The empty and desolate consciousness.

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THE EMPTY AND DESOLATE CONSCIOUSNESS

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INTRODUCTION

In this treatise we attempt to examine critically and develop systematically Sartre's theory of consciousness as it appears principally in his major philosophical work, *Being and Nothingness*. We do not intend to cover the entire scope of Sartre's existential thought. Our primary interest is focused on the interpretation of his theory of consciousness as developed in his phenomenological ontology. More particularly, we will show that Sartre's aim in his *Being and Nothingness* is to describe, by means of a phenomenological approach, the failure of the "Being-for-itself" (human consciousness) in its relentless attempt to identify itself with "Being-in-itself" (reality other than human consciousness; the "massive" and "full" being as Sartre calls it).

All theories of consciousness are at least to some extent speculative and hence must confront the challenge of that formidable foe which is none other than the challenge of analytical philosophy. And since, in contemporary philosophy, the schism between analytical and existential philosophies appears almost irreparable it is imperative that all philosophers who concern themselves with existential thought meet this challenge rather than simply dismiss it as mere "unimportant nonsense" (to borrow one of Wittgenstein's favorite expressions). To this end, then, we commence our treatise by confronting this challenge. In the first part of this paper we provide a brief discussion of the limitations of analytical philosophy which render it inadequate to provide a careful and detailed description of the human consciousness. And moreover, it appears to us that the metho-
dological limitations and the restricted and fragmentary manner of philosophizing, which is characteristic of analytical philosophy, prevent it from accommodating an adequate theory of consciousness.

Phenomenology, in contrast to analytical philosophy, is geared toward the investigation of consciousness. Indeed, phenomenology is a discipline whose primary concern is to provide a description of the human consciousness and the objects of consciousness as they appear to consciousness. Phenomenology, therefore, seems to be a particularly appropriate method for the formulation of a theory of consciousness. And since Sartre sought to resolve the problem of consciousness from a phenomenological basis we provide an adumbrative exposition on the phenomenological method in the latter section of the first part.

For a clear understanding of Sartre's phenomenological ontology it is imperative to recognize the influence of two phenomenologists, namely, Husserl and Heidegger, on Sartre. The theories of these two philosophers form the basis of Sartre's phenomenological ontology. Our second part is, therefore, devoted to the explication of some of the theories of these philosophers that are particularly relevant to Sartre's phenomenological ontology and his theory of consciousness.

In the third part our main purpose is to develop systematically Sartre's phenomenological description of the two regions of Being: "Being-for-itself" and "Being-in-itself," their characteristics, their relations, their interactions and their activities. Through detailed discussions of Sartre's phenomenological approach, his initial postulates, his theories of negation and Nothingness, his concept of "bad faith" and his characterizations of
"Being-for-itself" and "Being-in-itself," we show Sartre, first, methodically empties the "Being-for-itself" of most of its being; second, fills the "Being-in-itself" with being; and, third, thus creates an hiatus between the two regions of Being, only to demonstrate that a synthesis between the two regions of Being is unattainable. In the last section of this part we recapitulate the main points of the previous sections to substantiate our conclusion that for Sartre the unification of the two regions of Being into a synthetic whole is an impossibility.

In the final part of this treatise we seek to show that Sartre's initial postulates upon which his entire system is based are unwarranted and untenable. Moreover, his "phenomenological method" cannot justifiably be described as phenomenological, at least not in the strict Husserlian sense of the term. Here we also challenge his characterization of the "Being-for-itself" as an empty and impersonal non-being. From our criticisms it would appear that Sartre fails in his project to show the impossibility of a synthesis between the two regions of Being. However, despite this apparent failure, he makes a measurable contribution to the problem of Being, and above all he succeeds in indicating the limitations of phenomenology in resolving the problem of consciousness and the problem of Being.
A. The Limitations of Analytical Philosophy

The philosophical attitude prevalent in the English-speaking countries exhibits a profound distrust for all "Speculative philosophies" that dominated the German thought in the nineteenth century. This distrust soon resulted in an almost complete disregard for all speculative systems, including its more recent mode, that of Sartrean "phenomenological ontology." This skepticism is at least partially justified by the extravagances of German speculative thought, which indeed, in some instances, is both obscure and incoherent. From this attitude, then, emerged a new philosophical movement, commonly known as the analytical movement.

The group of philosophers known as the analytical philosophers, contrary to the popular impression, does not constitute a school. Although they share the common belief that philosophy must be approached from a scientific viewpoint, and indeed it is their claim that they have succeeded where Kant had failed, namely, in finding a way "to set philosophy upon the sure path of science," which is a dubious claim, they hold no distinctive common thesis. Some have thought, erroneously, that the unifying thesis can be found in the verifiability theory of meaning. But this theory, although of prime importance, has many different formulations, of which not one is commonly agreed upon. Moreover, even the interests of these philosophers are at variance; the earlier positivists were interested in
the empirical verification of propositions which would, in turn, determine the meaningfulness of such sentences, whereas the later linguistic analysts were primarily concerned with the study of language as the tool of knowledge. The vast profusion of literature that has been published in the past five decades, and the rapidity with which the movement evolved render it impossible to provide a comprehensive and detailed review of the entire analytical movement. However, it will be fruitful here to critically evaluate a few theories of its major exponents that are particularly relevant and to show their methodological limitations in providing a theory of consciousness.

It is generally recognized by students of philosophy that logical positivism is the root from which later movements grew. Thus, an exposition on analytical philosophy will do well to begin with this movement and attempt to fix on some of its central points. In this regard there seem to be at least four major theses which are central to all positivists; these are (1) logical atomism, more specifically, the theory that all complex statements of fact are in fact compound statements which depend for their truth on simple statements about sense experience, and, furthermore, these are independent statements which do not entail any other; (2) the verifiability theory of meaning, which claims that a statement means precisely that which would verify it in sense experience, or "the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification"; (3) the analytical character of a priori knowledge, i.e., that all necessary statements unfold the contents of our ideas rather than report truths about nature; (4) the emotive theory of value, i.e., that statements of value
are neither true nor false, but expressions of attitude. Of these four theses, the verifiability theory of meaning is the most important and interesting for our purposes, for if this theory is true, then any general speculative theory concerning the human consciousness would be, in principle, impossible. This theory implies the assumption that everything that could be said could be expressed in terms of elementary statements, i.e., the theory of logical atomism. The theory on the character of a priori knowledge and the emotive theory of value are not particularly relevant, since they do not have any important bearing on the question of the possibility of a theory of consciousness. We shall thus confine ourselves primarily to an investigation of the verifiability theory of meaning, and any mention of the theory of logical atomism will be purely incidental, in that it will serve only to implement our understanding of the verifiability principle.

The common exaltation of science and the aversion to metaphysics have been of fundamental importance in shaping the course of investigation ventured by the logical positivists. Closely related to these attitudes is their stress of sense experience as the terminus a quo and ad quem of our thinking, and their deep suspicion of any talk of universals or necessary connections outside the fields of logic and mathematics. Their attitude of disdain for all noncognitive enterprises, such as the formulation of universal value theories, which they believe, strictly speaking, are not the concern of the philosopher, since his task is limited to clearing up the theoretical puzzles about methods and meanings left behind by the scientists, led them to brand these as emotive and,
consequently, unworthy of serious attention. If this conception of philosophy prevails, then the business of philosophy must be degraded to that of a handmaiden of science. Philosophy thus regarded is indeed a dreary and bleak matter. It would seem from this that all that is left for the philosopher is a universe of sense contents. It is true, that no positivist ever maintained this explicitly; however, it is nevertheless tacitly implied in their claim that when a remark about what is not sensible is ventured, this remark, although not false, is meaningless. Implicit in this unverifiable claim is the argument that an assertion is a statement of fact; and if we are clear as to what is asserted, we must be able to recognize that experience or those experiences that will verify this assertion. Thus, when making an assertion we must always refer to the relevant experience, namely, sense experience. If this theory is true, the implications that it entails are devastating to our present project, for it would not only render any theory about the human consciousness implausible, but it would prima facie rule it out as unthinkable and meaningless. We must now inquire in what sense, if any, this theory is true.

In attempting to make their investigations appear "scientific," the positivists chose to restrict their discussions of meaning in such a manner that they would not include any mention of the noetic process, for such a process would clearly entail in it the problem of consciousness, which, as it were, is not publicly verifiable, let alone conclusively verifiable. From this it becomes obvious why the positivists designed the verifiability principle to be an empirical test, which admits only sense
experience as evidence, to determine the object meant. This resulted in their emphasis on the sensory rather than the introspective or any other mode of verification. Formulated in this restricted manner, this principle has proved incapable of accommodating the vast profusion of facts, which clearly is not limited to sense experience alone. Thus, there has not been a single empiricist theory of meaning commonly accepted among the positivists; instead, there has been a succession of theories, each subsequent one benefiting from the errors of the preceding one. Our most feasible approach, then, would appear to be to systematically analyze the main phases in the development of the verifiability theory and to show how each successive one fails to cover those experiences which are necessary for the formulation of a theory of consciousness.

The first stage of the verifiability principle was formulated by Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* of 1922. Here he argued that "everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly," and "everything that can be said can be said clearly." For Wittgenstein the criterion of meaningful statements is their coincidence with facts, and this coincidence is verified through these very facts of "my world," and what "my world" consists of is the realm of sensibly and instantaneously given atomic facts, to which only I have access. Strictly speaking, we cannot refer to this "my world" as the field of consciousness or even as immediate experience, for these would imply an experiencing agent, and this is not permissible in Wittgensteinian language, since any reference to a "self" would be vacuous talk, for there could be no empirical verification that would sustain this "self."
For two reasons this theory would clearly cripple any attempt to establish a theory of consciousness. First, all communication with other minds—which is presupposed in every theory of consciousness—would be impossible, owing to the privacy of access to the atomic facts to which all meaningful statements must, in the end, refer. And there is no reason to suppose that objects are anything other than groups of atomic facts which, because they are simple, are not subject to further analysis nor, therefore, to definition or description. If the atomic facts are incapable of definition or description, what could serve as the common denominators through which communication is made possible? The objects themselves? Indeed no, for these objects are merely aggregates of atomic facts, and atomic facts are private and incommunicable. If communication with other minds is impossible, then any theory that purports to generalize certain characteristics about consciousness is no more than a string of meaningless words.

Secondly, this theory would remove any talk about other minds and would relegate such conjecture to the category of vacuous talk. Let us take, for example, the sentence "Peter believes that there is a leprechaun inside his watch." Now for two reasons this sentence is meaningless in Wittgensteinian language. (1) In accordance with Wittgenstein's extensionalist logic, it was maintained that all compound propositions are truth functions of the propositions they contained. But in our example the compound sentence, "Peter believes that there is a leprechaun inside his watch," does not depend for its truth upon the truth of its subordinate proposition, namely, "there is a leprechaun inside his watch." Hence such
a sentence is not a proposition asserting a state of affairs. (2) Since it is obviously the case that Peter's belief is not directly verifiable, this sentence makes no claim beyond the empirically verifiable one that Peter uttered a sequence of sounds. In this regard all sentences that purport to tell of the consciousness of other minds must be discarded as "unimportant nonsense." But when a positivist stands in a communicative relation with another Subject, he is not merely apprehending a sequence of perceptible sounds uttered by this Subject. He understands the meaning of the sounds which are but the expression by means of which another autonomous consciousness, with the capacity to organize, to construct, and so on, manifests itself. And repudiating the postulation of another consciousness like my own seems to be, at best, an arbitrary choice. There are other weaknesses with this theory, but suffice here to say that such a theory is incompatible with any and all theories of consciousness.

We have seen from the above discussion of his theory that Wittgenstein had remained unwaveringly faithful to two of Schlick's original and fundamental theses: first, "that a factual proposition refers to empirical fact alone," and second, "that this fact was always what its assertor would regard as the best warrant for the truth of his assertion." These theses were reverentially adhered to by the positivists through all their later variations of the verifiability principle.

Now we come to the second stage. Here those positivists who felt Wittgenstein's theory too cramping to be borne, sought to loosen the verification principle, but nevertheless they retained the important position that that which a person refers to must in some sense be verified by that
particular person. Thus the theory has here acquired a new appearance which centers around the phrase "what might be verified by me." And indeed this revised version was able to cover many statements in its net of meaningful statements that have been ostracized as verbal waste by Wittgenstein's rather extraordinary criterion of meaningfulness. But unfortunately even in this new dressing the theory still obviates any hope for a meaningful inspection of consciousness other than my own.

The third stage again attempted a more inclusive theory by extending the range of the verifiable. A new qualification was added: in sum, it stipulated that the net of meaningful statements in inclusive of all those statements that I might in principle verify. However, there is a drawback to this seemingly plausible theory, and that is, it demands the verification to be conclusive. The covert assumption underlying this theory is that ultimately meaning must make reference to ostensive definitions, and nothing less will serve. And Schlick held that "the statement that two experiences of different subjects not only occupy corresponding places in a systematic order, but also resemble each other qualitatively, has for us no sense. Note that it is not false, but senseless (sinnlos); we have no idea what it means." Conjointly, these two theses, namely, meaning must ultimately refer to ostensive definitions, and the equipollence of experiences of different subjects, lead either to the elimination of all statements about the experiences of other people, since such statements cannot be ostensively sustained nor is the equipollence of experiences of different subjects conclusively verifiable, or else to the reduction of other people's experience to one's own, namely to redefine the experience
of other people in terms of their empirical manifestations—that is, in terms of the overt behavior of their bodies and ultimately in terms of my sense contents. Strictly speaking, of course, it is meaningless to speak of experience of "other people" unless we define this experience in terms of my sense contents.

While positivists such as Ayer adhered closely to this form of dogmatic behaviorism, others like Carnap and Hempel preferred the even more radical form of "physicalism."\(^1\)

In this peculiar brand of physicalism it was maintained that whenever a person makes a statement such as "I am angry," and we accept this statement to be true, what we in effect accept are the physical manifestations of the person's body, i.e., his verbalizations, his clenching of his fist, his facial contortions, and ultimately the changes in his neurones. What is meant here is that there is not only a "logical equivalence" between the "physical" and the "mental," but there is also an "identity of content" between the two; and this process was known as the translation of the "mental" into the "physical."\(^2\)

What the physicalists have actually done was to make a leap from the logical equivalence, which demands that both the statement about consciousness and about the overt behavioral manifestations must be true or false simultaneously, to the claim of identity of content. Resolving one content into the other in this manner is clearly unacceptable, for "uniform accompaniment is not identity."\(^3\) This view was soon abandoned by Carnap, who admitted with candor the untenability of this theory. He writes: "A person sometimes knows he is angry without applying any of those procedures which another person would have to
apply ..."17"Anger is not the same as the movements by which an angry organism reacts to his environment ..."18It is, in short, an experience and not a bodily reaction. Later Carnap reformulated this theory into a milder version; here he replaces "translatable" by "reducible." However, the logical equivalence was still maintained, but now the observable bodily reactions are referred to as "symptoms"19(Carnap) or "test conditions"20(Hempel) of anger, and we are to verify our judgments by these alone. Although his modification was aimed at a compromise, it fell short of its goal. For if "reducibility" implies that the mental assertion can be reducible to the physical in meaning or content asserted, then we have physicalism all over again. And if it means that the mental assertion refers to a state of consciousness, then it has succumbed to common sense.

Let us now examine a few of the difficulties inherent in this theory.

(1) If the "physical symptoms" are parallel to the states of consciousness of other people, then this uniform accompaniment must be observable. But no state of consciousness belonging to another person is, in principle, observable by another person. How, then, are we justified in drawing a parallel? (2) In the present form this theory assumes that for every conscious event there is a physical correlate; however, even if this were true, there is no way of maintaining it. The positivists allow for only two kinds of statements, analytic and synthetic. But the above assertion is not analytic, for the identity of the states of consciousness and the physical manifestations is no longer maintained. Nor, for that matter, is it a synthetic statement, for states of consciousness are not verifiable by the other subjects. Thus the theory here is not only unestablished but
meaningless. Moreover, even if we allow for the verification of conscious events by other subjects, this verification can never be exhaustive and, consequently, never conclusive.

Let us here recapitulate some of the main points of this view and assess its plausibility in providing an adequate theory of consciousness. We have seen how the first version of Carnap's physicalism is unacceptable, as was later recognized by Carnap himself. Yet the modified version, which could be an intelligible and natural view as urged by the positivists, becomes rampant with contradictions and incoherences, for their methodology does not permit such a theory. If we accept the physicalists' view that the consciousness of men, in its rich proliferations, is not, as distinct from its physical manifestations, a true object of knowledge at all, then any philosopher who chooses not to speak of the consciousness in physical terms must remain silent. The untenable consequences of physicalism would seem to suggest that we should search for a theory of consciousness elsewhere.

The inadequacies of the third interpretation made it necessary to once again reformulate the verifiability principle. According to the fourth interpretation, a statement is meaningful if it might, in principle, be verified by anyone at all. Yet according to Professor Schlick, the stipulation that the verification must be conclusive must still be retained here. Such is the emphasis on the conclusiveness of verification that we are persuaded to regard it as nothing less than a central doctrine for the positivists.

When I speak of the consciousnesses of other people, how can I con-
clusively verify their existence? No finite number of instances will enable me to have conclusive evidence that other people possess consciousness, for this would necessitate nothing short of completing an infinite series, and it is always conceivable that in the future a contrary instance might appear.

It is evident that this theory, as urged by Schlick, must now be abandoned. As Professor Ayer pointed out very forcefully, no statement of fact is conclusively verifiable. He further maintained that "if this is correct, the principle that a sentence is factually significant only if it expresses what is conclusively verifiable is self-stultifying as a criterion of significance. For it leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to make a statement of fact at all." 21

In a fifth attempt the positivists were finally convinced that the insistence on conclusiveness proved to be a liability rather than an asset, and this demand was abandoned in Professor Ayer's new proposal in the second edition of his Language Truth and Logic. Here he distinguished between strong, or conclusive, and weak verification. He writes:

"A proposition is said to be verified in the strong sense of the term if, and only if, its truth could be conclusively established in experience. But it is verifiable in the weak sense if it is possible for experience to render it probable." 22 We say that the question must be asked about any putative statement of fact is not. Would any observation make its truth or falsehood logically certain? But simply, Would any observation be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood? And it is only if a negative answer is given to this second question that we conclude that the
statement is considered nonsensical."23 This position is a clear advance over the previous attempts, for it readily admitted propositions about other people's minds, since we can at least claim that their ostensible behavior is relevant in determining the truth or falsehood of these propositions. Though regarding these propositions Professor Ayer continued to hold, with less than apodeictic certainty, his behavioristic view. The problem with this criterion was no longer its exclusion of meaningful statements but its inclusion of statements as meaningful that are in fact, by the fiat of common sense, meaningless.

In an article titled "Meaninglessness" published in Mind, Ayer reformulated this theory in more technical terms. He writes: "Let us call a proposition which records an actual or possible observation an experiential proposition. Then we may say that it is the mark of a genuine factual proposition that some experiential propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible from those other premises alone."24 But this new criterion, as Isaiah Berline noted, would allow one to meaningfully say, "This logical problem is bright green"; and with the aid of another premise, "I dislike all shades of green," one could deduce a verifiable conclusion not deducible from either premise alone, namely, "I dislike this logical problem,"25 which is obviously a manifest absurdity. Indeed, some ten years later Ayer himself recognized the untenability of this criterion and abandoned it. Clearly, then, as a criterion for meaningfulness, this theory is unsatisfactory.

It would seem that the repeated necessity for readjustment and improvisation and revision would have, with constraining evidence, indicated the
futility of pursuing this task of establishing an acceptable verifiability principle. However, although this movement became relatively stagnant in Britain, it took a new course in America. The emphasis now shifted from de facto verification to language—a language free from the vestiges of archaic metaphysics and obscurities, in which the components would include only logical symbols and subjects and predicates that refer to observable (sensible) things. Thus the criterion for meaningfulness now becomes that of translatability into this empirical language. Insofar as the logical constants and quantifiers are concerned, they bear no great importance for us. And as for the phrase "observable predicates," this sieve proves equivocal if it admits such unobservables as other people's consciousnesses, and it begs the question if it excludes them as meaningless. Hence, many of our previous criticisms are applicable here, for instance, reference to observable or sensible things as a criterion of meaningfulness. Although this modification was meant to be a measurable advance over previous attempts, it too proved implausible.

We have reviewed the main stages in the development of the verifiability theory; to some we devoted brief attention, and others we dealt with in considerable detail. From this we can safely say that through its different variations a two-fold thesis was consistently and persistently upheld. On the one hand the meaning of a statement is precisely that which would secure its truth; and on the other hand, regarding facts, only sense experience can bring certainty of truth. It is toward this dual thesis that ultimately all forms converged. This dual thesis, if held, would inevitably rule out any attempt that purports to theorize about
consciousness. This emphasis on meaning-inspection, hardly objectionable in its right place, tends toward dogmatism when it oversteps its rightful sphere. The range of empirical actualities is certainly not limited to sense experience alone. And by reducing all empirical actualities to my personal sense contents, I invariably omit vast realms of nonperceptible data such as all historical facts, psychological facts that constitute an individual's psychic life, and everyday communication with others. If philosophy neglects these perennial data which bear incommensurable consequences to one's life, then philosophy is but a form of intellectual gymnastics. And in eliminating theories of consciousness, as did the positivists, in what I believe to be an arbitrary manner, it subtracts from itself that very margin of credibility.

Let us now turn to the later developments of analytical philosophy known as linguistic philosophy. Here those analytical philosophers who were critical of the insurmountable difficulties brought about by the positivistic approach sought a new course. From these philosophers emerged the new idea: that the assumption in advance that what one means will fall neatly into preconceived categories is unwarranted. A statement must speak for itself; it may have its own kind of meaning, and that kind of meaning its own logic. The key to these varieties of meaning is language. Only through the nuances of language can we explore the manifold content of idea, impulse, and feeling that human beings can express. The rule here is no longer that of searching for meaning but "look for the use."

The earlier forms of linguistic analysis are variegated and numerous. However, we shall limit our discussion to three: the common sense theory
of G. E. Moore (although, strictly speaking, his philosophy is not solely linguistic analysis, Moore did pioneer the linguistic movement, and his influence on the later forms of linguistic analysis is incommensurable; N. Malcolm's theory of common usage; and Ayer's application of Russell's theory of "definite description" and his theory of "logical constructions."

