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INTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1948

A Thesis Presented
by
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Political Science
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INTRODUCTION

In the following chapters we will carry out an inspection of how the internal political configurations, institutions, routines, and domestic developments affected the conduct of foreign policy in the Soviet Union and the United States between 1945 and 1948. By unfolding the circumstances around the eruption of the Cold War, we might gain a valuable insight into the interrelatedness of internal political conditions and foreign policy.

The twentieth century has been the century of wars. Half of its so far elapsed ninety-four years witnessed global conflicts which were called "war". Since Walter Lippmann's landmark 1947 book we have known that wars can differ not only in intensity and dimension, but also in temperature, and it was this "Cold War" that dominated world politics between the mid-forties and the late eighties.

Opinions diverge concerning the starting point of the Cold War. According to some assessments, the Cold War started in 1917 when the Bolshevik Coup established a regime openly hostile to the Western capitalist democracies and, in return, the Western states launched an abortive and disorganized intervention to dispose of the Red Menace. Others believe that World War II turned into Cold War following V-E Day, originating from the Soviets' violation of the Yalta Agreements. More widely accepted views attach
the New Year's Day of the Cold War calendar to events like Stalin's February, 1946 preelection speech, Churchill's Fulton speech, the announcement of the Greek-Turkish Aid (Truman Doctrine), the Soviet pullout from the Paris negotiations of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), the Berlin Blockade, the Vandenberg resolution, or the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, depending on which issues the student considers to be the major cause.

Those who believe that the main source of the Soviet-American conflicts was the deep-seated differences in the philosophical, ideological, historical, and moral heritage of the two societies, that is intrinsic factors, tend to trace the beginning back to 1917. If one finds the causes in external events as in the changes in the European balance-of-power and in the Soviet conduct following World War II, the starting point is likely to be identified with one of the above mentioned series of post-war events¹.

Naturally, one is not bound in evaluating the Cold War era to adhere to a single set of causes, or search by any means a fixed date for its eruption. The Cold War was the result of complex historical, political, philosophical, and psychological developments that embrace not decades, but several centuries. Traditions of the Western societies go back as far as the ancient Greeks and Romans, incorporating the results of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, as

well as those of nineteenth century liberal political thought. As opposed to this, the philosophical creed of Communism is of more recent origin and evolved purposefully as a sharp departure from the course of Western development and as a response to the ugly inequalities having originated from the industrial revolution. Furthermore, while Western states were the cradles of civil liberties and liberal political institutions, and many of them have exercised democracy since the American War of Independence and the French Revolution, Russia shifted from one of the most repressive authoritarian regimes to the most ruthless totalitarian regime in history. As a result of these historical determinants, the political institutions and the entire policy making process followed a different pattern in the Soviet Union and in the most prominent representative of the Western democracies, the United States.\textsuperscript{2}

Nonetheless, this thesis concentrates on the intrinsic causes of the Cold War. As a part of our main line of argument we will claim that there was not a significant possibility of altering or influencing the policies of the Soviet Union, because of the secretiveness of the system, and because particular actions were often not taken as a response to certain Western steps, but as a part of a strategy that was determined by primarily domestic factors. We will elaborate on the nature of the factional debates

\textsuperscript{2} Bialer and Mandelbaum, chp. 2; Ryavec, pp. 11-16.
within and around the Politburo, and attempt to discover the connections between these struggles and the foreign policy outcomes. We will show that the basic assumptions of American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union evolved during 1945-1946, were converted into concrete policies during 1947-48 through compromises and cooperation between the President and the Congress, and were affected by the proposals and activities of Henry Wallace, Truman's primary adversary on issues concerning the Soviet Union. Furthermore, an inspection of personal political predilections and beliefs of individual leaders on both sides will be carried out along the lines of the previous chapter.

The thesis is divided into three main sections. In the first part we will provide a theoretical discussion on the question of how internal factors affect foreign policy by an analysis of the existing literature and by developing a new approach on the basis of our findings. In the second part we will turn to our case studies. The discussion of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy in the Soviet Union starts with the presentation of the general characteristics of postwar Soviet politics under Stalin. This is necessary because understanding the Soviet policy-making process and the motives of decisions is impossible without pointing out how sharply they differed from the Western models. After getting acquainted with the main
characters of the events, we will investigate the central issues of domestic politics during our period that affected the attitudes of the leading politicians towards foreign policy. Subsequently, we will turn to the area of foreign policy, and show how it was influenced by the main characters of the competing factions and Stalin, and attempt to explain the reasons of the shift in foreign policy that took place during 1947.

Since the American political system lies within our traditional understanding of politics, we will not elaborate on its operation in this paper. Following an overview of the immediate postwar American politics, first we will discuss how the Truman Administration during 1945-1946 came to revise the basic attitude of President Roosevelt toward the Soviet Union, then we will show how the entire course of American foreign policy was altered by 1949 as a result of the interactions among the President, the Congress, and Henry Wallace, Presidential Candidate and challenger to Truman's foreign policy throughout 1947-1948.

In the third section we will provide an assessment of Soviet and American foreign policy in terms of their being constrained by domestic factors and we will relate the empirical findings to the theoretical assertions laid down in the first chapter. The thesis will be completed by a brief conclusion.
CHAPTER 1
INTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

International relations deals with the interaction of nations. Since 1648, it has been the state, as the prime embodiment of a nation's sovereignty, that most frequently has communicated will and intentions between nations. Generally, governments or regimes representing states articulate and coordinate their attitudes and strategies in relation to other states in the form of a comprehensive foreign policy. Although foreign policy, like any communicative action, is in large part constituted of responses to incoming stimuli, that is other states' behavior, significant events, general external developments, these are not the sole determinants - an equally important component comes from inside the state. This thesis explores the internal factors that influence a nation's foreign policy.

As has been noted, foreign policy is drawn up by the regime that controls the state. According to Salmore and Salmore, a "regime is defined as the role or set of roles in a national political system in which inheres the power to make authoritative policy decisions". The desired goal of a regime is to obtain and retain power, and it acts rationally in the respect that it attempts to use its resources.

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3 Salmore and Salmore, p. 103.
efficiently in order to achieve these ends. The term rational here should not suggest, in opposition to the argument of many realist analysts, that all decision makers operate with the same approach and act in the same way under the same circumstances. "Decision makers vary significantly in choice propensities, beliefs, and personality traits. These characteristics structure the decision-makers' range of goals and shape the analysis of alternatives by the decision maker. Insofar as possible, a policy-maker's choices are selected which are consistent with these principles and constitute the boundaries of rational behavior for the decision-maker".

These points indicate the need to follow a two-fold technique in our investigations. On the one hand, foreign policy is influenced and constrained by resources available for the regime to realize its conceptions. As we will argue, resources are determined mostly by non-personal or structural components originating outside the personality of the individual leaders. These include in addition to the geographical conditions and economic capabilities of the country, the type of the regime, prevalent methods for arranging political affairs, internal cohesion of the governing group, or the relationship of the leaders and the led towards each other.

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4 Walker, pp. 404-405.
On the other hand, we need to take into consideration the idiosyncratic features of those who conceive of and implement foreign policy. The factors belonging into this area arise from inside the individuals, they vary from person to person, and affect behavior differently. When discussing these issues we utilize the findings of cognitive psychology, belief system, and operational code theories.

By carrying out these examinations we aim to set up an explanatory model for foreign policy formation. We will step beyond the die-hard rational actor model and give a weighed credit to idiosyncratic influences. As our title shows, we did not select the accepted term "domestic", since it downplays several aspects this paper emphasizes. However, our imposing limits on rationality does not mean that we intend to erase that notion from our vocabulary.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the isolationist-turned-internationalist said in the 1940s that "politics stops at the water's edge". Being a leading Republican politician (potential presidential candidate in 1944), and the number one authority in the GOP in the foreign policy area, his pronouncements were influential. Indeed, this sentence soon became the basis of the bipartisan American foreign policy (apart from occasional discords as the debate over China), and remained so until the controversies of the Vietnam War. Vandenberg’s goal was to make foreign policy immune from the
fluctuations and partisan fightings of domestic politics. This was especially necessary after the 1946 elections when the Republican party for a short period regained the majority in the Congress, and in the context of the shock caused by the breakup of the Grand Coalition the new superpower could not afford an inconsistent and defensive foreign behavior.

However, these remarks beg the question: is it possible to completely bifurcate foreign and domestic politics? Can we make foreign policy immune from internal influences? We will not spend much time for proving our answer, which is clearly "no"; the entire argument in the following pages will make it apparent.

As a first step, we need to articulate the basic assumptions that will assist us in our further investigations. According to the mainstream realist approach, the ultimate aim of states is to preserve their sovereignty and territorial integrity. There are three factors that determine a state’s behavior vis-a-vis other states: the degree of functional differentiation among states, the character of the international system, and the distribution of capabilities. Since, as Waltz argues, there is no functional differentiation among states, and the international system is anarchic, lacking a central legitimate authority, and is unlikely to develop a hierarchic order, the sole factor that affects a state’s
international behavior is its relative capabilities. Further developing this argument realists claim that similarly situated states behave similarly, regardless of their different domestic structures.

In opposition to this approach we argue that there is a close relationship between a state's internal characteristics and its international behavior. Both are mutually inseparable: it is not possible for a leadership to pursue a foreign policy by completely ignoring the domestic context of the actions, and vice versa, any measures in the domestic political field must be contemplated, designed, and implemented by taking into consideration their international repercussions.

A logical continuation of this point is that different domestic structures affect foreign policy differently. If the domestic context is favorable, the leaders will be faced with an easier task when conducting the state's foreign policy. Similarly, inconvenient internal circumstances pose greater difficulties for the decision makers. In order to understand the exact nature of this relationship, we need to examine the different types of domestic structures that occur in the international arena, and explore what sort of influence they exert on the state's foreign behavior.

As it has been pointed out above, a regime's primary goal is to maximize its political support and, ultimately, its power. Consequently, their political, including
diplomatic strategies are constrained by their need to remain in office. Leaders opt for war, negotiations, sanctions, economic measures, not so much according to the intrinsic value of each of these actions, but chiefly in terms of their likely impacts on the government’s political fortunes.

A large number of scholars have concerned themselves with the study of the different ways regimes constrain foreign policy. These approaches can be arranged into two groups. The underlying idea in the studies belonging to the first group centers around the notion of accountability. As they argue, closed societies, where there is a low degree of accountability, are not, or are only to a very low degree constrained by domestic political influences, whereas in open regimes this influence is strong. The second group, in contrast, acknowledges the possibility of the phenomenon rejected by the former group.

One of the earliest works that aimed to inspect the issue belongs to R. Barry Farrell. He contended that political conditions in open and closed systems are fundamentally different. Open polities have much opposition, because they have "competitive, regular electoral contests, legalized two- or multi-party organizations aimed at offering alternative governmental leadership, a high degree of toleration for autonomous groups in politics, and an acceptance of constitutional restraints on governmental
power". As opposed to this, closed systems are largely immune from visible domestic constraints. The characteristic features of the "totalitarian" regimes include "an official ideology, a single mass party, a system of terroristic policy control, near complete party control of all means of mass communication, and central control of the entire economy".

In a later, and more sophisticated project called CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations), Salmore and Salmore went further, but fundamentally remained within the confines of the previous studies. They developed a three-fold system of criteria that describe the manner regimes constrain foreign policy formation. The important factors are the following: (1) the amount of political resources at the regime's disposal, (2) political constraints, (3) the regime's disposition to use the resources at its disposal. The availability of resources varies according to the scope of societal activity under the control of the regime, to the degree of political institutionalization, and public support. Regimes with wide governmental scope and an efficacious and complex bureaucracy will face fewer difficulties during foreign policy formation and implementation. Political constraints include the degree of coherence within the regime, accountability, and the extent the leadership represents the society. Diverse societal

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5 Farrell, pp. 167-208.
interests and rules of attaining and retaining political office also contribute to the relationship. According to Salmore and Salmore, military governments and one party systems are less constrained, since they are generally immune from doctrinal or ideological differences. The third factor depends on two aspects: on the extent to which regimes are willing to change the rules of the political game in order to achieve power and implement policy, and on their commitment to expand either the resource base of the society or its control over it. Governments that are maximalist or expansionist will be less constrained than minimalist or status quo leaderships.

Wilkenfeld in his IBA (Interstate Behavior Model) model approaches the question from a slightly different perspective. As he points out, it is the "formal institutional factors", such as legislatures and bureaucracies, "linkage mechanisms", for instance public opinion, and "political system aggregate descriptor variables", referring to the overall features of the political system, we need to direct our attention to. At a later stage when discussing political conflicts he finds that "within certain groups of nations ... there tends to be a relationship between internal (domestic) conflict behavior and external (foreign) conflict behavior", and there is a tendency for internal and external conflict behavior to

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6 Salmore and Salmore, pp. 103-122.
occur simultaneously, or for one of them to be followed in time by the other. He argues that in relatively open types of regimes (personalist, polyarchic) there are cases when a pattern of mutual reinforcement appears in which a certain pair of internal and external conflict measures occur in succession. In these states neither external, nor internal measures can be taken in isolation of each other. However, in centrist states the primary characteristic of which is centralized control of most aspects of life, the leadership does not have to concern itself with the internal repercussions of external events.

All these models place disproportionately great weight on the concept of accountability. They claim that the primary, and often sole source of constraint originates from the existence of legitimate opposition and certain constitutional procedures. Furthermore, they downplay the possibilities of political divisions in closed societies. In fact, due to the diffusion of power across institutional and bureaucratic groups there exist political constraints in totalitarian or centrist regimes. In such structures leadership is often collective, and power must be shared with other groups of authority. Conflict within the regime can be intense, and foreign policy decision making highly politicized because of the presence of competing belief

7 Wilkenfeld, pp. 107-123.
systems and institutional interests, and as a result of the continuous struggle for power and position among high ranked officials.

An alternative approach toward the issue would concentrate on regime level factors that place constraints on foreign policy. Two such components might be regime fragmentation and vulnerability. The former of these concepts "concerns the degree to which a government's central political leadership is fragmented by persisting, internal political divisions in the form of competing personalities, institutions/bureaucracies, factions, or competing parties or other such groups". Ultimately, it involves a single leader's ability to dominate the political environment\(^8\). Furthermore, it is necessary to take into consideration not only the decision making unit's direct impact on the policy outcome, but also the extent to which additional factors within the unit exert influence on the decision making process.

If the regime is pervasively controlled by a predominant leader, we need to know about his political style. If he is insensitive, knowledge about his personality might offer sufficient clues to understand the process. But if he is sensitive to external stimuli, we are compelled to inspect other aspects of the political life. When no one individual has the ability to routinely determine the

\(^8\) Hagan, pp. 343-346.

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position of the government, but the influential actors gather in a single group, we are required to find out about the consensus building ability of the group. If agreement occurs quickly, we need to learn about the group's internal dynamics. If there emerges difficulty in this process, additional information is necessary. Finally, in order to describe the operation of multiple autonomous groups, the relationship of these associations provides us with cues. If they do not deny each other's legitimacy, they are likely to eventually come to an agreement. If, however, they do so, a deadlock in the decision making process is almost inevitable.9

Examining the constraints springing from inside the regime, we need to take a look at the significance of the relationship between the leadership and the wider political environment. Hagan argues that "if a leadership does face significant challenges to its position, it will likely avoid actions that could provoke controversies that, in turn, might help opposing political parties or other groups (e.g., the military) to force its removal from office". The best way to measure regime vulnerability is to examine the frequency of changes in the political leadership over a particular period of time. Hagan asserts that the most fragmented and the most vulnerable regimes will have to cope with the greatest constraints during their operation.

