Phillip BrickerChristopher MeachamMaya EddonJennie TraschenMoulton, Joshua D2024-04-262024-04-262016-052016-0510.7275/8319743.0https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14394/19912This dissertation is divided into two parts. In the first part I defend substantivalism. I do this by offering, in chapter 1, a counterpart-theoretic defense of substantivalism from Leibniz’ shift arguments. Then, in chapter 2, I defend substantivalism from the hole argument and argue, against the consensus, that the question of haecceitism is irrelevant to substantivalism in the context of general relativity. In the second part of the dissertation I defend supersubstantivalism. I do this by offering, in chapter 3, an argument against dualistic substantivalism. The argument appeals to plausible principles of modal plenitude to show that the dualist is committed to a range of problematic possibilities. Then, in chapter 4, I consider a range of supersubstantivalist positions. I conclude by arguing for a version of supersubstantivalism I call compresence supersubstantivalism.spacetimesubstantivalismmetaphysicsphilosophy of physicsMetaphysicsPhilosophy of SciencedissertationN/A