Post-Conflict Recovery or Conflict Recurrence: A Comparative Analysis of Economics, Colonial Histories, and Natural Resource Mining in Burkina Faso and Togo

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Post-Conflict Recovery or Conflict Recurrence:
A Comparative Analysis of Economics, Colonial Histories, and Natural Resource Mining in Burkina Faso and Togo

A Thesis Presented by
Izabela Knap Frechette

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Post-Conflict Recovery or Conflict Recurrence:
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ABSTRACT

POST-CONFLICT RECOVERY OR CONFLICT RECURRENCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMICS, COLONIAL HISTORIES, AND NATURAL RESOURCE MINING IN BURKINA FASO AND TOGO

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What are the factors that contribute to peace after civil conflict? What are the factors that contribute to conflict recurrence after civil conflict? In this comparative analysis, Burkina Faso’s military coup in 1988 and Togo’s military coup from 1987-1990 provide two most similar cases that allow for a better understanding of what leads to peace or conflict recurrence. Colonial histories, economics, and natural resource mining are three major factors present in this comparative case analysis that explain why Burkina Faso’s conflict has ended with peace while Togo’s conflict has recurred.

Through a colonial history analysis, the importance of colonial extractive institutions becomes clear in both the economic development and the patterns of conflict of each country. The institutions from the colonial administration in each state have shaped the institutions after independence. This has resulted in poor levels of development and ineffective institutions and systems of governance. Moreover, colonial asymmetric intervention and the resulting treatment of ethnic groups connects to post-independence ethnic inequalities and tensions that have fueled conflict recurrence in Togo. The clear ethnic oppression of the Kwa peoples in Togo has fueled the continuation of conflict. In comparison, the lack of clear ethnic oppression in Burkina Faso contributes to how peace developed after conflict.

The economic analysis here presents the issues of how poor economic performance and lower levels of development can fuel conflict and vice versa. Both countries are underdeveloped and suffer from poor institutions. In addition to this, there are also issues regarding protectionism. Burkina Faso has very strong economic protections which have prevented serious issues of economic volatility, but these protective measures have also contributed to limited growth. Togo on the other hand has very few economic protections which have resulted in a highly volatile and vulnerable economy. Additionally, economic decision making and diagnostics in both governments are considered. In Togo, a poor economic diagnosis had resulted in a serious economic crisis before
the start of the conflict. Burkina Faso on the other hand did not suffer from poor economic issue
diagnoses and therefore did not suffer the same consequences.

Finally, through an analysis of natural resource mining policies in both Burkina Faso and
Togo, it become clear that there are very different opportunities for human development which is
key in conflict prevention in this analysis. In Burkina Faso mining policies allow for better levels of
human development while in Togo mining policies prevent opportunities for improved human
development. Here, it becomes clear that economic growth is not as important as policies promoting
human development in efforts to promote peace and prevent conflict recurrence.

The combination of colonial histories, issues of economics and economic development, and
mining policies are studied in this research to clarify why Togo experienced conflict recurrence while
Burkina Faso had lasting peace. Clearly, economic growth as evidenced by the Togolese experience
does not prevent conflict recurrence. Instead, better opportunities for human development and a
more stable economy provided the basis for peace in Burkina Faso. Mining policy in Burkina Faso is
the source of the opportunities for human development. Moreover, colonial histories account for
institutional quality, ethnic divisions, and levels of development in both Togo and Burkina Faso. By
addressing colonial histories and generating a better understanding of their impact on present-day
societies, peace and conflict can be better addressed. Moreover, it becomes clear that opportunities
for human development present themselves as a way to obtain peace after civil conflicts.

Key Words: conflict, durable peace, post-conflict recovery, economics, human development,
 military coup, economic development, colonial history, international development, West Africa
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BEAC - Banque des États de l’Afrique Centrale (Bank of Central African States)
CBMP - Burkinabe Precious Metals Counter
CFAF – West African Franc (currency)
CNR - Conseil National de la révolution (Burkina Faso Political Party)
CSP - Council of Popular Salvation (Burkina Faso Political Group)
CUT - Comité D’uneunion Togolaise (Togolese Political Party)
DDCM - Department for Mine Development and Control (Togo)
DGMG – Directorate for Mines and Geology (Togo)
DLM - Directorate for Mine Laboratory (Togo)
DRGM - Department of Mining Research and Geological Surveys (Togo)
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
HDI – Human Development Index
IMF - International Monetary Fund
MLN - Mouvement de Libération Nationale (Burkina Faso Political Party)
MME – Ministry of Mines and Energy (Togo)
PAI - Parti Africain de l’Indépendance (Burkina Faso Political Party)
PPD - Programme Populaire de Développement (Burkina Faso Development Program)
PTP - Parti Togolaise du Progrès (Togolese Political Party)
RDA - Rassemblement Democratique Africain (Burkina Faso Political Party)
TA - Technical Assistance
UN – United Nations
UMOA - Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine (West African Monetary Union)
WB - World Bank
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Introduction:

Why do some conflicts end with durable peace and others recur or seem to be never ending? To better understand why conflicts either successfully end or recur, it is important to look at the both the politics and the economics of the country in question. This thesis is focused on post conflict recovery and conflict recurrence from both an economic development perspective and a political perspective. By conducting a comparative case study between two conflicts, one in Burkina Faso and the other in Togo, issues such as colonial histories and the resulting institutions, ethnic fractionalization, economic performance, natural resources, and mining policies prove to be instrumental in understanding why conflict has ended or continued in the cases studied. Colonial histories, especially the presence of asymmetric intervention, prove to be a major variable in clarifying why the Togolese conflict continued while Burkina Faso’s conflict ended in peace.

Based on this comparative study, the major explanatory variable between the different outcomes of each case study is the experience each country had under colonialism. Specifically, Togo experienced asymmetric intervention by the German and French colonial administrations; by choosing to support the Ewe ethnic group over the Kabye, the German and French colonial administrations gave more power to one ethnic group which generated the political power imbalance between the two very similarly sized groups. This explains the higher level of ethnic tensions between the two small ethnic majorities and the resulting unstable governance that can be seen in both the economic analysis and the historical analysis presented here. Burkina Faso on the other hand had a large ethnic majority which was supported by the French colonial administration which helps to explain the lack of ethnic tensions and the political power of the Mossi ethnic group. Moreover, natural resources, specifically those that can be mined like gold in Burkina Faso and phosphates in Togo can serve as a major source of income for the state and the population. However, given different approaches to governing these natural resources and differing mining policies, Burkina Faso has been able to provide the population more opportunities to improve human development which has likely helped to prevent conflict recurrence. Togo, on the other hand, has limited phosphate profits only to the government which has cut off the opportunity for Togolese people to improve their level of human development through the mining of natural resources.

This research contributes to the existing understanding of conflicts, conflict recurrence, post conflict peace, the sources of instability in underdeveloped countries, economic development, and
the role that human development has in all these different literatures. This thesis provides an in
depth look at two conflicts in West Africa with a focus on the politics, the colonial influence on
post-independence societies, and the economic factors that tie into peace and conflict. Additionally,
the focus on human development in both conflicts fills in a gap in the literature about the wellbeing
and quality of life of people living in conflict prone areas and how this contributes to peace or
conflict recurrence. Finally, this research provides a critique of World Bank development strategies.

The layout of the research and findings is as follows. The first section explains the literature
that this research is based on and contributes to. The second section provides the case background
with a focus on the colonial and post-colonial histories of Burkina Faso and Togo. This colonial
history and its influence on independent Togo and Burkina Faso will be analyzed. The third section
is focused on each specific conflict which is explained and analyzed. Then, the fourth section first
provides an analysis of the economic history of each case and secondly provides an analysis of the
importance of mining in each country. This economic analysis will be followed by the conclusion
which includes areas for further research.

Section 1: Literature and Theory

The basis of this thesis is rooted in the literature and theory on durable peace. Durable peace
after civil wars is focused of how to end conflict and how to make that peace last in the long term
rather than the short term. There are multiple variables that contribute to creating a durable peace.
Factors that will be present in this analysis are as follows. There are economic and development
factors both from internal and external actors. Then, there is also the importance of ethnic divides
within nations that can contribute to or hinder the development of durable peace. Finally, the way
the civil war ended also plays a crucial role in how to create durable peace. Each of these factors is
examined in the literature on durable peace and each plays an important role in clarifying what
works and what does not work in creating durable peace.

The literature on durable peace highlights the importance of economic factors in
determining the source of conflict and the likely remedies for the effect war has on a country’s
economic health. It is important to understand that the infrastructure and the economy of a state
that experiences war will be damaged resulting in the fall of per capita income measures (Addison,
2020). Moreover, the longer the war is, the worse the economic damage will be (Chen, Loayza, and
Reynal-Querol, 2008). This means that wars clearly influence the economy of the state where
violence takes place. Moreover, there are general patterns in the economies of countries that face
multiple if not protracted wars and therefore have trouble finding a durable peace. Many of the countries that are at the greatest risk of conflict are the world’s poorest countries, 70% of which are in Africa (Tschirgi, Lund, and Mancicni, 2010). What this shows is the importance of a healthy economy with low poverty levels and open political society for avoiding conflict and creating durable peace. Additionally, external aid once violence has ceased plays an important role in creating a stable environment where durable peace can develop (Collier, 2009). Nikolas Emmanuel stresses that when aid providers back peace processes with financial resources there is a significantly higher likelihood that peace will last longer than in conflicts where there is no external aid funding (2015). However, economic development aid is different and is criticized in this analysis. As for states themselves, Mason et al find that should a government address the population’s grievances after war by restoring a better level of economic wellbeing, resumption of civil war can be avoided (2011).

States can address the issue of economics and development through fiscal strategies, welfare policies that address inequalities, education, and restructuring imports and exports. First, the import and export sectors can be key in rebuilding a state’s economy after civil war, especially if that state has high concentrations of natural resources. Tony Addison stresses that while imports and exports sectors are key in the economic recovery after conflict, especially exports, they must not be driven by only external demand, there needs to be more than just market forces in play (Addison, 2020). External demand serves as the main driver of economic recovery and can generate the income that is necessary for reconstruction spending by the government but cannot be the only source of economic growth (Addison, 2020). Here, Addison stresses the importance of control over recovery by those who have been affected by conflict.

Addison also emphasizes the importance of diversifying the export sector to help speed up growth of the state economy and to allow for the process of rebuilding to begin. External demand may be the driver of growth but maintaining a diverse exporting sector and maintaining the interest of state recovery at the forefront of decision making is key in the stable economic recovery that leads to durable peace. Moreover, Addison considers rich country protectionism and the lack of development finance as factors that can hinder this economic growth in post conflict states (2020). The focus here is on the ability of states to rebuild their economies after conflict through their import and export sectors which depend on the interests of the state and are confronted by challenges of other more powerful states.

Import and export sectors are decidedly not the only vehicle for economic growth, in fact domestic economic issues such as education, jobs, national expenditures, land reform, and fiscal
measures play a major role in economic recovery from civil conflicts. Paul Collier in a piece from 2009 emphasizes the importance of a fiscal strategy that includes low taxation, high aid, low inflation, and a higher level of scrutiny towards public spending (Collier, 2009). Moreover, Collier emphasized the importance of jobs for young men, to take out a significant portion of likely combatants and satisfy their economic needs, and deep cuts in military spending (Collier 2009). The allocation of military spending to other public resources is also supported by Chen, Loayza, and Reynal-Querol in their 2008 piece on the aftermath of civil wars. By cutting military spending, the national government signals its commitment to ending conflict and its interest in addressing the needs of the population during recovery. With higher scrutiny towards public spending, there comes scrutiny towards the different effects war has had on different people and how dynamics are thus created. This is vital in addressing the needs of the population after conflict, to both remedy the initial causes of conflict and to prevent additional conflict. Moreover, land reform also plays a major role in economic development and stability in post conflict settings. Specifically, if land reform is consistent, democratically enacted, and done on a significant scale, lasting peace is more likely to be a result (Ioris and Ioris, 2018).

It is imperative to remember that issues of economics and development can help in creating durable peace but can also hinder the ability of states to develop peace in post conflict settings. Like threats to political stability, economic inequality and unemployment serve as threats to the creation of a durable peace in post-conflict settings. There is the danger of education contributing to the recurrence of conflict but only in the case where employment opportunities do not keep up with pace of education (Ishiyama and Breuning, 2012). There is also the issue of land reform, which is a thinly understood concept in the realm of creating durable peace. Failure to conduct land reform significantly, democratically, and consistently will damage the chances for durable peace (Ioris and Ioris, 2018).

In a similar vein to inequality and discrimination in economics, there is the importance of resources, especially natural resources. Peace has already been determined to be shorter after conflicts over natural resources because of the importance of such resources makes them a prize worth fighting for (Rustad and Binningsbo, 2012). This means that peace after conflicts over natural resources already face a much more difficult track to lasting peace. Distribution of natural resources significantly shorten post conflict peace duration by about half the length of peace periods after other conflicts (Rustad and Binningsbo, 2012). Rustad and Binningsbo also test financing and aggravation mechanisms for addressing conflicts over natural resources and find no effect. These
last findings on the importance of natural resources and financing and aggravation mechanisms are however contested by the results shown by Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) while also confirmed by the results of Østby, Nordås & Rod (2009). These conflicting findings are likely due to the fact that Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner’s work instead focuses on the availability of resources as a factor of feasibility for belligerents, rather than the motivation, to start or continue conflict.

Another consistently important topic in the literature about factors that contribute to peace in post conflict settings is societal and political reconstruction in addition to institutional reforms. A key element of these reforms is the proper and fair representation and equitable living opportunities of the people of the state. Institutional guarantees for political inclusion and support for the economic interests of ethnic groups and communities that were most heavily affected by the violence is key to creating lasting a durable peace (Ioris and Ioris, 2018 and Gurses and Rost, 2013). Moreover, security and good governance are also key to creating durable and lasting peace as shown by Phil Vernon’s 2020 recognition of negative peace (improved security) and positive peace (improved quality of life). From broader outcomes such as democracy and overall good governance there is the increased focus on reforming and reintegrating the military in a way that it creates a diverse array of officer appointments, civilian oversight, and nonpoliticalized civilian control (Berg, 2020). Moreover, implementing an open political system after civil wars and creating electoral reforms that allow for proportional representation, especially after negotiated settlements, helps to increase the durability of peace after civil war (Walter, 2004, Keels 2018, and Gurses and Rost, 2013). Furthermore, ongoing reforms are stressed as important to maintain peace especially in the case of protracted conflicts (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002). Reforms to the electoral process and addressing the issue of proportional representation is key in post conflict settings in combination with addressing grievances of war survivors and ex-combatants.

There are reforms that have been noted in the literature on durable peace that damage the prospects of creating the stability and security that is necessary for peace. The exclusion of specific factions from the officer corps exacerbates grievances and facilitates insurgent mobilization (Berg, 2020). Politicizing police officer appointments, distributing rents through armed forces, and allowing the military to use force unconstrained can increase the risk of renewed fighting and create insurgent groups from those excluded soldiers (Berg, 2020). Additionally, by exploiting regime control over resources and increasing levels of repression, security forces successfully contribute to the development of insurgent forces who will increase the likelihood of renewed civil war (Berg, 2020). Moreover, poor governance in the distribution of benefits and poorly implemented democracy can
contribute to recurrence of conflict (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002 and Molemele, 2015). Finally, multiple sovereignty remains a threat to peace, but is dependent on the willingness of dissidents to rebel, something that can be addressed as discussed earlier (Mason et al. 2011). Avoiding discriminatory and exclusionary policies at the level of individuals is key to achieving a lasting and durable peace in the literature.

In addition to post conflict reforms, how the war ended also plays a role in the development of lasting a durable peace. Caroline Hartzell addresses this topic through her empirical research and finds that both military victories and negotiated ends to civil wars result in stable peace, depending on multiple other factors, and that the existing research that pinpoints military victories as the most damaging and therefore least likely to result in peace is questionable (Hartzell, 2009). Moreover, there is evidence that wars ending in rebel groups’ decapitation are still capable of recurrence because rebel groups may be able to reorganize (Ryckman, 2020). This suggests that rebel leader decapitation merely results in a short-term peace and not a lasting and durable peace. Moreover, there is no evidence that conflicts that end in both government victory and rebel leader decapitation recur (Ryckman, 2020). In the cases where wars end short of a decisive victory, such as temporary truces, negotiated settlements, or military stalemates, there is evidence that humanitarian aid is effective and least likely to undermine peace (Narang, 2014). The durable peace literature highlights the importance of the trickle-down effects that the way a war ends can affect how peace is built.

There are other factors that come from the way a war ends that can serve as obstacles to generating durable peace. Rebel group victories can result in a more durable peace but only if the new rebel regime can survive the first few years after the termination of conflict (Mason et al, 2011). On the other hand, government victories create a stable peace early on, but these regimes can become increasingly unstable overtime as it takes some time for rebels to regroup (Mason et al, 2011). These structural and agency issues are not all that contributes to peace agreement failures. With rebel groups there is also the threat of renewed conflict if, as previously mentioned, there is only rebel group decapitation and no structural reforms implemented to address the grievances of that rebel group (Ryckman, 2020). The durable peace literature emphasizes that the way wars end can have cascading effects from higher level negotiations to the lowest level of individual impacts and effects. When wars end, there are still going to be lasting effects on those who were either directly or indirectly affected by the conflict. Without addressing these small-scale motivations to fight, as shown here, the prospects for peace are low.
Ethnic divides also play a role in whether durable peace is created in the aftermath of civil wars. How ethnic groups interact after conflict overshadows the level of violence during war (Gurses and Rost, 2013). By looking at the tensions between ethnic groups, the literature highlights the value of addressing grievances and tense social relations between ex-combatants. These results emphasize the importance of forgiveness in cases of ethnic group based civil wars since demonstrations can result in violent clashes between different groups (Kijewski and Rapp, 2019).