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Symptoms of a highly constrained foreign policy behavior are ambiguous verbal statements, inconsistent pronouncements, controversy avoidance, and diplomacy characterized by low intensity and occasional hostility\textsuperscript{10}.

In addition to regime fragmentation and vulnerability, the legitimacy of a state's institutions is also an important aspect that needs to be taken into account. If an institution is legitimate, the politicians or officials may be willing to place its survival ahead of their own personal and group interests, and accommodate internal concerns to external pressures. If the institution lacks legitimacy, officials are likely to despoil the state to maximize their own selfish group interests, and block essential changes necessary to develop an effective foreign policy\textsuperscript{11}.

Snyder approaches the issue of regime level constraints on foreign policy in different terms. The least constrained regimes are what he calls the cartelized systems in which parochial interests have the greatest opportunity to control state policy. In such a system bargaining among compact groups with different, highly concentrated interests proceeds by logrolling: each group gets what it wants most in return for tolerating the adverse effects of the policies its coalition partners desire. Each logroller has a stronger

\textsuperscript{10} Hagan, pp. 346-350.

\textsuperscript{11} Larson (1991), pp. 85-111.
incentive to pursue its parochial interests than to promote the collective good.

Unitary systems are more constrained than cartelized ones. Here interests are diffuse and encompassing: the ruling oligarchy’s assets and skills are mobile across economic and bureaucratic sectors. It has no parochial reason to back the success of some sectors over the others, or to engage in logrolling. As proprietor of the national economy it has little incentive for risky policies. However, Snyder also credits the possibility that single leaders may slip out of control. The most constrained regime type is the democratic one, although institutions even in such a system may work imperfectly and create cartelized blocs within different segments of the elected government.¹²

After concluding our investigations in the area of structural and systemic constraints on a state’s foreign policy, we turn our attention to factors that originate on the level of the individual. The following discussion will be based upon the findings of cognitive psychology, belief system, and operational code theories. We will argue that in addition to non-personal influences, policy outcomes are affected by idiosyncratic determinants. As opposed to the classical rational actor model that describes states as billiard balls or black boxes, assuming that under the same

¹² Snyder ("Myths..."), pp. 21-66.
circumstances actors handle issues with the same approach and, supposedly, arrive at the same decision, the above mentioned theories acknowledge the existence of individual-specific strategies. They contend that each person perceives the environment differently, and different perceptions about the world result in different actions. How do individuals perceive the world? How do they handle incoming data? How do they synthesize them? How do the constructed perceptions constrain the relationship of the individual and the environment? How do these procedures relate to political, and especially foreign policy decision making? In order to answer these questions, first we need to take a look at the contributions of cognitive psychology to the issue.

According to the basic findings of cognitive psychology, the two ultimate characteristics of human cognition are the top-down processing of new information, that is matching and assimilating it into preexisting structures, and limited computational capacities, that is the prevalence of simplifying mechanisms. These structures or mechanisms are called schemas which are generic concepts stored in the memory. They might be a collection of subjective theories constructed by generalizing one's own experiences. A subset of schemas can be called analogies that are specific schemas, and they also operate in the above fashion.
The schema structure generates prototypes against which specific examples can be compared. It not only helps interpret incoming data, but also allows us to go beyond them, and its "default values" create a more complete picture.

There are numerous schemas stored in our mind, and they are recalled according to the particular situation. Because of our inclination to simplification, we tend to recall schemas that are most readily available and for doing so we rely on superficial commonalities without probing more deeply or widely in search of less obvious but perhaps more relevant patterns. A schema choice also involves the assessment of the fit between the incoming stimuli and the repertoire of available schemas stored in memory. We make a similarity judgement of the extent the situation we are facing matches the memory evoked. Certain schemas are destined to be more influential by personal, generational, and career experiences; and if these factors reinforce each other, the analogy may become extraordinarily powerful.

Once a schema has been constructed and stored in memory, and has proved to work under specific circumstances, modifying or altering it requires an extended exposure to contrary experience, and it will usually not erode even if a series of unparallels between them and reality are pointed out.
On the basis of these assumptions Khong develops an Analogical Explanation (AE) framework in order to answer the central question: how do analogies influence the selection of policy alternatives? According to this theory, analogies perform six diagnostic tasks: define the nature of the situation confronting the policy-maker; assess the stakes; provide prescriptions; help predict alternative options' chances of success; evaluate their moral rightness; and warn about dangers associated with the options.\(^\text{13}\)

Khong claims that if it is proved that an analogy was used at important junctures in the policy process, then we can accept that it affected the decisions. This is the point where research in the field of cognitive psychology relates to operational code theory. Operational code theory was initiated by Nathan Leites's book "The Operational Code of the Politburo" (1951) that was developed into a exhaustive monograph about Bolshevism two years later. In "A Study of Bolshevism" Leites attempted to "study the spirit of a ruling group ... [through] ... the analysis of [one aspect of] ... its doctrine ... what (he) call(s) the operational code, that is, the conceptions of political 'strategy'".\(^\text{14}\)

Sixteen years later Alexander George undertook the development of Leites's approach to a comprehensive model for studying political behavior and decision making. His aim


\(^{14}\) cited in Walker, p. 404.
was to concentrate primarily on the "maxims of political strategy" solely as beliefs rather than on the psychoanalytically based, characterological aspects, and underlined the cognitive as opposed to the affective elements of the issue. He classified the basic beliefs of political leaders into two groups. Whereas philosophical beliefs refer to assumptions and premises about the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict, and the role of the individual in history, instrumental beliefs focus upon ends-means relationships in the context of political actions.\(^{15}\)

George also identified two techniques to detect the impact of operational-code beliefs upon decisions. The core of the model is the process tracing and the congruency procedure. Process tracing is a methodology that shows how the actor's beliefs and other factors influenced his assessment of the situation and his choice of action, whereas the congruence procedure by specifying a set of expected outcomes based on one's theoretical perspective and checking them against actual outcomes establishes consistency between the content of given beliefs and the content of decisions.\(^{16}\)

Subsequent studies went a step further and attempted to link personality, beliefs, perceptions, and foreign policy

\(^{15}\) George (1969), pp. 190-222.

\(^{16}\) George (1979), pp. 95-124.
behavior. These investigations found several different patterns for the relationship of the above factors. One possible chain of causation detected by Starr suggests a straightforward link between beliefs, perceptions, and behavior: Beliefs --> Perceptions of the Object --> Behavior towards the Object. However, as Walker noted, the linkages may be more complex. "For example: the instrumental beliefs in an individual's operational code may prescribe the same behavior toward different types of objects. Therefore object-perceptions would vary, but behavior would not. The philosophical beliefs in an operational code may dispose an actor to diagnose differently the respective situations surrounding two objects of the same type or even the same object at two different observation points. Therefore, object-perceptions would not vary, but behavior would"¹⁷.

Both the model set up with the assistance of cognitive psychology and the operational-code theory builds on a larger concept called "belief system". The ultimate problematique around the entire area is the nature of the "filtering device" of existing beliefs about empirical and normative issues. How do these devices differentiate important from unimportant data? To what extent are decision makers affected by their preconceived views?

Belief systems are a set of ideas and thoughts concerning the environment that are held relatively

¹⁷ Walker, p. 414.
constant. According to Holsti, belief systems have a "dual connection with decision-making. The direct relationship is found in that aspect of the belief system which tells us 'what ought to be', acting as a direct guide in the establishment of goals. The indirect link ... arises from the tendency of the individual to assimilate new perceptions to familiar ones, and to distort what is seen in such way as to minimize the clash with previous expectations."\(^{18}\)

When examining belief systems, many themes we have discussed in the preceding pages reoccur. Since policies are usually developed by a number of actors, the belief systems or images of the individuals interact. In this case we need to develop a collective belief system for the group which is the aggregation of individual beliefs. When there is one person acting as a principal force affecting the formulation and implementation of decisions, his belief system has a disproportionate share in the collective belief system. In such cases the establishment of a balance of power among the group's constituent members is helpful. In order for a decision making group to operate effectively a minimal level of agreement between its members' belief systems is required. Those bodies where there is a high degree of overlap among the individuals' belief systems are likely to arrive at consensus rapidly, whereas worldview differences

\(^{18}\) cited in Little and Smith, eds., p. 12.
result in difficulties in developing coherent policy intragovernmentally".

Throughout the preceding pages we have reviewed the existing literature concerning the internal determinants of foreign policy. In doing so we attempted to find the most appropriate ways they might be helpful to understand the relationship between these two spheres of politics. We have pointed out, contrary to mainstream realism, that a state’s domestic conditions do exert influence on its behavior vis-a-vis other states. Since a regime’s primary goal is to stay in office, maximize its political support and, ultimately, its power, the adoption of any policy takes place in this context. On the basis of these assertions we accepted the following set of criteria:

1. Governments in both open and closed societies are constrained in conducting their foreign policies.
2. The adequate method to examine the impact of domestic structure on foreign policy is regime fragmentation and vulnerability. The most fragmented and vulnerable states will have to cope with the greatest constraints.
3. States with legitimate institutions are more likely to develop an effective foreign policy than those without.

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19 Rosati, pp. 15-38.
4. If in a state parochial interests evolve and control the state policy, they are able to ignore many of the constraints imposed on them by the structure they operate in. Regimes with encompassing interests or governments surrounded by democratic-constitutional regulations cannot easily bypass constraints.

5. Decision making individuals are constrained by the processes their cognition inherently follows.

6. Belief systems shared by political leaders predispose them toward and turn them away from certain kinds of actions.
CHAPTER 2
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1948

2.1 Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet Union, 1945-1948

2.1.1 The General Characteristics of Postwar Soviet Politics Under Stalin

The condition that ultimately left an imprint on Soviet life in the late 1940s was that after Germany, the Soviet Union suffered the most severe devastation of all countries during World War II. As a result of a series of formal and informal agreements between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain, Stalin, in return for American Lend-Lease and British weapon and food supplies, agreed that he would keep the German troops engaged in the Eastern front until the other two members of the Grand Alliance had gained sufficient strength to be able to win in the Western front. During four years of the "Great Patriotic War" the Soviet Union lost twenty million people and approximately $128 billion worth of industrial capital was destroyed.

The German invasion in 1941 necessitated extraordinary measures in the political and administrational sphere. It

20 Taubman, pp. 41-47.
was no longer possible to maintain strict discipline to the extent it had been feasible during the twenties and thirties. The bulk of the attention of the leadership and the energy of the country had to be devoted to the war effort. This did not bring about anything that can be referred to as "freedom" in the Western sense, but the loosening grip was certainly felt by the Russian (and all the Soviet) people. Stalin had to "liberalize" many aspects of the political system; Western influence was tolerated for the first time since the Revolution. Derogatory articles concerning the capitalist countries disappeared from the newspapers and, as many contemporary observers noted, even anti-Western jokes were banned21. The tasks of the party and the secret police had to be redefined; nationalist feelings and religious sentiments were allowed to evoke the atmosphere necessary for a successful war which was fought not for the Party or for Communism, but for "Mother Russia". Some degree of private initiative appeared, especially in agriculture, in order to supply the army and the population22.

These unusual circumstances were highly unfavorable for the Soviet system. The leadership in Moscow was witnessing a dangerous disintegration of the party, first of all in the occupied territories. In Leningrad the number of party

21 Conquest (1991), chp. 4.

22 Dunmore, p. 1.
members went down from 150,000 to 16,000, in the Ukraine from 500,000 to 16,000. The structure of the society and the administrative apparatus was either destroyed or terribly shaken, and although there was a widespread and so far unparalleled expectation for a genuine change in the nature of the system, this lethal process had to be halted. It was indispensable to eradicate laxity, restore discipline and central control, since the very existence of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was at stake. It was this party revival that became the core of Stalin’s immediate post-war policies23.

The political system that served as a tool in the dictator’s hand was often looked upon by Western observers as a monolithic one with Stalin in the center and a very small number of people around him. They have assumed that important decisions were made solely in this narrow body, but even within it the most significant factor was Stalin’s wish.

In fact, in the Soviet policy making process there were different patterns at work simultaneously. As far as the general characteristics of the regime is concerned, it was overwhelmingly totalitarian, centralized, and repressive. Stalin and the Politburo were the ultimate place where decisions were made. The input side to the system was insignificant, there was practically no response for

23 McCagg, p. 120.
pressures coming from below, or more exactly such pressures were nonexistent. The directions issued at the supreme level were implemented without questioning, and in order to secure this, the state bureaucracy was constantly harassed by the leadership's agents, the secret police, and the party apparatus.

However, at the organizational level the picture needs to be refined. The bureaucracy was far more important from the point of view of managing the entire Soviet system. The senior administrators played a key role ensuring that measures were carried out. Decisions were largely predictable, since they were dictated by the official ideology of the Party and the Politburo orders.

A third, more "pluralistic" pattern in the Soviet policy making process meant that there were various views and interests present at the different levels of the hierarchy, and decisions were born as a result of compromises between the different interest groups24.

There is no consensus about the precise extent of Stalin's power in the Politburo. Even at the highest level it is not adequate to claim that it was exclusively Stalin whose will had an impact on the output side of Soviet politics. On the one hand, he was practically an unchallenged leader. His relationship with his Politburo colleagues is most frequently presented as one between a

24 Dunmore, pp. 6-9.
Master and his servants. Milovan Djilas recalled in his remembrance volume that Molotov had the habit of following Stalin wherever he went with a small notebook in his hand and put down each of the Leader's words. Stalin often treated the Politburo members like toys: for instance in the early fifties he excluded Molotov, Mikoyan, and Voroshilov from Politburo meetings simply by not inviting them. If he wanted to have a policy accepted he knew the Politburo would not support, he asked their endorsement without letting them know about the contents of the issue.

However, the Politburo no longer consisted of inexperienced people. They were all senior politicians; Molotov, Andreyev, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan had been members since the twenties, and Stalin could not remove them at will. There were no killings between 1945 and 1949, then Voznesenskii was excluded and executed. Until 1953 there were only two more dismissals, Popov and Andreyev, but neither was arrested.

Furthermore, throughout the last decade of his life, Stalin was suffering from recurrent bouts of debilitating ill health, which limited his ability to supervise policy implementation in a really detailed and sustained manner.

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25 Djilas, p. 134.
26 Khrushchev, pp. 278-281.
After his February 9, 1946 preelection speech he delivered only one more public speech, at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, but even there he spoke only briefly and many observers considered it merely a ceremonial appearance. Nonetheless, he remained the supreme authority in virtually all areas, and it seems very unlikely that anyone from the Politburo would have dared to turn against him. Instead, they were fighting fiercely among themselves to gain a favorable position where they could exert more influence on the Master’s decisions.