In 1925 Professor Moore published what many analysts consider to be his singularly most important work, "A Defense of Common Sense." In this essay he suggested the efficacy of common sense and its language to provide the genuine philosophical problems on the one hand, and the criterion to determine the genuineness of speculative claims on the other. He further held that even apparently trivial deviations from ordinary (standard) language may result in the infiltration of pseudo-philosophical problems, and that those philosophical statements that violate ordinary language are false. Thus, to resolve any theory of consciousness we must ultimately make ordinary language our court of appeal. But precisely because ordinary language and common sense, with their profusion of ambiguities, vagaries, and lack of certainty do not even ask the question "Are there other consciousnesses like mine?" let alone provide the sort of answer the philosopher seeks, they are inadequate to serve as tools for the formulation of a theory of consciousness. The main difficulty with Moore's proposal seems to be the extension of jurisdiction of common sense and ordinary language into realms where their arbitrations are ineffective.

Professor Malcolm believed that Moore's fundamental proposal was sound, and that its difficulties could be remedied by stressing the importance of language. According to Professor Malcolm, when philosophers depart from
common sense, what they are really doing is misusing words; he writes "the
philosophizing of the more important philosophers has consisted in their
more or less subtly repudiating ordinary language."^27 However, he maintained
that under certain conditions, common sense, when using language correctly,
could not be mistaken. These conditions stipulated that any expression
employed should have (1) a descriptive and (2) an un DERivative use. ^26 Thus
regarded, "it is not possible for an ordinary form of speech to be im-
proper. That is to say, ordinary language is correct language,"^29 and
cannot produce false statements. Here Professor Malcolm sees "correct
language to imply not only proper usage, but also truth, that is, being
correct is equivalent to being true. Thus to refute any philosophical
paradox, all one need do is to indicate where there has been a misuse of
language. The confusion here seems to be the confounding of the terms
"proper" and "true." Truth may be understood as that which corresponds
to a statement of fact; while propriety demands no more than the conformity
to an established usage. Proper usage does not, on the one hand, assure
inerrancy; nor, on the other hand, does improper usage imply falsehood.
Ordinary language has not reached the reflective level nor the sophisti-
cation capable of coping with philosophical problems such as that of con-
sciousness. And here any deviation from "proper" (ordinary) usage need
not necessarily result in falsehood.

Despite the problems encountered in both Moore's and Malcolm's theories,
Ayer persisted in adhering to the conviction that philosophy is intimately,
and indeed inextricably, linked to language. For Ayer all meaningful
philosophical statements were definitions, and definition here means none
other than "definition in use." As Ayer explains, "We define a symbol in use by showing how the sentences in which it significantly occurs can be translated into equivalent sentences, which contain neither the definiendum itself, nor any of its synonyms." And the theories which were instrumental in bringing about this mode of translation, which Ayer acknowledged as the main concern of philosophy, were Russell's theory of "definite descriptions" and his theory of "logical constructions." Let us look briefly at Russell's theory of "definite descriptions." Here Russell showed how we might meaningfully use names without postulating the existence of the entities named. Russell himself proposed the example "The author of Waverley." The analysis of this complex descriptive name would be as follows: "Someone (or, more strictly, something) wrote Waverley and nothing else wrote Waverley." And the statement "The author of Waverley is not" could be dealt with in a corresponding manner. "Either each thing failed to write Waverley, or two or more things wrote Waverley." Thus when Russell's theory of "definite description" is applied, we can remove any expression or word that purports to name any alleged entity or stand for a thing or substance, whose being is in question, such as "the absolute," "nothingness," and other metaphysical impostors.

In his theory of "logical constructions" Russell proposed the rule that "Whenever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities." This substitution is effected when a sentence referring to any questionable inferred entity is replaced by an acceptable equivalent whose reference is confined to what is empirical and indubitable. Thus the reference to any physical object would be substituted by a class of sensory data.
Ayer, however, went beyond Russell in his application of the latter's theories. Not only were material substances eliminated but all entities beyond the reach of our acquaintance, such as consciousness of other people, were removed. In common language, because we use the phrase "other people" as a grammatical subject to which we attach consciousness, we frequently take consciousness to refer to some intangible "thing" that exists in its own right. And because, according to both Russell and Ayer, consciousness of other people's minds does not and cannot refer to anything, it has outlived its usefulness and must now retire into the metaphysical menagerie. Like Moore's and Malcolm's theories, this too must be abandoned, for none of these theories can accommodate any theory of consciousness.

Now we turn to the later linguistic philosophers, generally known as the Oxonian "ordinary language" philosophers. Our present discussion will be confined to the exposition and criticism of one of the most respected exponents of this group, namely, Professor Ryle.

According to Professor Ryle, ordinary language is riddled with confusions which in turn produce perplexing philosophical problems. And revealing this sort of confusion is to shed light on the nature of the problems and their solutions. This sort of confusion that language induces Ryle terms "category mistakes," which in sum amounts to making one category do the work of another. A category mistake occurs when we misuse a "sentence factor." A sentence factor is "any partial expression which can enter into sentences otherwise dissimilar." Thus in the sentence 'I am the man who wrote this paper,' 'I,' 'the man who,' 'who wrote this paper,' 'wrote this paper' are all sentence factors. Let us illustrate with an example:
"time began in 4004 B.C." and "the rain began at four o'clock." The sentence factors "time" and "rain" seem to belong to the same category, yet if this were the case then it is obvious that we are confusing time and an event in time, as time itself can never be an event in time. In the manner in which Ryle chose to define sentence factor he would have to admit an indefinite number of sentence factors and in turn an indefinite number of categories, and this he did.

Our question here is whether this doctrine nullifies all theories of consciousness; that is, do sentences that purport to speak of consciousness entail a "category mistake" of the kind described by Ryle? Does the belief that there are other consciousnesses similar to my own entail category mistakes? Are we here misusing the sentence factor "consciousness"? Clearly not! When a speculative philosopher assures us that consciousness is of a different "material" than, say, the objects of consciousness, or that there is an Ego which interprets, organizes, and unifies different contents of consciousness, one wonders if he is making a "category mistake" or if these problems could be resolved by simply admitting to such mistakes. If a philosopher is clear and consistent in articulating his concept of consciousness, the ultimate court of appeal would seem to be that of reason rather than whether it entails any "category mistakes." Undeniably specious linguistic resemblances have led to many purely intellectual puzzles, but we must resolve these problems, not dissolve them. And whether the human consciousness can be synthesized with the object of consciousness is, to me at least, certainly a genuine and fascinating philosophical problem; and if we approach such a problem methodically, systematically, consistently,
and rationally, we can avoid confounding the use of terms which is not so much the result of language as it is a consequence of confused reasoning.

The bewildering absurdities that are imposed on the philosopher appear to be not so much a consequence of language but rather the result of unclear thought. Expressions and sentences by themselves are neither absurd nor true or false. Only as interpreted are they true, false, or absurd. If I say nobody came, and interpreted this to mean that nobody has that sort of attribute that enables it to come and go, then undeniably this expression is absurd. But the absurdity lies in the interpretation and not in the expression itself. It is undeniable that we are often misled by words in the ways Ryle has described, but the underlying source of confusion is to be found in thought. The discussion of words is at best prefatory and preparatory for the resolution of such confusions. Our ultimate appeal must be to an analysis of thought, consciousness, and mind.

We have reviewed the basic tenents of the logical positivists and the earlier and later linguistic analysts. Their austere speculative asceticism, their stern self-exactions, their requirement of rigor of statement, their demand for clarity, and their insistence on fidelity to fact are indeed admirable. However, it is very disconcerting to see the positivists, on the one hand, restricting philosophy to meaning-inspection at the price of total neglect of the more important and interesting philosophical problems; and the linguistic analysts, on the other, limiting their investigations to the sphere of language, again at the cost of forsaking the perennial problems of philosophy. Not only are the interests of the analytical philosophers not channelled in the direction of a study of consciousness,
but their very methodology prevents them from theorizing about the human consciousness.

Logical positivism is guided by the desire to inspect the contents of consciousness rather than consciousness itself. And its distaste for all forms of speculative philosophy imposes on it the conviction that the subjective aspect of consciousness is unworthy of serious attention. The logical positivists are only interested in the objective elements of consciousness, namely, the objects or, more accurately, the contents of consciousness. Thus any speculation on the pure form of consciousness is regarded as nothing more than verbal waste.

Any philosophy which purports to analyze nonperceptible actualities must to that degree be speculative; this seems to be the unavoidable consequence of a basic human limitation. But through austere rationalism we need not be misled into obscure and incoherent speculations. However, some philosophical problems, among them the problem of consciousness, cannot be expressed in a clear-cut manner; nor is ordinary, everyday language efficacious as a tool for the articulation of such problems. Hence the philosopher must resort to a language which is often obscure; yet however obscure his language, his method and his concepts need not be. We must now examine another mode of philosophizing which would more readily accommodate theories of consciousness. To this end we shall direct our attention to phenomenology, specifically, phenomenology as Husserl understood it to mean.

"Phenomenology" is often considered to be a profound and recondite approach to philosophy and science, but the vagueness which accompanies this term is not only misleading but empties it of meaning. There has been no clear notion of the precise contributions of phenomenology to philosophy; but only the general conception that any attempt to detach philosophy from speculative constructionism and to limit investigation to the data which are presented in consciousness—descriptive rather than explicative—is phenomenological. This much, at least, is accurate. But to take but one example, the popular impression that phenomenology is inextricably tied up with existentialism and that these two terms can be used indiscriminately is unwarranted. The reason for this misconception is perhaps due to the fact that Sartre's philosophy, which is both phenomenological and existential, is frequently taken as representative of both the phenomenologists and the existentialists. This is, of course, inaccurate; for philosophers like Heidegger and Marcel, who consider their approaches to be phenomenological, would gladly be disassociated from the Sartrean line. And others like Jean Nering and Dietrich von Hildebrand would not particularly relish being called existentialists.35

To trace the genesis of the term phenomenology we must, in the end, make reference to Kant's original distinction between the phenomenon or appearance of reality in consciousness, and the noumenon, the thing-in-itself. In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant proposed that scientific knowledge concerns phenomena and not noumena, and to this extent his
critique can be considered a sort of phenomenology. This position further stresses that what is known is phenomena, precisely because to know here means to appear to consciousness in a particular way. We can think of a "thing-in-itself" or noumenon but not know it, the known aspect of a "thing-in-itself" is the phenomen, i.e., its appearance. Phenomena are all that we have to go by; but according to Hegel, who was the first philosopher to designate his own philosophy as phenomenology, phenomena reveal all that is to be revealed through the dialectical process of human thought, and here is where Hegel deviated from Kant.

If we understand phenomenology to express merely a descriptive approach, then to the extent that positivism is concerned with a descriptive mode of philosophizing, its claim that only phenomena are given to the consciousness, and that the sole business of the philosopher is to describe the contents of consciousness, it is phenomenological. As Heidegger explained, the expression "descriptive phenomenology" is tautological, for these two terms are inseparable. And from this, what Freud and the later behaviorists proposed to do in psychology, namely, to confine themselves to description and observation of human behavior, they too are to this degree phenomenologists. But surely this is not the sole interest of the phenomenologists. Their prime concern lies with the essences (the constant elements in a coordinated series of the actual and possible manifestations of appearance) which are revealed through phenomena as known through consciousness. Implied here is the dual conviction that consciousness cannot be known independently of reality, and its converse, that reality is not knowable apart from consciousness. But in seeking to reveal the essence of
phenomena described, phenomenology is not to be confused with some sort of modified Kantian noumenology; the phenomenologists are not seeking for something "behind" the phenomenon. Throughout the history of philosophy there has been a relentless quest for a consistent reconciliation between the reality of which we are conscious and the consciousness we have of reality. And the phenomenologists are no exception; they are united in their belief that only phenomena are given, and that a reconciliation, if it is possible, must be sought in phenomena, that is, our consciousness of them. Hence, as Lauer puts it, consciousness is for the phenomenologist "a kind of being which things exercise, the only kind of being directly available to the investigator. Thus, ... consciousness is best expressed by the German word *Bewusstsein*, which means the kind of being an object of knowledge has in being known." However, not in the sense of an identification of being and being-known, but rather the notion that revelation of being can come about only through examination of its being-known.

An investigation of an act of consciousness will reveal that (1) acts of consciousness are related to each other in a continuum, and (2) an act of consciousness is never solely subjectively conditioned but must always have an objective aspect to it, that is, it must always refer to some object of consciousness. Because every act of consciousness is a complex compounding of subjective and objective elements, its analysis must in turn be a complex affair. But the phenomenologist is confident that this analysis is possible, and moreover it will lead him to the very origin of pure consciousness, free from all *a priori* prejudices, and will bring him to an understanding of the only being which can have significance for him.
Thus an examination of the experienced world must begin with consciousness, for it is only through consciousness that this world, as experienced, is possible; consciousness becomes the very condition of our experience.

The "objective" essences, which the phenomenologist aims at discovering, must be independent of any arbitrary meaning that a subject may feel disposed to assign to them. The subject cannot, as it were, "produce" the objects; nor, on the other hand, are the objective essences conceived as engendering the relationship which exists between essence and subject. This relationship, which resides in the conscious act, is not derived from it; it has an autonomy that renders it truly objective. Hence this objective relationship maintains the equilibrium between the two elements, and it can only be revealed by an investigation of pure consciousness. And the essences, if they are to be found, must be sought in consciousness.

Thus phenomenology is not merely a discipline which takes consciousness as its point of departure but revolves its whole investigation around consciousness, attempting to unveil consciousness in its present form as the very seat of all possible experience, and consequently all knowledge.

These general remarks will suffice for our present purpose. We do not propose to here provide an all-inclusive exposition of phenomenology, which would invariably lead us into indissoluble conflicts, for the phenomenologists by no means agree on many issues, and, moreover, their interests and techniques differ. Our sole intent is to show the advantages of phenomenology to cope with the problem of consciousness, and how this discipline is oriented so that it readily admits analyses of consciousness.

With a few criticisms of analytical philosophy and a few brief remarks
on phenomenology, we now turn to the background wherein Sartre developed
his phenomenological ontology. The two men whose influences on Sartre
were conspicuously evident throughout Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* are
Husserl, commonly considered to be the founder of the phenomenological
method in its present form, and Heidegger, who was for many years an
assistant to Husserl at Freiburg. We shall next consider some relevant
thoughts of each of these men in turn, emphasizing the points of congruence
and divergence between these philosophers and Sartre. Our concern will be
confined to those theories that have influenced Sartre's method and his
analysis of consciousness, and hopefully our discussion of those theories
will implement our understanding of Sartre. We do not pretend this study
to be exhaustive, even of those theories here considered.
PART II
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF SARTRE

A. Husserl and the Theory of Intentionality

Phenomenology for Husserl is both a method and a philosophy. It is a method in that it outlines the steps and provides the techniques to reveal the pure phenomenon, wherein the essence of appearances and that which appears are to be found; it is a philosophy in that it purports to give necessary and essential knowledge of that which is, free from all contingent factors. Phenomenology seeks to return to "things" as they are described in terms of the consciousness wherein they are experienced. Such experience is distinguishable from other experiences, for the essence of each experience is clearly recognizable as different from essences of other experiences.

In his search for a science of essences, or an essential science, Husserl consistently adhered to his convictions that the task of philosophy is none other than an investigation of the very meaning (essence) of being, and that this investigation must, in its own right, be just as scientific as mathematics. According to Husserl, this science is possible only through the application of the phenomenological method, wherein "things" are freed of all elements of contingency. Thus Husserl's philosophy can be regarded as an elaboration of the method through which we can arrive at the essential knowledge of things, or through which we can discover the what of the things that are. Such a science cannot be a system, for each "thing" must be examined separately in order to determine its
essence. There cannot be one underlying principle to which all essences of things conform, but this is not to say that the approach and method cannot be systematic. And in this respect, unity, if it exists, must be found "in the unity of a well-built edifice, wherein one solid stone is placed on another," and each stone represents an essence which is necessary and eternally true.

Phenomenology as a study of consciousness must ultimately examine each act of consciousness as a "pure" act of consciousness, seeking to discover in each its essence. From this approach Husserl arrived at the conclusion that consciousness must always be consciousness of (something), that is "the essence of the Cartesian cogito contained the coxitatum as immediately as the cogito itself."39 Thus an act of consciousness is inextricably linked to its object, they are but the subjective and the objective aspects of the same thing. Hence, to know an act of consciousness essentially is to know its object; and this knowledge of the object is absolute in the sense that it is free from all vestiges of contingency, including that of existence. Object here is not limited to things, but includes persons, thought, events, categories, states of affairs, mental constructs such as numbers, and others. And each of these objects has an essence which "can be 'seen' immediately in an adequate view of the act of consciousness wherein it is contained."40 However, mental constructs, specifically those of mathematics and logic, are purely the products of consciousness; they are static and changeless and thus are independent of the conditions of the stream of progressive experience which other objects as objects are subjected to. Thus the flux of experience renders it impossible to describe essences,
with the exception of those of logic and mathematics, to any degree of exactitude, for by such a description we would immobilize the flow of consciousness. Essences, again with the exception of those of logic and mathematics, if they are described exactly, become static. And since, as Husserl admitted, we must allow a certain latitude in the conception of what essences are, the description of these need not be exact.

For Husserl, to grasp the essence of something is to grasp its meaning. In this regard essence and "sense" are identical, and since sense, or the signification of things, is not to be found in a contingent world of things existing independently of consciousness, it follows that we must seek essences of things in consciousness itself. But to speak of essence is to speak of that which is absolutely necessary, and since Husserl defines the necessary as that which has been purified of all contingency, then a science of essence is nothing more than this purification which can be accomplished only in consciousness; and this is the precise reason why Husserl confines his investigation to consciousness and attempts to purify consciousness.

In his attempt to accomplish this purification of the consciousness, Husserl developed his singularly most important concept, the concept of intentionality. In his analysis of meanings Husserl concluded that to mean is to intend (meinen), and thus a meaning (meinung) is an intention of the mind. And intentionality refers to both the relationship between mind and some extra-mental reality and the objective term of the mind's operation in this reality, wherein is found the very essence of being itself. Thus essence, sense, and meaning, which are to be found in consciousness, are nothing but intentions, and these are joined through the common bond of
intentionality. The world of consciousness becomes the world of intentions. But intentions as mere intentions are empty—only when this intention is justified, is it fulfilled. To fulfill an intention requires more than the meaning which the mind assigns in thinking—it requires an experience of that which the mind signifies in thought. A genuine intention must signify some characteristic of the actual state of affairs; that is, it must have some objective reference, and this is the justification it needs to be a full intention rather than an empty intention.

In his pursuit of the essence of consciousness Husserl came to the conclusion that consciousness is always in the form of "consciousness-of" something; that is, consciousness must always be oriented towards an object, and this orientation is its very intentionality, which is to be found in an analysis of consciousness itself. Thus all acts of consciousness must entail both subjectivity and objectivity. And true reflection is inseparable from the object of reflection, for reflection is but an erlebnis (vital experience) of the latter, and, similarly, to reflect on one's own consciousness is to have an erlebnis of it. From this, to be aware of one's own consciousness as objectively oriented is to have an "intentional erlebnis."

When Husserl characterized his philosophy as a "science of essences," two theses are implied: first, the objects of this science are independent of mental construction; and secondly, the essences known are independent of their correspondence to reality outside the consciousness. Thus we can arrive at the essences only after we have purified both the consciousness and the objects of consciousness of all accidental and contingent elements.
Consequently, Husserl developed the techniques necessary to assure pure phenomenality of all objects of investigation. His first and more fundamental technique aimed at removing all factual roots of objects of investigation, for according to Husserl, existence is contingent and is a prime source of doubt. This technique he calls the *epoche*, and it aims at the radical and universal elimination of all positions that commit one to any position regarding factual existence. By this Husserl did not intend to eliminate existence itself but merely to remain noncommittal, to leave this question out of consideration, and simply not enter into the question of what things are. "Existence," or as Husserl frequently called it, "transcendence, is simply bracketed (put in parentheses) in the sense that in its regard no position is taken either for or against—it may be that things exist outside consciousness, but since this existence can have no significance whatever with regard to the essence of things, it is simply left out of consideration."\(^1\)

The *epoche* is conceived as that which eliminates the contingent question of existence and, in turn, eliminates the doubt it entails. Throughout the phenomenological journey this question cannot be reintroduced, lest doubt should be reintroduced, thus bringing back the impure elements that are not necessary and, therefore, not essential. This technique is, of course, a negative device which serves as a filter. But the *epoche* must have a positive counterpart which will penetrate into the essential residue, thus gradually revealing the pure subjectivity as the exclusive source of all objectivity. And this is to be found in the various levels of reduction.

There are, according to Lauer,\(^2\) six recognizable levels of reduction to
be found in Husserl's writings, and each reduction brings a greater purity of the subject. Furthermore, only when subjectivity is at its purest can it be the universal a priori source of objectivity.

The first stage of reduction, psychological reduction, aims at idealizing the phenomenon of consciousness in that it seeks to disengage the essence of consciousness from all its factual concretization and thus to "escape the relativism inherent in the multiplicity of contingent subjects."43

The second reduction, eidetic reduction, seeks to idealize objectivity while purifying subjectivity. Here the essence of consciousness is seen to be consciousness-of something. If the first reduction is regarded as the purification of the cogito, then the second reduction can be viewed as the purification of the cogitatum.

The remaining reductions seem less clear, for they are not so much distinct stages within a reductive process but rather concomitant factors within a framework of purification. The first of these can be referred to as the "phenomenological reduction." Here we must conceive awareness as that which in no way objectifies that of which it is an awareness, that is, to regard a subject which is in no sense of the word objectified, hence a "pure" subject. Lauer explicates this rather difficult notion in the following manner: "We might understand it as a way of grasping objects: in every intentional act an object is that of which consciousness is consciousness. There can, then, be no consciousness-of a pure subject; that would be to objectify it and thus make it cease to be 'pure.' Still, 'object' is an essentially relative term; there can be no object which is not object for a subject. Hence, if an object is genuinely given as object,
it is given as object for a subject, and thus the subject, too, is given; it is a datum of consciousness. Just as there is no consciousness (act of consciousness) without its objective reference, so there can be no object without its subjective reference. So long as the term of this reference is not objectified, it is 'pure subject.' If then, there is a subject which is in no way an object, it is a subject of which we cannot be conscious in the strict sense of the term, since the very preposition 'of' would indicate in it an objective relationship. And still we must say of this subject that it is known; in fact, it is the first absolute certitude. It is known and it is known in consciousness, but it is not known as that of which one is conscious; it is simply known as that which is conscious, which is to say, as the subjective term of the act of consciousness, corresponding to the pure grammatical subject of the cogito. If the subject is at all conscious of being conscious it is conscious of itself as subject. But this subject can be regarded as an object of reflection, and in so doing we arrive at the knowledge of its essence—and this is pure subjectivity. But this is possible only through a further reduction, that is, if we universalize the subject attained through the phenomenological reduction by objectifying it. From this it is clear that by a further reduction we can arrive at a pure transcendental ego, wherein an identification of essential knowledge and objective knowledge can be attained. From this identification it follows that to know the transcendental ego is to know objectivity. Then the transcendental ego must be the a priori source of all objectivity.