Addressing the needs of different factions in terms of power sharing rather than organizational structures is also key to post conflict reform leading to durable peace (Hartzell, 2009). Discrimination and exclusion, especially in the case of ethnic groups, serve as a major spoiler of peace efforts. If there is political and economic discrimination against one of the ethnic groups involved in the conflict, then conflict is likely to resume (Gurses and Rost, 2013). This is due mainly to either the creation of new grievances or the perpetuation of grievances that existed during the conflict.

In addition to creating post conflict peace, a key focus in this thesis is on human development. The concept of human development is focused on the concepts of wellbeing, freedom, the state of education and healthcare, and overall quality of life for each individual (Sen, 2010). Naila Kabeer writes that the true aim of development is intended to improve human wellbeing and expansion of choice for each individual (Kabeer, 1994). Human development shows the inequalities that are missed by the measures often used in economic development literature and is therefore more useful in the analysis of inequalities that lead to conflict and violence. Additionally, Martha Nussbaum writes about human development and the capabilities approach in terms of “what people are able to do and able to be” while linking these capabilities to living a good life and the concept of human dignity (Nussbaum 2011, 100). Human development is therefore the concept of development not in economic terms, but in terms of the ability of individuals to live a dignified life that is healthy and guided by their own decision making. Moreover, human development is connected to conflict according to Namsuk Kim and Pedro Conceição (2010). Specifically, lower levels of human development increase the risk of conflict outbreak while conflict contributes to lower levels of human development (Kim and Conceição, 2010). Therefore, policy measures that work to sustain or improve human development can indirectly lower the risk of conflict (Kim and Conceição, 2010). Therefore, more opportunities to improve human development play an important role in economics as well as in conflict prevention.
Another important concept addressed in this paper is the resource curse which is when resource rents are used in such a way that they promote imports rather than food production, foster large-scale and often inefficient models of industrialization which result in unbalanced growth, and difficulty in changing industrial policies due to structural inflexibility built into the economy (Karl, 1999). The resource curse proves to have an institutional nature according to Mehlum Halvor, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik who write that natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners (2006). They find in their work that the difference for these experiences comes from the quality of institutions: when institutions are grabber friendly, or in other words institutions that suffer from weak rule of law, malfunctioning bureaucracy, corruption and rent-seeking and production are competing activities, aggregate income is pushed down, but when institutions are producer friendly, in other words institutions that attract entrepreneurs into production and rent-seeking and production are complementary, resources will raise income (Halvor et al, 2006). Natural resources can be a key factor in economic development as they provide a very clear route to integration into the global economy through exports. However, the distribution of resources proves to be a major driving factor of ethnic income inequality which can be a driver behind conflict (Lessmann et al, 2017). The homogenous spread of resources and resource revenues can spur national development while the uneven spread of resources and resource revenue distribution is positively correlated with civil war onset (Lessmann et al, 2017). Thus, Lessmann et al conclude that resources can be a blessing for resource rich regions but may prove to be a factor in conflict onset in ethnically divided nations.

Moreover, violent conflict is more likely in areas where local communities have been excluded from decision-making processes, when only a few people are able to reap the economic benefits, and when extractive industries clash with the cultures and traditions of local people or align with pre-existing tensions (Grzybowski, 2012). Natural resources in fractionalized countries prove to contribute to lower incomes and can contribute to fighting activities between rivaling groups (Hodler, 2006). Additionally, income inequality rises due to natural resources in ethnically polarized societies, while income inequality falls with the discovery of natural resources in homogenous societies (Fum et al, 2010). Finally, the direct effect of resource wealth tends to increase risk of war: ethnic fractionalization in combination with resource wealth seems to lead to greater risk of war, but this is not true for linguistic or religious fractionalization (Brunnschweiler et al, 2009).

Additionally, the structure of economies may actually be the route through which natural resource dependence provides incentives for conflict (Wegenast et al, 2014). There is evidence that
the past impacts of natural resource production are what conflict onset is most responsive to, the impact of natural resources is independent of state strength, agricultural dependence actually drives the link between primary commodities and conflict, and finally that natural resources are associated with shorter wars that are more likely to end in military victory (Wegenast et al, 2014). Non-oil resource rich countries prove to have much larger improvements in their Human Development Index (HDI) scores in comparison to countries without minerals (McMahon et al, 2014). Benefits have come mainly from foreign direct investment (FDI), export revenues, and fiscal revenues and are highly dependent on infrastructure benefits and strong linkages to other industries, both of which require cooperation between public and private sectors (McMahon et al, 2014). Overall, natural resources are most beneficial to countries who have strong governing institutions which see the value in the equal spread of the benefits from resource extraction. Rent-seeking behavior and the compiling of revenues into the hands of the few only serve to increase the likelihood of conflict as natural resources can be used to fund rebellions.

Another important basis of theory used in this thesis is focused on colonial histories and the corresponding impacts on institutions and economic development after independence. Robin Grier (1999) finds that the level of education at the time of independence is key in explaining the development gap between former British and former French colonies. Moreover, the duration of colonization and the identity of the colonial power are significantly and positively related to education (Grier, 1999). Grier writes that the French approach to colonization did put effort into alienating the native culture while British colonization did not. As a result, the British left more educated populations than the French did which resulted in the larger development gap between the two post-colonial societies even though education rates after independence may have converged.

Outside of education and more focused on colonial institutions and how successfully colonial governments are translated into post-colonial societies is Pierre Englebert’s 2000 publication Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa. Englebert argues that the extent to which colonial state institutions clash with the precolonial state institutions accounts for what differentiates state capacity and economic growth across the region. This means that the greater the incongruence between pre- and post-colonial institutions, the greater the relative power payoffs to domestic elites of adopting neo-patrimonial policies over developmental ones. The more illegitimate the colonial state, or the more the colonial state clashes with the pre-colonial institutions and state structures, the more likely that post-colonial political
elites are to resort to neo-patrimonial policies which lead to poor governance and economic stagnation (Englebert, 2000). Overall, Englebert shows that African countries have paid a high price for not questioning the state structures inherited from colonialism, mostly in the form of foregone economic growth.

Another commonly cited work on institutions and colonization is Acemoglu, Johnson, and James’ *The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation*. Acemoglu et al write that in areas where Europeans faced high mortality rates, usually due to diseases in the area that Europeans had no natural immunity to, they would not settle and instead would set up extractive institutions which have persisted to the present. As a result of these extractive institutions, colonies usually have less secure property rights, more distortionary policies, lower investment in human and physical capital, and as a result fail to achieve a greater level of income. There are three economic mechanisms discussed by the authors that lead to the persistence of extractive institutions. These include unwillingness on behalf of post-colonial elites to incur the costs of introducing better institutions, smaller elite groups means the gains from extractive institutions will be greater for each individual creating an incentive to keep extractive institutions, and finally if irreversible investments are made that are complementary to a particular set of institutions, they will be more likely to support those institutions.

There is another body of literature relevant to this thesis which is focused on the politics of military coups in African countries. Pat McGowan and Thomas Johnson’s work *African Military Coups D’état and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis* provides the understanding that military coups are the principal form of regime change on the African continent and that they can happen under any kind of political system. McGowan and Thomas find that military coups are far more frequent in states that were under French colonialism and that those countries whose economies grew most rapidly had the fewest military interventions. Specifically, African states whose industrial employment increased the most between 1960 and 1978 had significantly fewer military interventions between 1960 and 1982 than those states who had less effective industrial programs. This becomes a cycle of poor economic performance and military coups: economic stagnation and decline lead to military coups and military coups in turn lead to more economic decline and uncertainty.
Another work focused on African military coups is Thomas Johnson, Robert Slater, and Pat McGowan’s *Explaining African Military Coups D’état, 1960-1982*. In this article, the authors find that African states that have relatively dynamic economies, societies that were not high socially mobilized before independence and have maintained or restored some degree of political participation and pluralism have experience far fewer coups, attempted coups, and coups plots than states with the opposite set of characteristics. Moreover, the likelihood of a coup increases when the military's role in society is not to defend against external threats and when civilian and military institutions, values, and roles are blended. Moreover, military cohesion and political centrality are two features that have been determined to lead to more coups. When the military of an African state is large and ethnically homogenous the more the military becomes involved in politics. Furthermore, early social mobilization in African societies and early rapid industrialization of capital cities are also strongly related to the event of subsequent military coups. There are also major economic features of African states which do not experience many, if any, military coups. These characteristics are as follows: the ratio of industrial jobs to all other forms of employment increased the most between 1960 and 1978, states whose economies grew in the late 1960s, and finally those states who’s mid 1960’s export performance was superior. States whose commodity exports became less diversified in the start of the 1960s have experienced more military coups than those who’s economic or market dependency lessened in the same period.

Section 2: Case Selection

The approach to selecting cases followed the logic of most similar cases. The initial data for potential cases came from Flores and Nooruddin’s article “Democracy under the Gun Understanding Post Conflict Economic Recovery”. While their work was more focused on how post conflict democratization has a negative effect on economic recovery and that outright military victory more frequently results in a longer lasting peace, the article proved to be a good source for finding potential cases. Flores and Nooruddin’s article did have some issues with data, so ensuring that the conflict data was complete was important in case selection. In order to ensure the selection was of the most similar cases, both had been under the same colonial administration and each conflict had to have taken place during a similar time period so as to avoid issues with studying conflicts in completely different time periods. Additionally, similar geographic location became another constraint on case selection due in part to the limited availability of data. To narrow down the possible options for case studies even further, there was additional data collection from the
World Bank to find out which cases from Flores and Nooruddin had information on the levels of education achieved before, during, and after each conflict. The variables used here were the adult and youth literacy rates from five years, or as close to five years as possible give the gaps in data, before each conflict and five years after each conflict ended.

Although the Flores and Nooruddin article does have a gap in the data for Togo for the year 1991, it is still clear that the conflict was not over or that at the very least there was conflict recurrence, thus the decision to use Togo as a most similar case with Burkina Faso which has not had a prolonged conflict or conflict recurrence. The thinking behind this data constraint was based on the logic of human capital being beneficial to economies which will be addressed in the theory and literature section of this thesis. Given these constraints on data and the focus of this research, Togo and Burkina Faso were the best “most similar” cases for study in this thesis.

Finally, it is important to recognize that the cases selected for this analysis were based on the concept of most similar cases and colonial history was, at first glance, one of the major variables that was to be held constant between the case studies. However, given the in-depth case study format of this analysis, colonial histories are discovered to be a key explanatory variable of the different outcomes of each conflict of study. This difference comes in the form of asymmetric intervention by German and French colonial administrations in Togo where very small ethnic majorities were treated very differently and resulted in serious ethnic tensions that outlasted colonialism. Burkina Faso, on the other hand, did not experience asymmetric intervention on behalf of the French colonial administration given the very clear difference in size and power of the ethnic majority, the Mossi.

Section 3: Case Background

In order to better understand the origins of the two coups of study in this thesis, the ethnic, colonial, and post-colonial background of Togo and Burkina Faso are provided here. Each history allows for a better understanding of just how deeply connected colonialism is to each conflict. Colonial policies regarding ethnic groups as well as extractive institutions are shown to have shaped both Burkina Faso and Togo to an extent that is present during and after each conflict of study. Togo’s history will be introduced first and analyzed and Burkina Faso will be introduced second.
Pre-conflict History of Togo:

Ethnic History of Togo:

Togo has a rich and diverse ethnic history with over 50 different ethnic groups (Lasisi, 1993). There are two major subgroups used to identify the different ethnic groups; ethnic groups located north of 8.5 ° latitude are known as the voltaic of Gur and is made up of the Kabri (Kabye), Losso, Bassari, Konkomba, Tyokossi, and the Dagomba while those ethnic groups south of 8.5 ° latitude are known as the Kwa and are made up of the Ewe (Evhe), Mina, Aja, Fon, Ana (Yoruba), Adangbe, and the Akposso (Lasisi, 1993). Each ethnic group in Togo fitted into one of two political cultural groups. The ministates or segmentary societies were among the southern Gur speaking people which include the Konkomba, Kabri, Losso and Bassari and some of the Kwa-speaking groups. Here, political power was more dispersed with social and religious activities that took on the form of age-grades and ancestral worship. Then, there were the megastates of centralized polities which included the Kotokoli, Tyokossi, Dagomba, and Mamprusi of the north and the Ewe, Mina, Fon, and Ana of the south where political authority rested in the hands of either priest kings or hereditary monarchs with a stronger sense of territoriality (Lasisi, 1993). There is clearly a plethora of social, religious, and political organizational structures amongst these different ethnic groups in Togo and under colonialism these groups were forced to assimilate to a European structure of politics and socialization. This has resulted in the unequal distribution and access to social and economic opportunities for members of different ethnic groups based on the concept of ethnic interest and consciousness (Lasisi, 1993). The most recent survey of Togo’s population in regard to proportions of different ethnic groups is as follows: Adja-Ewe/Mina 42.4%, Kabye/Tem 25.9%, Para-Gourma/Akan 17.1%, Akposso/Akebu 4.1%, Ana-Ife 3.2%, other Togolese 1.7%, foreigners 5.2% (World Factbook, 2021b). This recent survey provides a look into both the overall population, and the general effect of colonial policies regarding ethnic groups in Togo. Looking at the percentages of ethnic groups in Togo, and the treatment of ethnic groups by the German and French colonial administrations, it becomes clear that Togo proves to be a case of asymmetric intervention. Without a clear ethnic majority, colonial policies sided with one ethnic group over the others which had serious and long lasting effects which are made clear in the next section.
Colonial History of Togo:

Togo’s colonial history began in 1884 with the signing of a treaty between Germany and King Mlapa, the priest king of the Mina Ethnic group, where Togo became a protectorate of Togoland (Lasisi, 1993). Ethnic resistance to colonialism varied: Togo being an indigenous Ewe name generated a sense of belonging amongst most of the Kwa groups while the Gur groups outwardly resisted colonial rule (Lasisi, 1993). Here, the sense of belonging was due to how Togo was named as an ethnically Ewe name. This connects directly to how the German and French colonial administration favored the Ewe ethnic group, the small ethnic majority of Togo, through asymmetric intervention. By favoring one of the smaller ethnic minorities in Togo through the choice of name for the protectorate under German rule and eventually through French colonialism and into independence, the Ewe people have been able to reap the benefits of this colonial favoritism while the Gur peoples outwardly resisted colonial rule. This connects clearly to the tensions that developed between the Kwa people and the Gur people in Togo and is directly related to the power imbalance between the Kabye group and the Ewe group which has affected the style of governance and the prospects for peace after the conflict of study.

Togo’s geographic borders were decided by a number of agreements signed by the French in the East and the British in the West between 1885 and 1907 which resulted in approximately 50 kilometers of coastline and a hinterland between the 6th and 11th degree north parallels (Lasisi, 1993). This area is within the borders of the endemic malaria area in Africa and as a result was not a settler colony (see figure 1). Under German colonial rule, Togo was an extractive colony and took on some elements of German culture such as the imposition of a paternalistic autocratic administration system, the construction of roads and railways, the introduction of new legal and educational systems, and a market economy that was heavily reliant on cash crops for exportation and the importation of European industrial products (Lasisi, 1993). Additionally, the German colonial administration started a military recruitment strategy, which was continued by the French that targeted specific ethnic groups from the Gur region of Togo including the Kabye, Losso, Bassari, and Kotokoli (Lasisi, 1993). This military recruitment strategy tied directly to ethnic inequalities and the ethnic dynamics of the conflict of study. By recruiting only specific ethnic groups, especially those who are part of the Gur people who openly resisted colonialism, French colonialism generated a system of favoritism towards the Kwa peoples, especially the Ewe, while oppressing and cutting out political opportunities for the Gur people by recruiting them into the military. This has undoubtedly contributed to the political inequality between the two major ethnic
groups in Togo which has fed into the political survival strategy of constantly fighting for positions of power. As a result of this, governance in Togo after colonialism has been volatile and the shift of power from the Ewe to the Kabye in 1967 set off a serious period of instability given the sudden shift in power dynamics.

While some ethnic groups in Togo did have a somewhat similar system with a centralized government, such as the centralized polities of the Kotokoli, Tyokossi, Dagomba, and Mamprusi of the north and the Ewe, Mina, Fon, and Ana of the south, the legal and educational systems in addition to the market economy were dramatically different to the pre-colonial ethnic societies in Togo. This ties directly into the literature on colonialism and the resulting preference for neopatrimonial policies over development policies which become clear in the section on the post-colonial history of Togo. What is key to remember is that Togo was established as a state purely for capitalist reasons and as such was developed as an extractive colony resulting in the lasting colonial institutions that can be seen today. During World War One both Great Britain and France invaded Togo starting August 7, 1914, and this invasion eventually resulted in the start of the French and British colonial administrations of Togo in 1922 (Lasisi, 1993).

Under French control, the German administrative, social, and economic policies continued but were eventually adjusted to fit more with the characteristics of French colonialism (Lasisi, 1993). What makes Togo an interesting case of French colonialism is that it was not considered a colony from the beginning, but rather a distinct entity under international law which meant that French assimilation was not a policy that France could pursue as with the rest of French colonies in West Africa (Lasisi, 1993). Under control of both Great Britain and France, there were two Togo’s that were split only on a geographic ideology which resulted in the splitting of all existing ethnic groups along the French-British border of the two Togo’s (Lasisi, 1993). In addition, the different administrative and fiscal strategies on either side of the British-French border further aggravated different ethnic groups including the Ewe, Buem, Akposso, Konkomba, and Tyokossi (Lasisi, 1993). As a result, the Ewe ethnic group was one of the first under colonialism to demonstrate ethnic solidarity, as they were negatively affected by the arbitrary British-French border (Lasisi, 1993). Their association with European culture through Christianity and formal western education under colonial rule allowed the Ewe to take on a more direct strategy by sending their protests to both the British government and President Woodrow Wilson of the United States (Lasisi, 1993). Furthermore, the Ewe assimilation to European culture seems to have given them an advantage in terms of power considering it gave them the ability to reach out to international powers at the time. Clearly,
assimilation through education and religion gave the Ewe peoples an advantage under colonial rule and in fighting against policies they did not agree with e.g., the arbitrary British-French border that split their ethnic group and disturbed their trade policies. This is also further proof of French colonial favoritism and even support towards the Kwa peoples, especially the Ewe people. This has impacted power dynamics between ethnic groups by providing a political platform and political space for the Ewe people while the Gur peoples, especially the Kabye, have been silenced and forced into a political disadvantage through military recruitment strategies in combination with the clear evidence of colonial preference for supporting the Ewe people.