Confronting factions or groupings sharing different ideological, philosophical assumptions within a country’s political system are generally referred to as "Left" and "Right", and this distinction is often applied to describe Soviet politics, as well. However, traditional definitions of political trends and approaches often prove inadequate in relation to the Soviet Union. Disputes between the different factions were mainly personal struggles for power and influence, rather than moving along any particular consistent ideological line or a specific issue-orientation. No policy was adopted by a group if it was backed by the opponent, but after the outcome of the struggle had been determined, it was safe for the victor to adopt the loser’s platform if it was considered a viable approach. The entire

29 Ra’an an, p. 27.

30 Shulman, pp. 4-5.
nature of these conflicts followed a "feudal" pattern: representatives of the individual groupings invested their subordinates, whenever possible, with power and positions in return for personal loyalty and allegiance. They promoted the interests of their clients, thereby increased their own power. Ideological positions adopted on issues did not necessarily reflect personal predilections, but rather the political obligations of various leaders to their subordinates and allies. In order to become an accepted leader and to gain a solid power base, it was advisable for a person to establish himself as the only genuine and orthodox executor of Leninism and as the sole scientific interpreter of history with the implicit claim of infallibility. Because of the lack of constitutional, legitimized rules for power transfer, practically all changes in the leadership could be achieved exclusively by coups.31

Stalin, quite understandably, did little to discourage disputes. He did not have to fight for preeminence, he was still on top. Additionally, allowing his principal officers to contend with one another enabled him to disengage himself from the day-to-day "micromanagement" of politics, to examine alternative courses of action and, at the same time ensure that his lieutenants became less likely to combine forces against him.

31 Ra’anan, pp. 7-11.
2.1.2 The Main Characters beside Stalin

Until very recently sources and documents on the background of specific Soviet political decisions, including minutes and records of the sessions of top decision making bodies were scarce, or completely unavailable for researchers. As a result, discord prevails among students of Soviet politics concerning the causes of certain policies and the aims of individuals, especially in the Stalinist era. As one prominent Russian analyst put it in a 1993 publication, "this article is one possible version, an original reconstruction of historical phenomena and events, the true fabric of which is still being carefully concealed from the public".\(^{32}\)

According to one view, which seems to be more widely accepted and that insists on the usual left-right distinction, there were two distinct groupings located on the two sides of the political palette between 1945 and 1948. The leftist group was led by Andrei Zhdanov and Nikolai Voznesenskii. It had built up strong ties with most of the foreign Communist parties, especially with the Yugoslavian and Bulgarian ones, and found its supporting basis in the party apparatus. The rightist wing was represented by Georgii Malenkov and Lavrentii Beriya. This faction that was backed by senior officials in economic

\(^{32}\) Alekseyev, p. 13.
ministries, the secret police, and the Caucasian party leaders, also had some connections with Communist parties, but in general did not maintain close relations with foreign parties.

The Zhdanov group, runs the line of this interpretation occupied a militant, dogmatic stance on foreign and domestic issues. It instigated unalloyed hostility toward the West, urged aggressive use of foreign communists and mass action of the proletariat to achieve rapid subjugation in the Eastern European countries. As opposed to this, the Malenkov group advocated a less forward, or militant international policy. They showed little interest in the affairs of Eastern Europe and were less directly associated with foreign relations.\(^{33}\)

In our thesis we will develop a different train of thought. A closer look at the main characters of these factional debates will help elucidate the issue. Zhdanov’s political fortunes before and during the war were determined by the successes and failures of the international ventures he supported (he had been appointed chairman of the Supreme Soviet’s Foreign Affairs Committee in 1938), and his activity as the leader of the Leningrad Party organization. During 1939 and 1940 he derived prestige from having been one of the main architects of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, and continued to defend the relationship with Berlin even after

\(^{33}\) Ra’an, Shulman, etc.
Germany had built up substantial forces along the Soviet border. Zhdanov argued that there was no danger of a Nazi attack, since Germany could not fight a two-front war. In 1939 he also advocated the invasion of Finland, probably because of its strategic importance for Leningrad.\textsuperscript{34}

The debacle in Finland further discredited Zhdanov, while the events of June, 1941 ultimately doomed his wartime position.\textsuperscript{35}

Molotov, as the father of the Nazi-Bolshevik pact, was also in serious trouble. A newly established Commissariat for State Control was given supervisory authority over the Council of People's Commissars where Molotov was chairman, and a deputy commissar of Foreign Affairs was appointed beside him in the person of Andrey Vyshinskiy. Later Stalin himself became the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, replacing Molotov.\textsuperscript{36}

At the same time Malenkov and Beriya, who were junior leaders at that time, were promoted to the rank of candidate members of the Politburo in 1941. In order to undermine Zhdanov's reputation with Stalin, they laid the groundwork for his transfer to the doomed city of Leningrad. This was the nadir of Zhdanov's career, since even the abandonment of the city was contemplated during the three-year-long siege.

\textsuperscript{34} Conquest (1991), pp. 105-141.

\textsuperscript{35} McCagg, pp. 16-17.

\textsuperscript{36} McCagg, p. 107.
It is worthwhile to note that Leningrad always saw Moscow as a provincial city. Leningrad was the imperial capital, a revolutionary center in 1825, 1905, and twice in 1917, and its party bosses had the habit of challenging Stalin’s leadership, like Zinoviev in 1927, Kirov in 1934, or Zhdanov in 1946.

During the war the role of the Politburo was de facto taken over by a special body, the State Defense Committee. The rivals’ positions were well reflected in the composition of that body, since Malenkov and Beriya, junior leaders who were only candidate members of the Politburo, were included, while Zhdanov, who had been an influential senior politician, was excluded despite his Politburo membership.

By 1944 Zhdanov was again on the ascendancy after the heroic defense of Leningrad, but since Malenkov’s star was still high he was appointed chairman of the Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Liberated Areas and Zhdanov’s comeback had to wait. In the fall of 1944 he was moved to Helsinki to supervise Finland’s compliance with the terms of the armistice, and he could play no role in the leadership for several months. Strangely enough, suddenly he was relieved as first secretary of the Leningrad party.

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37 Hahn, p. 28.
39 McCagg, pp. 82-86.
organization and was elevated to Moscow exactly when a great celebration was held in Leningrad in the honor of the "Hero City". He was followed as Leningrad first secretary by his protege, A. Kuznetsov\(^40\).

2.1.3 The Main Issues of Soviet Domestic Politics Following the War

As it has been pointed out earlier, the war brought about an earthquake in the traditional patterns of Soviet life and power relations. The importance and influence of the party diminished, whereas the role of the army, the secret police, the industry and the industrial management significantly increased. Stalin was well aware of this serious change and did not hesitate to act to restore the party to the role it "deserved". To achieve his aim he primarily relied on the assistance of the Zhdanov group.

Naturally it was the army that gained the greatest prestige from the victory over the Nazis. In order to tackle the popularity of the army, Stalin and the party revivalists in their public speeches downgraded its role in the military successes, and they emphasized that it was the Party, Comrade Stalin, the great Russian people (or Soviet people, depending on the personal predilections of the speaker), and

\(^{40}\) Dunmore, pp. 15-17., 27.; McCagg, pp. 86-96.
only last the army that won the war. Marshal Zhukov, the main war hero, lost his influence and was sent to a remote corner of the country. In February, 1946 the separate army and navy commissariats were merged under the Armed Service Commissariat (later Ministry) led by Stalin. There were six deputy ministers appointed, five of whom were professional soldiers, but the sixth, N. Bulganin, who was not a soldier, became the political general in charge of general questions and practically had authority over the others41.

During the war the NKVD gained extremely great power. It had authority over the frontier guard, as well, and in certain regions with the help of the GULAG administered vast territories. It also commanded immense economic capacities. Stalin had been suspicious about the extraordinarily powerful secret police for a long time. Already back in 1941 the economic and security functions of the NKVD were separated, but this did not limit Beriya’s influence significantly and he also became a member of the State Defense Committee. When converting war industries into peacetime duties, this empire was shaken and in 1946 Beriya was removed from the direct supervision of the NKVD (MVD). Although he became full member of the Politburo he was not given a position in the executive organs of the Party42.

41 Hahn, p. 40.

42 McCagg, p. 17.
A third branch that had to be overshadowed was the industry managers. Between 1941 and 1945 the vast industrial capacities were all placed into the service of the war effort. Traditional administrative and regulatory processes were ignored and the industrial management became more influential at the expense of the party. The successful performance of the industry during the war further improved its position. The leading figure of the industrial "lobby" was Malenkov who was also in charge of the cadre selection and was the member of the State Defense Committee. As has been mentioned, in 1944 he became the chairman of the committee directing the economic rehabilitation of the liberated areas. After the conclusion of the war the large scale demobilization, the transition to peacetime production and political routines largely affected him and his power basis. In September, 1945 the State Defense Committee was abolished, and Malenkov had to surrender his post as deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.\(^{43}\)

In the spring of 1946 all top governmental organs were reorganized, Malenkov and Beriya became members of the Politburo, but at the same time Kuznetsov, the Leningrad first secretary and Popov, another Zhdanovite, secretary of the Moscow committee, were elevated to the Secretariat.\(^{44}\) Malenkov was absent from the list of the deputy chairmen of

\(^{43}\) Ra’anani, p. 25.

\(^{44}\) Truman (vol. 1), p. 377.
the Council of Ministers, as well. Since even the Politburo proved to be too broad an organ for Stalin, he separated a group of six for directing foreign policy (Politburo Committee for Foreign Affairs), which was supplemented in October, 1946 by Voznesenskii as member in charge of economic issues, this way transforming the "septet" into a universal body\textsuperscript{45}.

Zhdanov participated in the party revivalist process initiated by Stalin from the beginning. After he gave up his position in Leningrad he became the chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Supreme Soviet and was in direct charge of Soviet relations with the foreign Communist parties\textsuperscript{46}. In this period Stalin relied on Zhdanov's influence in carrying out his policies against the army, the police, and the industrial management, but he had no intention of letting Zhdanov slip out of his fingers. The reason why this almost happened was partly his poor health during 1945 and 1946. The Generalissimo had two heart attacks prior to and during the Potsdam Conference according to President Truman\textsuperscript{47}. He spent most of the cold seasons at the Black Sea resorts, and was absent even from the November 7 parades in 1945 and 1946. Zhdanov managed to convince Stalin that Malenkov's activity at the cadre selection and

\textsuperscript{45} Ra'anan, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{46} Hahn, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{47} Ra'anan, p. 28.
in other areas in the Central Committee apparat had been wrong (although as we have seen Stalin did not really have to be convinced). Zhdanov and Voznesenskii wanted to stop the dismantling of German industries, the main task of the Malenkov committee for the rehabilitation of the liberated areas, so they led a campaign to investigate the operation of the committee, which proved to be successful\(^48\). The dismantling was terminated, Malenkov was suspended as Central Committee secretary and cadres chief, and replaced by another Zhdanov ally, Patolichev from the Chelyabinsk organization\(^49\).

The 1946 celebration of the Revolution was the climax of Zhdanov’s power. It was not only Stalin who was missing from the balcony of the Lenin Mausoleum, but also Malenkov, Beriya, Molotov, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, that is all those who were not strongly related to Zhdanov. However, present were Zhdanov, Voznesenskii, Kuznetsov, Popov, Patolichev, and several others from Zhdanov’s immediate circle. Even the ceremonial speech was delivered by Zhdanov\(^50\).

As is clear from these episodes, the most powerful leader beside Stalin in the first two postwar years was Andrei Zhdanov. In the next section we will explore what foreign

\(^{48}\) Khrushchev, pp. 246-258.

\(^{49}\) Ra’an-an, p. 22.

\(^{50}\) McCagg, p. 107.
policy line the Soviet Union followed during the "Zhdanovshchina", as the period of Zhdanov's predominance is often referred to.

2.1.4 The General Approach towards Foreign Policy, 1945-1946

As far as the foreign policy approaches of the individual leading personalities are concerned we can rely upon the series of speeches delivered in February, 1946 before the elections to the Supreme Soviet. These speeches are usually and rightly regarded in the West as overtures of the Cold War, since they signalled for the first time an unmistakable shift in the official Soviet attitude. None of the Politburo members wanted to maintain the Grand Alliance and continue the East-West cooperation unaltered. All of them shared the same militant Marxist-Leninist ideological heritage and never for a single minute had broken with their basic hostile stance. However, there were significant differences among the leaders concerning the extent of their hostility, and these differences can be detected in the speeches.

The speeches of Zhdanov, Molotov, Malenkov, Beriya, and Stalin and as well as Voznesenskii's announcement a few weeks later about the new five-year plan show that Zhdanov, Molotov, Voznesenskii, and Stalin were remarkably less
hostile toward the West than Malenkov and Beriya. The speeches were published in the Pravda in the following order: Beriya (February 6) emphasized the threat of a new imperialist war the main target of which would be the Soviet Union, and called for the strengthening of the military-economic might of the country; Molotov (February 7) although underscoring international danger, viewed the world as divided horizontally, and not vertically; Zhdanov (February 8) urged the reorientation of the economy to peacetime production, did not mention international tension or the possibility of a renewed armed conflict, and did not identify imperialists with nations; Malenkov (also on February 8) ignored the prospects for peaceful development, and focused on the necessity of concentrating on the military strength and heavy industry, and he laid more emphasis on geographically defined blocs than Zhdanov. Stalin (February 10) was more in line with Zhdanov’s remarks, like Voznesenskiy (March 16) who indicated that the gap between the heavy and light industry would not be so great as in regular five-year plans, although he wanted to achieve this with voluntarist methods: he wanted to push both heavy industry and consumer production, with regard almost exclusively to needs as opposed to the capacities of the economy\textsuperscript{51}.

\textsuperscript{51} Pravda articles of respective days.
The two basic approaches towards foreign policy in postwar Soviet politics, like in most countries, were isolationism and participationism. As Stalin indicated to American Ambassador in Moscow Averell Harriman in October, 1945 at the Gagry resort, there was a strong isolationist wing present at the top level, but he himself opposed it. Malenkov and Beriya, who were the main advocates of this stance underscored military danger. They were closely connected with the industrial leadership that had no interest in getting involved in the affairs of the imperialists.

The participationist line was represented by Stalin, Zhdanov, and Molotov, partly because of the offices they held. Molotov in his speeches on November 6, 1945 and February, 1946 supported the reliance on the United Nations, and called for an "anti-blocist" continuation of the Grand Alliance. He argued that the supposedly divided West could be forced by diplomatic maneuvers to comply with the Soviet wishes. Zhdanov also did not consider some cooperation impossible, since, as it had been pointed out, he was talking about horizontal divisions, conflicts not between nations, but between imperialist "elements" and "the people". In his November 7, 1946 speech he was less optimistic, but claimed that forces working for peace were becoming stronger and stronger. Stalin backed the participationists, because isolationism was advocated mostly
by representatives of the industrial "lobby" and the Malenkov-Beriya group he wanted to do away with anyway. In his interviews he was almost always optimistic about the peaceful developments, avoided mentioning the prospects of war, and occasionally promised improvement in living conditions in the country52.