It would seem that with the transcendental ego we would have arrived at
the final term whereby no further reduction is possible. But according to Husserl, the successive flow of experiences does not allow this subject to remain static, for to become static is to cease to be subjectivity. Thus there is a final reduction which terminates in the last term, namely, a "pure flow of consciousness," which realizes the temporality of consciousness.

To implement the reductions in assuring the penetration of the residue of phenomena left after the *epoche* to their very essence, Husserl developed the technique called *ideation*. This technique consists in submitting the original perception or imagination to a series of "free" variation, wherein the object is viewed from various aspects. And after a few aspects the constant element will be "seen," and this is precisely the essence of the object. We need not labor through the infinite variety of possible and actual aspects—a few aspects suffice to bring out the essence. This technique has the advantage in securing the objective validity of the knowledge resulting from the process. But what is necessary for one subject need not have universal validity. Thus Husserl develops a fourth technique, that of essential intuition. Here the essence of things, events, processes, intuitions, are simply "seen." But for this intuition to be definitive, it is not sufficient that one subject "sees" the essence involved. Husserl asserts that all subjects must "see" it in a similar way if they are reasonable.

We have indicated some main features of Husserl's methodology, his goal, his theory of intentionality, and his basic phenomenological techniques, and we are now prepared to examine some of Heidegger's theories.
B. Heidegger and His Phenomenology of the Dasein

Strictly speaking, we cannot justifiably maintain that Heidegger's analysis of "human Dasein" has any direct bearing on Sartre's theory of consciousness, for Heidegger avoids appeal to consciousness in his description of "human Dasein" characterized as "Being-in-the-world." But there is constraining evidence that Heidegger's conception of "Nothingness" has brought Sartre closer to his own notion of "nothingness," and, moreover, we can detect many points where the thoughts of the two men converge. Like Heidegger, Sartre abolishes Husserl's reductions, for both these philosophers are concerned with the solution of "Being" based on a phenomenological ontology; their focus of attention is on the very existence of "Being" facing the world which Husserl discards. We also find traces of Heidegger in Sartre's analyses of facticity and contingency, of potentiality and instrumentality, of anguish, and of authenticity and inauthenticity. But nowhere is Heidegger's influence more conspicuous than in Sartre's notion of time. Here Sartre almost replicates Heidegger's conception, with the exception of perhaps the idea and the explanation of present. In the brief exposition that we shall now attempt we will confine ourselves to Heidegger's major work, his Being and Time, published in 1927. This work, which Sartre was obviously familiar with prior to writing his own magnum opus, exerted considerable influence on Sartre's thinking.

The perennial question which Heidegger asks in his Being and Time is: "What is the Being of the things-that are?" And his original project was to answer this question by providing three sections on interpreting the Dasein as temporality. Of these proposed sections only the first two
reached the press. The first section was entitled "A Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein." Here Heidegger sought to provide, through phenomenological analysis, a methodical exposition of the "fundamental reality of existence: a temporal horizon within which the things 'in the world' come to have meaning and hence come 'to be' in time." The second section, "Dasein and Temporality," sought to carry this theme forward by "showing how the Dasein, in projecting the world's horizon, founds history."

Of the first section our sole hope is to explicate the aspects of Dasein as they converge toward the fundamental structure of the Being of the Dasein as Care (Sorge). According to Heidegger, any solution to the question "What is the Being of the things-that-are?" must begin by a phenomenological analysis of the Dasein's "standing-in" (Instandigkeits) in the world, which will reveal the fundamental relationship of the Dasein to the things-that-are. And to understand Dasein's "standing-in" is to examine the phenomenon of human concern (Besorgen) for things, for this "standing-in" is not so much a spatial phenomenon as it is essentially a human relationship to things as "utensils," that is, the instrumentality of things. And it is furthermore a human relationship of concern, of intention, of meaning and knowledge. Thus the world is possible only through the "concern" of Dasein. Here "world" clearly does not refer to the world of things; it is the world of the Ich (my world). But what is the structure of the Dasein that makes meaning possible? In this context Heidegger sees three aspects of the Dasein which engender this relationship of world-projecting concern to the things-that-are. The two modes of this structure are the eigenlich.
(authentic mode), and the unexistent (inauthentic) mode. In the authen-
tic mode of standing-in the Dasein relates himself to things "in view of
the whole structure of what he really is." Whereas in the inauthentic mode,
the Dasein is distracted by the petty necessities of everyday life and loses
sight of the full structure of his possibilities. The authentic aspects
are: realization of self as already cast into the world, facticity
(Befindlichkeit); understanding (Verstehen); and speech, discourse or lan-
guage (Rede). The inauthentic aspects are: ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit);
curiosity (Neugier); and prattle (Gerede). The aspects of each mode are
inseparable, for they are constituents of the basic act of standing-in.

The authentic mode of Dasein's standing-in, if examined, will reveal
that the fundamental concern (Besorgen) of Dasein involves a self-extension
projecting toward what is unknown and is not yet, so that being and meaning
may be instilled in the things-that-are, always in view of the fundamental
possibility that lies with the Dasein alone. But before we analyze the
fundamental ontological structure which underlies, unifies, and makes
possible the aspects of the authentic mode, we must first examine the pos-
sibility of inauthenticity, for it is within this context that authenticity
becomes meaningful, again because authenticity is in part the realiza-
tion of Dasein's forfeiture of his fundamental possibility.

The inauthentic aspects of standing-in are just as positive as the
authentic aspects; that is, ontologically speaking they are on the same
footing; together they form the two facets of the Dasein's finitude. The
Dasein, insofar as he is finite, is cast into a world whose very condition
seems to be those trivial necessities of daily life, which take the form
of "they" in Heideggerian language. This condition of the "every day Dasein" is the forfeiture (Verfallensein) of Dasein's fundamental possibility, that is, "not-being-itself" which is a genuine and positive possibility of Dasein. This condition of Dasein finds roots in the finitude of Dasein, which renders impossible a pure revelation of Being in a perfect relationship to the things-that-are. Thus authentic existence must remain as a directional ideal toward which Dasein strives in his attempt to extricate himself from the inessential. The consequence of this is that man exists in a state of impure Dabeiindlichkeit, which is what Heidegger calls Zweideutigkeit (ambiguity). This state imposes upon the aspect of genuine understanding (Verstehen) an impure element of curiosity (Neugier). These two aspects, understanding and curiosity, are referred to as "originative thinking" and "calculative thinking" in Heidegger's later works. Understanding reveals meaning of things whereupon it is exercised in a new light; whereas curiosity or "calculative thinking" merely recapitulates the preconceived, the preconditioned and established meaning of things imposed by the "they." In curiosity no new horizon of meaning is ever invented.

The opposition between understanding and curiosity leads us to the third aspect. Here we have the distinction between the inauthentic aspect, prattle (Gerede) and its authentic aspect, discourse (Rede). Here understanding is permeated by prattle and thus becomes curiosity rather than genuine understanding, whose expression can come about only through genuine discourse.

Our next step is to examine the necessary and fundamental structure of
Dasein's essential possibility, which underlies and unifies the aspects which we have thus far discussed. What we seek here is an ultimate form of concern which covers the entire realm of things that can enter the horizon of the world of meaning. This form of concern touches the meaning of all things-that-are. What is involved here is nothing short of the very questioning of the horizon of meaning itself. Heidegger characterizes this attitude as Sorge. The approximate English translation of this term is to be found in the term "care." Here, in the state of Sorge (care), Dasein confronts his fundamental possibility. The Dasein realizes "his own reality as projection of the world horizon and, at the same time, as radical finitude." He is both the very source of all meaning in the world and nothingness as finite being. Thus this revelation puts Dasein's whole being-in-the-world into question; this pivotal point of authentic self-discovery is what Heidegger terms Angst (anguish). But anguish is proper to the Dasein alone, and in this state the Dasein experiences the seeming dissolution of the world in his recognition that he is cast into a world whose meaning and being depend upon his meaning and interpretation of it through genuine understanding and discourse. Thus recognition by the Dasein of his total responsibility for there being a "world" leads to the further recognition that "every moment of authentic existence must unite care for each of the three temporal extases: the past, the present, and the future." The past which Dasein must assimilate as part of the authentic Befindlichkeit, the future which Dasein builds out through the projections of Verstehen (understanding), and the present of that dwelling with the things-that-are that takes place in the Rede (discourse) which expresses
his grasp of things." However, this recognition is possible only when Dasein has reached the extreme precipice of inauthenticity, where he flees the realities of his finite existence. And through Angst (anguish) the caring Dasein discovers the very nature of that dynamic, finite structural whole which is his existence. Thus in Sorge (care), and through Angst (anguish), "Heidegger has sought to unify the three modes in an expression which underscores the characteristic temporality of each. In Sorge, he says, Dasein discovers himself as Sich-vorweg-im-schon-sein-in-einer-Weltals-Sein-Bej (Seienden), i.e., as self-projecting Being (expressing the futurity of the projection in Verstehen) that is already in a world (expressing the past nature of Befindlichkeit) as being in company with the things-that-are (which expresses the essential present act of coming to dwell with the Seienden discursive, temporal fruition that is Rede)." With the discovery of the dynamic structure underlying the three modes of standing-in, Heidegger must now turn to the inner ontological nature of the discovered structure—its nature as temporality.

We have seen how Heidegger expresses the essence of Dasein as his freedom to project himself in time beyond the here and now toward the future that is not yet (noch nicht). And because the Dasein, in grasping the fullness of his whole structure, reveals to himself at once his fundamental possibility and his finitude, he must understand this in terms of his ultimate end or limit. The cognizance of this absolute limitation is rooted in his awareness of his Being-toward-death (Sein-zum-Tode). Only within this context does the Dasein's "very possibility to be" become meaningful. Thus every moment, every act, and every event must be viewed within the
haunting awareness of death, and furthermore each moment and each act comes to a terminal dissolution. The freedom to project, to develop his essence, endowed on every Dasein, must be viewed in light of the limits imposed on the Dasein by his essential finitude. And when Dasein accepts his essence as a Being-toward-death, all external influences and events lose their overriding importance. When the Dasein confronts this Nothingness (Nichtigkeit) of his own Being, all mundane events are seen from the only authentic perspective. Thus Heidegger writes, "In anguishing the Dasein discovers himself by the Nothingness of the possible impossibility of his existence." The Dasein realizes that his ultimate possibility is death, that is, the impossibility of his existing forever. The Nothingness of Dasein is the Nothingness of Being, which is to say that the Dasein recognizes Nothingness as his ultimate end; the Dasein is but might not be—he is finite as a Being-toward-death. And this grasping, willing, and accepting the reality of his own Nothingness, which is imposed on him by his radical finitude, is the very condition of his freedom.

The existential-ontological unity of the three aspects of standing-in is, according to Heidegger, a temporal unity. Thus to each aspect of standing-in there corresponds a mode of temporality. And our next step is to examine each aspect of standing-in corresponding to a mode of temporality.

(1) The future.

It is precisely because the Dasein's structure enables him to project forward toward his possibilities that he can anticipate them and be present to them now, which in a sense brings the Dasein's future to the now-here. And insofar as the fundamental possibility of the Being of Dasein is
pointed toward the future, this futurity must in some manner guide the Dasein's whole self-development. Thus Heidegger concludes: The fundamental extasis of the Dasein is the future. For Heidegger all understanding (Verstehen) is grounded in the futurity of projecting toward possibilities. Then to have an authentic understanding, the Dasein must always project toward his future.

(2) The Past.

Again in projecting toward the future of possibilities the Dasein must recapture his past. And to this extent the Dasein brings the past into the realm of the here-now. But in so doing the Dasein must be aware of his fundamental position—Dennlichkeit (facticity)—which is rooted in the past. The past, as it were, is given, and the existence of the Dasein is "turned" by what has come before. Thus future projection must take into account the past.

(3) The present.

The fundamental projection of the Dasein toward the possibilities of the future involves bringing the future and the past to the present. Here the Dasein is in the creative process of making-present of what is present. But the grasp of the present can only be expressed in genuine discourse (Rede). Hence, in this manner Heidegger has at once unified the three aspects of authentic standing-in in time (it is well to mention here that Heidegger likewise unified the three inauthentic aspects of standing-in, which are inseparable from the authentic aspects. Unfortunately, we have neither the time nor space to deal with this portion of Heidegger's *Being and Time* and the three modes of temporality.
With Husserl and Heidegger behind us, we are now prepared to analyze Sartre's theory of consciousness.
PART III

THE HIATUS BETWEEN THE "BEING-FOR-ITSELF" AND "BEING-IN-ITSELF"

A. Sartre's Point of Departure

In Sartre's major philosophical work, *Being and Nothingness*, we find the subtitle "An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology." In this subtitle Sartre indicates his method and point of departure to his solution of the problem of Being. And the title of his work seems to suggest the two regions of Being which he proposes to consider, namely, Being (Being-in-itself, *l'etre-en-soi*) and Nothingness (Being-for-itself, *l'etre-pour-soi*). Any interpretive analysis which purports to explicate the basic principles underlying Sartre's solution of the problem of Being will do well to first clarify this particular phrase "phenomenological ontology." What does "phenomenological ontology" mean for Sartre? The answer to this question will be found in the important Introduction with which Sartre prefaces his *Being and Nothingness*.

In these introductory pages Sartre traces the development of the concept of the "phenomenon" back to the founder of the "phenomenological" method, Edmund Husserl. For the phenomenologists the existent as "phenomenon" is limited to a series of appearances which manifest it; these appearances are neither exterior nor interior to the object under consideration. They, in effect, reject the notion of the reality of a "Being-in-itself" which lies concealed behind a series of appearances. On this point, Sartre, remaining faithful to his claim of being a realist, however, deviating from phenomenology, posits a transphenomenal being which, as it were, "overflows" its appearances. We shall elaborate on this notion later on, for
the present suffice to say that this notion will present considerable difficulties for Sartre as he attempts to reconcile his postulation of a "transphenomenal being" (being-in-itself) and his position as a phenomenologist. In our criticism we will deal with this problem in greater detail. The phenomenologists, furthermore, assert that appearances as such are all the same—they refer to one another yet none of them stands in a more privileged position in our consciousness. With this attempt the phenomenologists hoped to have abolished the traditional dualisms (that have obstructed the path of the philosopher since the time of Descartes) by means of the monism of the phenomenon. One such dualism is the cleavage between "interiority" and "exteriority"; that is, the notion that the reality of a "Being-in-itself" lies "behind" the "series of appearances" which manifest it. This particular dualism Nietzsche characterized as "the illusion of hidden worlds." The effort on the part of the phenomenologists, if successful, will obviously obviate Kant's distinction between the "phenomenon" and the "thing-in-itself." In this light the phenomenologists (Husserl and others) regard the "phenomenon" as relative insofar as it presupposes someone to whom it is revealed, and absolute insofar as it reveals itself as it is and as absolutely indicative of itself referring to nothing but itself; hence, it is a relative-absolute. In this phenomenological framework the distinction between "essence" and "appearance" can no longer be maintained—the phenomenon must reveal at once both essence and appearance of the object considered. "The essence of an existent is no longer a property sunk in the cavity of this existent, it is the manifest law which presides over the succession of its appearances, it is the principle of this series
...But essence, as the principle of the series, is definitely only the concatenation of appearance; that is, itself an appearance.59

Although by reducing the existent to its manifestations we have eliminated many dualisms, yet one still remains to plague the philosopher. No matter how numerous the instances of appearance, they can never exhaust the infinite number of possible appearances which the object to be identified can manifest. Thus, since only a few appearances, or even one, often suffice in revealing the identity of an object, say a table, this single appearance must be related or linked to the whole series of possible appearances which the observer may not or cannot perceive in such a manner as to permit it, in some way, to have “a transcendent or transphenomenal reference insofar as it refers to other phenomenal aspects which are not given in this particular intuition.”60 (This is clearly reminiscent of Husserl’s concept of “ideation”). The opposition is no longer that of “appearance” versus “being”; rather it is replaced by that of the finite and the infinite or, better still, “the infinite in the finite.”61 that is, the problem of “relating the single appearance which is now to the appearances which it is not but to which it is indissolubly linked.”62 Our immediate problem then is to clarify the “being of this appearing.”

In considering this problem, if the appearance is examined from the context of its appearing, then our concern must at the same time include the description of its concrete manifestations, for we are here assuming that that which manifests itself really is. But in affirming that that which manifests itself (the object) really is, we are saying that one instance of its appearing (one single appearance) does not and cannot provide
the whole series of possible appearances, yet by the very fact that this single instance of appearing is possible implies that the object already, in some sense, exists. Thus at any moment the "being" of that which appears always "overflows" the given appearances that the individual observer may perceive. And in this light Sartre distinguishes the "being of phenomenon" from the "phenomenon of being," which are, for him, inseparable since the latter, insofar as it has transphenomenal reference, must refer to the former. And the function of "phenomenological ontology" is precisely to clarify the relation between these two aspects. Sartre calls it ontology because, for him, appearance really is, "appearance is not supported by any existent different from itself; it has its own being"; and it is phenomenological in the sense that "being" is inextricably linked to the concrete manifestations of those appearances which, as it were, always posit a consciousness to appear to. (Strictly speaking, Sartre's phenomenological method does not follow rigidly Husserl's method. We shall clarify this point in our criticism.) This appearing to consciousness is the phenomenon's "being for a consciousness." Just as the phenomenon presupposes a consciousness, consciousness must also always be consciousness of something; that is, every act of consciousness posits a "transcendent" object (or "content") outside itself. Consciousness is always in the form of consciousness-of; it is invariably objectively oriented. Consciousness, therefore, is positional consciousness of the world. Thus consciousness, to the extent that one conceives it as "knowing," this "knowing" is nothing other than knowledge of an object. Implicit in this idea that a knowing consciousness can be knowledge only of its
object is the idea of a consciousness which is conscious of itself as consciousness. From this Sartre asserts that whenever I am conscious of an object, I am at the same time conscious that I am conscious of the object, and moreover this consciousness does not reflect on the positional consciousness as its object, indeed it is "pre-reflective": Positional consciousness and self-consciousness appear concomitantly, that is, as soon as positional consciousness appears, self-consciousness is there. For otherwise I may find myself trapped in an infinite regress, i.e., I may be led to postulate the idea of a consciousness which is conscious of itself as a consciousness which is consciousness ... and so on ad infinitum. It need not concern Sartre that one may not have knowledge of this self-consciousness, for he is concerned here solely with what is known and not with how things are known. We should also remember that Sartre's prime preoccupation is ontology and not epistemology. This primary self-consciousness, unlike consciousness which necessarily posits an object, does not posit its own consciousness as an object. Sartre seems to suggest here that all positional consciousness implies the necessity of a non-positional consciousness, and concludes that all positional consciousness of an object is at the same time non-positional consciousness (of) self. (The "of" is bracketed to show that its function is purely grammatical.) And this primary consciousness Sartre calls the "pre-reflective cogito," differentiating it from the Cartesian cogito, as well as the authentic mode of reflection; this latter concept we shall discuss later.

It was in criticizing the Cartesian cogito that Sartre came upon the notion of the pre-reflective cogito. For Sartre this primary ("immediate"
or "spontaneous") consciousness (of) self not only precedes but conditions the Cartesian *cogito*, for self-consciousness must not be considered "a new consciousness but as the only mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of something." It is a region of being involving a pure "translucence" prior to all knowledge. To clarify this notion of immediate consciousness, Sartre provides the example of pleasure. According to him, pleasure and consciousness (of) pleasure are logically indistinguishable. "Consciousness (of) pleasure is constitutive of pleasure as the very mode of its own existence, of the material of which it is made, and not as a form which is imposed by a blow upon a hedonistic material." Pleasure cannot exist 'before' the consciousness (of) pleasure." The immediate consciousness (of) pleasure is not a representation, it is a "concrete event, full and absolute," "it is a plenitude of existence," a nonsubstantial absolute, a pure "appearance" existing only as it appears. Yet, this appearance itself is a form of being.

Thus far in his analysis Sartre hopes to have established three main points: (1) things are reduced to their concrete manifestations, namely, the entire series of their appearances (this entails nothing short of a complete revision of the problem of the "phenomenon"); (2) these appearances are not merely subjective appearances (thus raising the problem of the "being of the phenomenon"); (3) and since these appearances are present to the consciousness, a further problem must be confronted, and that is to determine the nature or being of this perceiving subject, that is, the *percipiens* which is revealed through consciousness (this in turn leads to the question of the pre-reflective *cogito*). From this Sartre feels he has
provided an adequate basis for both knowledge and self-consciousness.

The next question which Sartre must ask is: "Is the 'transphenomenal' being actually the being which the phenomenon of being refers?" To phrase it differently, "Is consciousness sufficient to provide the foundation for the appearance qua appearance?" To answer this question we must first recognize the fact that just as there must be a being of the percipi (perceived thing), there must also be a being of the percipiensa (perceiving consciousness), lest we fall into the solipsistic position of having to identify the object with the consciousness of the object, whereby the object as such would simply vanish. The being of the known must be distinct from the being of the knower. But insofar as the phenomenon must always appear to and for a consciousness (percipiens), and must at the same time be the manifestations of the object (percipi) as appearing, it seems that the being (esse) of the phenomenon resides in neither the percipi nor the percipiensa, but rather demands both for its being.

