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NEGATIVE COMPLEMENTIZERS:  
INTERCLAUSAL LICENSING OF NEGATIVE POLARITY ITEMS

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0. Introduction: the central asymmetry.

Negative Polarity Items (henceforth NPI) can be licensed across clause boundaries without overt negation (Klima (1964), Ladusaw (1979), Linebarger (1980)):

- (1) a. The witnesses denied [that anybody left the room before dinner]
- b. The professor doubts [that anybody understood her explanation]

It has been assumed since Klima (1964) that the negative force verbs like *deny* and *doubt* directly licenses the NPI in the embedded clause. Under this hypothesis, we expect the NPIs in (2) to be licensed as well, since they are complements of the same verbs *deny* and *doubt* in (1a) and (1b). However, as noted by Feldman (1985) and Progovac (1988), this is not the case':

- (2) a. \*The witnesses denied anything
- b. \*The professor doubts any explanation

The any determiners in (2) can only receive, very marginally, a 'free choice' reading, characteristic of any's that are not licensed (Ladusaw (1979)). In this paper, I discuss in detail this asymmetry between clausal and non-clausal arguments of negative lexical items. I present an account of the asymmetry that crucially involves the C<sup>0</sup> selected by negative predicates to head their clausal complements. I argue that this negative



If anything, the only change is that the sentences are now slightly more acceptable. This is so because any has only a 'free choice' reading in all the examples in (2) and (4), and just makes that reading more salient<sup>3</sup>. The sentences in (2) also become more easily acceptable with modals, and if the DP itself is modified (5):

- (5) a. The witnesses will deny any statement made by the defendant  
 b. The professor would doubt any explanation given by a student

These sentences sound less awkward than the ones in (2); but, even in these cases (and maybe even against the speaker's first intuition), the any determiners still have only a 'free choice' reading. Thus, if we introduce the adverb just, the truth conditions of the sentences do not change, a result that can only obtain if the DPs headed by any had a 'free choice' reading in (5):

- (6) a. The witnesses will deny just any statement made by the defendant  
 b. The professor would doubt just any explanation given by a student

In contrast, when we consider the sentences in (1), they behave in a radically different way. Adding just to the sentences in (1) induces a sharp change in truth conditions, indicating that the any previous to the insertion of just was not 'free' but licensed:

- (7) a. The witnesses denied that just anybody left the room before dinner  
 b. The professor doubts that just anybody understood the explanation

The conditions under which the sentences in (7) and (1) are true are not the same. (7a) is true even if the witnesses agree that some people left the room before dinner. Their claim is that only certain people did it. By contrast, the sentence in (1a) is true if the witnesses are claiming that absolutely no one left the room before dinner. Similarly, in (7b), the sentence is true even if the professor believes that some of her students did understand the explanation, whereas in (1b) the professor believes that none did.

1.2. The second test for distinguishing 'free' and licensed NPis involves substitution of the negative verbs for non-negative ones. In cases of 'free' any, this change has no consequences, whereas in cases of licensed

NPIs it results in ungrammaticality, thus showing that the choice of main verb is irrelevant in cases like (2), whereas it is relevant in cases like (1). Consider the sentences in (5), which are identical to those in (2) except for the fact that modals and relative clauses have been added to make them more acceptable. If the *any* in (5) is a 'free choice' variable, then replacing *deny* or *doubt* will have no effect on the acceptability of the *any* constituent, which will remain 'free'. This is borne out: If we substitute *repeat* and *believe* for *deny* and *doubt*, (8), the sentences remain good and the *any*'s have the same 'pick any' interpretation (Vendler (1967)) in (5):

- (8) a. The witnesses will repeat any statement made by  
          the defendant  
      b. The professor would believe any explanation given  
          by her students

However, when this test is applied to the cases in (1), and we substitute *repeat* and *believe* for *deny* and *doubt*, the results are now sharply ungrammatical:

- (9) a. \*The witnesses repeated that anybody left the  
          room before dinner  
      b. \*The professor believes that anybody understood  
          the explanation

1.3. The third test involves NPIs that do not have a 'free choice' reading available. There are NPIs like a single *N* which do not have a 'free' reading. They only have the following two choices: if licensed by an affective element, they are interpreted as existentials, but if not licensed, they are interpreted as equivalent to 'one and only one'. This is shown in (10):

