaviors that lead to moral outcomes; means were 3.82 versus 3.28 and 3.68, respectively, $F(2, 137) = 2.967, p = .055$. Though we replicated the acceptability effect

from Study 1, the goal of Study 2 was to determine whether enhanced moral regard would account for increased prescriptive decision making by powerholders. To fully address the role of moral regard we turned to the Moral Go/No-go Association Task, a measure of implicit moral esteem.

Analyses of the MGNAT data involved calculating participant d-prime (d') scores for the critical 600ms blocks using procedures outlined in Nosek and Banaji (2001) and defined by Green and Swets (1966). Signal detection theory uses four different response types: hits (target stimulus present & correct “go” response); misses (target stimulus present & incorrect “no go” response); false alarms (target stimuli absent & incorrect “go” response); and correct rejections (target stimuli absent & correct “no go” response). Importantly, these four response types differentiate between participants’ correct “go” responses (i.e. signal) and incorrect “go” responses (i.e. noise) to determine signal sensitivity, d-prime (d'). As described by Nosek and Banaji, “sensitivity is calculated as (1) the proportion of hits [...] and false alarms [...] each converted to z-scores; (2) a difference between z-score values for hits and false alarms is d-prime” (pp. 634).

We tested the prediction that high power participants would experience enhanced moral regard with greater accuracy (i.e., fewer association errors) in response to stimulus words for self-moral pairings compared to self-immoral, other-moral and other-immoral pairings. Using a repeated measures analysis we compared the four d' prime scores (self-moral, self-immoral, other-moral, and other-immoral pairings) as within-subject variables across the three power conditions (high power, low power, and control). The condition by d' prime score interaction was not significant, $F(2, 135) = 2.188, p = .116$. High power

participants, compared to low power and control, were not more accurate on self-moral associations compared to the other three association pairings.

We also tested the prediction that high power participants would be more accurate on self-moral pairings compared to low power and control participants. One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed no effect of power condition on accuracy of self-moral pairings. That is, high power, low power, and control exhibited roughly equal self-moral association scores with means of 1.32, 1.15 and .97, respectively. Further examination of participant d' prime scores revealed no significant differences for other-moral and other-immoral pairings³ based on power group. Since we were not able to confirm the prediction that power leads to enhanced moral regard via greater accuracy on self-moral pairings we did not have cause to test moral-esteem as a mediator for power and acceptability judgments.

The findings of Study 2 did not provide support for the moral self-regard pathway as specified by hypothesis 3--powerholders' approach-based morality would boost implicit moral-esteem, and thus license immoral behaviors and judgments. Using the MGNAT to assess implicit associations, high powerholders were not more accurate in their associations for self-moral pairings compared to other pairings, nor were they more accurate for self-moral pairing compared to low power and control participants. Further, overall correlations between d' prime scores and acceptability judgments were uncorrelated, and there was no association when broken down by power condition. The MGNAT is a relatively new measure developed by our lab and is currently being tested

³There was a marginal effect for self-immoral pairings, $F(2, 136) = 1.791, p = .060$, but post hoc analyses revealed that this effect was driven by the control group ($M = .685$) compared to the high and low power groups ($M_s = 1.049$ and $.842$, respectively).

in a number of studies. Data from other studies (including Study 3 of this project) suggests that the MGNAT does provide some sensitivity for picking up differences, but perhaps the lack of difference in Study 2 reflects the relative stability of moral esteem.

In Study 2, having power once again led to more prescriptive decision making—that is, greater acceptance of proscriptive immorality for the sake of prescriptive moral outcomes. Those primed with power seemed to prioritize prescriptive moral outcomes and deprioritize proscriptive morality. However, we did not find evidence that this effect was due to higher moral self-regard for those primed with power. In other words the high moral self-regard pathway to immorality was not supported by the study's findings.

CHAPTER IV

STUDY 3: BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF POWER ON HELPING AND CHEATING

Study 3 built upon the prior two studies' findings by further testing the relationship between power and moral regulation, and by focusing on power-based differences in prescriptive and proscriptive morality, explored here through actual behaviors. After being primed with power, participants were asked to engage in a behavioral activity of helping and cheating (counterbalanced). By examining the relationship between power and the initial (i.e., Time 1) behavior, Study 3 allowed us to test whether power is associated with specific patterns of helping and cheating, particularly greater levels of prescriptive morality and proscriptive immorality.

Method

Participants

Participants were 141⁴ (93 women, 30 men and 18 unspecified) undergraduates from the Psychology Department subject pool who received experimental credit for their participation.

Materials

Cheating Task (Vohs & Schooler, 2008). This activity is an extension of previous cheating measures (von Hippel, Lakin, & Shakarchi, 2005), which presented participants with a real opportunity to cheat on a laboratory task. Participants were asked to calculate 20 individually presented mental-arithmetic problems (e.g., $1 + 8 + 18 - 12 + 19 - 7 + 17$

⁴At the end of Study 3 we asked participants if they were suspicious of the experimental tasks or instructions. We had reason to exclude 12 participants from the analyses based on suspicion. However, reanalyzing the data without these participants did not change any of the results. Therefore, we are reporting the results from the complete data set.

$- 2 + 8 - 4 = ?$). Participants were told that the computer program contained a glitch that revealed the solution if participants right-clicked their computer mouse. The experimenter explained that the researcher would not know if participants right-clicked the computer mouse, but that they should try to solve the problems honestly. In actuality, the computer program was designed to show the solution if the participant right-clicked their computer mouse and would record the number of times the participants right-clicked the mouse during the math problems. We also recorded the number of truthful attempts before participants right-clicked to see the solution. The dependent measure of cheating was the number of times participants right-clicked the computer mouse to reveal the math solution. Therefore, higher right-click counts indicate greater cheating.