The French government was also aware of this issue but instead treated it as a British problem so there was no action on either side as the British and the League of Nations refused to recognize the Ewe as a centralized state (Lasisi, 1993). As a result, the Ewe people were able to assimilate to colonial rule and made very clear efforts to use this as a way to appeal to colonizers to address the issue of splitting an ethnic group with an arbitrary boundary. These efforts to assimilate to colonial rule may and the resulting favoritism of the Ewe people likely influenced the post-colonial power that the Ewe people have in Togo. Additionally, the strategy to vie for power within the colonial system proves to have become a kind of survival strategy; by fighting for and gaining power within the different colonial and post-colonial systems in Togo people have been able to survive. This post-colonial power of the Ewe people is reflected in the conflict studied here from 1987-1990 as the ethnic power dynamics during the coup of study reflect these ethnic tensions that were started and developed under French colonialism. This political battle for power throughout Togo’s history is the result of asymmetric intervention and colonial favoritism of the Ewe ethnic group. Through the favoritism of the Ewe, other ethnic groups, especially the Kabye who are the second largest ethnic group in Togo, were put at a serious disadvantage. This favoritism of a small majority of the population in Togo put the balance of power into a disproportionate advantage for the Ewe at the cost of the Gur people, especially the Kabye, and as a result has contributed to grabber friendly institutions in addition to the unstable political environment of Togo during independence and after the conflict of study.

During World War II, more ethnic fractionalization and related issues began to arise in Togo under colonial rule relating to the arbitrary British-French boundary. As the Ewe sense of nationalism continued to develop, there were adverse reactions from other ethnic groups in Togo. The Dagomba ethnic group was in favor of the arbitrary boundary as it reunited the Dagomba pre-colonial state and allowed them to enjoy the benefits of being a united ethnic group under colonial
rule (Lasisi, 1993). Then, in 1956 a UN organized vote resulted in British Togo being integrated into the Gold Coast which meant the end of Ewe hopes to unify under a single state (Lasisi, 1993). As a result, the Ewe, in order to maintain their political and economic privileges and in order to survive under colonialism, began to fight for the integration of all ethnic groups in a new state within French mandated territory (Lasisi, 1993). This movement by the Ewe people in combination with the concentration of infrastructure in the southern Kwa areas and Ewe monopolization of the corresponding economic and political opportunities resulted in other ethnic groups in Togo realizing their underprivileged positions under colonial rule (Lasisi, 1993). The Ewe’s strategy of assimilation to the existing colonial power structure to increase their own power in addition to the support generated by asymmetric intervention on behalf of the colonial administrations of Togo proved have carried on into post-independence Togo.

Due to colonial politics and competition between the French and the British, the French encouraged and supported the creation of the first political organizations in the area by the Ewe because they disliked the support that the British were getting from key Ewe leaders like Sylvanus Olympio and Augustone de la Souza (Lasisi, 1993). Moreover, the Ewe leaders were encouraged by the French to continue their political activities as the French accelerated the territory’s movement towards self-government and independence (Lasisi, 1993). Here, it becomes even more clear that the Ewe people were supported by the French colonial administration through asymmetric intervention that lasted throughout Togo’s colonial era. This provides clear evidence that political competition between colonial states, Britain and France in this case, resulted in rushed efforts to allow self-governance and independence in colonial states and territories that were otherwise too unstable under colonial infrastructures and state apparatuses to become stable independent states. This also connects to the literature on coups in Africa. By pushing for the start of political activities under French colonialism, Togo started to fit the pattern of colonial history that contributes to African military coups. In their efforts to maintain more control over Togo than the British, to avoid the absorption of French Togo into the Gold Coast, and to reduce criticism of their policies in Togo, the French colonial administration worked towards gaining the favor of the Ewe ethnic group by offering independence and self-governance (Lasisi, 1993). This effort to start self-governance under colonialism gave a distinct political advantage to the Ewe ethnic group, favored during colonialism due to German and French asymmetric intervention in addition to Ewe efforts to assimilate and the fact that French colonial institutions were located mostly in Kwa areas where the Ewe people lived. Moreover, by starting self-governance under French colonial rule, Togo’s post-colonial institutions
were forced to be built upon French colonial institutions. Thus, colonial institutions in Togo stuck due to both their extractive nature, the advantages of keeping ineffective institutions for elites, and finally because they were the base from which Togo was given the opportunity to develop as an independent state under colonial rule. Moreover, the grabber friendly extractive institutions and the unstable political environment of Togo after independence are the result of colonial asymmetric intervention and favoritism of the Ewe ethnic group.

As self-governance was allowed in Togo, the struggle for ethnic solidarity transformed into the struggle for central political power (Lasisi, 1993). Due to the uneven spread of colonial institutions the Gur people were marginalized in the fight for central power in the newly self-governing Togo (Lasisi, 1993). This meant that the Ewe people who were able to benefit the most from colonial institutions in both economic and political realms were the most involved and most powerful in the political battle for central control of Togo (Lasisi, 1993). This inequality in the political power afforded to the two major ethnic groups in Togo is also reflected in the coup of study. Once again, the Ewe held virtually all political power until the military coup, which was led by the Kabye minority group which made up the greater part of the military. The two Ewe dominated parties that were fighting for control were the Comite D’union Togolaise (CUT) and the Parti Togolaise du Progrès (PTP) (Lasisi, 1993). In 1950 and 1956 the PTP won the majority of seats in the territorial assembly resulting in Nicholas Grunitzky being appointed as Prime Minister (Lasisi, 1993). Then, in 1958 power was transferred to Sylvanus Olympio of the CUT and Togo gained independence under his rule as prime minister on the 27th of April 1960 (Lasisi, 1993).

Post-Independence History of Togo:

Even after independence in Togo, the social, economic, and political inequalities that developed during French colonialism remained and the new government did nothing to improve the inequalities meaning that ethnic groups only became even more divided under self-rule in Togo (Lasisi, 1993). As a result, the Kwa people led by the Ewe were able to dominate the government and the economy while the Gur peoples dominated the army (Lasisi, 1993). It is important to remember that Gur domination in the army was the result of German and French asymmetric intervention policies restricting the recruitment of soldiers under colonialism to the Kabye, Losso, Bassari, and Kotokoli ethnic groups (Lasisi, 1993). This organization of government and army by ethnic groups, conducted first by German and French colonial administrations and then continued
under self-governance, is key in understanding how ethnic tensions in combination with discriminatory practices led to the military coup of study. By restricting positions in the army to only Gur peoples under colonial rule and after independence, these ethnicity-based policies set the ground for a military coup. A united military under one major ethnic group, the Kabye, as stated by McGowan, Johnson, and Slater, can allow for the political involvement of the military and be the perfect setting for a military coup. On the thirteenth of January 1967 there was a military coup, and all governing power was given to Gnassingbé Eyadéma, of the Kabye ethnic group, who assumed leadership of the nation under the reasoning that the army took control of the nation in order to prevent an imminent civil war from the culmination of very clear tension in the nation (Polity5, 2018b; Lasisi, 1993). This military coup and the corresponding ethnic tensions fit very well with the literature and theory on African military coups and colonial influence in ethnic tensions. Clearly, French colonial persecution of and discrimination against specific ethnic groups carried into post-independence Togo.

Eyadéma remained in power in Togo since 1967 after arresting all opponents who were also mostly of Ewe descent and formed his one-party state the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolaise (RPT) (Polity5, 2018b; Lasisi, 1993). Under Eyadéma’s control of Togo, the Kabye ethnic group has continued to be favored within the government and in the “distribution of social and economic infrastructures” (Lasisi, 1993). This favoritism towards Eyadéma’s own ethnic group, the Kabye, and other Gur peoples generated opposition from the Ewe and other Kwa ethnic groups (Lasisi, 1993). This ethnic tension because of Eyadéma’s military coup has fueled the continuity of conflict in Togo. This change in the ethnic group holding central political power disrupted the ethnic power dynamics that developed under German and French colonialism. In addition to the clear favoritism of the Kabye ethnic group and the oppression of the Ewe under Eyadema’s rule, ethnic tensions continued to flare and as a result contributed to conflict recurrence. This also connects back to the literature on durable peace. By failing to treat the different ethnic groups of Togo equitable, Eyadéma created a setting prone to conflict. Power within Togo was split so that the Ewe dominated the modern sector of the economy while the Gur people monopolized both political and military power (Lasisi, 1993). The ethnic fractionalization and the resulting military coup and military heavy control of the government were the direct result of colonialism and colonial policies by both the German and the French in Togo. German policies to have mostly Kabyc, Losso, Bassari, and Kotokoli man the armies and the French perpetuation of this policy allowed for an ethnically homogenous army in the position to become politically involved, which are the two major factors in
McGown, Johnson, and Slater’s breakdown of African military coups. This means that colonial policies have influenced Togo’s military coup, even after independence. Colonial favoritism and discrimination towards different ethnic groups in Togo was the beginning of ethnic tensions in Togo which have undoubtedly contributed to the coup of study and the continued tensions and conflict present currently in Togo. Moreover, Eyadéma’s assumption of power in 1967 and the resulting change in which ethnic groups were being discriminated against set the grounds for the conflict of study in 1986.

Pre-conflict History of Burkina Faso:

Ethnic History of Burkina Faso:

Upper Volta, now known as Burkina Faso, before colonization was a section of Africa that was made up of many different ethnic and social groupings. These groups were classified along a spectrum of decentralized groupings that were governed by elders and local chiefdoms that covered modest populations and territory to the more centralized and hierarchical Mossi empire which ruled over a more sizable population and engaged in conquest and tribute extraction from subjugated peoples (Harsch, 2017). Eventually, the Mossi empire established or imposed chiefdoms throughout the central plateau (Harsch, 2017). The geographic distribution of these different groups of people was as follows: those who were more decentralized, the Lobi, Dagara, Birifor, and Oule, lived on the border of present-day Burkina Faso and Ghana and had no defined territorial organization because they had no chiefs (Harsch, 2017). The main social unit of these groups was instead small farming groups who would only combine in instances of necessary military defense or when there was a need to decide family inheritance (Harsh, 2017). The Gourounsi was another group similar to the Lobi and the Dagara who acknowledge chiefs that performed religious rituals and controlled specific areas of land including its allocations to different people and moreover recognized the roles of village chiefs in their responsibility for organizing war parties in conflicts with neighbors or attacks by non-Gourounsi (Harsch, 2017). Another group was the Dioula who were mainly scattered across the western regions of current day Burkina Faso and engaged a great deal in heavy itinerant trade and were more nomadic than other local ethnic groups (Harsch, 2017). The Dioula were linked together through their Islamic faith and their trade networks and often established decentralized towns in non-Muslim societies (Harsch, 2017). Finally, the Liptako people were members of a highly stratified
Islamic emirate established in approximately 1810 which included free people, subordinate castes, subjugated people, and slaves (Harsch, 2017). These different ethnic and social grouping throughout the geographic area of Burkina Faso provide a social setting filled with multiple different ethnic groups that generated their own political and social settings. The most recent survey of ethnic populations in Burkina Faso is as follows: Mossi 52%, Fulani 8.4%, Gurma 7%, Bobo 4.9%, Gurunsi 4.6%, Senufo 4.5%, Bissa 3.7%, Lobi 2.4%, Dagara 2.4%, Tuareg/Bella 1.9%, Dioula 0.8%, unspecified/no answer 0.3%, other 7.2% (World Factbook, 2021a). These statistics on ethnic proportions of the population reflect colonial policy and ethnic favoritism. Given the large ethnic majority of the Mossi empire in Burkina Faso, there was no opportunity for colonial asymmetric intervention which would have had a worsening impact on political power opportunities for different ethnic groups. This helps to explain the lack of blatant and recorded instances of ethnic oppression after independence. This is key in understanding why Burkina Faso’s conflict of study ended in peace rather than continued conflict as in the case of Togo. This will be shown in the next section on colonial Burkina Faso.

Colonial History of Burkina Faso:

The French colonization of Burkina Faso, then known as Upper Volta, started in the Yatenga Province where the lack of a strong Mossi empire presence in the area provided an avenue for the French to claim the area as a French protectorate in 1895 (Harsch, 2017). Then in 1919 Upper Volta was established as a colony separate from Soudan and Haute-Senegal et Niger and instead of becoming a large settlement colony, Upper Volta developed from an area of colonial suppression to civil administration due to the lack of desire to pay for a strong military presence in the area (Harsch, 2017). Moreover, Burkina Faso’s location is in an area that suffers from endemic malaria which was likely another reason for Burkina Faso not becoming a settler colony (see figure 1). The state institutions introduced by the French during colonization consisted of were to collect taxes, count and categorize the population, build and maintain roads, recruit labor, draft laws and regulations, police, provide sanitation and basic health services, and to carry out other routine tasks that were modeled after the French government serving as the metropole (Harsch, 2017). Once again, the different ethnic groups in Burkina Faso each had their own methods of governance with the Mossi Empire being the largest and the strongest. These differences in ethnic group governance styles clashed with the colonial administration which, as in Togo, resulted in post-colonial institutions that practiced more neo-patrimonial policies than developmental policies.
Within these different colonial institutions there was a strict hierarchy at both state and local levels: the senior positions were occupied by Europeans while junior posts were limited to Africans who had learned to speak and possibly how to read and write in French (Harsch, 2017). This connects heavily to colonial literature and theory as those who were favored by colonial authorities were able to continue to hold this power, even after independence. Additionally, this selective acceptance of different people under colonial rule connects to the issue of poor governance after colonialism as very few people in Burkina Faso had the skills to handle a government based on the European style. African civil servants were required to directly assist colonial local officials and staff in the administrative office as interpreters, clerks, messengers, drivers, guards, and record keepers (Harsch, 2017). This need for African civil servants led to the establishment of training centers for these support personnel but very little in the way of creating actual schools which essentially ensured the lowest rates of education and lowest rates of school attendance in Burkina Faso (Harsch, 2017). These rates of education are key in understanding Burkina Faso’s development process, as stated by Grier. In the more junior positions, African employees would often extort money, goods, or services from residents as another a mechanism of survival and to gain income or to flex their newfound power as the local associates of the French colonization process (Harsch, 2017). These practices have carried over into the independence era of Burkina Faso as these corrupt practices helped to keep high levels of colonial profits and cement loyalty to the colonial administration (Harsch, 2017). Corruption was a survival strategy under French colonial rule which has been carried over through time and is still present in Burkina Faso. Practicing corruption to continue to make high incomes and gain higher amounts of loyalty through exploitation is a poor practice that has led to continued corruption in Burkina Faso which has been a key reason for the multiple coups faced by Burkina Faso, especially the one studied here in 1988.

The French colonial strategy was to initially destroy the pre-existing state structures, but this eventually resulted in cooperation with chiefs rather than bypassing them due to the lack of educated individuals that the colonial powers could work with to have direct colonial control in addition to the threat of disease to colonial settlers (Harsch, 2017). French colonialism in Burkina Faso worked through the Mossi empire, which inevitably resulted in the political advantage of the Mossi and resentment from non-Mossi elites (Harsch, 2017). By working with Mossi chiefs rather than by passing them and creating a completely military based colonial administration, there was no asymmetric intervention that favored a large ethnic minority. As a result, there was no clear change in political advantage for ethnic groups and the Mossi ethnic group maintained their political power
under colonialism. This resentment from non-Mossi elites was not the result of asymmetric intervention as ethnic tensions in Togo were. Rather, this resentment is instead the result of ethnic groups being forced to subject themselves to colonial rule by the French colonial administration and the Mossi chiefs due to their geographic location within the boundaries of Upper Volta. The issue in Burkina Faso was not asymmetric intervention resulting in the uneven balance of power between similarly sized ethnic groups. Instead, the issue was that the Mossi empire worked as an extension of the French colonial administration which meant that all ethnic groups in the geographic area of upper volta were forcefully subjected to colonial rule through the Mossi chiefs.

Once again, corruption ran throughout the colonial power and chiefdom ties: some chiefs did take advantage of their positions as ties to the French colonial power by diverting revenues into their own pockets given their newfound freedom from the old checks on their power (Harsch, 2017). These abuses of power and diversion of funds was especially prevalent in the judicial system (Harsch, 2017). Moreover, the corruption of chiefs also reared its face in the overestimation of subjects within a chief’s domain in order to increase the portion of colonial taxes imposed on the population and in the colonial conscription of African peoples which was also under the control of chiefs (Harsch, 2017). Military recruitment and conscription were an especially powerful form of colonial power as it was compulsory and punishable by fine or imprisonment (Harsch, 2017). As individuals were recruited into the colonial military of Upper Volta, they would be assigned to different colonial projects including building the physical colonial infrastructure through the construction of bridges, roads, railway lines, and administrative or private buildings (Harsch, 2017). In addition to working on infrastructure projects, those who were recruited or conscripted in Upper Volta were also subject to fighting on various European fronts during World War I (Harsch, 2017).