We have seen that the notion of the "intentionality" demands that consciousness must always be conscious of something other than itself. Thus, in every act of consciousness there must be a "transcendental" constituent. Hence, the problem of being cannot be found in a concept of consciousness alone. Consciousness (of) self, we concluded, is non-positional; that is, it does not posit itself as an object, and moreover, it is revealed through reference to positional consciousness which is always object oriented, which is to say, positional consciousness emerges as not-self, for it invariably refers to the other-than-self. This transphenomenal reference or not-self cannot be detached from its "appearances" as phenomenon. And
the revelation of the transphenomenal being, being-other-than-consciousness, is possible only because it exists, in some sense, independent of the consciousness of it. Thus Sartre writes: "Consciousness is a being for which it is, in its being a question of its being insofar as this being implies a being other than itself," and "The transphenomenal being of what exists for consciousness exists in itself." Then the existent which is revealed as appearance to consciousness must have its own being, for its appearing to consciousness is possible only because it rests on the foundation of its own being. Were it otherwise, the existent would dissolve in consciousness and would not be able to appear to consciousness as something other than consciousness. As consciousness directs itself toward an object, it "transcends" the existent as merely "ontic" phenomenon, that is, the consciousness "transcends" the existent as merely appearing toward the existent as an intelligible object. This means precisely that consciousness in transcending the ontic aspect of the existent captures the meaning or sense of the transphenomenal being. Here again we see how the phenomenon of being and the transphenomenal being are inextricably related. From this we can conclude that the phenomenon of Being is founded on Being, and the phenomenon of Being is Being only insofar as it is revealed to consciousness. At this point we must make a preliminary distinction between Being as transphenomenal being and the being of consciousness. In the later chapters Sartre refers to the being of consciousness as "Being-for-itself" (l'être-pour-soi) in contrast and opposition to the "Being-in-itself" (l'être-en-soi) of the phenomenon. Clearly, that this is possible for Sartre is the consequence of his notion of consciousness as that which emerges as other-than-the-
being-of-the-phenomenon which is revealed as appearing to consciousness. Here we see, in embryo, Sartre's original and possibly his most important theory, namely, the opposition between Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself which is engendered through the innermost constitution peculiar to consciousness alone. In other words, consciousness always emerges only as a form of being which is not the transphenomenal being. This opposition and tension will be kept alive throughout the entire six hundred and fifty-two pages of his *Being and Nothingness*. And it is indeed Sartre's primary concern to show that the Being-for-itself continually strives for an unattainable synthesis with the Being-in-itself, and furthermore, it is because the Being-for-itself can detach itself from Being-in-itself, thus generating a hiatus, that Being-for-itself can come into a meaningful relationship with Being-in-itself.

In the concluding pages of his Introduction Sartre provides a brief analysis of Being-in-itself. For him Being-in-itself is neither "created" nor does it "create itself"; it is neither passive nor active; neither affirmative nor negative; it simply is. "It is an immanence which cannot be made real, an affirmation which cannot be affirmed, an activity which cannot act, because it is clogged (enmante) in itself." Being simply is in itself; it is "opaque" to itself because it is full of itself. Being is what it is, it is "massive" and "full" being. Thus, Being-in-itself is absolutely contingent, neither derivable from possibility nor reducible to necessity; it simply is: it is superfluous (de trop). "Uncreated, without reason for being, without any connexion with any other being, Being-in-itself is de trop (superfluous) for eternity .... Being is. Being
is in itself. Being is what it is." The reason why Sartre characterizes Being-in-itself as radically contingent will become clear as we continue with our exposition. Insofar as Being-for-itself, which is nothing else than the revelation of Being-in-itself, and Being-in-itself wherein all being is concentrated, must be related to Being in general; that is, they constitute the two regions of Being, we must examine both of these regions of Being. Let us first turn to Being-for-itself, or human consciousness.
B. The Two Regions of Being

1. For-itself

   a. The Theory and Forms of Negation.

At this point in his inquiry Sartre has apparently reached an impasse. He has so far distinguished the two modes of Being: the For-itself, which as such, is devoid of being, and the In-itself, which is full and massive being. He must now establish the relation between these two modes of being which for him is "an original emergence and is a part of the very structure of these beings." He must now concern himself with the following questions: (1) "What is the synthetic relation we call being-in-the-world?" and (2) "What must man and the world be in order for a relation between them be possible?" The answer to these interdependent questions must be sought in an investigation of different types of human conduct; consequently, Sartre begins by examining the three notions, namely, interrogation, apprehension of destruction, and negative judgment. Let us look briefly into each.

(1) Interrogation. Every question presupposes a being who questions and a being which is questioned, and furthermore every question presupposes an ignorance on the part of the being who questions. This ignorance is for Sartre a pure "non-being" in the consciousness of the being who questions. But when I ask the question "Is my pencil on the table?" the negative answer (my pencil is not on the table) implies another form of "non-being." This Sartre describes as the "non-being of being in transcendent being." Thus the question is a "bridge set up between two non-beings: the non-being of knowing in man, the non-being of being in transcendent being." And finally, if the answer is affirmative, a third non-
being is introduced. The fact that I assert that the pencil is on the

table presupposes the recognition of the pencil if it were in fact on the
table, but this recognition is only possible through the elimination of
what it is not. Thus even an affirmative reply imposes this third form
of non-being which Sartre calls the "non-being of limitation."

(2) Apprehension of Destruction. We found in interrogation the pres-
ence of pure non-being; however, non-being is not limited to interrogation
but is present in the prehension of the structure of destruction. In the
destruction of a bottle, it is reduced to pieces of glass. Here destruc-
tion means "change" in the presence of a human witness. This is, of course,
not to suggest that there could be no destruction in the absence of a human
consciousness to witness the destruction. What it means here is that in
the strict sense, disorganization or destruction supposes organization and
order which is possible only when there is a human consciousness viewing,
organizing, and ordering things. The notion of apprehension of destruct-
tion is meaningful only when both states, prior and posterior to the event
of destruction, are known to the human consciousness. Then in this sense
we may say that the destruction or annihilation of a form A is a form of
non-being which is possible only as it appears to a human consciousness.

(3) Negative Judgment. Let us take the case where I recall placing my
pencil on the desk, and someone placed it elsewhere, say, on the bureau;
as I return to my desk and look for the pencil, I judge: my pencil is not
on the desk. By this very judgment that I claim something is not, namely
the pencil is not on the desk, a non-being is thereby introduced. This
non-being, however, is not derived from negative judgment; rather, negative
judgment is derived from non-being. (Sartre obviously derived this idea from Heidegger's essay on "What Is Metaphysics?") Thus the notions of interrogation, destruction, and negative judgment each introduces its particular form or forms of non-being, and, according to Sartre, the source of all non-being is to be found in the For-itself, that is, the human consciousness which all three notions presuppose. Before we elaborate on Sartre's concept of non-being, let us first look into the positions which Sartre rejects; these are the dialectical concept of nothingness of Hegel and the phenomenological concept of nothingness of Heidegger.

According to Sartre, Hegel conceives of pure being and pure non-being as "two abstractions which could be reunited only on the basis of concrete realities." and "the true concrete is the Existent with its essence: it is the totality produced by the synthetic integration of all the abstract moments which are surpassed in it by requiring their complement." Hegel follows Spinoza's *omnis determinatio est negatio* and asserts that all being receives its determination from non-being, in which case non-being is inserted into being itself. Hegel writes: "This pure Being is pure abstraction and consequently absolute negation, which taken in its immediate moment is also non-being." We must conclude, then, for Hegel pure being and pure non-being are the same thing. Or more accurately, Hegel has inserted non-being in being itself, all being is at the same time non-being. Sartre explicitly rejects this position; he, on the contrary, claims that non-being is outside being; being is invariable prior to non-being. We shall soon see how this explanation is possible for Sartre.

Heidegger, on the other hand, as we have seen, stresses the tension
between being and non-being. Each of these is regarded as an antagonistic force, and their mutual repulsion engenders the real. In his analysis of various modes of human conduct (hate, prohibition, regret, etc.) Heidegger concludes that each mode includes the apprehension, under one form or another, of nothingness. And the human attitude which engenders the fundamental confrontation of nothingness is anguish (Angst) wherein the Dasein recognizes himself as a being-toward-death (Sein-zum-Tode, radical finitude) and the contingency of the world. Human reality emerges from an awareness of what his being is in the face of what he is not. And the world as contingent can be disclosed only by human reality, which, in this sense, imposes the contingent dimension on the world. Human reality as it realizes the world as contingent, raises the question: "How does it happen that there is something rather than nothing?" and in so doing it recognizes the world as "suspended" in nothingness....

Both these positions are unacceptable to Sartre, for they have overlooked the structure of the mind, wherein alone the origin of non-being is found. We must, however, recognize that Heidegger's position has brought us closer to Sartre's position. Heidegger, while explaining the more basic modes of nothingness, failed to account for the less significant modes, such as "the pencil is not on the table," "the unicorn does not exist," etc. But since very negation ("negatities") is supported by being, and furthermore, each negation is the intrinsic constituent of the reality of being as revealed to the subject, clearly, then, we cannot ignore these "minor" negations.

Sartre, then, asserts against Hegel that non-being is "outside" of being
but, nevertheless, always appears against a background of being. But what is it that makes this non-being possible? What is it that generates this non-being and by which non-being "happens to things?" We have seen that whatever appears must always appear to a consciousness, and that Being-in-itself simply is, that is, it is neither passive nor active. Furthermore, Sartre asserts that in knowing the consciousness knows what it knows by eliminating all that which is not what it knows. Consequently, in knowing, consciousness introduces negation. Hence, non-being must find its origin in the For-itself. Earlier we concluded that destruction, insofar as we consider this notion to imply "change," i.e., form A is destroyed if it has been changed to another form B, introduces non-being. By this Sartre meant that only human consciousness can understand annihilation of, say, a form A. Sartre seems to suggest that to understand destruction, that is destruction if it is to be meaningful, we must presuppose the presence of a human consciousness, rather than the idea that no destruction is possible in the absence of a human witness. Again in negative judgment non-being is exposed, for to make the judgment that "my pencil is not on the table" is to assume that I would recognize my pencil if I should see it; and this recognition is possible only by eliminating all that which is not my pencil. Thus, for Sartre, it is from human consciousness wherein all non-being emerge, and, in fact, every act of knowledge implies the nihilating power of the For-itself. The For-itself, then, continuously generates non-being through which it can organize, limit, and order the universe.

The next question put to Sartre with particular urgency is: What is the nature of human consciousness such that nothingness comes to things?
This power to nihilate, to generate non-being is a peculiar characteristic of the human consciousness alone and is called "neantisation." The approximate English translation of this term could be either "nihilation," "negation," or "noughting." In its activity of negation the human consciousness, or the For-itself, is viewed as that which is "outside" of the Being-in-itself. The For-itself, unlike the In-itself, is not massive, dense, or full being. It is, if you will, a hole in Being-in-itself ("un trou dans l'être"). Were it otherwise, this negating capacity would vanish.

For according to Sartre, only "what is not" is able to understand "what is." This simply means only "what is not Being-in-itself" is able to apprehend "what is Being-in-itself." Thus Sartre concludes, Being-for-itself is not Being-in-itself, "it is its own non-being." Let us here recall Sartre's previous conclusion: every question in essence posits the possibility of a negative reply. Then it is always possible that the being in question may unveil itself as a Nothingness, and consequently the questioner in realizing this nihilating withdrawal in relation to the given must view the presentation as perpetually fluctuating between being and Nothingness. It is essential, therefore, that the questioner has the permanent possibility of disassociating himself from the causal series which constitutes being and which can produce only being.

The questioner (For-itself) then, must be isolated, detached, disengaged from and outside of Being-in-itself if he is to have the possibility of bringing forth non-being. He must, therefore, lie outside of the deterministic framework that characterizes the world. In sum, human consciousness must be free; freedom must be the being of consciousness. In this context
then, just as my past is not the condition of my present, my present is not the condition of my future. My past does not determine my present because there is "nothing" in me which lends itself to determination.  

Then, according to Sartre, what I was is not the foundation of what I am any more than what I am is the foundation of what I shall be.

This freedom which manifests itself and of which we are conscious emerges from our consciousness of anguish ("angoisse"). As I face the possibilities, my possibilities, which I alone can determine, I am anguished. Anguish is nothing other than this fear which is induced in me as I confront my possibilities in the light of the responsibilities entailed in my determining these possibilities.

Before we proceed further in our exposition, let us here recapitulate Sartre's main contentions. First, we may say that non-being and negation under the various forms we have examined, namely, interrogation, destruction, and negative judgment, find their origin in the form of Nothingness inherent in the heart of consciousness itself. Thus, it is in the absolute and pure subjectivity of human consciousness that the origin of non-being which we ascribe to things is found. Secondly, this power of "nihiliation" or "nihilating withdrawal" of the For-itself, which continuously generates non-being into the world, is known as "neantisation." And every judgment and act of knowledge is in some form a "neantisation" (negation). Thirdly, since human consciousness can generate non-being, it is a characteristic of the human consciousness that it is its own non-being, its own nihilation. Fourthly, insofar as the For-itself generates non-being, it itself must lie "outside" of being (Being-in-itself), and this means precisely that it is
free, that is, it is disengaged from the causal order of Being-in-itself. The For-itself, then, is freedom. At this point it must be apparent to the reader that Sartre uses the terms "For-itself," "human reality," "human consciousness," "Nothingness," "consciousness" and to a certain extent even "nihilation" synonomously. Nihilation, however, as we shall see later, is the act by which the For-itself projects toward the In-itself, and Sartre frequently adopts the term "ecstasy" to designate this act. Ecstasy, as it were, is the act by which the For-itself escapes from itself toward the Being-in-itself, in knowing, desiring, judging, etc.

From this peripheral exposition we can already detect the radical separation between the two regions of Being in Sartre's system. This opposition will be subject to further emphasis as we proceed along our exposition. Our next step is to show how Sartre, through his notion of bad faith shows how the For-itself in its very being is permeated with nothingness.

b. Bad Faith

In our previous discussion we have concluded that consciousness for Sartre is "a being such that in its being, its being is in question insofar as this being implies a being other than itself,"99 And with our analysis of the theory and the forms of negation, we were led to the conclusion that Sartre sees consciousness as a being "the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being."100 But this does not suffice, for the human consciousness is not only the being by whom "negations" are disclosed in the world; it is also the being who "can take negative attitudes with respect to himself."101 Moreover, "it constitutes itself in its own
flesh as the nililation of a possibility which another human reality projects as its possibility. Thus, when a prisoner attempts to escape, he regards the policeman guarding the gate as a Not. Indeed some men (e.g., caretakers, overseers, goalers) are constantly regarded as Not to the extent that the Not is inherent in their very subjectivities which they establish as a perpetual negation. Other attitudes, such as irony, penetrate even deeper into the consciousness. In irony a man negates what he posits; he makes an affirmation which demands itself to be understood as a negation; "he creates a positive object which has no being other than its own nothingness." This form of subtle behavior leads to the following question: What is the being of consciousness which has the possibility of denying itself? This kind of behavior, however, does not lend itself to generalization. It appears then the best approach would be to examine one attitude which is essential to human reality and, as such, it directs its negation toward itself. This is the attitude of bad faith (mauvaise foi).

Bad faith, unlike the general form of falsehood, is directed toward oneself. The essence of a lie or falsehood supposes that the person uttering the lie is in complete possession of the truth. Its aim is to deceive the other person toward whom the lie is directed. Lie as such does not involve the inner structure of present consciousness, for all the negations which constitute it bear on objects which are removed from consciousness; these objects do not exist, they are transcendent. Here, of course, we are speaking of the ideal lie, wherein the liar is not the victim of his own lie. Frequently, however, the liar is, to a certain degree
a victim of his own lie, that is, he tries to convince himself of his own lie. These more common forms of lie appear somewhere between the ideal lie and bad faith. In bad faith the lie is directed toward oneself. Usually the person who is practicing bad faith is covering with an opaque screen some unpleasant truth, or else he is presenting as truth some pleasant untruth. Here there does not exist the duality of the deceiver and the deceived, both the deceiver and the deceived are one and the same subject, it implies in essence the unity of a single consciousness. Thus the deceiver must know in his capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from him in his capacity as the one deceived. Moreover, the deceiver must know the truth exactly in order to conceal it more carefully and he does this "in the unitary structure of a single project." But how is it possible that the lie should still subsist when the duality which conditions it has vanished? And since bad faith demands of the person afflicted with this condition to be conscious (of) his bad faith, it would seem that to the extent he is conscious (of) his bad faith he is in good faith. It would appear that bad faith on principle obviates itself. For Sartre, however, these difficulties are not as crippling as they might appear at first glance. Indeed, bad faith is very precarious, it is "metastable" (unstable, subject to sudden change) and fluctuates between good faith and "cynicism" (the deliberate attempt to deceive oneself—an extreme form of bad faith), but nevertheless, it presents an autonomous and durable form. A person who lives in bad faith may have occasional awakenings to his own "cynicism" or good faith, yet there is still this prevalent characteristic to his life.
This paradox of bad faith does not lend itself to the sort of psychoanalytical explication provided by the dualism of the Ego and the Id. The dissimulation of bad faith supposes the unity of a single psychic organism in which the same thing is veiled and unveiled, known and unknown, accepted and at the same time rejected. The duality of Ego and the Id favored by the psychoanalysts is seen to replace the duality of the deceived and the deceiver, and this Sartre does not allow, for the notion of bad faith supposes psychic unity in human consciousness. Dualism then, is altogether inadequate to explain that which essentially supposes unity.

For purposes of clarification we shall examine the patterns of bad faith and attempt a description of them. In this regard, therefore, we must seek to answer the question: "What must be the being of man if he is to be capable of bad faith?"

A typical example of bad faith is when a woman who consents to go out with a man for the first time, well aware of his intentions, yet ignoring these his less noble intentions. The man's conduct, discreet or otherwise, may be conducive of certain conclusions which the woman may refuse to recognize. And her interpretation of his conduct is subjectively imposed; she conjures up the interpretation to suit her modest temperament; she procrastinates the urgent need for a decision while in constant recognition of the unavoidable eventual confrontation with her choice. She evaluates the actions and the conduct of the man at face value, that is, as Being-in-itself; she reflects only on the superficial and refuses to acknowledge that which is ostensively concealed. And finally she rejects herself as that which stimulated the conduct in the man, and instead realizes
herself as not being her own body but rather as an object, a Being-in-itself. Thus, she is at once transcendence and facticity; transcendence insofar as she surpasses herself as not being herself, and facticity insofar as she realizes herself as an object and interprets at face value only the overt conduct of the man. These two properties are coordinated and realized in bad faith such that one necessarily implies the other. And because in bad faith is manifest the property of transcendence, its aim becomes that of establishing the notion that "I am not what I am." In transcendence the self regards itself as a thing and tries to flee and escape from it, yet at the same time remaining unwaiveringly itself. Hence, in affirming transcendence as being facticity, the self is at once affirming facticity as being transcendence. The self, then, is defined by the concept of "transcendence-facticity" in this manner, is metastable, for in bad faith the self fluctuates between transcendence and facticity. This concept, however basic, is but one aspect of bad faith. Another aspect inherent in bad faith is the duplicity derived from human reality which can be expressed in the following manner: the Being-for-itself of human reality implies complementarily a Being-for-others. Implicative here is the idea that to any particular conduct two interpretations are always possible—that of the Self and that of the Other. Although, ontologically speaking, these two "looks" have different status, this, however, does not suggest that the Self is in a privileged position to apprehend the "being," whereas the Other apprehends only the appearance. According to Sartre, then, these different aspects of bad faith converge upon the same structure, that is, the structure which demands that human reality must be viewed as
a being "which is what it is not and which is not what it is." Here again, like our analysis of the forms of negation, there appears a form of duality which is "integrated" in the unity of consciousness.

But how is it possible for the For-itself to be conscious of these concepts of continual oscillation? In this connection let us consider the antithesis of bad faith, namely, the concept of sincerity. In sincerity the self must be for itself only what it is, but this requires the self to be identical to itself, hence a Being-in-itself. But if bad faith is to induce illusion and good faith is to remain as an ideal which human reality strives for, then we cannot allow this principle of identity to subsist, at least not in this context. For this concept of identity removes the possibility of bad faith and makes good faith the being of human reality. Man exists as consciousness of being and not as a Being-in-itself. No human condition typifies him as a being which is exactly what he is, in other words as a Being-in-itself. Here Sartre substantiates this claim with the example of the waiter of a cafe, for simplification let us call him Pierre. The conduct peculiar to a waiter does not express his being what he is, but instead expresses his "playing at being a waiter in a cafe"; he plays with his condition to realize it. The waiter cannot be immediately a waiter in the sense that this inkwell is an inkwell. The waiter reflects on his condition as a waiter, he realizes that it is precisely this person (the waiter) that he must be but which he is not. But Pierre can be a waiter only in representation, he represents himself as a waiter, and to this degree there is no denying that Pierre is a waiter. However, he is not a waiter in the mode of Being-in
itself but in the mode of being what he is not. The discrepancy lies in the fact that the subject cannot be identical to the object; no matter how insistent Pierre may be in positing himself as this being, by this very positing he has surpassed this being, and not toward another being, mind you, but toward emptiness, toward nothingness. Looking ahead then, sincerity is an impossible task to achieve; its very structure implies contradiction with the structure of human consciousness—the being which is necessarily not what it is and is what it is not. With human consciousness comes a form of fluidity which enables the For-itself to escape identification to any particular human condition. Each of us is that "divine absence" of which Paul Valery speaks.

Consider now the mode of being that concerns only a single self; that of being sad. Surely here is manifest the essence of sincerity, namely, I am sad in the mode of being what I am. There seems no apparent reason to suppose the infiltration of any element of bad faith. But to be sad means only to make oneself sad, which implies that I am not sad prior to making myself sad. This process is continuous rather than a spontaneous event which generates sufficient momentum to perpetuate this state of consciousness (consciousness (of) being sad—sadness). Then to the extent that I make myself sad I may lose myself in being sad and consequently I play at being-sad. Here again nothing else is at stake other than the fundamental structure of human reality which is not what it is and is what it is not.

Human consciousness is never supported by being which is its own substantial being. Consciousness is manifest as consciousness in acting which constitutes its being. Consciousness is its own being, that is, it is the
revelation of being but that it is not itself being. To the extent that
good faith imposes on consciousness a block identity, demands it to be
Being-in-itself, to be what it is, it is irreconcilable to the fundamen-
tal structure of For-itself.