- (10) a. I didn't write a single letter, I had no paper  
          # the one for Mary  
      b. I wrote a single letter, #I had no paper  
          the one for Mary

Let us now substitute the DPs headed by *any* in sentences (1) and (2). The prediction is that in the cases where the *any* is a licensed NPI, we will find the interpretation in (10a), whereas in those cases where the *any*s are not licensed, we will only find the reading in (10b). Consider first the clausal cases in (1), now (11):

- (11) a. The witnesses denied that a single person left  
          the room before dinner  
      b. The professor doubts that a single student  
          understood her explanation

The sentences in (11) have a reading which is equivalent to their corresponding ones in (1): The NPI a single N is indeed licensed in the embedded clause<sup>5</sup>. By contrast, when we consider the sentences in (2) under this criterion, the effects are the opposite. Take the sentences in (5) to give these sentences the best chance, given that some speakers find the sentences in (2) already quite marginal. Consider now the cases in (12):

- (12) a. The witnesses will deny a single statement made  
by the defendant  
b. The professor would/can doubt a single  
explanation given by her students

The sentences in (12) have only one interpretation: in the case of (12a), there is only one particular statement the defendant will make, which the witnesses will deny. In (12b), there is only one explanation the professor will doubt. Thus, (12a) can be followed up with '...namely, the statement about her being in the garden during the shooting', and, similarly, (12b) can be continued with '...namely, the one about having lost the homework'. No matter what intonation is given to the sentence, the NPI reading is simply not available in these cases. We can conclude that the asymmetry in (1) and (2) is consistent: NPIs are licensed only in clausal complements of negative predicates. In what follows, I will mark as deviant (\*) all instances of non-licensed NPIs like the ones in (2), regardless of whether they acquire a 'free choice' interpretation. The asterisk means that the NPI is not licensed by negation, not that the sentence cannot have any interpretation at all.

## 2. No asymmetry induced by overt Negation.

The asymmetry between clausal and non-clausal complements does not surface in cases where an overt negation licenses NPIs across a clause boundary (13):

- (13) a. The witnesses didn't say that anybody left the  
room before dinner  
b. The witnesses didn't say anything

If we apply the tests used above to distinguish licensed anys from free-choice ones, the results show no clausal/non-clausal asymmetry in (13): If just is present, the meaning of both sentences changes (14a, b). If negation is absent, the NPIs are not licensed (14c,d):

- (14) a. The witnesses didn't say that just anybody left  
the room before dinner

- b. The witnesses didn't say just anything
- c. \*The witnesses said that anybody left the room before dinner
- d. \*The witnesses said anything

Finally, if we substitute the any NPI for a single N, no radical change in truth conditions obtains (15):

- (15) a. The witnesses didn't say that a single person left the room before dinner
- b. The witnesses didn't say a single thing

(15a) has a reading equivalent to (13a). Similarly, (15b) has as an available reading one equivalent to (13b) (see endnote 5). This shows that the NPI is licensed in (15). Given this evidence, we can conclude that there are fundamental differences between NPI licensing in the environment of an overt functional negative morpheme versus an inherently negative lexical item: Whereas an overt negative marker does not discriminate between clausal and non-clausal complements in its ability to license NPIs, inherently negative lexical items do discriminate between these two types of arguments with regard to NPI licensing. This result is unexpected if the negative content of the verbs is an active NPI licenser; both morphological negation and this inherent negative feature should have similar properties.

### 3. Some tough cases: Action Nouns

There are some cases where the generalization presented above might seem to break down. These cases involve action nouns like:

- (16) a. The bumper prevented any damage to the car
- b. The witness denied any involvement in the crime
- c. She dispelled any doubts we had
- d. He refused any medication
- e. The senator denied any allegations of drug-dealing

These cases may appear to be NPI any at first glance, but important differences can be pointed out that clearly show otherwise. I will present a fourth test that distinguishes 'free choice' any's from NPI ones; It is based on Ladusaw's (1979) argument that 'free choice' any is a universal quantifier, whereas NPI any is an existential. The test involves substituting all for any. If any is a 'free choice', this change does not alter the truth conditions of the sentence. However, if the DP headed by any is an NPI, the truth conditions change significantly. In order to illustrate this, consider

uncontroversial cases of both 'free choice' any and NPI any. Let us start with the former; take (17):

- (17) a. any dog can bite  
 b. any store would be cheaper than this one  
 c. all dogs can bite  
 d. all stores would be cheaper than this one

The sentences in (17a, c) and (17c, d) mean almost the same<sup>6</sup>: if any dog can bite, then it must be true that all dogs can bite, and vice versa. Similarly, it is a necessary truth that any store would be cheaper than this one iff all stores are cheaper than this one. It is a sufficient condition for any to be a 'free choice' (rather than NPI) that the substitution of all preserves truth conditions. If the substitution is possible, the any at stake is a 'free choice'. Take now NPI any (18):

- (18) a. I did not see any dog  
 b. Did any store give you a lower price?  
 c. If any human being were to enter this room...

