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Identity and indeterminacy
Abstract
The story of the Ship of Theseus is a familiar puzzle in the literature on change and identity. Our intuitions about identity through time seem to commit us to the truth of each of the following claims about Theseus's ship(s): (i) the Original Ship = the Rebuilt Ship (O = R); (ii) the Original Ship = the Continuous Successor Ship (O = C); and (iii) the Rebuilt Ship $\not=$ the Continuous Successor Ship (R $\not=$ C). Of course, (i) through (iii) are jointly inconsistent with the fact that identity is transitive and symmetric. I explore the possibility of solving the puzzle by claiming that at least some of the puzzle's identity claims are not true but rather vague or indeterminate in truth value. There are two main ways to explain this alleged indeterminacy, one semantic and one metaphysical. According to the Semantic Vagueness Solution one might hold that the sentences used to express the indeterminate identity claims are semantically indeterminate, in that either the singular terms flanking the '=' symbol are referentially indeterminate, or that it is indeterminate what relation is expressed by the '=' symbol itself. Either way, the Semantic Vagueness Solution is one according to which the indeterminacy is a feature not of the world, but of the language used to describe the world. Alternatively, one might hold that the identity relation itself is vague. In this case, the indeterminacy or vagueness is not a property of the language; rather it is a feature of the world itself. Objects like ships, according to the Metaphysical Vagueness Solution, are vague objects, objects with metaphysically vague identity conditions. I argue against the semantic Vagueness Solution, and defend the Metaphysical Vagueness Solution from several published criticisms (Gareth Evans's "Can There be Vague Objects?" to name one). I conclude by discussing the real problem facing the Metaphysical Vagueness Solution: if the identity relation were vague--if ships, for example, were vague objects--then we could not achieve determinate reference to them. Consequently, trying to solve the puzzle of the Ship of Theseus by appeal to such metaphysical vagueness seems ill advised.
Subject Area
Philosophy
Recommended Citation
Cowles, David Winthrop, "Identity and indeterminacy" (1991). Doctoral Dissertations Available from Proquest. AAI9207379.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI9207379