As for some of the existing ethnic groups in the geographic area of Upper Volta, there was active resistance to colonization from some groups more than others. The Lobi people were one of the major sources of direct resistance to French colonial rule as they fought against taxation, forced cotton cultivation, and labor and military conscription and were involved in direct violence and suppression in 1915-1916, the 1930s well into the 1940s and again in 1953 (Harsch, 2017). The Mossi people who had been afforded an advantage by working with colonial powers had no recorded instances of overt resistance, but when there was resistance, it was by villagers who were resisting their chiefs in a form of indirect resistance to colonialism (Harsch, 2017). Mossi cooperation with colonial France was key in the French maintaining control over the area, but it was done in the interests of the Mossi who wanted to stay within the higher echelons of society and
maintain some semblance of the control they had before colonialism. In 1932, French colonial powers made clear their immense power over Upper Volta by further dividing the existing ethnic groups in the area by incorporating a large portion of the Upper Volta colony into the Ivory Coast, making Ouahigouya and a small part of Dedougou part of Soudan (Mali), and attaching Gourma and Liptako to Niger (Harsch, 2017). This division of Upper Volta forced the Mossi into a subordinate position but chiefs continued to cooperate with colonial forces through the collection of taxes and labor recruitment in an effort to convince the French of their loyalty in the hopes of winning the reconstruction of the former colony and in turn their empire under colonialism (Harsch, 2017). This decision by the French colonial administration further proves that the French support of Mossi chiefs was done solely to make it easier to control Burkina Faso’s population with less use of colonial resources. This decision to divide the existing ethnic groups in Burkina Faso including the Mossi reveals that there was no clear favoritism towards the Mossi empire, but it was rather a case of how to expend the least amount of resources during French colonial rule in Burkina Faso. This political strategy proved the influence and power of colonialism over the remnants of the Mossi empire who were initially far too powerful and unwilling to let the start of French colonization begin within their empire. The efforts of the Mossi to continue a positive relationship and maintain their place of power under colonialism may have been in the name of survival but can be most clearly connected to the fight for political power under French colonialism.

In September 1947 Upper Volta was reconstituted as an overseas territory under the colonial borders (Harsch, 2017). This was done not because of Mossi loyalty, but in an effort to counter the wave of post-World War two anti-colonialism (Harsch, 2017). As Upper Volta was relabeled a territory, political life began to develop while still under the control of France. There was the elimination of forced labor and oppressive indigenat legal statutes and the allowance of some freedom of the press and freedom of assembly (Harsch, 2017). French territories were then allowed new assemblies elected on a restricted franchise where they had some say over budgets and public works (Harsch, 2017). This level of social mobilization before independence connects directly to the literature on coups as societies with higher levels of social mobilization before independence were more prone to military coups (McGowan et al, 1984). As some colonial policies were lifted in an effort by the French to avoid scrutiny during Post-war decolonization waves, the French maintained a foothold in Upper Volta resulting in the limited political development and dependence on the stability of the French control over the territory. Upper Volta’s years of increasing political independence as a French territory meant that the beginning of the state of Burkina Faso was both
heavily influenced, limited by and heavily reliant upon the stability afforded by French control and influence. Moreover, the institutions that Burkina Faso’s government was built on were those very same extractive institutions that were put in place by the French colonial administration.

As a French territory afforded greater, albeit limited, political freedoms Upper Volta began its foray into party politics. The Mossi continued to push for the restoration of the old borders which had allowed them to be the strongest and most unified ethnic group within Upper Volta (Harsch, 2017). Once the restoration of the old borders came in the late 1940s, the Mossi chiefs were able to maintain authority at the local level but still had to participate in party politics (Harsch, 2017). However, the more progressive Voltaic nationalists formed the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) which was at its start a militant party aligned with the French communist movement (Harsch, 2017). The first assembly election took place in June 1948 where participation was restricted to less than 5% of the adult population of Upper Volta and resulted in the overwhelming majority win by Mossi chiefs (Harsch, 2017). However, by the mid-1950s the RDA was able to demonstrate their growing electoral strength as they also tempered their initial militancy and communist radicalism (Harsch, 2017). Moreover, the Mossi aristocracy began to break apart as its faction ridden party developed a new alliance with the RDA resulting in a combination of some of the Mossi elite with representatives of the very small elite of teachers and civil servants, Mossi and non-Mossi (Harsch, 2017). In 1956, in a political landscape with no mass parties and a political strategy that forced the small parties to appeal to villagers and the urban poor with highly specified campaigns, the RDA won dominance in the territorial elections (Harsch, 2017). Moreover, due to the high salaries given to those in elected office (Harsch, 2017) the pattern of corruption in government, especially electoral fraud and violence, continued with the introduction of party politics in Upper Volta due to how corruption became a strategy for survival under French colonialism.

Political tensions between the RDA and the Mossi aristocracy continued through the 1950s. Neither party was clearly fighting for independence as there were clear prospects for further African citizenship rights under the continued French rule, and both parties saw that this continued support for the French would only be an asset (Harsch, 2017). In October of 1958 Ouezzin Coulibaly was replaced as central leader of the RDA by Maurice Yaméogo while Mogho Naaba Kougri, the Mossi successor, made a proposal for a government of “Union and Public Safety” that was immediately rejected (Harsch 2017, 20). Kougri’s response was an attempt at a show of force that backfired and resulted in the increase of anti-chief sentiments throughout Upper Volta (Harsch, 2017). Eventually, anti-independence sentiments of the RDA became explosively clear after Yaméogo ordered two
independence parties, the MLN (Mouvement de Libération Nationale) and the PAI (Parti Africain de l’Indépendance), to be subjected to repression, threats, and bribery along with police harassment resulting in the driving out of opposition deputies in the assembly or their absorption into the RDA (Harsch, 2017). Clearly, French colonialism has had a lasting impact on politics in Upper Volta. From the reliance on French support and the hope for expanded rights under French rule, it seems to have been an issue of willing dependence on the French. This relationship can be seen through Yaméogo’s decision, after De Gaulle announced in 1959 that French territories could claim independence without losing French assistance, to arrest the six opposition figures who proposed a “natural union” government to help build the new state in its newfound independence (Harsch, 2017). Clearly, even when allowed to develop political parties as a French territory, French colonial policies, and the related reliance of Upper Volta’s political elites on French support remained influential.

Post-Independence History of Burkina Faso:

Yaméogo continued his efforts to remain in close contact with colonial French powers even throughout Upper Volta’s independence in 1960, this included making only minor changes to the state structures inherited from French colonial authorities (Harsch, 2017). These efforts to maintain colonial institutions were clear and according to the literature it is very likely that these efforts have hurt Burkina Faso’s chances of developing out of the poor extractive colonial institutions and structures put in place by the French. These issues regarding poor institutions were worsened by Yaméogo’s efforts to increase the number of trained officials working within the government as higher numbers of employees did not increase government efficiency and instead introduced even more corrupt officials to the government of Upper Volta resulting in the disappearance of financial allocations from the reserve bank (Harsch, 2017). Clearly, French influence and corruption ran rampant throughout the history of Upper Volta and have had lasting effects on the stability and governance of Burkina Faso into the present day.

Serious political and social issues became present in Upper Volta in the 1960s starting with Yaméogo’s efforts to decrease public expenditure through 20% wage cuts (Harsch, 2017). These wage cuts resulted in the largest protest in the history of Upper Volta and Yaméogo’s transfer of power to Lieutenant Colonel Sangoule Lamizana (Harsch, 2017). It remains unclear why these wage cuts were introduced, but the reaction clearly shows resistance from a large part of the population to losing a portion of their income due to a decision that was made by a publicly corrupt government.
that relied heavily on French support. Moreover, with the transition of power to Lieutenant Colonel Sangoule Lamizana, the government of Burkina Faso came under military control and influence which is key in the onset of military coups.

Under the control of Lieutenant Colonel Lamizana, public displays of wealth were far more limited which allowed for anti-corruption efforts to be imposed and economic austerity efforts to increase without public backlash (Harsch, 2017). The austerity efforts included salary reductions of 10%, the elimination of hundreds of state employees, and the imposition of patriotic contributions equivalent to half a month's pay (Harsch, 2017). The result of these austerity measures after five years was that Upper Volta succeeded in clearing its debt arrears, strengthened tax collection, and had saved enough money to permit spending on public salaries and new investments (Harsch, 2017). In this case, strong austerity measures taken on by Lamizana who was not outwardly flexing his wealth, as monetary exuberance often reasonably led to suspicions of corruption in a very poor country like Upper Volta, led to positive effects on the debt balance and opportunities for investment.

However, since state institutions that developed out of colonial institutions did not yet reach the northern area of Upper Volta, chiefs began to appeal for restoration of their previous privileges under the condition that they pledge their allegiance to the government in place and do nothing to undermine governmental authority (Harsch, 2017). Mossi chiefs regained their former privileges in October of 1968 and the political consequences included the outcry of students and women stating their dislike of this backwards policy regarding chiefs and party politicians once again began to push for civilian government rather than continued military control of Upper Volta (Harsch, 2017). This is another example of how a favored ethnic group under French colonialism, the Mossi, has been able to maintain its powerful position even after colonialism. However, there is a distinct difference in this case in comparison to the Togolese case; here the Mossi in Burkina Faso are such a large ethnic majority that even in the face of opposition from those who did not support Mossi chiefs regaining their former privileges they were able to maintain their power. This is in conjunction with the fact that the Mossi were the ethnic group supported by the French colonial administration without any major ethnic group opposition, unlike in Togo where the Ewe ethnic group was marginally larger than the Kabye group and were supported by the German and French colonial administrations through asymmetric intervention which then resulted in the higher levels of ethnic conflict and cleavages in Togo in comparison to Burkina Faso.
In June 1970 a new constitution was adopted, and Gerard Kango Ouedraogo of the RDA became the prime minister of Upper Volta while the military retained its substantial role in political and state affairs (Harsch, 2017). Serious environmental issues developed in Upper Volta in 1972 and 1973 in the form of a severe drought that forced very high levels of mass migration and resulted in widespread crop failures (Harsch, 2017). In combination with this serious environmental issue, the history of corruption and profiteering in Upper Volta reared its face once more in the form of state officials profiting from grain hoarding which then drove up grain prices even higher (Harsch, 2017). This pattern of corruption in government officials has lasted through the history of Upper Volta ever since the start of the colonization process which means that corruption became a means of surviving if not thriving for those working in the government of Upper Volta. Moreover, the strong presence of the military in political and state affairs sets the stage for the conflict of study based on the literature of coups in the African continent.

On the 8th of February 1974 Lamizana suspended the constitution, dissolved the national assembly, and banned party activities ending the Second Republic abruptly (Harsch, 2017). This reveals the beginning of a pattern in Upper Volta which has continued into the history of Burkina Faso, military coups d’etat are now becoming more frequent occurrences in the first two decades after independence. In October of 1977 a new constitution entrenched a formal military rule of Upper Volta through direct election of the president without the former constitution’s transitional provisions (Harsch, 2017). Lamizana retained the presidency and the history of those in control of politics being rich and the people of the country being poor continued (Harsch, 2017). This proves to be a key difference between the conflict backgrounds between Burkina Faso, where the source of conflict was about economic inequality and poor governance, and Togo where the conflict was about ethnic groups and the resulting power struggles. The following unrest continued to escalate and culminated in the November 25th, 1977, coup led by Colonel Saye Zerbo where he detained the president and many of his officials, scrapped the constitution, dissolved the national assembly, suspended political parties, and prohibited all political activities (Harsch, 2017). Under Zerbo, Captain Thomas Sankara worked as the secretary of information and encouraged truthful reporting resulting in issues of embezzlement and poor public resource management becoming clear to the population and to the world (Harsch, 2017). The feelings junior officers had of frustration and contempt for senior officers, civilian politicians, and political institutions were the result of how junior officers considered such people and institutions to be corrupt, indecisive, and inefficient (Hasrch, 2017). These thoughts of the Upper Volta government are not inaccurate and have been
characteristic of the government in Upper Volta since the time that civilians were given positions within the colonial structure and institutions put in place by the French government.

Once again, the deep disenchantment with the government resulted in another coup d’état led by Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo and the Council of Popular Salvation (CSP) on November 7th, 1982, where he became president and named Thomas Sankara as prime minister on the 10th of January 1983 (Harsch, 2017). In his position as prime minister, Sankara was provided with just the platform he needed to press for continued reforms and win greater support from the general public (Harsch, 2017). As Sankara garnered increased support from the public, especially as a leftist, it is possible that French interventionist policies were behind Sankara being purged from government on May 17, 1983 (Harsch, 2017). By continuing the dependent relationship with France, the government of Burkina Faso was set up in a way to allow such interventionist policies. This means that, once again, French colonialism in Burkina Faso played a key role in the political unrest by setting the seeds of insurrection and the military coup that followed in 1988. In the resulting aftermath, Sankara came back into power by declaring over the radio the overthrow of Ouedraogo and announcing the Conseil National de la Révolution (CNR) as the new government (Harsch, 2017). Upper Volta was then renamed Burkina Faso, and it remained very autocratic and undemocratic as political parties were banned, and the third republic was dissolved just like its predecessors (Harsch, 2017). Moreover, the military presence within the government remained the same even with the introduction of a very limited civilian presence in the government. This military presence in the government plays a key role, just as the dislike for Thomas Sankara, in setting the scene for the conflict of study that took place in 1988.

Section 4: Case analysis

Togo’s Coup of Study:

Brewing discontent with Eyadéma’s rule, and his oppression of the newly displaced Kwa ethnic groups, resulted in a number of attempted coups one of which in September 1986, reached the level of an armed conflict (UCDP MTD state-based violence). By turning the initial power dynamic of ethnic groups, a result of colonial asymmetric intervention, in Togo on its head and oppressing the Kwa groups and the Ewe people, Eyadema created an atmosphere perfect for renewed and long-lasting conflict. On the evening of 23 September 1986, fighting broke out in the capital Lomé (UCDP MTD state-based violence). Some 60 to 70 armed men attacked strategic
targets, including the radio station, military barracks housing President Eyadéma, and RPT headquarters with the goal of deposing Eyadéma and installing a new government under the leadership of MTD leader Gilchrist Olympio and a dissident army officer names Francisco Lawson (UCDP MTD state-based violence). It is important to recognize that Gilchrist Olympio was the son of Sylvanus Olympio, and important Ewe political figure. This means that ethnic tensions, which initially developed under German and French colonial rule in Togo and were exacerbated by Eyadéma’s oppression of the Ewe people during his rule, played a key role in the onset and continuation of this conflict of study. Following a night of clashes, the rebels were defeated by government forces (UCDP MTD state-based violence). What is important to recognize here is that Eyadéma failed to address the grievances of those affected in his coup that resulted in his rise to power. This clear connection to the literature on rebel groups and durable peace also ties to the new oppression of the Ewe ethnic group under the formerly oppressed Kabye military government. By switching the ethnic group in control of the Togolese government during Eyadéma’s coup and then oppressing the Ewe majority ethnic group, Eyadéma put himself in a position to face continued outcry and resistance to his rule. These ethnic tensions and the resulting effect on conflict recurrence are directly related to how German and French colonial administrations in Togo conducted asymmetric interventions by supporting the marginally larger Ewe ethnic group and oppressing the marginally smaller Kabye ethnic group.

There was increasing opposition, which included high levels of public outcry due to a trial of students who, in October of 1990, were accused of distributing anti-government propaganda and resulted in the deaths of 28 demonstrators on April 11th, 1991, in the Be Lagoon in Lomé (UCDP Government of Togo one sided violence). President Gnassingbé Eyadéma met with opposition leaders to hold a conference to restructure the political system which ended on August 28th, 1991, even though Eyadéma did try to suspend its proceedings (Polity5, 2018b). The results of the conference were twofold. First, there was the step towards democratization with the legalization of opposition parties which then triggered very high levels of social and political unrest that lasted for years to come (UCDP Togo State-based Violence). Second, there was the adoption of an electoral timetable which involved a referendum on the new constitution on February 9th, 1992, which then created a prime minister position where some executive powers were transferred to the new prime minister Koukou Koffigoh while Gnassingbé Eyadéma maintained his position as president (Polity5, 2018b). There was continued political instability and power struggles within the government that culminated in October of 1992 when part of the army held the interim parliament hostage resulting
in opposition parties and labor unions declaring a general strike on the 16th of November of 1992 which lasted several months and had a severe impact on the Togolese economy (UCDP Government of Togo one sided violence). Then, in January 1993, there were intensified demonstrations as Eyadéma ended the period of transition. This included the death of 19 peaceful protestors at the hands of security forces on January 25th and as a result an estimated 250,000 Togolese people fled the country during the violence (UCDP Government of Togo one sided violence). International pressure then forced Eyadéma’s regime to agree to elections in August of 1993 (UCDP Government of Togo one sided violence). The August 1993 presidential elections were held with opposition boycott and allegations of electoral fraud and the candidacy of the main challenger being rejected by the supreme court on a technicality (Polity5, 2018b). As a result, Eyadéma was given the election as all the other opposition candidates continued to boycott elections through 2002 (Polity5, 2018b). This is an example of poorly implemented democracy which, according to the literature on durable peace, is a major cause on conflict recidivism. Moreover, the continued oppression and clear corruption during elections only served to worsen the situation and make peace even more unattainable in Togo.

Gnassingbé Eyadéma died on February 5th, 2005, of a sudden heart attack and the military high command then announced that Faure Gnassingbé would take over the presidency after his father which contravened the constitution, and this resulted in charges of fraud and violent riots which were quickly ended by the armed forces (Polity5, 2018b). It is common belief that this unconstitutional transition of power from father to son was intended to maintain the dominance of the Kabye ethnic group (Banjo, 2008). Thus, ethnic tensions play a major role in the politics of Togo and may have an indirect effect on mining considering that positions in the mining sector are considered highly prestigious (Banjo, 2008). Moreover, the unconstitutional appointment of Faure Gnassingbé provoked a severe reaction by the military against demonstrators and members of opposition parties resulting in the deaths of over 400 civilians in the months of April and May 2005 alone and over 10,000 more people to flee the country (UCDP Government of Togo one sided violence). The next set of elections in March of 2010 also resulted in Faure Gnassingbé’s re-election which once again stoked opposition claims of fraud and triggered protests (Polity5, 2018b). Clearly, in Togo political tensions have remained high since the end of the conflict in 1990 and the political monopoly of the Kabye ethnic minority may have an impact on how governance is conducted, especially in the mining sector. Moreover, the blatant corruption in the democratic system of Togo and the ethnic oppression conducted by the Kabye government only served to continue conflict in
the state which has suffered from conflict recidivism ever since Eyadéma’s rise to power in 1967. These ethnic tensions are the direct result of asymmetric intervention by the German and French colonial administrations in Togo and have fueled the Togolese conflict since 1967 through to present day.

