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LEIBNIZ: UNITY, THOUGHT, AND BEING
Abstract
This work is an investigation of Leibniz's concern with the problems of unity. His concern with these problems is understood to be central to his metaphysics. His distinction between the unity of the individual as true unity and the unity of the general as a unity only of thought is seen to decisively condition his treatment of the problem of the composition of the continuum, his determination of the being space and time, of number, quality, and relation, and his effort to introduce the scholastic doctrine of substantial forms into post Cartesian thought. The results of our investigation are: (1)an exposition of Leibniz's division of unity into the modes of unity through itself and unity through aggregation; (2)a determination of what unity is in the case of each of its modes; and (3)an exposition of the relatedness of unity in each of its modes to being. Although the importance of the concept of unity for Leibniz is often noted by his commentators, neither his analysis of this concept nor the systematic implications of that analysis have been successfully understood. We show that the interpretations of Leibniz's doctrine to be found in Betrand Russell's Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz and G. H. R. Parkinson Logic and Reality in Leibniz's Philosophy cannot be maintained. In the case of Russell's Critical Exposition, the failure of his interpretation of this doctrine is shown to invalidate the main critical assertion of his work; namely, that Leibniz maintained an inconsistent set of premisses. The central point of our interpretation is that Leibniz's concept of substantial unity is precisely the concept of transcendental unity to be found in that main current of scholastic thought whose foremost representative was Thomas Aquinas. The Thomistic analysis of the concept of transcendental unity is not distinctive in scholastic tradition; however, like Aquinas, Leibniz holds that the principle of individual unity is substantial form, and this doctrine was original with Aquinas. For Leibniz, the unity of a substance is the undividedness of its being. Since for him, unity is identical with being in re, substance for him is simply undividedness of being. Leibniz's concept of the unity of an aggregate is explicated as the basis of his concept of phenomenality. We show that the unity of an aggregate is the numerical oneness of the thought which, in respect of some abstract concept such as time, place, movement, and shape, thinks the many reals as singly real. This numerical oneness of thought is the being of the aggregate; what he calls a phenomene bien fonde. Finally, the suggestion is briefly investigated that the theory of transcendental being may be usefully applied in the field of interpretation theory. Since transcendental being is intermediate between subjectivity and objectivity, and it is to this category that we may assign the interpreters own historical experience of the text. Thus, an historical encounter with the text need not be regarded as constituting what is merely subjective in the interpretation even though such an encounter can have no objective reference in the work itself. Jasper's encounter with Nietzsche's Existenz in his Nietzsche interpretation and Bultmann's encounter with the kergyma of the New Testament are briefly considered along these lines.
Subject Area
Philosophy
Recommended Citation
STEINBUCH, THOMAS ANTHONY, "LEIBNIZ: UNITY, THOUGHT, AND BEING" (1981). Doctoral Dissertations Available from Proquest. AAI8118045.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI8118045