Let us substantiate this concept with one final example. The thief
who steals is frequently haunted by an intolerable feeling of guilt. He
blames his inclination to steal on the misgivings of fate; he considers
his predicament "different" from those of other thieves; he would vehe-
mently refuse to characterize himself as a thief, for this is not an innate
and permanent quality. Here is clearly a man in bad faith, who, while
acknowledging all the facts imputed to him, refuses to draw the conclusion
which they impose. If a friend should criticize his inconsistent behavior,
he may show himself indulgent and admit to the fact that he is a thief, in
which case, by acknowledging that he is what he is, he is to this degree
sincere. The condition of bad faith induces him to reject that he is a
thing in the sense that his condition is a permanent one, i.e., his mis-
takes constitute for him a destiny. With the recognition of each misdeed
he feels that he is born anew, pure and undetermined. This is certainly
acceptable if he intends his assertion "I am not a thief" to mean "I am not
what I am." That is, if he declared to himself, "To the extent that a
pattern of conduct is defined as the conduct of a thief, and to the extent
that I have adopted this conduct, I am a thief. But to the extent that
human reality escapes final definition by patterns of conduct, I am not
one." But if he "slides surreptitiously towards a different connotation
of 'being,' he understands 'not being' in the sense of 'not!Being'in-itself.'
He lays claim to 'not being a thief' in the sense which this table is not an inkwell. He is in bad faith.\textsuperscript{112}

In sincerity the thief recognizes himself as a thief and submits a public confession. In so doing he hopes to have surpassed his condition; to phrase it differently, he hopes to be regarded as no longer being the same thief whom he acknowledged as being and thus escape into the region of freedom and of good will. He attempts to reassure himself and escape from himself by self-contemplation (introspection). He regards himself as a thief, as a Being-in-itself. He hopes to establish his freedom through his confession and self-discovery. He forces his new self on the Other. But are these not precisely the phenomena of bad faith? Both bad faith and sincerity then characterize an escape from oneself.

We can conclude then in sincerity one passes continuously from "the being which is what it is, to the being which is not what it is and inversely from the being which is not what it is to the being which is what it is."\textsuperscript{113} Likewise bad faith causes me "to be what I am in the mode of 'not being what one is,' or not to be what I am in the mode of 'being what one is!'\textsuperscript{114}" Bad faith and sincerity are inextricably related, indeed bad faith is possible only because sincerity itself is founded in bad faith. And the underlying condition of the possibility for bad faith is that "human reality, in its most immediate being, in the infrastructure of the pre-reflective cogito, must be what it is not and not what it is."\textsuperscript{115}

Sartre, by his specious definition of For-itself, as that being which is what it is not and is not what it is, sought to render the inherent and essential paradox of the fissure in the massivity of being (Being-in-itself) and this fissure is none other than consciousness. As the previous remarks
on the analysis of bad faith have demonstrated, the For-itself oscillates continuously between the being which is not what it is and the being which is what it is not. Consciousness, as it continually escapes block identity, concretization and permanence is permeated with nothingness. This analysis, apart from its incommensurable value in preparing the ground work for an investigation of the structures of consciousness reveals Sartre as a master diachotitian pursuing, in one of the few instances, a genuine phenomenological analysis. The next project put to us with particular urgency is an investigation of the immediate structures of consciousness.

c. The Structures of Consciousness.

With our remarks on his Introduction, on the negations, on bad faith, and briefly on freedom, we have established Sartre’s main postulates. The remaining of his treatise, although of considerable length, is but an elaboration and development of the positions already outlined. Thus our whole task is reduced to the problem of the relation between the Being-for-itself and the Being-in-itself. We have already attempted a brief and superficial distinction between the opacity of the Being-in-itself and the translucidity of the Being-for-itself. We must now direct ourselves to an examination of the immediate structures of the Being-for-itself, in hopes of clarifying the radical opposition between the two regions of being. Our concern here is with the immediate, if not fundamental structures of consciousness. These are: (a) Impersonality; (b) Nonsubstantiality, (c) lack and desire, and (d) values and Possibles. We shall consider each in turn.
Impersonality

All particular forms of consciousness, as we have seen, must ultimately require the presence of a pre-reflective cogito. Our previous investigations lead us to conclude that the pre-reflective cogito does not posit an object, yet at the same time it is autonomous and acts as a witness of its own being. This witnessing, or what Sartre calls "self-presence," constitutes the relation of the subject to itself, and as self-presence the subject is indissolubly linked to itself. In this self persists the perpetually unstable equilibrium from the fact that this self is not able to achieve self-coincidence. The pre-reflective cogito, therefore, must be impersonal; that is, it does not constitute an Ego as the unifying factor of the successive representations of a consciousness. This notion is developed in greater detail in an article entitled "The Transcendence of the Ego," where Sartre argues explicitly against Husserl. In this article Sartre asserts that the Ego is a superfluous postulation, since consciousness is defined by intentionality; that is, it is always object oriented. It is the objects (all objects of consciousness) that are the stipulating and specifying elements of any individual consciousness, since consciousness cannot exist without the objects of consciousness. Even the constant elements of consciousness such as personal identity cannot be taken as the Ego; such a feeling of personal identity is rather "an activity of consciousness itself by means of a 'transversal' intentionality." This "transversal intentionality" is but a recollection of past consciousness brought to the present. Consciousness does not lend itself to concretization; it is pure and absolute translucidity which faces the massive
opacity of Being-in-itself. To introduce the massive and opaque being of the Ego in consciousness is to reduce the For-itself into an In-itself in the mode of self identity. Such an ego-logical structure would effect that very Cartesian substantialization of consciousness which Sartre rejects at the outset. Consciousness, according to Sartre, is permeated by nothingness and is unable to bear the weight of the heavy and massive Ego.118

In both the Cartesian and Kantian notions of the cogito, the consciousness is regarded as an object of reflection. And it is precisely from this reflective act that the Ego is thought to emerge. Thus Sartre sees the Ego as the result and creation of the reflexive act. In this sense the Ego, like any other concept, is but the object of consciousness. In the event that I am conscious of, say, a chair, the Ego does not emerge. It is misleading to assert that "I am conscious of a chair," instead it would be more accurate to say "there-is-consciousness-of-a-chair." In a reflective act the object of consciousness appears concomitantly with self-consciousness. When I am conscious of this chair I am at once conscious that I am conscious of this chair; and this in egological language would constitute the Ego performing the reflexive act. (We are here reminded of our previous comments on the notion of the pre-reflective cogito.) This is, of course, inaccurate, for what Sartre meant to express by the concept of the pre-reflective cogito is not the positing of an Ego but rather the fact of immediate presence to self. Sartre's aim here is quite basic for his phenomenological ontology. He seeks to establish here a consciousness without Subject. All Being-in-itself is external to consciousness, For-itself as such is nothing but emptiness of Being-in-itself; it is infected with
nothingness. The For-itself exists solely for the object. Consciousness is deplete of being, it perpetuates its absence of being; which is to say, it is in a continuous process of nihilation. All the substantial value that the For-itself may possess is borrowed from exteriority, from Being-in-itself toward which consciousness is directed. Consciousness itself must be devoid of all constant elements, and consequently no egological formulation is possible for consciousness.

(2) Nonsubstantiality.

Again, as we have seen, Descartes fell into error when he claimed "Dubito ergo cogito ergo sum." In this formula Descartes assumed that the Self is identical with the Self as thinking, that is, the existing Self is identical with the thinking Self, and concluded that the Self must be a "thinking substance." This position trapped Descartes in a plethora of difficulties and necessitated his postulating God to extricate him from this lonely predicament and to place him once again in the world. This difficulty seems to have originated from Descartes' initial choice.

Descartes made his point of departure from the reflective cogito rather than the pre-reflective cogito. He postulated "I think that I think" instead of the more plausible "I think of something." He did not recognize the intentional character of consciousness, and as a consequence he fell into an infinite regress having to posit a thinking being which reflects on itself as a thinking being and so on and so forth. Sartre was cautious to avoid this fallacy and made his departure from the pre-reflective cogito (the consciousness which is at once self-consciousness and conscious /of/ something). From consciousness emerges the nothingness of pure
translucidity which is invariably intentional, directed towards that which is beyond consciousness. Consciousness, therefore, unlike the Cartesian "thinking substance," must be nonsubstantial.

The In-itself, insofar as it remains consistent with the principle of identity, that is, insofar as it is exactly identical to what it is, cannot have possibles. "Its relation to possibles can only be established from the outside, namely, by a being which faces the possibles." But a being which faces possibles must carry in itself the ontological dimension of non-being, for being acquires signification only against the background of non-being. And since it is precisely through consciousness that non-being happens to things, then to the extent that consciousness implies nothingness, to that very degree nothingness implies the possibility of questioning being. But if the For-itself is capable of nihilation and negation; if it is by consciousness that non-being happens to things; if nothingness emerges from consciousness, and if the For-itself is the being which is not what it is and is what it is not, then it must necessarily be nonsubstantial. Were it otherwise, For-itself would be relegated to the realm of Being-in-itself, opaque and saturated with substance.

The concepts of consciousness as nothingness, as negation, as nihilation, as a being which is not what it is and is what it is not, as impersonal, as nonsubstantial are clearly intimately connected. If we can establish but one of these interrelated and interwoven concepts, we have essentially established the others, for each necessarily implies the others. These concepts, if not concentric to one another, at least overlap one another. And they all converge toward one central theme, namely, the translucidity
and emptiness of consciousness. Let us now examine the remaining two structures of human consciousness: the For-itself as lack and desire, and the For-itself as haunted by values and possibles.

(3) Lack and Desire.

The process of nihilation does not simply consist of an introduction of emptiness into consciousness. If the For-itself is to sustain nihilation, it must itself, in some sense, be a lack of being. It is not as though an external being has expelled the In-itself from consciousness, rather the For-itself is continuously determining itself not to be a Being-in-itself; that is, it determines its being by means of a being which it is not. The For-itself posits itself as not being the In-itself. This mode of not being is peculiar to the For-itself, for it touches the inner nature of the being which is not what it is not. There are, however, other modes of not being, i.e., a table is not a chair. In this mode of not being, both the table and the chair are left intact, that is, untouched; the relation here is external, and it is established only by the presence of a human witness. However, in contrast, there are negations which establish an internal relation between what one denies and that concerning which the denial is made. The most characteristic of such internal negations is that of Lack. This lack is engendered only through the upsurge of human reality, and it is in no way contaminated by In-itself which, as it were, is all positivity. Insofar as lack appears only in a human world, it must constitute three elements; these are, according to Sartre: "that which is missing or 'the lacking,' that which misses what is lacking or 'the existing,' and a totality which has been broken by the lacking which would be restored
by the synthesis of 'the lacking' and 'the existing'—that is 'the lacked.' Thus, when I say that the moon is not full and that a quarter is lacking, I at once presuppose in my intuition that quarter which is lacking. For it is only within the context of a realized totality which constitutes "the existing" and "the lacking" that "the existing" as missing "the lacking" becomes intelligible. The totality becomes the foundation of "the existing" as lacking. The given itself simply is what it is; it is nothing more than a Being-in-itself, and we cannot say of it as either complete or incomplete, for it bears no relation to other beings. "The lacking" is the complement of "the existing" and together they form the synthetic totality of "the lacked." But "the lacking," insofar as it is determined by the synthetic whole, is constituted in the being of "the existing." And likewise, it is the full moon (the synthetic whole) which confers on the crescent moon ("the existing") its being as crescent, which is to say it is what-is-not that determines what-is.

If we assert with Sartre that lack is possible only through lack and that lack appears only through human reality, then we are led to conclude that, in some sense, human reality is itself a lack.

The fact that human reality is a lack appears still more forcefully in Sartre's consideration of desire. Here Sartre rejects the notion of desire as a psychic state, for the covert assumption here is that desire manifests the being whose nature is to be what it is. But a being which is what it is does not call for completion, it simply is. The call for completion arises when there is a human transcendence which surpasses the incomplete toward the complete. Thus an incomplete circle isolated from human con-
sciousness simply is; it requires no completion, for as an open curve it is complete and full. Then in the case of "hunger" or "thirst" there need be an external transcendence which can surpass these desires toward the totality "satisfied hunger" or "satisfied thirst."

Nor, on the other hand, can we conceive of desire as a conatus in the manner of a physical force or drive, in effect, an efficient cause. The conatus as a producer of states cannot be identified with desire as the appeal from states. An organism manifesting certain symptoms may be interpreted as an organism deprived of water, but these symptoms are positive phenomena and refer to themselves only. There can be no mental-physical correspondence such that the physical symptoms posit a psychic state in consciousness. We have seen that psychic states as such cannot exist in consciousness, for consciousness is empty. If desire is to be desire to itself, it must necessarily, by nature, be an escape from itself toward the desired object. Desire, then, is a lack of being and at the same time haunted by the being of which it is desire.

We have seen that the bond between the existing and the lacking is not one of simple contiguity. Although the lacking is, strictly speaking, absent, it is profoundly present in the heart of the existing, and this is because the existing and the lacking are at the same moment apprehended and surpassed in the unity of a single totality. Hence everything which is lacking is lacking to ... for .... The For-itself (to recall what we said earlier) is its own nothingness; it is its own foundation insofar as it denies in relation to itself a certain being or mode of being, and, furthermore, it denies itself as a Being-in-itself. What it lacks, then,
is being, which if it possessed would constitute for it a totality—a For-itself-in-itself. Thus, to the extent that the For-itself points toward that which it lacks, it is haunted by Being-in-itself. The project of the For-itself is directed toward that perfection (the For-itself-in-itself) which constitutes the unified totality. If such a synthesis were possible, then the For-itself would sustain in itself a real Self; that is, the utopian identification of For-itself and In-itself would thus be realized. The For-itself, as we have seen, incessantly strives to identify itself with the Being-in-itself, and its attempt is again and again frustrated, for such a synthesis is not possible. In such a synthesis there would be entailed certain contradictions, for instance, the For-itself, which posits itself as a non-being, if it is contaminated with In-itself, could no longer possess the power of nihilation, nor its translucidity; it would no longer be the being from which non-being, negation, and nothingness emerge. Nor could it be the being which is not what it is and is what it is not. Hence, a Being-for-itself can never be a Being-in-itself without losing, ipso facto, its most characteristic features of consciousness. However, although this synthesis is unattainable, the For-itself finds its signification in this haunting totality; the For-itself must be seen as projecting towards this unified whole, this lack, this impossible synthesis. From this it becomes clear that the For-itself is indissolubly linked to the In-itself in the manner of a lack to that which defines its lack. The For-itself does not lend itself to the sort of "statification" which would be necessary if the For-itself is to be identified (synthesized) with the block, massive, full, and opaque In-itself.
The For-itself, then, on principle, can never become a Being-in-itself.

(4) For-itself as Haunted by Values and Possibles

The For-itself's attempt to close this gap created by its yearning to be an In-itself gives rise to another aspect of its basic structure, that of value. Value is the being which the For-itself continually desires. This aspiration, however, is clearly hopeless, for we cannot reach absolute fullness of being without thereby losing ourselves as consciousness of being, as emptiness of being. Value is another one of those notions that emerges with the apparition of human consciousness, and in this sense human consciousness must be the being by which values exist.

Value as a fundamental structure of the For-itself appears from a contradictory point of view. This is so because as project (nihilation) it is "a tearing from ... towards" a not-self from In-itself which is other than the For-itself and so helps to constitute the value of the For-itself's projection. Value, then, stands beyond any individual consciousness and haunts the For-itself as a being which the For-itself incessantly strives for and to which it is indissolubly linked. And because value is inseparable from human reality, it cannot have the substantial and permanent qualities which render it as something outside itself. Here the only permanence is the contingent necessity by which the For-itself aspires toward a form of being which is, in principle, unattainable. Value, then, as the expression of the For-itself's persistent yet futile striving toward that which is impossible, namely, Being-in-itself, emerges as a kind of permanent lack which is perpetually present.

Once again we have witnessed the notion of a For-itself aspiring for
something which it itself is not, and to this extent at least, this lack inherent in the For-itself refers to a transcendent existent. That which the For-itself lacks in order to constitute itself as a complete self is what Sartre calls "possible." Possibility, then, forms an integral part of human reality since it expresses the projective character of a For-itself which is constantly moving toward that which it is not. Possibility is realized with the apparition of the human consciousness as nihilation, for it shows that "the For-itself exists only insofar as it remains at a certain distance from itself as a being which both is and is not its possibilities." But the For-itself does not possess "possibilities" in the manner it possesses objects, for possibilities cannot be separated from human reality; possibilities provide, to a certain extent, the meaning of human existence. Nor is it permissible to speak of man as merely possibility; possibility as possibility must always remain in some sense unfulfilled; possibility always entails at once a radical impossibility, were it otherwise it would no longer be a possibility but an identity in the mode of self-coincidence. Just as we speak of the For-itself "nihilating," we could in like manner speak of possibility "possibilating;" for nihilation is an act by which the For-itself realizes its own being by projecting towards that which it is not and which it never can be. Possibility as such requires human presence; it arises as soon as consciousness appears, i.e., the full moon as a "possible" is a consequence of a human witness—the For-itself surpasses beyond the crescent moon toward the full moon. This form of surpassing is possible only because, in some sense, For-itself if a possibility, an absence from itself, existing at a distance from it—
self. Once again is the underlying implication that the For-itself does not exist as a self-coincidence or a thing. Human consciousness, then, in its nihilating movement toward its own possibilities involves it in a relation with what it is not, and in this manner it projects toward a beyond, a totality of existents which constitutes the world. Consciousness realizes its relation with the world by regarding it in terms of what it is not itself. The world as the totality of existents, that is, as the In-itself, towards which the For-itself incessantly strives, serves as a constant correlate of the For-itself's projection toward its own possibilities. We must, therefore, admit two elements; first the relation of the For-itself to its own possibility, this Sartre calls "Circuit of Ipseity," and, secondly, the totality of existents (the world) through which the For-itself "traverses" in its movement towards its own possibilities. The For-itself in its act of nihilating itself (asserting that it is not an In-itself) provides In-itself with signification as that which consciousness is not; consequently the In-itself becomes the objective correlate of the For-itself's nihilating act. The world existents take on meaning through their relationship to the projects of the For-itself.126 The In-itself and the For-itself, thus regarded, are clearly distinct, yet inseparable, for without In-itself there could be no For-itself, and conversely, without For-itself the world as object of consciousness could not subsist.

In the course of our exposition we have examined in some detail each successive stage in the development of Sartre's almost systematic project of draining out all being from the For-itself. In the examination of each negative structure of consciousness (negation, interrogation, destruction,
negative judgment, bad faith, and sincerity) Sartre arrived at the same conclusion; namely the For-itself is empty of being and that wherein which nothingness resides. Our subsequent investigations of consciousness revealed more forcefully its impersonal and nonsubstantial nature, and, furthermore, consciousness is seen as a lack which projects toward values and possibles. All this merely reinforces our original conviction; and although we have not yet penetrated the structure of the In-itself, we have clear indications of its antithetical nature as it opposes the For-itself.

We have commented briefly on the nature of this opposition, however, we do not propose to elaborate on this opposition until we have adequately explicated the structure of the In-itself. Suffice here to remind the reader that this theme is of predominant importance and that it constitutes the very purpose of Sartre's Being and Nothingness.

d. Consciousness and Time.

The examination of the various structures and activities peculiar to human consciousness has led Sartre to attempt to establish a more inclusive principle that will unite these interrelated structures and activities. Like Heidegger, Sartre believes that this principle is to be found in the concept of temporality. This is a natural, if not unavoidable, consequence of the preceding development, since like Heidegger, Sartre regards the self as the being which continually projects itself beyond itself toward that which it is not and perhaps even more relevant, Sartre asserts with Heidegger that all the activities of the For-itself happen "in time." Let us now consider each of the three temporal dimensions which constitute Sartre's phenomenological description of temporality.
The concept of "passivity" of human sensations which is frequently conceived as some form of present cerebral trace of the past by the psychologists must now be rejected, for according to Sartre, just as the extended cannot be explained by means of the unextended, the past cannot be explained by the present. Moreover, Sartre also rejects any suggestion that purports to explain the past as something unreal, or as Bergson conceived it, as a purely "honorary existence." Both these conceptions of the past isolate the past from the present, and furthermore these notions presuppose the consciousness as some sort of solidified being, a Being-in-itself. Such a conception of consciousness obviates all hope for an adequate explanation of the past.

Here as elsewhere Sartre remains unwaveringly faithful to his original notion of the For-itself, and through it he will attempt a solution to the problem of temporality. Insofar as the In-itself is full, massive, dense, and compact being, it can have neither a history nor a past, neither a present nor a future; it simply is— it is gratuitous, unjustified and superfluous. It has a past only insofar as a human witness makes reference to it. A house that was once green and is now painted red does not have the color green as its past. Only in the memory of a human consciousness could remain an image of a green house. Apart from human consciousness the green house would be lost forever. Only the human consciousness can support this particular past state, namely, the once green color of the house. On this account, however, Sartre may be challenged. One might argue that, in some sense, a nail used a second time may not perform its function as efficiently,
and that in this sense it carries its past with it. To this Sartre would reply that even in this case the past no longer is, for there exists a new molecular structure in the nail that affords a different genre of activity. And that in this sense no permanence whatsoever may persist. On this point Sartre is not totally convincing.

In considering the past of the For-itself Sartre asserts that it is but the "solidification" of the For-itself. In saying "I was angry" I am referring to a past state wherein no possible may reside, this past state, then, becomes an In-itself. And insofar as I refer to this my past I am facing it as an In-itself, as an external thing. I am never my past, but always "I was my past." The For-itself as a being wherein freedom is manifest and wherein possibilities reside, cannot be identified with its past. The For-itself is always beyond what it is.

(2) Present. 129

According to Sartre when we speak of the present we mean to be present to something, and this something is invariably a Being-in-itself. Thus only the For-itself can be present to something. The In-itself merely is. To be present means to be in contact with In-itself without being identified with it. And this is possible only because the For-itself negates the In-itself as that to which it is present. (On this point Sartre, unlike Heidegger, stresses the For-itself as apprehension of the massive Being-in-itself as negation of itself.) Here again we are reminded of the basic intentional structure of the For-itself. Thus regarded the present is a flight from Being-in-itself, for the For-itself posits the In-itself and negates it at the same time. "The present instant is a fictive 'reification'
which in fact does not exist." The present, then, is not. It is a flight by the For-itself from the being that it was (its past) toward the being that it will be (its future). We are thus led to conclude that the For-itself as present is not what it is (past) and is what it is not (future). As in our previous analyses, here again, is evidence of Sartre's remarkable consistency.

(3) Future. 131

Just as there is no past without the human consciousness, there could be no future without human consciousness. And furthermore, just as the In-itself has no past, it has no future. The For-itself, on the other hand, knows and plans its future or anticipates its future insofar as it faces the future. The future is related to a possibility which is already contained in the For-itself. In this sense the For-itself projects toward the future only to come back to itself. It is, in short, a relation and a position of the For-itself to For-itself.