If we now introduce all where we had any, the meaning of the sentences change considerably: (18a) can be false while (19a) is true, for instance if I have seen some dogs but not all of them. Similarly, one could answer 'yes' to (18b) and 'no' to (19b) being entirely truthful, and the same is true for the remaining cases.

- (19) a. I did not see all dogs  
 b. Did all stores give you a lower price?  
 c. If all human beings were to enter this room...

This confirms that there is an observable difference between NPIs and 'free choice' anys regarding their existential and universal quantificational force, respectively. We can now make the substitution in the apparently problematic cases in (16), in order to determine whether these cases are truly exceptions to the generalization that negative verbs do not license NPIs in non-clausal complements. Consider (20):

- (20) a. The bumper prevented all damage to the car  
 b. The witness denied all involvement in the crime  
 c. She dispelled all doubts we had  
 d. He refused all medication  
 e. The senator denied all allegations of drug-dealing

There is no possible scenario where any of the sentences in (20) could be true and its correlate in (16) false, or vice versa. Thus for instance, if it is true

that the bumper prevented all damage to the car, then it is necessarily true that the bumper prevented any damage to the car. Similarly, if the witness denied all involvement in the crime, she denied any involvement in the crime as well, and if she dispelled all doubts we had, then it is also true that she dispelled any doubts we had. All sentences in (20) entail their correlates in (16). Crucially, however, the entailment from all to any does not hold in cases of NPI *any*; the sentences in (19) do not entail the sentences in (18). Therefore, the examples in (16) are cases of 'free choice' *any*. They do not constitute counterevidence to the claim that negative verbs do not license NPIs in non-clausal complements. The clausal versus non-clausal asymmetry holds consistently.

#### 4. An account of the asymmetry: Negative Complementizers

I would like to argue that the clausal/non-clausal contrasts just discussed involve the presence versus absence of a negative Complementizer; that is, a  $C^0$  that may be selected only by certain lexical items. Verbs like *deny* and *doubt* select a C that has the feature [+Ng], parallel to the way in which verbs like *wonder* and *ask* select a C that has the feature [+Wh]. It is the  $C^0$  what licenses the NPIs in the examples in (1). Its absence precludes NPI licensing, and the fact that NPIs in non-clausal arguments are not licensed follows trivially. The syntactic representation of (1a, b), under this hypothesis, is as illustrated in (21a, b):

- (21) a. [<sub>IP</sub> the witnesses denied [<sub>CP</sub> that<sub>Ng</sub> [<sub>IP</sub> anybody left the room before dinner]]]  
 b. [<sub>IP</sub> the professor doubts [<sub>CP</sub> that<sub>Ng</sub> [<sub>IP</sub> anybody understood her explanation]]]

Previous discussions of these type of sentences assumed that the syntactic structure of the embedded sentences in (21a) and (21b) was identical to the structure of a declarative clause like 'I say [that penguins fly]'. The NPI licensing properties relied crucially on the matrix verb (Klima (1964)), or on the downward entailing properties of the matrix predicate (Ladusaw (1979)). In the case of *doubt* or *deny*, these analyses focus on the verbs themselves in order to account licensing of NPIs across clause boundaries, failing to explain the asymmetry discussed in previous sections. The proposal made here follows the spirit of Hale's (1968) analysis of sentence negation in Warlpiri, which involved selection of a negative AUX by a matrix negative verb; and it follows Progovac (1988) in that the syntactic representation of sentences embedded under

inherently negative verbs diverges from the structure of that clauses embedded under non-negative verbs. Progovac (1988) also argues that it is crucially the CP projection that is responsible for the successful NPI licensing inside the embedded clause. I depart from her analysis in the specifics of what element of the CP projection licenses the NPIs. Progovac's proposal involves a polarity operator in the specifier of the CP projection, rather than a [+Ng] C head.