Stalin always remained more cautious in foreign policy questions, he did not support adventurist lines. He made gestures toward the West after Hitler's attack, eliminated the Comintern in 1943 and did not revive it until 1947, and adopted a Soviet anthem instead of the Internationale that explicitly called the international proletariat for struggle. Overall, he preferred salami tactics to direct confrontation. He considered the spirit of Yalta and Potsdam cooperative and not antagonistic. He agreed to the establishment of the United Nations, but in return for these concessions he expected to have the only say in Eastern Europe. Even in his reply to Churchill's Fulton speech in March, 1946 where he compared urging of the cooperation of the English speaking countries to Hitler's ideas about the superiority of the German people, he made a clear distinction between Churchill and the current British government, and he minimized the perception of threat by

52 McCagg, pp. 159-167.
claiming that Churchill and his allies would not succeed in organizing a military expedition against Eastern Europe.\(^3\)

Stalin publicly downgraded the significance of the atomic bomb. At Potsdam he reacted indifferently to President Truman's hint about the existence of an extraordinarily powerful weapon, news which seemingly did not take him by surprise.\(^4\) In subsequent interviews, as for instance with Elliot Roosevelt, he never mentioned the nuclear threat.\(^5\) Before 1949 there was not a single article published in the military press about atomic energy. In his answers to the written questions submitted by the London Sunday Times staff member Alexander Werth, he claimed that danger of a new war did not at that time exist. He said he did believe in friendly Soviet-Western relations, but not in the atomic bomb. He thought that the monopoly could not last for long, and the use of the A-bomb would be prohibited. However, behind the scenes there was an intense concentration of resources on nuclear experiments and a breathless struggle to break the American monopoly. Stalin in private never denied that the A-bomb was a dangerous weapon and a useful bargaining tool. "That is a powerful thing. Pow-er-ful!"


\(^4\) Truman (vol. 1), p. 458.

\(^5\) Taubman, pp. 143-144., 163.
as he once said in one of his emotional outbursts\textsuperscript{56}. Since he expected war sooner or later (within fifteen or twenty years), he regarded the imbalance of power as a serious political disadvantage and felt impelled to overcome this period of vulnerability as swiftly as possible. Naturally, he rejected the Baruch Plan that would have kept the nuclear secret in American hands for three more years, and he used the peace movement in Western Europe to evoke an anti-American and anti-atom atmosphere.

The dismantling of the East German industries, that is leaving as little as possible for the West Germans in case of a unification also fitted in the picture as long as the future of the country was unclear\textsuperscript{57}. The application of a militant line within the Cominform was also a useful method of keeping the Western governments under the threat of mass revolt at home. In a letter to Professor Razin of the Frunze Military Academy, who had brought up the possibility of the adaptation of a more offensive military doctrine, Stalin wrote that once the Soviet Union tested his own atomic weapon, it will be in a good position to assert itself. But until then it would be silly to provoke the West\textsuperscript{58}.

As a short conclusion of the events of 1945-1946 we can state that these two years witnessed the gradual

\textsuperscript{56} Djilas, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{57} Shulman, pp. 21-22.

\textsuperscript{58} Ra’ananan, pp. 118-122.
deterioration of the relationship between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union. As it has been pointed out above, there was a consensus among the top Soviet leaders concerning the untenability of the Grand Alliance. However, continuous communication between East and West was maintained, in large part due to the predominance of participationist forces in the leadership. Simultaneously, the wartime and postwar agreements were interpreted differently on the two sides of the Iron Curtain. For the Soviet Union the Western endorsement of its need for friendly governments along its borders meant that it was only the Soviet Union whose interest were to be taken into consideration in that part of the world. They assumed that the sacrifice of millions Russians had created a legitimate basis for them to exclude Western influence and establish regimes following the Soviet pattern.

2.1.5 A New Approach towards Foreign Policy, 1947-1948

The communization of Eastern Europe was achieved through distinct stages. Seton Watson, for instance, distinguishes three stages through which Stalinist regimes came to life\(^\text{59}\). In the first stage there were mostly genuine coalitions between traditional bourgeois parties and the Communists as

\(^{59}\) Seton-Watson, pp. 170-188.
a result of elections or agreements among the different political forces. Later, in the "bogus coalition" stage, when the Communist parties gained substantial strength and the cooperation among the parties proved to be a nuisance for them they ousted the bourgeois parties from the governments or the parliaments, and merged with the Social Democratic Parties. In the final stage, in which the monolithic, Stalinist regimes were created, the non-communist political parties were either outlawed or stripped of all facilities for exerting influence on politics, Communists who were not educated in Stalin's court were prosecuted and expelled or executed, and the whole political-economic structure of the country was transformed following the Soviet pattern.

The years 1945 and 1946 passed in the spirit of genuine coalitions in Eastern Europe and of the predominance of the Zhdanov group and the party revivalists in Soviet domestic politics. As we have pointed out, Zhdanov favored a relative moderation concerning foreign relations and his preponderance in the Politburo and the tentative endorsement of his line by Stalin had an impact on Soviet foreign policy.

However, the party revival became too successful and the Zhdanov group became too powerful for Stalin by early 1947. The November 7, 1946 parade had a powerful psychological impact on Stalin. He realized that allowing a faction to
gain such strength could endanger his own power. Simultaneously, the East European Communist leaders were no longer satisfied with their situation where they had to seek consensus all the time with the bourgeois elements in the governments and were eager to take advantage of the closeness of the Red Army and the Soviet predominance in the Allied Control Commissions. By mid-1947 Stalin had ascertained that the West, and especially the United States had ultimately changed the policies of President Roosevelt and no longer would make concessions in order to maintain a safe world order. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were clear signs of the shift.

Zhdanov also perceived the nature of these developments. He realized that unless he adopted a much more militant strategy he would lose the support of both Stalin and the foreign Communists he had built up while being the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Committee. In close cooperation with the Yugoslavs he organized the revival of the Comintern, whereas his ally, Voznesenskii set forth an offensive program for the further development of the heavy industry and launched an attack on the most prominent Soviet economist, Yevgenii Varga.

The establishment of the Cominform was the direct consequence of foreign and Soviet internal developments. Different tactics had to be adopted by both the Zhdanov

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group and the East European Communists. The start of the deterioration of Zhdanov’s position is reflected by Malenkov’s inclusion in the Soviet delegation to the founding meeting of the Cominform, but it was still Zhdanov who was in the center. Malenkov presented only a minor report that discussed the Soviet decrees on literature, culture, and philosophy, that is the significant achievements of the Zhdanovshchina. Malenkov also had to denounce Aleksandrov, one-time follower of Zhdanov, who had switched sides and had gone over to Malenkov. There were no Asian parties invited which can be explained by the fact that Malenkov had been working in the Commission for the Far East of the Politburo, and Zhdanov probably wanted to keep Malenkov’s clients out of the negotiations. In addition, the Chinese were looked upon suspiciously at the time since Stalin had not authorized Mao’s military offensive.\footnote{Ra’anan, pp. 101-110.}

Zhdanov developed the two-camp theory and dropped his idea about the horizontal division in the world. It can be supposed that this change was necessary for him not to isolate himself within the Soviet leadership. He admonished the Western Communist parties that their collaborative tactics had been wrong and called on them to revise their policies from the top to the bottom. However, it needs to be emphasized that Zhdanov intended to give a certain scope of initiative to local party leaders, and he meant the
Cominform as an informative propaganda organization, rather than a tool for control⁶².

The result of these policies were exactly the opposite of what had been planned. The strikes that broke out in France and Italy were unsuccessful and ultimately undermined the respect of the Communists. Zhdanov's designs to allow a scope of initiative for the local leaders only fuelled insurrectionism throughout Eastern Europe. Stalin was caught between Western pressures and those of the insurrectionists, and he was compelled to find a way out. Malenkov, who had regarded the Cominform as a tool for imposing uniformity in Eastern Europe, and Beriya, who had the "adequate" means for regulating the naughty, offered a solution: to promote them on the expense of Zhdanov's authority while uniformizing and Stalinizing the satellite states⁶³.

In addition to the founding of the Cominform, the Varga affair represented an episode of great significance among the events of 1947, and was an indication of a tangible shift in the domestic balance of power. Yevgenii Varga, who was the director of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics published his major book "Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War" in 1946. In this book he argued that capitalist governments during the war had acquired great power over their economies


⁶³ Dunmore, p. 117.

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through planning to concentrate the resources on the war effort. The capitalist states retained the ability to plan after the war which enabled them to cope more effectively with economic crises. The difference between the capitalist and socialist countries had diminished and they became less objectionable for each other. Varga considered revolutions abroad less likely and less necessary.

Varga's ideas were unchallenged during 1946 and most of 1947. Moreover, they were mostly given a warm welcome. But by the end of 1947 the voice of the critics had become amplified by the above outlined developments. Voznesenskii, already a Politburo member, attacked Varga publicly in his book "The Wartime Economy of the USSR During the Great Patriotic War", published in December, 1947. Zhdanov's son, Yurii as head of the Agitprop's Science Section was responsible for the field of economic science, and in this capacity he presumably sanctioned the attacks.

Voznesenskii in his book claimed that the Capitalist economies had been severely devastated, whereas the Soviet economy had been left practically intact by the war. The talk about planning in the West is merely a wish, since the state had played no decisive role in the war economies of capitalism. According to Voznesenskii, it was still the monopolies that controlled the capitalist economic policies, consequently, the transition from war to peacetime production would produce crises and mass unemployment.

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After Voznesenskii had started the attack, Varga came under severe criticism from all directions, but he was not executed, never arrested, and practically was not affected by the entire hysteria measured by contemporary Soviet standards\(^{64}\).

Stalin presumably shared some of Varga’s basic ideas, which can be inferred beside the outcome of Varga’s fate from Stalin’s interview with the Republican Presidential aspirant Harold Stassen in April, 1947. In that conversation Stalin played the role of the interviewer and elicited responses from Stassen concerning the prospects of the American economy that supported the essence of Varga’s ideas, namely that state regulation of the capitalist economy was feasible. In May, 1947 after the text of the interview had been published in the United States, Pravda accused the American press of altering Stalin’s words. Later the Moscow radio claimed that Stalin did not use the word "regulation" and the actual word was "control". These words were exactly the pivotal elements of the Varga debate. Two and a half years later Malenkov quoted Stalin’s words from the document published in the United States and he used the expression "regulation", removing all doubts about its authenticity, and giving an expected answer to the

\(^{64}\) Hahn, pp. 84-94.
speculations about who had been behind the changing of the text.\footnote{Taubman, pp. 137-142.; Tikos (1972), pp. 76-87.; Tikos (1965), pp. 115-120.}

It was not accidental that the fall of Zhdanov and the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform took place at the same time. The Soviet-Yugoslav rift had interfactional aspects within Moscow, since Stalin was not pleased with Zhdanov's attempts to create a power base abroad through the Cominform organization. Stalin in January, 1948 summoned Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations into the Kremlin and invited Malenkov and M. Suslov, who later denounced Voznesenskii, to the discussions. The topic of the meeting was to be the Balkan Federation the Yugoslavs and the Bulgarians were working on. Despite the fact that the plan had previously been endorsed by Molotov, Stalin at the meeting came up with serious objections. In fact he did not oppose the idea of federations, and he even proposed that similar federations should be established between Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania, as well as between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. It is more likely that Stalin used the question of federations only as a pretext to bring things to a head and break up Zhdanov's Balkan cobweb which was threatening to gain a state-organizational form beyond being an ideological bloc. During the Moscow talks, a few members of the Yugoslav delegation made a trip to...
Leningrad that ultimately infuriated Stalin, since the Leningrad party organization was one of Zhdanov's most important strongholds. He warned the Yugoslav leaders in a letter written in May, 1948 that if Tito meddled into the Soviet factional struggles, he would have no basis to object if Stalin sent his own agents to Belgrade.\textsuperscript{66}

By that time Zhdanov was no longer in a position to save the Yugoslavs. During the second Cominform meeting in June, 1948, where the Soviet delegation included Malenkov and Suslov beside Zhdanov, a resolution was passed condemning Yugoslavs for pursuing an anti-Soviet foreign policy. The decision was published under the name of Zhdanov, which was a humiliation similar to that of Bukharin who had been forced to denounce his "Rightist" associates two decades earlier. Malenkov had done the same with Aleksandrov at the founding meeting of the Cominform.\textsuperscript{67}

Shortly after the Cominform meeting Zhdanov died, probably under natural circumstances, and it was again Malenkov and Beriya, as during the war, who gained the upper hand in the factional debates. The finale of the first four postwar years of Soviet internal politics was the Leningrad Affair, apparently staged against Zhdanov's followers whose cradle and center was Leningrad, the revolutionary city. After Suslov became a member in the Secretariat, and

\textsuperscript{66} Ra'anan, pp. 137-142.; Djilas, pp. 166-169.

\textsuperscript{67} Hahn, pp. 98-99.; Ra'anan, p. 143.
Malenkov also managed to regain his membership, they with the help of Beriya "succeeded" in revealing a plot emanating in Leningrad. The charges were so secret that even Politburo members did not know about them. It was only after Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 that some information leaked out about the case. There are Western sources that refer to certain Soviet observers who claim that the Zhdanov group was attempting to create a separate party organization for the Russian Federation centered in Leningrad. The main victims of the purge were Voznesenskiy and Kuznetsov who were shot in 1950 along with several other secondary characters of the story.

Malenkov and Beriya placed the final gloss on the profile of the Cominform that resembled in almost every respect its predecessor. By 1949 thoroughly uniformized Stalinist regimes were established and the remnants of political freedom were rooted out completely. The showtrials to eliminate insurrectionist local leaders who were not willing to give up the right for individual initiative followed the Soviet pattern of the thirties and were coordinated by Beriya's secret police connections. The economies of the satellite countries were transformed along the lines of five-year plans outlawing private ownership and enterprise.

69 Khrushchev, pp. 245-258.; Hahn, pp. 122-129.
In 1949 the Council of Mutual Economic Aid was established to isolate the Eastern European economies from Western capitalist influence and to provide an organization to keep them under control.

2.2 Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the United States, 1945-1948

2.2.1 American Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945-1946

The United States emerged from World War II as the preponderant country in the world. Warfare had taken place outside the American Continent, thereby the infrastructure remained undamaged. However, the United States, as member of the Grand Alliance established an immense standing army and transformed its powerful economy to concentrate on the war effort. While these changes had been indispensable for the victory, the disarmament and the transition to peacetime routines created a series of tensions that affected the political affairs of the first postwar years. Despite the large-scale demobilization the American military was considered the strongest because of its long-range air force, sizeable navy, and most importantly, its nuclear monopoly. These factors created a tangible sense of security
and predominance within the American leadership in the immediate postwar months.  

On April 12, 1945 shortly after having taken the oath, the new President, Harry S. Truman expressed to his Cabinet members that he intended to continue the late Franklin Roosevelt's policies, but also made it clear that he would be President in his own right. Although before he became Vice President he had been working in the Senate for ten years and maintained a broad set of connections in the legislative body and among the close colleagues of Roosevelt, some of his new advisors had uneasy feelings concerning Truman as President. Admiral Leahy was afraid that for a man so "completely inexperienced in international affairs" certain difficult issues might prove insoluble, and even General Marshall said that "only time could tell what he was really like." However, Truman was not absolutely ignorant about the situation of his country. As a Senator he was the chairman of the Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program whose creation he proposed, and while coordinating its operation he got to know almost everything about the American war effort.