Helping Measure. We asked participants to evaluate a pamphlet for a fictitious non-profit organization, Pioneer Valley Survival Center (see Appendix F and G for pamphlet). The pamphlet described the Pioneer Valley Survival Center's role in the community by providing meals, clothing, medical services, and outreach programs, and also noted that they continually looked for financial support for these programs. After viewing the pamphlet for three minutes, participants used separate 7-point scales to evaluate whether the pamphlet was informative (1= "not at all informative" to 7 = "extremely informative"), attractive (1= "not at all attractive" to 7 = "extremely attractive") and if the Pioneer Valley Survival Center served an important role in the community (1= "not at all important" to 7= "extremely important").

At the bottom of the evaluation form participants were informed that as part of the experiment they would be entered into a lottery to win \$50. The researcher would select seven students to win \$50 each, and participants were asked if they won the lottery

whether they would be willing to donate any of the \$50 to the Pioneer Valley Survival Center. Participants filled out the lottery entry form at the bottom of the evaluation task with their name, contact information (e.g., phone number or email address), and the amount of money they would like to donate. Participants removed the entry form and placed their own slip into a locked ballot box in the laboratory. After data collection concluded, seven students were selected to win \$50 each, and from this pool of money \$130 was actually donated to the Northampton Survival Center (265 Prospect Street Northampton, MA 01060).

Moral Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT). Participants completed the same MGNAT used in Study 2. The MGNAT measured implicit moral esteem via ease of association in number of errors (with fewer errors indicating greater association) when “moral” versus “immoral” words were associated with “self” versus “other.”

Moral Dilemma Measure. Using the same measure from Studies 1 and 2, participants evaluated 10 moral dilemmas involving immoral actions that produced moral outcomes. The reliabilities for the 10-item subscales of moral attitude, acceptability and likelihood judgments were .619, .685, and .633, respectively.

Moralisms Scale (Janoff-Bulman, 2009). Using the same measure from Studies 1 and 2, participants evaluated 10 prescriptive (PreM) and 10 proscriptive (ProM) items. Only PreM and ProM moral weight ratings were recorded in Study 3 with reliabilities of .540 and .533, respectively.

Moral Esteem Scale. Using the same scale from Studies 1 and 2, explicit moral esteem was measured using the adapted Rosenberg (1962) Self-Esteem measure. The reliability for Moral Esteem was .874⁵.

Procedure

Participants took part in a study that consisted of three priming conditions followed by both cheating and helping behavioral tasks (counterbalanced). Participants also completed the MGNAT, Moral Dilemmas and Moralisms Scale, and standard demographics from Studies 1 and 2. At the end of the study, participants were thanked for their involvement and given a debriefing document that explained the research goals.

Results and Discussion

The goal of Study 3 was to provide another test of the neglect pathway using actual behaviors of cheating and helping. Following from hypothesis 2, we predicted high power participants, compared to low power and control would show increased proscriptive behavior (i.e., greater cheating on the computer task) and increased prescriptive behavior (i.e., larger donations on helping task). We believed this pattern of behavior would reflect powerholders' activation of approach-based prescriptive behavior, while simultaneously minimizing the immorality of proscriptions and failing to inhibit these behaviors.

Proscriptive Behavior

Does power lead to increased cheating? To test this prediction we analyzed the computerized cheating task by creating several cheating indexes, including total cheating across the 20 math equations (i.e., total number scored as 1 – 20) and average number of

⁵ Consistent with Study 1 we did not find any group differences on explicit moral-esteem.

honest attempts before cheating (i.e., average number of incorrect answers submitted before right-clicking for the solution). There were no condition effects for either total cheating, $F(2, 138) = .507, p = .603$, or average number of honest attempts before cheating, $F(2, 42) = .989, p = .380$. Further, a chi-square test revealed that the power groups did not differ in their proportion of cheating, $\chi^2(3, N = 141) = 3.461, p = .177$. Across all power conditions 31.9% cheated at least once while 68.1% completed the task honestly. Moreover, for the 45 participants who cheated, the average number of times they cheated was 5.20, with no group differences.

Prescriptive Behavior

Does power lead to increased helping? We analyzed the pledged donation amount and the three rating items from the pamphlet evaluation task (informative, attractive, and important) to test this prediction.

Prescriptions Predict Moral Judgments

Given the previous finding that power groups differed in their donation amounts, we examined the interaction of power and donations⁶ on ratings of acceptability⁷, which was completed following the cheating and helping behaviors. We hypothesized that the combined effect of high power and higher donation (e.g., prescriptive behavior) would be associated with greater acceptance of immoral behavior. Hierarchical moderated multiple regression was used to predict acceptance of moral dilemma items. In Step 1 the dummy

⁶ Donations were positively associated with PreM for all groups, as would be expected, and not with ProM.

⁷ Unlike Studies 1 and 2, there was a marginal effect of power on acceptability judgments, $F(2, 135) = 2.395, p = .095$ with means for high power, low power, and control ($M_s = 3.35, 3.34, \text{ and } 3.78$, respectively). Post hoc analyses reveal that high and low power were moderately different from control, but not from each other. It is important to note, however, that in this case the judgments followed actual behaviors (or restraint from behaviors) reflecting proscriptive and prescriptive morality.

coded variables for power condition and donation were entered. In Step 2 the interaction terms for donation by power condition were added. The control condition was treated as the reference group. The addition of the interaction terms at Step 2 indicated that the relationship between the acceptance scores and donations varied across the power conditions, $\Delta R^2 = .038$, $F(2,117) = 3.238$, $p = .042$. As shown in Figure 5, the association between acceptance and donations is positive for the high power condition compared to low power and control groups. Simple slope analyses revealed that the regression line for high power is significantly different from control, $b = -2.502$, $SE = .013$, $p = .014$, and moderately different from low power, $b = -1.708$, $SE = .013$, $p = .09$.