Burkina Faso’s Coup of Study:

Burkina Faso’s conflict started with Thomas Sankara’s death in a coup led by military captain Blaise Compaoré on October 15, 1987 (Polity5, 2018a). Sankara was displaced during the coup by a rebel group called the Popular Front, which was led by Sankara’s former allies Compaoré, Lingani, and Zongo (UCDP Burkina Faso Government Violence). There was an autocratic reform period in 1991 when a new constitution was being drafted while opposition groups boycotted the elections as they were not allowed to challenge the Compaoré regime (Polity5, 2018a). Following the 1987 coup, Blaise Compaoré became the new president, and the Popular Front was reorganized as a political umbrella organization that replaced the CNR (UCDP Burkina Faso Government Violence). While President Compaoré initially ruled together with Lingani and Zongo, the latter two were imprisoned and executed after they allegedly plotted a coup in 1989 (UCDP Burkina Faso Government Violence). Compaoré continued to run a military government until 1991, when a new nominally democratic constitution was adopted. In order to run in the presidential elections, Compaoré resigned from the military; he subsequently won a 7-year term as president after running unopposed, as the opposition boycotted the election (UCDP Burkina Faso Government Violence). There was then the creation of an electoral commission which was demanded by opposition parties on February 21, 1998, and put into law on May 7th, 1998 (Polity5, 2018a). Then, despite multiple boycotts Compaoré was re-elected with 87.5% of the vote on November 15, 1998 (Polity5, 2018a). Compaoré kept his place as Burkina Faso President, winning the 1998, 2005, and 2010 presidential elections (UCDP Burkina Faso Government Violence). Compaoré’s participation in the 2005 election was disputed, as the opposition parties claimed that he had already served his maximum of two terms as stipulated in the 2000 constitution (UCDP Burkina Faso Government Violence). However, Compaoré claimed that he was allowed to run for another two terms after the 2000 constitution was adopted (UCDP Burkina Faso government violence). Eventually, Compaoré was forced to resign on October 31, 2014, and was then followed by Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, also of Mossi decent, as the winner of the first fair presidential election with his party Movement for the
People of Progress who claimed the merit of being the first peaceful and elected transfer of power in Burkina Faso (Polity5, 2018a). This implementation of democracy proves to be a major difference from Togo where an early push for democratization in 1991 with the legalization of opposition parties resulted in a huge socio-political uproar. The different results from moves towards democracy must be due to very different levels of social stability in each country as Burkina successfully embraced democracy decades after the conflict while Togo’s push for democracy was immediately after conflict. Clearly, timing of democratization matters.

Finally, it is important to recognize that nowhere in the Burkina Faso conflict was ethnic oppression mentioned as an issue. In Togo, the Eyadéma regime oppressed the Kwa people and openly favored the Gur peoples, especially the Kabye ethnic group as a result of colonial asymmetric intervention. In Burkina Faso, there were no policies of ethnic discrimination that are available in the existing literature on the conflict, the lack of clear ethnic oppression in Burkina Faso after the 1988 conflict undoubtedly contributed to the lasting peace.

Section 5: Economic Analysis

Another aspect of the Togolese and Burkinabe conflicts that is studied here is economic history and capacity of both countries and how this has contributed to the conflicts and conflict recurrence. This section will consist of an in-depth look into World Bank and IMF reports on the economies of both countries around the time of each conflict and an analysis of mining in both countries. The focus on mining is conducted in section 5b and provides an in depth look at natural resources and how they can contribute to both conflict and peace through the variable of human development. Moreover, this section will provide a detailed analysis of the successes and shortfalls of a World Bank in the Togolese economy.

Section 5a: The Economies of Togo and Burkina Faso

First, Togo’s economic history and capabilities are analyzed. This section will first give a general overview of the Togolese economy at the time of the coup of study and the pattern of debt creation and amortization in the aftermath of the 1988 military coup. Then the efforts of the Togolese government to address economic issues will be analyzed. Next, the level of protectionism in the country and its effects will studied. Finally, a case study on a World Bank technical assistance project will provide an opportunity to see the effects of World Bank involvement in Togo at the time of the conflict and discern just how beneficial external interventions really are.
The International Monetary Fund provides a look into the economic system of Togo just after the conflict of study in their Country Report Togo - Recent Economic Developments from 1994. There are three major characteristics used to describe the external sector of the Togolese economy: heavy reliance on primary commodity exports, large but slowly decreasing debt service requirements, and finally a traditional role as the trade center for the region (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Togo as a coastal state does benefit from being a port that exports about one third of its total imports to neighboring land locked countries (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). As a port country, exports play an important part in earning for the Togolese government. A heavy reliance on exports for income in Togo put the government and the people at the whim of global markets, especially considering that the consistent weakness of prices for Togo’s exports (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). As a result of adverse price and volume developments in Togo, there was a 43% decline in the value of exports in 1992-1993 while re-exports plummeted during the general strike from November 1992 to March 1993 (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). In the case of Togo, post conflict tensions represented by the 1992-1993 strike has a very heavy impact on the economy in terms of growth.

Moreover, in looking at Togolese debts, there is a clear connection between internal conflict and the ability of the government to pay off debts. The slowly decreasing debt service requirements were successful, but less so in the face of socio-political turmoil which warped the economic numbers. At the end of 1993 Togo’s external debt amounted to CFAF 363.9 billion where CFAF 32 billion was the result of arrears (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). The steady reduction of the debt to GDP ratio in Togo was from 94% in 1985 to 68% at the end of 1990 but increased to 103% at the end of 1993 due to the contraction in GDP (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). This provides a clear example of how deeply intertwined politics and economics are. The general strike from 1992-1993 had a huge impact on the economic performance of Togo (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Additionally, in combination with the general strike, dissatisfaction with the government grew as poor economic performance affected the lives of Togolese citizens. This falls in line with the literature on conflicts and coups on the cycle of economic performance and conflict; poor economic performance begets higher levels of government dissatisfaction and conflict which then results in the cyclical worsening of the economy.

In addition to the influence of the external sector on the Togolese economy, there are internal and more local sectors that are key in understanding the Togolese economy at the time of the conflict of study. The most important activity in the informal sector was commerce which accounted for over 80% of operations at the time (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Within this informal market most food stuffs were sold and a large portion of imported goods (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). In
the informal sector most people were self-employed, in subsistence agriculture for example, and their incomes were at or below the minimum wage which was the poverty limit (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). All workers in Togo were guaranteed a minimum wage which was determined by collective bargaining by trade unions, employers, and the government for those who work in the formal private sector (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Moreover, real incomes in rural areas followed a downward trend since the sharp drop in world prices for coffee and cocoa (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). For example, the very poorest in Togo even before conflict were reliant on subsistence farming and about 50% of the population was food insecure (Kjellstrom et al, 1987). In addition to falling incomes and fluctuating prices, Togo also suffered from issues related to unemployment and population growth. The yearly average of population growth in Togo was 3.2% and the growth of the labor force was very similar (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Estimates of the rate of unemployment were within the range of 16%-28% from 1991-1993, just after the conflict, and employment in the private and formal sectors had been falling, reflecting the impacts of the continued political and social unrest after conflict (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). The agricultural sector employed approximately two thirds of the total labor force and to a certain extent absorbed those laid off from the modern sector (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). With these consistent rates of unemployment, especially after the military coup in 1987, there was undoubtedly dissatisfaction with the government of Gnassingbé Eyadéma which was likely a part of the reason behind continued conflict in Togo. Moreover, with the rates of unemployment and low incomes for a large portion of the Togolese population, there is once again a clear connection to the cycle of poor economic performance resulting in continued conflict.

Outside of income and unemployment issues, there were also the efforts taken on by the government to help address economic issues and shortfalls. The economic policy in Togo was based on a policy of investment planning which allowed very limited government intervention and instead left a very important role for the private sector which served as an important means for attracting foreign capital (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). This policy was in part the result of World Bank projects from 1988 and 1987 that were focused on the privatization of textile mills and of parastatal companies (see table 1). In light of this privatization policy, there were also severe shortfalls on behalf of the ministry of planning which lacked transparency and suffered from administrative procedures that prevented efficient preparation and financial monitoring of investment expenditure (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). This inefficient and non-transparent management of planning seriously affected the reliability and efficiency of the ministry of planning. This poor governance was likely a result of the extractive institutions that were set up in Togo under French colonial administration which put Togo at a
severe disadvantage economically. Moreover, the asymmetric intervention by German and French colonial administration in Togo undoubtedly affected the ability of Togolese people to govern in an effective way when combined with extractive and grabber-friendly institutions. Here it becomes clear that institutions and the asymmetric treatment of ethnic groups has had a negative impact on the ability of Togo to become a developed country and to function with a stable and transparent government. As a result, Togo has suffered from repeated and extended conflict.

However, even with these institutional and governance related issues, in 1988 and 1989 there was progress in implementing structural reforms and financial adjustments under the IMF supported adjustment program resulting in a budget surplus of 1.6% of GDP and a decline in the overall financial deficit by 5.8% of GDP (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). In 1990 and 1991 the economic successes of Togo began to change as continued social and political unrest severely affected revenue collection which in turn had a negative effect on financial performance (Sacerdoti, 1994). From 1982 through 1991 there was a government liquidation and privatization reform program that reduced the government’s portfolio from 73 to 30 enterprises (Sacerdoti, 1994). This effort to increase privatization, a very neoliberal policy, in Togo did not seem to have been helpful with any social unrest. Moreover, by increasing privatization, the ability of the government of Togo, which was already limited given colonial institutions and a lack of transparency, to contribute to better economic development continued to dwindle. This suggests a connection back to colonial asymmetric intervention in Togo as the competition between the Kwa and the Gur peoples may very well have resulted in privatization; by allowing private groups to take control, neither ethnic group is put at an advantage or disadvantage in terms of economic power. The financial and economic situation in Togo continued to deteriorate further in 1992 and 1993 as social and political unrest continued to grow in severity especially given the general strike that was in effect for a significant period in 1993 (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Expenditures in Togo were also declining due to the collapse of foreign investment as a result of political uncertainties which arose from the existing sociopolitical unrest (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). This evidence of Togo’s economy after the 1987 military coup provides a clear story of how social and political instability feed into economic issues, even if there were some successes along the way. Togo’s economy suffered from weaknesses in efficiency and transparency which only field both economic and sociopolitical ills.

In addition to inefficiency, there were also serious issues in addressing how to fix the economy in the face of political turmoil. In an effort to address the worsening social and political situation in Togo, the government decided in 1992 to continue the economic adjustment process
with a comprehensive tax reform that included strengthening the tax administration and overhauling the public sector (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). These efforts, however, were squashed and resulted in further economic and financial management deterioration due to the general strike which was a result of increased dissatisfaction with the government in November of 1992 through March of 1993 (Sacerdoti, 1994). This effort to address economic issues took the existing social and political unrest for granted and instead resulted in worsened conditions. The government’s decision to focus on economic and financial growth during a time of severe social and political unrest only exacerbated the existing economic crisis on top of the social and political turmoil. Several measures were passed in July of 1993 in an effort to increase public revenue collection, but they were delayed due to the unsettled sociopolitical climate and eventually fell short in the aftereffects of the general strike (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). There was a 64% drop in direct taxes on income due to the stagnation of economic activity while the profits tax for enterprises fell steadily from CFAF 8.5 billion in 1990 to CFAF 3.7 billion in 1992 and CFAF 1.6 billion in 1993 (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Moreover, in the rundown of the political and economic crisis there was little success in curtailing Togolese government expenditure (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Clearly, social and political turmoil have had a negative effect on economic development and growth in Togo in the early 1990s. This points towards the importance of understanding how deeply connected society, politics, and economics are especially in fragile post conflict settings. Any programming for economic and financial solutions must be conducted in a way that is flexible and able to adapt to the social and political environment. Forcing a project, whether it be on behalf of the state’s government, the IMF, the WB, or the UN, in an unstable environment will only cause more damage as this Togolese example proves.

In addition to issues in addressing problems in the Togolese economy and as a consequence of both the socio-political issues and the lack of economic protection in Togo, total export revenues declined by 45% between 1991 and 1993 (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). The lack of economic protection in Togo, a vulnerable underdeveloped country, meant that the already weak economy was subjected to fluctuations in global prices and demand making economic stability with or without socio-political turmoil virtually impossible. Togo did have much lower levels of government control in the economy, as evidenced by all prices being free of control apart from key items including petroleum products, cement, reinforcing bars, and wheat flour (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). This proves to be in direct contrast with the higher levels of protection in Burkina Faso. Moreover, it became very clear that the Togolese economy was very vulnerable in 1992 and 1993 given the large decline in phosphate export volume in combination with an adverse terms of trade shock (Sacerdoti et al,
1994. As prices fluctuate, incomes fall for the majority of the population which lives in rural areas of Togo, tensions inevitably increased as a result of decreasing welfare and quality of life. Based on this information, Togo seems to have suffered from too little economic protection in the global economy which may have benefitted economic growth, but this proves to be unimportant in preventing conflict recurrence and developing peace. This lack of protection policies may be connected to colonial asymmetric intervention in Togo. By lowering the levels of protection in Togo, neither the Kwa or the Gur people would have control over imports or exports. Therefore, competition between ethnic groups as a result of colonial asymmetric intervention resulted in lower levels of economic protection which have negatively impacted the stability of the Togolese economy and in turn has increased the likelihood of continued conflict. Moreover, there is a very clear issue in terms of the resource curse and heavy dependence on international markets for income. The heavy reliance on phosphate in turn produces a serious vulnerability in the Togolese economy that was only worsened by political and social unrest after the introduction of an increasingly democratic government generated by the development of opposition parties in a high autocratic government under Gnassingbé Edeyama.

In addition to the internal issues that have affected the Togolese economy after conflict, there were also issues that arose because of the combination of Togo’s own economic and governance issues and external intervention by the World Bank. Based on the information available in the World Bank discussion paper Institutional development and Technical Assistance in Macroeconomic Policy: A Case Study of Togo published in 1987, the Togolese economy suffered from failure on behalf of both the Togolese government and the World Bank to find a way to make technical assistance (TA) a successful program. This pre-conflict analysis of the successes and shortcomings of technical assistance in Togo allows for a better understanding of the economic conditions and inappropriate strategy on behalf of the World Bank to help the Togolese economy. Additionally, this ineffective effort to aid the Togolese economy may have very well contributed to the rise of conflict in 1988, considering that literature states that poor economic performance can give rise to conflict. Given the degree of ethnic discrimination present in Togo since colonization, the World Bank did consider this to be a sign to decrease operations in Togo and move instead to areas where people were more willing to address ethnic discrimination for the sake of the poor (Kjellstrom et al, 1987). This reasoning on behalf of the World Bank failed to take into account that those who are poor and ethnically discriminated against would suffer even more without economic intervention by the World Bank. To deprive those suffering due to poverty because of ethnic
discrimination in a country would not improve the ethnic tensions in an area, but rather force the poor to suffer even more when they could have been helped by World Bank intervention.

The economic issues started in the ’70s in Togo due to the heavy reliance on phosphate exports for state income and the failure to properly address problems that arose with the fluctuation of phosphate prices on the global market. Togolese economic growth in 1974 was erratic due to fluctuating prices of phosphate on the global market (Kjellstrom, 1987). As a response to fluctuations in phosphate prices, the Togolese government widened the budget and the balance of payment deficits in an attempt to capitalize on the phosphate boom, but this instead led to the crisis of ’79-’82 where the diagnosis was a cyclical rather than structural issue with the economy (Kjellstrom, 1987). This meant that instead of addressing the budget and balance of payments problems, the Togolese government instead focused on slowing investment which just resulted in the stagnation of GDP from ’79-’82 (Kjellstrom, 1987). Moreover, action by the government to address the crisis was stalled by uncoordinated and weak institutions along with the fragmentation of decision making which was limited to those at the political summit (Kjellstrom, 1987). The incorrect diagnosis of the issue, as a cyclical rather than structural issue, shows poor decisions on behalf of the Togolese economy to first rely so heavily on phosphates for income and to then fail to take the necessary measures to address the resulting issue. The unorganized and hierarchical nature of economic institutions and decision-making structures in Togo could very well be the result of colonial policies: Togo developed as a state out of extractive colonial institutions with the added element of competition and disorganization that came from asymmetric intervention on behalf of both the German and French colonial administrations. As a result, Togo suffers from a serious disadvantage when it comes to development and post conflict recovery: poor institutions combined with ethnic tensions and power struggles as a result of colonialization.

As a result of this economic crisis in Togo, relations with the IMF were strained until 1983 when the Togolese government showed a “genuine willingness to fix the issue” (Kjellstrom 1987, 8). IMF involvement consisted of programs focused on budget austerity, very tight monetary policy, changes to public investment planning, and rehabilitation of state enterprises (Kjellstrom, 1987). The IMF policies put into place were not focused on the incorrect diagnosis of the structural problems that resulted in the ’79-’82 crisis, but rather on addressing the symptoms of that problem. This focus was made very clear in the ‘83-’84 structural adjustment program which was intended to improve public resource management while waiting for the economy to recover before working towards restarting economic activity (Kjellstrom, 1987). As a result of this policy, livelihoods throughout
Togo were seriously damaged during the crisis of ’79-’82 and in its aftermath. The combination of austerity measures, the halting of economic growth due to the misdiagnosis of the structural nature of the phosphate boom, and IMF policies resulted in a very serious blow to living standards in Togo and to Togolese livelihoods. This damage to Togolese livelihood very well could have contributed to the rise of conflict in 1987 as it increased dissatisfaction with both the economy and how the Togolese government was treating its citizens.