Besides, he had spent most of his youth reading books on history after he had been prescribed strong glasses which

70 Ambrose, pp. 92-121.
71 Druks, p. 9.
72 Truman (vol. 1), pp. 118-211.
had prevented him from participating in the dangerous games of kids of his age\textsuperscript{73}. He still vividly remembered the failure of the League of Nations to stop the Japanese in Manchuria, the Italians in Ethiopia, the Germans in the Rhineland or Czechoslovakia, and the Spanish Civil War, and concluded that all these debacles had originated in the United States' refusal to join the League. He often recalled that after 1933 isolationism was furthered by both the Democrats and the Republicans, and that position was abandoned only after the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. Truman also felt the need for an adequate preparedness for defense, because he viewed that democracy had to be ready to defend itself against dictatorship. In relation to the Russians he had for long espoused a rather strong anti-Communist stance, and remained throughout the war of the opinion that the Soviet Union was a difficult wartime ally and would be a "troublesome peacetime partner". He considered upholding of the Yalta agreements and turning back the tide of isolationism in America his cardinal foreign policy task\textsuperscript{74}.

One of Truman's first and most important decisions was the appointment of James Byrnes Secretary of State. Byrnes had been Senator between 1931 and 1941 when he was proposed by Roosevelt to the Supreme Court, but shortly after that as the United States entered the war the President asked him to

\textsuperscript{73} Truman (vol. 1), pp. 135., 138-141.

\textsuperscript{74} Truman (vol. 1), p. 175.
give up his lifetime position and become the leader of the Office of Economic Stabilization. In 1943 he was elevated even higher, and became the chairman of the Office of War Mobilization which meant, according to many observers that Byrnes was the "Assistant President" in charge of domestic affairs. One of the most important episodes that strongly affected his relationship with the new President had been Roosevelt’s decision to nominate Truman for the Vice Presidency instead of Byrnes. Now that Truman became President he clearly wanted to make that affair up to Byrnes and appointed him Secretary of State who was to succeed him as President in case he died (since the elected President was not alive). But Byrnes probably never forgot that actually he could have been President at the moment and not Truman75.

Byrnes was considered an expert on the Yalta Conference, mainly because no official minutes about the secret conversations existed. Truman asked Byrnes to transcribe the shorthand notes he had made during the Conference and share it with him, which happened on April 23, 1945. During their conversation that day since both of them were already in possession of the atomic secret, Byrnes was of the opinion that the circumstances would enable the United States to dictate its own terms.

April 23 was also the day of a significant meeting of Truman with his top military advisors and with Molotov who arrived to participate in the San Francisco Conference. According to Admiral Leahy there was a consensus of opinions among the advisors that the United States should take a firm stand in affairs concerning the Soviet Union. However, two of the participants warned about the possible consequences of such policies. Secretary Stimson, who favored the balance-of-power approach to world politics and considered the acceptance of spheres of influence a way to avoid collision with the Soviets, called for cautiousness, and proposed that the settlement of territorial acquisitions and the question of the influence the great powers could exert in Eastern Europe must precede the establishment of the United Nations. General Marshall also advised Truman to exercise more caution, because the Soviets might delay entry into the Pacific war until the United States had carried out the dirty work.

Stalin’s decision to refuse to send Molotov to the San Francisco Conference as a response to Western objections about his policies in Poland also pushed Truman toward a stiffer stance. Ambassador Harriman, to resolve the conflict, suggested to Stalin that Molotov’s participation

76 Leahy, April 23, 1945
77 Schlesinger, p. 234.
78 LaFeber, pp. 96., 98-100.
would be a step in the right direction. He even offered a special plane to get the Soviet Foreign Minister to San Francisco. The Generalissimo finally gave in. Beside Harriman's efforts it is likely that Stalin was more than curious about the new President and wanted to get first hand information about him. If that was his intention he got it. Already in possession of a full knowledge about the atomic experiments and after meeting with Harriman where they had agreed that it had been time to "make it plain to the Soviet government" that the United States would not forever allow the Soviet Union to do anything it wanted, Truman talked to Molotov in a language that shocked even Charles Bohlen, his interpreter, who was otherwise pleased by this bluntness. But it was not only Harriman who convinced Truman about the necessity of a firm stance. Bernard Baruch in his report to the President believed that the Soviet Union could be handled if "we kept our promises and insisted that Russia do the same, and if we had a concise grasp of our policy". A friendly firmness, a strict control of Germany, a new peace making machinery, and aid to Britain would result in a stable and acceptable world order.

President Truman kept this advice especially in relation to the United Nations, but in this area he cooperated with another character who did not make it easier for his pro-

79 Druks, p. 35.
80 Baruch, pp. 357-358.
Soviet sentiments, if there were any, to come into the foreground. Prime Minister Churchill proposed that the Western allies should retain the occupied territories together with Berlin, Prague and Vienna to gain a more advantageous position during the subsequent negotiations, but Truman asked how could America expect Stalin observe the agreements if itself broke them. Nevertheless, Churchill's remarks probably helped Truman at the San Francisco Conference to refuse to yield to the Soviet demands, because he remembered the failure of the League of Nations and knew that an effective Charter was indispensable. Churchill also wanted an early Big-Three meeting to negotiate from a more favorable position, but Truman decided on postponement. There were several domestic questions and budgetary problems to be solved, he had a new Secretary of State, but most importantly he wanted to give those working on the atomic bomb more time so that he could negotiate in possession of the good news.

Although within the highest circles the new approach toward the Soviets was already being formulated, the American public, which is an important component to be taken into account during policy formulation, was still so friendly to the Russians that they did not even want to hear about accusations. During the 1945 Congressional debates only a few Congressmen warned against a Soviet danger, and

81 Stimson, May 12, 1945.
Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes said that those who claimed that the Soviet Union was dangerous were the same who had not expected Hitler to attack us. According to General Eisenhower cooperation with the Russians was possible, and greater contact would lead to greater understanding.

Truman himself also did not want to take a hostile stance until he was sure that the Soviets did not want to cooperate, but also wanted to retain the support of Britain. Therefore he decided to dispatch missions to Stalin and Churchill as a preparation for the Potsdam Conference and as reassurance that he advocated cooperation. Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s all-purpose troubleshooter and Joseph Davies, former Ambassador to Moscow were both pro-Russian and anti-colonialist diplomats and a right choice to carry out the President’s intentions.

Hopkins was always optimistic about the policies of the Russians, and considered that everything should be done to promote the Big-Three cooperation. As Charles Bohlen noted, no one tried harder to preserve the wartime alliance. Hopkins had a mild, but successful negotiation with Stalin. They came to an agreement on the Polish issue, Stalin accepted the right for a free debate in the General Assembly of the United Nations and again promised a Soviet entry into the Pacific war. Hopkins also explained to Stalin that the

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82 Druks, pp. 42-43.
abrupt termination of the Lend-Lease was only a procedural mistake. However, Harriman felt that Stalin would never "fully understand our interest in a free Poland as a matter of principle."83

Davies interpreted Truman's views to Churchill, namely that the world situation was dangerous due to the disagreements concerning the Yalta provisions. Churchill warned that a "steel curtain" was being built between Eastern and Western Europe, and because of this the United States should keep its forces on the Old Continent and retain the currently occupied territories. He also signalled that in case America failed to do so, Britain still had superior air power and it was still difficult to cross the Channel. Davies reiterated Truman's intention to carry out the Yalta agreement and expressed his shock at Britain's attitude toward the Soviet Union84.

However, after the Postdam Conference, where Truman was informed about the successful explosion of the atomic bomb which made him boss the whole meeting, as Churchill observed, the President had a much clearer picture about the Soviet ambitions85. He ultimately concluded that the Soviets were aiming to expand not only in Europe, but also toward

84 Druks, p. 46.
85 Stimson, July 22, 1945.
the Middle East and North Africa, but he also thought that a great deal of it was only a bluff.\footnote{Truman (vol. 1), pp. 454-455.}

Stalin maintained his promise to declare war on Japan, which was still considered necessary. On June 18 General Marshall advised the President that a Soviet entry would be a "decisive action levering them (Japan) into capitulation". Admiral King was hesitant whether it was really necessary, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 21 repeatedly advocated the Russian participation. Marshall said if America fought alone nothing would prevent the Soviet Union from marching right into Manchuria and taking whatever they wanted. During the Potsdam Conference on July 29 Molotov proposed that the United States should publicly invite the Soviet Union to enter, which, naturally, was immediately rejected by Truman.\footnote{Druks, p. 69.}

Nonetheless, the Soviets declared war on Japan as scheduled, and after the two nuclear attacks the Japanese surrendered a year earlier than it had been expected in April.

During the immediate postwar months there was a continuous communication between the members of the former Grand Alliance. The scene of these negotiations was the Council of Foreign Ministers established at Potsdam, but
which proved to be basically futile apart from the conclusion of the peace terms with the former Nazi satellites.

Furthermore, the first two Foreign ministers’ Conferences provided certain events which contributed to Secretary Byrnes’s subsequent replacement. The London Foreign Ministers Conference in October, 1945 adjourned without any result fundamentally because of Molotov’s intransigence, but before all channels had been tried to reach some compromise, Byrnes, without consulting the President or the members of the delegation, persuaded the Chinese Minister to declare the conference ended. On their way home from London Byrnes indicated his uneasiness about his decision, but this time no consequences followed. Ambassador Harriman visited Stalin at the Black Sea after the futile Conference, and they succeeded in establishing some basis for compromise. Byrnes did not want to miss the opportunity to repair his London mistake, and called for a Foreign Ministers Meeting to Moscow, but against the advice of senior diplomats. Prior to his departure he briefed a number of Senators on his plan to get Soviet approval to create an atomic energy commission under the authority of the United Nations. The Senators felt that Byrnes wanted to share information about nuclear experiments with the Russians before establishing adequate institutions for inspection. They asked the President about

his intentions and Truman reassured them that he would not give out atomic secrets. He cabled Byrnes not to do so, and Byrnes cabled back that he agreed89.

The atmosphere of the December, 1945 Moscow Conference was far from pleasant. Byrnes had not suggested the participation of the French to please Stalin, and Bevin also was sidetracked during most of the discussions. The whole Conference was hastily improvized, thoroughly disorganized, and items were put on the agenda without proper preparation. Byrnes ran much of the negotiations from his own head. Furthermore, the Secretary was not sending back regular reports to the President as had been the case in other conferences. When Bohlen, his aide and interpreter asked why, Byrnes replied sharply that he knew when to report.

That time his performance had serious consequences. The press declared the Moscow Conference an "eastern Munich" and Byrnes a new Chamberlain, because he agreed to a partial broadening of the Bulgarian and Rumanian governments, which was a retreat from the Yalta agreements90.

However, his main critic was the President himself. He was infuriated because of Byrnes's one-man show, and because he ignored Ambassador Harriman. According to Harriman and Samuel Rosenmann, counsel to the President, Byrnes behaved independently because he was jealous of Truman and he

89 Truman (vol. 1), pp. 547-548.
90 Druks, p. 89.
thought that Truman had stolen the Presidency from him. Leahy reported that Truman was angry because Byrnes had not consulted with him about the Moscow agreements, and the Secretary was trying to lead the American foreign policy in a direction the President could not accept. Byrnes's personal style was to operate as a loner, keeping matters restricted to a small circle of advisers, which method inevitably conflicted with Truman's strong views on the prerogatives of the President. Besides, Byrnes was considerably senior to Truman in the Democratic Party, so he might have felt that he was entitled to have an independent position. Truman wrote him a letter and read it out to him (he denies it) in which the President expressed his discontent about the Secretary's manner of conducting policy. He reiterated that he opposed extending recognition to Bulgaria and Rumania unless the governments of those countries included all democratic elements. Truman felt there would be war unless the Soviet Union was faced with determined resistance. That was the time when Truman decided to replace Byrnes with Marshall, as soon as the General accomplished his mission in China.

During 1945 and 1946 advisors of the President continuously worked on assessing Soviet intentions and the military power that would support the particular policies.

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91 Leahy, December 28, 1945.

According to one of the most characteristic estimates set forth by Rear Admiral Inglis, Chief of Naval intelligence, the Soviet land armies were powerful enough to take over all of Europe except the British Isles, the Middle East, and North Africa, but the they would not fight until they had reconstructed their economy and transportation, stockpiled an atomic arsenal, and consolidated their position in Eastern Europe. As Inglis pointed out, there were more than ten million people in forced labor camps in the Soviet Union, and much of the army was kept abroad because there was not enough food and accommodation at home.\(^3\)

George Kennan, Charge d’Affaires in Moscow also believed that the Soviet union was bent upon disrupting the American society and destroying the American international authority to secure its power, but not by war. According to Harriman, Russia would not provoke war if it realized that the United States would not make endless concessions. But if not met with a firm resistance and not contained at all fronts, Communism would not hesitate to take over power in all of Europe.\(^4\)

These opinions were supported by the events of the Iranian crisis. The State Department correctly assessed the situation as different from that in Eastern Europe. In Iran there was no pro-Soviet government on power that could have

\(^3\) Druks, p. 95.

objected to the "meddling into their internal affairs". Furthermore, the Soviets were met by a united opposition in the UN Security Council and they had no choice but to yield on the issue\textsuperscript{95}. Credit should be given to Byrnes who had the courage to throw the full support of the United States behind such a small country on the border of the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{96}.

The Paris Peace Conference that took place between July and October, 1946 was the only negotiation where the Soviet and American delegations achieved genuine results but also it was during that conference when one of the most peculiar episodes of Truman’s first Presidential term happened.

Henry Wallace was a prominent representative of the New Deal, he had been Secretary of Agriculture and later Vice President for Roosevelt, and Truman retained him in his Cabinet as Secretary of Commerce. He had always opposed the firm stance toward Russia taken by the Truman administration, but in 1945 he generally remained quiet in his critiques. However, after the Fulton speech he thought Churchill was taking advantage of Truman’s hospitality and was trying to force his own militancy on the President. Wallace in a letter to the Mexican President wrote that Churchill insulted Truman by trying to imply that the

\textsuperscript{95} Bohlen, pp. 251-252.

\textsuperscript{96} Bohlen, p. 257.
President’s presence meant an endorsement of the speech which had conveyed that "intervention in Europe was advisable when Anglo-American forces were strengthened". In a letter to Truman on March 14, 1946 which was not answered, and in another one written in July, Wallace warned the President about the danger of a new war and called on him to share the nuclear secrets with the Russians and to destroy all atomic weapons. He believed relations could be improved by extending economic contacts.97

Truman answered in a cordial manner, but felt that Wallace was willing to give in to the Soviets to achieve better world situation. Finally, on September 12, in a speech in Madison Square Garden Wallace launched an all-out attack on the administration’s foreign policy. He criticized Truman’s "get-tough" policy and the military, claiming that "only the United Nations should have atomic bombs and its military establishment should give special emphasis to air power. It should have control of the strategically located air bases with which the United States and Britain have encircled the world".98

According to Karl Schmidt Truman knew all about the speech, since Wallace had showed it to him and had read the text out.99 Wallace in his diary recalled the encounter as

97 Yarnell, pp. 1-3.
98 Yarnell, pp. 4-8.; Truman (vol. 1), p. 612.
follows: "At the meeting with the President I went over page by page with him my Madison Square Garden speech to be given on September 12. Again and again he said, "That's right"; Yes, that is what I believe." He didn't have a single change to suggest. He twice said how deeply he appreciated my courtesy in showing him my speech before I gave it... The President apparently saw no inconsistency between my speech and what Byrnes was doing - if he did, he didn't indicate it in any way..."\textsuperscript{100} Truman denied this, saying that when they met on September 10, they were talking about issues unrelated to foreign policy, and Wallace mentioned his planned speech only in the last part of the conversation when there was no time left for him to read it even in parts. He simply welcomed Wallace's intention to deliver a speech. After the speech, Truman told reporters answering a question that he had approved of the whole speech, but on September 14 when tensions were going high he had to issue a communiqué stating that he had been misunderstood and there had been no change in the administration's foreign policy\textsuperscript{101}.