Subject NPIs in English are usually not licensed by sentence negation, because negation does not c-command the subject constituent at S-structure (22a); only when Neg moves to C can the subject NPI be licensed (22b) (Laka (1990)). In the cases under consideration here, the licenser is C itself, and, similar to cases where Neg has moved to C, licensing of subject NPIs obtains (22c):

- (22) a. \*<sub>[IP]</sub>Anybody [<sub>i</sub> didn't leave]  
 b. [<sub>CP</sub>Why didn't [<sub>IP</sub> anybody leave]]  
 c. I doubt [<sub>CP</sub> that<sub>Ng</sub> [<sub>IP</sub> anybody left]]

If the licenser does not c-command the NPI at S-structure, licensing fails. Hence, a case where the negative verb does not c-command the NPI but where C does, is a crucial testing ground for this hypothesis. The prediction is that even if the lexical verb does not c-command the NPI, the NPI will nevertheless be licensed, since the C<sub>Ng</sub> c-commands it. This is borne out:

- (23) [<sub>CP</sub>that<sub>Ng</sub> [<sub>IP</sub>anyone left the room early]]<sub>i</sub> was denied  
 t<sub>i</sub> by the witnesses

##### 5. A solution for Ladusaw's (1979) puzzle

Examples like (23) force Ladusaw (1979) to introduce an 'ad hoc' condition in his Inherent Scope Convention for the distribution of NPIs in English. Under Ladusaw's (1979) definition of scope, both the subject and the VP are under the scope of negation in a clause. Ladusaw notes that, given this fact, it cannot be claimed that being in the scope of a trigger is a sufficient condition for the licensing of an NPI. If it were, subject NPIs would be licensed in negative sentences in English. Ladusaw points out that when a triggering element precedes the subject, subject NPIs are licensed:

- (24) a. has anyone seen Clarence?  
 b. rarely is anyone audited by the IRS

In light of this evidence, Ladusaw (1979) adds a

condition in the principles accounting for the distribution of NPIS; this condition requires that the NPI appear rightward of their triggers as well as within their scopes. However, Ladusaw notes, when negation is in a higher clause, the precedence condition seems not to apply anymore. His data are shown in (25):

- (25) a. that anyone has finished yet isn't likely  
           is unlikely  
           is doubtful  
       b. for John to have found any unicorns is impossible  
   isn't possible  
       c. for anyone to win all six races would be unlikely

Because of examples like (25), identical to (24) in all relevant respects, Ladusaw reduces the precedence condition to those cases where the trigger and the NPI are clausemates, as in (26)':

- (26) A NPI must appear in the scope of a trigger. If its trigger is in the same clause as the NPI, the trigger must precede the NPI. (Ladusaw 1979:112)

This solution is not wholly satisfactory, given the premises of Ladusaw's work: that NPI licensing can only be accounted for in terms of the semantics of the clauses in which they occur, and not in terms of the Syntax. The problem posed to the enterprise by the addition of this condition is acknowledged by Ladusaw: "In spite of the argument of section 0, it is wrong to say that polarity filtering is totally semantic, since there is still reference to syntactic structure in part of the ISC [Inherent Scope Convention]: the left-right order restriction on clausemate triggers and NPI's." (Ladusaw 1979:207). The problem encountered by Ladusaw (1979) can be avoided if we accept that syntactic structure also plays an essential role in determining the distribution of NPIS (Klima (1964), Progovac (1988), Laka (1990)). Once the role of Syntax in NPI licensing is acknowledged, the oddities displayed by NPIS as compared to other quantifiers can be better accounted for. The precedence condition is no longer necessary if the licensing conditions require that NPIS be in the c-command domain of their triggers at S-structure (Laka (1990)). The clausemateness condition, on the other hand, can be done without once it is accepted that what licenses the NPI in the embedded clause is not the upstairs negative verb, but, rather, the C<sup>0</sup> that heads the embedded clause.