The World Bank’s technical assistance project had its own shortcomings that only magnified the existing shortfalls of the very young Togolese government and institutions. The technical assistants sent by the World Bank to Togo were heavily reliant on the Togolese government to provide “a propitious work environment and qualified local staff with whom the technical assistance can work” (Kjellstrom 1987, 19). This expectation proved to be rather backwards in a country like Togo which had only gained independence just under thirty years earlier. Moreover, there was very limited use of technical assistance to help train national civil service workers and those who did have training lost their skills due to a lack of opportunities to apply their skills and gain practical experience (Kjellstrom, 1987). This proved to be a major issue in the use of Technical Assistance in Togo by the World Bank. Failure to train Togolese civil servants and loss of skills due to little to no opportunities to gain practical experience had a negative impact on the work force and on government institutions. A more effective approach to helping the Togolese economy would have been to recognize the shortcomings of the existing institutions and work towards training civil servants and giving them the opportunity to practice their skills, gain real experience, and work towards improving their own institutions. To apply help that relies on strong institutions and good governance to a state like Togo is akin to trying to build a house before putting down the foundation; without a strong institutional base and civil servants who are well trained, effective and have better quality output, the technical assistance from the World Bank failed to generate a positive result.

In addition to being an ineffective strategy, the WB technical assistance program proved to fuel conflict and issues of competition for more power within the government. There was evidence found by the World Bank that some government ministers in Togo used technical assistance to make themselves more powerful than other ministers (Kjellstrom, 1987). This reflects in part the survival strategy of ethnic elites under French colonialism: to garner as much power as possible to survive the political climate. This shows how colonial asymmetric intervention in Togo has had impacts throughout independence by generating an unstable governing climate which is heavily
affected by the interests of the powerful. Additionally, there were many cases where technical assistance staffers were used to replace national staffers which left Togo with fewer well trained and experienced staffers and a heavy reliance on external assistance (Kjellstrom, 1987). This use of TA staffers in the place of Togolese staffers was also done in operational projects (Kjellstrom, 1987). The replacement of national civil servants with TA staffers eliminated the learning opportunities for civil servants in Togo which rendered the TA program ineffective. The swapping of national staffers with technical assistance staffers was due to poor governance on behalf of the Togolese government as well as poor management of the WB technical assistance project. By having TA staffers do the work of national civil servants, the World Bank’s TA project only served to weaken the institutions and the civil work force of Togo.

In addition to the replacement of national staffers by technical assistance staffers, there were also clashes between the two groups. TA staffers were able to enjoy privileged access to ministers while Togolese staffers did not, which meant that TAs often had more control over critical issues than Togolese staffers (Kjellstrom, 1987). As a result, tensions between TA staffers and Togolese staffers arose and IMF and WB efforts to help Togo develop were subverted as these replacements meant there would be no actual improvement in local capabilities (Kjellstrom, 1987). In other words, the relationships between TA staffers, Togolese Ministers, and Togolese staffers resulted in the inefficient use of and poor results of the World Bank’s TA program. Moreover, these relationships increased the dependence of Togo on external development aid. As a result, the combination of poor governance and technical assistance staffer failing to train Togolese civil servants was damaging rather than beneficial to the Togolese government and economy. Here it becomes clear that the combination of World Bank efforts and the complications of Togolese governance as a result of asymmetric intervention has had a clear negative impact on the development of Togo economically as well as having a negative impact regarding the start and the continuation of conflict.

Moreover, the TA strategies proved to fall short in adapting to the internal politics within the government of Togo. As roles changed in the Togolese government, the incoming member could, and often would, scrap the plans of the previous member resulting in lower efficiency and much slower results for government plans (Kjellstrom, 1987). With the turnover of political servants in Togo and the scrapping of previous plans, the job of TA staffers was made more difficult as they had to adjust to political shifts in addition to helping address economic issues. This frequent ministerial turnover and the resulting frequent changes in government plans also reflects the impacts of colonial asymmetric intervention. With the power imbalance between ethnic groups and the
political advantage of the Kwa peoples, governance in Togo was forced into an unstable turbulent position given the continuous battles over power. However, there are cases where turnover of ministry leadership was beneficial in Togo; the appointment of a new Minister of State Enterprises who was keen on seeking World Bank assistance for sweeping state reform helped to reinvigorate the 1984 IDA-financed technical assistance program to promote state enterprise reform (Kjellstrom, 1987). What this shows is that international development aid must be conducted in a manner that is conscientious of national challenges and changes during efforts to provide aid and develop strategies to address these changes more effectively. Moreover, the World Bank writes that development “requires long lasting institutions with well trained staff” who are capable of conducting the development process “harmoniously and effectively” (Kjellstrom, 1987). Given the previous description of the Togolese government and the institutions at hand, development is an incredibly difficult to attain goal for Togo. Moreover, this Technical Assistance project actually prevented the development of a well-trained staff. Instead of focusing on austerity measures and using technical assistance staffers to replace national civil service staffers, the focus should be on how to improve the institutions in place in Togo and how to help civil service employees be more effective and work together. Moreover, an understanding of the institutions and power dynamics that are residual from colonial times in countries where the World Bank is conducting projects would be beneficial to the effectiveness of projects and in addressing the institutional causes of underdevelopment which also contribute to conflict.

In comparison to Togo, Burkina Faso had a different relationship with international development organizations but a similar economy. Burkina Faso’s economic history is based on a World Bank Economic Memorandum published in 1989, just after the conflict of study. This is due to the fact that Togo had massive World Bank and IMF involvement throughout the economy after the Togolese coup in 1987, but Burkina Faso has had a different economic experience which can be seen in the appendix showing tables regarding IMF and World Bank programming over the years in both countries.

Burkina Faso’s economy at the time of the conflict can be broken down quite simply into different sectors. The primary sector was made up of agriculture, stock raising, and forestry and fisheries (Economic memorandum, 1989). The secondary sector was made up of mining, manufacturing, electricity, gas, water, and construction (Economic memorandum, 1989). The secondary sector itself was made up partially of modern and private enterprises (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Within the secondary sector there were very low levels of employment
especially in mining and industry (Economic Memorandum, 1989). These would seem to be some of the best sources for increasing the income of the general population in Burkina Faso, but due to low employment this possibility was not harnessed. Even given the growth rate of the gold mining sector between 1982 and 1987 being estimated at 26% per year, limited employment prevented this growth from being taken advantage of (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Another major source of income for Burkina Faso was migrant labor and fund transfers from Burkinabe migrants into the Cote D'Ivoire (Economic memorandum, 1989). In addition to the primary and secondary sectors of Burkina Faso’s economy, there was also the informal sector, the Banking sector, and the parastatal sector which represents both high levels of protectionism and government involvement in the economy.

The informal sector has not expanded apart from gold panning between 1982-1987, the one part of mining that has grown and been taken advantage of by the general population (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The importance of informal mining is further analyzed in this thesis as a major source of income and improved quality of life for the Burkinabe population which has been key in the prevention of conflict recurrence. On the other hand, the Banking sector of Burkina Faso was heavily laden with rules and regulations which limited opportunities for growth. These limitations included a system of strict credit management, control of banking margins, so narrow to the point that banks have been pushed away from taking necessary risks, and interest rates which were kept too low to stimulate the mobilization of financial savings (Economic Memorandum, 1989). These tight measures of control in the banking sector were the result of both a high level of government involvement in the sector, by the Ministry of Finance, and poor governance of finances which has resulted in the dampening of growth opportunities in Burkina Faso. This key difference of state control in economics between Togo and Burkina Faso could be connected to the effects asymmetric intervention had in Togo and the lack of asymmetric intervention in Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso, because of the lack ethnic tensions and competition arising from colonialism, may have been able to maintain tighter control over sectors like the economy with higher levels of protectionism and the large parastatal sector. Togo, on the other hand suffered serious ethnic clashes due to colonial asymmetric intervention and this seems to be connected to the increased privatization and the lack economic protections. This stark contrast in economic policies between Togo and Burkina Faso suggests the reasoning could be connected back to the treatment of ethnic groups under colonialism.
As previously mentioned, Burkina Faso’s parastatal sector is analyzed here as a major sign of government involvement in economics which can be a double-edged sword. The parastatal sector of Burkina Faso was established at independence and expanded by following governments, proving to be a key point of difference between Burkina Faso and Togo which opted instead for far less government involvement in economics (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The parastatal sector controlled virtually all public services in Burkina Faso, the banking system, and dominated the modern industrial sector through its non-negligible role in the commercial sector (Economic Memorandum, 1989). From 1982-1987 the civil service and parastatal salaries were dropping or stagnant and the investment rate fell from 23% of GDP in 1982 to 19% in 1989 (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Even with these dropping salaries, the parastatal sector was dominant in controlling water, electricity, and mining with the exception of gold mining which was far more powerful in the informal sector (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This dominance of the parastatal sector shows the very powerful role the Burkina Faso government had in the state economy, which is in stark contrast to Togo which made clear efforts between 1982 and 1991 to reduce the parastatal sector.

The parastatal sector of Burkina Faso worked within a rigid legal framework created in 1984 where there were administrative agencies and the industrial and commercial agencies in addition to the state-owned and mixed-capital enterprises which were governed, for the most part, by general business regulations (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The ministry of Economic Promotion, the Ministry of Finance, and other similar technical ministries such as commerce and transportation appointed and supervised public enterprise managers (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Given this vast level of supervision, there was still very little intervention on behalf of these various enterprises (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This limited intervention on behalf of the supervisory ministries means that the events taking place within the parastatal sector either were going according to the government’s plans and wishes, or the supervisory institutions were ineffective in their work. Considering the colonial history of Burkina Faso, especially as an extractive colony, ineffective institutions make sense according to the literature on the impact of colonialism. Regardless, the multitudes of ministries that supervised different enterprises in the parastatal sector of Burkina Faso showed high levels of government guidance and involvement throughout the Burkinabe economy. This is a striking difference to Togo where there was very little government involvement and a much bigger focus on privatization. This multitude of ministries could very well be connected to Mossi chiefs being granted their original governing privileges after independence. By regaining their
original political power, Mossi chiefs may have institutionalized that power by creating these different ministries in the economic sector which connects directly back to how ethnic groups in Burkina Faso were treated differently from ethnic groups in Togo during colonization.

Throughout these economic sectors, there are major constraints that have impacted Burkina Faso’s economic growth, stability, and development. These constraints were demographics, environmental issues, and issues regarding human resource development (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Within agriculture, there was a heavy reliance on exports for the overall trade balance in Burkina Faso, ranging between 57% and 87% from 1982 to 1989 (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Moreover, the growth of the Burkinabe population posed another environmental threat as this resulted in the increased exploitation of resources, especially fuel wood, which resulted in deforestation, soil erosion, and loss of surface water (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The overpopulated central plateau of Burkina Faso was one of the major victims of the environmental pressures and disasters well known to the Sahel region: rapid growth of the rural population, overexploitation of cultivable land, plant cover and water resources; a sharp decline in soil fertility; and erosion and the threat of desertification (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This heavy reliance on agriculture was dangerous, especially given Burkina Faso’s geographic location in the Sahel, a notoriously vulnerable part of the world when it comes to environmental threats like climate change.

Given the expansive role of the government in the Burkinabe economy, and as in any underdeveloped country working towards development, there were a great deal of efforts on behalf of the government to make fixes in the economy. This is where the constraint of human resource development becomes clear along with poor execution on behalf of improving public investment planning. For most of Burkina Faso’s history, the population and training system was enrolling a small fraction of the school age population while orienting the relatively larger percentage of enrolled children into secondary and higher education (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This strategy was an effort to generate a larger pool of civil servants but eventually fell out of line with the needs of the economy (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The heavy focus on secondary and higher education has developed into a time lagged result of poor governance, a concept which will be addressed later on in this section. The World Bank recommended that the focus be shifted to increasing primary school education and enrollment rates (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This is a rational response as increased primary school rates of graduation will improve employment prospects for the Burkinabe population and provide the basis for which a stronger pool of civil servants can be created.
Finally, there was the issue of poor execution of public investment planning which can be seen in the example of the Programme Populaire de Développement (PPD) which took place from 1984-1985 (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The PPD stressed food security, water supply, housing, and basic social services with an emphasis on the following sectoral composition with the budget allocation of CFAF 142.6 million: agriculture and stock raising (23% of the program), water supply (19%), transportation (23%) and human resources (12%) (Economic Memorandum, 1989). However, actual disbursement for the PPD barely went over CFAF 80 billion with the following implementation rates: transportation (77%), agriculture and stock-raising (65%), human resources sectors (65%), water supply sector (28%) and the projects of national priority (21%) (Economic Memorandum, 1989). These variable and very low implementation rates of the different focus points of the PPD while using only 56% of the total budget show poor investment management and poor governance on behalf of the managers of the PPD. While there was a clear focus on improving human resources, the overall project failed to have a substantial impact due to the poor use of the budget and the failure to follow the initial plan for the PPD. This proves to be a case of poor management of funds and investment by the Burkina Faso government. This case shows how government involvement in the economy can have a negative impact as much as it can have a positive impact, especially in the delicate realm of development.

Outside of government efforts to fix issues within the Burkinabe economy, there were also very serious issues regarding debt. From the start of the 1970s, Burkina Faso had negligible debt obligations that began to rise to 6% of revenue by 1975, 9% by 1980, and almost 20% by 1987 (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Overall capital spending by the government ranged between 10% and 20% of total expenditure between 1975 and 1987 and as more resources were channeled into debt amortization investment spending fell from 17% of total expenditure in the late 1970s to 5% in 1986 (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This shows a very heavy responsibility on behalf of the government to maintain a handle on debts, even in a poor and underdeveloped country like Burkina Faso. Moreover, the timing of this shift in debt financing and government spending lines up almost perfectly with the timing of the conflict of study. This reflects, once again, the literature on conflicts that focuses on the importance of economic performance. By cutting into spending to address debts, Burkina Faso was forced to limit growth and opportunities for human development. In comparison to Togo, Burkina Faso managed to get a handle on their debts sooner, but this may be due in part to the different measurements used; Togo’s debt is measured as a percentage of GDP and Burkina Faso’s debt is measured as a percentage of total revenues. Given these different
measures and the lack of available data to draw a better comparison here, all that can be known for sure is that the timelines of debt amortization were different but still successful, until 1988 in Burkina Faso after the coup of study.

By the end of 1987 though, the downward trend in investment spending was reversed and deficit financing reached the central bank ceiling (Economic Memorandum, 1989). During this period of increasing the funds allocated to relieving debts there was also a substantial trade deficit from 1983-1987 where major exports of goods like cotton, livestock, and gold (largely outside official channels) covered only 45% of the cost of goods and services being imported at the same time (Economic Memorandum, 1989). However, even with this large trade deficit Burkina Faso remained one of the few countries in the UMOA and the BEAC zones to have a positive and substantial balance in the operations account with the French Treasury (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This was likely because of remittances from Burkinabe workers abroad, large surpluses on factor services from public and private transfers at the time, and significant net capital inflows of which 54% of which went to grants for project financing, 38% of which went to net disbursements on foreign loans, and 8% went to private direct investment all combined to result in a balance of payments surplus through the ’80s, except for 1982 and 1985 (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Burkina Faso seemed to have been able to maintain a better handle on its debts than Togo did, even with a large trade deficit.

However, even with this impressive performance regarding debt payments, Burkina Faso did start to face issues with the public finance system after the 1988 overthrow of Thomas Sankara by Blaise Compaoré. The budgetary situation in Burkina Faso began to rapidly decline based on the available data from 1988 on preliminary debt services (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The public finance system began to deteriorate even while the economy was performing so well (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The World Bank Economic Memorandum from 1989 did not have the final balance of the treasury accounts, but the preliminary data showed a number of slippages on the recurrent expenditure side especially in extra-budgetary accounts (Economic Memorandum, 1989). These slippages seem to have been the source of the increasing amounts overdue as they caused bigger issues with cash-flow problems (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Burkina Faso overall seemed to have a good handle on its debts until 1988 when the public finance system began to deteriorate, and arrears climbed to between CFAF 25 and 30 million by the end of 1988 (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The reason for these slips was not clear but considering that the timing was just after another military coup that put Blaise Compaoré in power and the source of the slips seem
to be issues with recurring expenditures on extra-budgetary accounts, corruption does not seem to be out of the question. Moreover, this connects back to the literature as conflict in this case does beget more economic difficulties.

Given the successful history of dealing with debt in Burkina Faso, there are still issues present in governing the economy that need to be addressed in this analysis. First, even though the government is highly involved in the economy, there are issues of information and decentralized decision making especially in the public and parastatal sectors (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Due to these information issues the government tended to focus its action on “major but partial elements” of public sector management (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This, in effect, was poor governance in the public sector which, as the qualitative analysis provided here suggest, may very well have been connected to the lack of asymmetric intervention during colonialism and the clear ethnic majority held by the Mossi empire. Moreover, given the dispersed nature of data on borrowing arrangements and the previously mentioned decentralized decision making, this has resulted in grave mistakes in the forecasting of debt service commitments and poor management of public debt (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This proves to be a clear case where poor institutions and data result in poor governance; without effective institutions and good data collection governance proves to be a more difficult task than it already is.