It is inconceivable that the President would have endorsed the speech if he had carefully read it, but Wallace's view could not be a surprise for him after the two letters he had received.

\textsuperscript{100} Wallace, pp. 612-613.

\textsuperscript{101} Truman (vol. 1), pp. 609-613.
John Foster Dulles, the leading Republican foreign policy expert was disturbed by the incident, and he wrote Senator Taft that if the Russians perceived that the United States was divided it might increase chances of war. According to the Republican National Committee, Truman "betrayed Mr. Byrnes and was bidding for the support of the CIO Political Action Committee which favored appeasing the Russians abroad and promoting communism at home". Although Senator Vandenberg reiterated that Republicans would continue to support bi-partisan foreign policy, he indicated that they could cooperate with only "one Secretary of State at a time". Senator Connally, a leading Democrat on foreign affairs insisted that in the present situation there was no room for "partisan politics or intraparty division or personal ambition". Meanwhile, Wallace released the letters he had written to the President in March and July which made it clear that Truman had been aware of his Secretary's foreign policy views102.

The whole affair was especially awkward for the administration because Byrnes was in the middle of the peace negotiations that for the first time appeared to be successful, and Bernard Baruch was working on the American proposal on atomic energy to the United Nations. Byrnes threatened to quit if Wallace's activity would be tolerated, and the next day Wallace was fired. He was replaced by

Averell Harriman as Secretary of Commerce which was a clear indication that Truman was not willing to modify his stance.\textsuperscript{103}

In concluding our treatment of the first two postwar years in American foreign policy formation we can point out that although Truman identified himself with most of Roosevelt's policies, he was compelled to seek a new foreign policy approach on the one hand by the changed international situation, and by the largely uncompromising attitude of most of his top advisors. He could no longer count on the Russians as allies, but channels of communication and cooperation were still maintained and used by both sides. The Soviet Union was seen as an expansionist power with a large military establishment, but also as one with serious economic problems, and it was believed by taking a firm stance the expansion could be contained.

\textbf{2.2.2 Change in American Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, 1947-1948}

Act II of Truman's first term started with the debacle of the Democratic Party at the 1946 Congressional elections. The President at the time seemed very weak, and chances for his renomination were slight. The Republican gains meant a

\textsuperscript{103} Truman (vol. 1), pp. 614-615.
divided government for 1947-1948 and indicated a Republican victory for 1948. The Democrats were defeated for several reasons. After four years of war substantial savings had accumulated with the population because of the wartime restraints, people were eager to buy commodities that had been scarce during the war, but there was a shortage of practically all goods. There were severe housing problems, thousands of veterans were homeless. Furthermore, the 1946 removal of price control caused high inflation which threatened the savings of the population.

The administration got into conflict with the traditional supporters of the Democratic Party, as well. In 1946, 116 million man-days of work were lost due to strikes in the auto and steel industries and at the railways. Truman took an uncompromising stance with the strikers, which was judged as a curtailment of basic freedoms even by politicians like Senator Taft who was not famous for being fond of labor organizations. The exodus of New Dealers from the Cabinet and their replacement often with undistinguished friends of Truman resulted in the disaffection of many liberals.\footnote{Hartman, pp. 3-7.}

The bloc of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans which had represented an opposition since the Seventy Eighth Congress between 1944 and 1946 now gained substantial strength.
The Republicans after a negative campaign came up with their own legislative program based on tax reduction and drastic cut in federal spending, and with relatively slight emphasis on foreign policy. Senator Taft, the Republican leader in his January 3, 1946 radio speech devoted only a very short time to that area, predicting Congressional resistance to large-scale foreign assistance and tariff reductions, but favored the continuation of bi-partisanship endorsed by senator Vandenberg.105

Taft’s leadership did not extend to foreign policy questions. A strategic "division of labor" existed between him and Vandenberg, who expressed his confidence in Taft’s dominance in domestic issues, while Taft for this reason shared his power with him. Vandenberg’s counterpart in the House Foreign Affairs Committee was Charles Eaton who was also supporter of internationalism and bi-partisanship and who proved to be a key figure beside Vandenberg in creating a smooth cooperation between the Congress and the administration.106

In working out its own legislative agenda recovering after the election defeat, the administration identified itself with the report made by White House staff member James Rowe, Jr. Rowe considered the clash between the


106 Vandenberg, pp. 318-319.
President and the Congress inevitable, for this reason he recommended that Truman prepare his proposals on legislation in as general a manner as possible and in a conciliatory tone. According to Rowe the President should insist on bipartisan cooperation and avoid emphasizing differences between programs of the administration and the Congressional majority.\textsuperscript{107}

Prospects for a successful performance were not favorable. There were heated intraparty debates among Democrats, and Truman did not enjoy much respect. Senator Fulbright proposed that the President appoint a Republican Secretary of State and then resign. Former Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn refused to be the minority leader, and he accepted the post only after strong White House pressures. All this convinced Truman to set forth a moderate legislative program.\textsuperscript{108}

Meanwhile Henry Wallace got into the limelight. Although throughout most of 1947 he denied that he intended to lead a third party, during his visits abroad he continued his attack on Truman and started to indicate that he would not support him in 1948. The White house wanted to be very careful with Wallace, since for a great number of voters he was still associated with the New Deal, but it was also

\textsuperscript{107} Hartman, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{108} Hartman, p. 18.
calculated that his sharp attacks might alienate the voters rather than winning a larger support\textsuperscript{109}.

The first five months of the Congress passed in a conciliatory atmosphere mainly because of the intraparty conflicts of the GOP delayed the presentation of the controversial parts of their program on tax and labor legislation.

Tranquil relations between the President and the Congress during the first months of 1947 extended into the area of foreign affairs, as well. The appointment of General Marshall to replace Byrnes as Secretary of State also was a factor that helped maintain bi-partisanship, and enjoying the support of Vandenberg and Eaton. The Greek-Turkish Aid, the peace treaties with the former Nazi-allies, a relief aid for Europe, and the National Security Act successfully went through the Congressional procedures\textsuperscript{110}.

Although most Republicans were firmly anti-Communist and politically internationalist, they were reluctant to spend the money of the taxpayers abroad and were skeptical about "free trade" in general. This was manifested in the rejection of the original form of the reciprocal-trade program, and the United States could join the GATT only after the agreements of a series of special negotiations

\textsuperscript{109} Yarnell, pp. 14-19.

\textsuperscript{110} Bohlen, pp. 258-259.
between the State Department and the Republicans had been included in an executive order\textsuperscript{111}.

The tough times for Truman in the Congress came after changes in the world policy trends necessitated a new approach, which required Congressional authorization.

When Ambassador Smith asked Stalin "How far is Russia going to go?", the Generalissimo replied "We're not going much further"\textsuperscript{112}. Approximately that was the extent the United States government was familiar with Soviet intentions, and we are not much more informed at this moment, either. Nonetheless, the administration's response to the British announcement of their inability to maintain support of Greece, and to the Russian diplomatic pressures on Turkey concerning the Black Sea straits was a dramatic but predictable continuation of the foreign policy shift initiated shortly after the conclusion of the war. America assumed Britain's responsibilities in the Eastern Mediterranean, and maybe the only dissident was George Kennan who regarded the Soviet threat as political and economic. He opposed giving military assistance to Turkey that might provoke the Russians, but supported an economic and political aid to Greece\textsuperscript{113}.

\textsuperscript{111} Hartman, pp. 49-53.

\textsuperscript{112} Smith, Walter B., pp. 53-54.

\textsuperscript{113} Kennan (1964), pp. 332-339.
After consulting Harriman, Under Secretary of State Acheson, and Secretary of Defense Forrestal, Truman decided to appear before the Congress. Vandenberg also summoned a meeting of the Republican Policy Conference and asked the Senators to endorse the President’s proposal. Truman knew that the Congress would not support his aid plan unless confronted with the situation in a way that they could not reject it. Meeting with Congressional leaders on February 27, Acheson presented a dramatic situation in the Mediterranean and all over the world, and although the participants of the meeting were impressed, Vandenberg still insisted that in order to secure success the President should "scare the hell out of the people". When Marshall received the draft of Truman’s speech the President was to deliver before the Congress, he felt that there was a little too much anti-Communism in it, but his reservations were rejected on the basis of the arguments mentioned above. Kennan and Bohlen were also taken by surprise by the sweeping and uncompromising tone of the speech\textsuperscript{114}.

The Congress was confronted with a situation where opposition to the bill meant appeasing Communism\textsuperscript{115}. Despite this, many critics feared that the United States would commit itself to an excessively broad policy of intervention and foreign aid, and that bypassing the United Nations and


\textsuperscript{115} Ambrose, pp. 124-134.
acting against the Soviet Union would lead to war. Vandenberg also joined the critics, since he saw bipartisanship violated because the President had not consulted the Republicans prior to making his decision about the aid. He also claimed that the administration was too slow in dealing with Britain's economic decline, and the situation was so grave that only a Truman-Stalin meeting could save the possibilities of an American-Soviet cooperation. While some Senators accused the President of endangering the security of the United States by breaking with the traditional foreign policy line, others, like Senator Fulbright said the bill did not go far enough and an overall Middle East policy was necessary. He called for the clarification of the American determination to resist "any attempt on Russia's part to destroy liberty and freedom", and said that it was necessary to establish a Federation of Europe.

Senator Claude Pepper, who rallied behind Wallace's movement objected to the belligerent tone of Truman's speech and feared that the bill would make reconciliation with Russia impossible. Wallace himself accused the President of "whipping up anti-Communist hysteria", while others were afraid that the aid program would necessitate instituting strict controls and would result in strengthening the

116 Druks, p. 106.
117 Druks, p. 138.
executive power. To reassure uneasy legislators and the public, Acheson at the committee hearings placed limits on the universal character of the proposal by binding it to the current issue in the Mediterranean, while senators Vandenberg and Connally drafted amendments enabling the United Nations to terminate the program if it considered it unnecessary or unfavorable. By passing the bill isolationism was broken in America, and Truman took the offensive in the Cold War.\textsuperscript{118}

In a parallel legislation to extend UNRRA aid to European countries, which plan lacked the strong anti-Communist potential, the administration had to face a much more substantial resistance, and the originally proposed $350 million was cut to $200 million.\textsuperscript{119}

The peace treaties with former Nazi-allies did not represent a major issue and did not stir significant debate. The main topic of the objections raised by Senator Fulbright was that endorsing Soviet gains would leave countries, especially Italy, vulnerable to Communism, as the example of Hungary showed in May, 1947.\textsuperscript{120}

The Plan to unify the armed forces under one department had been on the agenda since the end of the war, but consensus between the Army and the Navy was not reached.

\textsuperscript{118} Druks, p. 142.; Acheson, p. 225.

\textsuperscript{119} Hartman, p. 65.

\textsuperscript{120} Hartman, p. 67.
until January, 1947, and then after a short Congressional debate the National Security Act was passed\textsuperscript{121}. 

Having finished the most important foreign policy issues, Congress set to put the final gloss on its domestic agenda. The Republicans managed to settle their factional disputes that had prevented them from presenting controversial proposals. Truman also had to break with his conciliatory posture since he strongly opposed the Republican views on the upcoming issues\textsuperscript{122}. Furthermore, in the summer of 1947 he was advised to decide what he wanted to do with Wallace, because since the passing of the Truman Doctrine and the announcement of the Marshall Plan there had been a growing distance between the policy of the administration and Wallace's declarations. In a memo to Clark Clifford, sent by his aide George Elsey the administration was called for action. Elsey perceived a substantial crowd of supporters behind Wallace consisting of isolationists, conservatives, and Communists, who feared that Truman's policies meant war. Elsey also considered Wallace a potential Presidential candidate for 1948\textsuperscript{123}. Wallace was gaining some followers even in the Congress in the person of Senator Glen Taylor and Senator Claude Pepper, and he could be proud of enjoying

\textsuperscript{121} Truman (vol. 2), pp. 63-79. 
\textsuperscript{122} Hartman, p. 71. 
\textsuperscript{123} Elsey Memo to Clifford, "Cooperation - Or Conflict? - The President's Relationship With and Opposition Congress". December 1946, in Clifford Papers, noted in Hartman, p. 75.
the support of other distinguished personalities, like Albert Einstein who had expressed his admiration about Wallace’s policies in a letter written in September, 1946\textsuperscript{124}.

The impact of this shift within the administration toward a tougher stance concerning the Wallace affair was certainly present at the Presidential veto of the Taft-Hartley bill in June, 1947. Traditionally the firmest support for the Democratic Party came from the organized labor, but certain measures of Truman during the 1946 railroad strikes had alienated the workers from the Democrats. After the Congress passed the Taft-Hartley bill, the probability that workers would line up behind a third party became very high. The bill provided for sweeping changes in labor policy. Jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts were prohibited, inter-industry bargaining was banned, and rights of the unions were curbed. Although major provisions were amended out, the veto was still inevitable for Truman to enhance his image as the defender of the common man. Wallace himself admitted that the veto was an important action to save the support of organized labor for the Democrats\textsuperscript{125}.

The central issue of Truman’s foreign policy in the fall of 1947 and in the spring of 1948 was the European Recovery Program. Secretary of State Marshall late in April, 1947,

\textsuperscript{124} Yarnell, pp. 58., 62., 12.

\textsuperscript{125} Truman (vol. 2), pp. 45., 542.
upon arriving home from an abortive Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow presented to the President a report outlining his conviction that the Soviets were determined to take advantage of Europe's helpless economic situation. In Moscow Marshall came to the conclusion that Stalin, looking over to Europe saw that the best way to advance Soviet interests in the West was to let matters drift, let the devastated European economy go bankrupt by intransigence and refusing to cooperate. The Generalissimo showed indifference about the futility of the negotiations: "We may agree the next time, or if not then, the time after that". The plan to combat the situation was first outlined by Acheson in a speech delivered on May 8, but which did not get much publicity\textsuperscript{126}.

Although Vandenberg and Eaton agreed on the necessity of a large-scale aid program, and Harold Stassen, Republican Presidential aspirant also called the GOP to rise above "petty grievances" and fixed opposition concerning that issue, the Marshall aid package still had a long way to go till acceptance. First of all, the Administration was not prepared to include the Soviet Union and its satellites into the program, since it would have made it unacceptable for the Congress. Although the Soviet withdrawal from the Paris talks eliminated the greatest obstacle to the passage, the Congress was still far from being convinced. The President

\textsuperscript{126} Bohlen, pp. 262-263.
as well as reserved in his declarations until September because the recent vetoes and amendments did not create a favorable atmosphere to stir isolationist sentiments and promote proposals requiring large expenses\textsuperscript{127}.

