Nathan W. ChanJohn K. StranlundMarta VicarelliQuezada Escalona, Felipe Javier2024-04-262024-04-262021-052021-0510.7275/22097096.0https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14394/18518This dissertation consists of three chapters about enforcing collective property rights systems. In the first chapter, we analyze how public co-enforcement affects a collective property rights regime's success. In the second chapter, we consider the problem of managing and defending the commons when common-pool resource coalitions form endogenously. We conducted experiments in the field with members of areas managed under a collective property rights system. Lastly, in the third chapter, we develop a method to estimate the direct effect of monitoring effort on non-recorded extraction (i.e., illegal extraction) of a natural resource. Each chapter has been designed around the territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs) management scheme implemented in Chile to enhance small-scale fisheries' sustainability.Common pool resourcesillegal harvestcollective property rightenforcementsurveillanceterritorial use of right for fishingAgricultural and Resource EconomicsEnvironmental StudiesOther Economicscampusfivehttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9594-0403