Moreover, poor institutions are only weakened by how numerous they are, and this was clearly the case in Burkina Faso. There were numerous different agricultural and rural sector institutions in Burkina Faso which has resulted in cumbersome and innumerable fiscal, price, and trade regulations (Economic Memorandum, 1989). In combination with the numerous institutions, and possibly even a result of these institutions, there were poor decisions regarding aid. Specifically, after the drought in 1986 food aid was continued even though there was a domestic cereal surplus (Economic Memorandum, 1989) This resulted in the collapse of local market prices and serves as an example of aid being more harmful than it is beneficial (Economic Memorandum, 1989). In addition to this, there were serious limitations to the industrial development of the domestic market (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Low per capita income, the limited development of urban centers, and the dispersal of the population have each served as barriers to industrial development due to the resulting higher distribution costs (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Here, poverty has sown more poverty as efforts to improve the domestic market and provide better services were thwarted by the inability to cover distribution costs, cumbersome institutions and regulation, and poorly directed aid.
In addition to poor institutions and ineffective aid, there was also the issue of protection. As previously mentioned, economic protection can serve as a double-edged sword, and Burkina Faso shows just that. As a landlocked country, transportation costs are higher in Burkina Faso, and these higher costs were combined with numerous measures for protection. (Economic Memorandum, 1989; Wilkins, 1989). The efforts to protect the Burkinabe economy developed overtime into inefficient protection combined with poor institutions which resulted in the unnecessary complication of the duties of customs officers (Economic Memorandum, 1989). As a result of this complication of custom officer tasks, fraud became prevalent, there were poor investment incentives, and people became so used to the protection that they struggled whenever it was phased out (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Moreover, the investment incentives that were present came in the form of very costly benefits to the state, such as protracted tax exemptions, and to the economy, such as excessive customs protection (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Here, protectionism in an effort to entice investment only served to damage the state and the economy itself.

Finally, there is the issue of education in Burkina Faso. As previously mentioned, education in Burkina Faso was too heavily focused on secondary and higher education. The cost of education, apart from primary education, was relatively high in Burkina Faso since teacher salaries were not low and there were organizational issues that have resulted in lower teacher utilization rates (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Moreover, one third of the budget for education was allocated to scholarships for secondary and higher education (Economic Memorandum, 1989). On top of this ineffective use of funds and poor organization within the education sector, the education sector’s external efficiency remained low as the training in skills and technologies did not have a clear link to the corresponding needs of the economy (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This means, that even with higher education rates in secondary and higher education statistics, Burkina Faso did not successfully provide a workforce that could have been used to improve not only economic growth, but also the wellbeing and quality of life of citizens. Given these characteristics, there was an increasing risk of underemployment as the education system produced more graduates than there are mid-level professional jobs, and the number of university graduates exceeded the demand for senior-level professions in Burkina Faso (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Finally, out of the secondary and higher education students, 62% of those enrolled are in literary disciplines (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This all means that there was a huge disconnect between the education sector and the economy which resulted in the needs of the Burkinabe economy not being met and the
educated population of Burkina Faso failing to find sources of income that match their credentials. As a general critique, this case goes to show that education cannot be studied outside of employment opportunities when focusing on economic and human development. There is human development with education but there needs to be some kind of balance between graduate rates and job creation otherwise there will be serious unemployment issues which can fuel conflict.

Finally, looking at the history of World Bank projects for both Burkina Faso and Togo (see table 1), it becomes clear that the relationships between the IMF and World Bank with Togo and Burkina Faso were very different, which could have contributed to the different outcomes after each respective conflict. It is interesting to see that there have been more structural adjustment projects and technical assistance projects in Togo than there have been in Burkina Faso, Togo with four structural adjustment projects between 1980 and 1995 while Burkina Faso has had only one structural adjustment project. This could be part of the issue with Togo’s slow economic recovery post conflict, though there is undoubtedly an effect due to continued socio-political tensions. However, looking at the rates of GDP growth per capita and GDP per capita, it seems that these structural adjustment and technical assistance programs might have been helpful with economic growth in Togo after 1994 (see table 4 and table 5). What is important to recognize here is that while Togo’s economy is larger than Burkina Faso’s, this has essentially nothing to do with whether conflict ended or continued. In this comparative case study analysis, the size of the economy does not prevent conflict or conflict recurrence. There are also many other projects that focused on reorganizing or addressing issues with investment in Togo which could have also had lasting impacts on economic recovery after conflict. This is however affected by the implications of continuing political and social unrest after the introduction of opposition parties in 1991. There could be a potential issue with introducing structural adjustment programs and investment changes during social and political unrest. This may be an example of the importance to call for political and social stability before changing investment structures and introducing structural adjustment projects. Moreover, structural adjustment projects, based on the evidence given in the case study from earlier, do not seem to help with human development of the population especially in improving the quality of life and wellbeing of the Togolese population. This could be key in understanding Togo’s economic growth in conjunction with continued conflict. The economy may have been growing in Togo a few years after the conflict, but due to the organization of the economy human development was likely lower. This in combination with the oppression of different ethnic groups and the poor implementation of democracy in 1991 has likely contributed to the continued conflict in Togo.
Moreover, Burkina Faso’s relationship with the World Bank as evidenced by the list of projects present in Table 1 have been mostly focused on improving infrastructure, addressing environmental concerns, and focusing on urban and rural development. Given the limited scope of this thesis, each project cannot be analyzed here. However, to conduct an analysis of different World Bank projects in Burkina Faso and Togo as well as around the world can be beneficial. A historical study like that can help in addressing how to improve relationships between developing countries and development organizations by looking at what has worked and what hasn’t given the different economic and political atmospheres that are involved in World Bank projects.

This analysis of the economies of Burkina Faso and Togo around the time of each conflict highlights several key points and avenues of improvement. First, protectionism in developing countries proves to be a double-edged sword. Protectionism in Burkina Faso helped in creating a less vulnerable economy, outside of environmental factors, but also suffocated opportunities for economic growth. Togo, on the other hand, lacked protectionism and therefore suffered the consequences of economic vulnerability and volatility due to the heavy dependence on global markets. In addition to the issue of balancing the right amount of protectionism for each economy, there is also the problem of poor governance and institutions. Colonial institutions are present in both countries and had a lasting impact on how each country developed economically as well as how each economy is governed. Finally, there is also the topic related to international interventions and external efforts to improve the economic development of each country. Much like protectionism, economic development projects by the IMF and the World Bank can be helpful and harmful. The key is international institutions being able to adjust to changes in economics as well as changes in political and social atmospheres. Without awareness of political and social tensions, economic interventions will not live up to expectations of success and instead may hurt the economy, much like technical assistance in Togo did in the early 1980s.

Section 5b: Mining in Togo and Burkina Faso

The focus on mining here is to provide a look into how economic policies in both Burkina Faso and Togo have contributed to conflict or conflict recovery. Moreover, both countries are natural resource rich which raises the risk of the resource curse which contributes to lower levels of economic development and conflict recurrence. Artisanal mining, however, proves to be key in contributing to human development in Burkina Faso, but not in Togo due to regulations and mining law.
Within the Togolese economy, mining, especially of phosphates, played an important role in both growth and instability. From ‘89-'93 mining was stagnant in Togo and economic growth remained at 0.1% (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Mining had plunged in 1990 due to the loss of phosphate export markets in Europe which had banned Togolese phosphate due to the high cadmium content and in Asia and Latin America due to changes in ownership of customer’s enterprises (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Mining conditions worsened in 1992 as there were severe disruptions in production which led to export volumes to fall to 2.1 million metric tons in 1992 and 1.6 million metric tons in 1993 (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). The reason behind the disrupted production remains unclear but is likely due to political turmoil that had set off the general strike in 1992 which had seriously cut down on the number of available employees and laborers (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). These issues seriously affected the Togolese economy during and after the conflict of study. It is likely that they have contributed to how conflict in the country had continued after the 1988 coup.

Togo’s mining institutions were far more disorganized than in Burkina Faso resulting in an even deeper entrenchment in the resource curse and a lower level of economic development. First, it is important to recognize that mining in Togo was done entirely by companies, either government or foreign owned (Togo First Phase of Mining, 2015). This may connect back to colonial asymmetric intervention. By privatizing natural resource extraction, neither of the clashing ethnic groups, the Ewe or the Kabye, could maintain complete control over natural resource revenues and instead left that to outside groups. The five major mining companies in Togo were SCANTOGO owned by Heidelberg Cement in Germany which extracted about 1,500,000 metric tons of clinker, WACEM a west African cement company that extracted 400,000 metric tons of cement and 1,200,000 metric tons of clinker, MM Mining an Australian owned company with majority equity owners “Togolese Private Interests” that extracted 85,000 metric tons of iron ore, SNPT is the Togolese mining company which had the exclusive rights to phosphate extraction at about 2,00,000 metric tons a year, and finally there was POMAR which extracted an unknown amount of marble and was owned by Groupe Dennis which, due to a lack of publicly available information, seems to be a shell company hinting at corruption (Togo First Phase of Mining, 2015; Perez, 2019b). What is important to note here is that every one of the previously mentioned companies was owned entirely by their parent company which are essentially foreign interests extracting mineral from Togolese soil (Perez, 2019b). This is in stark contrast to Burkina Faso which had 10% equity ownership for every gold extracting mine on their soil. As a result, even though Togo has a monopoly over phosphate extraction, Togo limited its revenues from extractive industries. Additionally, the ambiguity of
“Togolese Private Interests” and around Groupe Dennis generated a lack of transparency around who is really getting the revenues from extractive industries. This lack of transparency around mining revenues and the high level of mineral extraction contributed to the resource curse as the lack of transparency prevented accountability for where mining revenues went and how they were spent. In addition, this lack of transparency increased the risk for foreign investors which prevented economic growth in Togo from the natural resource wealth. Moreover, it was undoubtedly frustrating for Togolese citizens whose lives were affected by resource extraction, whether it be through pollution or displacement for the development of a new mine, to not know where the profits are going and to not receive any direct benefits from resources being extracted from their own land.

In addition to the different companies that extracted resources and their characteristics, there are the characteristics of the mining sector itself in Togo that potentially contributed to the resource curse and lower opportunities for human development. First, there were multiple different minerals that were being mined which inevitably added to the difficulties of good governance as previously mentioned. In addition, the institutions in Togo’s mining sector suffered from disorganization, overlap, and poor legal management. Both the MME and SNPT lacked the skills to properly monitor the mining activities taking place in Togo and staff in the National Environmental Regulation Agency (ANGE) had limited knowledge about the environmental and social management of extractive industry operations (Togo First Phase of Mining, 2015). Moreover, according to a World Bank Report on a proposed mining and governance project there was overall poor governance of extractive industries in Togo, sector institutions faced overlapping and unclear roles and inadequate capacities to address issues in mining and in revenue collection in Togo, the SNPT itself faced poor corporate accountability, and a serious lack of reporting of reliable data on mineral production and revenues generated by the extractive industries sector (Togo First Phase of Mining, 2015). These overlapping and often confusing roles by departments in the mining sector contributed to ineffective and overall poor governance of mining in Togo which contributes to the resource curse and the resulting tensions between the population and the government, especially of those who were directly and negatively impacted by mineral extraction and extraction policies.

In addition to these institutional problems, there were legal and regulatory issues that contribute to the resource curse and stagnation in foreign investment. There was incongruence between the mining code and the state’s constitution, a lack of harmonization with other legislative pieces like Land Law, Finance Law, and Framework Law on the Environment, and finally the
Togolese mining code clashed with other mining laws and mining organizations in the sub-Saharan region (Togo First Phase of Mining, 2015). In addition, the legal framework of mining in Togo had qualities that made foreign investment and research unappealing due to a lack of permit holder’s security (World Bank, 2019). Additionally, the lack of clear requirements for award or rejection of mineral permit applications increased the likelihood that foreign investors would not become involved due to fear of their investments being lost or unrecoverable (World Bank, 2019). Finally, government approval process delayed or blocked further development and production which created another disincentive for further research and investment into the Togolese mining industry (World Bank, 2019). These legal and regulatory issues present in the Togolese mining sector prohibited both more effective economic development and more effective governance, both of which served as a source of and an exacerbating factor of the resource curse. Moreover, Togolese policy regarding artisanal mining, which proves to be very beneficial for human development in Burkina Faso, was limited to the extent that the Togolese population has almost no clear opportunities to benefit from resource extraction and improve their quality of life and wellbeing.

Togolese mining policy prohibited artisanal mining unless there has been explicit authorization by the Minister of Mines, something that is very difficult to achieve especially given the administrative issues present within the mining sector as previously mentioned (Loi No 96-004, 1996). This means that artisanal mining was virtually impossible to do legally in Togo unless rural communities by luck could work under a company in their local area where gold and diamonds were being extracted. This severely limited the ability of Togolese artisanal miners to generate a profit off artisanal gold and diamond mining. Moreover, by making artisanal mining unavailable, a large number of people have been cut off from potential natural resource profits. This may be a result of colonial asymmetric intervention as this mining policy eliminates profits that cannot be collected by one specific group. This issue merits further study to be considered conclusive. Due to phosphate, limestone, iron, and clinker being the major minerals extracted from Togo which were heavily reliant on industry for circulation, there were limited opportunities for artisanal mining in these sectors. Moreover, mining laws in Togo denied rural communities the opportunity to exploit natural resource deposits in their area. This means that mining in Togo was governed in a way that makes even readily exploitable minerals like gold and diamonds virtually impossible to attain via artisanal mining. By reducing the ability for citizens to legally conduct artisanal mining projects, Togo cut off the opportunity for citizens to improve their wellbeing and quality of life through natural resource extraction.
Burkina Faso’s mining policies and natural resources, however, tell a very different story from that of Togo. Burkina Faso’s institutional structure did allow for individual citizens to benefit directly from gold mining, but there were still issues with governance. There were three major phases of mining governance in Burkina Faso: first was from 1986 when the parastatal Burkinabe Precious Metals Counter (CBMP) was created and from 1995-96 when the state declared a “Decade for mining Development” and published a “Declaration for Mining Policy” (Werthmann, 2017). Then there was the second stage which consisted of the liberalization and privatization of gold mining from 1996 to 2006 when the CBMP collapsed, and the final stage from 2006 to 2016 when the new transitional government of Burkina Faso created a new mining code and a parliamentary commission that conducted an inquiry into the mining sector (Werthmann, 2017). With the privatization of the gold mining sector in the mid-1990s private gold buying companies were able to profit quite a bit, especially if they were well-connected with the Compaoré government, which resulted in some Burkinabe businessmen making their own laws in their mining areas, smuggling gold out of the country, and provoking conflicts with gold miners and the local populations (Werthmann, 2017).

Additionally, in the mid-1992 there was a great deal of structural reforms and opening of the economy to increase FDI flows which benefiting mining companies by creating employment, tax-revenues for the state, and higher exports (Investment Policy Review, 2009). This inflow of foreign investors and mining companies resulted in eight different major companies mining in Burkina Faso, all of which were 10% owned by the government (Perez, 2019a). Avocet mining, a West African gold mining and exploration company had an annual capacity of 5,200 kilograms of gold, Endeavour Mining Corp was also West African and extracted 3,000 kilograms of gold per year, IAMGOLD Corp was a Canadian owned company that extracted 12,000 kilograms of gold per year, Kalsaka Mining S.A. owned by Amara Mining in London extracted 2,300 kilograms of gold per year, Semafo Burkina Faso s.a. which was headquartered in Canada and extracted 9,300 kilograms of gold per year, Société des Mines de Taparko s.a was owned by Nord Gold which is a Russian low-cost gold producer and extracted 4,100 kilograms of gold per year, Bissa Gold was also owned by Nord Gold and extracted 8,000 kilograms of gold per year, and finally there was the Perkoa Group owned by the Swiss Glencore plc which extracted 1,100 kilograms of gold per year (Perez, 2019a). What is important to recognize is that the government of Burkina Faso had 10% of the major equity with each of these companies meaning that the government did get revenues from foreign mining companies working in Burkina Faso. This means that even though a great deal of profits from
extractive industries went to foreign companies, Burkina Faso still generated revenues from foreign mining companies working on Burkina Faso land. These revenues then went to the government, but since there is no way to follow the money, it remains unclear if these mining revenues are brought back into the Burkinabe economy or not. This is in direct contrast with Togo where there are no direct government revenues from mining outside of phosphates. This contrast in government control of natural resource extraction and revenues may very well be connected to the colonial asymmetric intervention in Togo which could be connected to the higher levels of privatization and lower levels of government control. The reasoning behind this comes from the competition between the Ewe and the Kabye that was generated during colonial asymmetric intervention which may have impacted governance given this ethnic based political power competition. This could help to explain the limited government control and the increasing levels of privatization, if one ethnic group cannot control these resources, then it would make sense to instead give control to outside groups and corporations. Burkina Faso on the other hand does not have any major ethnic cleavages and given the extensive history of the Mossi being in control, it makes sense that they would maintain their control through higher levels of protection and government involvement in the economy. Another major problem in Burkina Faso is that there were still issues in converting exploration projects into exploitation projects as a result in the failure of attracting companies with enough resources to build the mines that want to exploit (Luning, 2012). Even with increases in FDI, money made from gold mining mostly stayed in the hands of foreign companies and exploration projects failed to generate promise of additional income from mining.