The finding that participants primed with power, who also pledged to give higher donations (e.g. prescriptive behavior), was associated with greater acceptance of immoral behavior provides additional support for the neglect pathway. We believe this pattern is a reflection of the relationship between power and approach-based morality that makes immoral behavior more acceptable. Conversely, for low power and control participants, the smaller the pledged donation the more accepting they were of immoral behaviors. Perhaps low power and control participants were attempting to normalize immoral behavior to take the focus off their own minimal donations. Importantly, in this research participant donations reflected donation intentions because students had not yet received any lottery winnings. Such altruistic intentions, rather than actual acts, may play an important role in the proscription behaviors (i.e., corruption) of high powerholders. The interaction between power, donations (e.g., moral-based behavior) and moral Donation amount was marginally different by power condition, $F(2,138) = 2.587$, $p = .079$ with participants in the low power group donating significantly less ($M = \$19.68$)

than the high power and control groups (Ms were \$26.33 and \$27.79, respectively). In addition, evaluations that the survival center filled an important need in the community varied by power condition, $F(2,139) = 5.372, p = .006$, with low power participants rating the survival center as less important ($M = 5.74$) compared to high power ($M = 6.38$) and control ($M = 6.21$) participants. Further, ratings of pamphlet attractiveness were marginally different for power condition, $F(2,137) = 2.624, p = .076$; high power participants rated the pamphlet as most attractive ($M = 4.26$) compared to low power participants ($M = 3.70$) and control ($M = 4.05$). All participants found the pamphlet to be equally informative, $F(2,137) = .625, p = .537$. Interestingly, those low in power were the most withholding of donations as well as the harshest critics of the survival center's importance. One possible explanation is that this reflects the relationship between low power and inhibition-based proscriptive morality, which shifts one's focus to avoiding immorality rather than promoting morality. As will be discussed below, more research needs to be done on low power and also points to the need for control groups (included here), so often not included in past research. Judgments relates to current research on moral licensing (Monin & Miller, 2001). Moral licensing suggests that individuals who engage in moral behaviors initially reward themselves with "moral credits" and, ironically, are more likely to engage in immoral behaviors afterward. Therefore, moral licensing theory would predict that all participants (regardless of power condition) who intended to donate would be more accepting of immoral behavior because of moral credentialing. However, in this research we did not find a main effect of moral licensing; instead, prescriptive intentions were more powerful (in terms of moral licensing) for high powerholders. This result underscores the unique interplay between power and morality.

Moral Self-Regard

Study 3 also provided a second examination of the moral self-regard pathway as measured by the relationship between power and participants' scores on the MGNAT. As in Study 2, we did not find a relationship between power and participants' four association scores. However, further examination of participant *d*'prime scores revealed significant order effects for self-immoral, other-moral, and other-immoral pairings. That is, when participants completed the cheating task (e.g., before or after the helping task) influenced their implicit moral association scores. For self-immoral pairings, participants who completed the cheating task directly prior to the MGNAT had significantly higher self-immoral association scores ($M = 1.16$) compared to those who donated directly prior to the MGNAT ($M = .674$), $F(1,139) = 17.776, p > .000$. There was no effect for self-moral pairings, which we believe is a reflection of the stability of self-moral associations. Nevertheless, participants regarded themselves as more immoral immediately after cheating. Similarly, other-immoral and other-moral association scores were strongest for those who cheated directly prior ($M = 1.122$ and $M = .575$ respectively) compared to those who donated directly prior ($M = .8433$ and $M = .575$ respectively). Although these results go beyond the scope of the current studies, they do provide preliminary evidence for the sensitivity of the MGNAT as a tool to capture changes in implicit moral esteem.

Study 3 provides further support for the neglect pathway and suggestive evidence that having power is associated with morally-based behaviors. Using actual behaviors, we found high power individuals who engaged in prescriptive acts like donating were more accepting of immoral behavior. We predicted, but did not find differences in actual cheating nor an effect of proscriptive behaviors (e.g., cheating) on moral judgments for

participants primed with power. Moderated multiple regression analyses were run including cheating as a predictor of acceptability judgments, but none of the analyses were significant. Therefore, we concluded that cheating did not moderate the relationship between power and acceptability judgments. In this research participants had to activate cheating behavior (e.g., right-clicked mouse to reveal solution) rather than inhibit default cheating, used in previous studies. Perhaps this modification to activate cheating rather than inhibit, actually suppressed the rate of overall cheating, which is why we were unable to find the predicted relationship between power and cheating. Further, participants completed this study in a room with two other participants and perhaps the public setting again suppressed cheating that might have occurred in private. Future research will refine the cheating paradigm to further test our prediction that cheating would increase for individuals primed with high power.

CHAPTER V

GENERAL DISCUSSION

By bridging the power, self-regulation, and morality literatures we proposed that powerful individuals, because of their approach tendencies, are oriented more towards moral prescriptions or “shoulds” and thus focus more on moral acts and moral intentions while minimizing the importance of moral proscriptions (*neglect pathway*). We proposed an alternative pathway to corruption for powerholders via moral self-regard.

Powerholders, because of their approach-based moral focus, would experience an automatic boost of implicit moral self-regard that would license future immorality. In three studies we found supportive evidence for the neglect pathway (Studies 1 & 3), but not the moral self-regard pathway (Study 2).

Past evidence for our hypotheses comes from consistent findings suggesting that power leads to increased approach tendencies, as demonstrated through increased action, positive affect, automatic cognition, risk taking, and socially inappropriate behavior (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). In addition, we found suggestive evidence for our predictions from the positive social acts of corrupt individuals such as Eliot Spitzer and Bernard Madoff. Eliot Spitzer was a proponent of same-sex marriage and voted to provide rights to illegal immigrants, while Bernard Madoff sat on the board of numerous charities and gave away millions of dollars. Our theoretical model helps reconcile why these individuals simultaneously engaged in moral (prescriptive) and immoral (proscriptive) actions.