The future as that toward which the For-itself projects must define each movement of consciousness. Each of our gestures is explained and specified by the future. This future is the expression of the fundamental incompleteness of our being; it constitutes that lacking being toward which the For-itself aspires. Without this lacking being, the For-itself would suffer the weight of identification with the In-itself. This is why we must again apprehend For-itself as a non-being whose complement is at a distance. The lacking as such, however, is never reached. While the past is empty of possibilities, the future is overflowing with possibilities. These possibilities are precarious for the For-itself as freedom may or may
not realize them. Thus the future as possibility, as that toward which the For-itself aspires, must remain eternally problematic, eternally in question, and eternally unfulfilled.

With his description of the three temporal modes Sartre is prepared to attempt to establish time as an organic unity. Here Sartre differentiates between that order of successive events (before and after) which can be characterized as static temporality and that progression whereby the present becomes the past and the future becomes the present, which can be characterized as dynamic temporality.

In static temporality it is the instant which is itself before some instants and after others. The instant in isolation is intemporal, for temporality always posits a succession or progression of instants. If, however, we assign the character of In-itself to two instants, we cannot establish a tie between them. The link must be sought in a being which lies outside. Descartes assigned this task to God; Kant chose an intemporal "Self" for this function. Both these solutions require of the intemporal to perform the task of temporalizing. Sartre, however, feels that he can avoid this difficulty by making before and after an internal relation which is only intelligible to and relatable by a being which is itself in some sense before itself. Thus the For-itself can be conceived as the being which can make intelligible the notion of before-after. The For-itself alone can bring unity into the succession of time.

The past as past constitutes for the For-itself its own past. Although the For-itself cannot be identified with its own past, it nevertheless carries it behind itself as its solidified and immutable background. In
this regard Sartre expresses this facing-the-past as an ecstasy toward the past, that is, in the sense of "standing out from" the past. Likewise there is the ecstasy which is an upsurge into the future, a project toward completion which is never to be attained. The third ecstasy involves the present. In this ecstasy For-itself escapes from itself as it is present to being. Although Sartre does not grant this ecstasy any ontological priority, he nevertheless considers it the basis of the other ecstasies. Unlike Heidegger, Sartre is not willing to give priority to the future.

The three moments of temporality, insofar as any particular moment will necessarily involve the others, are interrelated. And each temporal factor of the For-itself is a futile projection which on the one hand seeks to strive toward self-coincidence and on the other hand to maintain itself intact as the being of consciousness. Sartre expresses this dispersive nature of these three temporal moments as the "diasporic" mode of the For-itself's being.

With respect to dynamic temporality, Sartre considers the following question: "Why does the present become the past?" "What is the meaning of duration?" "What is the meaning of progress?" To answer these questions Sartre investigates the meaning of progress. According to Sartre progress cannot be explained in terms of change; progress is understandable only in light of the fundamental incompleteness of the For-itself, which in its endless yet futile pursuit of In-itself constitutes the source of time. The For-itself, therefore, is the denial of the instant (present), the rejection of the past, and the pursuit of the future. If there were no progress and, therefore, no duration, then the For-itself would be a solidified past and
a statified future, in short, a Being-in-itself. Thus progression in time finds its signification in the structure of the For-itself, and conversely there could be no For-itself without progress in time. The For-itself is a perpetual flight away from the past toward the future.

e. Pure and Impure Reflection

Our final remarks on consciousness will concern Sartre's notion of reflection. This notion, however, must not be confounded with Sartre's previous notion of the pre-reflective cosito. The pre-reflective cosito is non-positional consciousness of self; it is non-reflecting consciousness or, as Sartre calls it, "non-thetic consciousness," "conscience non-positionelle (de) soi." Reflection, on the other hand, is authentic reflection; here the For-itself clearly and explicitly reflects on itself by positing itself. From this "scissiparity" of reflection emerges a double being (a dyad), namely, the reflecting consciousness and the reflected consciousness—the reflecting-reflected. Thus the reflecting consciousness must in some way also be the consciousness which it reflects. And paradoxically the reflected consciousness must remain an object of reflection, for Sartre rejects absolute identification. The ontological structure of reflection is similar to the relation between For-itself and In-itself. We have seen that it is nothingness which separates the For-itself and the In-itself, and in like manner nothingness separates the reflecting consciousness and the reflected consciousness. In the case of the For-itself and the In-itself the nihilation was performed outside of consciousness, that is, it was directed at the In-itself. In reflection, however, the nihilation is performed within consciousness itself.
In reflection the For-itself seeks to achieve identity and coincidence with itself in such a way as to leave the For-itself intact. It is for this reason that the For-itself posits itself as an object. But this attempt is doomed to failure, for the intentional structure of the For-itself affirms itself as not being the object upon which it is directed. In its attempt to capture itself as an object the For-itself must surpass itself and express itself as something other than this object. From another point of view this difficulty again proves insuperable. Insofar as the For-itself is a being through which negations emerge, it cannot grasp itself as an In-itself without first negating it. And by negating itself as an In-itself it can no longer grasp itself as In-itself. To succeed the For-itself must transform itself into an In-itself while at the same time preserving itself as For-itself, this as we have seen is a manifest impossibility. "The For-itself can never be completely objectified and internalized at the same time." The most characteristic feature of the For-itself, then, is this permanent impossibility of stabilization.

There are, however, two modes of reflection, the pure and the impure. In pure reflection the reflecting consciousness is directed upon the naked reflected consciousness (the non-positional consciousness) treated as a "quasi-object." This mode of reflection, however, is limited, for there must necessarily be a gap between the reflecting and the reflected; but this is not to suggest that the reflected consciousness is merely a datum of consciousness which stands completely detached from consciousness and exists as other than consciousness, for as we have suggested, there is a certain identity between them. This act of reflection penetrates the reflected
consciousness in all three of its temporal moments, for the temporal moments constitute an integral ontological aspect of the For-itself. Hence, reflection is consciousness of the three temporal modes.

In impure reflection consciousness considers itself as saturated with the succession of particular psychic states, i.e., desires, passions, emotions, affections, and other factors that make up our everyday psychic life. This mode of reflection Sartre calls "psychic temporality." Insofar as these particular moments constitute the individual's psychic life, they are very much a part of consciousness and consequently in this sense cannot be reduced to a complete In-itself. On this point, however, Sartre is not very clear; he sometimes calls the psyche a "hypostatized For-itself" and other times he refers to it as an inchoate form of In-itself. With these definitions the strict delineation between the For-itself and the In-itself can no longer be maintained. Concerning this problem, however, Sartre seems to have, somewhat artificially, relegated the psyche to the realm of the Being-in-itself, since he regards In-itself as that which in the strictest sense is not For-itself.

The two modes of reflection are clearly interrelated. Through the purification of impure reflection we arrive at the pure reflection. The distinction between pure and impure reflection is necessary because from this distinction we can distinguish "original temporality" (revealed through pure reflection) and "psychic temporality" which emerges from impure reflection. Insofar as psychic facts appear to consciousness through reflection, psychic temporality must always be a derivative form, and to this degree it must be regarded as a Being-in-itself. Furthermore, psychic
temporality necessarily exists as that which merely is or has been, since its constituents are a series of "nows" or "those which have been."

Another characteristic feature of impure reflection is that its psychic facts invariably refer to a world which appears as a kind of shadow accompanying my existence—a shadow which is revealed to me in every act of pure introspection. This accompanying shadow may be "ideal" but nevertheless is, since it is revealed to consciousness.

The primary concern in our analysis of reflection is again to show the impossibility of resolving this fundamental dilemma which confronts the For-itself, namely, its futile desire and relentless effort to be both For-itself and In-itself; to seek to appropriate the In-itself yet remaining pure For-itself. Now that we have the analysis of the first region of being behind us, that is, the Being-for-itself, we are in a position to consider, in greater detail, the nature of that region of being to which we have so frequently alluded, namely, the Being-in-itself.


We have completed our description of the Being-for-itself, and we saw why, for this aspect of being, Sartre chose as its guiding thread the examination of negative attitudes, and why the underlying condition of the For-itself must be its permanent possibility of non-being. One of Sartre's original goals, however, was to resolve the problem: "What is the original relation of human reality to the being of phenomenon or Being-in-itself?"

And we concluded earlier that for Sartre this relation between the two regions of being is a primitive up-surge, and it forms a part of the very structure of the For-itself. Indeed, this would not be an external relation
conceived as uniting two substances originally isolated, for the Being-in-itself is conceived as the synthetic totality (transphenomenal being) of which the nonsubstantial consciousness, like the phenomenon, constitutes only the articulation. On the one hand, the In-itself, in order to be, needs only itself, for it refers only to itself. On the other hand, the For-itself as its own nothingness is as far removed as possible from the In-itself. The relation of the For-itself to the In-itself, therefore, cannot be founded in the In-itself, which as In-itself simply is. Rather the relation is constitutive of the For-itself. Thus such questions as "Since the In-itself is what it is, how and why does the Being-for-itself have knowledge of the Being-in-itself?" and "What is knowledge in general?" characterize this relation that we are now pursuing.

a. Knowledge as a Relation between the For-itself and the In-itself.

According to Sartre there is only intuitive knowledge. Deduction and discursive arguments are only instruments which lead to intuition, they are not examples of knowing. As soon as the intuition is reached, the methods utilized to attain it are effaced before it. Intuition, however, cannot be understood as the presence of the thing (Sache)"in person" to consciousness as conceived by Husserl, for the In-itself can never by itself be presence. It follows then, intuition is the presence of consciousness to the thing. Consciousness must of necessity be consciousness /of/ (the brackets are to emphasize that the word is inserted for grammatical reasons) something. Consciousness which is not consciousness /of/ something would be consciousness /of/ nothing. Consciousness in the form of the "reflecting-reflected" dyad, stipulates the condition that the re-
fleeting exists only in order to reflect the reflected, and that the reflected is a reflected only insofar as it refers to the reflecting. The two terms of this dyad, then, point to each other, each subsisting insofar as the other subsists.

We have stated earlier that non-being is an essential structure of presence. Presence entails a radical negation as presence to that which one is not, which is to say, that that which is present to me is what is not me. Furthermore, this non-being is implied, a priori, in every theory of knowledge, for any notion of an object is possible only by an original act of negation which would designate the object as other than consciousness. Thus the original relation of presence as the foundation of knowledge is negative. But negations as such emerge only through the For-itself. Knowledge, then, is neither a relation, an activity, a quality, nor a virtue; it appears as a mode of being of the For-itself insofar as it is a "presence to ..." This original act of negation, it must be noted, refers to an internal negation, in contradistinction to an external negation. Let us clarify this distinction. In an external negation a witness establishes an external bond between two being, as in the case when I say "A chair is not a table." Here the foundation of this negation is clearly neither in the table nor in the chair. Both these objects are left untouched and intact. As objects they are simply what they are. By an internal negation, on the contrary, "we understand such a relation between two beings that the one which is denied the other qualifies the other at the heart of its essence—by absence." Thus in the case of internal negation whereby I assert: "I am not intelligent," I intend prima facie to indicate that "not
being intelligent" is a certain negative qualification of my being. From their nature it is evident that such negations cannot be applied to being In-itself, and that they must belong to the Being-for-itself. Only the For-itself can be determined in its being by a being which it is not. And if the internal negation can appear in the world, it is only through the For-itself that it comes into the world. Only the For-itself, as the being which can appear to itself as not being what it knows, and can constitute knowledge, for only that which is not can know that which is.

Here we must clear a common dilemma. It is often objected that all negations presuppose cognition as their prior condition, for it is argued one cannot negate without first possessing some knowledge of that which one is about to negate. This objection has some merits; for it is undeniable that consciousness is unable to know that from which it is completely cut off. But here we must regard the qualities or thing denied as "a constitutive factor of the being of the Being-for-itself." 141 In fact it is in terms of the being-other-than-consciousness that consciousness can make known to itself that it is not. Thus the For-itself is the non-being which receives its determination through the massive and opaque presence of the Being-in-itself. By this view Sartre opposes the concept of materialism which purports to establish a substance (knower) in terms of another substance (object known) in hopes that they may be merged in one act of knowledge. An examplification of this original relation is found in the case of fascination. Fascination exemplifies the immediate fact of knowing where the knower vanishes under the overwhelming focus on the known. Insofar as the knower is fascinated by the known, the knower is reduced to
pure negation of the known. Yet the fascinated intuition remains at a
distance from the object, otherwise the For-itself would merge in a fusion
with the In-itself. "In fact the condition necessary for the existence of
fascination is that the object be raised in absolute relief on a back-
ground of emptiness; that is, I (the knower) am precisely the immediate
negation of the object and nothing but that."^143

Knowledge, then, expresses solely the fact that "there is" being. It
is pure solitude of the known in the sense of immediate presence of the
known as pure denied identity with the knower. The term that best captures
the essence of knowledge is the verb "to realize." Realize here covers
both the aspect of awareness and the aspect of making. Thus knowledge is
realization in this two-fold sense; I realize that "there is" being (aware-
ness of being), and I realize being (to make that which appears, or to
make appear.) Through my knowledge I make that "there is" being: through
my knowledge I make the world appear. Here Heidegger's influence is appar-
ent, for it will be recalled that Heidegger, too, in this sense, asserted
that "knowledge is the world."

Our preceding exposition has shown us a For-itself which denies con-
cretely that it is a particular object. We must now inquire into the nature
of the For-itself which renders possible knowledge of a specific object
against the background of the knowledge of a total world. It would appear
that knowledge of a "this" is possible if we emphasize some specific
negation against the background of the knowledge of the total world which
is necessarily present. But insofar as the totality is an internal ontolog-
ical relation of "thises," it can be revealed only in and through the
individual "theses." To phrase it differently then, "the presence of the For-itself to the world can be realized only by its presence to one or several particular things, and conversely, its presence to a particular thing can be realized only on the ground of a presence to the world." Insofar as consciousness makes itself be, in the unity of a single upsurge, the totality which is not being, being stands before consciousness as the totality which is not consciousness. The very meaning of consciousness lies outside in being, yet it is through the For-itself that the meaning of being appears. Only that which is able to negate is able to make the world appear. This negation, however, insofar as it involves the world and "theses" (In-itself) entails in it an element of externality. Of external negations such as "a chair is not a table" we have said that the determining relation resides neither in the chair nor in the table. The "this" (the chair) and "that" (the table) emerge from the For-itself through an internal negation. It is the For-itself that delimits the dumb and massive In-itself through the act of nihilation. This is but a modification of Spinoza's omnis determinatio est negatio. Insofar as the external negation cannot belong to "this" or "that," it cannot be objective; that is, it cannot belong to the In-itself. Nor can it have subjective existence like the pure mode of being of the For-itself which is pure internal negation. Thus external negation must remain "in the air" exterior to the In-itself as well as to the For-itself. External negation, precisely because it is exteriority, must be substantiality, yet ironically it cannot be referred to any substance. It is therefore nothing, its being is to be summoned by the For-itself. From this then space cannot be
regarded as an external relation, since space is that by which For-itself realizes "this" as external to "that." The For-itself through its internal negations knows and delimits "this" and knows and delimits "that" such that it realized "this" as external to "that." Although the notion of space supposes the existence of external objects, it nevertheless is subjective, for it is only by consciousness that "this" is realized as external to "that," and it is this very realization that constitutes the notion of space.


If we wish to characterize more precisely the nature of the In-itself, we shall have to consider briefly the structures of the In-itself. To the In-itself Sartre ascribes three features; they are: quality, potentiality, and instrumentality.

(1) Quality.

The being of the "this" when considered apart from all external relations with the world or with other "thises" is nothing other than quality. Quality is not simply subjective determination, i.e., the yellow of the lemon is not a subjective mode of apprehending the lemon; it is the lemon. On the other hand, nor can we conceive of an object that appears as pure and empty form which fuses together its disparate qualities. The truth of the matter is that the lemon is extended throughout its qualities and each of its qualities overlaps each of its other qualities. "It is the sourness of the lemon which is yellow, it is the yellow which is sour." In the sense that qualities extend throughout each other, every quality of being is all
being. Quality expresses the absolute contingency of being, and the apprehension of a quality, therefore, does not add anything to being except the fact that being is there as "this." "Quality is the whole of being revealing itself within the limits of the 'there is.'"¹⁴⁹ But in order for a quality to be, it must be for a nothingness which is not itself a quality. Quality, then, is revealed to the For-itself. The For-itself, by internal negations knows (announces to itself) that which-it-is-not by means of the quality. The quality "is there" at a distance and "haunts us" from a distance. It is a presence perpetually out of reach, and it refers us to ourselves as to an emptiness. A quality is not some mysterious being imprinted upon substance; it is merely the "profile" of being—to-be revealed—to the For-itself as not-being-the-For-itself.

(2) Potentiality.¹⁵⁰

In order to see the notion of potentiality in a clearer light, let us here recapitulate our previous concept of internal negation. The For-itself by applying the act of negation on any In-itself projects itself toward the future. The "this" appears as that toward which I project, and as soon as I apprehend it I have surpassed it. Indeed, the For-itself is non-thetic consciousness of itself and the thetic consciousness of being. And thetic consciousness of being implies a future dimension; that is, insofar as the For-itself posits Being-in-itself it escapes toward the future. Even in a mere external negation whereby I assert that at this moment a chair is not a table, I hint at the exclusion of the future, and thereby making reference to the future dimension. In an internal negation, however, the future dimension appears more explicitly and in several ways. Take the example
whereby I assert that I am not this chair. Here the chair may be considered as an object on which, in the future, I may or may not sit; furthermore, it possesses traits of permanence. And permanence always indicates an elementary view of the future in things, for in considering an object as permanent, I go beyond this object toward the future. In the manner that the For-itself regards the chair as an object for future sitting, as a permanent object, etc., it endows the In-itself with potentiality. Still there are other ways that potentialities may manifest themselves in the In-itself. In the case of the crescent moon we saw how the For-itself surpassed the crescent moon and thereby investing in the crescent moon the potentiality of a full moon. Thus it is by and through the For-itself that potentialities come to the In-itself.

In regard to possibilities of the For-itself, however, since they depend solely on the free choice of the For-itself, their contrary is always possible. When I regard a particular In-itself from one point of view, I endow it with one set of possibilities, and as I regard it from a different point of view, I may endow it with a new set of possibilities. For instance, I may decide to sit on this particular chair, or I may decide to reduce it to pieces of wood and use these for firewood. Thus the possibilities of the In-itself are nothing but the potentializing view of the For-itself.

Now in the notion of the For-itself as the capacity to go beyond things, Sartre sees the solution to the problem of abstractions. According to Sartre abstractions as such are never given. He writes paradoxically, "Green is never green." What Sartre meant by this statement was simply that the existent never possesses its essence as a present quality; instead, it
points at it. The essence constitutes the ideal outlines of a thing realized in the most perfect form—it must always lie beyond consciousness, it must be that background against which instances of this essence as manifest in reality appear to consciousness. If there were such an idealistic form which corresponds to the idealistic aspiration of the For-itself, it would be found in beauty. But because the For-itself is forever insatiable and appears as a perpetual "lack," this ideal must remain an absence forever. It is always apprehended as "an absence revealing itself implicitly in the imperfections of the world."152

It is appropriate at this point of our analysis of the structures of the In-itself to emphasize that these structures (spacality, potentiality, permanence, essence, quality) appear to consciousness as soon as there is consciousness. Furthermore, the In-itself reveals itself not as an individual structure but as the totality of its structures. No singular structure has any priority over any other; they all appear at once to consciousness. And there is no unifying factor in the manner of a substance which is conceived to possess all the structures of the In-itself.

(3) Instrumentality. 153

The notion of the For-itself as a "lack" has appeared again and again in our analysis of the For-itself. Here again we must appeal to this concept in order to understand the "drives" and "appetites" so frequently discussed in psychology. According to Sartre the notion "drives" must be understood as the projections from the For-itself into the In-itself, projection emanating from the essential "lack" which constitutes the For-itself. Drives are not the sort of In-itself existents which the psychologists tend
to favor. On the level of the consciousness of the world, this lack can appear only in projection, as a transcendent and ideal characteristic which the world is not. Thus the world is revealed as haunted by absences to be realized, and each "this" appears with a cortège of absences which point to it and determine it. These absences are essentially indistinguishable from potentialities; however, it is easier to apprehend their meaning. Thus, insofar as the absences determine "this" as this, the "this" must point toward the absences, specifically, its absences. And since each absence is an absent In-itself, it points toward other aspects of its being and toward other beings, and this series of "pointing toward" is "petrified" (fixed) in In-itself. Now then, these absences, insofar as they urge realization and completion bring us to Sartre's concept of task. The In-itself, although it appears as passive indifference, it nevertheless indicates a task which can be fulfilled. And this In-itself as it indicates a task is precisely what Sartre calls a "tool." This quality of "instrumentality" enables the transformation of objects into a "world" which is the correlate of the nihilation which is the For-itself. The world of tools appears as the externalized image of the possibilities of the For-itself projected into the realm of the In-itself. Thus we have to recognize the world as derivative from an indifferent background of Being-in-itself which becomes organized into meaning through the projections of the For-itself as nihilation. Indeed, it is by the very act of nihilation, whereby I affirm myself as not being this indifferent realm of Being-in-itself, that I make the world meaningful as the objective correlate of my eternal striving!\textsuperscript{154}. 
With these analyses Sartre feels that he has made an advance over earlier theories, and that he is able to do justice to both idealism and realism without falling into their error. With the idealists he affirms that the Being-for-itself is genuine knowledge of Being, but he insists that knowledge must refer to a real being. Through the For-itself the In-itself allows itself to be affirmed. The function of the For-itself consists in part in the affirmation of In-itself through internal negations of itself as In-itself. With the realists Sartre asserts that it is Being itself which is present to consciousness, but he maintains that the For-itself adds nothing to the In-itself save the affirmation that "there is" an In-itself. And moreover, in opposition to the realists Sartre insists that the knower (the For-itself) does not exist as an absolute and self-sufficient form of being. From this we are left to wonder if Sartre is as much of a realist as he pretends. It is evident, however, from his Being and Nothingness that Sartre consistently opposes idealism insofar as he relegates the whole mass of being to the realm of the Being-in-itself. But in so doing he has emptied the Being-for-itself of all of its being. Yet he assigns to the For-itself unlimited activities. The For-itself must above all make that "there is" being, and it is only through the apparition of the Being-for-itself that there is presence of time and space; in short, meaning of the world is possible only through the For-itself. The world simply is. It is the For-itself which through its profusive variety of ecstasies, through its continual nihilation and its multiform intentionality, constitutes the world. The For-itself must perform all these activities and yet it must remain an empty nothingness; herein lies the
paradox.