Let us go back to (23). It cannot be argued that D-Structure plays any role in the licensing of NPIS

(Linebarger (1980)), since subjects of passives are never licensed by an element that c-commands them at D-structure but not at S-structure. The grammaticality of (23) cannot be accounted for on the basis of the D-structure configuration. Neither can it be argued that the NPI in the embedded sentence is actually licensed by the negative verb at Logical Form, after reconstruction has taken place (Chomsky (1976), Van Riemsdijk & Williams (1986) and references therein). If reconstruction were available for NPI licensing, an NPI in a preposed VP should be licensed even if the licenser is not preposed along with it. This is not the case. Consider the VP preposing cases in (28), which yield ungrammaticality:

- (28) a. \*<sub>[VP]</sub> buy any records]<sub>i</sub>, she didn't t<sub>i</sub>  
 b. \*<sub>[VP]</sub> buy any records] is what she refused to do

The importance of the head C<sub>N<sub>g</sub></sub> in the licensing process is also independently confirmed by the contrast between (29) and (30) (Pesetsky, p.c.):

- (29) (i) What did nobody do?  
 a. \* <sub>[VP]</sub> Buy any records]  
 b. <sub>[VP]</sub> Buy records]
- (30) (i) What did Bill deny?  
 a. <sub>[CP]</sub> That<sub>N<sub>g</sub></sub> he had bought any records]

The answer to the question in (29a) is ungrammatical, because there is no available licenser in the VP that constitutes the answer. Note, however, that without the NPI, the answer is fine (29b). In contrast, the answer to the question in (30b), which has an NPI in it and does not contain the negative verb *deny* is perfectly grammatical. The crucial difference between (29a) and (30a) is the presence of the C<sub>N<sub>g</sub></sub> heading the clause. The evidence strongly suggests that it is precisely the C of the embedded sentence in (23) that makes the difference. The ungrammatical cases lack C<sub>N<sub>g</sub></sub>.

#### 6. On selection

The presence or absence of C<sub>N<sub>g</sub></sub> is also crucial in complements of negative nouns. Consider (31):

- (31) a. her denial that anybody left the room before the shooting surprised the jury  
 b. \*her testimony that anybody left the room before the shooting surprised the jury

The contrast in (31) is accounted for under the C<sub>N<sub>g</sub></sub>

hypothesis: in (31a), *denial* selects a  $C_{Ng}$ , which in turn licenses the subject NPI in the clause it heads. In (31b), however, there is no  $C_{Ng}$  (*testimony* does not select it). Thus, licensing fails. Moreover, the contrast in (32) illustrates that, parallel to (1), complements of negative nouns also display a [+/- CP] asymmetry:

- (32) a. Her denial that any human rights should be respected shook the audience  
 b. \*Her denial of any human rights shook the audience

Whereas (32a) is fine as a result of the NPI being licensed by  $C_{Ng}$ , (32b) is deviant or only acceptable in a 'free' reading, as the test with *just will* confirm.

$C_{Wh}$  is usually selected by lexical items that have an interrogative force like *wonder* and *ask*, and  $C_{Ng}$  can be selected by lexical items with a negative force (*deny* and *doubt*, for instance). However, both types of Comps can also occur in environments where the main verbs does not appear to be 'interrogative' or 'negative' (33):

- (33) a. I can't say whether Mary will arrive  
 b. that anyone might do anything like that never occurred to John

The presence of the modal and *not* (or a Q morpheme in the matrix sentence) is necessary in order to allow the presence of the [Wh] Complementizer in (33a). If the modal and *not* are missing, the embedded C can no longer be [+Wh] as shown in (34a); on the other hand, the verb *say* can always take a  $C_{Wh}$  if the subject of the matrix sentence is focalized, as in (34b):

- (34) a. \*I say whether Mary will arrive  
 b. I say whether we will go on vacation or not!

Similarly, in (33b), (from Ladusaw (1979)) the verb *occur* selects a  $C_{Ng}$ , although it is by no means an inherently negative lexical item. The presence of *never* is mandatory to sanction the Comp type, and its absence makes the presence of  $C_{Ng}$  impossible:

- (35) \*that<sub>[Ng]</sub> anyone might do anything like that often occurred to John

Feldman (1985) discusses cases similar to those in (33). He notes that affectives in the sense of Klima (1964) and Ladusaw (1979) and root modals can alter the selectional properties of certain verbs<sup>8</sup>: the presence of

these elements allows these verbs to take [+Wh] Comps:

- (36) a. \*Albert said whether energy was matter  
 b. Albert didn't say whether energy was matter  
 c. Why did you assume who I would bring?