But by September-October the Soviet Union appeared more hostile for the Americans. Numerous Congressmen returned from their European trips with the first-hand experience about the economic situation of the Old Continent, while the Soviets revived the Comintern which encouraged the Western Communists to instigate strikes, especially in France and Italy. Truman requested the Appropriations and Foreign Affairs Committees to consider the need for and urgent aid to Europe, and he signalled that $580 million was necessary for France, Italy, and Austria to survive the winter. He was pressed by Clifford and others to summon a special session, which he did calling the Congress to reconvene on November 17. Since July the special committee concluded their investigations and the President could appear before the Congress with concrete plans\textsuperscript{128}.

During the special session only the interim aid was discussed, because the lack of sufficient support in the Congress prevented the administration from presenting a large-scale assistance program. Senator Taft, and Clarence Brown, the Director of the Republican National Committee

\textsuperscript{127} Hartman, pp. 102-109.

\textsuperscript{128} Hartman, pp. 107-112.
attacked Truman's policies in Germany because they wrecked Europe, and now the American taxpayer was paying for the mistakes. Other opponents emphasized inflationary problems, and the rise in the cost of living. They reminded the President that he had opposed socialism in Greece, but now he was ready to promote it in Britain or France. Senators Pepper and Taylor objected to the bill as a "weapon in an ideological war", and wanted to send the proposition over to the United Nations. Finally the bill for aid of $540 million was passed. As a result of a Republican amendment an aid to China was included in this sum at the expense of the European countries\textsuperscript{129}.

Separate treatment of the interim aid meant additional expenses, but at the same time allowed the administration to gain further support for the long-range plan, and the President on December 19, 1947 asked the Congress to provide $17 billion over a four year period for the European Recovery Program\textsuperscript{130}.

By the end of 1947 Truman succeeded in restoring his liberal image, and public opinion endorsed his ventures in foreign policy. Henry Wallace had no choice but to break with the Democratic Party and join a new political movement. The first indication in the direction of this shift came in

\textsuperscript{129} Hartman, pp. 116-120.

\textsuperscript{130} Bohlen, pp. 265-266.
early December, and he planned to announce his decision publicly before Truman's State of the Union Message scheduled for January 5.¹³¹

A major strategy recommendation to be followed until the elections was presented to Truman in November, 1947 by Clark Clifford, who succeeded Samuel Rosenman as special counsel to the President in June, 1946, and who was considered by many the "top advisor to the Truman administration". The underlying suggestion of Clifford's memorandum was that the alliance of Southern conservatives, Western progressives, and big city labor should be strengthened in order to be successful at the 1948 elections. Clifford predicted that the GOP candidate would be Thomas Dewey, and Henry Wallace would run as a third party candidate with the support of the Communists. Clifford was strongly anti-Communist and since 1946 he had analyzed Soviet-American relations, which helped shape the containment policy. He feared Wallace would take away enough votes from the Democrats to permit a Republican victory. He believed that poor relations with the Russians would intensify, but during crises the American people usually supports the President. An attack against Wallace should be launched "whenever the moment is psychologically correct" by pointing out his Communist connections, but some channels must be left unblocked if he wanted to return to the Democrats. Truman's role as commander-in-chief and

¹³¹ Yarnell, pp. 26-27.
coordinator of the foreign policy should be emphasized, since recently it had been Marshall who had moved into the foreground, but the voters in 1948 would decide about Truman, not Marshall\textsuperscript{132}.

Shortly after Wallace's announcement on December 29, 1947 about his candidacy on the Progressive party's ticket, attack against him intensified. Senator Howard McGrath, chairman of the Democratic National Committee claimed "that a vote for Wallace ... is vote for the things for which Stalin, Molotov, and Vishinsky stand". However, the Progressives seemed to be gaining strength. In February they won a Congressional seat in a special election to fill in a vacancy, after which Senator Taylor announced he would run with Wallace as a Vice Presidential candidate\textsuperscript{133}.

It was time for Truman, who had been reserved so far, to join the anti-Wallace choir. Meanwhile he took up action to step on the offensive in the legislative area, as well. In his State of the Union Message on January 7, 1948 he outlined a broad scope of actions about promoting human rights, development of human and conservation of natural resources, and raising the standard of living. Concerning foreign policy issues the President expressed his continued support for the United Nations and the economic reconstruction of Europe. He insisted that he was "fighting

\textsuperscript{132} Yarnell, pp. 28-46.

\textsuperscript{133} Yarnell, pp. 50-54.
poverty, hunger and suffering...striving to achieve a concord among the peoples... (and) this leads to peace - not war", directly rejecting Wallace’s charges. On February 2 he sent his civil rights message to the Congress to win over the black vote, in which the impact of the Wallace-phenomenon was prominent. 

As far as the Marshall plan was concerned, in December Vandenberg was still worried about the prospects of the large-scale aid program. As he wrote to his wife, "our friend Marshall is going to have a helluva time down here when he gets to his long-range plan". Senator Taft was in favor of a program of less extensive scope, but he compared Marshall’s proposition to the Soviet five-year plans. Instead of the requested $6.6 billion for the first fifteen months Taft cited former President Hoover’s opinion that $4 billion was sufficient. However, after the coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 had convinced twenty to thirty hesitating Republicans, this amendment was turned down in the Senate. During the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing the question of an aid to China reappeared and received an endorsement from former Ambassador to Moscow William Bullitt, former commander in the Far East General Wedemeyer, and General MacArthur. Despite Marshall’s

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134 Truman (vol. 2), pp. 211-214.
objections more than $400 million was appropriated for China within the European Recovery Program\textsuperscript{135}.

On March 17, in a special address to the Congress and later that day in his St. Patrick’s Day speech, Truman for the first time accused the Soviet Union of threatening peace. He openly identified Wallace with the Communists, after the former secretary blamed the Czechoslovakian coup on the administration. According to Wallace, it was a natural reaction for the Soviet Union to consolidate its positions after a series of aggressive steps taken by Truman\textsuperscript{136}.

In his St. Patrick’s Day speech the President touched upon the signing of the Brussels Pact that happened on the same day, and gave it a very warm welcome, but he also perceived that the Brussels Pact was not enough and tried to get bi-partisan support for joining a peacetime military alliance\textsuperscript{137}. On April 27 Marshall, Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, Vandenberg, and Dulles met at Blair House and agreed that a regional pact was needed and the Congress should pass a resolution in favor of it. According to Secretary Forrestal "the tactics would be to have this action initiated by the Republicans and to have the ball picked up immediately by the President". Lovett and

\textsuperscript{135} Hartman, pp. 159-165.
\textsuperscript{136} Hartman, pp. 168-169.
\textsuperscript{137} Truman (vol. 2), pp. 278-279.
Vandenberg drafted a resolution which was passed shortly by the Senate on June 11, and only three weeks later the administration began discussions with European countries about a military alliance\textsuperscript{138}.

Meanwhile, further "cooling" of the Cold War, the Berlin Blockade, the success of the Marshall Plan and the Vandenberg resolution severely undermined Wallace's approach to foreign policy, which was the core of his program. He made a final attempt in early May to save his situation by writing a letter to Stalin, but in the fall campaign the Progressives no longer posed a substantial threat to the Democrats\textsuperscript{139}.

In the final stage of the 1948 campaign the GOP adopted the Vandenberg foreign policy plank that charged the administration with lack of clarity and consistency. The Democrats were criticized for the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, because they allowed the Russians to control the Kuriles, North Korea, and Manchuria, endangering Alaska and the West Coast, and enabled them to cut Europe into two creating instability and dictatorship. Despite these charges foreign policy did not become a decisive issue in the campaign\textsuperscript{140}.

\textsuperscript{138} Truman (vol. 2), pp. 277-283.; Bohlen, pp. 267-268.

\textsuperscript{139} Yarnell, pp. 76-78.

\textsuperscript{140} Hartman, pp. 215-216.
CHAPTER 3
ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1948

As has been pointed out in the introductory chapter, the two most helpful methods to examine the impact of internal factors on foreign policy are to analyze regime vulnerability and fragmentation.

Totalitarian regimes tend to be stable, especially if a certain period of time has passed since their establishment. Oppressive regimes may gain power by either overthrowing a democratic government, or as a continuation of an undemocratic pattern of rule in a particular country. In the latter case, the regime may consolidate its power more rapidly than in the former. However, in both instances the totalitarian leadership is highly vulnerable in its first years of operation.

The communist government of the Soviet Union could not be considered an unexperienced regime in 1945. It had been ruling the country for more than twenty-five years, and most of its top leaders had been in position since the 1920s. The population had time to adapt to the expectations of the communists. Stalin had finished the great purges and had removed practically every element from every stratum of society and the bureaucracy that had represented a potential
threat to his power. This required approximately 50 million lives, but the regime was finally safe.

There had been no change in the top leadership since the mid-twenties. No position in the government or the bureaucracy at any level was subject to competition. There were no political parties, there was basically no political life. The lack of constitutional and legal procedures gave ground to abuses of power without consequences. Accountability was not a factor in Soviet politics. Public officials and the public were separated, with no communication between them. There was no free press or radio that could have revealed the real face of the system. Journalists were members of the regime with political functions to ensure that only one policy line was present in the public mind. If a grain of sand should still have gotten into the machinery, there was one of the most fearful secret polices in history at the Party's disposal.

In short, the Soviet regime was not exposed to a high number of vulnerability factors. The only ones that were present emerged from the effects of the war. As we have discussed, a serious disintegrating process started in the party and the society. The grip had to be eased, and it was difficult to reinstitute it. The mere fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat allied with the most hateful imperialist states shook the ideological basis of the power of the Party. There was a considerable expectation in the
society that Stalin would not return to the pre-war routines. As a matter of course, the very nature of the communist system did not allow the continuation of a freer atmosphere.

In general, democratic regimes are more vulnerable than totalitarian ones. The political group that controls the government has to compete for power with other political formations in regular elections. They are bound to be replaced if their power bases shrink or if their opponents gain more influence than they possess. There is a change at the top if the ruling group violates the written and unwritten rules of the political game. Furthermore, politics takes place under the continuous attention of the public. The population or the electorate judges the leadership either directly on the way political decisions affect their lives, or indirectly through the picture the free media projects about it.

Being a democratic country, these remarks apply to the United States, as well. The period this thesis treats was especially one when the party of government could not feel its power entirely secure. The Democrats had been in the White House and holding a majority in the Congress for more than a decade. Although they were unable to grab the presidency before another seven years, the Republicans were
clearly getting more popular, and in fact they gained a majority in the Congress in 1946.

Additionally, in 1945 the Democrats lost one of their greatest assets, Franklin D. Roosevelt, a leader who had been elected president an unprecedented four times. The new president was far less charismatic than his predecessor and, most importantly, was not identified closely with the New Deal, the political magic word that meant an almost automatic election victory for whoever put it on its flag in the 1940s.

Furthermore, the country had just been through a costly and exhausting world war, and although its domestic economic effects were clearly more positive than negative, it required an enormous effort of demobilization and reorganization.

Finally, there is probably no other country where the mass media has greater influence than in America. The press and the radio stations already in the 1940s were hungry for every piece of information. The public and private life of the most low-ranked politician took place in front of the entire country, and no one of them could afford to make mistakes.

On the basis of the preceding observations, we may claim that there were several vulnerability factors the governing regime in the United States had to take into account. However, the overall American political system, the liberal
democracy based on representation and freedom was not vulnerable. Among the major political groups competing for power there was not a single one that aimed to overthrow the prevailing order. Democratic institutions, market economy, and free enterprise were among the most cherished values that no significant party dared to question. The replacement of governments might take place every four years, but the entire process followed time honored constitutional regulations and affected only the top political positions. Additionally, the institutions of the state were legitimate.

As far as vulnerability is concerned, to conclude the above discussion, the regime in the United States was exposed to several factors that diminished its safety, but the ultimate political order was stable.

The other crucial point of view to be analyzed in order to understand the relationship of internal conditions and foreign policy is regime fragmentation. As we elaborated on it earlier, the concept denotes the existence of competing individuals, institutions, and parties within a regime, each of which demands a share in the decisionmaking process. Furthermore, a single leader’s ability to control the political sphere is also a significant element of regime fragmentation.

Any discussion of personalities in the Soviet Union between the 1920s and 1950s must center around Yosif Stalin.
Opinions vary concerning the extent Stalin could have his own way in the leadership. The picture is more subtle than it is generally presented. On the one hand, Stalin was an unquestioned master. Series of legends and an entire cult of personality were constructed around him. He was respected and feared above any power. Political conspiracies in the background generally were not plotted vertically against him, but horizontally among the secondary factions who competed for his grace. On the other hand, he was aging and more and more exhausted. He was no longer able to devote equal and scrupulous attention to each segment of the country as he had been before the war. His illness attacked him periodically, and then he was compelled to withdraw from his duties completely for weeks.

As far as rank and renown were concerned, Stalin was followed by the longest serving Politburo members. Molotov, Andreyev, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan had been on that body since the twenties, and Stalin had practically no means to eliminate them. However, he probably did not even have to concern himself about them. Despite their eminence they did not participate actively in the power struggles.

According to the main argument of the thesis, the third line in the leadership consisting of Zhdanov, Malenkov, Beriya, and Voznesenskii, was the most dynamic, the most dangerous from Stalin's point of view, and the most effective in influencing key decisions. We have argued that
Zhdanov patronized forces of relative moderation during 1945-1946. During this period he adopted a fairly relaxed view on world affairs. As it can be inferred from his public speeches and policies, he saw no danger of a new war and considered the division within the Grand Alliance to be horizontal, not vertical, that is not between blocs of states, but between certain elements within the states which favored conflict. Voznesenskii appeared also relatively moderate in 1946, calling for establishing balance between heavy industry and consumer production. However, by the summer of 1947, as the Cold War tensions were rising high, and because their position in the Party started to deteriorate, this foreign policy stance proved no longer viable, and they adopted a tougher approach. At the Cominform meeting in September, 1947 and in the campaign on the economic front initiated against the views of Yevgenii Varga, Zhdanov and Voznesenskii were the central characters. The profile of the Cominform that was given to it after the Malenkov group had gained the upper hand in the struggle showed that Zhdanov still advocated the possibility of various ways towards communism. Malenkov and Beriya already in 1946 placed emphasis on international dangers and called for establishing a stronger defense.\(^\text{141}\)

It was not necessary for all personalities in the Politburo to rally behind one of the groupings. Bulganin, \(\text{\textsuperscript{141}}\) Hahn, McCagg, etc. 102
Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Molotov remained uncommitted to either side, though in particular issues they had to join one of them to achieve their goals. After the causes had been accomplished, they always withdrew to the middle. Bulganin participated in Stalin's assault on the army when he became a political deputy minister of the Armed Services. Khrushchev was called back to Moscow in 1949 to counterweight the dominance of the revived Malenkov group\(^\text{142}\); Mikoyan, as Commissar of Foreign Trade, was the chairman of the committee that investigated the dismantling of the German industries\(^\text{143}\). Molotov praised the efforts of the Leningrad leadership during the war and was one of the main figures of the party revival. He and Zhdanov were the father figures of the Nazi-Bolshevik pact, but whereas Zhdanov was made the scapegoat, Molotov's diplomatic skills were useful for Stalin. He put distance between himself and Zhdanov and joined Malenkov and Beriya to suggest to Stalin that he send Zhdanov to Leningrad. In 1945-1947 he maneuvered back to Zhdanov, but without irreversible commitments, although in 1949 during the Leningrad affair he was removed from the top of the Foreign Ministry\(^\text{144}\).