Across Studies 1 and 3 we found support for the neglect pathway as predicted by hypotheses one and two. We expected individuals primed with power would be more accepting of immoral actions that led to moral outcomes, because their prescriptive moral focus increased their sensitivity to morality (rather than immorality). Using the Moral Dilemma measure developed for this research, we combined immoral actions and moral outcomes, and found that participants primed with power were more accepting of proscriptive misdeeds for the sake of prescriptive good deeds compared to low power and control participants (Studies 1 and 2)⁸. Interestingly, high powerholders were not higher on prescriptive morality in general – that is, they didn't have higher PreM scores on the Moralism Scale (Study 1), nor did they donate more (Study 3). However, greater acceptance of immorality was associated with higher PreM scores (Study 1) and donations (Study 3) only for those primed with power. The interactions from Studies 1 and 3 suggest the importance of enhanced prescriptive focus – that is, when their prescriptive morality is high (dispositionally or as a result of their own past actions or intentions), they are more apt to be accepting of proscriptive (immoral) behavior. We also proposed a second pathway to corruption involving enhanced moral-regard for powerholders. This pathway was informed by past moral licensing research (Monin & Miller, 2001) that found participants who engaged in an initial moral act (e.g., non-biased hiring decision or buying environmentally friendly products) were more likely to engage in immoral behavior afterward because of a boost in moral self-regard. Following from this, hypothesis 3 predicted that high powerholders, because of their prescriptive moral

⁸ Unexpectedly, we only found a marginal effect of power on moral judgments in Study 3. However, we attribute this effect to the inclusion of morally-based behaviors (cheating and donating) prior to the moral judgments.

focus, would experience an automatic boost of moral regard that would license immorality. We used a new instrument developed by our lab to measure implicit moral esteem, Moral Go/No-go Association Task. We expected high power participants to have stronger implicit association scores for “self” and “moral” pairings compared to all other word pairings (self-immoral, other-moral, other-immoral), with high power also having stronger associations on self-moral pairings compared to low power and control.

However, we did not find support for the moral self-regard pathway (Study 2). Of note, we predicted that positive moral intentions alone—thoughts in the absence of deeds— would be powerful enough to elicit the automatic boost of moral regard, which we did not find. This prediction was informed by self-other biases research by Pronin and Kugler (2007), which that suggests individuals overvalue thoughts and may ignore behavior when engaged in self-evaluations, validating their “good” selves with good intentions. Interestingly, in Study 3, these intentions, specifically to donate future lottery winnings, were sufficient to produce greater acceptance of proscriptive immorality by those primed with high power.

Although power did not relate to differences in implicit moral self-regard, high power was still associated with a focus on prescriptions, as shown through acceptability judgments, thereby providing additional support for the neglect pathway (Study 2). It appears that power may not automatically make one feel more moral, but it helps one focus on morality by prioritizing prescriptive moral outcomes. A measure of moral esteem was included in all three studies, but there were no group differences, which we believe is a reflection of people’s strong tendency to see themselves as moral. Bandura and colleagues’ work on moral disengagement (1996) found ordinary individuals who

engaged in detrimental behavior (e.g., harming another) still viewed their behavior as moral. Moral disengagement helped keep moral-esteem intact, and may shed light on why we found a ceiling effect for explicit moral-esteem even after participants cheated in Study 3. Future research should examine the relationship between power and moral esteem (implicit and explicit) for those with real, not manipulated power.

Overall, this research supports the conclusion that for powerholders the neglect pathway is the operative path by which power may lead to moral transgressions, a form of corruption. In three studies we found suggestive evidence that the approach tendencies of powerholders maximized the role of good moral acts and intentions and minimized the impact of moral transgressions, because the individual's monitoring system focused on and valued instances of moral successes (i.e., good behavior and intentions) rather than moral failures (i.e., bad behavior and intentions). We did not find support for the moral self-regard pathway, and therefore cannot conclude that moral esteem mediates the relationship between power and acceptance of immorality. The take home message from this project is that powerful individuals regulated their moral behavior by focusing primarily on prescriptions, "shoulds," and less on proscriptions, "should nots," and this paradoxically led to greater acceptance of immoral behavior.

Limitations and Future Research

Although this research project provides many insights into the relationship between power and morality, it is critical to extend this work to other samples of powerholders. Will these results generalize to individuals in chronic positions of high power (e.g., business or political leaders)? Perhaps the degree of these effects is proportional to the amount of power one possesses. Another issue closer to this project,

is teasing apart the differences between high and low power. In Study 3 we found that low power participants viewed the charitable organization more as a matter of personal preference rather than mandatory. We did not predict this relationship and there is not much literature that speaks to the specific mechanisms for low power individuals; therefore future research would be well served to continue to include control groups, as in this project. There are important theoretical reasons to tease apart the low power construct, because the term may confound two very different experiences. On the one hand, people low in power may know they are in a subordinate position, but may not desire or know how to change their situation. Alternatively, those low in power may be aware of their status and also be motivated to change their position, but may not have the means or may be actively prevented from improving their position. Another power state to consider, especially as it is relevant to organizational behavior, is “equivalent power” – that is, members working together on a project who have important implications for moral regulation. In extreme cases of corruption individuals often have partners (for example, Bernie Madoff’s lawyer Ira Sorkin), so sharing power may be another part of how moral regulation can lead to corruption.

Another future direction for this research is to continually refine our test of power on implicit moral esteem. One possibility is to increase the MGNAT time window from 600ms to 750ms given that 600ms is extremely quick and may not accurately reflect attitude-based errors. Past research by Nosek and Banaji (2001) supports this recommendation since they find that using response windows between 500 and 850ms accurately capture automatic attitudes. Further, using actual moral behaviors, not just intentions, might be the key to understanding how power may boost moral-regard.