Sartre appears, from this strict philosophical sense, to be both a realist and an idealist, but this is but an unavoidable consequence in the development of the fundamental characteristic of his system—that is the tension between a Being-in-itself which has nothing to do and all to be, and a Being-for-itself which has all to do and nothing to be. This perpetual opposition which emerges as a consequence of the nature of the two regions of being is truly characteristic of Sartre's philosophy alone.

(3) In-itself and Time.\(^{156}\)

In his analysis of the temporality of the world, Sartre remains unwaiveringly faithful to his original conception of the two regions of being. According to Sartre, the succession of time as such does not exist. The In-itself exists "in one stretch" through past, present, and future; whereas the temporality of the For-itself sets itself along the revealed In-itself which appears as something identical to itself. Temporality, then, is nothing but the measure of the permanent identity of the In-itself. It is through time that we recognize "this" chair as "this" chair. Objects independent of consciousness simply are, and time flows over them; it is through consciousness that they have permanence (become temporal). We need not elaborate any further on the nature of the temporality of the In-itself. Our analysis of temporality as it pertains to the For-itself has adequately demonstrated the one essential point that concerns us, namely, temporality appears only with the apparition of human consciousness.
C. The Impossibility of a Synthesis

We have struggled our way through the long and tortuous road of the first two parts of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*. Our exposition was an attempt to render Sartre's arguments in simpler language and at the same time without doing violence to the meaning Sartre intended to convey. However, due to the obscurity of Sartre's essays, in many instances we were forced to use his often fantastic terminology and hence to forsake our aim at clarity. Indeed, every critic who has written on Sartre's ontology, to our knowledge, has denounced the obscurity and complexity of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*. Now that we have provided this rather lengthy exposition and have imposed so heavily on the reader's patience and indulgence, what conclusions can we offer? The question that is put to us with particular urgency is "What is the predominant theme in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness"? More specifically, "What can we conclude from our analysis of Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself?" To this end let us reassess the main point of our exegesis.

In the early pages of his Introduction we can already detect Sartre's effort to distinguish between the being of consciousness and the being of the phenomenon (transphenomenal being or Being-in-itself, Sartre seems to use these terms synonymously). Here we saw how Sartre, proceeding from a supposed phenomenological approach, sought to establish explicitly the nature of consciousness and the nature of Being-in-itself and the irreconcilable opposition between them. Consciousness for Sartre is always intentional, it always appears in the form consciousness-of, that is, it is invariably object oriented. Hence consciousness cannot exist without the object of consciousness, nor can the object make its appearance without consciousness. Consciousness is, more-
over, immediate consciousness of self, which is to say, it is non-positional consciousness of self. This is precisely the nature of consciousness as a pre-reflective cogito. Furthermore, consciousness is the source of all negations and therefore it possesses the power to negate, or in Sartrean terminology, it can perform the "nihilating withdrawal" with respect to its objects. And since consciousness is the source of all non-being, it must itself be a non-being, for according to Sartre, only that which is itself a non-being can make non-being happen to things. Consciousness, then, is the non-being by and through which non-being comes into the world. Insofar as consciousness necessarily posits an object, the object must in turn require a consciousness to which it appears; and this appearing to consciousness emerges as that which is other-than-consciousness, in other words, the Being-in-itself appears as not-self. Being-in-itself is also conceived as that which really is; it rests on the foundation of its own being. And this Being-in-itself is massive, full, dense, opaque, dumb, and brute existent; it is gratuitous, superfluous, unjustifiable, and without reason for being; it is "de trop"; it is radically contingent, it simply is. Consciousness, then, is conceived as pure non-being (empty being) but at the same time it is pure activity; Being-in-itself, on the other hand, is absolutely inactive, yet it is overflowing with being. With this radical distinction Sartre hoped to have established the basic structural differences between the two regions of being and thereby providing the foundation for his project, namely, to show the impossibility of an eventual synthesis of the two regions of being, and to show that the For-itself continuously strives for this unattainable synthesis.
In his analysis of the different types of human conduct, Sartre again sought to expose consciousness as the source and origin of non-being. And from this Sartre embarked on his venture to systematically empty the For-itself of all being. Our examination of each of the three modes of human conduct, namely, interrogation, apprehension of destruction, and negative judgment, revealed to us the characteristic feature of consciousness—its capacity to generate non-being. From this we were led to conclude that the For-itself is its own non-being; and as we shall see later, this conclusion is unwarranted.

The concept of bad faith once again served primarily to show how it is that the For-itself, in its very being, is permeated with nothingness. Consciousness, as the being permeated by nothingness and as the being from which non-being emerges, cannot be identified with Being-in-itself, which, as such, is full and massive being. The For-itself is here regarded as the being which is not what it is and is what it is not, as the being which constantly escapes identification, in contradistinction to the Being-in-itself, which is exactly what it is and is perpetually identical to itself. Indeed, from this perspective, then, any attempt on the part of the For-itself to synthesize (identify or appropriate, this latter term Sartre sometimes uses to designate the pursuit of synthesis by the For-itself) the other region of being, namely the Being-in-itself, will ultimately lead to frustration.

We next considered the immediate structures of the For-itself; these were impersonality, nonsubstantiality, lack and desire, and values and possibles. In his discussion of impersonality Sartre concluded that the For-itself as the being of its own nothingness does not lend itself to any
egological formulation. In the section on nonsubstantiality, Sartre characterized the For-itself as a nonsubstantial being in contrast to the Cartesian "thinking substance." In the remaining two sections on the immediate structures of the For-itself Sartre explored the concepts of lack, desire, values and possible. These four structures, as we have seen, express the same fundamental project, that of the For-itself in its pursuit of a synthesis. The For-itself as lack, desire, values, and possible cries out for completion and for identification with the Being-in-itself. But because the For-itself is the being of its own nothingness, this aspiration is, in principle, unattainable and therefore must remain a perpetual yearning. It should also be noted that the immediate structures of the For-itself are stipulated by fundamental structure of the For-itself as Nothingness, emptiness and non-being. The immediate structures themselves are but an elaboration of an unavoidable result of the For-itself as Nothingness.

The sections devoted to the explication of the notions of temporality and reflection proved to be no less explicit in their emphasis on the radical opposition and the futility of the For-itself's effort to appropriate the Being-in-itself, be it in the mode of self-coincidence or in the mode of identifying itself with an external In-itself.

It must now be apparent that when we speak of the For-itself seeking to appropriate the In-itself, attempting to capture the In-itself, in search for self-coincidence or self-identification, we mean to express the For-itself in its unique project of synthesizing itself with Being-in-itself. These are but different modes of the same project. This project, however, must not be confounded with the concept of knowledge. Knowledge is merely
a type of relation between Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself, and as such it cannot be understood as a synthesis.

Our discussion on the structures and temporality of the In-itself revealed to us the unavoidable conclusion of Sartre's phenomenological ontology. Here, as elsewhere, we must ultimately recognize that the In-itself in its many structures (quality, permanence, potentiality, spatiality, essence, and temporality) appears as soon as and insofar as there is consciousness. Consciousness is the underlying condition for the appearance of Being-in-itself, which invariably appears as other-than-consciousness. The hiatus created as the very consequence of the natures of the two regions of being can never be removed, and yet these beings are perpetually interdependent, each subsisting only insofar as the other subsists.

Our attempt here is aimed at establishing the following thesis, namely, for Sartre the synthetic unity of a For-itself-in-itself is an ideal and not realizable structure of experience, moreover his analysis of the two regions of Being served primarily to show that such a synthetic unity would be a flagrant contradiction. In fact the validity, consistence and significance of his ontological system require the unresolvable dualism of the For-itself and the In-itself. In the next few pages we hope to state our case more forcefully by examining four fundamental structures of the For-itself: the For-itself as a nonsubstantial being; as lack; as desire; and as Nothingness (non-being).

(a) For-itself as a nonsubstantial being.

In our expository section devoted to the analysis of the notion of non-substantiality, we stressed that Sartre conceived the For-itself as a non-
substantial being in contradistinction to Descartes' "thinking substance." Consciousness, for Sartre, requires no sustaining "substance" in order to be. If we posit a substantial consciousness we would, by the same stroke, introduce elements of Being-in-itself into consciousness and thereby destroy consciousness as pure consciousness which can never exist as an autonomous substance. A substantial predicate, then, is a priori ruled out for consciousness. Sartre's system cannot accommodate a substantial consciousness, for in it it appears as a manifest contradiction.

If we postulate a substantial consciousness are we not, in effect, synthesizing the two regions of Being? An autonomous and substantial consciousness would participate in the realm of the For-itself as well as in the realm of the In-itself. In such an ideal construction the For-itself would appropriate the Being-in-itself in the heart of its own being. Hence if this construction were possible in real experience, then we would have realized the ideal synthetic unity in reality. But, as we have already seen, Sartre argues that this is not possible. It would appear, then, by this manner of argumentation Sartre sought to expose the untenability of such a postulation in his system. Indeed, by exposing the contradictions entailed in such a synthesis, Sartre strove to render the unresolvable dualism of the For-itself and the In-itself.

(b) For-itself as Lack.

The For-itself as a lack seems to suggest that it is, in some sense, incomplete. And insofar as the For-itself is incomplete it seeks and points at its fulfillment. According to Sartre what the For-itself lacks is being, more explicitly Being-in-itself. Thus if the For-itself is to be fulfilled
it must appropriate Being-in-itself in a synthetic totality. Such an appropration, however, is none other than the synthesis of the two regions of Being. But, in Sartre's view, the For-itself is a perpetual lack which can never be fulfilled or completed, hence, the For-itself must remain a lack for eternity.

The For-itself as a lack points at its fulfillment, which is to say, it projects towards the For-itself-in-itself. And so long as the For-itself remains a lack its projection is but an ideal projection, and the ideal Being (For-itself-in-itself) is that which the For-itself continually strives for yet never realizes. What Sartre proposed to do by his analysis of the For-itself as a lack of Being-in-itself, then, was to show that the unification of the opposing realms of Being is not possible.

(c) For-itself as Desire.

The For-itself as desire like the For-itself as lack, expresses a fundamental incompleteness. The For-itself as desire, Sartre tells us, is the continuous desire to be assimilated with Being-in-itself in a synthetic unity, and this synthetic unity constitutes that very being (For-itself-in-itself) which is, in principle, unattainable. Sartre rejects the notion of desire as a psychic state, for all psychic states exist in the mode of being which is exactly that it is, namely, in the mode of Being-in-itself. But Being-in-itself is all positivity and therefore complete and fulfilled. And a fulfilled desire is no longer a desire. The For-itself as a continuous desire demands that it remain forever unfulfilled and incomplete. Then if we characterize the Being-for-itself as a perpetual desire we must thereby conclude that the For-itself can never be fulfilled and hence never be assimilated
with the Being-in-itself. Here as in the previous sections Sartre has
guided us to the same conclusion.

(d) For-itself as Nothingness.

Our final illustration pertains to that structure of the Being-for-
itsel which embraces all of the above three examples. The For-itself as
Nothingness is the very condition which makes the For-itself as lack, as
desire and as a nonsubstantial being possible. These three characteristics
of the For-itself participate in the fundamental structure of the For-
itself; they are but the expressions of the For-itself as Nothingness. The
For-itself as Nothingness, then, appears as the structure from which all its
other structures are derived.

Sartre devoted lengthy sections to substantiate his claim that the For-
itself, in its innermost being, is a non-being. His discussion of the origin
of negations, of the concept of Nothingness, of bad faith, of the immediate
structures of the Being-for-itself, of temporality and in a negative sense
even his discussion of the nature of the Being-in-itself were designed to
demonstrate the inescapable emptiness of the For-itself. If for the present
we grant Sartre this dubious claim (we shall challenge this claim in our
criticism) we must conclude with Sartre, that the For-itself as the being
whose most characteristic feature is its Nothingness can never appropriate
the Being-in-itself. In other words the For-itself and the In-itself because
of their contradictory natures, can never exist harmoniously in the unity of
a synthetic whole. And this is precisely to say that a synthesis between the
two regions of Being can never be achieved. We ought, then, in Sartre’s view,
regard the appropriation of In-itself by the For-itself as an unattainable
ideal.

Appropriation, then, must remain forever a symbolic yet impossible ideal—the For-itself-in-itself. This basic dualism can never be resolved. The For-itself, as it aspires to be its own foundation, seeks the status of For-itself-in-itself; it seeks to be the Absolute—in short, to be God. For God, according to Sartre, is precisely this synthesis—the For-itself-in-itself. From this, then, Sartre writes: "One can say that what renders the fundamental project of the human reality most conceivable is that being who projects himself to be God." To be man, then, is the fundamental desire to be God. Hence, the dialectical relationships between the For-itself and the In-itself must be understood as this failure to achieve synthesis. From this the reader may wonder why Sartre seeks to establish an ultimate resolution of the dualism in the "synthetic liaison." In this regard he writes "the For-itself and the In-itself are reunited by a synthetic liaison which is not other than the For-itself itself." This union, however, must be understood in regard to the genesis of the dualism. By this union Sartre merely sought to answer the question "How did the duality arise?" The For-itself does not have any autonomous substance to which the In-itself may be synthesized—it has only its Nothingness—and hence, the ideal project is doomed to failure from the start.

In his Conclusion Sartre makes a final attempt to reconcile the two polarities of Being in an ideal synthesis of Being. Here Sartre explains that our previous analysis has shown that understanding of the For-itself presupposes the immediate acknowledgment and consideration of the In-itself, and vice versa. And unless an intimate relation exists between them, they would be mere abstractions.
"The In-itself and the For-itself are not juxtaposed. Quite to the contrary, the For-itself without the In-itself is something like an abstraction. It could no more exist than a color without form or a sound without highness and without timbre; a consciousness which would be consciousness of nothing would be an absolute nothing (nihilum absolutum)."\textsuperscript{160}

The For-itself insofar as it is consciousness (of) the In-itself must point to this internal relation which constitutes for Sartre the essence of the bond unifying the In-itself and the For-itself.

"If consciousness is linked to the In-itself by an internal relation, does that not signify that it is articulated with it in order to constitute a totality and is it not to this that the name of being or of reality refers? Undoubtedly, the For-itself is nihilation, but, by virtue of nihilation, it is; and it is in a priori unity with the In-itself."\textsuperscript{161}

However, despite the fact that this internal relation does provide us a concept of Being which is a synthetic totality, we are still left with the dualism as it appears in the existent, which is a For-itself in relation to an In-itself.

"If we have to consider the total being as constituted by the synthetic organization of the In-itself and the For-itself, are we not going to find again the difficulty which we wish to avoid? Are we not going to encounter again in the existent itself the hiatus which we discerned in the concept of being?"\textsuperscript{162}

Thus Sartre seems to suggest here that the ideal synthesis of Being is an impossible and self-contradictory structure, but, nevertheless, if it should exist, we would know its structure.

The impossibility of a synthesis is the necessary conclusion from the development of Sartre's system, and as such we must accept it. The problem seems to reside in the Introduction of Sartre's \textit{Being and Nothingness}. Here Sartre introduces a few postulates that are not derivable from a phenomenological basis, and from these he develops an entire ontology. He charac-
terizes the Being-for-itself as empty of being but, nevertheless, demands of it a vast profusion of activities. On the other hand, the Being-in-itself is regarded as full and massive being, whose only function is to be exactly what it is. In our next and final chapter we shall concern ourselves with evaluating Sartre's phenomenological method, some of his postulates, and some weaknesses in Sartre's conception of the Being-for-itself.
PART IV
CRITICISMS

In his Introduction Sartre announced his project as a "phenomenological ontology." In our critical evaluation we must determine to what extent Sartre's approach is phenomenological in the strict Husserlian sense. It was in anticipation of this comparison that we provided a resume of Husserl's method. In these following pages we shall show that, in fact, Sartre has deviated substantially from Husserl's phenomenological method, despite the fact that he has characterized his inquiry as "phenomenological."

The entire "phenomenological" basis of Being and Nothingness is to be found in the Introduction where Sartre developed the idea of phenomena, the Being of phenomena, the phenomena of Being, and the pre-reflective cogito. His purpose here, as we have mentioned earlier, is first to formulate in some detail the problem of Being; and secondly to establish the initial distinction between the two regions of Being. Since his primary concern is to find a solution for the problem of Being by means of phenomenological ontology, Sartre began with a discussion of the phenomena of Being and the Being of phenomena. And his consideration of the pre-reflective cogito and of consciousness as opposed to the Being-in-itself was meant to serve as a preliminary introduction for an eventual establishment of this fundamental dualism.

We must now ask: "Is the analysis of the structures of the two regions of Being derived from a purely phenomenological basis?"

To begin with, in his analysis of Being, Sartre rejects both the techniques of epoche and reductions, for as a realist Sartre cannot leave this problem of existence suspended or "bracketed out." In fact, Sartre holds that
the Husserlian reductions are not the proper method to begin the analysis of being. In his analysis of consciousness Sartre borrows Husserl's notion of "intentionality," but he argues that Husserl's theory of intentionality lends itself to two interpretations: "Either we understand by this that consciousness is constitutive of the being of its object, or else it signifies that consciousness in its most profound nature is in rapport with a transcendental being." As we have seen Sartre adopts the latter interpretation and claims that Husserl's theory, in its first interpretation, leads ultimately to a transcendental idealism which would make reality subjectively created and unreal. Taking Husserl's notion of intentionality as his point of departure, Sartre develops his own peculiar "ontological proof" of transcendent being. He writes: "Consciousness is consciousness of something: This signifies that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness, i.e., consciousness originated carried in a being which is not it. It is this which we call the ontological proof." And "To say that consciousness is consciousness of something signifies that for consciousness there is no being outside this precise obligation to be a revealing intuition of something, i.e., a transcendent being;... for a revealing intuition implies a revealed. Absolute subjectivity can only be constituted in the face of a revealed; immanence can be defined only in the seizure of a transcendent." Whatever other merits such a form of argumentation may have, it is clearly not phenomenological in the rigid Husserlian sense. There has been no reduction, and consequently the examined content of subjectivity remains impure, contaminated by the "natural attitude." If Sartre has not remained
faithful to the Husserlian phenomenological method, how may we characterize his method? On this account Natanson writes: "The nature of Sartre's method may be characterized as quasi-phenomenological and intuitive ...

Sartre does not use the term "intuition" in the Kantian sense of Anschauung but rather in the sense of felt necessity which accompanies an inspiration of such experiences as 'revealed' ontological truth, which is the heart of Sartre's method. In contrast to hypothetico-deductive types of philosophies, revealed ontology is an exploitation of the subject-pole of experience; in contrast to Husserlian phenomenology, ontological revelation does not begin with a formal époche and does not have a precise methodology."168

Thus Sartre, attending to the demands of realism, went beyond phenomenon to postulate a massive Being-in-itself. Starting from the phenomenon and the notion of intentionality, he concluded that Being-in-itself is. By ascribing this ontological status to the objects of consciousness, Sartre has gone far beyond Husserl, who confined himself to a coherent systemization of phenomena. It is understandable why Sartre, who claims to be a realist of sorts, must somehow arrive at the existence of concrete and massive being; however, it seems somewhat audacious to begin with the phenomenon and hope to arrive at concrete being. If we recall, phenomenology purports merely to describe that which appears, yet Sartre assures us that the Being-in-itself "overflows" its appearance.169 One wonders, as a phenomenologist, how he knows this. His notion of "transphenomenality" expresses this same idea.

In this connection Roger Troifontaines writes in his Le Choix de Jean-Paul Sartre:
"The phenomenon from which one starts manifests itself at once as a relation between two transphenomenal beings; consciousness on the one hand and the objective condition of all manifestation on the other. Is one consistent then, with the method of phenomenology, when one asserts that a being which appears only in relation to consciousness is non-relative to consciousness? Granted that relation as a term implies a degree of autonomy that belongs to the Being-in-itself, yet is it not a palpable extrapolation to make it into an absolute and to cut it from all relations? Is it not yet another equally obvious extrapolation to declare it non-conscious, inert, massive, simply because it is other than my consciousness?... The question comes down to this: by what right does one place beyond all relation an In-itself which is known only through a relation?"170

On this point Gabriel Marcel makes the following comment:

"There is reason to believe that the source of the contradiction is to be found in the unclear introduction to the work (Being and Nothingness). This source seems to me to lie in what M. Sartre in a dangerously ambiguous phrase, designates as 'the transphenomenality of being.' Contrary to what might be expected this word in no way refers to anything that resembles Kant's Ding-an-sich (thing-in-itself). The transphenomenal being of phenomena is the being of this table, of this pack of tobacco, of the lamp, and more generally the being of the world implied by consciousness. What consciousness requires is simply that the being of that which appears should not exist solely insofar as it appears... It is difficult to see how the transphenomenality of being could be anything but a figment invented by a mode of thinking which has not yet fully succeeded in unfolding its own meaning."171

Likewise C. E. Magny questions:

"Upon what do the initial analyses rest, what is our guarantee for their validity? Must they be taken as postulate or as grounds of evidence, or how else?"172

Desan in his The Tragic Finale remarks:

"Sartre's proof of the existence and massiveness of Being-in-itself is certainly not apodictic... My own opinion is that this initial start is not a form of evidence but is something far more like a postulate."173

Indeed it seems that Sartre has relied on what Natanson calls an "intuition."174 It is clear that with this attempt Sartre hoped to have avoided
idealism and ultimately solipsism. But to depart from a phenomenological basis, as Sartre did, irreconciliable contradictions become inevitable.

Sartre's entire exploration of the Being-for-itself is partially aimed at sustaining this postulate. For if Sartre can succeed in showing that the For-itself is truly empty of all being, then it follows that if there is being it must necessarily be found in the realm of Being-in-itself—since these are the only two regions of Being Sartre admits. Hence, we must now determine how successful Sartre has been in his attempt to sustain his views that non-being resides in the For-itself—which is itself a non-being—and that this For-itself is impersonal and nonsubstantial.