Stalin himself during 1945 and 1946 supported the more moderate approach. After realizing that Zhdanov's

\(^{142}\) Ra'an an, pp. 13-15.

\(^{143}\) Conquest (1968), pp. 645-649.

\(^{144}\) Ra'an an, p. 17.
predominance in the apparatus and his alliance with Tito had become more than dangerous for him he started to back Malenkov and the fast homogenization of Eastern Europe, simultaneously maintaining his friendliness toward the West throughout 1947 and 1948.

Taking a look at the personalities in the immediate postwar American political life, we find a president in the center who did not gain the office through election. He was not new to politics having served as a public official for years at the local level and two terms as a United States Senator. Nevertheless, most of his close advisors had uneasy feelings as to whether he would be able to handle foreign affairs effectively. It need be noted that Truman was not entirely inexperienced in that area, either: he was chairman of the Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense. As to the formation of his beliefs, Harry Truman took an early interest in history, participated in World War I in Europe, and his formative years from a political point of view coincided with the failure of the League of Nations and the aggressions committed by the Central Powers in the early thirties. He was a strong supporter of FDR and the New Deal, but he was coming from an entirely different background, a Missouri middle class family.

The president had always been strongly anti-communist, as had been most of his top colleagues. We may group the major
politicians into three categories, as far as their attitudes toward foreign policy were concerned. In the first group we can place those who ever made pronouncements that could be interpreted as shows of a compromising stance in relation to the Soviet Union.

We have cited remarks of Secretary Stimson, General Marshall (pp. 58-59), General Eisenhower (p. 61). Their opinions, however, were prompted by a concern about the war effort, or were pronounced shortly after the war when cooperation between America and the Soviet Union had taken place. Another stance, voiced by Secretary Ickes (p. 61), was typical of those who were either not experts on foreign issues, or had served in the government during the Depression when as a matter of course those countries the governments of which allegedly had assumed a greater responsibility for the social welfare of their citizens had been looked upon with sympathy. A third pattern of attitude, similar to that represented by Joseph Davies and Harry Hopkins (pp. 61-62), characterized diplomats during the war who had been elevated by FDR as part of his strategy of suppressing experts on Russia who might have jeopardized the operation of the Grand Alliance.

A very important factor that was clearly friendly towards the Soviet Union was the American public. President Roosevelt’s efforts after the US entered the war to push the real face of communism to the background were very
successful. Russia was not perceived as a country that was just as dangerous as Nazi Germany, and the public was certainly not ready to substitute Uncle Joe for Hitler, at least not before the end of 1946. But, as always, public opinion shifted back to its original position after the media image of the Soviet Union changed.

The only notable political character who was a leftist-isolationist and an apologist of communism was Henry Wallace accompanied by his Progressive followers inside and outside the Congress. According to Truman, Wallace was the best Secretary of Agriculture the United States had ever had. However, his performance at the end of his career diverted the attention of the contemporary and subsequent generations from his great past accomplishments. The former vice president did not start out as a communist sympathizer. He was a Cabinet member of the most powerful capitalist country, responsible for important economic policies. We have sufficient grounds to assume that his foreign policy position throughout 1946 and at the beginning of 1947 was based on a genuine concern about the increasingly unstable world order, and he was occupied with a quest for resolving the problem of atomic weapons.

As opposed to this, as he became more and more active asserting his ideas both in the domestic and the international arena, he could no longer maintain an unaffiliated position towards those whose cause he was
defending. He found himself entirely isolated in the Democratic Party, and as a matter of course was placed both by himself and by the public to the left edge of the political stage. He could not avoid an actual involvement with communists. As we have referred to it earlier, his political opponents did not fail to point out his links with the communists during the 1948 presidential campaign.

We may claim that all the other significant personalities who were in positions where they could affect foreign policy decisions (Acheson, Bohlen, Byrnes, Clifford, Harriman, Kennan, Vandenberg, Taft, Dulles, Eaton, Churchill), were consistently anti-communist and opposed any appeasement of the Soviets during the period under discussion here.

Of these we need to emphasize the influence of Averell Harriman and Winston Churchill. The ambassador from the beginning insisted on a firm stance toward the Russians. He was the American politician who established the closest contact with Stalin and who was allowed to see the Generalissimo on a regular basis. It was characteristic of his prominence that the president selected him as the new Secretary of Commerce after the firing of Henry Wallace.

If there was anyone who favored a tougher approach in relation to the Soviet Union than Harriman, it was the British Prime Minister. Although both Roosevelt and Truman held Churchill in high esteem, they had reservations about Britain as a colonial empire and Churchill as an old
fashioned conservative leader. Truman was disturbed by Churchill’s demands to retain the territories occupied by American and British troops at the end of the war, and to hold the Potsdam Conference early; nevertheless he did not yield to the Soviets in San Francisco and Potsdam, partly at Churchill’s influence.

There were two major incidents between 1945 and 1948 that took place between leading personalities over foreign policy issues. The first one started in October 1945 at the London Foreign Ministers’ Conference and culminated after the Moscow meeting in December, but it had its roots back in the 1944 presidential elections. As we have analyzed it earlier, Byrnes blamed Truman for not getting the vice presidency. This episode made him assume after being appointed Secretary of State that he was entitled to an independent position in the Cabinet, and started to engage in adventurous negotiations at the above two conferences. Truman was furious because of not having been consulted, because he did not agree with the deals Byrnes had made and, ultimately, because he felt the Secretary did not accept his supremacy in decision making. In this manner it is clear that Byrnes’s attempts were motivated by his intention to assert himself as an equal authority in foreign affairs rather than by a special inclination to appease the Russians.

The Wallace episode did not involve personal conflicts. Unlike the Byrnes affair, it was based on serious policy
differences that could not be resolved by a simple replacement. After Wallace left the Cabinet, Truman no longer had any control over him. Wallace took advantage of his image as a prominent New Dealer and former vice president relying on the residual public sympathy towards the Soviet Union and the growing concern about the unstable world order. Being highly unpopular and lacking extensive public opinion data, Truman had to take Wallace very seriously, especially after the former secretary announced his bid for the presidency. It was necessary for Truman to re-establish himself as the protector of the common man, otherwise the non-Republican vote would have been more evenly split between the Democrats and the Progressives, resulting in an automatic Republican victory, as it was prognosticated by the Elsey and Clifford memos noted earlier. The president as part of a large-scale strategy vetoed the Taft-Hartley bill and prepared his radical civil rights proposal to counterbalance the Progressive influence.

In foreign policy, the main area of their competition, a clear example of Wallace’s presence was Truman’s attempt to find accommodation with the Soviets through a direct, secret negotiation, but the idea was dropped when Marshall threatened to quit after he had been informed about the planned mission of Chief Justice Fred Vinson to Stalin.145

145 Ferrell, pp. 250-257.
The second factor that determines the degree of regime fragmentation is the presence of different institutions which strive to assert their power in the face of or beside the others.

In the Soviet Union, as in most totalitarian countries, there was no separation of power. Theoretically, there existed a legislative body, an executive, and courts, but in practice there was only one power center that had a say in politics. The Party was an all-encompassing organization that controlled every sphere of the society. Both at the national and the local levels, decisions were made by the Party leaders and were given out as commands to the different institutions. Officials like government members or city council chairpersons functioned as mere tools in the hands of the Party. They had no right to initiate policies; the plans described by the Party had to be carried out without questioning.

As we have pointed out however, in addition to the totalitarian pattern of policymaking there were other aspects at work, as well. Although Party orders were expected to be implemented servilely, the leaders were aware how important the efficient operation of the bureaucracy was. Keeping the largest country in the world under total control required an immense and at least to some extent organized army of officials. For this reason, there was an unspoken but unambiguous trade-off between the Party and the
bureaucracy that insured that the interests of both sides were represented in policy.

Furthermore, as chains of personal subordinances similar to feudal hierarchies evolved, decisions came about as results of compromises between the individual members of these chains. On the one hand, in order for officials to get opportunities for promotion, they needed to identify themselves with the positions of their superiors. On the other hand, leaders were compelled to please their subordinates to build up power bases that enabled them to assert themselves in the face of other factions.

The other factors that participated in the largely informal Soviet policy making process were also characteristic of totalitarian regimes. First, it was the enormous military establishment that ultimately made the Soviet Union a superpower. Compared to other sectors of the country, it was relatively developed, although its main strength was given to it by the gigantic standing army. In budgetary and other key political decision the interests of the army always represented top priority. Second, a repressive society is unthinkable without a mighty secret police. The NKVD, later MVD or KGB, stood entirely above the law, and in some instances even over the Party. Its power permeated frontiers, and helped keep the orbit countries obedient. Third, the Soviet Union was one of the most industrialized countries in the world. The smooth
maintenance of the military required a full-speed industrial production. For this reason, heavy industry always took precedence over the other sectors of the economy.

On the basis of the above observations we may claim that the Soviet regime was fragmented to a small degree in the absence of competing political parties. The fragmentation that existed originated from the rival interest groups and institutions, but their influence was always subordinated to the ultimate supremacy of the Party, which maintained a public posture of agreement.

In the United States there are two basic institutions that share responsibility for making and implementing decisions: the president and the Congress. Originating from the division of power which is the ultimate characteristic of democracies, political decisions are made by the executive and the legislative branch in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution which is supervised by the Supreme Court. Since in the United States the president is the prime diplomat and the chief negotiator, American foreign policy is fundamentally formulated by the executive branch. However, resulting from the treaty approving, budgetary, and war declaring responsibilities of the Congress, successful foreign policy cannot be pursued without cooperation with the legislative body.  

146 McCormick, pp. 265-344.
The first four postwar years of politics in the United States can clearly be divided into two periods. Concerning foreign developments the years 1945 and 1946 passed in the belief that the successful establishment of the United Nations would eventually create the possibility for cooperation among the great powers and a stable, democratic world order would be achieved. However, by the end of 1946, because of the Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe and the futility and atmosphere of the negotiations, President Truman was impelled to institute a bottom-up change in the basic American foreign policy tactics. Throughout 1947 and 1948, gaining the support of the Congress, his administration laid the groundwork for an unparalleled break with the isolationist warnings of President Washington, that reached its climax on April 4, 1949, when the United States, for the first time in its history, became the member of a peacetime entangling military alliance.

The division of Truman's first term into two parts can be applied to domestic politics, as well, and the applicability is not accidental. Because in the Seventy Ninth Congress the Democratic Party enjoyed a majority, and significant foreign policy decisions requiring Congressional authorization were not made, the legislative branch did not play a central role in foreign policy during 1945 and 1946. These two years were taken up by the long and generally fruitless attempts to save the East-West cooperation, and formulate a novel
approach to the changed world within the administration. Similarly to the leading Soviet politicians who basically saw no possibility for an unaltered Soviet-American alliance, the overwhelming majority of President Truman’s advisors opposed the continuation of Roosevelt’s wartime appeasing tactics. The year 1947 brought not only the embodiment of the previous years’ speculations, but also the Eightieth Congress with a strong Republican majority. These two simultaneous changes elevated the Congress to occupy a more influential stance on foreign policy. This was also the period when the tacit alliance of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans became tangible for the first time.

This situation was not to favor an effective foreign policy formation. The program of the GOP laid little emphasis on foreign issues. The Republicans were strongly anti-communist and internationalist, but unwilling to devote the taxpayers’ money to ventures abroad. To press the major legislation in the foreign policy area through Congress the president was compelled to exaggerate the communist threat. Those proposals that lacked the vehement anti-communist potential got often stuck in the House.

However, the attitude of the Congress was not always totally uncompromising. The leader of congressional Republicans, Robert Taft conceded the number one position on foreign issues to Senator Arthur Vandenberg in exchange for the latter’s support in the domestic field. The majority of
the Republican representatives rallied behind the bipartisanship of Vandenberg and Congressman Eaton, and Congress in close cooperation with the President created the foundations of the American foreign policy that was followed throughout the Cold War.
As a final conclusion we may claim that internal conditions did constrain foreign policy both in the Soviet Union and the United States. Our case studies have provided examples for the interrelation of these spheres and demonstrated the differences prevalent in totalitarian and democratic regimes in this respect.

The totalitarian Soviet regime was relatively stable, the top leadership had been in power practically for a quarter of a century, and thanks to the great purges of the thirties "reactionary" elements had been removed from the society. Accountability was not a factor in Soviet politics and the secret police served as a safety valve in case the previous components broke down.

Regime fragmentation was low; the power of Yosif Stalin was one of the most pervasive in history. A strict hierarchy and long-serving "sacred cows" ensured that the state of affairs was not shaken up from below. Furthermore, the relatively effective operation of an immense bureaucracy and the absence of the separation of power and political competition further decreased fragmentation.

Factors that increased vulnerability and added to regime fragmentation were few in the Soviet Union in the late forties. The most important ones were the effects of the war
that were possibly the most devastating exactly in this country. Despite the relatively monolithic character of the communist leadership, several patterns of policymaking existed that involved not only the tyrannic commands of Stalin but also trade-offs within the bureaucracy and in and around the Politburo. Fragmentation from an institutional point of view emerged from the general lack of legitimacy in the political sphere and the existence of rival power groups with parochial interests, although the influence of these was always subordinated to the supremacy of the Party.

In the United States internal conditions and foreign policy were more closely intertwined. In our discussion we have sorted out a number of regime vulnerability and fragmentation factors. Individual regimes were relatively vulnerable politically. They were compelled to compete for power periodically with other participants of politics and could be removed from power if circumstances changed. As a result of the continuous media attention the information flow between the government and the governed was two-directional. In the immediate postwar years the party of government was losing power and was divided internally largely as a result of the death of its long-time leader. The war not only made America the number one power in the world but also caused several serious difficulties that were almost as hard to tackle as the war itself.
The character of the American political life and the nature of the hierarchy made the relationship of leading personalities to each other and to the affairs of the country different from that in the Soviet Union. Issues and decisions were discussed publicly, and a greater number of individuals and institutions could affect their outcomes. Political debates were normal phenomena and could involve problems of cardinal significance.

These circumstances, however, did not render American foreign policy arbitrary or impossible to calculate. Individual regimes were vulnerable but constitutional democracy was not. There were a great number of participants that filtered foreign policy decisions but the general legitimacy made these decisions authentic and orderly.

We have seen that there were more vulnerability factors in the United States and the American political regime was more fragmented than the Soviet one in the late nineteen-forties. According to our previous premises this means that American foreign policy was more constrained by internal factors than Soviet foreign policy. This claim, supposedly, has a dual consequence. It is more difficult to unfold the real motives behind Soviet foreign policy behavior and to infer from foreign policy decisions to domestic developments and vice versa, whereas students of the two spheres of American politics can mutually contribute to and draw from each other’s research.
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