It was surprising that we did not find any behavioral differences on cheating in Study 3. One possibility is that the situation of being in public, as well as our modification of the cheating task may have suppressed actual cheating behavior. Our cheating task was not an exact replication of previous methods (Vohs & Schooler, 2008), because we had individuals engage in cheating by right-clicking to reveal the solution compared to methods in which participants inhibited cheating by pressing the spacebar to stop the solution from being shown. In this way, it may be more difficult to activate cheating as opposed to inhibiting it. Future research is needed to replicate the revised paradigm. Further, online samples could be used to provide an anonymous setting to facilitate cheating.

Implications of Research

Across three studies we tested whether power activated a type of moral regulation that might make powerholders more vulnerable to corruption. We predicted two possible paths to corruption, a neglect pathway and a moral self-regard pathway. The neglect pathway involved power activating approach-based moral regulation that prioritized moral “shoulds” and deprioritized moral “should nots” making immoral transgressions more acceptable. We found confirmation for this pathway in Studies 1 and 3 by manipulating participant power and measuring acceptance of immorality as well as preference for dispositional morality (PreM and ProM). Specifically, high power individuals were more accepting overall of immorality, and this relationship was amplified when individual PreM was added. Study 3 provided an extension to Study 1 by including behaviors of cheating and helping prior to moral judgments. The inclusion of behaviors provided new insights into the joint effect of helping behavior and dispositional

morality; high powerholders who pledged higher donations (prescriptive behavior) were most accepting of immorality. The parallel nature of the findings from Studies 1 and 3 is particularly noteworthy. High power combined with high prescriptive morality, either dispositionally (Study 1) or via positive intentions (Study 3), seems to be a recipe for greater immorality and corruption.

Table 1. Means for Prescriptive and Proscriptive Moralism Items (Study 1)

| | <u>Prescriptive Preference</u> | <u>Proscriptive Preference</u> |
|------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| High Power | 6.6 | 6.9 |
| Low Power | 6.5 | 7.0 |
| Control | 6.6 | 7.1 |

| | <u>Prescriptive Moral Weight</u> | <u>Proscriptive Moral Weight</u> |
|------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| High Power | 7.3 | 6.6 |
| Low Power | 7.2 | 6.5 |
| Control | 6.8 | 6.5 |

Table 2. Correlations Among PreM and ProM Scores and Acceptability Judgments By Power Condition (Study 1)

High Power

| | Acceptability | ProM |
|------|---------------|------|
| PreM | .215 | .052 |
| ProM | -.558** | -- |

Low Power

| | Acceptability | ProM |
|------|---------------|--------|
| PreM | -.370** | .372** |
| ProM | -.356** | -- |

Control

| | Acceptability | ProM |
|------|---------------|------|
| PreM | -.124 | .206 |
| ProM | -.415** | -- |

Figure 1. Conceptual Model of Power Illustrating Dual Pathways to Corruption




Figure 2. Mean Difference for Acceptance of Immoral Behavior By Power Condition (Study 1)




Figure 3. Acceptance of Immoral Behavior as a Function of Power Condition and Prescriptive Morality (Study 1)




Figure 4. Mean Difference for Acceptance of Immoral Behavior By Power Condition (Study 2)





Figure 5. Acceptance of Immoral Behavior as a Function of Power Condition and Donation Amount (Study 3)



APPENDIX A
NARRATIVE POWER PRIMING TASK

High Power:

Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or individuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of another person or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate those individuals. Please describe this situation in which you had power – what happened, how you felt, etc.

Low Power:

Please recall a particular incident in which someone else had power over you. By power, we mean a situation in which someone had control over your ability to get something you wanted, or was in a position to evaluate you. Please describe this situation in which you did not have power – what happened, how you felt, etc.

Control:

Please recall what you did yesterday. Please pick one situation from your day and describe what happened, how you felt, etc.

APPENDIX B
MORAL DILEMMA MEASURE

1. As a manager, you are approached by an employee to sponsor a charity event that will provide food and clothing for a local women’s shelter. You have already sponsored the maximum number of events allowed by your company, but you are still interested in finding a way to sponsor the event, so you consider using money from your department’s cash account. Although it violates company rules, you consider taking money from your department’s cash account to sponsor the charity event.

Do you sponsor the charity event with money from the department's cash account?
 _____ Yes _____ No

To what extent do you feel you should/should not use money from the department’s cash account to sponsor the charity event?

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|---|--|
| <i>feel very strongly</i> <i>should not</i> | | | | | <i>neutral</i> | | | | <i>feel very strongly</i> <i>should</i> |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | |

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to use money from the department’s cash account (i.e., violate company policy) to sponsor the charity event?

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|---|--|
| <i>completely</i> <i>unacceptable</i> | | | | | <i>neutral</i> | | | | <i>completely</i> <i>acceptable</i> |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | |

As the manager what is the likelihood that you would use the department’s cash account to sponsor the charity event?

| | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|---|-----------------------------------|
| <i>not at all</i> <i>likely</i> | | | | | <i>neutral</i> | | | | <i>extremely</i> <i>likely</i> |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | |

2. Your lifelong best friend is turning 21 on Saturday and you agreed to help your friends throw an elaborate surprise party. Your parents also planned a family dinner with distant relatives, who haven’t seen you in several years, for the same night. You can only attend one of the events on Saturday. Since there are only two other friends handling the elaborate birthday arrangements, you consider lying to your parents to get out of your family dinner.

Do you lie to your parents to help your friends set up for the surprise party?
 _____ Yes _____ No

What is the likelihood that you would steal the merchandise from the store you manage to give your spouse a special gift on your first anniversary?

not at all *extremely*
likely *neutral* *likely*
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

4. You work in the informational technology division of your company and are responsible for monitoring emails. You receive a help request from one of your friends to “unsubscribe” an angry email to your boss that he intended to delete, but accidentally sent. Deleting emails is strictly prohibited and could cost you your job, but if the email is read by your boss it will likely result in your friend’s firing.