Sartre begins with the discussion of three types of human conduct: interrogation, apprehension of destruction, and negative judgment. And with each notion Sartre introduces non-being under one form or another. From the notion of interrogation, Sartre concluded that every interrogation presupposes an ignorance (absence of knowledge) on the part of the one who questions, and this absence of knowledge is a form of non-being which is incarnated in consciousness itself. Can we allow this? If we accept the term "non-being" to imply the idea of "otherness," then clearly we cannot accept Sartre's conclusion. But if we understand non-being to mean non-existence or non-existent; or absence, privation, lack or negation of existence or existent, then Sartre's conclusion does not appear to be a blatant sophism after all, since this is precisely Sartre's characterization of non-being. And if we embrace the existential definition of non-being: "Non-being is the source of negation"; then we must concede to Sartre that absence (negation) of knowledge...
does in fact imply a non-being which emerges from consciousness. Likewise, if we admit that negative judgment is a form of non-being, then we must ultimately recognize that non-being emerges from the human consciousness. With the concept of destruction Sartre sought to illustrate the same point, namely, every instance of an apprehension of destruction a form of non-being is introduced. Since the apprehension of destruction presupposes the acknowledgment or recognition of a state of affairs prior to destruction, which is no longer and hence the appearance of a form of non-being, in human consciousness, Sartre concluded that with every instance of destruction a non-being is thereby introduced. And since only human consciousness can apprehend destruction and that state of affairs which no longer exists, it follows, for Sartre, that consciousness is the being by and through which non-being emerge. This assertion does not pose any difficulty, our question is how does Sartre justify his claim that the being from which non-being emerges must itself be a non-being. The problem for Sartre, then, is to justify his identification of this non-being as human consciousness. Sartre claims that "that by which non-being comes into the world, must be its own non-being," hence consciousness must itself be a non-being from which other non-beings emerge. Again he argues: "The Being by which Non-being arrives in the world must nihilate Non-Being in its Being, and even so it still runs the risk of establishing Non-being as a transcendent (absence of being) in the very heart of immanence (presence of being) unless it nihilates Non-being in its being in connection with its own being." Sartre seems to be arguing that only "what-is-not-Being-in-itself" is able to apprehend "what-is-Being-in-itself."
and because Being-in-itself is full, impregnable, and massive being, non-being cannot reside in Being-in-itself. Thus, insofar as we can conceive of non-being, it must be located in consciousness. And since non-being can only emerge from that which is itself non-being, it follows, then, consciousness must be its own non-being. Our problem is reduced to this: "Can we accept Sartre's claim that 'non-being can emerge only from that which is itself a non-being'?" Let us consider this problem.

First, we cannot say of non-being that it is, for it does not possess that ontological status which is characteristic only of being, therefore, we cannot conceive of it as an autonomous existent in the manner Sartre does. We can speak of non-being only as a concept which emerges from consciousness. And because the human consciousness is (or has) a faculty which is able to compare, to divide, to abstract, to construct and reconstruct, to penetrate the past, to foresee the future, to view its possibles, and so on, it can formulate the concept of non-being. If consciousness were indeed a non-being, one wonders how it is possible for such a consciousness to perform the numerous activities assigned to it. An active non-being is a manifest absurdity.

Secondly, the concept of non-being clearly has some ontological status, such that we can say that it is without violating the fiat of reason. Hence, we can conceive of non-being in the manner of a concept, which posits a consciousness which nevertheless is not itself a non-being. Sartre's identification of consciousness and non-being would then appear to be a superfluous postulate. Here, as in the case of the transphenomenal being, Sartre has essentially relied on an "intuition" rather than rigorous and systematic
phenomenological analysis to which he avowed fidelity. In his exploration of the notion of bad faith Sartre sought to establish the For-itself as a being which can direct its negations toward itself, that is, it recognizes itself as a being which is not what it is and is what it is not, a being which continually escapes block identity, concretization, statufication, permanence and so on. And with this Sartre hoped to have, more forcefully, established the For-itself as a being which is permeated with nothingness; a being which is in its innermost being, a non-being. Can we allow this conclusion? If we accept Sartre's characterization of the For-itself as a being which continually escapes block identity, concretization, statufication, etc. can we infer from this a being which is permeated with nothingness? In his discussion of bad faith Sartre speaks of "my deceiving myself"; "my awakening to my cynicism"; "my playing to be something other than myself"; and so on. In this context what could Sartre be referring to if I am nothing? That the For-itself continually escapes block identity, concretization, permanency, statufication and ultimately all enclosed definition is due to the continuous flux of experiences which enriches it and to which it is assimilated, and not, as Sartre asserts, because it is a non-being in its innermost being. Hence, Sartre's arguments on this point are untenable.

Our discussion on the notion of "intentionality" led us to conclude that for Sartre consciousness must always be consciousness of something. Moreover, consciousness must be essentially different from the object of consciousness. And since the object of consciousness is none other than the Being-in-itself, which as such is full and massive being, Sartre concluded that consciousness
must be in the mode of non-being. Granted consciousness as that which is other than Being-in-itself must be nonsubstantial and different from the objects of consciousness, but it does not follow from this that it is itself a non-being in the sense of not being a real entity. It would have been far more plausible to postulate a being of consciousness whose being is essentially different from the Being-in-itself (which appears as the object of consciousness) yet nevertheless receives from the Being-in-itself intelligible determinations in a non-material way. In this manner it would have eliminated the necessity for postulating a non-being manifesting an intrinsic essential structure of consciousness. This, however, is not possible for Sartre, such a postulation would disrupt the consistency of his system. For Sartre, that the For-itself is a non-being in the heart of its being is a necessary consequence of the For-itself as a nonsubstantial being; for us, however, this does not follow. Nor does the power to negate or nihilate, which according to Sartre is inherent in every consciousness, require it to be, in its innermost being, a non-being. On the contrary, the capacity to negate demands that consciousness be a real existing human consciousness, for to negate is to think, and to think requires nothing short of a being which in some sense is. We must ultimately recognize that "being" is an all-inclusive term, and it does not lend itself to the sort of abstractions of which one might conceive in terms such as "mineral," "animal," or "rational." We must conclude, then, that consciousness is not its own non-being. If human consciousness is not itself a non-being, then what sort of "being" is it? This question leads us to our next point of discussion; we must now consider Sartre's denial of any egological structure of con-
sciousness.

We have seen how Sartre has asserted, with unwaivering consistency, that consciousness is a nonentity (not a real being) and that it is merely a series of functions, which as such are but a continual negation. It is through "internal negations" that the external world is made to appear; as negation, then, the For-itself is nothing but the revelation of Being-in-itself. Moreover, this possibility to negate requires as its absolute prerequisite an internal void in consciousness. Non-being, in fact, is the condition of all negative judgments, interrogations, knowledge and so on. As the For-itself is present to something, it is a continual nihilation (neantisation). Consciousness as a non-being cannot sustain the existence of a permanent and underlying entity. The apprehension of a feeling of personal identity through time, Sartre claims, is but the "transversal" and "intentional" activity of the For-itself which succeeds in transmitting to the present concrete and real remembrances of the past. Sartre, then, denies the existence of an Ego in consciousness.

In rejecting the Ego or the permanent Self, Sartre stands in opposition to both Descartes and Kant. Descartes, in formulating his "Cogito ergo sum," departed from the reflexive cogito, and thus established the Self as a thinking self. Hence the supposition of an "Ego" in the center of our thinking is explicit. Kant, too, in his transcendental theory considered the self to be an inscrutable subject presupposed by the unity of empirical self-consciousness. Moreover, by repudiating the Ego Sartre sets himself against Husserl. Indeed, Husserl's systematic phenomenology is essentially a description of the cogitatum as it appears to the Ego which is regarded as the
unifying element. Husserl in this connection, asserts: "The ego sum must be considered apodictic."

Sartre, then, rejects all egological formulations for consciousness; however, as we shall subsequently show, he is not consistent in maintaining this position, and, moreover, there are disadvantages to such a position.

First, Varet has cogently captured this point in his *L'Ontologie de Sartre*: Sartre acknowledges the distinction between authentic reflection and pre-reflective cogito. We have seen that in authentic reflection consciousness explicitly and clearly reflects on itself and posits itself; that is, in every act of cognition, I know that I know something. Hence, in any act of authentic reflection, I encounter and posit the Ego; for here knowledge appears as my knowledge of myself as the being who knows. And because Sartre cannot escape the presence of the Ego in authentic reflection, he deviously sought to avoid this problem by developing his entire ontology by means of the pre-reflective cogito. By utilizing the concept of pre-reflective cogito instead of authentic reflection, Sartre would have bypassed the problem of the dyadic reflecting-reflected; and hence, he need not posit a scissiparity in consciousness. But by the mere fact that Sartre recognized the notion of authentic reflection, he has engendered in consciousness a scissiparity—the encounter with the Ego is, therefore, unavoidable. On this point there is an obvious lack of consistency on the part of Sartre.

Secondly, the resolute conviction with which I assert that I am does not seem to give way even in face of the subtlety of Sartrean dialectic. Although, strictly speaking, it is virtually impossible to prove such an assertion, it is at least as certain, if not more so than, Sartre's intuition.
tions." Sartre would probably argue that consciousness is nothing but
"revelation of ...," "lack of ...," "desire for ...," Being-in-itself; it
itself is Nothingness. However, it is apparent that "revelation of ...,
"lack of ...," and other such relations presuppose an inescapable terminus
a quo and ad quem which is none other than the Ego who negates, desires,
lacks, and so on. Sartre has characterized the For-itself as a permanent
lack of Being-in-itself and a permanent desire to appropriate Being-in-
itself. The For-itself as a lack of Being-in-itself admittedly manifests a
form of being essentially different from Being-in-itself, but by this very
fact we must conceive of it as a being rather than a non-being. In like
manner the For-itself as desire for Being-in-itself expresses the idea of one
form of being which desires another form of being; in short we must postu-
late both the being that desires and the being that is desired.

Thirdly, by the very fact that exteriority delimits and specifies
consciousness, consciousness must exercise the acts of awareness. For in-
stance, in the notion of "spatiality." Sartre may be right when he asserts
that the notion of space is meaningless apart from a human consciousness
which realizes "this" as external to "that." But it is only because con-
sciousness is a permanent Center that it can effect a unification of the
external objects in a spatial relation. And also the feeling of personal
identity in the temporal unity of past and present cannot be adequately
explained without positing a Subject who is able to unify past and present.
This feeling of personal identity is nothing but the expression of perman-
ence in consciousness, and a non-being could hardly possess any sort of
permanence or identity. It is difficult to understand how Sartre could, on
the one hand, accept the existence of a past for the For-itself, yet, on
the other hand, reject permanence in consciousness. With these comments,
then, can we still be satisfied with Sartre's empty and impersonal For-
itsel devoid of all being? Sartre's repudiation of the Ego does not seem
to be apodictic. Nor is his characterization of the For-itself as having
all to do and nothing to be convincing.

Throughout Sartre's Being and Nothingness he speaks of "my possible,"
"my desire," "my past," and so on. One wonders how he can refer to the I
in this manner if I am nothing. Furthermore, in the entire section devoted
to the concept of "bad faith," Sartre exploits the ontological dualism of
the I and the Other, and he also defines bad faith as an act wherein I
hide the truth from myself. It would appear that Sartre has failed in his
project to empty the For-itself of all being, and that the For-itself is
not as empty and impersonal as Sartre would have us believe.

If our exegesis has succeeded in showing that Sartre's efforts were
devoted to placing the whole ontological mass on the side of Being-in-
itself and concomitantly extracting from Being-for-itself all being, only
to demonstrate that ultimately a synthesis between the Being-for-itself and
the Being-in-itself is impossible, then we must conclude that Sartre has
failed. For we cannot accept Sartre's characterization of Being-for-
itself, and nor can we allow Sartre to affirm by means of an intuitive pos-
tulate the existence of the transphenomenal being. Sartre's conception of
Being, although unique in the history of philosophy, has not been adequately
substantiated. From these conclusions, then, Sartre's idea of the impossible
synthesis has no meaning for us. Sartre may be correct when he affirms that
an ultimate synthesis between the two regions of Being is impossible, and
indeed it would be an insurmountable task to attempt to resolve the
Subject-Object dualism by means of a reconciliation of the two polarities
of Being; however, Sartre with his analysis of Being has not succeeded
in showing that such a synthesis is unattainable. Although Sartre has
failed in his original project he has succeeded in showing the limits of
phenomenology. He has shown that phenomenology as a philosophical disci-
pline is incompatible with realism, and that as a purely descriptive method
it may occasionally lose itself in the subjectivity of the philosopher who
applies this method. From Sartre's failure it becomes apparent to us that
phenomenology is not the only approach to the solution of the problem of
Being and therefore the problem of consciousness.

Many philosophers have attempted to solve the problem of Being from a
phenomenological basis, among them are Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre, and
each one of them arrived at a different conclusion. This should indicate
to us that phenomenology does not prescribe a definitive conclusion, and
that the theories and conclusion obtained from a phenomenological basis
depend primarily on the disposition of the individual philosopher.
FOOTNOTES

2. *Tractatus*, sec. 5.5-5.63.
4. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Blanshard, Chapter V.
11. Ibid., pp. 208-209.
12. Ibid., p. 209.
18. Ibid., p. 420.
19. Ibid., 408-422.
20. Ibid., p. 273.
22. Ibid., p. 37.
23. Ibid., p. 38.


34. Ibid.


36. Ibid., p. 7.

37. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

38. This exposition is based on Q. Lauer's *Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect*.


40. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

41. Ibid., p. 49.

42. Ibid., pp. 51, 64.

43. Ibid., p. 51.

44. Ibid., p. 53.

45. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

46. This exposition is based on T. Langan's *The Meaning of Heidegger* and W. Brock's Introduction to a collection of Heidegger's essays under the title *Existence and Being*. 
57. For comments on Husserl's phenomenological method cf. supra, Part II, A.

58. Sartre, however, cannot consistently maintain the absolute status of the "phenomenon," since he posits a transphenomenal "being" which is the underlying condition for all possible phenomena, and to which all phenomena must ultimately refer. And to the extent that Heidegger asserts that the world is "always-already-given" (Desan, p. 8) he too must renounce any absolute status for the "phenomenon." Thus it seems that either we are phenomenologists a la Husserl who refused to commit himself on the problem of the existent, or we are realists and acknowledge the reality of existents. These two positions seem to be irreconcilable.

59. Being and Nothingness (hereafter quoted as BN), p. xlvi.

60. Existentialist Thought, p. 91.

61. BN, p. xlvii.

62. Existentialist Thought, p. 91.

63. BN, pp. xlvii-xlxi.

64. BN, p. xlvii. If that which appears indeed "overflows" its given appearance, then one wonders how could Sartre, with consistency, claim that appearance is not supported by any existent different from itself. It would appear that phenomenon is supported by that being which "overflows" its appearances.
65. For elaboration on Husserl's concept of "intentionality" cf. supra. Part II, A., pp. 34 ff.

66. BN, p. liv.

67. Ibid., pp. liv-lvi.

68. Ibid., p. liv.

69. Ibid., p. liv.

70. Ibid., p. lv.

71. Ibid., p. lv.

72. Ibid., p. lvii.

73. Sartre's notion of "intentionality" obviously owes considerable indebtedness to Husserl.

74. Here Sartre adheres closely to a realist position, however, since as a phenomenologist he cannot justifiably go beyond the realm of phenomena his argument collapses.

75. BN, p. lxii. Unlike Heidegger Sartre is concerned with the human existents as consciousness. For Heidegger's definition of the Dasein cf. supra pp. 42 ff.

76. BN, p. lxii.

77. Sartre has again trespassed the boundaries of phenomenology.

78. The Sartrean For-itself is roughly equivalent to Heidegger's Dasein, though Sartre stresses the role of the For-itself as consciousness. Both philosophers, however, regard human reality in terms of an active concern with itself and not-self.

79. BN, p. lxv.

80. BN, p. lxvi. Insofar as the In-itself simply is, it is natural for Sartre to concentrate on the For-itself. Thus, like Heidegger, Sartre begins with "existent which we ourselves are." Sartre's characterization of the Being-in-itself is puzzling. From a phenomenological point of view, Sartre can hardly substantiate his positing a Being-in-itself much less his attempt to characterize it.

81. BN, p. 4.

82. Ibid., p. 4.
Sartre's characterization and his postulation of a "non-being" in human consciousness presents many difficulties. This problem will be elaborated in our criticism.

84. BN, p. 5.
85. Ibid., pp. 6-8.
86. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
87. Sartre seems to emphasize the fact that "destruction" is a human term; that the term "destruction" acquires full significance only when it is supported by human presence and human apprehension. And if we argue with critics such as Jean Wahl (Deucalion, I:47) against Sartre by affirming that destruction can occur in the absence of human witness, then we would have missed the point.
88. BN, p. 9-12.
89. Further on his essay Sartre identifies non-being with the human consciousness itself. In our criticism we shall show that this position is altogether untenable.
90. BN, p. 13.
92. Ibid., p. 13.
94. Sartre's "neantisation" is very similar to Heidegger's Nichtung, and moreover, Sartre's formulation of "le neant se neantise" reminds us of Heidegger's famous "Nothing nihilates itself."
95. BN, p. 23. From the fact that all non-being emerge from the human consciousness it does not follow that human consciousness itself is a non-being. For a detailed discussion on this point see the section on criticism.
96. If we acknowledge an egological structure for the human consciousness, which Sartre maintains, then Sartre's argument that there is nothing in my consciousness which lends itself to determination falls. Cf. supra section on criticism. In this light Sartre's absolute freedom seems somewhat less than apodictic.
97. Sartre's notion of "angoisse" invites comparison to Heidegger's notion of "Angst." For Heidegger's notion cf. supra, pp. 40-43.
98. BN, pp. 47-70.
99. Ibid., p. 47.
100. Ibid., p. 47.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., pp. 47-48.
104. Ibid., p. 47.
105. Sartre's notion of "bad faith" is vaguely reminiscent of Heidegger's notions of "forfeiture" and "inauthenticity." Cf. supra, pp. 40-43.
106. BN, p. 49.
107. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
108. Ibid., pp. 59-60.
109. Ibid., p. 62.
110. This condition clearly cannot prevail, since by acknowledging that he is what he is he has surpassed this condition such that he is no longer what he is. Thus sincerity is, for Sartre, in principle, impossible.
111. BN, p. 64.
112. Ibid., p. 64.
113. Ibid., p. 66.
114. Ibid., p. 66.
115. Ibid., p. 67.
116. Ibid., pp. 73-77.
117. The Tragic Finale, p. 28.
118. Sartre's arguments against all egological structures for the human consciousness are not convincing. This will constitute one of the major points of our criticism.
119. BN, pp. 77-84.
120. BN, p. 23.
121. Ibid., pp. 86-91.
122. Sartre's assertion that the For-itself is itself in some sense a lack of being is a consequence of his previous and original identification of non-being and consciousness. This conclusion, however, is unwarranted as we hope to show further on.
123. This, however, in no way suggests that human consciousness is itself a non-being.
124. BN, pp. 95-105.
126. Sartre's discussion on this point naturally invites comparison to Heidegger's treatment of the "world."
127. Sartre's indebtedness to Heidegger on the entire concept of "temporality" is quite evident. cf. supra, pp. 45-47.
128. BN, pp. 107-120.
129. Ibid., pp. 120-123.
131. BN, pp. 124-129.
132. Ibid., pp. 130-142.
133. Ibid., pp. 120-123.
134. Ibid., pp. 142-149.
135. Ibid., pp. 150-170.
136. It is clear why Sartre adhered to his concept of the pre-reflective cogito instead of the notion of authentic reflection throughout his essay, since in so doing he hoped to have avoided the difficulties that Descartes had to face. But by the very fact that Sartre acknowledged such a notion as the authentic reflection he has, to this degree, succumbed to that very position that he set out to oppose.
137. Existentialist Thought, p. 112.
138. BN, pp. 171-216.
140. Ibid., p. 175.
141. Ibid., p. 176.
142. Ibid., p. 177.
143. Ibid., p. 177.

144. Heidegger too expresses this idea—that is, he also regards the background against which particulars appear, as the world which is plainly whole.

146. Ibid., pp. 186-204.
147. Ibid., pp. 186-191.
148. Ibid., p. 186.
149. Ibid., p. 187. On the nature of quality Sartre claims that he is a realist. Heidegger, however, forsakes realism on this point.
150. Ibid., pp. 192-199.

151. Here Sartre contradicts himself, for he has asserted previously that objects do not possess any traits of permanence, for they do not have a past, nor a future for that matter. What Sartre probably meant in claiming that a chair possesses traits of permanence is that the For-itself imposes this permanence on the object by projecting towards the future dimension.

152. The Tragic Finale, p. 54. Sartre's analysis of potentiality bears some resemblance to Heidegger's treatment of this same subject.

153. BN, pp. 200-204.

154. Heidegger's influence is clear. However, Heidegger stresses that the Dasein is lost in the world through "ina Authenticity." Sartre, on the other hand, insists that the For-itself becomes absorbed in the world through the very act of revelation which brings the world into being.

155. Heidegger makes the same claim.

156. BN, pp. 204-216.

157. Ibid., p. 564.
158. BN, p. 621.
159. Critique of J. P. Sartre's Ontology, Natanson, p. 61.
160. BN, p. 621.
161. Ibid., p. 622.
162. Ibid., p. 622.
163. Ibid., pp. lxii-lxiv.
164. Ibid., p. lxii.
165. Ibid., pp. lxii-lxv.
166. Ibid., p. lxiii.
167. Ibid., pp. lxii-lxiv.
169. Cf. supra, pp. 50-51.
173. Ibid., p. 138.
175. Cf. Demos, The Philosophy of Plato, p. 154: "Not-A is equivalent to 'other than A.' Otherness is a relation whose term falls within Being: what is other than something, is something too ... Now it is indifferent what entity we select as itself and what as its others. Every entity is the other of some other entity." In this non-being simply means a being-other-than ... This in no way suggests that it is nothing, or absence of being.
177. What is Metaphysics? (in Existence and Being), Martin Heidegger, in Dictionary of Existentialism, ed. R. B. Winn, p. 68.
178. The Question of Being, Martin Heidegger, in Dictionary of Existentialism, p. 68.
179. BN, p. 23.
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid.
183. Cf. supra, pp. 35-38.
184. Desan, op. cit., p. 149.
185. Cf. supra, p. 92 ff.
186. Cf. supra, pp. 52-54, 92 ff.
188. Cf. supra, pp. 87-88.
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4. Existentialism and Human Emotions, section of "Existentialism" translated by Bernard Frechtman; all other sections by Hazel E. Barnes from Being and Nothingness, The Wisdom Library, New York, 1957.


23. To Freedom Condemned, translated by W. Baskin, Philosophical Library.

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43. Laing & Cooper. *Reason and Violence*
49. Nutanson, M. *A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontology*, Univ. of Nebraska, 1951.
54. Schrag, C. Q. *Existence and Freedom*.
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78. Gilson, E. Being and Some Philosophers, Toronto, 1949.
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