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Traditionalism and parallel distributed processing as qualitatively distinct models of the mind
Abstract
My main concern in this work is answering the question: does parallel distributed processing (PDP) as a model of the mind offer a genuine alternative to traditionalism? There has been vigorous debate within the last eight years on the subject of the relative merits of the one model over the other; however, a detailed examination of the nature of their respective differences has not been attempted. The mental realm is that realm in which causal interaction is governed by laws quantifying over representational states. Traditionalism is the thesis that the law-governed transitions between mental states are transitions between computational states. PDP is the thesis that the transitions between mental states are transitions between distributed representational states in a PDP-type system. The representational content of a distributed state is determined by the causal history of the system as a whole, and results from the changing of system parameters via learning so as to insert this state in the causal chain between the perception of some external state-of-affairs and behavior. Traditionalism and PDP are best considered not as providing a detailed picture of the causal processes involved in mental activity, but rather as providing a general framework that sets broad constraints on how such law-governed transitions proceed. I describe two aspects of qualitative distinctness that can be used even when comparing such non-specific models. The first involves examining the ontological commitment of each: assuming a realist interpretation, what must exist if traditionalism (or PDP) is a true model of the mind? If the two models make the same commitments, one may ask the further question: do the constraints imposed on the form that mental causal transitions take allow the possibility of an isomorphism between causal sequences permitted by the one model with those permitted by the other? An examination of the manner in which representational content is determined within PDP systems shows that there is no possible isomorphism. Therefore, the two models are qualitatively distinct.
Subject Area
Philosophy
Recommended Citation
Litch, Mary M, "Traditionalism and parallel distributed processing as qualitatively distinct models of the mind" (1996). Doctoral Dissertations Available from Proquest. AAI9619408.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI9619408