Do you help your friend delete an email (i.e., violate company rules)? _____ Yes
 _____ No

To what extent do you feel you should/should not help your friend delete an email (i.e. violate company rules)?

feel very strongly *feel very strongly*
should not *neutral* *should*
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to help your friend delete an email (i.e. violate company rules)?

completely *completely*
unacceptable *neutral* *acceptable*
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

What is the likelihood that you would help your friend delete an email (i.e. violate company rules)?

not at all *extremely*
likely *neutral* *likely*
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

5. A patient calls late Friday to inquire about a test result. You look up the patient’s file and see that his test results show he is healthy and needn’t worry all weekend. However, you are only a lab assistant and it is a violation of company policy for you to tell patients their test results. You consider telling the patient the results of their test even though it is a violation of company policy.

Do you tell the patient their results (i.e., violate company policy)? _____ Yes
 _____ No

not at all *extremely*
likely 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 *likely* 9

7. You are running a few errands for your grandparent and you are using their car, which has a handicapped license plate. The only convenient spot in the store parking lot is reserved for the handicapped. You're in a hurry and won't be there long. Do you park there?

Do you park in the handicapped spot although you are not actually handicapped?
 _____ Yes _____ No

To what extent do you feel you should/should not park in the handicapped spot although you are not actually handicapped?

feel very strongly *feel very strongly*
should not 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 *should* 9

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to park in the handicapped spot although you are not actually handicapped?

completely *completely*
unacceptable 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 *acceptable* 9

What is the likelihood that you would park in the handicapped spot although you are not actually handicapped?

not at all *extremely*
likely 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 *likely* 9

8. Your wife is in labor and needs to get the hospital immediately. You approach a school zone and see that no one is outside. The school zone speed limit is clearly marked at 15 mph, but you are currently traveling at 45mph to get your wife to the hospital as quickly as possible. Do you speed through the school zone even though it is against traffic laws?

Do you speed through the school zone even though it is against traffic laws? _____
 Yes _____ No

To what extent do you feel you should/should not speed through the school zone even though it is against traffic laws?

feel very strongly should not 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 9 *feel very strongly should*

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to speed through the school zone even though it is against traffic laws?

completely unacceptable 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 9 *completely acceptable*

What is the likelihood that you would speed through the school zone even though it is against traffic laws?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 9 *extremely likely*

9. You are a doctor that specializes in pain management and one of your terminally ill patients takes a turn for the worse. The patient asks you to euthanize them to end their suffering, but euthanasia is outlawed in your state. Do you break the law to help end your patient's continued suffering?

Do you break the law to help end your patient's continued suffering? _____ Yes
 _____ No

To what extent do you feel you should/should not break the law to help end your patient's continued suffering?

feel very strongly should not 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 9 *feel very strongly should*

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to break the law to help end your patient's continued suffering?

completely unacceptable 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 9 *completely acceptable*

What is the likelihood that you would break the law to help end your patient's continued suffering?

not at all likely 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 9 *extremely likely*

10. You unexpectedly got your high school girlfriend pregnant, you marry her and raise the child together. However, you are a high school dropout and are unable to find any jobs. To make ends meet you sell drugs out of your apartment. Although against the law, you consider continuing to sell drugs to support your family. What do you do?

Do you continue to sell drugs to support your family? _____ Yes _____ No

To what extent do you feel you should/should not continue to sell drugs to support your family?

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|---|---------------------------|
| <i>feel very strongly</i> | | | | | <i>neutral</i> | | | | <i>feel very strongly</i> |
| <i>should not</i> | | | | | | | | | <i>should</i> |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | |

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to continue to sell drugs to support your family?

| | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|-------------------|
| <i>completely</i> | | | | <i>neutral</i> | | | <i>completely</i> |
| <i>unacceptable</i> | | | | | | | <i>acceptable</i> |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 9 |

What is the likelihood that you would continue to sell drugs to support your family?

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|------------------|
| <i>not at all</i> | | | | <i>neutral</i> | | | <i>extremely</i> |
| <i>likely</i> | | | | | | | <i>likely</i> |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 9 |

APPENDIX C
MORALISMS SCALE

Some decisions are “up to you”---there isn’t a clear right or wrong answer, or a better or worse choice. One such decision might be choosing a flavor of ice cream. Such decisions are completely a matter of personal preference. Other decisions, such as killing an innocent person, are clearly matters of right or wrong behavior and not matters of personal preference.

For each situation described below first please indicate (i.e., circle the number) the degree to which you think the decision is a **matter of personal preference**. Then indicate **how strongly you feel** the person in the scenario **should or should not** engage in the behavior presented. There are no correct answers, so please just choose the number on the scales below that best represents your response.

1. Tim is overweight and has already eaten two hamburgers and a large order of fries. He is full, but he really likes the onion rings at the restaurant, so he considers ordering a third burger and an order of onion rings.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| <i>not at all a matter of personal preference</i> | | | | | | | | <i>completely a matter of personal preference</i> |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

To what extent do you feel Tim should or should not order the third burger and onion rings?

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|---|---|
| <i>feel very strongly he should not</i> | | | | <i>neutral</i> | | | | <i>feel very strongly he should</i> |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

2. Stacy is a pre-med student and has an early morning chemistry class. She intends to go to class, but finds it hard to get up early. She could just miss class and get the notes from other students, but considers waking up early anyway to get to class on time.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| <i>not at all a matter of personal preference</i> | | | | | | | | <i>completely a matter of personal preference</i> |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

To what extent do you feel Stacy should get up, attend class, and take the notes herself?

| | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|---|--|
| <i>feel very strongly she should not</i> | | | | <i>neutral</i> | | | | <i>feel very strongly she should</i> |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

3. Susan has a large friendly dog who likes to run free. There is a leash law in her town that states dogs should be leashed in public, but Susan is thinking of letting her dog run free on the bike trail in town.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

*not at all a matter of
personal preference*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

*completely a matter of
personal preference*

To what extent do you feel Susan should or should not let her dog run free on the bike trail in town?