Another key difference in the mining policies in Togo and Burkina Faso are that Burkina Faso’s mining policy allowed for citizens, whether they were miners or subsistence farmers looking to boost their income, to improve their wellbeing and wealth which helped to mitigate some of the tensions created by the resource curse. This artisanal mining policy could be a result of the lack of asymmetric intervention in Burkina Faso during colonialism. Without clear ethnic cleavages, like those generated by asymmetric intervention in Togo, there is not as much conflict over natural resources which would mean there was no need to cut off mining privileges from specific groups. Artisanal mining in Burkina Faso was pursued by two main groups: floating populations who migrated to where there were gold deposits and members of rural communities who lived near mining sites (Werthmann, 2017). Artisanal mining itself provided an alternative to other kinds of informal occupations and to labor migration (Werthmann, 2013). By providing other avenues from income, Burkinabe citizens were allowed other avenues outside of the major sectors like subsistence
agriculture and the urban informal sector to make income and to support themselves which is key in human development (Werthmann, 2013). As a result of the effects of droughts on subsistence farming and the availability of gold deposits, artisanal mining became a principal economic activity whether it be seasonal or migrant labor (Pokorny et al, 2019). Additionally, artisanal gold mining had a different effect from industrial gold mining in that it did generate job opportunities and cash income for local households whereas industrial mining largely failed to do so (Pokorny et al, 2019). This allowed artisanal mining to be an incubator for local economic development and human development (Pokorny et al, 2019). Artisanal mining functioned in tandem with industrial mining in Burkina Faso as the presence of artisanal miners was taken as a sign of good gold deposits and artisanal miners were then allowed to work under the regulation of a Burkinabe mining company (Luning, 2008). As such, artisanal gold mining provided better incomes for local populations which allowed people to afford better food and healthcare, generating better human development. These benefits of artisanal mining were exploitable for two reasons. First, mining governance in Burkina Faso allowed for local communities to take part in artisanal mining in the margins of industrial mines and to sell the gold they find to companies. Second, since gold does not need to be processed like other minerals to be useful it was a readily exploitable resource as it allowed for artisanal gold miners to generate direct profits. This means that governance and the exploitable qualities of minerals like gold go hand in hand in combatting tensions generated by the resource curse. This is not to say that artisanal gold mining is the solution to the resource curse in Burkina Faso, but rather that it helped to mitigate worsening human development which leads to helps in conflict prevention.

Conclusion

This thesis has focused on post-conflict recovery and conflict recurrence by comparing two similar cases: Burkina Faso and Togo. The selection of these cases was based on the most similar cases ideology since both Burkina Faso and Togo were under French colonial control and influence, both gained independence in the 1960s, and both experienced multiple military coups. Moreover, both Togo and Burkina Faso are located in West Africa, with Burkina Faso just north of Togo in the Sahel region. This means that both countries have similar colonial and institutional backgrounds and face somewhat similar environmental concerns. However, in the analysis of colonial histories, it became clear that colonialism was not actually an area of similarity between Togo and Burkina Faso. Instead, the colonial history of each country has proven to be a major explanatory variable,
especially when considering the asymmetric intervention in Togo and the lack thereof in Burkina Faso.

Based on these similarities, it has been made clear that colonial histories, especially the legacy of colonial institutions that have existed into present day, serve as a major handicap in progressing towards political stability and economic development in both Togo and Burkina Faso. Ethnic clashes and inequalities are also based in colonial history, as evidenced in the analysis conducted here, and are the result of statehood being forced upon entirely different and essentially incompatible styles of governance within the geographic territories of both Burkina Faso and Togo. In Togo, clear ethnic discrimination, a result of colonial asymmetric intervention, after the conflict resulted in conflict recurrence while in Burkina Faso the lack of clear ethnic tensions contributed to peace after the conflict of study. Furthermore, the extractive institutions created during French colonialism have endured in both Togo and Burkina Faso, as have the survival strategies used under colonialism. This has had a massive effect on how the Togolese and Burkinabe governments and economies function which has played a key role in both conflicts.

Outside of colonial histories, it is also very clear that different approaches to economics have impacted both countries in similar ways. Burkina Faso, on the one hand, had economic protection that prevented serious instability and volatility but also made economic growth incredibly difficult. Togo, on the other hand, lacked economic protection which was damaging as it resulted in a highly vulnerable and volatile economy. Additionally, the natural resources in each country have proven to contribute to the issue of the resource curse which has been part of the issue with the low levels of economic development in each country. The natural resource extraction policies and approaches differ in each country and have had different effects specifically on human development. In Burkina Faso, artisanal gold mining has created a route for Burkinabe people to increase their incomes and generate a higher quality of life and improved welfare. Moreover, the government of Burkina Faso maintained a hold in all mining projects by owning 10% of all projects. Togo, in contrast, severely restricted artisanal mining and did not have any direct ownership of any mining projects, apart from phosphate mining which the state had a monopoly on, which instead are controlled entirely by outside companies.

Finally, this thesis confronts the policies and projects of the World Bank. The case study in Togo provides an in depth look at the disconnect between the World Bank and the Togolese government. As a result of this disconnect, technical assistance was not beneficial in this case and instead made conditions in the Togolese administration worse and developed a higher dependence.
on the presence of technical assistance staffers. Burkina Faso’s relationship with the World bank is
different as evidenced by the projects that have taken place, which instead of focusing on structural
adjustments and technical assistance have been more focused on agricultural infrastructure, urban
development, and education. Clearly, relationships with international development organizations
have the potential to be helpful and harmful. The issue is finding out how to provide help and
mitigate the potential harms that can be introduced through IMF and World Bank programming.

This thesis, partially due to a lack of readily available data, has focused on telling the story of
two very similar countries that have had very different outcomes from military coups in the late
1980s. The research here is limited to the information made available by other researchers.
Moreover, gaps in data from the IMF and World Bank have limited opportunities to parse apart
differences in how Burkina Faso and Togo addressed their debts. Furthermore, given the serious
lack of data on human development, and the resulting lack of information on the HDI of each
country over time, this research depends on making the connection between opportunities for and
evidence of improved human development. This issue can only be resolved through better and more
inclusive data collection for future studies. Finally, it is important to recognize a key strength of this
paper is in the in-depth case studies. Should this have been a quantitative analysis, the key variable of
different colonial experiences would have been ignored because both Togo and Burkina Faso were
French colonies. However, by looking at what at first glance was a similar colonial background for
each case, as French colonies, it became clear that the in-depth research into the colonial history of
each case proves that this most similar factor is in actuality a key difference. Without these in-depth
case study of the colonial histories in Togo and Burkina Faso, this key explanatory variable of the
different treatment of ethnic groups would not have been clear making it harder to understand why
Togo’s conflict continues while Burkina Faso’s conflict ended in peace.

A human development perspective is key in how this analysis adds to the existing knowledge
of post conflict recovery, development aid, and conflict recurrence. Moreover, by sourcing the start
of each conflict to the colonial histories of each state, the importance of institutions has been
brought to the forefront. This work does leave some unresolved problems and questions which can
be the subject of further research, both political and policy based. These questions and topics of
further research are as follows: How can IMF and World Bank projects and policies be modified or
improved to create avenues for better development that helps human development and not just
economic growth? What are potential strategies for addressing poor institutions that have been in
place in sub-Saharan countries since colonialism? How can colonial institutions in post-
independence societies be addressed to improve institutional, social, political, and economic stability? What are the theories surrounding addressing post-colonial institutional legacies? How can current tools for development employed by the IMF and the World Bank be improved to generate resulted in both economic growth and in human development? The purpose of this thesis is intended to highlight the importance of human development, colonial histories, and international development projects in economic development, conflict recovery, and the prevention of conflict recurrence. In addition, this thesis provides a critique of international development efforts by through the case study of Togo and in the analysis of the different World Bank projects that have taken place in both countries and have contributed to different conflict outcomes. Human development is neglected in economic development, political science, and conflict studies and this thesis highlights and points towards increasing the study of human development in order to improve policies in economic development and in conflict prevention and recovery.
# Appendix 1

## TABLES:

*Table 1: World Bank Publications and Projects*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burkina Faso (Year)</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Togo (Year)</th>
<th>Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>- West African Drought relief</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>- First education project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Forestry project ($14 million)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(construction of two teacher training colleges, strengthening of directorate of education research and teacher training in ministry of education which is in charge of primary and secondary school curricula;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Niena Donkele rice program (6 million five hundred thousand)</td>
<td></td>
<td>expansion of national institute of agricultural training to train mid through high level staff and agricultural teachers for primary and secondary schools $11 million)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Involvement of women in three bank projects</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Drought relief fund project</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Second Bougouriba agricultural project ($16 million)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>- Fourth highway project</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>- Fourth highway project</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cotton road project</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Phosphate engineering and technical assistance project agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Agricultural pricing in Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Power and engineering and technical assistance project</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1982          | - Third rural development fund project  
|              | - Education project  
|              | - 3rd telecommunications project  
|              | - Expansion of rural development project with 23 million 80 thousand $  
|              | - Volta noir agricultural development project  
|              | - Houts-bassins agricultural development project  
|              | - Koudougou pilot agricultural project  
|              | - Agricultural issues study  
| 1982          | - Country economic memorandum basic needs and human resources and recent economic developments and economic outlook  
|              | - Second technical assistance project  
|              | - Second highway project  
|              | - Second rural development project in rural areas  
| 1983          | - Third highway project  
|              | - Second telecommunications project  
|              | - Second rural development fund project  
|              | - Performance audit of Bougouriba agricultural development project  
|              | - Cost financing of education in Upper Volta: current situation and prospects  
|              | - Country economic memorandum in human resources  
|              | - Perkoo mining exploration  
| 1983          | - Togo, Ivory Coast, Ghana CMAO restructuring project (clinker production and railways)  
|              | - Lomé water supply project  
|              | - Structural Adjustment project (to strengthen the balance of payments and restructure the economy in a more productive direction with higher growth through: accelerated rural development largely food crops for consumption and export, rehabilitate state enterprises in association with
| 1985 | Burkina Faso fertilizer project |
|      | Primary education development project (financial strategy to accelerate the expansion of primary education) |
| 1985 | Health services development project |
| 1984 | Third highway project (completion report) |
| 1984 | Maritime region rural development project and rural development project in rural areas (poor results due to weather and failure to adopt proposed technical packages. Both show difficulties with institution building and effecting counterpart training) |

| 1986 | Issues and options in the energy sector |
|      | Technical assistance project (fuelwood and deforestation) |
| 1985 | Educational improvement project (improve the quality of education in primary and secondary schools and... |
- Third technical assistance project (to help implement and consolidate the second phase of the second structural adjustment project)
- Second structural adjustment project (reverse economic decline and lay the foundation for sustainable growth over the midterm and continue to improve the balance of payments and public finance position)
- Issues and options in the energy sector (reliance on imported petroleum products and imported energy)

1987
- Livestock development project
- Artisan and small and medium scale enterprise project
- Upper volta urban development project

1986
- Institutional development and technical assistance in macroeconomic policy formulation: a case study of Togo
- Wood recovery in the Nangbeto lake region (removal of 2,500 cubic meters of fuel wood to build a hydro plant on the Mono River the conclusions and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1988 | - Agricultural research project  
      - Cotton development programs in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, and Togo  
      - Upper Volta Second Education project (performance assessment)  
      - Agricultural support services project                         |
| 1987 | - Announcement of first international finance corporation project in Togo:  
      privatization of two textile mills  
      - Agricultural extension project (to strengthen the existing extension services in areas of four of the five regional directorates, seeks to introduce the main elements of the training and visit system: systemic visits to groups of farmers, regular training of extension staff, improved linkages between extension and research, proper monitoring and evaluation, efficient management systems at both national and regional levels, technology transfers focused on simple low risk changes in agriculture methods)  
      - Private enterprise development |
project (support the government’s policy of fostering a stronger private sector through the introduction of appropriate policy and institutional and financial measures; four components: establish new institutional support system to provide promotional and extension services to private enterprises, provide support for the ongoing govt program of privatization of parastatals, a pilot scheme for microenterprise lending in collaboration with NGOs/ PVOs, and a line of credit to finance fixed investments and working capital of existing enterprises and new projects)

- Togo, Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta agricultural and rural development projects
- Transport rehabilitation project
- Feeder roads project (completion report)
- Third structural adjustment program
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Projects and Programs</th>
</tr>
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| 1989 | - The effects of river blindness and migration on rural agriculture: the case of some onchocerciasis control program in some areas of Burkina Faso  
- Upper Volta Niena Dionkele rice development project  
- Burkina Faso second Urban project  
- Burkina Faso economic memorandum |
| 1988 | - Cotton development programs in Burkina Faso, Togo, and the Ivory Coast  
- Cotton Sector Development Project  
- Education project (completion report)  
- First and second technical assistance and structural adjustment project (project performance assessment report)  
- Grassroot development initiatives project (Grant financing for NGOs sponsored community-based projects, technical support services fo the steering committee for review and evaluation of project proposals and implementation monitoring, assistance to programme de developpement local et participatif/ NGO division to provide an effective government liaison and resource center for project management, assistance to NGO community to strengthen coordination and complimentary among NGOs. |
| 1990         | - Upper volta forestry project (project completion report with mixed results) |
|             | - Upper volta second Bourguiba agricultural development project (completion report) |
|             | - Upper volta hauts bassins agricultural development project (completion report) |
|             | - Upper volta third telecommunications project (completion report) |
| 1989         | - Preinvestment project (to reduce the immediate constraints on investment caused by the lack of properly prepared projects and to create institutional capacity for identifying investment proposals and processing these through feasibility studies obtaining financing and establishing final project execution plans. Investment preparation component in the format of feasibility studies and detailed execution plans included in the government's triennial public investment project. Sectoral priorities component in the form of studies and training to supplement present knowledge of sectoral investment priorities. |
|             | - Telecommunications project |
| 1991         | - Burkina Faso koudougou agricultural pilot project (completion report) |
|             | - Environmental management project (staff appraisal and recommendations of the |
| 1990         | - Second cocoa and coffee development project (completion report) |
|             | - Second structural adjustment program (project performance assessment report) |
- Fourth education project
- Upper volta volta noire agricultural development project (completion report)
- Public works and employment project
- Urban household energy strategy
- Burkina Faso structural adjustment program project (focused on public resource management and private sector incentives, The private sector incentives component addresses public enterprise sector restructuring, banking sector restructuring, and trade and regulatory reform. The public sector resource management component includes restructuring recurrent budget expenditure to support human resource development, preparation of a civil service management reform, and improved investment programming.)
- Transport sector adjustment investment project
- Fourth highway project (project completion report)
- Feeder roads and highway project
- Power rehabilitation and extension project (streamlining the relationship between Compagnie Energie Electrique du Togo and the government reinforcing CEET’s organization and effecting improvements in all aspects of operations and financing part of the investment program of the power sector for ’90-’94)
- Technical education and vocational training report (restructuring technical education and vocational training by strengthening ministry of technical education and vocational training directorates, creating a labor market information system, and monitoring the VET program, training of sector personnel, national training fund: creating the managerial structures and fund training activities)
- Fourth structural adjustment
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>- Public institutional development project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Food security and nutrition project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Training and Visit system has a high payoff report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Perkoa Mining exploration and technical assistance project (completion report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>- Second rural development project in cotton areas (completion report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Third structural adjustment program project (assessment report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Lomé water supply project (completion report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Third coffee and cocoa development project (completion report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Power, engineering technical technical assistance project (completion report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>- Private sector assistance project (focused on institutional development of government agencies delivering administrative services to the private sector and financial intermediaries. Also focused on deepening financial intermediaries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>- Urban development project (execution of priority urban works having optimal impact on the employment and incomes of the poor, promotion of small contractors in the construction sector, active participation of local residents, community groups, and NGOs in the neighborhood environment improvement activities, strengthening the ability of the local government to administer the city, lay the groundwork for innovations in urban environmental management, contribute to poverty alleviation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Upper volta third rural development project (completion report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Burkina Faso public expenditure review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Engineering credit for the Ouagadougou water supply project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Fourth highway project (completion report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Review of policies, strategies, and programs in the traditional energy sector</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Case studies in financing quality basic education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- National environmental action plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Review of World Bank’s assistance, and Nangbeto Hydroelectric projects (completion report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to assist African governments in reducing poverty</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Evaluation of training and visit based extension in Burkina Faso</td>
<td>- Third technical assistance project (completion report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Education rehabilitation project (designed to reverse rapid deterioration in the education sector after several years of socio-political unrest which resulted in declining enrollment and quality. Development of better schools through construction and rehab, provision of textbooks and the quality of schools initiative, development of better education system management through decentralized recruitment and financing of teachers, development of system management tools including information and communication systems, budgetary programming and monitoring, consolidation of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the ministerial restructuring by strengthening decision making processes and further decentralization responsibility for instructional and financial management

- Fourth structural adjustment project
- Private enterprise development project (completion and results)
- Agricultural extension project (completion and results)


Table 2: Burkina Faso Transactions with the IMF

Total Purchases and Loans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Disbursements</th>
<th>Repayments</th>
<th>Charges and Interest Paid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>538,817</td>
<td>58,752</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
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<td>51,386</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,531,034</td>
<td>14,758</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Disbursements</td>
<td>Repayments</td>
<td>Charges and Interest Paid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
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<td>1,453,400</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>49,085</td>
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<td>31,603</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>8,840,000</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>17,680,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48,730</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>17,680,000</td>
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<td>151,730</td>
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<td>6,630,000</td>
<td>632,000</td>
<td>374,671</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>13,260,000</td>
<td>1,264,000</td>
<td>316,871</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>13,260,000</td>
<td>2,148,000</td>
<td>366,353</td>
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*Table 3: Togo Transactions with the IMF:*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Togo</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>5.195</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-2.803</td>
<td>-2.637</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Sources: “Togo: Transactions with the Fund.” International Monetary Fund. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP per Capita (Annual %)</th>
<th>GDP per Capita (Annual %)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3.058</td>
<td>3.491</td>
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<td>-0.511</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>-2.774</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6.189</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>2.835</td>
<td>5.149</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7.987</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>4.342</td>
<td>-5.39</td>
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Table 5: GDP Per Capita

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>398.173</td>
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<td>387.014</td>
<td>576.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
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<td>566.737</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>396.811</td>
<td>603.898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>348.069</td>
<td>587.145</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>407.838</td>
<td>569.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>397.926</td>
<td>535.482</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>400.694</td>
<td>445.265</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>395.041</td>
<td>500.598</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>406.311</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>438.765</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>453.674</td>
<td>617.326</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>473,372</td>
<td>584,054</td>
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Appendix 2

MAPS:

Figure 1 Map of Distribution of Malaria in Africa


Figure 3 Map of Togo

Bibliography:


https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312444942.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894217724135.