Feldman (1985) concludes that the evidence forces us to abandon the idea that complement selection is determined by the verb of the matrix clause alone (Grimshaw (1979) and Pesetsky (1982)). Rather, complement selection must be viewed as a compositional process, one where not only the matrix verb, but also the inflectional elements of the matrix sentence play a role. That selection may involve more elements than just the matrix V, was also noted by Bresnan (1970) in the case of 'for to' infinitivals. The distribution of  $C_{Ng}$  supports this view of selection as a 'team work', because functional elements distinct from the verb affect the selection of the C heading the embedded clause.

Both [Wh] and [Ng] Comps license NPIs (37):

- (37) a. I wonder whether anybody will show up  
 b. I deny that<sub>[Ng]</sub> anybody will show up

Given that in (39a) it is the complementizer that licenses the subject NPI in the embedded sentences, all the asymmetries observed in the case of negative verbs and  $C_{Ng}$  also surface in relation to interrogative verbs and  $C_{wh}$ . For instance, similarly to the cases above, involving licensing of NPIs in the domain of negative verbs, there is also a clausal/non-clausal asymmetry when we consider interrogative verbs (H. Lasnik, p.c.):

- (38) a. I wonder whether any questions will be asked  
 b. \*I wonder about any questions

Whereas in (38a) the NPI *any questions* is licensed, this is not the case in (38b), where the NPI occurs in a non-clausal argument. As usual, we can resort to the just test: a non licensed *any* will be interpreted identically whether *just* is present or not; a licensed NPI is forced to acquire a 'free' interpretation and thus the truth conditions under which the sentence is true will change. Consider now (39a) and (39b):

- (39) a. I wonder whether just any questions will be asked  
 b. I wonder about just any question

It is clear that *just* induces a change in the interpretation of (38a) and (38a). The two sentences do

not mean the same thing: in (38a) the subject wonders whether the number of questions asked will be zero or more than zero. In (39a), however, the subject of the sentence wonders about the kind of questions that will be asked. On the contrary, (38b) and (39b) have the same meaning. If anything, the only difference between the two is that (38b) is more easily acceptable than (39b). Nevertheless, both of them are instances of 'free' any.

### 7. Conclusion

I have argued that NPI licensing across clause boundaries governed by negative predicates is due to a functional head,  $C_{ng}$ , and not to the lexical item whose complement contains the NPI. I have argued that there is a consistent correlation between the presence of  $C_0$  and the possibility of having licensed NPIs in the domain of a negative predicate. This result suggests the possibility that NPI licensing in general must involve a functional head, and that lexical items are never NPI licensers, but must rely on a functional element.

#### NOTES:

1. Progovac (1988) shows that the asymmetry extends to Servo-Croatian, and in a footnote in Kempchinsky (1986) Jácas notes the same asymmetry for Spanish. Laka (1990) discusses Spanish and Basque regarding this phenomenon.

2. I assume that any belongs to the category D (Abney (1986), and that it heads a DP, as in (i) and (ii):

(i) [<sub>DP</sub> any [<sub>NP</sub> thing]]

(i) [<sub>DP</sub> any [<sub>NP</sub> blue paintings by Picasso]]

The categorial status of just is less clear to me. I will assume that it is either the Spec of the DP headed by any, or that it is generated as an  $X^0$  adjunct of any.

3. Speakers who do not find just particularly helpful in inducing a 'free choice' reading can introduce the modifier ol' after any.

4. The readings are facilitated if given a particular intonation contour. However, as we shall see in (12), intonation cannot salvage cases where a single N is not licensed. I assume that intonation does not determine licensing, but is its phonological reflex.

5. The examples in (11) have also another reading, where a single N is not interpreted as an NPI but rather as 'one and only one'. This reading is not relevant here; what is crucial is the availability of the NPI reading.

6. There is of course one difference between 'free choice' **any** and universals like **all** and **every**: the former takes the totality of elements one by one, but the latter does not necessarily do so (Vendler (1967)). This difference becomes apparent in cases like (i) and (ii):

- (i) pick any card
- (ii) pick all cards

This difference between 'free choice' **any** and other universal quantifiers is not relevant for this argument.

7. Ladusaw also modifies the first part of his Inherent Scope Convention in accordance to (26): "When an N-meaning becomes the scope of a trigger, the resulting meaning is no longer an N-meaning. If the NPI is clausemate with the trigger, the trigger must precede." where N-meaning stands for the interpretation of a licensed NPI.

8. The verbs mentioned by Feldman are **believe**, **suspect**, **doubt**, **suppose**, **assume**, **expect**, **assert**, **say**, **deny**, **imply**, **think**, **regret**.

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