*feel very strongly
she should not*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

neutral

*feel very strongly
she should*

4. Mary walks by a homeless man on the street, and he asks if she can spare some change. There's a local shelter that costs \$2.00 a night that Mary knows about. Mary could just walk past the homeless man, but considers giving him the \$2.00 instead.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

*not at all a matter of
personal preference*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

*completely a matter of
personal preference*

To what extent do you feel Mary should or should not give the homeless man money?

*feel very strongly
she should not*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

neutral

*feel very strongly
she should*

5. Jill is applying for a competitive year-long internship. Her uncle knows someone at the firm that is offering the internship. Jill could ask her uncle to pull strings for her, but she considers instead working hard on her application and trying to get the position on her own merits.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

*not at all a matter of
personal preference*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

*completely a matter of
personal preference*

To what extent do you feel Jill should work hard on her application and try to get the position on her own merits?

*feel very strongly
she should not*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

neutral

*feel very strongly
she should*

6. Cory is in the supermarket, where he sees an elderly woman having trouble carrying her groceries. He is in a hurry and knows he could ignore her, but considers instead helping the elderly woman carry her groceries.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

*not at all a matter of
personal preference*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

*completely a matter of
personal preference*

To what extent do you feel Cory should or should not help the elderly woman with her groceries?

*feel very strongly
he should not*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

neutral

*feel very strongly
he should*

7. Justin is a student artist and likes to paint graffiti in public areas, even though the city's policy prohibits it. He believes people like his work, and while waiting alone in a subway station, Justin considers painting some colorful graffiti on a blank wall in the station.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

*not at all a matter of
personal preference*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

*completely a matter of
personal preference*

To what extent do you feel Justin should or should not paint some colorful graffiti on a blank wall in the station?

*feel very strongly
he should not*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

neutral

*feel very strongly
he should*

8. Chris needs one more math course to complete his college requirements. He is taking a math course that is much too easy for him, because he has already been taught all the material in another class. He considers taking a more difficult course that would challenge him and teach him something new.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

*not at all a matter of
personal preference*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

*completely a matter of
personal preference*

To what extent do you feel Chris should or should not take a more difficult math course?

*feel very strongly
he should not*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

neutral

*feel very strongly
he should*

9. Sam really likes pornography on the web. He already spent two hours earlier in the day on an online pornography site. He just returned to his apartment and considers immediately going online to a pornography website.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

*not at all a matter of
personal preference*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

*completely a matter of
personal preference*

To what extent do you feel Sam should or should not immediately go online to a pornography website?

feel very strongly he should not 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 *feel very strongly he should* 9

10. Ellen moved to the city and is staying with a friend, who says she is welcome to stay until she finds her own apartment. Ellen’s friend works long hours and is rarely at home. Ellen could just put off finding her own place to live, but considers looking for one as soon as she can.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

not at all a matter of personal preference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 *completely a matter of personal preference* 9

To what extent do you feel Ellen should or should not start looking for her own apartment?

feel very strongly she should not 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 *feel very strongly she should* 9

11. Melanie and Scott have just bought a house in a quiet, middle-class neighborhood. The homes are not fancy, but are modest and well-kept. Melanie and Scott are considering ignoring the community and painting their house bright orange with green trim.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

not at all a matter of personal preference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 *completely a matter of personal preference* 9

To what extent do you feel Melanie and Scott paint their house bright orange with green trim?

feel very strongly they should not 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 *feel very strongly they should* 9

12. Brenda and Dan just finished an expensive dinner at a fine local restaurant. The bill is accurate, but is far more expensive than they thought it would be. The waiter was good. Brenda and Dan know they could just leave a small tip, but consider spending more money to give the waiter an appropriate larger amount.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

not at all a matter of personal preference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 *completely a matter of personal preference* 9

To what extent do you feel Brenda and Dan should or should not leave the waiter a good tip?

feel very strongly they should not 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 *feel very strongly they should* 9

13. Linda had a great time with Bob. When they go back to her apartment, it's clear she and Bob want to have sex. Neither of them have contraceptive protection, but they consider having sex anyway.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

not at all a matter of personal preference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 *completely a matter of personal preference* 9

To what extent do you feel Linda and Bob should or should not have sex anyway?

feel very strongly they should not 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 *feel very strongly they should* 9

14. Jason has a big project to complete for an important client, and it is due by the end of the day. He knows he could give the work to two new interns, but he considers staying late and doing a good job finishing the project himself.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

not at all a matter of personal preference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 *completely a matter of personal preference* 9

To what extent do you feel Jason should or should not stay late and finish the project himself?

feel very strongly he should not 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 *feel very strongly he should* 9

15. Sheila is going to a funeral, and it's an unusually hot day. She is thinking of wearing a skimpy, revealing dress to keep her relatively cool at the funeral.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

not at all a matter of personal preference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 *completely a matter of personal preference* 9

To what extent do you feel Sheila should or should not wear a skimpy, revealing dress to the funeral?

feel very strongly she should not 1 2 3 4 *neutral* 5 6 7 8 *feel very strongly she should* 9

16. Brian loves to gamble and particularly likes going to the racetrack. He's been on a losing streak and knows he should quit his habit, but he just got his paycheck and considers going back to the track to gamble.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

not at all a matter of personal preference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *completely a matter of personal preference*

To what extent do you feel Brian should or should not go back to the track?

feel very strongly he should not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *neutral* *feel very strongly he should*

