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Author ORCID Identifier
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4040-7289
AccessType
Open Access Dissertation
Document Type
dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Degree Program
Philosophy
Year Degree Awarded
2021
Month Degree Awarded
May
First Advisor
Hilary Kornblith
Second Advisor
Christopher Meacham
Third Advisor
Sophie Horowitz
Fourth Advisor
Seth Cable
Subject Categories
Epistemology
Abstract
This dissertation concerns whether philosophy as a discipline can, and does, produce philosophical knowledge. Specifically, this dissertation concerns several prominent arguments for philosophical skepticism. Some support philosophical skepticism by arguing that the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions to justify philosophical beliefs is illegitimate because either intuitions are not a legitimate kind of evidence or intuitions are an unreliable source of justification. Others argue that philosophical knowledge is untenable because philosophers rarely, if ever, resolve their philosophical disagreements despite spending their professional lives attempting to do so. In brief, the purpose of this dissertation is to defend philosophical knowledge from these arguments by showing that philosophical knowledge is not threatened by either intuition or disagreement skepticism.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.7275/20201463.0
Recommended Citation
Dixon, Jonathan, "Defending Philosophical Knowledge" (2021). Doctoral Dissertations. 2238.
https://doi.org/10.7275/20201463.0
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/2238