17. While on campus, Jay is approached by a student asking if he could volunteer two hours this weekend to help with a food drive for the local survival center. Jay doesn't have plans for the weekend. Jay is deciding whether to commit himself to helping with the food drive.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

not at all a matter of personal preference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *completely a matter of personal preference*

To what extent do you feel Jay should or should not help with a food drive for the local survival center?

feel very strongly he should not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *neutral* *feel very strongly he should*

Sarah is getting more and more into debt with her credit card. She recently bought lots of expensive new clothes and costly furniture for her apartment. She could start saving her money but instead is thinking of buying a very expensive hi-definition TV and going into even deeper debt.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

not at all a matter of personal preference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *completely a matter of personal preference*

To what extent do you feel Sarah should or should not buy the TV and go into greater debt?

feel very strongly she should not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *neutral* *feel very strongly she should*

19. Dana is cleaning out her closet and finds her old American flag. She has no need for the flag anymore, so she is thinking of cutting it up into small pieces that she can use as rags to clean her house.

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

not at all a matter of personal preference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *completely a matter of personal preference*

To what extent do you feel Dana should or should not cut the American flag into pieces to be used as rags?

feel very strongly she should not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *feel very strongly she should*
neutral

20. Ned inherited a lot of money and has cut back on work to manage his investments. He is approached by a foundation that that has been successful at setting up job-training for the poor and is in need of additional funding. Ned is trying to decide whether to donate money for the foundation

To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?

not at all a matter of personal preference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *completely a matter of personal preference*

To what extent do you feel Ned should or should not donate money to the foundation?

feel very strongly he should not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *feel very strongly he should*
neutral

PROSCRIPTIVE items: 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19

PRESCRIPTIVE items: 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 17, 20

(Note: To make the Proscriptive and Prescriptive should/should not scales comparable, subtract the Proscriptive scores from 10. The Proscriptive and Prescriptive personal preference scores are comparable as is.)

APPENDIX D
PAMPHLET EVALUATION TASK

We are interested in getting your feedback for the Pioneer Survival Center pamphlet. There are no correct answers, so please just choose the number on the scales below that best represents your response.

1. How informative was the pamphlet?

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------------------------------|
| Not at all informative | | | | | | | Extremely informative |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 7 |

2. How visually attractive was the pamphlet?

| | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| Not at all attractive | | | | | | | Extremely attractive |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 7 |

3. To what extent do you think the Pioneer Survival Center fills an important need in the community?

| | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------------------|
| Not at all important | | | | | | | Extremely important |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 7 |

Thank you!

As thanks for completing this task you will be entered into a lottery. The lottery will select seven (7) students who will each win **\$50**. Please fill out and detach the entry form below. Place you completed submission in the box marked "Lottery."

Name: _____

Contact info (e-mail/telephone): _____

If you win this \$50 lottery how much of the total would you be willing to donate to the Pioneer Survival Center? (We would deduct this amount from the check we send you.)

\$ _____

APPENDIX E
MORAL SELF ESTEEM

1. I feel that I'm a person of moral worth, at least on an equal plane with others.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. I feel that I have a number of good moral qualities.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

3. All I all, I am inclined to feel that I am a moral failure.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4. When it comes to morality, I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

5. I take a positive attitude toward my moral self.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

6. When it comes to morality, on the whole I am satisfied with myself.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

7. I wish I could have more respect for my moral self.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8. At times I think I am not morally good at all.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

APPENDIX F
HELPING BEHAVIOR MEASURE (FRONTSIDE OF PAMPHLET)


**PIONEER
SURVIVAL
CENTER**



The Pioneer Survival Center is an emergency food pantry that provides low-income individuals and families with free food, clothing, personal care items, and referrals for emergency assistance. The Center distributes over 650,000 pounds of food each year.

The Pioneer Survival Center opened in November of 1979. The initial funding for the Center came from community donations.

From the minute it opened its doors, the Survival Center fulfilled a long-standing need: distributing food to people in emergency situations and to help people with low-incomes who require assistance in making ends meet on a short term basis. Clothing and household items were available in the earliest days.



**PIONEER
SURVIVAL
CENTER**



Our Mission

The Pioneer Survival Center strives to improve the quality of life for low-income individuals and families in by providing food and other resources with dignity and respect.

APPENDIX G HELPING BEHAVIOR MEASURE (BACKSIDE OF PAMPHLET)



Kids' Summer Food

Program:

During the summer months, the Pioneer Survival Center's Kids' Summer Food Program provides eligible children with free food packages to help feed them breakfast and lunch every weekday for ten weeks during summer vacation. Every eligible child in the household can receive a pre-bagged package of food which includes dry milk, cereal, fruit, juice, peanut butter, jelly, mac & cheese, tuna, soup, and vegetables.

Turkeys: During the month of November, the Survival Center distributes either a turkey or grocery store gift card to each client family when they come in for their regular package of groceries. We also try to have other traditional Thanksgiving items available such as potatoes, cranberry and squash.

Other Resources:

Personal Care Items, Pet Food, Job Training

Client Comments

I appreciate the wonderful, kind volunteers, the fact the place exists for help with food and clothes, the patience, amiableness and warmth with the people here and their aim to accommodate.

The food provided some months makes the difference between hunger and eating. The center has also acted as a networking tool for access to other needed services. The staff is friendly and helpful.

DONATE

The PSC is a non-Profit organization. Donations of money are the lifeblood of The Survival Center. Unlike donations of food that rely upon scarce storage space, your financial contributions can be put to immediate use in buying food when the need is greatest, and at the best value when buying salvage, on sale, or in bulk. Money is also needed to pay salaries, maintain the building, buy gasoline for the truck, and keep our refrigerators running. Contributions of any size are gratefully received and are fully tax-deductible.

VOLUNTEER

The Pioneer Survival Center's dedicated volunteer community plays an integral role in our 32-year success providing food and other resources to low-income individuals and families with dignity and respect.

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